60. Now Caesar had his whole army together and so had Pompey his. They encamped opposite each other on hills in numerous redoubts. There were frequent collisions around each of these redoubts while they were making lines of circumvallation and trying to cut off each other’s supplies. In one of these fights in front of a redoubt Caesar’s men were worsted, and a centurion, of the name of Scaeva, while performing many deeds of valor, was wounded in the eye with a dart. He advanced in front of his men beckoning with his hand as though he wished to say something. When silence was obtained he called out to one of Pompey’s centurions, who was likewise distinguished for bravery, “Save one of your equals, save your friend, send somebody to lead me by the hand, for I am wounded.” Two soldiers advanced to him thinking that he was a deserter. One of these he killed before the stratagem was discovered and he cut off the shoulder of the other. This he did because he despaired of saving himself and his redoubt. His men, moved by shame at this act of self-devotion, rushed forward and saved the redoubt. Minucius, the commander of the post, also suffered severely. It is said that he received 120 missiles on his shield, was wounded six times, and, like Scaeva, lost an eye. Caesar honored them both with many military gifts. A certain man of Dyrrachium having offered to betray the town to him, Caesar went by agreement with a small force by night to the gates at the temple of Artemis.... The same winter Pompey’s father-in-law (Scipio) advanced with another army from Syria. Caesar’s general, Gaius Calvisius, had an engagement with him in Macedonia, was beaten, and lost a whole legion except 800 men.
60. καὶ τῷ Καίσαρι σύμπας ὁ στρατὸς ἤδη παρῆν, παρῆν δὲ καὶ Πομπηίῳ. καὶ ἀντεστρατοπέδευον ἀλλήλοις ἐπὶ λόφων ἐν φρουρίοις πολλοῖς, πεῖραί τε ἦσαν περὶ ἕκαστον φρούριον πυκναὶ περιταφρευόντων καὶ περιτειχιζόντων ἀλλήλους καὶ γιγνομένων ὁμοῦ καὶ ποιούντων ἐν ἀπόροις. ἐν δὲ ταῖσδε ταῖς πείραις περί τι φρούριον ἡττωμένου τοῦ Καίσαρος στρατοῦ λοχαγός, ᾧ Σκεῦας ὄνομα ἦν, πολλὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ δρῶν ἐς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐτρώθη βέλει καὶ προπηδήσας κατέσεισεν ὡς εἰπεῖν τι βουλόμενος. σιωπῆς δʼ αὐτῷ γενομένης, Πομπηίου λοχαγὸν ἐπὶ ἀνδρίᾳ γνώριμον ἐκάλει· σῷζε τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, σῷζε τὸν φίλον καὶ πέμπε μοι τοὺς χειραγωγήσοντας, ἐπεὶ τέτρωμαι. προσδραμόντων δʼ ὡς αὐτομολοῦντι δύο ἀνδρῶν, τὸν μὲν ἔφθασε κτείνας, τοῦ δὲ τὸν ὦμον ἀπέκοψε. καὶ ὁ μὲν τάδε ἔπρασσεν ἀπογιγνώσκων ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ φρουρίου. τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις αἰδὼς ἐπὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι καὶ ὁρμὴ προσέπιπτε, καὶ τὸ φρούριον περιεσώθη, πολλὰ καὶ τοῦ φρουράρχου Μινουκίου παθόντος, ᾧ γέ φασι τὴν μὲν ἀσπίδα ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσιν ἀναδέξασθαι βέλη, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἓξ τραύματα καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὁμοίως ἐκκοπῆναι. τούτους μὲν δὴ Καῖσαρ ἀριστείοις πολλοῖς ἐτίμησεν, αὐτὸς δʼ, ἐκ Δυρραχίου τινὸς αὐτῷ πρασσομένης προδοσίας, ἧκε μέν, ὡς συνέκειτο, νυκτὸς σὺν ὀλίγοις ἐπὶ πύλας καὶ ἱερὸν Ἀρτέμιδος … τοῦ δʼ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος ἄλλην στρατιὰν ἐκ Συρίας ἦγε Πομπηίῳ Σκιπίων ὁ κηδεστής· καὶ αὐτῷ Γάιος Καλουίσιος περὶ Μακεδονίαν συμβαλὼν ἡττᾶτο, καὶ τέλος ἓν αὐτοῦ κατεκόπη χωρὶς ὀκτακοσίων ἀνδρῶν.
61. As Caesar could obtain no supplies by sea, on account of Pompey’s naval superiority, his army began to suffer from hunger and was compelled to make bread from herbs. When deserters brought loaves of this kind to Pompey, thinking that he would be gladdened by the spectacle, he was not at all pleased, but said, “What kind of wild beasts are we fighting with?” Then Caesar, compelled by necessity, drew his whole army together in order to force Pompey to fight even against his will. The latter occupied a number of the redoubts that Caesar had vacated and remained quiet. Caesar was greatly vexed at this and ventured upon an extremely difficult and chimerical task; that is, to carry a line of circumvallation around the whole of Pompey’s positions from sea to sea, thinking that even if he should fail he would acquire great renown from the boldness of the enterprise. The circuit was 1200 stades. So, great was the work that Caesar undertook. Pompey built a line of countervallation. Thus they parried each other’s efforts. Nevertheless, they fought one great battle in which Pompey defeated Caesar in the most brilliant manner and pursued his men in headlong flight to his camp and took many of his standards. The eagle (the standard held in highest honor by the Romans) was saved with difficulty, the bearer having just time to throw it over the palisade to those within.
61. Καίσαρι μὲν δὴ οὐδὲν ἦν ἐκ θαλάσσης διὰ Πομπήιον ναυκρατοῦντα· ἐλίμαινεν οὖν ὁ στρατὸς αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν πόαν ἠρτοποίουν, αὐτόμολοί τἐ Πομπηίῳ τοιούσδε ἄρτους προσήνεγκαν ὡς εὐφρανοῦντες ἰδόντα. ὁ δὲ οὐχ ἥσθη, ἀλλʼ εἶπεν, οἵοις θηρίοις μαχόμεθα. ὁ μὲν δὴ Καῖσαρ ὑπʼ ἀνάγκης τὸν στρατὸν ἅπαντα συνῆγεν ὡς καὶ ἄκοντα Πομπήιον βιασόμενος ἐς μάχην· ὁ δὲ αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν φρουρίων ἐκ τοῦδε κεκενωμένα προσλαβὼν ἡσύχαζε. καὶ τῷδε μάλιστα ἀνιαθεὶς ὁ Καίσαρ ἐπετόλμησεν ἔργῳ δυο χερεῖ τε καὶ παραλόγῳ, πάντα Πομπήιου τὰ στρατόπεδα ἑνὶ τείχει περιλαβὼν ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐς θάλασσαν ἀποτειχίσαι, ὡς μεγάλην, εἰ καὶ διαμάρτοι, δόξαν οἰσόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ τολμήματι· στάδιοι γὰρ ἦσαν διακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐνεχείρει τοσῷδε ἔργῳ, Πομπήιος δʼ αὐτὸν ἀνταπετάφρευε καὶ ἀντῳκοδόμει· καὶ μάταια τὰ ἔργα ἀλλήλοις ἐποίουν. γίγνεται δʼ αὐτοῖς ἀγὼν εἷς μέγας ἐν ᾧ Πομπήιος τρέπεταί τε τοὺς Καίσαρος πάνυ λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐδίωκε φεύγοντας σημεῖά τε πολλὰ εἷλεν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸν αἰετόν, ὃ δὴ κυριώτατόν ἐστι Ῥωμαίοις, μόλις ἔφθασεν ὁ φέρων ὑπὲρ τὸ χαράκωμα τοῖς ἔνδον ῥῖψαι.
62. While this remarkable defeat was in progress Caesar brought up other troops from another quarter, but these also fell into a panic even when they beheld Pompey still far distant. Although they were already close to the gates they would neither make a stand, nor enter in good order, nor obey the commands given to them, but all fled pell-mell without shame, without orders, without reason. Caesar ran among them and with reproaches showed them that Pompey was still far distant, yet under his very eye some threw down their standards and fled, while others bent their gaze upon the ground in shame and did nothing; so great consternation had befallen them. One of the standard bearers, with his standard reversed, dared to thrust the end of it at Caesar himself, but the attendants of the latter cut him down. When the soldiers entered the camp they did not station any guards. All precautions were neglected and the fortification was left unprotected, so that it is probable that Pompey might then have captured it and brought the war to an end by that one engagement had not Labienus, misled by a god, persuaded him to pursue the fugitives instead. Moreover Pompey himself hesitated, either because he suspected a stratagem when he saw the gates unguarded or because he considered the war already decided by this battle. So he turned against those outside of the camp and made a heavy slaughter and took twenty-eight standards in the two engagements of this day, but he here missed his second opportunity to give the finishing stroke to the war. It is reported that Caesar said, “The war would have been ended to-day in the enemy’s favor if they had had a commander who knew how to make use of a victory.”
62. γενομένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς λαμπρᾶς ὁ Καῖσαρ ἑτέρωθεν ἦγεν ἄλλον στρατόν, οὕτω δή τι καὶ τοῦτον περίφοβον, ὡς Πομπηίου μακρόθεν ἐπιφανέντος μήτε στῆναι περὶ τὰς πύλας ὄντας ἤδη μήτε ἐσελθεῖν ἐν κόσμῳ μήτε πεισθῆναι τοῖς προστάγμασιν, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ τύχοιεν, ἀμεταστρεπτὶ χωρὶς αἰδοῦς καὶ παραγγέλματος καὶ λογισμοῦ. Καίσαρος δʼ αὐτοὺς περιθέοντός τε καὶ σὺν ὀνείδει μακρὰν ἔτι τὸν Πομπήιον ὄντα ἐπεδεικνύοντος, καὶ ἐφορῶντος τὰ σημεῖα ἀπερρίπτουν καὶ ἔφευγον, οἱ δὲ μόλις ὑπʼ αἰδοῦς κατέκυπτον ἐς τὴν γῆν ἄπρακτοι· τοσοῦτος αὐτοῖς τάραχος ἐνεπεπτώκει. εἷς δὲ καὶ στρέψας τὸ σημεῖον ἀνέτεινε τὸν οὐρίαχον ἐς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα. καὶ τόνδε μὲν οἱ Καίσαρος ὑπασπισταὶ κατέκοπτον, οἱ δʼ ἐσελθόντες οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τὰς φυλακὰς ἀπήντων, ἀλλὰ μεθειμένα πάντα ἦν καὶ τὸ χαράκωμα ἀφύλακτον, ὥστε αὐτὸ δοκεῖ συνεσπεσὼν ἂν τότε ὁ Πομπήιος ἑλεῖν κατὰ κράτος καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἑνὶ τῷδε ἔργῳ πάντα ἐξεργάσασθαι, εἰ μὴ Λαβιηνὸς αὐτόν, θεοῦ παράγοντος, ἐπὶ τοὺς φεύγοντας ἔπειθε τραπῆναι· καὶ αὐτὸς ἅμα ὤκνησεν, ἢ τὴν ἀφυλαξίαν τοῦ χαρακώματος ὡς ἐνέδραν ὑφορώμενος ἢ ὡς ἤδη κεκριμένου τοῦ πολέμου καταφρονήσας. ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἔξω τραπεὶς ἑτέρους τε ἔκτεινε πολλοὺς καὶ σημεῖα τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἔλαβεν ἐν ταῖς δύο μάχαις ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσιν καὶ δεύτερον τόνδε καιρὸν ἐντελοῦς ἔργου μεθῆκεν. ὃ καὶ τὸν Καίσαρά φασιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι σήμερον ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ἐξείργαστο τοῖς πολεμίοις, εἰ τὸν νικᾶν ἐπιστάμενον εἶχον.
63. Pompey sent letters to all the kings and cities magnifying his victory, and he expected that Caesar’s army would come over to him directly, conceiving that it was oppressed by hunger and cast down by defeat, and especially the officers because apprehensive of punishment for their bad conduct in the battle. But the latter, as though some god had brought them to repentance, were ashamed of their fault, and as Caesar chided them gently and granted them pardon, they became still more angry with themselves and by a surprising change demanded that they should be decimated according to the law of their country. When Caesar did not agree to this they were still more mortified, and acknowledged that he had been shamefully treated by them. They cried out that he should at least put the standard bearers to death because they themselves would never have run away unless the standards had turned in flight first. Caesar would not consent to this, but he reluctantly punished a few. So great was the zeal excited among all by his moderation that they demanded to be led against the enemy immediately. They urged him vehemently, beseeching and promising to wipe out their disgrace by a splendid victory. Of their own accord they visited each other in military order and took an oath by companies, under the eye of Caesar himself, that they would not leave the field of battle except as victors.
63. ὁ δὲ Πομπήιος τήν τε νίκην ὑπερεπαίρων ἐπέστελλε βασιλεῦσι καὶ πόλεσι πάσαις καὶ τὸν στρατὸν αὐτίκα τὸν Καίσαρος ἤλπιζε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μεταβαλεῖσθαι, λιμῷ τε πεπιεσμένον καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἥττης καταπεπληγμένον, μάλιστα δὲ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αὐτοῦ, τὸ σφέτερον ἁμάρτημα φοβουμένους. οἱ δέ, θεοῦ σφᾶς ἐπὶ μετάνοιαν ἄγοντος, τὸ ἁμάρτημα ᾐδοῦντο καὶ τοῦ Καίσαρος αὐτοῖς ἐπιμεμφομένου τε πράως καὶ συγγνώμην διδόντος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠρεθίζοντο καθʼ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐκ παραδόξου μεταβολῆς ἐκέλευον τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ διακληρώσαντα αὑτοὺς τὸ δέκατον μέρος ἀναιρεῖν. οὐ πειθομένου δὲ τοῦ Καίσαρος μᾶλλον ᾐδοῦντο καὶ συνεγίνωσκον αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀξίως ὑπὸ σφῶν ἠδικῆσθαι καὶ τοὺς φέροντας τὰ σημεῖα κτείνειν ἐπεβόων, ὡς οὐκ ἂν αὐτοί ποτε φυγόντες, εἰ μὴ τὰ σημεῖα προαπεστράφη. ὡς δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἀνασχόμενος ὀλίγους μόλις ἐκόλασεν, αὐτίκα πᾶσιν. αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν μετριοπάθειαν ὁρμὴ τοσήδε ἐνέπιπτεν, ὡς εὐθὺς αὐτὸν ἄγειν ἀξιοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους· καὶ ἐνέκειντο σφόδρα προθύμως, παρακαλοῦντές τε καὶ ὑπισχνούμενοι διορθώσεσθαι τὸ ἁμάρτημα νίκῃ καλῇ· κατά τε σφᾶς ἐπιστρεφόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἰλαδὸν κατὰ μέρη συνώμνυντο, ἐφορῶντος αὐτοῦ Καίσαρος, μὴ ἐπανήξειν ἐκ τῆς μάχης, εἰ μὴ κρατοῖεν.
64. Wherefore Caesar’s friends urged him to avail himself of the army’s repentance and eagerness promptly, but he said in the hearing of the host, that he would take a better opportunity to lead them against the enemy, and he exhorted them to be mindful of their present zeal. He privately admonished his friends that it was necessary first for the soldiers to recover from the very great alarm of their recent defeat, and for the enemy to lose something of their present high confidence. He confessed also that he had made a mistake in encamping before Dyrrachium where Pompey had abundance of supplies, whereas he ought to have drawn him to some place where he would be subject to the same scarcity as themselves. After saying this he marched directly to Apollonia and from there to Thessaly, advancing by night in order to conceal his movements. The small town of Gomphi to which he came refused to open its gates to him, and he took it by storm and allowed his army to plunder it. The soldiers, who had suffered much from hunger, stuffed themselves immoderately and drank wine to excess. The Germans among them were especially ridiculous under the influence of drink. It seems probable that Pompey might have attacked them then and gained another victory had he not disdainfully neglected a close pursuit. After seven days of rapid marching Caesar encamped near Pharsalus. It is said that among the notable calamities of Gomphi the bodies of twenty venerable men of the first rank were found lying on the floor in an apothecary’s shop, not wounded, and with goblets near them, as though they were drunk, and that one of them, like a physician, was seated in a chair and had dealt out poison to them.
64. ὅθεν αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν φίλοι παρεκάλουν ἀποχρήσασθαι τοιᾷδε μετανοίᾳ καὶ προθυμίᾳ στρατοῦ· ὁ δʼ ἐς μὲν τὸ πλῆθος εἶπεν, ὅτι μετὰ βελτιόνων καιρῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἄξει, καὶ μεμνῆσθαι τῆσδε τῆς προθυμίας διεκελεύσατο, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ἀνεδίδασκεν, ὅτι χρὴ καὶ τῶνδε προεξελεῖν τὸν φόβον τῆς ἥττης πολὺν αὐτοῖς ἐγγενόμενον καὶ τῶν πολεμίων τὸ φρόνημα ἀκμάζον προκαθελεῖν. ὡμολόγει τε μεταγιγνώσκειν πρὸς Δυρραχίῳ στρατοπεδεύσας, ἔνθα ἔστιν ἡ παρασκευὴ πᾶσα Πομπηίῳ, δέον ἀποσπᾶν αὐτὸν ἑτέρωθι ἐς ὁμοίας ἀπορίας. καὶ τάδε εἰπὼν ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν εὐθὺς μετῄει καὶ ἀπʼ αὐτῆς ἐς Θεσσαλίαν νυκτὸς ὑπεχώρει λανθάνων· Γόμφους τε πόλιν μικρὰν οὐ δεχομένην αὐτὸν ἐξεῖλεν ὑπὸ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ στρατῷ διαρπάσαι. οἱ δʼ ὡς ἐκ λιμοῦ πάντων ἐνεπίμπλαντο ἀθρόως καὶ ἐμεθύσκοντο ἀπρεπῶς, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ Γερμανοὶ γελοιότατοι κατὰ τὴν μέθην ἦσαν, ὥστε δοκεῖ καὶ τότε ἂν ὁ Πομπήιος ἐπελθὼν ἐργάσασθαί τι λαμπρόν, εἰ μὴ διώκειν ὅλως ὑπερεῖδεν ἐκ καταφρονήσεως, μέχρι Καῖσαρ ἑπτὰ συντόνως ἡμέραις ὁδεύσας ἐστρατοπέδευσε περὶ Φάρσαλον. λέγεται δʼ ἐν τοῖς Γόμφοις γενέσθαι παθήματα γενναῖα καὶ νεκροὺς τῶν ἐπιφανῶν γερόντων ἐν ἰατρείῳ φανῆναι, κυλίκων αὐτοῖς παρακειμένων ἀτρώτοις, εἴκοσι μὲν ὡς ἐκ μέθης κατακεκλιμένους ἐπὶ τὸ ἔδαφος, ἕνα δʼ ἐπὶ θρόνου παρακαθεζόμενον οἷα ἰατρόν, ὃς τὸ φάρμακον αὐτοῖς ἄρα παρέσχε.
65. After Caesar had withdrawn Pompey called a council of war, at which Afranius advised that they should make use of their naval force in which they were much superior, and being masters of the sea should harass Caesar, who was now wandering and destitute, and that Pompey himself should conduct his infantry with all haste to Italy, which was well disposed toward him and was now free from a hostile army. Having mastered it, together with Gaul and Spain, they could attack Caesar again from their own home, the seat of imperial power. Although this was the best possible advice Pompey disregarded it and allowed himself to be persuaded by those who said that Caesar’s army would presently desert to him on account of hunger, and that there was not much left of it anyway after the victory of Dyrrachium. They said it would be disgraceful to abandon the pursuit of Caesar when he was in flight, and for the victor to flee as though vanquished. Pompey sided with these advisers partly out of regard for the opinions of the eastern nations that were looking on, partly to prevent any harm befalling Lucius Scipio, who was still in Macedonia, but most of all because he thought that he ought to fight while his army was in high spirits. Accordingly he advanced and pitched his camp opposite to Caesar’s near Pharsalus, so that they were separated from each other by a distance of thirty stades.
65. Πομπήιος δʼ ἐπὶ τῇ Καίσαρος ἀναζεύξει βουλὴν προυτίθει. καὶ Ἀφρανίῳ μὲν ἐδόκει τὸ ναυτικόν, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πολὺ προῦχεν, ἐπιπέμπειν Καίσαρι καὶ ἐνοχλεῖν θαλασσοκρατοῦντας ἀλωμένῳ καὶ ἀποροῦντι, τὸ δὲ πεζὸν αὐτὸν Πομπήιον ἄγειν κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν εὔνουν τε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὖσαν καὶ πολεμίων ἔρημον, κρατυνάμενον δʼ αὐτήν τε καὶ Γαλατίαν καὶ Ἰβηρίαν ἐξ οἰκείας καὶ ἡγεμονίδος γῆς αὖθις ἐπιχειρεῖν Καίσαρι. ὁ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἄριστα ἄν οἱ γενόμενα παριδὼν ἐπείθετο τοῖς λέγουσιν αὐτίκα τὸν Καίσαρος στρατὸν μεταθήσεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ, ἢ οὐ πολὺ σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι τὸ ἔτι λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ Δυρράχιον γενομένῃ νίκῃ· τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον αἴσχιστον εἶναι, καταλιπεῖν φεύγοντα Καίσαρα καὶ τοῖς ἡττηθεῖσιν ὁμοίως τὸν νικῶντα φεύγειν. ὁ μὲν δὴ τοῖσδε προσθέμενος αἰδοῖ μάλιστα τῶν ἑῴων ἐθνῶν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀφορώντων καὶ φειδοῖ Λευκίου Σκιπίωνος, μή τι περὶ Μακεδονίαν ὢν ἔτι πάθοι, μάλιστα δʼ ἐς ἀγῶνα χρήσασθαι θαρροῦντι τῷ στρατῷ διανοούμενος ἐπῆλθε καὶ ἀντεστρατοπέδευσε τῷ Καίσαρι περὶ Φάρσαλον, καὶ τριάκοντα σταδίους ἀλλήλων ἀπεῖχον.
66. Pompey’s supplies came from every quarter, for the roads, harbors, and strongholds had been so provided beforehand that food was brought to him at all times from the land, and every wind blew it to him from the sea. Caesar, on the other hand, had only what he could find with difficulty and seize by hard labor. Yet even so nobody deserted him, but all, by a kind of divine fury, longed to come to close quarters with the enemy. They considered that they, who had been trained in arms for ten years, were much superior to the new levies of Pompey in fighting, but that for digging ditches and building fortifications and for laborious foraging they were weaker by reason of their age. Tired as they were they altogether preferred to perform some deed of valor rather than perish with hunger in inaction. Pompey perceived this and he considered it dangerous to risk everything on a single battle with disciplined and desperate men, and against the amazing luck of Caesar. It would be easier and safer to reduce them by want as they controlled no fertile territory, and could get nothing by sea, and had no ships for rapid flight. So he decided on the most prudent calculation to protract the war and wear out the enemy by hunger from day to day.
66. ἀγορὰ δὲ Πομπηίῳ μὲν ἦν πανταχόθεν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτῷ προδιῴκηντο καὶ ὁδοὶ καὶ λιμένες καὶ φρούρια, ὡς ἔκ τε γῆς αἰεὶ φέρεσθαι καὶ διὰ θαλάσσης πάντα ἄνεμον αὐτῷ φέρειν· Καῖσαρ δὲ μόνον εἶχεν, ὅ τι μόλις εὕροι καὶ λάβοι κακοπαθῶν. καὶ οὐδʼ ὣς αὐτὸν ἀπέλιπεν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ σπουδῇ δαιμονίῳ συνενεχθῆναι τοῖς πολεμίοις ὠρέγοντο καὶ ἡγοῦντο πολέμῳ μὲν εἶναι παρὰ πολὺ ἀμείνους νεοστρατεύτων ἔτι ὄντων δέκα ἔτεσιν ἠσκημένοι, εἰς δὲ ταφρείας ἢ περιτειχίσεις ἢ σιτολογίας ἐπιπόνους ἀσθενέστεροι διὰ γῆρας· ὅλως τε κάμνουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει δρᾶν τι … μετʼ ἀργίας ἢ λιμῷ διαφθαρῆναι. ὧν ὁ Πομπήιος αἰσθανόμενος ἐπικίνδυνον μὲν ἡγεῖτο γεγυμνασμένοις καὶ ἀπογινώσκουσιν αὑτῶν ἀνδράσι καὶ τύχῃ Καίσαρος λαμπρᾷ περὶ τῶν ὅλων συνενεχθῆναι διʼ ἑνὸς ἔργου, δυνατώτερον δὲ καὶ ἀκινδυνοτερον ἐκτρῦσαι ταῖς ἀπορίαις αὐτοὺς οὔτε γῆς εὐπόρου κρατοῦντας οὔτε θαλάσσῃ χρωμένους οὔτε ναῦς ἐς φυγὴν ταχεῖαν ἔχοντας.
67. Pompey was surrounded by a great number of senators, of equal rank with himself, by very distinguished knights, and by many kings and princes. Some of these, by reason of their inexperience in war, others because they were too much elated by the victory at Dyrrachium, others because they outnumbered the enemy, and others because they were quite tired of the war and preferred a quick decision rather than a sound one — all urged him to fight, pointing out to him that Caesar was always drawn up for battle and challenging him. Pompey answered along this very line of argument by saying that Caesar was compelled to do so by his want of supplies, and that they had the more reason to remain quiet because Caesar was pushed by necessity. Yet, harassed by the whole army, which was unduly puffed up by the victories at Dyrrachium, and by men of rank who accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order to prolong his authority over so many men of his own rank — and for this reason called him derisively king of kings and Agamemnon, because that general also ruled over kings while war lasted — he allowed himself to be moved from his own purpose and gave in to them, being deceived now by the god that had misled him on other occasions during the whole of this war. He had now become, contrary to his nature, sluggish and dilatory in all things, and he prepared for battle against his will, to his own hurt and that of the men who had persuaded him to it.
67. ὁ μὲν δὴ κρατίστῳ λογισμῷ τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον ἐγνώκει, καὶ ἐς λοιμὸν ἐκ λιμοῦ τοὺς πολεμίους περιφέρειν· πολὺ δʼ ἀμφʼ αὐτὸν πλῆθος ἀνδρῶν ἀπό τε τῆς βουλῆς ὁμοτίμων οἱ καὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἱππέων οἱ διαφανέστατοι βασιλέες τε πολλοὶ καὶ δυνάσται, οἱ μὲν ὑπʼ ἀπειρίας, οἱ δʼ ἀμέτρως τοῖς περὶ τὸ Δυρράχιον εὐπραγήμασιν ἐπηρμένοι, εἰσὶ δʼ οἳ καὶ τῷ πλέονες εἶναι τῶν πολεμίων, οἱ δὲ καὶ κάμνοντες ὅλως τῷ πολέμῳ τὴν κρίσιν ταχυτέραν μᾶλλον ἢ πρέπουσαν ἐπειγόμενοι γενέσθαι, πάντες ἐξώτρυνον αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν μάχην, ἐπιδεικνύοντες αἰεὶ τὸν Καίσαρα παρατάττοντά τε καὶ προκαλούμενον. ὁ δʼ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα τοῦδε αὐτοὺς ἀνεδίδασκεν, ὅτι Καίσαρι μὲν τοῦτʼ ἐξ ἀπορίας ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, σφίσι δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ εὔκαιρον ἡσυχάζειν, ὅτι Καῖσαρ ὑπʼ ἀνάγκης ἐπείγοιτο. ἐνοχλούμενος δὲ ὑπό τε τοῦ στρατοῦ παντὸς ἐπηρμένου τοῖς περὶ τὸ Δυρράχιον ἀμέτρως καὶ τῶν ἐπʼ ἀξιώσεως αὐτὸν ἐπιτωθαζόντων ἐς φιλαρχίαν ὡς ἑκόντα βραδύνοντα, ἵνʼ ἀνδρῶν ὁμοτίμων τοσῶνδε ἄρχοι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε αὐτὸν βασιλέα τε βασιλέων καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα καλούντων, ὅτι κἀκεῖνος βασιλέων διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἦρχεν, ἐξέστη τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν καὶ ἐνέδωκεν αὐτοῖς, θεοῦ βλάπτοντος ἤδη καὶ τἆλλα παρʼ ὅλον τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον. νωθής τε γὰρ καὶ βραδὺς παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἐν ἅπασι γεγονὼς παρεσκευάζετο ἄκων ἐς μάχην ἐπὶ κακῷ τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν αὐτὸν ἀναπειθόντων.
68. That same night three of Caesar’s legions started out to forage; for Caesar himself approved Pompey’s dilatory proceedings and had no idea that he would change, and accordingly sent them out to procure food. When he perceived that the enemy was preparing to fight he was delighted at the pressure which he conjectured had been put upon Pompey by his army, and he recalled all of his forces at once and made preparations on his own side. He offered sacrifice at midnight and invoked Mars and his own ancestress, Venus (for it was believed that from Aeneas and his son, Ilus, was descended the Julian race, with a slight change of name), and he vowed that he would build a temple in Rome as a thank-offering to her as the Bringer of Victory if everything went well. Thereupon a flame from heaven flew through the air from Caesar’s camp to Pompey’s, where it was extinguished. Pompey’s men said that it signified a brilliant victory for them over their enemies, but Caesar interpreted it as meaning that he should fall upon and extinguish the fame and power of Pompey. When Pompey was sacrificing the same night some of the victims escaped and could not be caught, and a swarm of bees settled on the altar, the type of weakness. Shortly before daylight a panic occurred in his army. He himself went around and quieted it and then fell into a deep sleep.
68. Καίσαρι δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκείνης τρία μὲν ἐπὶ σιτολογίαν ἐξῄει τέλη ʽτὸν γὰρ Πομπήιον ἐπαινῶν τῆς βραδυτῆτος καὶ οὐδαμοῦ νομίζων μεταθήσεσθαι τοῦ βουλεύματος περιέπεμπεν ἐπὶ σῖτον̓, πυθόμενος δὲ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἥσθη τε τῆς ἀνάγκης, ἣν εἴκαζεν ἠναγκάσθαι Πομπήιον ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατοῦ, καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τάχιστα ἀνεκάλει πάντα καὶ ἀντιπαρεσκευάζετο. θυόμενός τε νυκτὸς μέσης τὸν Ἄρη κατεκάλει καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πρόγονον Ἀφροδίτην ʽἐκ γὰρ Αἰνείου καὶ Ἴλου τοῦ Αἰνείου τὸ τῶν Ἰουλίων γένος παρενεχθέντος τοῦ ὀνόματος ἡγεῖτο εἶναἰ, νεών τε αὐτῇ νικηφόρῳ χαριστήριον ἐν Ῥώμῃ ποιήσειν εὔχετο κατορθώσας. ὡς δὲ καὶ σέλας ἐξ οὐρανοῦ διαπτὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐς τὸ Πομπηίου στρατόπεδον ἐσβέσθη, οἱ μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν Πομπήιον ἔσεσθαί τι λαμπρὸν αὑτοῖς ἔφασαν ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ σβέσειν αὐτὸς ἐμπεσὼν τὰ Πομπηίου. αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ Πομπηίῳ τῆς αὐτῆς νυκτός τινα τῶν ἱερείων ἐκφυγόντα οὐ συνελήφθη, καὶ μελισσῶν ἑσμὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐκάθισε, ζῴου νωχελοῦς. μικρόν τε πρὸ ἕω πανικὸν ἐνέπεσεν αὐτοῦ τῷ στρατῷ· καὶ τόδε περιδραμὼν αὐτὸς καὶ καταστήσας ἀνεπαύετο σὺν ὕπνῳ βαθεῖ· περιεγειράντων δʼ αὐτὸν τῶν φίλων, ὄναρ ἔφασκεν ἄρτι νεὼν ἐν Ῥώμῃ καθιεροῦν Ἀφροδίτῃ νικηφόρῳ.
69. When his friends aroused him he said that he had just dreamed that he had dedicated a temple in Rome to Venus the Bringer of Victory. His friends and his whole army when they heard of this were delighted, being in ignorance of Caesar’s vow, and they went about their work in a reckless and contemptuous way as though it were already accomplished. Many of them adorned their tents with laurel branches, the insignia of victory, and their slaves prepared magnificent banquets for them. Some of them began already to contend with each other for Caesar’s office of Pontifex Maximus. Pompey, being experienced in military affairs, turned away from these squabbles with concealed indignation. He remained altogether silent in hesitancy and dread, as though he were no longer commander but under command, and as though he were doing everything under compulsion and against his judgment; such dejection had come over this man of great deeds (who, until this day, had been most fortunate in every undertaking), either because he had not carried his point when he had decided what was the best course but was about to cast the die involving the safety of so many men and also involving his own reputation, until now invincible; or because some presentiment of approaching evil troubled him, presaging his complete downfall that very day from a position of such vast power. After merely saying to his friends that whichever should conquer, that day would be the beginning of great evils to the Romans for all future time, he began to make arrangements for the battle. In this remark some people thought his real intentions escaped him, involuntarily expressed in a moment of fright, and they inferred that if Pompey had been victorious he would not have laid down the supreme power.
69. καὶ τόδε μὲν ἀγνοίᾳ τῆς Καίσαρος εὐχῆς οἵ τε φίλοι καὶ ὁ στρατὸς ἅπας πυθόμενοι ἥδοντο, καὶ τἆλλα ἀλόγως σὺν ὁρμῇ καὶ καταφρονήσει χωροῦντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον ὡς ἐπὶ ἕτοιμον. ὧν γε πολλοὶ καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς δάφναις ἀνέστεφον ἤδη, συμβόλῳ νίκης· καὶ οἱ θεράποντες αὐτοῖς δαῖτα λαμπροτάτην ἐπόρσυνον· εἰσὶ δʼ οἳ καὶ περὶ τῆς Καίσαρος ἀρχιερωσύνης ἐς ἀλλήλους ἤδη διήριζον. ἅπερ ὁ Πομπήιος οἷα πολέμων ἔμπειρος ἀπεστρέφετο καὶ νεμεσῶν ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς ἐνεκαλύπτετο, κατεσιώπα δʼ ὅμως ὑπὸ ὄκνου καὶ δέους, ὥσπερ οὐ στρατηγῶν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ στρατηγούμενος καὶ πάντα πράσσων ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης παρὰ γνώμην. τοσοῦτον ἀνδρὶ μεγαλουργῷ καὶ παρὰ πᾶν ἔργον ἐς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν εὐτυχεστάτῳ γενομένῳ τὸ δύσθυμον ἐνεπεπτώκει, εἴτε ὅτι τὰ συμφέροντα κρίνων οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ κύβον ἐχώρει πλήθους ἀνδρῶν τοσῶνδε σωτηρίας καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δόξης ἐς τότε ἀηττήτου· εἴτε τι καὶ μαντικώτερον αὐτὸν πλησιάζοντος ἤδη τοῦ κακοῦ συνετάρασσε, μέλλοντα τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἐκ δυναστείας τοσῆσδε ἀθρόως ἐκπεσεῖσθαι. τοσοῦτον δʼ οὖν εἰπὼν τοῖς φίλοις, ὅτι ἥδε ἡ ἡμέρα, ὁπότερος ἂν ἐπικρατήσῃ, μεγάλων ἐς αἰεὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἄρξει κακῶν, παρέτασσεν ἐς τὴν μάχην· ᾧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν προπεσεῖν τινες ἐν τῷ φόβῳ νομίζοντες ἡγοῦντο οὐδʼ ἂν Πομπήιον κρατήσαντα μεθεῖναι τὴν μοναρχίαν.
70. Caesar’s army (for since many writers differ I shall follow the most credible Roman authorities, who give the most careful enumeration of the Italian soldiers, in whom they place most confidence, but do not make much account of the allied forces or record them exactly, regarding them as foreigners and as contributing to them little real assistance) consisted of about 22,000 men and of these about 1000 were cavalry. Pompey had more than double that number, of whom about 7000 were cavalry. Some of the most trustworthy writers say that 70,000 Italian soldiers were engaged in this battle. Others give the smaller number, 60,00000. Still others, grossly exaggerating, say 400,000. Of the whole number some say Pompey’s forces were to those of Caesar as one-and-a-half to one, others say that he had two parts out of three. So much doubt is there as to the exact truth. However that may be, each of them placed his chief reliance on his Italian troops. In the way of allied forces Caesar had cavalry from both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, besides some light-armed Greeks, consisting of Dolopians, Acarnanians, and Aetolians. Such were Caesar’s allies. Pompey had a great number from all the eastern nations, part horse, part foot. From Greece he had Lacedemonians marshalled by their own kings, and others from Peloponnesus and Bœotians with them. The Athenians marched to his aid also, although proclamation had been made on both sides that no harm should be done to them by the soldiers, since they were the priests of the Thesmophorae. Nevertheless, they wished to share in the glory of the war because this was a contest for the Roman leadership.
70. στρατιὰ δʼ ἦν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, πολλῶν ἀμφίλογα εἰπόντων ἑπομένῳ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων τοῖς τὰ πιθανώτατα γράφουσι περὶ τῶν ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἀνδρῶν, οἷς δὴ καὶ μάλιστα θαρροῦντες τὰ συμμαχικὰ οὐκ ἀκριβοῦσιν οὐδὲ ἀναγράφουσιν ὡς ἀλλότρια καὶ ὀλίγην ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰς προσθήκην χώραν ἔχοντα, Καίσαρι μὲν ἐς δισχιλίους ἐπὶ δισμυρίοις, καὶ τούτων ἱππέες ἦσαν ἀμφὶ τοὺς χιλίους, Πομπηίῳ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ διπλάσιον, καὶ τούτων ἱππέες ἐς ἑπτακισχιλίους. ὧδε μὲν τοῖς τὰ πιθανώτατα λέγουσι δοκεῖ μυριάδας ἑπτὰ ἀνδρῶν Ἰταλῶν συμπεσεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐς μάχην· οἱ δʼ ὀλιγωτέρους ἑξακισμυρίων φασίν, οἱ δʼ ὑπερεπαίροντες τεσσαράκοντα μυριάδας γενέσθαι λέγουσι. καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἡμιόλιον, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τριῶν νομίζουσιν ἀμφὶ τὰ δύο τῷ Πομπηίῳ γενέσθαι μέρη. τοσάδε μὲν ἀμφιγνοοῦσι περὶ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς· ὅπως δʼ οὖν εἶχε, τοῖσδε μάλιστα τοῖς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν ἐθάρρει. τὸ δὲ συμμαχικὸν ἦν Καίσαρι μὲν ἱππέες τε Κελτοὶ … καὶ Κελτῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ Ἄλπεις ἀριθμὸς ἄλλος· Ἑλλήνων δʼ ἐπέλταζον αὐτῷ Δόλοπες, Ἀκαρνᾶνες, Αἰτωλοί. τοσοίδε μὲν τῷ Καίσαρι συνεμάχουν, Πομπηίῳ δὲ πάντα τὰ ἑῷα ἔθνη κατὰ πλῆθος, οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἵππων, οἱ δὲ πεζοί, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς Ἑλλάδος Λάκωνες ὑπὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις βασιλεῦσι τασσόμενοι, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος καὶ Βοιωτοὶ μετʼ αὐτῶν. ἐστράτευον δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, κηρυξάντων μὲν αὐτοὺς ἑκατέρων μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸν στρατὸν ὡς ἱεροὺς τῶν Θεσμοφόρων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν δόξαν ἄρα τοῦ πολέμου τραπέντες ὡς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας ἀγωνιούμενοι.
71. Besides the Greeks almost all the nations that one meets in making the circuit of the eastern sea sent aid to Pompey: Thracians, Hellespontines, Bithynians, Phrygians, Ionians, Lydians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, Paphlagonians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Hebrews, and their neighbors the Arabs, Cyprians, Rhodians, Cretan slingers, and other islanders. Kings and princes were there leading their own troops: Deïotarus, the tetrarch of Galatia in the East, and Ariarthes, king of Cappadocia. Taxiles commanded the Armenians from the hither side of the Euphrates. Those from the other side were led by Megabates, the lieutenant of King Artabazes. Some other small princes took part with Pompey in the work. It was said that sixty ships from Egypt were contributed to him by the sovereigns of that country, Cleopatra and her brother, who was still a boy. But these did not take part in the battle, nor did any other naval force. They remained idle at Corcyra. Pompey seems to have acted very foolishly in this respect in disregarding the fleet, in which he excelled so greatly that he could have deprived the enemy of all the supplies brought to them from abroad, and in risking a battle on land with men who boasted that they were inured to every kind of toil and who were ferocious fighters. Although he had been on his guard against them at Dyrrachium, a certain spell seems to have come over him at a time when it would inure most to Caesar’s advantage. Under this spell also Pompey’s army was most nonsensically puffed up, and rendered insubordinate to its own commander, and hurried into action without previous experience in war. But this was the ordering of divine Providence to bring in the imperial power which now embraces everything.
71. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὀλίγου πάντες, ὅσοι περιιόντι τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ θάλασσαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἕω, Θρᾷκές τε καὶ Ἑλλησπόντιοι καὶ Βιθυνοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Ἴωνες, Λυδοί τε καὶ Παμφύλιοι καὶ Πισίδαι καὶ Παφλαγόνες, καὶ Κιλικία καὶ Συρία καὶ Φοινίκη καὶ τὸ Ἑβραίων γένος καὶ Ἄραβες οἱ τούτων ἐχόμενοι Κύπριοί τε καὶ Ῥόδιοι καὶ Κρῆτες σφενδονῆται καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι νησιῶται. παρῆσαν δὲ καὶ βασιλέες καὶ δυνάσται στρατὸν ἄγοντες, Δηιόταρος μὲν τετράρχης Γαλατῶν τῶν ἑῴων, Ἀριαράθης δὲ Καππαδοκῶν βασιλεύς. Ἀρμενίους δὲ ἦγε τοὺς ἐντὸς Εὐφράτου στρατηγὸς Ταξίλης καὶ Ἀρμενίους τοὺς ὑπὲρ Εὐφράτην Μεγαβάτης, ὕπαρχος Ἀρταπάτου βασιλέως· ἄλλοι τε μικροὶ δυνάσται συνεπελαμβάνοντο τοῦ πόνου. λέγονται· δὲ καὶ ἀπʼ Αἰγύπτου νῆες ἑξήκοντα αὐτῷ παραγενέσθαι παρὰ τῶν Αἰγύπτου βασιλέων, Κλεοπάτρας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, παιδὸς ἔτι ὄντος. ἀλλʼ αἵδε μὲν οὐ συνεμάχησαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἄλλο ναυτικόν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ ἀργίας ἐν Κερκύρᾳ κατέμενε. καὶ δοκεῖ Πομπήιος τόδε μάλιστα ἀφρόνως ἐργάσασθαι, τῶν μὲν νεῶν καταφρονήσας, αἷς δὴ πολὺ προύχων ἐδύνατο πανταχοῦ τὴν ἐπακτὸν ἀγορὰν τοὺς πολεμίους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐν δὲ ἀγῶνι πεζῷ συνενεχθεὶς ἀνδράσιν ἐκ πόνου πολλοῦ μεγαλαύχοις τε καὶ θηριώδεσιν ἐς μάχας γενομένοις. ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν αὐτοὺς φυλαξάμενον περὶ Δυρράχιον θεοβλάβεια δοκεῖ παραγαγεῖν, ἐν καιρῷ μάλιστα δὴ πάντων ἥδε τῷ Καίσαρι γενομένη· διὰ γὰρ αὐτὴν ὁ στρατὸς ὁ τοῦ Πομπηίου κουφόνως μάλα ἐπήρθη, καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ σφῶν κατεκράτησαν καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔργον ἀπειροπολέμως ἐτράποντο.
72. Then each of the commanders assembled his soldiers and made an appeal to them. Pompey spoke as follows: “You, my fellow soldiers, are the leaders in this task rather than the led, for while I was still desirous of wearing Caesar out by hunger you urged on this engagement. Since, therefore, you are the arbiters of the battle, conduct yourselves like those who are greatly superior in numbers. Despise the enemy as victors do the vanquished, as young men do the old, as fresh troops do those who are wearied with many toils. Fight like those who have the power and the means, and the consciousness of a good cause. We are contending for liberty and country. On our side are the laws and honorable fame, and this great number of senators and knights, against one man who has seized the government by robbery. Go forward then, as you have determined to do, with good hope, keeping in vision the flight of the enemy at Dyrrachium, and the great number of their standards that we captured in one day when we defeated them there.” Such was Pompey’s speech.
72. ἀλλὰ τάδε μὲν ᾠκονόμει θεὸς ἐς ἀρχὴν τῆσδε τῆς νῦν ἐπεχούσης τὰ πάντα ἡγεμονίας· τότε δʼ αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιὰν ἑκάτερος συναγαγὼν ἐπώτρυνε, Πομπήιος μὲν τοιάδε λέγων· ὑμεῖς, ὦ συστρατιῶται, στρατηγεῖτε τοῦ πόνου μᾶλλον ἢ στρατηγεῖσθε· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐμοῦ τὰ Καίσαρος ἐκτρύχειν ἔτι βουλομένου τὸν ἀγῶνα τόνδε προυκαλέσασθε. ὡς οὖν ἀγωνοθέται τῆς μάχης χρήσασθε μὲν ὡς ἐλάττοσι πολὺ πλείονες, καταφρονεῖτε δὲ ὡς ἡττημένων νενικηκότες καὶ γερόντων νέοι καὶ πολλὰ κεκμηκότων ἀκμῆτες ἄνδρες, οἷς ὑπάρχει δύναμις τοσήδε καὶ παρασκευὴ καὶ τὸ συνειδὸς αὐτὸ τῆς αἰτίας· ὑπὲρ γὰρ ἐλευθερίας καὶ πατρίδος ἀγωνιζόμεθα μετὰ νόμων καὶ δόξης ἀγαθῆς καὶ τοσῶνδε ἀνδρῶν, τῶν μὲν ἀπὸ βουλῆς, τῶν δʼ ἱππέων, πρὸς ἄνδρα ἕνα λῃστεύοντα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. ἴτε οὖν, ὡς ἠξιοῦτε, μετʼ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐν ὄψει τιθέμενοι τήν τε φυγὴν αὐτῶν τὴν περὶ τὸ Δυρράχιον γενομένην καὶ ὅσα σημεῖα μιᾶς ἡμέρας κρατοῦντες αὐτῶν ἐλάβομεν.
73. Caesar addressed his men as follows: “My friends, we have already overcome our most formidable enemies, and are now about to encounter not hunger and want, but men. This day will decide everything. Remember what you promised me at Dyrrachium. Remember how you swore to each other in my presence that you would never leave the field except as conquerors. These men, fellow-soldiers, are the same that we met at the Pillars of Hercules, the same that we drove out of Italy. They are the same who sought to disband us without honors, without a triumph, without rewards, after the toils and struggles of ten years, after we had finished those great wars, after innumerable victories, and after we had added 400 nations in Spain, Gaul, and Britain to our country’s sway. I have not been able to prevail upon them by offering fair terms, nor to win them by benefits. You know that I dismissed them unharmed, hoping that we should obtain justice from them. Recall all these facts to your minds to-day, and if you have had any experience of me recall also my care for you, my good faith, and the generosity of my gifts to you.”
73. ὁ μὲν δὴ Πομπήιος ὧδε ἔλεγεν, ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ τοῖς ἰδίοις τοιάδε· τὰ μὲν δυσχερέστερα ἤδη νενικήκαμεν, ὦ φίλοι· ἀντὶ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ἀπορίας ἀνδράσι μαχούμεθα· ἥδε δὲ ἡ ἡμέρα κρινεῖ πάντα. μέμνησθέ μοι τῆς περὶ τὸ Δυρράχιον ἐπαγγελίας καὶ ὧν ἐφορῶντος ἐμοῦ συνώμνυσθε ἀλλήλοις, μὴ νικῶντες οὐδʼ ἐπανήξειν. οἵδε εἰσίν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐφʼ οὓς ἐξ Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἤλθομεν· οἵδε οἱ περιφυγόντες ἡμᾶς ἐξ Ἰταλίας, οἳ τοὺς δέκα ἔτεσιν ἀθλοῦντας ἡμᾶς καὶ πολέμους τοσούσδε καὶ νίκας δυσαριθμήτους ἀνύσαντας καὶ Ἰβήρων καὶ Κελτῶν καὶ Βρεττανῶν ἔθνη τετρακόσια περιποιήσαντας τῇ πατρίδι διέλυον ἀγεράστους ἄνευ θριάμβου τε καὶ δωρεᾶς, καὶ οὐδʼ ἐς τὰ δίκαια αὐτοὺς ἐγὼ προκαλούμενος ἔπειθον οὐδὲ χάρισιν ἐξήνυον. ἴστε, οὓς μεθῆκα ἀπαθεῖς, ἐλπίσας ἡμῖν τι παρʼ αὐτῶν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον. τῶνδε οὖν μοι τήμερον ἀθρόον ἀνενέγκατε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς, εἴ τι σύνιστέ μοι, κηδεμονίας ἢ πίστεως ἢ δωρεῶν μεγαλοφροσύνης.
74. “Nor is it difficult for hardy and veteran soldiers to overcome new recruits who are without experience in war, and who, moreover, like boys, spurn the rules of discipline and of obedience to their commander. I learn that he was afraid and unwilling to come to an engagement. His star has already passed its zenith; he has become slow and hesitating in all his acts, and no longer commands, but obeys the orders of others. I say these things of his Italian forces only. As for his allies, do not think about them, pay no attention to them, do not fight with them at all. They are Syrian, Phrygian, and Lydian slaves, always ready for flight or servitude. I know very well, and you will presently see, that Pompey himself will not assign them any place in his line of battle. Give your attention to the Italians only, even though these allies come running around you like dogs trying to frighten you. When you have put the enemy to flight let us spare the Italians as being our own kindred, but slaughter the allies in order to strike terror into the others. Before all else, in order that I may know that you are mindful of your promise to choose victory or death, throw down the walls of your camp as you go out to battle and fill up the ditch, so that we may have no place of refuge if we do not conquer, and so that the enemy may see that we have no camp and know that we are compelled to occupy theirs.”
74. ἔστι δὲ οὐ δυσχερὲς νεοστρατεύτων καὶ ἀπειροπολέμων ἔτι πολυπόνους ἀγωνιστὰς περιγενέσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ μειρακιωδῶς ἐς ἀταξίαν καὶ δυσπείθειαν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τραπέντων, ὃν ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι δεδιότα καὶ ἄκοντα χωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, τύχῃ τε παρακμάζοντα ἤδη καὶ νωθῆ καὶ βραδὺν ἐς ἅπαντα γεγενημένον καὶ οὐδὲ στρατηγοῦντα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ στρατηγούμενον. καὶ τάδε μοι περὶ μόνων ἐστὶ τῶν Ἰταλῶν, ἐπεὶ τῶν γε συμμάχων μηδὲ φροντίζετε μηδʼ ἐν λόγῳ τίθεσθε μηδὲ μάχεσθε ὅλως ἐκείνοις. ἀνδράποδα ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ Σύρια καὶ Φρύγια καὶ Λύδια, φεύγειν αἰεὶ καὶ δουλεύειν ἕτοιμα· οἷς ἐγὼ σαφῶς οἶδα, καὶ ὑμεῖς δὲ αὐτίκα ὄψεσθε, οὐδὲ Πομπήιον αὐτὸν τάξιν ἐγγυῶντα πολέμου. ἔχεσθε οὖν μοι τῶν Ἰταλῶν μόνων, κἂν οἱ σύμμαχοι δίκην κυνῶν περιθέωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ θορυβοποιῶσι. τρεψάμενοι δʼ αὐτοὺς τῶνδε μὲν ὡς συγγενῶν φειδώμεθα, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἐς τὴν τῶνδε κατάπληξιν ἐξεργάσασθε. πρὸ δὲ πάντων, ὡς ἂν εἰδείην ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε ὧν συνετίθεσθε μεμνημένους τε καὶ νίκην πάντως ἢ θάνατον αἱρουμένους, καθέλετέ μοι προϊόντες ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην τὰ τείχη τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν τάφρον ἐγχώσατε, ἵνα μηδὲν ἔχωμεν, ἂν μὴ κρατῶμεν, ἴδωσι δʼ ἡμᾶς ἀσταθμεύτους οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ συνῶσιν, ὅτι πρὸς ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων σταθμεῦσαι.
75. Nevertheless, after he had thus spoken Caesar detailed 2000 of his oldest men to guard the tents. The rest, as they passed out, demolished their fortification in the profoundest silence and filled up the ditch with the debris. When Pompey saw this, although some of his friends thought that it was a preparation for flight, he knew it was an exhibition of daring and groaned in spirit, that although they had with them famine, the most appropriate cure for such wild beasts, he must now meet these creatures in a hand-to-hand contest. But there was no drawing back now, his affairs being on the razor’s edge. Wherefore, leaving 4000 of his Italian troops to guard his camp, Pompey drew up the remainder between the city of Pharsalus and the river Enipeus opposite the place where Caesar was marshalling his forces. Each of them ranged his Italians in front, divided into three lines with a moderate space between them, and placed his cavalry on the wings of each division. Archers and slingers were mingled among all. Thus were the Italian troops disposed, on which each commander placed his chief reliance. The allied forces were marshalled by themselves rather for show than for use. There was great clamor and confusion of tongues among Pompey’s auxiliaries. Pompey stationed the Macedonians, Peloponnesians, Bœotians, and Athenians near the Italian legions, as he approved of their good order and quiet behavior. The rest, as Caesar had anticipated, he ordered to lie in wait by tribes outside of the line of battle, and when the engagement should become close to surround the enemy, to pursue, to do what damage they could, and to plunder Caesar’s camp, which was without defences.
75. ὁ μὲν τοσάδε εἰπὼν φυλακὴν ὅμως τῶν σκηνῶν κατέπεμπε δισχιλίους τοὺς πάνυ γέροντας· οἱ δʼ ἐξιόντες τὸ τεῖχος ἤρειπον μετὰ σιωπῆς βαθυτάτης καὶ ἐς τὴν τάφρον αὐτὸ ἐνεχώννυον. ὁρῶν δʼ ὁ Πομπήιος, ἡγουμένων τινῶν ἐς φυγὴν αὐτοὺς συσκευάζεσθαι, συνίει τοῦ τολμήματος καὶ ἔστενε καθʼ αὑτόν, ὅτι χωροῦσιν ἐς χεῖρας θηρίοις, λιμὸν ἔχοντες, ἄξιον θηρίων φάρμακον. ἀλλʼ οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀναδῦναι ἔτι, τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων ἐπὶ ξυροῦ. διὸ δὴ καὶ τετρακισχιλίους τῶν Ἰταλῶν φύλακας τοῦ στρατοπέδου καταλιπὼν παρέτασσε τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐς τὸ μεταξὺ Φαρσάλου τε πόλεως καὶ Ἐνιπέως ποταμοῦ, ἔνθα καὶ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀντιδιεκόσμει, τοὺς μὲν Ἰταλοὺς ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν ἐς τρία διαιρῶν ἐπὶ μετώπου, μικρὸν ἀλλήλων διεστῶτας, καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐπὶ τοῖς κέρασι τοῖς κατὰ μέρη τάσσων. τοξόται δὲ πᾶσιν ἀναμεμίχατο καὶ σφενδονῆται. καὶ τὸ μὲν Ἰταλικὸν οὕτω κεκόσμητο, ᾧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἑκάτερος ἐθάρρει· τὰ συμμαχικὰ δʼ ἦγον ἐφʼ ἑαυτῶν ὡς ἐς ἐπίδειξιν. πολύθρουν δὲ ἦν τὸ Πομπηίου συμμαχικὸν καὶ πολύγλωσσον· καὶ αὐτῶν ὁ Πομπήιος Μακεδόνας μὲν καὶ Πελοποννησίους καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Ἀθηναίους, ἀποδεξάμενος τῆς εὐταξίας καὶ σιωπῆς, παρεστήσατο τῇ φάλαγγι τῇ Ἰταλικῇ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους, ὅπερ ὁ Καῖσαρ εἴκαζεν, ἔξω τάξεως ἐκέλευσε κατὰ φυλὰς ἐφεδρεύοντας, ὅταν ἐν χερσὶν ὁ ἀγὼν γένηται, κυκλοῦσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ διώκειν, ὅσα δύναιντο βλάπτοντας, καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτὸ Καίσαρος ἀχαράκωτον ὂν διαρπάζειν.
76. The centre of Pompey’s formation was commanded by his father-in-law, Scipio, the left wing by Domitius Ahenobarbus, and the right by Lentulus. Afranius and Pompey guarded the camp. On Caesar’s side the commanders were P. Sulla, Antony, and Cn. Domitius. Caesar took a convenient place in the tenth legion, as was his custom. When the enemy saw this they transferred, to face that legion, the best of their horse, in order to surround it if they could, by their superiority of numbers. When Caesar perceived this movement he placed 3000 of his bravest foot-soldiers in ambush and ordered them, when they should see the enemy trying to flank him, to rise, dart forward, and thrust their spears directly in the faces of the men because, as they were fresh and inexperienced and still in the bloom of youth, they could not endure injury to their faces. Thus they laid their plans against each other, and each commander passed through the ranks of his own troops, attending to what was needful, exhorting his men to courage, and giving them the watchword, which on Caesar’s side was “Venus the Victorious,” and on Pompey’s “Hercules the Invincible.”
76. ἡγοῦντο δὲ τῆς φάλαγγος Πομπηίῳ μὲν ὁ κηδεστὴς Σκιπίων ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ Δομίτιος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δεξιοῦ Λέντλος· Ἀφράνιος δὲ καὶ Πομπήιος τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐφύλαττον. Καίσαρι δʼ ἐστρατήγουν μὲν Σύλλας καὶ Ἀντώνιος καὶ Δομίτιος, αὐτὸς δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως συνετάσσετο τῷ δεκάτῳ τέλει, καθάπερ ἦν ἔθος αὐτῷ. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἰδόντες οἱ πολέμιοι μετήγαγον ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἱππέων, ἵνα πλέονες ὄντες, εἰ δυνηθεῖεν, κυκλώσαιντο. συνεὶς δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ τρισχιλίους εὐτολμοτάτους πεζοὺς ἐνήδρευσεν, οἷς ἐκέλευσεν, ὅταν αἴσθωνται τοὺς πολεμίους περιθέοντας, ἀναπηδᾶν καὶ τὰ δόρατα ἐσπηδῶντας ἀνίσχειν ὀρθὰ ἐς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν ἀνδρῶν· οὐ γὰρ οἴσειν ἀπείρους καὶ νέους, ὡραϊζομένους ἔτι, τὸν ἐς τὰ πρόσωπα κίνδυνον. οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιάδε κατʼ ἀλλήλων ἐμηχανῶντο καὶ περιῄεσαν ἑκάστους, καθιστάμενοί τε τὰ ἐπείγοντα καὶ ἐς εὐτολμίαν παρακαλοῦντες καὶ τὰ συνθήματα ἀναδιδόντες, ὁ μὲν Καῖσαρ Ἀφροδίτην νικηφόρον, ὁ δὲ Πομπήιος Ἡρακλέα ἀνίκητον.
77. When all was in readiness on both sides they waited for some time in profound silence, hesitating, looking steadfastly at each other, each expecting the other to begin the battle. They were stricken with sorrow for the great host, for never before had such large Roman armies confronted the same danger together. They had pity for the valor of these men (the elite of both parties), especially because they saw Romans embattled against Romans. As the danger came nearer, the ambition that had inflamed and blinded them was extinguished, and gave place to fear. Reason purged the mad passion for glory, estimated the peril, and exposed the cause of the war, showing how two men contending with each other for supremacy had put themselves in a position where the one who should be vanquished could no longer hold even the humblest place, and how so great a number of the nobility were incurring the same risk on their account. The leaders reflected also that they, who had lately been friends and relatives by marriage, and had coöperated with each other in many ways to gain rank and power, had now drawn the sword for mutual slaughter and were leading to the same impiety those serving under them, men of the same city, of the same tribe, blood relations, and in some cases brothers against brothers. Even these circumstances were not wanting in this battle; because many unexpected things must happen when thousands of the same nation come together in the clash of arms. Reflecting on these things each of them was seized with unavailing repentance, and since this day was to decide for each whether he should be the highest or the lowest of the human race, they hesitated to begin the fight. It is said that both of them shed tears.
77. ὡς δὲ σφίσιν ἕτοιμα πάντα ἦν, ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ ὣς ἀνέμενον ἐν βαθείᾳ σιωπῇ, μέλλοντες ἔτι καὶ ὀκνοῦντες καὶ ἐς ἀλλήλους ἀποβλέποντες, ὁπότερος ἄρξει τῆς μάχης. τό τε γὰρ πλῆθος ᾤκτειρον, οὐδενός πω τοσοῦδε Ἰταλοῦ στρατοῦ ἐς ἕνα κίνδυνον συνελθόντος, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκκρίτων ὄντων ἑκατέρων ἠλέουν, καὶ μάλιστα, ὅτε ἴδοιεν Ἰταλοὺς Ἰταλοῖς συμφερομένους. ἐγγύς τε τοῦ κακοῦ γιγνομένοις αὐτοῖς ἡ μὲν ἐκκαίουσα καὶ τυφλοῦσα πάντας φιλοτιμία ἐσβέννυτο καὶ μετέβαλλεν ἐς δέος, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἐκαθάρευε δοξοκοπίας καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον ἐμέτρει καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι περὶ πρωτείων δύο ἄνδρε ἐρίζοντε ἀλλήλοιν αὐτώ τε κινδυνεύετον ἀμφὶ τῇ σωτηρίᾳ, μηδʼ ἐσχάτω πάντων ἡττηθέντε ἔτι εἶναι, καὶ τοσόνδε πλῆθος ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν διʼ αὐτούς. ἐσῄει δὲ σφᾶς, ὅτι φίλοι καὶ κηδεσταὶ τέως ὄντες καὶ πολλὰ συμπράξαντες ἀλλήλοις ἐς ἀξίωμα καὶ δύναμιν, ξίφη νῦν φέρουσι κατʼ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοὺς ὑποστρατευομένους ἐς ὁμοίας ἀθεμιστίας ἄγουσιν, ὁμοεθνεῖς τε ὄντας ἀλλήλοις καὶ πολίτας καὶ φυλέτας καὶ συγγενεῖς, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ ἀδελφούς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐνέλειπεν ἐκείνῃ τῇ μάχῃ, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐν τοσαῖσδε μυριάσιν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἔθνους ἐπʼ ἀλλήλας ἰούσαις πολλὰ τὰ παράδοξα συνέπιπτεν. ὧν ἐνθυμούμενος ἑκάτερος μετανοίας τε οὐ δυνατῆς ἔτι ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐνεπίμπλατο καὶ ὡς ἐσόμενος ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἢ πρῶτος ἢ τελευταῖος ὤκνει τοσῆσδε ἀμφιβολίας ἄρξαι. καί φασιν αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον καὶ δακρῦσαι.
78. While they were waiting and looking at each other the day was advancing. All the Italian troops stood motionless in their places, but when Pompey saw that his allied forces were falling into confusion by reason of the delay he feared lest the disorder should spread from them before the beginning of the battle. So he gave the signal first and Caesar reëchoed it. Straightway the trumpets, of which there were many distributed among so great a host, aroused the soldiers with their inspiring blasts, and the standard-bearers and officers put themselves in motion and exhorted their men. The latter advanced confidently to the encounter, but with stolidity and absolute silence, like men who had had experience in many similar engagements. And now, as they came nearer together, there was first a discharge of arrows and stones. Then as the cavalry were a little in advance of the infantry they charged each other. Those of Pompey prevailed and began to flank the tenth legion. Caesar then gave the signal to the cohorts in ambush and these, starting up suddenly, advanced to meet the cavalry, and with spears elevated aimed at the faces of the riders. The latter could not endure the enemy’s savagery, nor the blows on their mouths and eyes, but fled in disorder. Thereupon Caesar’s men, who had just now been afraid of being surrounded, fell upon the flank of Pompey’s infantry which was denuded of its cavalry supports.
78. μέλλουσι δʼ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἀλλήλους ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡ ἡμέρα προύκοπτε. καὶ τὸ μὲν Ἰταλικὸν ἅπαν εὐσταθῶς ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας ἀκριβοῦς ἀνέμενε· τὸ δὲ συμμαχικὸν ὁ Πομπήιος αὑτοῦ ταρασσόμενον ὁρῶν ὑπὸ τῆς μελλήσεως καὶ δείσας, μὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀταξίας κατάρξειεν, ὑπεσήμαινε πρῶτος, καὶ ἀντήχησε Καῖσαρ, αὐτίκα δʼ αἵ τε σάλπιγγες αὐτοὺς ἐξώτρυνον ὀρθίοις κλαγγαῖς ὡς ἐν τοσῷδε πλήθει πολλαὶ κατὰ μέρη, καὶ οἱ κήρυκες καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάται περιθέοντες ἤπειγον. οἱ δὲ σοβαρῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐπῄεσαν μετά τε θάμβους καὶ σιωπῆς βαθυτάτης ὡς πολλῶν ἀγώνων τοιῶνδε ἐμπειροπόλεμοι. πλησιάζουσι δʼ αὐτοῖς ἤδη τόξα καὶ λίθοι πρῶτον ἦν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων βραχὺ τὰ πεζὰ προλαβόντων πεῖραί τε καὶ ἐπελάσεις ἐπʼ ἀλλήλους. καὶ προύχοντες οἱ τοῦ Πομπηίου τὸ δέκατον τέλος ἐκυκλοῦντο. Καίσαρος δὲ τὸ σημεῖον τοῖς ἐφεδρεύουσιν ἄραντος, οἱ μὲν ἐξαναστάντες ἐς τοὺς ἵππους ἐχώρουν, ὀρθοῖς ἄνω τοῖς δόρασιν ἐς τὰ πρόσωπα τύπτοντες τοὺς ἐπικαθημένους, οἱ δʼ οὐκ ἐνεγκόντες αὐτῶν οὔτε τὴν ἀπόνοιαν οὔτε τὰς ἐπὶ στόμα καὶ κατʼ ὀφθαλμοὺς πληγὰς ἔφευγον ἀκόσμως. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα πεζὸν εὐθὺς ἱππέων ἔρημον γενόμενον ἐκυκλοῦντο οἱ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἱππέες, αὐτοὶ δείσαντες περικύκλωσιν.