---
title: "The Civil Wars · Ἐμφύλια"
author: "Appian"
translator: "Horace White"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 26 of 34
url: https://scriptura.si/works/appian-civil-wars/26/
cite: "Appian, tr. Horace White, The Civil Wars · Ἐμφύλια, section 26. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/appian-civil-wars/26/"
---

# The Civil Wars · Ἐμφύλια

*Appian, tr. Horace White*

From the Gracchi to Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, and the war of Octavian and Antony against Sextus Pompey: the fall of the Roman Republic.

> Greek: ed. Ludwig Mendelssohn, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0551.tlg017, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Horace White, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0551.tlg017.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 26. Book IV · sections 106–125

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/appian-civil-wars/26/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/appian-civil-wars/26/#p-N

[¶0] 106. There is another hill not far from Philippi which is called the Hill of Dionysus, in which are gold mines called the Asyla. Ten stades farther are two other hills, at a distance of eighteen stades from Philippi itself and eight stades from each other. On these hills Cassius and Brutus were encamped, the former on the southern and the latter on the northern of the two. They did not advance against the retreating army of Norbanus because they learned that Antony was approaching, Octavius having been left behind at Epidamnus on account of sickness. The plain was admirably situated for fighting and the precipitous hill-tops for camping, since on one side of them were marshes and ponds stretching as far as the river Strymon, and on the other gorges destitute of roads and impassable. Between these hills, eight stades apart, lay the main pass from Europe to Asia as between gates. Across this space they built a fortification from camp to camp, leaving a gate in the middle, so that the two camps became virtually one. Alongside this fortification flowed a river, which is called by some the Ganga and by others the Gangites, and behind it was the sea, where they could keep their supplies and shipping in safety. Their depot was on the island of Thasos, 100 stades distant. Their triremes were anchored at Neapolis, at a distance of seventy stades. Brutus and Cassius were satisfied with the position and they proceeded to fortify their camps.

> Greek: 106. Φιλίππων μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἕτερος λόφος οὐ μακράν, ὃν Διονύσου λέγουσιν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὰ χρυσεῖα ἔστι τὰ Ἄσυλα καλούμενα. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου δέκα σταδίους προελθόντι δύο εἰσὶν ἄλλοι λόφοι, Φιλίππων μὲν αὐτῶν ὅσον ὀκτωκαίδεκα σταδίους ἀφεστῶτες, ἀλλήλων δὲ ὅσον ὀκτώ, ἐν οἷς ἐστρατοπέδευσαν, Κάσσιος μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν, Βροῦτος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βορείου. καὶ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Νωρβανὸν ὑποχωρούντων οὐκέτι προῄεσαν· Ἀντώνιόν τε γὰρ ἐπυνθάνοντο πλησιάζειν, Καίσαρος ὑπολελειμμένου διὰ νόσον ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ, καὶ τὸ πεδίον ἦν ἐναγωνίσασθαι καλὸν καὶ οἱ κρημνοὶ στρατοπεδεῦσαι. τὰ γὰρ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτῶν, τῇ μὲν ἦν ἕλη καὶ λίμναι μέχρι τοῦ Στρυμόνος, τῇ δὲ τὰ στενὰ καὶ ἀτριβῆ καὶ ἀνόδευτα· τὸ δὲ μέσον τῶν λόφων, τὰ ὀκτὼ στάδια, δίοδος ἦν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν τε καὶ Εὐρώπην καθάπερ πύλαι, καὶ αὐτὰ διετείχισαν ἀπὸ χάρακος ἐς χάρακα καὶ πύλας ἐν μέσῳ κατέλιπον, ὡς ἓν εἶναι τὰ δύο στρατόπεδα. ἦν δὲ καὶ παρʼ αὐτὸ ποταμός, ὃν Γάγγαν τινές, οἳ δὲ Γαγγίτην λέγουσι, καὶ θάλασσα ὄπισθεν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τὰ ταμιεῖα καὶ ἐνορμίσματα ἔμελλον ἕξειν. Θάσον μὲν δὴ ταμιεῖον, ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν σταδίων οὖσαν, ἐτίθεντο, ἐνόρμισμα δὲ ταῖς τριήρεσι Νέαν πόλιν, ἀπὸ ἑβδομήκοντα σταδίων.

[¶1] 107. Antony moved his army rapidly, wishing to anticipate the enemy in occupying Amphipolis as an advantageous position for the battle. When he found it already fortified by Norbanus he was delighted. Leaving his apparatus there and one legion, under the command of Pinarius, he advanced with the greatest boldness and encamped in the plain at a distance of only eight stades from the enemy, and straightway the superiority of the enemy’s situation and the inferiority of his own became evident. The former were on elevated ground, the latter on the plain; the former procured fuel from the mountains, the latter from the marshes; the former obtained water from a river, the latter from wells freshly dug; the former drew their supplies from Thasos, requiring carriage of only a few stades, while the latter was 350 stades from Amphipolis. Still it seems that Antony was compelled to do as he did, for there was no other hill, and the rest of the plain, lying in a sort of hollow, was liable to inundation at times from the river; for which reason also the fountains of water were found fresh and abundant in the wells that were dug there. Antony’s audacity, although he was driven to it by necessity, confounded the enemy when they saw him pitch his camp so near them and in such a contemptuous manner as soon as he arrived. He raised numerous towers and fortified himself on all sides with ditch, wall, and palisade. The enemy also completed their fortification wherever the work was defective. Cassius, observing that Antony’s advance was reckless, extended his fortification at the only place where it was still wanting, from the camp to the marsh, a space which had been overlooked on account of its narrowness, so that there was now nothing unfortified except the cliffs on Brutus’s flank and the marsh on that of Cassius and the sea lying against the marsh. In the centre everything was intercepted by ditch, palisade, wall, and gates.

> Greek: 107. οἱ μὲν δὴ χαίροντες τῷ χωρίῳ τὰ στρατόπεδα ὠχύρουν, Ἀντώνιος δὲ ὥδευε μὲν σὺν τῷ στρατῷ μετʼ ἐπείξεως, τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐθέλων ἐς τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν τῆς μάχης προλαβεῖν, ὡς δὲ αὐτὴν εὗρεν ὠχυρωμένην οἱ πρὸς τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Νωρβανόν, ἥσθη καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἐν αὐτῇ κατέλιπε μεθʼ ἑνὸς τέλους, οὗ Πινάριος ἡγεῖτο, αὐτὸς δὲ μάλα θρασέως πολὺ προελθὼν ἐστρατοπέδευεν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ, σταδίους ὀκτὼ μόνους ἀποσχὼν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων. καὶ εὐθὺς ἦν κατάδηλος ἡ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐλάττωσίς τε καὶ πλεονεξία. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν ἐπὶ κολωνῷ, οἱ δὲ ἐν πεδίῳ, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐξυλεύοντο ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρῶν, οἱ δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕλους· καὶ ὑδρεύοντο οἱ μὲν ἐκ ποταμοῦ, οἱ δὲ ἐκ φρεάτων ὧν αὐτίκα ὠρωρύχεισαν· τήν τε ἀγορὰν οἱ μὲν ἀπʼ ὀλίγων σταδίων ἐπήγοντο ἐκ Θάσου, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ πεντήκοντα καὶ τριακοσίων ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως. ἐδόκει γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ Ἀντώνιος ὧδε πρᾶξαι, κολωνοῦ μὲν οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἑτέρου, τὸ δʼ ἄλλο πεδίον οἷα κοιλότερον ἐκλιμνάζοντος ἐνίοτε τοῦ ποταμοῦ· παρʼ ὃ καὶ τὰς πηγὰς τῶν ὀρυσσομένων φρεάτων γλυκείας τε καὶ δαψιλοῦς ὕδατος εὕρισκε. τό γε μὴν τόλμημα, εἰ καὶ ἐξ ἀπορίας ἐγένετο, κατέπλησσε τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐγγὺς οὕτω καὶ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐφόδου σὺν καταφρονήσει παραστρατοπεδεύσαντος. φρούριά τε ἤγειρε πολλὰ καὶ πάντα κατὰ σπουδὴν ὠχύρου τάφροις καὶ τείχεσι καὶ χαρακώμασιν. ὠχύρουν δὲ καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι, ὅσα αὐτοῖς ἐνέλειπεν. ὁ δὲ Κάσσιος τὴν ὁρμὴν τοῦ Ἀντωνίου μανιώδη οὖσαν ὁρῶν διετείχιζεν, ὃ ἔτι μόνον αὐτοῖς ἔλειπεν ἐς τὸ ἕλος ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατόπέδου, διὰ στενότητα ὑπεροφθέν, ὡς μηδὲν ἔτι ἀτείχιστον εἶναι πλὴν κατὰ πλευρὰς Βρούτῳ μὲν τὰ ἀπόκρημνα, Κασσίῳ δὲ τὸ ἕλος καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἕλει· τὰ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ πάντα διείληπτο τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι καὶ τείχει καὶ πύλαις.

[¶2] 108. In this way both sides had fortified themselves, in the meantime making trial of each other by cavalry skirmishes only. When they had done all that they intended and Octavius had arrived (for, although he was not yet strong enough for a battle, he could be carried along the ranks reclining in a litter), he and Antony prepared for battle forthwith. Brutus and Cassius also drew out their forces on their higher ground, but did not come down. They decided not to give battle, hoping to wear out the enemy by want of supplies. There were nineteen legions of infantry on each side, but those of Brutus and Cassius lacked something of being full, while those of Octavius and Antony were complete. Of cavalry the latter had 13,000 and the former 20,000, including Thracians on both sides. Thus in the multitude of men, in the spirit and bravery of the commanders, and in arms and munitions, was beheld a most magnificent display on both sides; yet they did nothing for several days. Brutus and Cassius did not wish to engage, but rather to continue wasting the enemy by lack of provisions, since they themselves had abundance from Asia, all transported by the sea from close at hand, while the enemy had nothing in abundance and nothing from their own territory. They could obtain nothing through merchants from Egypt, since that country was exhausted by famine, nor from Spain or Africa by reason of Pompeius, nor from Italy by reason of Murcus and Domitius. Macedonia and Thessaly, which were the only countries then supplying them, would not suffice much longer.

> Greek: 108. οὕτω μὲν ὠχυροῦντο αὐτῶν ἑκάτεροι καὶ ἐν τοσούτῳ μόνοις ἱππεῦσι καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς ἐπειρῶντο ἀλλήλων. ὡς δὲ ἐξείργαστο πάντα, ὅσα ἐπενόουν, καὶ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀφῖκτο, οὔπω μὲν ἐρρωμένος ἐς μάχην, φορείῳ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς συντάξεις τοῦ στρατοῦ κομιζόμενος, οἱ μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν Καίσαρα εὐθὺς ἐξέτασσον ἐς μάχην, οἱ δʼ ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον ἀντεξέτασσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑψηλοτέρων, οὐ κατῄεσαν δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐγνώκεσαν ἐς τὴν μάχην ἐπείγεσθαι, ταῖς ἀγοραῖς ἐλπίζοντες ἐκτρύσειν τοὺς πολεμίους. ἦν δὲ τὰ μὲν πεζὰ ἑκατέροις ἐννεακαίδεκα ὁπλιτῶν τέλη, τοῖς μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον ἐνδέοντα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, τοῖς δʼ ἀμφὶ τὸν Καίσαρα καὶ ἐπλεόναζον ἑκατέρωθεν· ἱππέες δὲ ἅμα τοῖς ἑκατέρων Θρᾳκίοις ἦσαν Καίσαρι μὲν καὶ Ἀντωνίῳ μύριοι καὶ τρισχίλιοι, Βρούτῳ δὲ καὶ Κασσίῳ δισμύριοι. ὥστε πλήθει μὲν ἀνδρῶν καὶ θράσει καὶ ἀρετῇ στρατηγῶν καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ παρασκευῇ λαμπροτάτην ἑκατέρων παράταξιν ὀφθῆναι, ἄπρακτον δὲ ἐς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, οὐκ ἐθελόντων συμπλέκεσθαι τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀγοραῖς προεκτρύχειν τοὺς πολεμίους, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἔχοντες Ἀσίαν χορηγὸν καὶ ἐξ ἐγγίονος πάντα διὰ θαλάσσης ποριζόμενοι, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις οὐδὲν ὂν δαψιλὲς οὐδὲ οἰκεῖον· οὔτε γάρ τι διʼ ἐμπόρων ἀπʼ Αἰγύπτου λαβεῖν εἶχον, ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τῆς χώρας δεδαπανημένης, οὔτε ἐξ Ἰβηρίας ἢ Λιβύης διὰ Πομπήιον οὔτε ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας διὰ Μοῦρκον καὶ Δομίτιον. οὐκ ἐς πολὺ δʼ αὐτοῖς ἔμελλον ἀρκέσειν Μακεδονία τε καὶ Θεσσαλία, μόναι σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε χορηγοῦσαι.

[¶3] 109. Mindful chiefly of these facts Brutus and Cassius protracted the war. Antony, fearful of the same, resolved to force them to an engagement. He formed a plan of effecting a passage through the marsh secretly, if possible, in order to get in the enemy’s rear without their knowledge, and cut off their avenue of supply from Thasos. So he arrayed his forces for battle with all the standards set each day, so that it might seem that his entire army was drawn up, while a part of his force was really working night and day cutting a narrow passage in the marsh, cutting down reeds, throwing up a causeway and flanking it with stone so that the earth should not fall away, and bridging the deeper parts with piles, all in the profoundest silence. The reeds, which were still growing around his passage-way, prevented the enemy from seeing his work. After working ten days in this manner he sent a column of troops by night suddenly, who occupied all the strong positions inside and built several redoubts at the same time. Cassius was amazed at the ingenuity as well as the secrecy of this work, and he formed the counter design of cutting Antony off from his redoubts. He carried a transverse wall across the whole marsh from his camp to the sea, cutting and bridging in the same manner as Antony had done, and laying a solid foundation for his rampart, thus intercepting the passage sage made by Antony, so that those inside could not escape to him, nor he render assistance to them.

> Greek: 109. ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον ἐνθυμούμενοι μάλιστα διέτριβον· ὁ δὲ Ἀντώνιος αὐτὰ δεδιὼς ἔγνω βιάσασθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐς μάχην καὶ ἐπενόησεν, εἰ δύναιτο βάσιμον τὸ ἕλος ἐργάσασθαι λαθών, ἵνα κατόπιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἔτι ἀγνοούντων γενόμενος τὴν ἀγορὰν σφᾶς ἀφέλοιτο τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Θάσου κομιζομένην. ἐκτάσσων οὖν αὖθις ἑκάστοτε ἐς μάχην τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ στρατοῦ πάντα, ἵνα ὅλος ἐκτετάχθαι νομίζοιτο, μέρει τινὶ νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἔκοπτεν ἐν τῷ ἕλει δίοδον στενήν, κείρων τε τὸν δόνακα καὶ χῶμα ἐπιβάλλων καὶ λίθους ἑκατέρωθεν, ἵνα μὴ τὸ χῶμα διαπίπτοι, τὰ δὲ βαθέα διεσταύρου καὶ ἐγεφύρου μετὰ σιωπῆς βαθυτάτης. ἀφῄρητο δὲ τὴν ὄψιν τοῦ ἔργου τοὺς πολεμίους ὁ πεφυκὼς ἔτι δόναξ ἀμφὶ τῇ διόδῳ. δέκα δʼ ἡμέρας ἐργασάμενος ὧδε ἐσέπεμψε λόχους ὀρθίους νυκτὸς ἄφνω καὶ τὰ ἐρυμνὰ τῶν ἐντὸς κατέλαβε καὶ ἐχαράκωσε φρούρια ὁμοῦ πολλά. ὁ δὲ Κάσσιος κατεπλάγη μὲν τοῦ ἔργου τὴν ἐπίνοιάν τε καὶ κλοπήν, ἀντεπινοῶν δὲ ἀποτεμέσθαι τὰ φρούρια τὸν Ἀντώνιον, διετείχιζε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικάρσιον τὸ ἕλος ἅπαν, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης, κόπτων ὁμοίως καὶ γεφυρῶν καὶ τὸν χάρακα τοῖς στεριφώμασιν ἐπιτιθεὶς καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ Ἀντωνίου γεγενημένην δίοδον ἀπολαμβάνων, ἵνα μήτε ἐκδραμεῖν ἐς αὐτὸν οἱ ἔνδον ἔτι δυνηθεῖεν μήτε ἐκεῖνος αὐτοῖς ἐπιβοηθεῖν.

[¶4] 110. When Antony saw this about noon, instantly, with rage and fury, he turned his own army, which was facing in another direction, and led it against the fortification of Cassius which lay between his camp and the marsh. He carried tools and ladders intending to take it by storm and force his way into Cassius’ camp. While he was making this audacious charge, obliquely and up hill, across the space that separated the two armies, the soldiers of Brutus were provoked at the insolence of the enemy in dashing boldly athwart their front while they stood there armed. So they charged of their own volition, without any order from their officers, took them in flank, and killed as many as they could reach. The battle once begun they charged upon the army of Octavius, also, which was drawn up opposite, put it to flight, pursued it to the camp which Antony and Octavius had in common, and captured it. Octavius himself was not there, having been warned in a dream to beware of that day, as he has himself written in his Memoirs.

> Greek: 110. ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἰδὼν περὶ μεσημβρίαν, ὡς εἶχεν, αὐτίκα σὺν ὁρμῇ τε καὶ ὀργῇ τὸν στρατὸν τὸν ἴδιον, ἐπὶ θάτερα τεταγμένον, ἦγεν ἐπιστρέφων εἰς τὸ διατείχισμα τοῦ Κασσίου, μεταξὺ τοῦ ἕλους καὶ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, σιδήρια φέρων καὶ κλίμακας, ὡς ἐξελῶν αὐτὸ καὶ παροδεύσων ἐς τὸ τοῦ Κασσίου στρατόπεδον. γιγνομένου δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ δρόμου σὺν τόλμῃ πλαγίου τε καὶ πρὸς ἄναντες, κατʼ αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ μεταίχμιον τῶν στρατιῶν ἑκατέρων, περιήλγησαν οἱ τοῦ Βρούτου στρατιῶται ἐπὶ τῇ ὕβρει, ὧδε μάλα θρασέως αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἐνόπλους ἐχθρῶν διαθεόντων, καὶ ἐπέδραμον αὐτοῖς αὐτοκέλευστοι πρό τινος ἐκ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐπιτάγματος καὶ ἔκτεινον οἷα πλαγίους ἀθρόως, οὓς καταλάβοιεν. ἀρξάμενοι δʼ ἅπαξ ἔργου καὶ τῷ Καίσαρος στρατῷ τεταγμένῳ μάλιστα κατὰ σφᾶς ἐπέδραμον καὶ τρέψαντες ἐδίωκον, μέχρι καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξεῖλον, ὃ κοινὸν ἦν Ἀντωνίῳ τε καὶ Καίσαρι, Καίσαρος αὐτοῦ διʼ ἐνύπνιον ἔνδον οὐκ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ φυλαξαμένου τὴν ἡμέραν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ἔγραψεν.

[¶5] 111. When Antony saw that battle was joined he was delighted because he had forced it, for he had been in trouble about his supplies. He judged it inadvisable to turn again toward the plain, lest in making the evolution his ranks should be thrown into disorder. So he continued his charge, as he had begun it, on the run, and advanced under a shower of missiles, and forced his way till he struck a body of Cassius’ troops, which had not moved from its assigned position and which was amazed at this unexpected audacity. He courageously broke this advance guard and dashed against the fortification that ran between the marsh and the camp, demolished the palisade, filled up the ditch, undermined the works, and killed the men at the gates, disregarding the missiles hurled from the wall, until he had forced an entrance through the gates, and others had made breaches in the fortification, and still others had climbed up on the debris. All this was done so swiftly that those who had just now captured the fortification met Cassius’ men, who had been at work in the marsh, coming to the assistance of their friends, and, with a powerful charge, put them to flight, drove them into the marsh, and then at once wheeled against the camp of Cassius itself. These were only the men who had scaled the fortification with Antony, the remainder being engaged in conflict with the enemy on the other side of the wall.

> Greek: 111. ὁ δὲ Ἀντώνιος ὁρῶν τὴν μάχην συνερρωγυῖαν ἥσθη μὲν ὡς ἀναγκάσας ʽπάνυ γὰρ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀγοραῖς ἐδεδίεἰ, ἀναστρέφειν δὲ εἰς τὸ πεδίον οὐκ ἔκρινεν, μὴ τὴν φάλαγγα ἀνελίσσων ταράξειεν, ὡς ἀρξάμενος δʼ εἶχεν ὁρμῆς, ἐχεῖτο δρόμῳ καὶ ἀνέβαινε, βαλλόμενός τε καὶ χαλεπῶς, μέχρι βιαζόμενος ἐνέκυρσε τῇ φάλαγγι τῇ Κασσίου, τὴν τάξιν τὴν δεδομένην φυλασσούσῃ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὡς ἄλογον καταπεπληγμένῃ. ῥήξας δʼ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τόλμης ἐπὶ τὸ διατείχισμα ὥρμα, τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε ἕλους καὶ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, τόν τε χάρακα ἀνασπῶν καὶ τὴν τάφρον ἐγχωννὺς καὶ τὸ οἰκοδόμημα ὑπορύσσων καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πύλαις καταφονεύων καὶ τὰ ἐπιπίπτοντα ἐκ τοῦ τείχους ὑπομένων, ἕως αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσήλατο διὰ τῶν πυλῶν ἔνδον, ἕτεροι δὲ ταῖς ὑπωρυχίαις ἐσῆλθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῖς πεπτωκόσιν ἐπανέβαινον. καὶ πάντα οὕτως ἐγίγνετο ὀξέως, ὥστε τοῖς τὸ ἕλος ἐργαζομένοις ἐπιβοηθοῦσιν ὑπήντων ἑλόντες ἤδη τὸ διατείχισμα. τρεψάμενοι δὲ καὶ τούσδε σὺν ὁρμῇ βιαίῳ καὶ ἐς τὸ ἕλος κατώσαντες ἐπανῄεσαν ἐς αὐτὸ ἤδη τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῦ Κασσίου, μόνοι σὺν τῷ Ἀντωνίῳ, ὅσοι τὸ διατείχισμα ὑπερῆλθον, τοῦ ἄλλου πλήθους, ἑκατέρων ἐκτὸς ἀλλήλοις μαχομένου.

[¶6] 112. As the camp was in a strong position it was guarded by only a few men, for which reason Antony easily overcame them. Cassius’ soldiers outside the camp were already worsted, and when they saw that the camp was taken they scattered in disorderly flight. The victory was complete and alike on either side, Brutus defeating the enemy’s left wing and taking their camp, while Antony overcame Cassius and ravaged his camp with irresistible courage. There was great slaughter on both sides, but by reason of the extent of the plain and the clouds of dust they were ignorant of each other’s fate. When they learned the facts they recalled their scattered forces. Those who returned resembled porters rather than soldiers, and did not at once perceive each other nor see anything clearly. Otherwise either party would have flung down their burdens and fiercely attacked the others carrying off plunder in this disorderly fashion. According to conjecture the number of killed on the side of Cassius, including slave shield-bearers, was about 8000 and on the side of Octavius double that number.

> Greek: 112. τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον ὡς ἐρυμνὸν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν ἐφύλασσον· ὅθεν αὐτῶν εὐμαρῶς ἐκράτησεν ὁ Ἀντώνιος. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἔξω τοῦ Κασσίου στρατὸς ἡσσᾶτο καὶ τὴν κατάληψιν ἰδὼν τοῦ στρατοπέδου διεσκίδνατο ἀκόσμως. καὶ τὸ ἔργον ἦν ἐντελὲς ἑκατέροις καὶ ὅμοιον· Βροῦτός τε γὰρ τὸ λαιὸν τῶν πολεμίων ἐτέτραπτο καὶ τὸ στρατοπεδον ᾑρήκει, Ἀντώνιός τε Κασσίου κρατῶν σὺν ἀμηχάνῳ τόλμῃ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐπόρθει. φόνος τε ἦν ἑκατέρων ποικίλος· ὑπὸ δὲ μεγέθους πεδίου τε καὶ κονιορτοῦ τὰ ἀλλήλων ἠγνόουν, μέχρι ποτὲ ἐπύθοντο καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνεκάλουν. οἱ δὲ ἐπανῄεσαν, ἀχθοφόροις ἐοικότες μᾶλλον ἢ στρατιώταις· καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἀλλήλων ᾐσθάνοντο οὐδὲ καθεώρων, ἐπεὶ ῥίψαντές γε, ὅσα ἔφερον, οἱ ἕτεροι μέγα ἂν εἰργάσαντο κατὰ τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀσυντάκτως ὧδε ἀχθοφορούντων. τὸν δʼ ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀποθανόντων εἰκάζουσι τῶν μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν Κάσσιον ἐς ὀκτακισχιλίους σὺν τοῖς παρασπίζουσι θεράπουσι γενέσθαι, τῶν δʼ ἀμφὶ τὸν Καίσαρα διπλασίονα.

[¶7] 113. When Cassius was driven out of his fortifications and no longer had any camp to go to, he ascended the hill to Philippi and took a survey of the situation. He could not see accurately on account of the dust, nor could he see everything, but upon discovering that his own camp was captured he ordered Pindarus, his shield-bearer, to draw his sword and kill him. While Pindarus delayed a messenger ran up and said that Brutus had been victorious on the other wing and was ravaging the enemy’s camp. Cassius merely answered, “Tell him that I pray his victory may be complete.” Then, turning to Pindarus, he said, “What are you waiting for? Why do you not deliver me from my shame?” Then, as he presented his throat, Pindarus slew him. This is one account of the death of Cassius. Others say that as some horsemen were approaching, bringing the good news from Brutus, he took them for enemies and sent Titinius to find out exactly; that the horsemen pressed around Titinius joyfully as a friend of Cassius, and at the same time uttered loud hurrahs; that Cassius, thinking that Titinius had fallen into the hands of enemies, said, “Have I waited to see my friend torn from me?” and that then he withdrew to a tent with Pindarus, and Pindarus was never seen afterward. For this reason some persons think that he killed Cassius without orders. Cassius ended his life on his birthday, on which also the battle was fought, and Titinius killed himself because he had been too slow.

> Greek: 113. Κάσσιος δὲ ἐξ οὗ τῶν διατειχισμάτων ἐξέωστο καὶ οὐδὲ ἐσελθεῖν ἔτι εἶχεν ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἀνέδραμεν ἐς τὸν Φιλίππων λόφον καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐφεώρα. οὐκ ἀκριβῶς δὲ αὐτὰ διὰ τὸν κονιορτὸν οὐδὲ πάντα ὁρῶν, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἑαυτοῦ μόνον εἰλημμένον, ἐκέλευσε Πινδάρῳ τῷ ὑπασπιστῇ προσπεσεῖν οἱ καὶ διαφθεῖραι. διαμέλλοντος δʼ ἔτι τοῦ Πινδάρου προσέθει τις ἀγγέλλων Βροῦτον ἐπὶ θάτερα νικᾶν καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν πολεμίων πορθεῖν. ὁ δὲ τούτῳ μὲν τοσόνδε ἀπεκρίνατο· νικῴης, λέγε αὐτῷ, παντελῆ νίκην, ἐς δὲ τὸν Πίνδαρον ἐπιστραφείς, τί βραδύνεις; ἔφη, τί τῆς ἐμῆς αἰσχύνης με οὐκ ἀπαλλάσσεις; Πίνδαρος μὲν δὴ δεσπότην, ὑπέχοντα τὴν σφαγήν, διεχρήσατο. καί τισιν οὕτως ἀποθανεῖν δοκεῖ Κάσσιον. ἕτεροι δὲ αὐτὸν οἴονται, προσιόντων ἐς εὐαγγέλιον ἱππέων Βρούτου, νομίσαντα εἶναι πολεμίους, πέμψαι τὸ ἀκριβὲς εἰσόμενον Τιτίνιον· τὸν δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ὡς Κασσίου φίλον περισχόντων τε σὺν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε καὶ ἀλαλαξάντων μέγα, τὸν Κάσσιον ἡγούμενον ἐς ἐχθροὺς ἐμπεσεῖν Τιτίνιον τοῦτο φάναι· περιεμένομεν φίλον ἁρπαζόμενον ἰδεῖν, καὶ ἔς τινα σκηνὴν ὑποχωρῆσαι μετὰ τοῦ Πινδάρου καὶ τὸν Πίνδαρον οὐκέτι φανῆναι. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσί τινες οὔπω κεκελευσμένον ἐργάσασθαι.

[¶8] 114. Brutus wept over the dead body of Cassius and called him the last of the Romans, meaning that his equal in virtue would never exist again. He reproached him for haste and precipitancy, but at the same time he esteemed him happy because he was freed from cares and troubles, “which,” he said, “are leading Brutus, ah, whither?” He delivered the corpse to friends to be buried secretly lest the army should be moved to tears at the sight; and himself passed the whole night, without food and without care for his own person, restoring order in Cassius’ army. In the morning the enemy drew up their army in order of battle, so that they might not seem to have been beaten. Brutus, perceiving their design, exclaimed, “Let us arm also and make believe that we have suffered no defeat.” So he put his forces in line, and the enemy withdrew. Brutus said to his friends, jeeringly, “They challenged us when they thought we were tired, but they dared not put us to the test.”

> Greek: 114. Κασσίῳ μὲν δὴ τέλος ἦν τοῦ βίου κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ Κασσίου γενέθλιον ἡμέραν, ὧδε τῆς μάχης γενέσθαι συμπεσούσης, καὶ Τιτίνιος ὡς βραδύνας ἑαυτὸν ἔκτεινε· Βροῦτος δὲ Κασσίου τὸν νέκυν περικλαίων, ἀνεκάλει τελευταῖον ἄνδρα Ῥωμαίων, ὡς οὔ τινος ἔτι τοιοῦδε ἐς ἀρετὴν ἐσομένου, ταχυεργίας τε αὐτῷ καὶ προπετείας ἐνεκάλει καὶ ἐμακάριζεν ὁμοῦ φροντίδων καὶ ἀνίας ἀπηλλαγμένον, αἳ Βροῦτον ἐς ποῖον ἄρα τέλος ὁδηγοῦσι; παραδοὺς δὲ τὸ σῶμα τοῖς φίλοις, ἔνθα λαθραίως θάψειαν, ἵνα μὴ καταδακρύσειε τὸν στρατὸν ὁρῶντα, αὐτὸς ἄσιτός τε καὶ ἀτημέλητος ἀνὰ τὴν νύκτα πᾶσαν τὸ Κασσίου στρατόπεδον καθίστατο. ἅμα δʼ ἡμέρᾳ τῶν πολεμίων τὸν στρατὸν παρατασσόντων ἐς μάχην, ἵνα μὴ δοκοῖεν ἠλασσῶσθαι, συνεὶς τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος, ὁπλισώμεθα, ἔφη, καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ἀνθυποκριθῶμεν ἐλάσσονα παθεῖν. ὡς δὲ παρέταξεν, οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρουν, ὁ δὲ Βροῦτος ἐπιτωθάσας ἔφη τοῖς φίλοις· οἱ μὲν δὴ προκαλούμενοι ἡμᾶς ὡς κεκμηκότας οὐδὲ ἀπεπείρασαν.

[¶9] 115. On the same day that witnessed the battle of Philippi another great calamity took place in the Adriatic. Domitius Calvinus was bringing two legions of infantry on transport ships to Octavius, one of which was known as the Martian legion, a name which had been given to it as a distinction for bravery. He led also a praetorian cohort of about 2000 men, four squadrons of horse, and a considerable corps d’elite of other troops, under the convoy of a few triremes. Murcus and Ahenobarbus met them with 130 war-ships. A few of the transports that were in front got away under sail. The wind suddenly failing, the rest floated about in a dead calm on the sea, having been delivered by some god into the hands of their enemies. The latter, without danger to themselves, fell upon each ship and crushed it; nor could the triremes that escorted them render any aid, since they were hemmed in by reason of their small number. The men who were exposed to this danger performed many deeds of valor. They hastily lashed their ships together with ropes and spars to prevent the enemy from breaking through their line. But when they succeeded in doing this Murcus discharged burning arrows at them. Then they cast off their fastenings as quickly as possible and separated from each other on account count of the fire, and thus again were exposed to being surrounded or rammed by the triremes.

> Greek: 115. ἧι δὲ ἡμέρᾳ τὴν μάχην ἐν Φιλίπποις συνέβαινεν εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ τοιόνδε πάθος ἄλλο ἐγίγνετο μέγα. Δομίτιος Καλουῖνος ἐπὶ ὁλκάδων ἦγεν ὁπλιτῶν δύο τέλη Καίσαρι, καὶ τὸ διώνυμον ἦν αὐτῶν, τὸ Ἄρειον, ὃ ἐπὶ τιμῇ τῆς ἀλκῆς ὠνόμαζον. ἦγε δὲ καὶ στρατηγίδα σπεῖραν, ἐς δισχιλίους ἄνδρας, ἱππέων τε ἴλας τέσσαρας καὶ ἕτερον πλῆθος ἐπειλεγμένον· καὶ τριήρεις αὐτοὺς παρέπεμπον ὀλίγαι. Μοῦρκος δʼ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀηνόβαρβος ἑκατὸν καὶ τριάκοντα μακραῖς ὑπήντων. καὶ αὐτοὺς αἱ ὁλκάδες ἱστίῳ μὲν αἱ πρῶται διέφυγον ὀλίγαι, αἱ λοιπαὶ δέ, χαλάσαντος ἄφνω τοῦ πνεύματος, ἐν γαλήνῃ σταθερᾷ κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος ἠλῶντο, ὑπό του θεῶν ἐκδεδομέναι τοῖς πολεμίοις. ἐνέβαλλον γὰρ ἀδεῶς ἑκάστῃ καὶ ἀνερρήγνυον· οὐδὲ αἱ παραπέμπουσαί σφας τριήρεις ἐπικουρεῖν ἐδύναντο, διὰ τὴν ὀλιγότητα κυκλούμεναι. ἔργα δʼ ἦν τῶν κινδυνευοντων πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα, ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ πλοῖα συναγόντων ἀπὸ κάλω σπουδῇ καὶ κοντοῖς ἁρμοζόντων ἐς ἄλληλα, ἵνα μὴ διεκπλεῖν αὐτὰ ἔχοιεν οἱ πολέμιοι. ὅτε δὲ τούτου κρατήσειαν, ὁ μὲν Μοῦρκος αὐτοῖς ἐπέβαλλε τοξεύματα πυρός, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συνδέσμους ἀνέλυον ὀξέως καὶ ἀπέφευγον ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ πῦρ αὖθίς τε ἐγίγνοντο ταῖς τριήρεσιν ἐς περίπλουν καὶ ἐμβολὴν ἕτοιμοι.

[¶10] 116. Some of the soldiers, and especially the Martians, who excelled in bravery, were exasperated that they should lose their lives uselessly, and so killed themselves rather than be burned to death; others leaped on board the triremes of the enemy, giving and receiving blows. Vessels half burned floated a long time, containing men perishing by fire, by hunger, and by thirst. Others, clinging to masts or planks, were thrown upon barren rocks or promontories, and of these some were saved unexpectedly. Some of them were nourished for five days by licking pitch, or chewing sails or ropes, until the waves bore them to the land. The greater part, vanquished by their misfortunes, surrendered to the enemy. Seventeen triremes surrendered, and the men in them took the oath to Murcus. Their general, Calvinus, who was believed to have perished, returned to Brundusium on his ship five days later. Such was the catastrophe that befell in the Adriatic on the same day that the battle of Philippi was fought, whether it be more fitly called a shipwreck or a naval engagement. The coincidence of the two battles caused amazement when it became known later.

> Greek: 116. ἀγανακτοῦντες δὲ οἱ ἄνδρες, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ Ἄρειοι, ὅτι κρείττους ὄντες ἀλκὴν διʼ ἀπραξίας ἀπώλλυντο, οἱ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνῄρουν, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὰς τριήρεις τῶν πολεμίων ἐναλλομενοι τὰ μὲν ἔδρων, τὰ δὲ ἔπασχον. νῆές τε ἡμίφλεκτοι μέχρι πολλοῦ περιέπλεον, ἄνδρας ἔχουσαι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός, τοὺς δʼ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ καὶ δίψης δαπανωμένους· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἱστῶν ἢ σανίδων ἐχόμενοι ἐς πέτρας ἢ ἀκτὰς ἐξεφέροντο ἐρήμους. καὶ εἰσὶν αὐτῶν, οἳ καὶ περιεσώθησαν ἐκ παραλόγου· τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἐς πέντε διήρκεσαν ἡμέρας, λιχμώμενοι τὴν πίσσαν ἢ ἱστίων ἢ κάλων διαμασώμενοι, μέχρι σφᾶς ὁ κλύδων ἐξήνεγκεν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. πολὺ δʼ ἦν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἑαυτὸ ἐπέτρεπεν, ὑπὸ τῶν συμφορῶν ἡσσώμενον. ἐπέτρεψαν δὲ καὶ τῶν τριήρων ἑπτακαίδεκα. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας οἱ περὶ Μοῦρκον ἐς ἑαυτοὺς μεθώρκουν, ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς αὐτῶν Καλουῖνος ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ νεὼς ἐπανῆλθεν ἐς τὸ Βρεντέσιον ἡμέρᾳ πέμπτῃ, δόξας ἀπολωλέναι. τοιοῦτο μὲν δὴ πάθος τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας τῇ περὶ Φιλίππους μάχῃ κατὰ τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐπεγίγνετο, εἴτε ναυάγιον εἴτε ναυμαχίαν ὀνομάσαι χρή· καὶ ἐξέπλησσε τὸ συγκύρημα τῶν ἔργων ὕστερον ἐπιγνωσθέν.

[¶11] 117. Brutus assembled his army and addressed it as follows: “In yesterday’s engagement, fellow-soldiers, you were in every respect superior to the enemy. You began the battle eagerly, although without orders, and you utterly destroyed their far-famed fourth legion, on which their wing placed its reliance, and all those supporting it as far as their camp, and you took and plundered their camp first, so that our victory far outweighs the disaster on our left wing. When it was in your power to finish the whole work, you chose rather to plunder than to kill the vanquished. Most of you passed by the enemy and made a rush for his property. We are the superior again in this, that of our two camps they captured only one, while we took all of theirs, so that here our gain is twice as great as our loss. So great are our advantages in the battle. How far we excel them in other respects you may learn from our prisoners — concerning the scarcity and dearness of provisions among them, the difficulty of procuring further supplies, and how near they are to absolute want. They can obtain nothing from Sicily, Sardinia, Africa, or Spain, because Pompeius, Murcus, and Ahenobarbus with 260 ships close the sea against them. They have already exhausted Macedonia. They are now dependent on Thessaly alone. How much longer will it suffice?”

> Greek: 117. ὁ δὲ Βροῦτος τὸν στρατὸν ἐς ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγὼν ἔλεξεν ὧδε· οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὦ συστρατιῶται, παρὰ τὸν χθὲς ἀγῶνα, ἐν ᾧ μὴ κρείσσους ἐγένεσθε τῶν πολεμίων. τῆς τε γὰρ μάχης ἤρξατε προθύμως, εἰ καὶ χωρὶς παραγγέλματος· καὶ τὸ τέταρτον τέλος, ὃ περιώνυμον αὐτοῖς ὂν ἐπεπίστευτο τὸ κέρας, διεφθείρατε ἅπαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτεταγμένους αὐτῷ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπέδου· καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτὸ εἵλετε πρότερον καὶ διηρπάσατε· ὡς προύχειν τάδε παρὰ πολὺ τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ βλάβης ἡμῶν. δυνηθέντες δʼ ἂν ὅλον ἐργάσασθαι τὸ ἔργον, ἁρπάσαι μᾶλλον εἵλεσθε ἢ κτείνειν τοὺς ἡσσωμένους· οἱ γὰρ πλέονες ὑμῶν τοὺς πολεμίους παροδεύοντες ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ὥρμων. καὶ ἐν τῷδε αὖ πάλιν οἱ μὲν διήρπασαν δύο τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατοπέδων ὄντων τὸ ἕτερον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνων ἅπαντα ἔχομεν, ὡς καὶ τῷδε τὴν ἐπίκτησιν τῆς βλάβης διπλασίονα εἶναι. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ πλεονεκτήματα τοσαῦτα· ὅσα δὲ ἕτερα προύχομεν αὐτῶν, ἔχετε καὶ παρὰ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων μανθάνειν, περί τε ἀπορίας σίτου καὶ ἐπιτιμήσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ κομιδῆς κακοπαθοῦς καὶ παρʼ ὀλίγον ἤδη σαφοῦς ἐπιλείψεως. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ Σικελίας ἢ Σαρδόνος ἢ Λιβύης ἢ Ἰβηρίας ἔστιν αὐτοῖς λαβεῖν διὰ Πομπήιον καὶ Μοῦρκον καὶ Ἀηνόβαρβον, ναυσὶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακοσίαις ἀποκλείοντας αὐτοῖς τὸ πέλαγος· Μακεδονίαν τε ἐξαναλώκασιν ἤδη καὶ ἐκ μόνης ἄρτι Θεσσαλίας ἔχουσιν, ἣ ἐς πόσον αὐτοῖς ἔτι ἀρκέσει;

[¶12] 118. “When, therefore, you see them eager to fight, bear in mind that they are so pressed by hunger that they prefer death by battle. We will make it part of our plan that hunger shall engage them before we do, so that when it is necessary to fight we shall find them weakened and exhausted. Let us not be carried away by our ardor before the proper time. Let no one think that delay implies want of generalship more than haste, when he casts his eye on the sea behind us, which sends us aid and provisions and enables us to win victory without danger if we wait and do not mind the insults and provocations of the enemy, who are not braver than ourselves, as yesterday’s work shows, but are trying to avert another danger. Let the zeal which I now desire you to repress be shown abundantly when I ask it. The rewards of victory I will pay you in full when it shall please the gods that our work be finished. And now for your bravery in yesterday’s engagement, I will give to each soldier 1000 drachmas and to your officers in proportion.” After speaking thus he distributed the donative to the legions in their order. Some writers say that he promised to give them also the cities of Lacedaemon and Thessalonica to plunder.

> Greek: 118. ὅταν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἐπειγομένους εἰς μάχην μάλιστα ἴδητε, τότε ἡγεῖσθε διωκομένους ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τὸν ἐν χερσὶ θάνατον αἱρεῖσθαι. ἡμεῖς δʼ ἀντιμηχανησώμεθα αὐτοῖς τὸν λιμὸν ἡμῶν προπολεμεῖν, ἵνʼ ἀσθενεστέροις καὶ τετρυμένοις ἐντύχοιμεν, ὅτε χρή. μηδʼ ἐκφερώμεθα ταῖς προθυμίαις παρὰ καιρόν, μηδὲ βραδυτῆτά τις ἡγείσθω τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἢ ταχυτῆτα, ἐς τὴν ὀπίσω θάλασσαν ἀφορῶν, ἣ τοσαύτας ἡμῖν ὑπηρεσίας καὶ τροφὰς ἐπιπέμπουσα δίδωσιν ἀκινδύνου νίκης ἐπιτυχεῖν, ἢν ὑπομένητε καὶ μὴ ἀδοξῆτε, εἰ προσπαίξονταί τε ἡμῖν καὶ προκαλοῦνται, οὐκ ἀμείνονες ὄντες, ὡς διέδειξε τὸ ἐχθὲς ἔργον, ἀλλὰ ἕτερον δέος ἰώμενοι. τὴν δὲ προθυμίαν, ἧς νῦν ὑμᾶς ἀξιῶ κρατεῖν, ἀθρόαν ἀπόδοτε, ὅταν αἰτῶμεν. ἐγὼ δʼ ὑμῖν τὰ νικητήρια ἐντελῆ μέν, ὅταν οἱ θεοὶ κρίνωσιν, ἐπὶ ἐντελέσι τοῖς ἔργοις διαλύσομαι· νῦν δὲ τῆς ἐχθὲς ἀρετῆς ἀνὰ χιλίας ἑκάστῳ στρατιώτῃ δραχμὰς ἐπιδίδωμι καὶ τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ὑμῶν ἀνὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὕτως εἶπεν καὶ αὐτίκα διεμέτρει τὴν δωρεὰν κατὰ τέλη· δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Θεσσαλονίκην ἐς διαρπαγὴν αὐτοῖς δώσειν ὑποσχέσθαι.

[¶13] 119. Octavius and Antony, seeing that Brutus was not willing to fight, assembled their men, and Antony addressed them thus: “Soldiers, I am sure that the enemy claim in their speeches a share of yesterday’s victory because they drove some of us and plundered our camp, but they will show by their action that it was wholly yours. I promise you that neither to-morrow nor on any subsequent day will they be willing to fight. It is the clearest proof of their defeat yesterday and of their lack of courage that, like those who have been vanquished in public games, they keep out of the arena. Surely they did not collect so numerous an army in order to pass their time in fortifications in the desert parts of Thrace. They built their fortifications when you were still approaching because they were afraid. Now that you have come they adhere to them because of yesterday’s defeat, on which account also the older and more experienced of their generals in utter despair committed suicide, and this act is itself the greatest proof of their disaster. Since, therefore, they do not accept our challenge and come down from the mountain, but trust to their rocky fastnesses instead of their arms, be valliant, O my soldiers of Rome, and force them to it again as you forced them yesterday. Let us consider it base to yield to those who are afraid of us, to keep our hands off such sluggards, or, soldiers as we are, to be unequal to the capture of their fortifications. We did not come hither to pass our lives in this plain, and if we delay we shall be in want of everything. If we are well advised we shall prosecute the war sharply, in order that peace may be of the longest duration possible.”

> Greek: 119. ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ καὶ ὁ Ἀντώνιος, εἰδότες οὐ μαχούμενον ἑκόντα τὸν Βροῦτον, τοὺς ἰδίους συνῆγον, καὶ ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἔλεξε· τὸ ἐχθὲς ἔργον, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοῖς μὲν λόγοις οἶδα ὅτι καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι μερίζονται, ὡς διώξαντές τινας ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον διαρπάσαντες, ἔργῳ δὲ ἐπιδείξουσιν ἅπαν ὑμέτερον· ὑπισχνοῦμαι γὰρ ὑμῖν οὔτε αὔριον οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιούσαις ἑκόντας αὐτοὺς ἐς μάχην ἥξειν. ὃ σαφεστάτη πίστις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐχθὲς ἥσσης καὶ φόβου, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀφιστῶνται τοῦ ἀγῶνος οἱ ἐλάττονες· οὐ γὰρ ἐς τοῦτό ʼγε στρατὸν ἤγειρον τοσόνδε, ἵνα τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ἐρημίαν οἰκῶσι διατειχίσαντες. ἀλλὰ αὐτὴν διετείχισαν μὲν ἔτι προσιόντων ὑμῶν διὰ δέος, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἐνοικοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἐχθὲς ἧσσαν· ἐφʼ ᾗ καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ὁ πρεσβύτερός τε καὶ ἐμπειρότερος πάντα ἀπογνοὺς ἑαυτὸν διεχρήσατο, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μεγίστη συμφορῶν ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις. ὅταν οὖν ἡμῶν αὐτοὺς προκαλουμένων μὴ δέχωνται μηδὲ καταβαίνωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρῶν, ἀλλὰ ἀντὶ τῶν χειρῶν πιστεύωσι τοῖς κρημνοῖς, τότε μοι θαρροῦντες ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ῥωμαῖοι, συναναγκάσατε αὐτοὺς αὖθις, ὥσπερ ἐχθὲς ἠναγκάσατε, αἰσχρὸν ἡγούμενοι δεδιότων ἐλασσοῦσθαι καὶ ὀκνούντων ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ τειχῶν ἄνδρες ὄντες ἀσθενέστεροι γενέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἤλθομέν γε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πεδίῳ βιώσοντες, οὐδʼ ἔστι βραδύνουσιν οὐδὲν αὔταρκες. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι τοὺς μὲν πολέμους ὀξεῖς, τὴν δὲ εἰρήνην ἐπὶ μήκιστον εἶναι.

[¶14] 120. “We, who have not incurred your censure for the onset and the plan of yesterday’s battle, will devise fresh opportunities and means for this end. You, on the other hand, when you are asked, repay your generals with your valor. Nor will you be troubled, after a little, by yesterday’s plundering of our camp, for our wealth consists not in the property we hold, but in conquering with might, which will restore to us as victors not only what we lost yesterday, which is still safe in the enemy’s possession, but the enemy’s wealth in addition. And if we are in haste to take these things let us hasten to bring on a battle. What we took from them yesterday balances what we lost, and perhaps more, for they brought with them all that they had extorted and plundered from Asia, while we, coming from our own country, left at home everything in the way of luxury, and brought with us only what was necessary. If there was anything lavish in our camp it was the property of your generals, who will gladly give it all to you as a reward for your victory. And as compensation for your losses we will give you an additional reward of 5000 drachmas for each soldier, five times as much to each centurion, and twice the latter sum to each tribune.”

> Greek: 120. τοὺς μὲν οὖν καιροὺς καὶ τὰ ἐς τοῦτον ἔργα ἐπιμηχανησόμεθα ἡμεῖς, οὐ μεμπτοὶ καὶ τῆς ἐχθὲς ὁρμῆς τε καὶ μηχανῆς ὑμῖν γενόμενοι· τὴν δʼ ἀρετὴν ὑμεῖς, ὅταν αἰτῆσθε, ἀποδίδοτε τοῖς στρατηγοῖς. μηδὲ ἄχθεσθε τῆς ἐχθὲς ἁρπαγῆς μηδʼ ἐπʼ ὀλίγον· οὐ γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἔχομέν ἐστι τὸ πλουτεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν, ὃ καὶ τὰ ἐχθὲς ἀφαιρεθέντα, ἔτι ὄντα παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις σῶα, καὶ τὰ πολέμια αὐτὰ ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις κρατοῦσιν ἡμῖν ἀποδώσει. καὶ εἰ ἐπειγόμεθα αὐτὰ λαβεῖν, ἐπειγώμεθα ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην. ἱκανὰ δὲ καὶ ἐχθὲς ἀντειλήφαμεν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἴσως ἱκανώτερα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας πάνθʼ, ὅσα ἐβιάσαντο καὶ ἥρπασαν, ἐπήγοντο, ὑμεῖς δʼ ὡς ἐκ πατρίδος ἰόντες τὰ μὲν δαψιλέστερα οἴκοι ὑπελίπεσθε, τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα μόνα ἐπήγεσθε. εἰ δέ τι καὶ δαψιλὲς ἦν, ἡμέτερον ἦν τῶν στρατηγῶν, οἳ πάντα ἐσμὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑμετέρας νίκης ἐπιδιδόναι πρόθυμοι. καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης δʼ ὅμως ζημίας ὑμῖν ἕνεκα ἐπιδώσομεν νικητήρια, δραχμὰς ἑκάστῳ στρατιώτῃ πεντακισχιλίας, λοχαγῷ δὲ πεντάκις τοσαύτας, χιλιάρχῃ δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ λοχαγοῦ.

[¶15] 121. Having spoken thus, he led out his men again on the following day. As the enemy would not come down then, Antony was disgusted, but he continued to lead out his men daily. Brutus had a part of his army in line lest he should be compelled to fight; and with another part he guarded the road by which his supplies were conveyed. There was a hill very near the camp of Cassius, which it was difficult for an enemy to occupy because, by reason of its nearness, it was exposed to arrows from the camp. Nevertheless, Cassius had placed a guard on it, lest it should be forced unexpectedly. As it had been abandoned by Brutus, the army of Octavius occupied it by night with four legions and protected themselves with wickerwork and hides against the enemy’s bowmen. When this position was secured they transferred ten other legions a distance of more than five stades toward the sea. Four stades farther they placed two legions, in order to extend themselves in this manner quite to the sea, with a view of breaking through the enemy’s line either along the sea itself, or through the marsh, or in some other way, and to cut off their supplies. Brutus counteracted this movement by building fortified posts opposite their camps and in other ways.

> Greek: 121. τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν τῆς ἐπιούσης πάλιν ἐξέτασσε· καὶ οὐ κατιόντων οὐδὲ τότε τῶν πολεμίων ὁ μὲν Ἀντώνιος ἐβαρυθύμει καὶ ἐξέτασσεν αἰεί, ὁ δὲ Βροῦτος τοῦ στρατοῦ τὸ μὲν εἶχε συντεταγμένον, μὴ ἀναγκασθείη μάχεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰς ὁδοὺς τῆς κομιδῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων διελάμβανε. λόφος δὲ ἦν ἀγχοτάτω τοῦ Κασσίου στρατοπέδου, δυσχερὴς μὲν ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν καταληφθῆναι, διὰ τὴν ἐγγύτητα ἐστοξεύεσθαι δυναμένων· ὁ δὲ Κάσσιος αὐτὸν ὅμως ἐφρούρει, μὴ καὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἐπιτολμήσειέ τις. ἐκλειφθέντα δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρούτου κατέλαβον οἱ περὶ τὸν Καίσαρα νυκτὸς τέτρασι τέλεσιν, ἐπαγόμενοι γέρρα πολλὰ καὶ διφθέρας ἐς προβολὴν τοῖς τοξεύμασιν. ὡς δὲ κατέσχον, ἄλλα τέλη δέκα μετεστρατοπέδευον ὑπὲρ πέντε σταδίους ἀπιοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄλλους τέσσαρας δύο, ὡς τῷδε τῷ τρόπῳ προελευσόμενοι μέχρι θαλάσσης καὶ ἢ παρʼ αὐτὴν ἄρα τὴν θάλασσαν ἢ διὰ τῶν ἑλῶν ἢ ὅν τινα τρόπον ἄλλον ἐπενόουν, βιασόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀποκλείσοντες τῶν πολεμίων. καὶ ὁ Βροῦτος αὐτοῖς ἀντεμηχανᾶτο, ἄλλα τε καὶ φρούρια ἀντικαθιστὰς τοῖς ἐκείνων στρατοπέδοις.

[¶16] 122. The task of Octavius and Antony became pressing, hunger was already felt, and fear fell upon them more and more each day, for Thessaly could no longer furnish sufficient supplies, nor could they hope for anything from the sea, which was commanded by the enemy everywhere. News of their recent disaster in the Adriatic having now reached both armies, it caused them fresh alarm, as also did the approach of winter while they were quartered in this muddy plain. Moved by these considerations they sent a legion of troops to Achaia to collect all the food they could find and send it to them in haste. As they could not rest under so great an impending danger, and as their other artifices were of no avail, they ceased offering battle in the plain and advanced with shouts to the enemy’s fortifications, and challenged Brutus to fight, reviling and scoffing at him, intending not so much to besiege him as by a mad rush to bring him to an engagement against his will.

> Greek: 122. τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἤπειγε τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Καίσαρα, καὶ λιμὸς ἦν ἤδη σαφής, ἔς τε μέγεθος καὶ δέος ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἐπεγίνετο. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ Θεσσαλίας αὐτοῖς ἔτι τὰ ἀρκοῦντα ἐκομίζετο, οὔτε τις ἦν ἐλπὶς ἐκ θαλάσσης, ναυκρατούντων πανταχῇ τῶν πολεμίων· τῆς τε ἔναγχος περὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον συμφορᾶς ἐξηγγελμένης ἐς ἑκατέρους ἤδη, μᾶλλον ἐδεδοίκεσαν αὐτά τε καὶ τὸν χειμῶνα προσιόντα ὡς ἐν πεδίῳ πηλώδει σταθμεύοντες. ὧν ἐνθυμούμενοι τέλος μὲν ὁπλιτῶν ἐς Ἀχαΐαν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἀγείρειν τὰ ἐντυγχάνοντα πάντα καὶ πέμπειν σφίσι κατὰ σπουδήν. οὐκ ἀνεχόμενοι δὲ κινδύνου τοσοῦδε προσιόντος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτεχνήσεων οὔτε ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ λοιπὸν ἐκτάσσειν, παρὰ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀνέβαινον μετὰ βοῆς καὶ τὸν Βροῦτον ἐκάλουν ἐς μάχην, ἐπισκώπτοντες ἅμα καὶ λοιδοροῦντες καὶ ἐγνωκότες οὐ πολιορκίας τρόπῳ μᾶλλον ἢ μανιώδει φορᾷ μὴ βουλομένῳ συμπλέκεσθαι.

[¶17] 123. Brutus adhered to his original intention, and all the more because he knew of the famine and of his own success in the Adriatic, and of the enemy’s desperation for want of supplies. He preferred to endure a siege, or anything else, rather than come to an engagement with men who were famishing, and whose hopes rested solely on fighting because they despaired of every other resource. His soldiers, however, without reflection, entertained a different opinion. They took it hard that they should be shut up, idle and cowardly, like women, within their fortifications. Their officers, although they approved of Brutus’ design, were vexed, thinking that in the present temper of the army they might overpower the enemy more quickly. Brutus himself was the cause of these murmurs, being of a gentle and kindly disposition toward all — not like Cassius, who was austere and imperious in every way, for which reason the army obeyed his orders promptly, not interfering with his authority, not inquiring the reasons for his orders, and not criticising them when they had learned them. But in the case of Brutus they expected nothing else than to share the command with him on account of his mildness of temper. Finally, the soldiers began openly to collect together in companies and groups and to ask each other, “Why does our general put a stigma upon us? How have we offended lately — we who conquered the enemy and put him to flight; we who slaughtered those opposed to us and took their camp?” Brutus took no notice of these murmurs, nor did he call an assembly, lest he should be forced from his position, contrary to his dignity, by the unreasoning multitude, and especially by the mercenaries, who, like fickle slaves seeking new masters, always rest their hopes of safety on desertion to the enemy.

> Greek: 123. τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ μὲν ἔγνωστο τὰ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πυνθανομένῳ περί τε τοῦ λιμοῦ καὶ περὶ τῇς κατὰ τὸν Ἰόνιον εὐπραξίας καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ὁρῶντι τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας ἀπόνοιαν· καὶ ᾑρεῖτο πολιορκίας καὶ ἄλλου παντὸς ἀνέχεσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς χεῖρας ἰέναι ἀνδράσιν ἐπειγομένοις ὑπὸ λιμοῦ, καὶ ἀπογινώσκουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἐν μόναις ταῖς χερσὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ στρατὸς οὐχ ὁμοίως εἶχεν ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης, ἀλλʼ ἐδυσφόρουν γυναικῶν τρόπον ἔνδον μετὰ ἀπραξίας καὶ φόβου κατακεκλεισμένοι. ἐδυσχέραινον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἡγεμόνες αὐτῶν, ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν τὸ ἐνθύμημα τοῦ Βρούτου, νομίζοντες δὲ καὶ θᾶσσον ἐπικρατήσειν τῶν πολεμίων μετὰ προθύμου στρατοῦ. αἴτιον δὲ τούτων ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ Βροῦτον ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φιλόφρονα ἐς ἅπαντας εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιον Κασσίῳ, αὐστηρῷ καὶ ἀρχικῷ περὶ πάντα γεγενημένῳ· ὅθεν ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος ὑπήκουον, οὐ παραστρατηγοῦντες οὐδὲ τὰς αἰτίας μανθάνοντες οὐδὲ εὐθύνοντες, ὅτε καὶ μάθοιεν, Βρούτῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλʼ ἢ συστρατηγεῖν ἠξίουν διὰ πραΰτητα. τέλος δὲ τοῦ στρατοῦ φανερώτερον ἤδη κατὰ ἴλας καὶ κατὰ συστάσεις διαπυνθανομένου· τί κατέγνωκεν ἡμῶν ὁ στρατηγός; τί ἔναγχος ἡμάρτομεν οἱ νικήσαντες, οἱ διώξαντες, οἱ τοὺς καθʼ ἡμᾶς πολεμίους κατακανόντες, οἱ τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτῶν ἑλόντες; Βροῦτος ἑκὼν ἠμέλει καὶ ἐς ἐκκλησίαν οὐ συνῆγε, μὴ ἀπρεπέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἀλογίστως ἐκβιασθείη, καὶ μάλιστα μισθοφόρων, οἷς ἐστιν αἰεί, καθὰ καὶ τοῖς εὐχερέσιν οἰκέταις ἐς ἑτέρους δεσπότας, ἐλπὶς ἐς σωτηρίαν ἡ ἐς τὸ ἀντίπαλον μεταβολή.

[¶18] 124. His officers kept teasing and urging him to make use of the eagerness of the army now, which would speedily bring glorious results. If the battle should turn out adversely, they could fall back to their walls and put the same fortifications between themselves and the enemy. Brutus was especially vexed with these, for they were his officers, and he grieved that they, who were exposed to the same peril as himself, should capriciously side with the soldiers in preferring a quick and doubtful chance to a victory without danger; but, to the ruin of himself and them, he yielded, chiding them with these words, “I seem to be carrying on war like Pompey the Great, not so much commanding as commanded.” I think that Brutus restricted himself to these words in order to conceal his greatest fear, lest those of his soldiers who had formerly served under Caesar should become disaffected and desert to the enemy. This both himself and Cassius had apprehended from the beginning, and they had been careful not to give any excuse for such disaffection toward themselves.

> Greek: 124. ἐνοχλούντων δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ κελευόντων νῦν μὲν ἀποχρήσασθαι τοῦ στρατοῦ τῇ προθυμίᾳ, τάχα τι λαμπρὸν ἐργασομένου, ἢν δʼ ἀντιπίπτῃ τι παρὰ τὴν μάχην, ἐπανιέναι πάλιν ἐς τὰ τείχη καὶ προβάλλεσθαι τὰ αὐτὰ χαρακώματα, χαλεπήνας ὁ Βροῦτος τοῖσδε μάλιστα ἡγεμόσιν οὖσι καὶ περιαλγήσας, ὅτι τὸν αὐτόν οἱ κίνδυνον ἐπικείμενοι συμφέρονται τῷ στρατῷ κουφόνως, ἀμφίβολον καὶ ὀξεῖαν τύχην προτιθέντι νίκης ἀκινδύνου, εἶξεν ἐπʼ οἰκείῳ καὶ σφῶν ἐκείνων ὀλέθρῳ, τοσόνδε ἐπιμεμψάμενος αὐτοῖς· ἐοίκαμεν ὡς Πομπήιος Μάγνος πολεμήσειν, οὐ στρατηγοῦντες ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ στρατηγούμενοι. καί μοι δοκεῖ τόδε μόνον ἐξειπεῖν, ἐπικρύπτων, ὃ ἐδεδοίκει μάλιστα, μὴ ὁ στρατὸς οἷα τοῦ πάλαι Καίσαρος γεγονὼς ἀγανακτήσειέ τε καὶ μεταβάλοιτο· ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτός τε καὶ Κάσσιος ὑφορώμενοι ἐς οὐδὲν ἔργον αὐτοῖς πρόφασιν ἀγανακτήσεως ἐπὶ σφίσιν ἐνεδίδουν.

[¶19] 125. So Brutus led out his army unwillingly and formed them in line of battle before his walls, ordering them not to advance very far from the hill so that they might have a safe retreat if necessary and a good position for hurling darts at the enemy. In each army the men exchanged exhortations with each other. There was great eagerness for battle, and unbounded confidence. On the one side was the fear of famine, on the other a well-deserved shame that they had constrained their general to fight when he still favored delay, and fear lest they should come short of their promises and prove weaker than their boastings, and expose themselves to the charge of rashness instead of winning praise for good counsel; because also Brutus, riding through the ranks on horseback, showed himself before them with a severe countenance and reminded them in a few words of what the opportunity offered. “You want to fight,” he said; “you force me to battle when I am able to conquer otherwise. Do not falsify my hopes or your own. You have the advantage of the higher ground and everything safe in your rear. The enemy’s position is the one of peril because he lies between you and famine.” With these words he passed on, the soldiers telling him to trust them and echoing his words with shouts of confidence.

> Greek: 125. ὧδε μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ Βροῦτος ἐξῆγεν ἄκων καὶ ἐς τάξεις διεκόσμει πρὸ τοῦ τείχους καὶ ἐδίδασκε μὴ πολὺ προύχειν τοὺ λόφου, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἥ τε ἀναχώρησις, εἰ δεήσειεν, εὐχερὴς εἴη καὶ τὰ ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀφιέμενα ἐπιδέξια. ἦν δὲ ἑκατέρωθεν παρακέλευσίς τε πάντων ἐς ἀλλήλους καὶ φρόνημα ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα καὶ θρασύτης ν̔πὲρ λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, τοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ δέους λιμοῦ, τοῖς δὲ ὑπὸ αἰδοῦς δικαίας, βιασαμένοις τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀναβαλλόμενον ἔτι, μὴ χείροσιν ὧν ὑπέσχοντο ὀφθῆναι μηδὲ ἀσθενεστέροις ὧν ἐθρασύνοντο, μηδὲ προπετείας ὑπευθύνοις μᾶλλον ἢ ἀξιεπαίνοις εὐβουλίας. ἃ καὶ ὁ Βροῦτος αὐτοῖς, ἐπὶ ἵππου περιθέων, σοβαρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ προενέφαινε καὶ διʼ ὀλίγων ὑπεμίμνησκεν, ὅσων ὁ καιρὸς ἐδίδου· ὑμεῖς ἠθελήσατε μάχεσθαι, ὑμεῖς με ἑτέρως ἔχοντα νικᾶν ἐβιάσασθε· μὴ δὲ ψεύσησθε τῆς ἐλπίδος μήτε ἐμὲ μήτε αὑτούς. ἔχετε καὶ λόφον σύμμαχον καὶ τὰ κατὰ νώτου πάντα ἴδια. οἱ πολέμιοι δʼ εἰσὶν ἐν ἀμφιβόλῳ· μεταξὺ γάρ εἰσιν ὑμῶν τε καὶ λιμοῦ.