1. I think you all understand, gentlemen, that it is better to make peace on fair terms than to continue fighting. But some of you fail to see that although our political leaders have no objection to peace in the abstract, they are opposed to such measures as would lead to it, on the ground that the people would be in very grave danger of seeing the existing constitution overthrown once peace was concluded.
1. ὅτι μὲν εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι δικαίαν ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ πολεμεῖν, δοκεῖτέ μοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντες γιγνώσκειν· ὅτι δὲ οἱ ῥήτορες τῷ μὲν ὀνόματι τῆς εἰρήνης συγχωροῦσι, τοῖς δʼ ἔργοις ἀφʼ ὧν ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο ἐναντιοῦνται, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάντες αἰσθάνεσθε. λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς ἔστι δεινότατον τῷ δήμῳ, γενομένης εἰρήνης, ἡ νῦν οὖσα πολιτεία μὴ καταλυθῇ.
2. Now had the Athenian people never made peace with Sparta in the past, our lack of previous experience and the untrustworthy character of the Spartans might have justified such fears. But you have done so on a number of occasions since the establishment of the democracy; and it is therefore only logical that you should first of all consider the results which followed at the time; one must use the past as a guide to the future, gentlemen.
2. εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδεπώποτε πρότερον ὁ δῆμος ὁ [τῶν] Ἀθηναίων εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἰκότως ἂν ἐφοβούμεθα αὐτὸ διά τε τὴν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἔργου διά τε τὴν ἐκείνων ἀπιστίαν· ὅπου δὲ πολλάκις ἤδη πρότερον εἰρήνην ἐποιήσασθε δημοκρατούμενοι, πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς πρῶτον ἐκεῖνα σκέψασθαι τὰ τότε γενόμενα; χρὴ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τεκμηρίοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς πρότερον γενομένοις περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι.
3. Now take the days when we were fighting Euboea and controlled Megara, Pegae, and Troezen. We were seized with a longing for peace; and, in virtue of his being Sparta’s representative at Athens, we recalled Cimon’s son, Miltiades, who had been ostracized and was living in the Chersonese, for the one purpose of sending him to Sparta to make overtures for an armistice.
3. ἡνίκα τοίνυν ἦν μὲν ὁ πόλεμος ἡμῖν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, Μέγαρα δὲ εἴχομεν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροζῆνα, εἰρήνης ἐπεθυμήσαμεν, καὶ Μιλτιάδην τὸν Κίμωνος ὠστρακισμένον καὶ ὄντα ἐν Χερρονήσῳ κατεδεξάμεθα διʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, πρόξενον ὄντα Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅπως πέμψαιμεν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα προκηρυκευσόμενον περὶ σπονδῶν.
4. On that occasion we secured a peace of fifty years with Sparta; and both sides kept the treaty in question for thirteen. Let us consider this single instance first, gentlemen. Did the Athenian democracy ever fall during this peace? No one can show that it did. On the contrary, I will tell you how much you benefited by this peace.
4. καὶ τότε ἡμῖν εἰρήνη ἐγένετο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτη πεντήκοντα, καὶ ἐνεμείναμεν ἀμφότεροι ταύταις ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἔτη τριακαίδεκα. ἓν δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πρῶτον σκεψώμεθα. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ εἰρήνῃ ὁ δῆμος ὁ [τῶν] Ἀθηναίων ἔσθʼ ὅπου κατελύθη; οὐδεὶς ἀποδείξει. ἀγαθὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐγένετο διὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν φράσω.
5. To begin with, we fortified Peiraeus in the course of this period: secondly, we built the Long Wall to the north: then the existing fleet of old, unseaworthy triremes with which we had won Greece her independence by defeating the king of Persia and his barbarians—these existing vessels were replaced by a hundred new ones: and it was at this time that we first enrolled three hundred cavalry and purchased three hundred Scythian archers. Such were the benefits which Athens derived from the peace with Sparta, such the strength which was added thereby to the Athenian democracy.
5. πρῶτον μὲν τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἐτειχίσαμεν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, εἶτα τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος τὸ βόρειον· ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν τριήρων αἳ τότε ἡμῖν ἦσαν παλαιαὶ καὶ ἄπλοι, αἷς βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καταναυμαχήσαντες ἠλευθερώσαμεν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν νεῶν ἑκατὸν τριήρεις ἐναυπηγησάμεθα, καὶ πρῶτον τότε τριακοσίους ἱππέας κατεστησάμεθα καὶ τοξότας τριακοσίους Σκύθας ἐπριάμεθα. [καὶ] ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀγαθὰ τῇ πόλει καὶ δύναμις τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο.
6. Later we went to war on account of Aegina; and after both sides had suffered heavily, we were seized once more with a desire for peace. So a deputation of ten —among them my grandfather, Andocides — was chosen from the whole citizen body and dispatched to Sparta with unlimited powers to negotiate a peace. They arranged a thirty years’ peace with Sparta for us. That is a long period, gentlemen; yet did the democracy ever fall in the course of it? Was any party, I ask you, ever caught plotting a revolution? No one can point to an instance. In fact just the opposite happened.
6. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διʼ Αἰγινήτας εἰς πόλεμον κατέστημεν, καὶ πολλὰ κακὰ παθόντες πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσαντες ἐπεθυμήσαμεν πάλιν τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ ᾑρέθησαν δέκα ἄνδρες ἐξ Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων πρέσβεις εἰς Λακεδαίμονα περὶ εἰρήνης αὐτοκράτορες, ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἀνδοκίδης ὁ πάππος ὁ ἡμέτερος. οὗτοι ἡμῖν εἰρήνην ἐποίησαν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτη τριάκοντα. καὶ ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ ἔστιν ὅπου, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ δῆμος κατελύθη; τί δέ; πράττοντές τινες δήμου κατάλυσιν ἐλήφθησαν; οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀποδείξει. ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον·
7. The peace in question exalted the Athenian democracy; it rendered it so powerful that during the years after we gained peace we first of all deposited a thousand talents on the Acropolis and passed a law which set them apart as a state reserve; in addition to that we built a hundred triremes, and decreed that they should be kept in reserve likewise: we laid out docks, we enrolled twelve hundred cavalry and as many archers, and the Long Wall to the south was constructed. Such were the benefits which Athens derived from the peace with Sparta, such the strength which was added thereby to the Athenian democracy.
7. αὕτη γὰρ ἡ εἰρήνη τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ὑψηλὸν ἦρε καὶ κατέστησεν ἰσχυρὸν οὕτως ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔτεσιν εἰρήνην λαβόντες ἀνηνέγκαμεν χίλια τάλαντα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ νόμῳ κατεκλῄσαμεν ἐξαίρετα εἶναι τῷ δήμω, τοῦτο δὲ τριήρεις ἄλλας ἑκατὸν ἐναυπηγησάμεθα, καὶ ταύτας ἐξαιρέτους ἐψηφισάμεθα εἶναι, νεωσοίκους τε ᾠκοδομησάμεθα, χιλίους τε καὶ διακοσίους ἱππέας καὶ τοξότας τοσούτους ἑτέρους κατεστήσαμεν, καὶ τὸ τεῖχος τὸ μακρὸν τὸ νότιον ἐτειχίσθη. ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀγαθὰ τῇ πόλει καὶ δύναμις τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο.
8. Then we went to war again on account of Megara, and allowed Attica to be laid waste; but the many privations which we suffered led us to make peace once more, this time through Nicias, the son of Niceratus. As you are all aware, I imagine, this peace enabled us to deposit seven thousand talents of coined silver on the Acropolis and to acquire over three hundred ships: an annual tribute of more than twelve hundred talents was coming in: we controlled the Chersonese, Naxos, and over two-thirds of Euboea: while to mention our other settlements abroad individually would be tedious.
8. πάλιν δὲ διὰ Μεγαρέας πολεμήσαντες καὶ τὴν χώραν τμηθῆναι προέμενοι, πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν στερηθέντες αὖθις τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιησάμεθα, ἣν ἡμῖν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου κατηργάσατο. οἶμαι δʼ ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας εἰδέναι τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην ἑπτακισχίλια μὲν τάλαντα νομίσματος εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀνηνέγκαμεν, ναῦς δὲ πλείους ἢ τριακοσίας ἐκτησάμεθα, καὶ φόρος προσῄει κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν πλέον ἢ διακόσια καὶ χίλια τάλαντα, καὶ Χερρόνησόν τε εἴχομεν καὶ Νάξον καὶ Εὐβοίας πλέον ἢ τὰ δύο μέρη·
9. But in spite of all these advantages we went to war with Sparta afresh, then as now at the instigation of Argos.
9. τάς τε ἄλλας ἀποικίας καθʼ ἕκαστον διηγεῖσθαι μακρὸς ἂν εἴη λόγος. ταῦτα δʼ ἔχοντες τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάλιν κατέστημεν εἰς πόλεμον πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, πεισθέντες καὶ τότε ὑπʼ Ἀργείων.
10. Now first of all, gentlemen, call to mind what I originally said that I was setting out to show. It was, was it not, that peace has never yet caused the fall of the Athenian democracy. That has now been proved against all possible arguments to the contrary. However, I have heard some people saying before now that the result of our last peace with Sparta was the installment of the Thirty, the death of many citizens by the hemlock-cup, and the exile of others.
10. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτου ἀναμνήσθητε, τί ὑμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπεθέμην τῷ λόγῳ. ἄλλο τι ἢ τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην οὐδεπώποτε ὁ δῆμος ὁ [τῶν] Ἀθηναίων κατελύθη; οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐξελέγξει με ὡς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ. ἤδη δέ τινων ἤκουσα λεγόντων ὡς ἐκ τῆς τελευταίας εἰρήνης τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους οἵ τε τριάκοντα κατέστησαν πολλοί τε Ἀθηναίων κώνειον πιόντες ἀπέθανον, οἱ δὲ φεύγοντες ᾤχοντο.
11. Those who talk in this fashion misapprehend matters. There is a wide difference between a peace and a truce. A peace is a settlement of differences between equals: a truce is the dictation of terms to the conquered by the conquerors after victory in war, exactly as the Spartans laid down after their victory over us that we should demolish our walls, surrender our fleet, and restore our exiles.
11. ὁπόσοι οὖν ταῦτα λέγουσιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκουσιν· εἰρήνη γὰρ καὶ σπονδαὶ πολὺ διαφέρουσι σφῶν αὐτῶν. εἰρήνην μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ποιοῦνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμολογήσαντες περὶ ὧν ἂν διαφέρωνται· σπονδὰς δέ, ὅταν κρατήσωσι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ κρείττους τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐξ ἐπιταγμάτων ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμῶν κρατήσαντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπέταξαν ἡμῖν καὶ ⟨τὰ⟩ τείχη καθαιρεῖν καὶ τὰς ναῦς παραδιδόναι καὶ τοὺς φεύγοντας καταδέχεσθαι.
12. The agreement made then was a forced truce upon dictated terms: whereas today you are considering a peace. Why, look at the actual provisions of the two as they stand recorded; contrast the conditions of the truce inscribed upon the stone with the conditions on which you can make peace today. On the stone it is laid down that we shall demolish our walls: whereas under the present terms we can rebuild them. The truce allows us twelve ships: the peace as many as we like. Under the truce Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros remained in the possession of their occupants: under the peace they are to be ours. Nor is there today any obligation upon us to restore our exiles, as there was then, with the fall of the democracy as its consequence. Where is the similarity between the one and the other? Thus the general conclusion which I reach in the matter is this, gentlemen: peace means safety and power for the democracy, whereas war means its downfall. So much for that aspect of the question.
12. τότε μὲν οὖν σπονδαὶ κατʼ ἀνάγκην ἐξ ἐπιταγμάτων ἐγένοντο· νῦν δὲ περὶ εἰρήνης βουλεύεσθε. σκέψασθε δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων, ἅ τε ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ στήλῃ γέγραπται, ἐφʼ οἷς τε νῦν ἔξεστι τὴν εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ γέγραπται τὰ τείχη καθαιρεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖσδε ἔξεστιν οἰκοδομεῖν· ναῦς ἐκεῖ μὲν δώδεκα κεκτῆσθαι, νῦν δʼ ὁπόσας ἂν βουλώμεθα· Λῆμνον δὲ καὶ Ἴμβρον καὶ Σκῦρον τότε μὲν ἔχειν τοὺς ἔχοντας, νῦν δὲ ἡμετέρας εἶναι· καὶ φεύγοντας νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἐπάναγκες οὐδένα καταδέχεσθαι, τότε δʼ ἐπάναγκες, ἐξ ὧν ὁ δῆμος κατελύθη. τί ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖ; τοσοῦτον οὖν ἔγωγε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, διορίζομαι περὶ τούτων, τὴν μὲν εἰρήνην σωτηρίαν εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ καὶ δύναμιν, τὸν δὲ πόλεμον δήμου κατάλυσιν γίγνεσθαι. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ταῦτα λέγω.
13. Now it is argued by some that present circumstances oblige us to continue fighting. Let us begin, then, gentlemen, by considering exactly why we are to fight. Everyone would agree, I think, that war is justified only so long as one is either suffering a wrong oneself or supporting the cause of another who has been wronged. Now we were both suffering a wrong ourselves and also supporting the cause of the Boeotians who had been wronged. If, then, Sparta guarantees that our wrongs shall cease, and if the Boeotians have decided to allow Orchomenus its independence and make peace, why are we to continue fighting?
13. φασὶ δέ τινες ἀναγκαίως νῦν ἡμῖν ἔχειν πολεμεῖν· σκεψώμεθα οὖν πρῶτον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, διὰ τί καὶ πολεμήσωμεν. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁμολογῆσαι διὰ τάδε δεῖν πολεμεῖν, ἢ ἀδικουμένους ἢ βοηθοῦντας ἀδικουμένοις. ἡμεῖς τοίνυν αὐτοί τε ἠδικούμεθα Βοιωτοῖς τε ἀδικουμένοις ἐβοηθοῦμεν. εἰ τοίνυν ἡμῖν τέ ἐστι τοῦτο παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων, τὸ μηκέτι ἀδικεῖσθαι, Βοιωτοῖς τε δέδοκται ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ἀφεῖσιν Ὀρχομενὸν αὐτόνομον, τίνος ἕνεκα πολεμήσωμεν; ἵνα ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἐλευθέρα ᾖ;
14. To free Athens? She is free already. To be able to build ourselves walls? The peace gives us that right also. To be allowed to build new triremes, and refit and keep our old ones? That is assured us as well, since the treaty affirms the independence of each state. To recover the islands, Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros? It is expressly laid down that these shall belong to Athens.
14. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε αὐτῇ ὑπάρχει. ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἡμῖν τείχη γένηται; ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης. ἀλλʼ ἵνα τριήρεις ἐξῇ ναυπηγεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς οὔσας ἐπισκευάζειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι; καὶ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει· τὰς γὰρ πόλεις αὐτονόμους αἱ συνθῆκαι ποιοῦσιν. ἀλλʼ ὅπως τὰς νήσους κομισώμεθα, Λῆμνον καὶ Σκῦρον καὶ Ἴμβρον; οὐκοῦν διαρρήδην γέγραπται ταύτας Ἀθηναίων εἶναι.
15. Well then, is it to get back the Chersonese, our colonies, our landed property abroad, and the debts owed us? A war for their recovery needs the support of the king of Persia and our allies, and they refuse that support. Or shall I be told that we must continue fighting until we have crushed Sparta and her allies? We are not adequately equipped, in my opinion, for a campaign on such a scale; and if we are successful, what must we ourselves expect from Persia afterwards?
15. φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χερρόνησον καὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; ἀλλʼ οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθʼ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία ἕως ἂν Λακεδαιμονίους καταπολεμήσωμεν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους αὐτῶν, μέχρι τούτου δεῖ πολεμεῖν; ἀλλʼ οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν οὕτω παρεσκευάσθαι. ἐὰν δʼ ἄρα κατεργασώμεθα, τί ποτε αὐτοὶ πείσεσθαι δοκοῦμεν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὅταν ταῦτα πράξωμεν;
16. No, even if this were a justifiable ground for war, and we had sufficient money and the necessary men, we ought not to continue it. So if we have no reasons for prolonging the war, no enemy to fight, and no resources, why should we not make every effort to secure peace?
16. εἰ τοίνυν περὶ τούτου μὲν ἔδει πολεμεῖν, χρήματα δὲ ὑπῆρχεν ἡμῖν ἱκανά, τοῖς δὲ σώμασιν ἦμεν δυνατοί, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἔδει πολεμεῖν. εἰ δὲ μήτε διʼ ὅ τι μήτε ὅτοισι μήτε ἀφʼ ὅτου πολεμήσωμεν ἔστι, πῶς οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὴν εἰρήνην ποιητέον ἡμῖν;
17. Do not overlook another thing, gentlemen; you are negotiating today for the peace and independence of all Greeks alike: you are giving them all the opportunity of sharing in every advantage. Think of the circumstances in which the leading powers are ceasing hostilities. To begin with, take Sparta. When she first went to war with us and our allies, she controlled both land and sea; but the peace is leaving her mistress of neither.
17. σκέψασθε δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τόδε, ὅτι νυνὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι κοινὴν εἰρήνην καὶ ἐλευθερίαν πράττετε, καὶ μετέχειν ἅπασι πάντων ἐξουσίαν ποιεῖτε. ἐνθυμήθητε οὖν τῶν πόλεων τὰς μεγίστας, τίνι τρόπῳ τὸν πόλεμον καταλύονται. πρῶτον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους, οἵτινες ἀρχόμενοι μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις πολεμεῖν ἦρχον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, νῦν δʼ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης οὐδέτερον τούτων ὑπάρχει.
18. And she is sacrificing this supremacy, not because we forced her to do so, but in order to give the whole of Greece its independence. The Spartans have now won three battles: the first at Corinth against the full allied forces, who were left with no excuse for their defeat, save only that the Spartans, with none to aid them, fought more bravely than all the rest together; the second in Boeotia under Agesilaus, when they once more gained a similar victory; and the third at the capture of Lechaeum, against the full Argive and Corinthian forces, together with the Athenians and Boeotians present.
18. καὶ οὐχ ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζόμενοι ταῦτʼ ἀφιᾶσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος. νενικήκασι γὰρ τρὶς ἤδη μαχόμενοι, τότε μὲν ἐν Κορίνθῳ πάντας πανδημεὶ τοὺς συμμάχους παρόντας, οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες πρόφασιν οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ κρατιστεύειν μόνοι πάντων, αὖθις δʼ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς, ὅτʼ αὐτῶν Ἀγησίλαος ἡγεῖτο, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τότε τὴν νίκην ἐποιήσαντο, τρίτον δʼ ἡνίκα Λέχαιον ἔλαβον, Ἀργείους μὲν ἅπαντας καὶ Κορινθίους, ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ Βοιωτῶν τοὺς παρόντας.
19. But in spite of these amazing successes they, the victors in the field, are ready for a peace which will leave them with nothing save their own territory: they are recognizing the independence of the Greek states, and they are allowing their defeated opponents to share the freedom of the seas. Yet what terms of peace would they have gained from us, had they met with but a single defeat?
19. τοιαῦτα δʼ ἔργα ἐπιδειξάμενοι [τοῖς Ἕλλησι] τὴν εἰρήνην εἰσὶν ἕτοιμοι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντες, οἳ ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ τὴν θάλατταν κοινὴν ἐῶντες τοῖς ἡττημένοις. καίτοι ποίας τινὸς ἂν ἐκεῖνοι παρʼ ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἔτυχον, εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην ἡττήθησαν;
20. Again, what are the conditions under which Boeotia is making peace? Boeotia went to war because she refused to allow Orchomenus its independence. today, after the loss of thousands of lives, after the devastation of a large part of her territory, after heavy public and private expenditure, which is now a dead loss, after four years of fighting, Boeotia is recognizing the independence of Orchomenus and making peace, thereby rendering her sufferings useless, as by acknowledging the independence of Orchomenus at the outset she need never have gone to war at all. Those are the circumstances in which Boeotia is ceasing hostilities.
20. Βοιωτοὶ δʼ αὖ πῶς τὴν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται; οἵτινες τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἐποιήσαντο ἕνεκα Ὀρχομενοῦ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιτρέψοντες αὐτόνομον εἶναι, νῦν δὲ τεθνεώτων μὲν αὐτοῖς ἀνδρῶν τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐκ μέρους τινὸς τετμημένης, χρήματα δʼ εἰσενηνοχότες πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὧν στέρονται, πολεμήσαντες δὲ ἔτη τέτταρα, ὅμως Ὀρχομενὸν ἀφέντες αὐτόνομον τὴν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται καὶ ταῦτα μάτην πεπόνθασιν· ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐῶσιν Ὀρχομενίους αὐτονόμους εἰρήνην ἄγειν. οὗτοι δʼ αὖ τούτῳ ⟨τῷ⟩ τρόπῳ τὸν πόλεμον καταλύονται.
21. Now what are the terms available to ourselves, gentlemen? How is Sparta disposed to us? Here, if I am about to cause distress to any of you, I ask his forgiveness, as I shall be stating nothing but the facts. To begin with, when we lost our fleet on the Hellespont and were shut within our walls, what did our present allies, who were then on the Spartan side, propose to do with us? They proposed, did they not, to sell our citizens as slaves and make Attica a waste. And who was it who prevented this? The Spartans; they dissuaded the allies, and for their own part refused even to contemplate such measures.
21. ἡμῖν δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πῶς ἔξεστι τὴν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι; ποίων τινῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τυγχάνοντας; καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀχθεσθήσεται παραιτοῦμαι· ⟨τὰ⟩ γὰρ ὄντα λέξω. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡνίκα ἀπωλέσαμεν τὰς ναῦς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ καὶ τειχήρεις ἐγενόμεθα, τίνα γνώμην ἔθεντο περὶ ἡμῶν οἱ νῦν μὲν ἡμέτεροι τότε δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ὄντες σύμμαχοι; οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐρημοῦν; οἱ δὲ διακωλύσαντες ταῦτα μὴ γενέσθαι τίνες ἦσαν; οὐ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοὺς μὲν συμμάχους ἀποτρέψαντες τῆς γνώμης, αὐτοὶ δʼ οὐδʼ ἐπιχειρήσαντες διαβουλεύσασθαι περὶ τοιούτων ἔργων;
22. Later we gave them our oath, were allowed to erect the column, and accepted a truce upon dictated terms, a hardship which was welcome enough at the time. Nevertheless we then proceeded, by means of an alliance, to detach Boeotia and Corinth from Sparta, and to resume friendly relations with Argos, thereby involving Sparta in the battle of Corinth. Who, again, turned the king of Persia against Sparta? Who enabled Conon to fight the engagement at sea which lost her her maritime supremacy?
22. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ὅρκους ὀμόσαντες αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν στήλην εὑρόμενοι ⟨παρʼ⟩ αὐτῶν στῆσαι, κακὸν ἀγαπητὸν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, σπονδὰς ἤγομεν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς. εἶτα δὲ συμμαχίαν ποιησάμενοι Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Κορινθίους ἀποστήσαντες αὐτῶν, Ἀργείους δὲ ἀγαγόντες εἰς τὴν ποτὲ φιλίαν, αἴτιοι τῆς ἐν Κορίνθῳ μάχης ἐγενόμεθα αὐτοῖς. τίνες δὲ βασιλέα πολέμιον αὐτοῖς ἐποίησαν, καὶ Κόνωνι τὴν ναυμαχίαν παρεσκεύασαν, διʼ ἣν ἀπώλεσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης;
23. Yet in spite of all that she has suffered at our hands, she agrees to the same concessions as those made us by our allies, and offers us our walls, our fleet, and our islands. What terms of peace do you expect representatives to bring you back, may I ask? Can they do better than obtain the same advantages from the enemy as our friends are offering us, the very advantages which we went to war to secure for Athens? Whereas others make peace at a loss to themselves, we gain precisely what we most want.
23. ὅμως τοίνυν ταῦτα πεπονθότες ὑφʼ ἡμῶν συγχωροῦσι ταὐτὰ ἅπερ οἱ σύμμαχοι, καὶ διδόασιν ἡμῖν τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰς νήσους ἡμῶν εἶναι. ποίαν τίνʼ οὖν χρὴ εἰρήνην πρεσβεύοντας ἥκειν; οὐ ταὐτὰ παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων εὑρομένους ἅπερ οἱ φίλοι διδόασι, καὶ διʼ ἅπερ ἠρξάμεθα πολεμεῖν, ἵνα ἡμῶν γένηται τῇ πόλει ταῦτα; οἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλοι τὴν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀφιέντες, ἡμεῖς δὲ προσλαμβάνοντες αὐτὰ ὧν μάλιστα δεόμεθα.
24. What, then, remains to be considered? Corinth, and the appeal which Argos is making to us. First as to Corinth. I should like to be informed of the value of Corinth to us, if Boeotia leaves our ranks and makes peace with Sparta. Recall the day on which we concluded our alliance with Boeotia, gentlemen:
24. τί οὖν ἐστιν ὑπόλοιπον περὶ ὅτου δεῖ βουλεύεσθαι; περὶ Κορίνθου καὶ περὶ ὧν [ἂν] ἡμᾶς Ἀργεῖοι προκαλοῦνται. πρῶτον μὲν περὶ Κορίνθου διδαξάτω μέ τις, Βοιωτῶν μὴ συμπολεμούντων, εἰρήνην δὲ ποιουμένων πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, τίνος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἀξία Κόρινθος.
25. Recall the assumption on which we acted. We imagined, did we not, that once Boeotia joined forces with us we could face the whole world. Yet here we are considering how we can continue fighting Sparta without her help, now that she is making peace.
25. ἀναμνήσθητε γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ὅτε Βοιωτοῖς τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐποιούμεθα, τίνα γνώμην ἔχοντες ταῦτα ἐπράττομεν. οὐχ ὡς ἱκανὴν οὖσαν τὴν Βοιωτῶν δύναμιν μεθʼ ἡμῶν γενομένην κοινῇ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀμύνασθαι; νῦν δὲ βουλευόμεθα, Βοιωτῶν εἰρήνην ποιουμένων πῶς δυνατοὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις πολεμεῖν ἐσμεν ἄνευ Βοιωτῶν.
26. “Perfectly well,” say some, “provided that we protect Corinth and are allied with Argos.” But if Sparta attacks Argos, shall we go to her help or not? For we shall assuredly have no choice but to follow the one course or the other. Yet should we withhold our help, we are left without a single argument wherewith to justify ourselves or to show that Argos has not the right to act as she pleases. On the other hand, should we give her our aid, is not a conflict with Sparta inevitable? And to what end? To enable us to lose our own territory as well as that of Corinth in the event of defeat, and to secure Corinth for Argos in the event of victory. Will not that prove to be our object in fighting?
26. ναί, φασί τινες, ἂν Κόρινθόν τε φυλάττωμεν καὶ συμμάχους ἔχωμεν Ἀργείους. ἰόντων δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς Ἄργος πότερον βοηθήσομεν αὐτοῖς ἢ οὔ; πολλὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ὁπότερον τούτων ἑλέσθαι. μὴ βοηθούντων μὲν οὖν ἡμῶν οὐδὲ λόγος ὑπολείπεται μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν Ἀργείους ὁποῖον ἄν τι βούλωνται δικαίως· βοηθούντων δὲ ἡμῶν εἰς Ἄργος οὐχ ἕτοιμον μάχεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίοις; ἵνα ἡμῖν τί γένηται; ἵνα ἡττώμενοι μὲν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν χώραν ἀπολέσωμεν πρὸς τῇ Κορινθίων, νικήσαντες δὲ τὴν Κορινθίων Ἀργείων ποιήσωμεν. οὐχ ἕνεκα τούτων πολεμήσομεν;
27. Now let us examine the Argive proposals in their turn. Argos urges us to join Corinth and herself in maintaining the war; yet in virtue of a private peace which she has negotiated, she has withdrawn her own territory from the field of hostilities. She forbids us to place the least trust in Sparta, although all our allies are joining us in making peace; yet she admits that Sparta’s treaty with herself, which was made without any such support, has been faithfully observed. Again, Argos calls her own peace traditional, but forbids the other Greeks to secure a traditional peace for themselves: the reason being that she expects to annex Corinth by prolonging the war, and after gaining control of the state which has always controlled her, she hopes to extend her influence over her partners in victory as well.
27. σκεψώμεθα δὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείων λόγους. κελεύουσι γὰρ ἡμᾶς κοινῇ μετὰ σφῶν καὶ μετὰ Κορινθίων πολεμεῖν, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἰδίᾳ εἰρήνην ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. καὶ μετὰ μὲν πάντων τῶν συμμάχων τὴν εἰρήνην ποιουμένους οὐκ ἐῶσιν ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν πιστεύειν Λακεδαιμονίοις· ἃ δὲ πρὸς τούτους μόνους ἐκεῖνοι συνέθεντο, ταῦτα δʼ οὐδεπώποτʼ αὐτούς φασι παραβῆναι. πατρίαν τε εἰρήνην ὀνομάζοντες ᾗ χρῶνται, τοῖς [δὲ] ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οὐκ ἐῶσι πατρίαν γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ πολέμου χρονισθέντος Κόρινθον ἑλεῖν προσδοκῶσι, κρατήσαντες δὲ τούτων ὑφʼ ὧν ἀεὶ κρατοῦνται, καὶ τοὺς συννικῶντας ἐλπίζουσι παραστήσεσθαι.
28. Such are the prospects to which we are committed; and we have a choice between two alternatives, that of joining Argos in fighting Sparta, and that of joining Boeotia in making common peace with her. Now what alarms me above all else, gentlemen, is our old, old fault of invariably abandoning powerful friends in preference for weak, and of going to war for the sake of others when, as far as we ourselves are concerned, we could perfectly well remain at peace.
28. τοιούτων δʼ ἐλπίδων μετασχόντας ἡμᾶς δεῖ δυοῖν θάτερον ἑλέσθαι, ἢ πολεμεῖν μετὰ Ἀργείων Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ μετὰ Βοιωτῶν κοινῇ τὴν εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνο δέδοικα μάλιστα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ εἰθισμένον κακόν, ὅτι τοὺς κρείττους φίλους ἀφιέντες ἀεὶ τοὺς ἥττους αἱρούμεθα, καὶ πόλεμον ποιούμεθα διʼ ἑτέρους, ἐξὸν διʼ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰρήνην ἄγειν·
29. Thus—and it is only by calling the past to mind that one can properly determine policy—we began by making a truce with the Great King and establishing a permanent accord with him, thanks to the diplomacy of my mother’s brother, Epilycus, the son of Teisander. But later the king’s runaway slave, Amorges, induced us to discard the powerful support of his master as worthless. We chose instead what we imagined to be a more advantageous understanding with Amorges himself. The king in his anger replied by allying himself with Sparta, and furnished her with five thousand talents with which to prosecute the war; nor was he satisfied until he had overthrown our empire. That is one instance of such policy.
29. οἵτινες πρῶτον μὲν βασιλεῖ τῷ μεγάλῳ — χρὴ γὰρ ἀναμνησθέντας τὰ γεγενημένα καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι — σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι καὶ συνθέμενοι φιλίαν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, ἃ ἡμῖν ἐπρέσβευσεν Ἐπίλυκος Τεισάνδρου, τῆς μητρὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀδελφός, ⟨μετὰ⟩ ταῦτα Ἀμόργῃ πειθόμενοι τῷ δούλῳ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ φυγάδι τὴν μὲν βασιλέως δύναμιν ἀπεβαλόμεθα ὡς οὐδενὸς οὖσαν ἀξίαν, τὴν δὲ Ἀμόργου φιλίαν εἱλόμεθα, κρείττω νομίσαντες εἶναι· ἀνθʼ ὧν βασιλεὺς ὀργισθεὶς ἡμῖν, σύμμαχος γενόμενος Λακεδαιμονίοις, παρέσχεν αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον πεντακισχίλια τάλαντα, ἕως κατέλυσεν ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν. ἓν μὲν βούλευμα τοιοῦτον ἐβουλευσάμεθα·
30. Again, an urgent request came to us from Syracuse; she was ready to end our differences by a pact of friendship, to end war by peace; and she pointed out the advantages of an alliance with herself, if only we would consent to it, over those of the existing alliance with Segesta and Catana. But once more we chose war instead of peace, Segesta instead of Syracuse; instead of staying at home as the allies of Syracuse, we chose to send an armament to Sicily. The result was the loss of a large part of the Athenian and allied forces, the bravest being the first to fall; a reckless waste of ships, money, and resources: and the return of the survivors in disgrace.
30. Συρακόσιοι δʼ ὅτε ἦλθον ἡμῶν δεόμενοι, φιλότητα μὲν ἀντὶ διαφορᾶς ἐθέλοντες εἰρήνην δʼ ἀντὶ πολέμου ποιεῖσθαι, τήν τε συμμαχίαν ἀποδεικνύντες ὅσῳ κρείττων ἡ σφετέρα εἴη τῆς Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Καταναίων, εἰ βουλοίμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς τοίνυν εἱλόμεθα καὶ τότε πόλεμον μὲν ἀντὶ εἰρήνης, Ἐγεσταίους δὲ ἀντὶ Συρακοσίων, στρατεύεσθαι δʼ εἰς Σικελίαν ἀντὶ τοῦ μένοντες οἴκοι συμμάχους ἔχειν Συρακοσίους· ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσαντες ἀριστίνδην καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, πολλὰς δὲ ναῦς καὶ χρήματα καὶ δύναμιν ἀποβαλόντες, αἰσχρῶς διεκομίσθησαν οἱ σωθέντες αὐτῶν.
31. Later, the same Argives who are here today to persuade us to continue the war, induced us to arouse Sparta’s anger by making a naval descent upon Laconia while at peace with her, an act which was responsible for endless disasters; from it sprang a war which ended with our being forced to demolish our walls, to surrender our fleet, and to restore our exiles. Yet what help did we receive in our misfortunes from Argos who had drawn us into the war? What danger did she brave for Athens?
31. ὕστερον δʼ ὑπʼ Ἀργείων ἐπείσθημεν, οἵπερ νῦν ἥκουσι πείθοντες πολεμεῖν, πλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν Λακωνικὴν εἰρήνης ἡμῖν οὔσης πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐντεῖναι ⟨ἐκείνων⟩ τὸν θυμόν, ἀρχὴν πολλῶν κακῶν· ἐξ οὗ πολεμήσαντες ἠναγκάσθημεν τὰ τείχη κατασκάπτειν καὶ τὰς ναῦς παραδιδόναι καὶ τοὺς φεύγοντας καταδέχεσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ πασχόντων ἡμῶν οἱ πείσαντες ἡμᾶς πολεμεῖν Ἀργεῖοι τίνα ὠφέλειαν παρέσχον ἡμῖν; τίνα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑπὲρ [τῶν] Ἀθηναίων ἐποιήσαντο;
32. Today, then, it remains for us to choose war instead of peace once again, the Argive instead of the Boeotian alliance, the present masters of Corinth instead of Sparta. Gentlemen, I trust that no one will induce us to choose such a course. The examples furnished by our past mistakes are enough to prevent men of sense from repeating them.
32. νῦν οὖν τοῦτο ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν, πόλεμον μὲν ἑλέσθαι καὶ νῦν ἀντʼ εἰρήνης, τὴν δὲ συμμαχίαν τὴν Ἀργείων ἀντὶ τῆς Βοιωτῶν, Κορινθίων δὲ τοὺς νῦν ἔχοντας τὴν πόλιν ἀντὶ Λακεδαιμονίων. μὴ δῆτα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ταῦτα πείσῃ· τὰ γὰρ παραδείγματα τὰ γεγενημένα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἱκανὰ τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥστε μηκέτι ἁμαρτάνειν.
33. A number of you are extremely anxious to see peace concluded as quickly as possible. In fact, according to those in question, the forty days allowed you for consideration are a waste of time and a concession which we delegates have done wrong to obtain, as the one object of our being sent to Sparta with full powers was to avoid any further reference of the matter to the Assembly. Our desire to secure our position by such a reference they call nervousness, since no one, they argue, has ever yet saved the Athenian people by open persuasion: measures for its good must be secret or disguised.
33. εἰσὶ δέ τινες ὑμῶν οἳ τοσαύτην ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσιν εἰρήνην ὡς τάχιστα γενέσθαι· φασὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰς τετταράκονθʼ ἡμέρας ἐν αἷς ὑμῖν ἔξεστι βουλεύεσθαι περίεργον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἀδικεῖν ἡμᾶς· αὐτοκράτορας γὰρ πεμφθῆναι εἰς Λακεδαίμονα διὰ ταῦθʼ, ἵνα μὴ πάλιν ἐπαναφέρωμεν. τήν τε ἀσφάλειαν ἡμῶν τῆς ἐπαναφορᾶς δέος ὀνομάζουσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ πείσας ἔσῳσεν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λαθόντας ἢ ἐξαπατήσαντας αὐτὸν εὖ ποιῆσαι.
34. Now I cannot praise this reasoning. I admit, gentlemen, that in time of war a patriotic and experienced general should employ secrecy or deception in leading the majority of men into danger; but when a peace to include the entire nation is being negotiated, an agreement to which sworn assent will be given and which will be recorded on public monuments, I deny that the negotiators should practise secrecy or deception. I maintain that we deserve praise much more than blame, if, in spite of our full powers of discretion, we still refer the question to you for consideration. Decisions should be reached with all the caution possible; then, once we have made our sworn compact, we should abide by it.
34. τὸν λόγον οὖν τοῦτον οὐκ ἐπαινῶ. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πολέμου μὲν ὄντος ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν τῇ πόλει τε εὔνουν εἰδότα τε ὅ τι πράττῃ, λανθάνοντα δεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐξαπατῶντα ἄγειν ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους, εἰρήνης δὲ πέρι πρεσβεύοντας κοινῆς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐφʼ οἷς ὅρκοι τε ὀμοσθήσονται στῆλαί τε σταθήσονται γεγραμμέναι, ταῦτα δὲ οὔτε λαθεῖν οὔτε ἐξαπατῆσαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν, εἰ πεμφθέντες αὐτοκράτορες ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκέψασθαι. βουλεύσασθαι μὲν οὖν ἀσφαλῶς χρὴ κατὰ δύναμιν, οἷς δʼ ἂν ὀμόσωμεν καὶ συνθώμεθα, τούτοις ἐμμένειν.
35. As delegates, we must be guided not only by your written instructions, but by your character, gentlemen. You have a way of suspecting and being dissatisfied with a thing if you can have it: while if there is anything which you have not, you airily talk as though it lay ready to your hand. If it is your duty to go to war, you want peace; if peace is arranged for you, you count up the benefits which war has brought you.
35. οὐ γὰρ μόνον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς γράμματα τὰ γεγραμμένα δεῖ βλέποντας πρεσβεύειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους. ὑμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἑτοίμων ὑμῖν ὑπονοεῖν εἰώθατε καὶ δυσχεραίνειν, τὰ δʼ οὐκ ὄντα λογοποιεῖν ὡς ἔστιν ὑμῖν ἕτοιμα· κἂν μὲν πολεμεῖν δέῃ, τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐὰν δέ τις ὑμῖν τὴν εἰρήνην πράττῃ, λογίζεσθε τὸν πόλεμον ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ὑμῖν κατηργάσατο.
36. Thus there are those who are already complaining that they cannot see the meaning of the treaty, if it is walls and ships which Athens is to recover. They are not recovering their own private property from abroad: and walls cannot feed them. This objection also requires an answer.
36. ὅπου καὶ νῦν ἤδη τινὲς λέγουσιν οὐ γιγνώσκειν τὰς διαλλαγὰς αἵτινές εἰσιν, τείχη καὶ νῆες εἰ γενήσονται τῇ πόλει· τὰ γὰρ ἴδια τὰ σφέτερʼ αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς ὑπερορίας οὐκ ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τειχῶν οὐκ εἶναι σφίσι τροφήν. ἀναγκαίως οὖν ἔχει καὶ πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἀντειπεῖν.
37. There was once a time, gentlemen, when we had no walls or fleet: but it was when we acquired them that our prosperity began. If you have a similar desire for prosperity today, then make sure of your walls and your ships. It was with them that our forefathers started; and, partly by persuasion, partly by stealth, partly by bribery, and partly by force, they won for Athens a greater empire than any other state has ever gained.
37. ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτε τείχη καὶ ναῦς οὐκ ἐκεκτήμεθα· γενομένων δὲ τούτων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποιησάμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὧν εἰ καὶ νῦν ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ταῦτα κατεργάσασθε. ταύτην δὲ λαβόντες ἀφορμὴν οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν κατηργάσαντο τῇ πόλει δύναμιν τοσαύτην ὅσην οὔπω τις ἄλλη πόλις ἐκτήσατο, τὰ μὲν πείσαντες τοὺς Ἕλληνας, τὰ δὲ λαθὸντες, τὰ δὲ πριάμενοι, τὰ δὲ βιασάμενοι.
38. Persuasion we used in arranging that Hellenotamiae should be appointed at Athens to control the joint funds, that the allied fleet should assemble in our own harbor, and that such states as possessed no ships should be supplied with them by us: stealth in building our walls unknown to the Peloponnesians: bribery in purchasing Sparta’s acquiescence: and force in crushing our enemies; thus it was that we built up an empire over the whole nation. All these successes were achieved in eighty-five years.
38. πείσαντες μὲν οὖν Ἀθήνησι ποιήσασθαι τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων Ἑλληνοταμίας, καὶ τὸν σύλλογον τῶν νεῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, ὅσαι δὲ τῶν πόλεων τριήρεις μὴ κέκτηνται, ταύταις ἡμᾶς παρέχειν· λαθόντες δὲ Πελοποννησίους τειχισάμενοι τὰ τείχη· πριάμενοι δὲ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων μὴ δοῦναι τούτων δίκην· βιασάμενοι δὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατηργασάμεθα. καὶ ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ πέντε ἡμῖν ἔτεσιν ἐγένετο.
39. Then came defeat; and not only did we lose our empire: our walls and our fleet were also seized as securities by Sparta. The fleet she confiscated, and the walls she demolished, to prevent our using them as the foundations of a fresh Athenian dominion. Thanks to the efforts of us delegates, representatives have today come from Sparta with full powers, offering to restore those securities to us, to concede us our walls and our fleet, and to recognize the islands as ours.
39. κρατηθέντες δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ τά τε ἄλλα ἀπωλέσαμεν, καὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἔλαβον ἡμῶν ἐνέχυρα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς μὲν παραλαβόντες, τὰ δὲ καθελόντες, ὅπως μὴ πάλιν ταύτην ἔχοντες ἀφορμὴν δύναμιν τῇ πόλει κατασκευάσαιμεν. πεισθέντες τοίνυν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πάρεισι νυνὶ πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες, τά τε ἐνέχυρα ἡμῖν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ ⟨τὰς⟩ ναῦς ἐῶντες κεκτῆσθαι, τάς τε νήσους ἡμετέρας εἶναι.
40. Now although we hold the very same key to prosperity as our forefathers, it is maintained by some that we must not acquiesce in this peace. Let such critics come forward in person, then, —we have ourselves made it possible for them to do so by securing a further forty days for discussion—and let them tell you on the one hand whether any of the clauses drafted is undesirable: if it is, it can be excised; on the other hand, if anyone wishes to make any additions, let him gain your approval and make them. If you accept all the clauses drafted, you can live in peace.
40. τὴν αὐτὴν τοίνυν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν λαμβάνοντας ἥνπερ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανον οἱ πρόγονοι, ταύτην οὐκ ἀκτέον φασὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τινὲς εἶναι. παριόντες οὖν αὐτοὶ διδασκόντων ὑμᾶς — ἐξουσίαν δʼ αὐτοῖς ἡμεῖς ἐποιήσαμεν, προσθέντες τετταράκοντα ἡμέρας βουλεύσασθαι — τοῦτο μὲν τῶν γεγραμμένων εἴ τι τυγχάνει μὴ καλῶς ἔχον· ἔξεστι γὰρ ἀφελεῖν· τοῦτο δʼ εἴ τίς ⟨τι⟩ προσθεῖναι βούλεται, πείσας ὑμᾶς προσγραψάτω. πᾶσί τε τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρωμένοις ἔστιν εἰρήνην ἄγειν.
41. If you are satisfied with none of them, war is inevitable. The decision rests entirely with you, gentlemen; make your choice. Argives and Corinthians are here to show you that war is preferable: while Spartans have come to gain your consent to a peace. The final word in the matter rests with you instead of with Sparta—thanks to us. Thus we delegates are making delegates of you all; every man of you who is about to raise his hand to vote is a delegate whose business is peace and war, no matter which he prefers. So bear in mind all that I have said, gentlemen: and vote for that alternative which will never cause you regrets.
41. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἀρέσκει τούτων, πολεμεῖν ἕτοιμον. καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐφʼ ὑμῖν πάντʼ ἐστίν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι· τούτων ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε ἕλεσθε. πάρεισι μὲν γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Κορίνθιοι διδάξοντες ὡς ἄμεινόν ἐστι πολεμεῖν, ἥκουσι δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πείσοντες ὑμᾶς εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι. τούτων δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος παρʼ ὑμῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις, διʼ ἡμᾶς. πρεσβευτὰς οὖν πάντας ὑμᾶς ἡμεῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ποιοῦμεν· ὁ γὰρ τὴν χεῖρα μέλλων ὑμῶν αἴρειν, οὗτος ὁ πρεσβεύων ἐστίν, ὁπότερʼ ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ, καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖν. μέμνησθε μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς ἡμετέρους λόγους, ψηφίσασθε δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν ὑμῖν μηδέποτε μεταμελήσει.