1. WHAT Hannibal the Carthaginian did to, and suffered from, the Romans during the sixteen years that he persisted in war against them, from his first march from Spain to Italy until he was recalled by the Carthaginians (their own city being in danger), and was then driven out by the Romans, this book will show. What Hannibal’s real reasons for that invasion were, as well as his public pretext, have been very clearly set forth in my Spanish history, yet I shall mention them here by way of reminder.
1. ὅσα δὲ Ἀννίβας ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ἐξ Ἰβηρίας ἐς Ἰταλίαν ἐσβαλών, ἑκκαίδεκα ἔτεσιν οἷς ἐπέμεινε πολεμῶν, ἔδρασέ τε καὶ ἔπαθεν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, ἕως αὐτὸν Καρχηδόνιοί τε κινδυνεύοντες περὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα μετεπέμψαντο καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐξήλασαν, ἥδε ἡ γραφὴ δηλοῖ. ἥ τις δὲ τῷ Ἀννίβᾳ γέγονε τῆς ἐσβολῆς αἰτία τε ἀληθὴς καὶ πρόφασις ἐς τὸ φανερόν, ἀκριβέστατα μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἰβηρικῇ συγγραφῇ δεδήλωται, συγγράψω δὲ καὶ νῦν ὅσον ἐς ἀνάμνησιν.
2. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, the father of this Hannibal, was the commander of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily when they contended with the Romans for possession of that island. Being prosecuted by his enemies on a charge of maladministration, and fearing a conviction, he managed to get himself chosen general against the Numidians before he had settled his accounts. Having proved useful in this war and having secured the favor of the army by plunder and largesses, he passed over the straits into Spain and made an expedition against Gades without the authority of Carthage. From thence he sent much booty to Carthage in order to win the favor of the multitude so that if possible he might ward off censure on account of his command in Sicily. Having gained much territory and great glory he inspired the Carthaginians with a desire to possess the whole of Spain, and persuaded them that it would be an easy task. Thereupon the Saguntines and other Greeks who were settled in Spain had recourse to the Romans, and a boundary was fixed to the Carthaginian possessions in that country, namely, that they should not cross the river Iberus (Ebro), and a treaty to this effect was made between the Romans and the Carthaginians. After this, Hamilcar, while settling the affairs of Carthaginian Spain, was killed in battle, and Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, succeeded him as general. The latter while hunting was killed by a slave whose master he had put to death.
2. Ἀμίλχαρ ᾧ Βάρκας ἐπικλησις ἦν, Ἀννίβου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἐστρατήγει Καρχηδονίων ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὅτε Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀλλήλοις ἐπολέμουν. δόξας δὲ πρᾶξαι κακῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐδιώκετο, καὶ δεδιὼς ἔπραξεν ἐς τοὺς Νομάδας αἱρεθῆναι στρατηγὸς πρὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. γενόμενος δὲ χρήσιμος ἐν τῷδε, καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν θεραπεύσας ἁρπαγαῖς καὶ δωρεαῖς, ἤγαγεν ἄνευ τοῦ κοινοῦ Καρχηδονίων ἐπὶ Γάδειρα, καὶ ἐπέρασε τὸν πορθμὸν ἐς Ἰβηρίαν, ὅθεν λάφυρα πολλὰ διέπεμπεν ἐς Καρχηδόνα, θεραπεύων τὸ πλῆθος, εἰ δύναιτο μὴ χαλεπαίνειν αὐτῷ τῆς στρατηγίας τῆς ἐν Σικελίᾳ, χώραν δʼ αὐτοῦ κατακτωμένου πολλὴν κλέος τε μέγα ἦν, καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ἐπιθυμία πάσης Ἰβηρίας ὡς εὐμαροῦς ἔργου. Ζακανθαῖοι δέ, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους, καὶ γίγνεται Καρχηδονίοις ὅρος Ἰβηρίας, μὴ διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν· καὶ τόδε ταῖς Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων σπονδαῖς ἐνεγράφη. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ Βάρκας μὲν τὴν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίοις Ἰβηρίαν καθιστάμενος ἔν τινι μάχῃ πεσὼν ἀποθνήσκει, καὶ στρατηγὸς Ἀσδρούβας ἐπʼ αὐτῷ γίγνεται, ὃς ἐκήδευε τῷ Βάρκᾳ. καὶ τόνδε μὲν κτείνει θεράπων ἐν κυνηγεσίοις, οὗ τὸν δεσπότην ἀνῃρήκει.
3. After them this Hannibal was chosen by the army as the third commander in Spain because he seemed to have great aptitude and fondness for war. He was the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hasdrubal’s wife, a very young man whose early years had been passed in the company of his father and his brother-in-law. The people of Carthage confirmed his election as general. In this way Hannibal, whose history I am about to write, became the commander of the Carthaginians against the Spaniards. The enemies of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal in Carthage continued to persecute the friends of those men, despising Hannibal on account of his youth. The latter, believing that this persecution was originally directed against himself and that he might secure his own safety by means of his country’s fears, began to think about involving it in a great war. Believing, as was the fact, that a war between the Romans and Carthaginians once begun would last a long time, and that the undertaking would bring great glory to himself, even if he should fail (it was said, also, that he had been sworn on the altar by his father, while yet a boy, that he would be an eternal enemy of Rome), he resolved to cross the Iberus in defiance of the treaty. For a pretext he procured certain persons to make accusations against the Saguntines. By continually forwarding these accusations to Carthage, and by accusing the Romans of secretly inciting the Spaniards to revolt, he obtained permission from Carthage to take such steps as he should think fit. Thereupon he crossed the Iberus and destroyed the city of Saguntum with its inhabitants. Thus the treaty, made between the Romans and the Carthaginians after the war in Sicily, was broken.
3. τρίτος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε στρατηγὸς Ἰβήρων ὑπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀποδείκνυται, φιλοπόλεμος καὶ συνετὸς εἶναι δοκῶν, Ἀννίβας ὅδε, Βάρκα μὲν υἱὸς ὤν, Ἀσδρούβου δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς ἀδελφός, νέος δὲ κομιδῇ, καὶ ὡς μειράκιον ἔτι τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ κηδεστῇ συνών. καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Καρχηδονίων αὐτῷ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐπεψήφισεν. οὕτω μὲν Ἀννίβας, περὶ οὗ τάδε συγγράφω, γίγνεται στρατηγὸς Καρχηδονίων ἐπʼ Ἴβηρσι· τῶν δʼ ἐχθρῶν τῶν Βάρκα τε καὶ Ἀσδρούβου τοὺς φίλους τοὺς ἐκείνων διωκόντων, καὶ Ἀννίβου τοῦδε καταφρονούντων ὡς ἔτι νέου, ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦθʼ ὁ Ἀννίβας ἐφʼ ἑαυτὸν ἡγούμενος, καὶ νομίζων οἱ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἐκ τῶν τῆς πατρίδος φόβων περιέσεσθαι, ἐς πόλεμον αὐτοὺς μέγαν ἐμβαλεῖν ἐπενόει. ὑπολαβὼν δʼ, ὥσπερ ἦν, τὸ Ῥωμαίοις ἐπιχειρῆσαι χρόνιόν τε Καρχηδονίοις ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μεγάλην αὐτῷ δόξαν, εἰ καὶ τύχοι πταίσας, τό γε ἐγχείρημα οἴσειν, λεγόμενος δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπὶ βωμῶν ἔτι παῖς ὁρκωθῆναι Ῥωμαίοις ἐπιβουλεύων οὔ ποτʼ ἐκλείψειν, ἐπενόει παρὰ τὰς σπονδὰς τὸν Ἴβηρα διαβῆναι, καὶ παρεσκεύαζέ τινας ἐς πρόφασιν κατηγορεῖν Ζακανθαίων. γράφων τε ταῦτα συνεχῶς ἐς Καρχηδόνα, καὶ προστιθεὶς ὅτι Ῥωμαῖοι κρύφα τὴν Ἰβηρίαν αὐτῶν ἀφιστᾶσιν, ἔτυχε παρὰ Καρχηδονίων πράσσειν ὅ τι δοκιμάσειεν. ὁ μὲν δὴ τὸν Ἴβηρα διαβὰς τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν ἡβηδὸν διέφθειρε, Ῥωμαίοις δὲ καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ἐπὶ τῷδε ἐλέλυντο αἱ σπονδαὶ αἱ γενόμεναι αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν ἐν Σικελίᾳ.
4. What Hannibal himself and what the other Carthaginian and Roman generals after him did in Spain, I have related in the Spanish history. Having collected a large army of Celtiberians, Africans, and other nationalities, and put the command of Spain in the hands of his brother Hasdrubal, he crossed over the Pyrenees mountains into the country of the Celts, which is now called Gaul, with 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 37 elephants. He passed through the country of the Gauls, conciliating some with money and some by persuasion, and overcoming others by force. When he came to the Alps and found no road through or over them (for they were exceedingly precipitous), he nevertheless marched boldly forward, but suffered great losses. The snow and ice being heaped high in front, he cut down and burned wood, quenched the ashes with water and vinegar, and thus rendering the rocks brittle he shattered them with iron hammers and opened a passage which is still in use over the mountains and is called Hannibal’s pass. As his supplies began to fail he pressed forward, the Romans remaining in ignorance until he was actually in Italy. Scarcely six months after leaving Spain, and after suffering heavy losses of men, he descended from the mountains to the plain.
4. Ἀννίβας δὲ ὅσα μὲν αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ μετʼ αὐτὸν ἄλλοι Καρχηδονίων τε καὶ Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοὶ περὶ Ἰβηρίαν ἔπραξαν, ἡ Ἰβηρικὴ γραφὴ δηλοῖ· ἐπιλεξάμενος δὲ Κελτιβήρων τε καὶ Λιβύων καὶ ἑτέρων ἐθνῶν ὅτι πλείστους, καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ παραδοὺς Ἀσδρούβᾳ τῷ ἀδελφῷ, τὰ Πυρηναῖα ὄρη διέβαινεν ἐς τὴν Κελτικὴν τὴν νῦν λεγομένην Γαλατίαν, ἄγων πεζοὺς ἐνακισμυρίους καὶ ἱππέας ἐς δισχιλίους ἐπὶ μυρίοις καὶ ἐλέφαντας ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα. Γαλατῶν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ὠνούμενος, τοὺς δὲ πείθων, τοὺς δὲ καὶ βιαζόμενος, διώδευε τὴν χώραν. ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ Ἄλπεια ὄρη, καὶ μηδεμίαν μήτε δίοδον μήτε ἄνοδον εὑρών (ἀπόκρημνα γάρ ἐστιν ἰσχυρῶς), ἐπέβαινε κἀκείνοις ὑπὸ τόλμης, κακοπαθῶν χιονος τε πολλῆς οὔσης καὶ κρύους, τὴν μὲν ὕλην τέμνων τε καὶ κατακαίων, τὴν δὲ τέφραν σβεννὺς ὕδατι καὶ ὄξει, καὶ τὴν πέτραν ἐκ τοῦδε ψαφαρὰν γιγνομένην σφύραις σιδηραῖς θραύων, καὶ ὁδὸν ποιῶν ἣ καὶ νῦν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐντριβὴς καὶ καλεῖται δίοδος Ἀννίβου. τῶν δὲ τροφῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιλειπουσῶν ἠπείγετο μέν, ἔτι λανθάνων ὅτι καὶ πάρεστιν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἕκτῳ δὲ μόλις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξ Ἰβήρων ἀναστάσεως μηνί, πλείστους ἀποβαλών, ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν κατέβαινε.
5. After a brief pause he attacked Taurasia, a Gallic town, took it by storm, and put the prisoners to death, in order to strike terror into the rest of the Gauls. Then he advanced to the river Eridanus, now called the Padus [Po], where the Romans were at war with the Gallic tribe called the Boii, and pitched his camp. The Roman consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, was at that time contending with the Carthaginians in Spain. When he learned of Hannibal’s incursion into Italy, he left his brother, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, in charge of affairs in Spain and sailed for Etruria. Marching thence with such allies as he could collect, he came before Hannibal to the Po. He sent Manlius and Atilius, who were conducting the war against the Boii, back to Rome, as they had no right to command when a consul was on the ground, and taking their forces drew them up for battle with Hannibal. After a skirmish and a cavalry engagement, the Romans were surrounded by the Africans and fled to their camp. The next night they took refuge in Placentia, a place strongly fortified, crossing the Po and then breaking down the bridge. Nevertheless Hannibal made a new bridge and crossed the river.
5. καὶ μικρὸν ἀναπαύσας προσέβαλε Ταυρασίᾳ, πόλει Κελτικῇ. κατὰ κράτος δὲ αὐτὴν ἐξελών, τοὺς μὲν αἰχμαλώτους ἔσφαξεν ἐς κατάπληξιν τῆς ἄλλης Κελτικῆς, ἐπὶ δὲ ποταμὸν Ἠριδανὸν τὸν νῦν Πάδον λεγόμενον ἐλθών, ἔνθα Ῥωμαῖοι Κελτοῖς τοῖς καλουμένοις Βοιοῖς ἐπολέμουν, ἐστρατοπέδευσεν. ὁ δʼ ὕπατος ὁ Ῥωμαίων Πόπλιος Κορνήλιος Σκιπίων, Καρχηδονίοις ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πολεμῶν, ἐπεὶ τῆς ἐσβολῆς Ἀννίβου τῆς ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐπύθετο, τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ ὅδε Γναῖον Κορνήλιον Σκιπίωνα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι καταλιπὼν διέπλευσεν ἐς Τυρρηνίαν, ὅθεν ὁδεύων τε καὶ συμμάχους ὅσους δύναιτο ἀγείρων ἔφθασεν ἐπὶ τὸν Πάδον Ἀννίβαν. καὶ Μάλλιον μὲν καὶ Ἀτίλιον, οἳ τοῖς Βοιοῖς ἐπολέμουν, ἐς Ῥώμην ἔπεμψεν ὡς οὐ δέον αὐτοὺς ἔτι στρατηγεῖ ὑπάτου παρόντος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν στρατὸν παραλαβὼν ἐς μάχην ἐξέτασσε πρὸς Ἀννίβαν. καὶ γενομένης ἀκροβολίας τε καὶ ἱππομαχίας, οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι κυκλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Λιβύων ἔφευγον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης ἐς Πλακεντίαν ἀνεχώρουν ἀσφαλῶς τετειχισμένην, τὸν Πάδον ἐπὶ γεφυρῶν περάσαντές τε καὶ λύσαντες τὰς γεφύρας. τὸν μὲν οὖν ποταμὸν καὶ ὁ Ἀννίβας ζεύξας ἐπέρα, τὸ δʼ ἔργον εὐθὺς τόδε, πρῶτον ἢ δεύτερον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Ἀλπείων ὀρῶν διαβάσει, παρὰ τοῖς ἐπέκεινα Κελτοῖς ἐξῇρε τὸν Ἀννίβαν ὡς ἄμαχον στρατηγὸν καὶ τύχῃ λαμπρᾷ χρώμενον.
6. These exploits, one after another, following his passage of the Alps, exalted Hannibal’s fame among the Cisalpine Gauls as an invincible commander and one most highly favored by fortune. In order to increase the admiration of those barbarians, who were easily deceived, he frequently changed his clothes and his hair, using carefully prepared devices each time. When the Gauls saw him moving among their people now an old man, then a young man, and again a middle-aged man, and continually changing from one to the other, they were astonished and thought that he partook of the divine nature. Sempronius, the other consul, being then in Sicily and learning what had happened, embarked his forces, came to Scipio’s aid, and encamped at a distance of forty stades from him. The following day they all made ready for battle. The river Trebia separated the hostile armies, which the Romans crossed before daylight on a raw, sleety morning of the spring equinox, wading in the water up to their breasts. Hannibal allowed his army to rest till the second hour and then marched out.
6. ὁ δέ, ὡς ἐν βαρβάροις τε καὶ τεθηπόσιν αὐτόν, καὶ διʼ ἄμφω δυναμένοις ἀπατᾶσθαι, τὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὴν κόμην ἐνήλασσε συνεχῶς ἐσκευασμέναις ἐπινοίαις· καὶ αὐτὸν οἱ Κελτοὶ περιιόντα τὰ ἔθνη πρεσβύτην ὁρῶντες, εἶτα νέον, εἶτα μεσαιπόλιον, καὶ συνεχῶς ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, θαυμάζοντες ἐδόκουν θειοτέρας φύσεως λαχεῖν. Σεμπρώνιος δʼ ὁ ἕτερος ὕπατος, ἐν Σικελίᾳ τότε ὢν καὶ πυθόμενος, διέπλευσε πρὸς τὸν Σκιπίωνα, καὶ τεσσαράκοντα σταδίους αὐτοῦ διασχὼν ἐστρατοπέδευσεν. καὶ τῆς ἐπιούσης ἔμελλον ἅπαντες ἐς μάχην ἥξειν. ποταμὸς δʼ ἦν ἐν μέσῳ Τρεβίας, ὃν Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸ ἕω, χειμερίου τε τῆς τροπῆς οὔσης καὶ ὑετοῦ καὶ κρύους, ἐπέρων βρεχόμενοι μέχρι τῶν μαστῶν. Ἀννίβας δὲ καὶ ἐς δευτέραν ὥραν ἀνέπαυσε τὴν στρατιάν, καὶ τότε ἐξῆγεν.
7. The order of battle on each side was as follows. The Roman cavalry were posted on the wings in order to protect the infantry. Hannibal ranged his elephants opposite the Roman horse and his foot-soldiers against the legions, and he ordered his own cavalry to remain quiet behind the elephants until he should give the signal. When battle was joined the horses of the Romans, terrified by the sight and smell of the elephants, broke and fled. The foot-soldiers, although suffering much and weakened by cold, wet clothes, and want of sleep, nevertheless boldly attacked these beasts, wounded them, and cut the hamstrings of some, and were already pushing back the enemy’s infantry. Hannibal, observing this, gave the signal to his horse to attack the Roman flank. The Roman horse having been just dispersed by fear of the elephants, the foot-soldiers were left without protection, and were now in difficulties. Fearing lest they should be surrounded, they everywhere broke in flight to their own camp. Many foot-soldiers were cut off by the enemy’s horse and many perished in the swift stream, for the river was now swollen with melting snow so that they could not wade, on account of its depth, nor could they swim, on account of the weight of their armor. Scipio, who followed trying to rally them, was wounded and almost killed, and was with difficulty rescued and carried to Cremona. There was a small arsenal near Placentia which Hannibal laid siege to, where he lost 400 men and was himself wounded. And now they all went into winter quarters, Scipio in Cremona and Placentia, and Hannibal on the Po.
7. παράταξις δʼ ἦν ἑκατέρων … τὰ κέρατα κατεῖχον, ἀμφὶ τὴν φάλαγγα τῶν πεζῶν. Ἀννίβας δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἱππεῦσιν ἀντέταξε τοὺς ἐλέφαντας, τῇ δὲ φάλαγγι τοὺς πεζούς· τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἐκέλευσεν ὀπίσω τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἀτρεμεῖν ἕως αὐτός τι σημήνῃ. γενομένων δʼ ἐν χερσὶ πάντων, οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαίων ἵπποι τοὺς ἐλέφαντας, οὐ φέροντες αὐτῶν οὔτε τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε τὴν ὀδμήν, ἔφευγον· οἱ δὲ πεζοί, καίπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ κρύους καὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀγρυπνίας τετρυμένοι τε καὶ μαλακοὶ ὄντες, ὅμως ὑπὸ τόλμης τοῖς θηρίοις ἐπεπήδων καὶ ἐτίτρωσκον αὐτά, καὶ τινῶν καὶ τὰ νεῦρα ὑπέκοπτον, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἐνέκλινον ἤδη. θεασάμενος δʼ ὁ Ἀννίβας ἐσήμηνε τὴν ἵππον κυκλοῦσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους. ἐσκεδασμένων δʼ ἄρτι τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν ἱππέων διὰ τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν πεζῶν μόνων τε ὄντων καὶ κακοπαθούντων καὶ δεδιότων τὴν περικύκλωσιν, φυγὴ πανταχόθεν ἦν ἐς τὰ στρατόπεδα. καὶ ἀπώλλυντο οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων καταλαμβανόντων ἅτε πεζούς, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραφέροντος· τοῦ γὰρ ἡλίου τὴν χιόνα τήξαντος ὁ ποταμὸς ἐρρύη μέγας, καὶ οὔτε στῆναι διὰ τὸ βάθος οὔτε νεῖν διὰ τὰ ὅπλα ἐδύναντο. Σκιπίων δὲ αὐτοῖς ἑπόμενος καὶ παρακαλῶν ὀλίγου μὲν ἐδέησε τρωθεὶς διαφθαρῆναι, μόλις δʼ ἐς Κρεμῶνα διεσώθη φερόμενος. ἐπίνειον δὲ ἦν τι βραχὺ Πλακεντίας, ᾧ προσβαλὼν ὁ Ἀννίβας ἀπώλεσε τετρακοσίους καὶ αὐτὸς ἐτρώθη. καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε πάντες ἐχείμαζον, Σκιπίων μὲν ἐν Κρεμῶνι καὶ Πλακεντίᾳ, Αννίβας δὲ περὶ Πάδον.
8. When the Romans in the city learned of this third defeat on the Po (for they had in fact been beaten by the Boii before Hannibal arrived), they levied a new army of their own citizens which, with those already on the Po, amounted to thirteen legions, and they called for double that number from the allies. At this time the legion consisted of 5000 foot and 300 horse. Some of these they sent to Spain, some to Sardinia (for they were at war there also), and some to Sicily. The greater part were despatched against Hannibal under Cn. Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, who had succeeded Scipio and Sempronius as consuls. Servilius hastened to the Po where he received the command from Scipio. The latter, having been chosen proconsul, sailed for Spain. Flaminius, with 30,000 foot and 3000 horse, guarded Italy within the Apennines, which alone can be properly called Italy. The Apennines extend from the centre of the Alpine range to the sea. The country on the right-hand side of the Apennines is Italy proper. The other side, extending to the Adriatic, is now called Italy also, just as Etruria is now called Italy, but is inhabited by people of Greek descent, along the Adriatic shore, the remainder being occupied by Gauls, the same people who at an early period attacked and burned Rome. When Camillus drove them out and pursued them to the Apennines, it is my opinion that they crossed over these mountains and made a settlement near the Adriatic instead of their former abode. Hence this part of the country is still called Gallic Italy.
8. οἱ δʼ ἐν ἄστει Ῥωμαῖοι πυθόμενοι, καὶ τρίτον ἤδη πταίοντες περὶ Πάδον ἥττηντο γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ Βοιῶν πρὸ Ἀννίβου), στρατιάν τε παρʼ αὑτῶν ἄλλην κατέλεγον, σὺν τοῖς οὖσι περὶ τὸν Πάδον ὡς εἶναι τρισκαίδεκα τέλη, καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἑτέραν διπλασίονα ταύτης ἐπήγγελλον. ἤδη δὲ αὐτοῖς τὸ τέλος εἶχε πεζοὺς πεντακισχιλίους καὶ ἱππέας τριακοσίους. καὶ τούτων τοὺς μὲν ἐς Ἰβηρίαν ἔπεμπον, τοὺς δʼ ἐς Σαρδόνα κἀκείνην πολεμουμένην, τοὺς δʼ ἐς Σικελίαν. τὰ πλέονα δʼ ἦγον ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν οἱ μετὰ Σκιπίωνα καὶ Σεμπρώνιον αἱρεθέντες ὕπατοι, Σερουίλιός τε Γναῖος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος. ὧν ὁ μὲν Σερουίλιος ἐπὶ τὸν Πάδον ἐπειχθεὶς τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐκδέχεται παρὰ τοῦ Σκιπίωνος (ὁ δὲ Σκιπίων ἀνθύπατος αἱρεθεὶς ἐς Ἰβηρίαν διέπλευσε), Φλαμίνιος δὲ τρισμυρίοις τε πεζοῖς καὶ τρισχιλίοις ἱππεῦσι τὴν ἐντὸς Ἀπεννίνων ὀρῶν Ἰταλίαν ἐφύλασσεν, ἣν καὶ μόνην ἄν τις εἴποι κυρίως Ἰταλίαν. τὰ γὰρ Ἀπεννῖνα κατέρχεται μὲν ἐκ μέσων τῶν Ἀλπείων ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, ἔστι δʼ αὐτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πάντα καθαρῶς Ἰταλία, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐς τὸν Ἰόνιον φθάνοντα νῦν μέν ἐστι καὶ ταῦτα Ἰταλία, ὅτι καὶ Τυρρηνία νῦν Ἰταλία, οἰκοῦσι δʼ αὐτῶν τὰ μὲν Ἕλληνες, ἀμφὶ τὴν Ἰόνιον ἀκτήν, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ Κελτοί, ὅσοι τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπιθέμενοι τὴν πόλιν ἐνέπρησαν. ὅτε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐξελαύνων Κάμιλλος ἐδίωκε μέχρι τῶν Ἀπεννίνων ὀρῶν, ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν ὑπερβάντες αὐτά, ἀντὶ ἠθῶν τῶν ἰδίων, παρὰ τὸν Ἰόνιον οἰκῆσαι· καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς χώρας ἔτι νῦν οὕτω καλοῦσιν, Ἰταλίαν Γαλατικήν.
9. Thus had the Romans divided their large armies at this juncture for many campaigns. Hannibal, learning this fact, moved secretly in the early spring, devastated Etruria, and advanced toward Rome. The citizens became greatly alarmed as he drew near, for they had no force at hand fit for battle. Nevertheless, 8000 of those who remained were brought together, over whom Centenius, one of the patricians, although a private citizen, was appointed commander, there being no regular officer present, and sent into Umbria to the Plestine marshes to occupy the narrow passages which offered the shortest way to Rome. In the meantime Flaminius, who guarded the interior of Italy with 30,000 men, learning of the rapidity of Hannibal’s movement, changed his position hastily, giving his army no chance to rest. Fearing for the safety of the city and being inexperienced in war (for he had been wafted into power on a popular breeze), he hastened to engage with Hannibal.
9. Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν δὴ μεγάλοις στρατοῖς ἐς πολλὰ ὁμοῦ διῄρηντο· Ἀννίβας δὲ τούτων αἰσθόμενος, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι, τοὺς ἄλλους λαθὼν ἐδῄου τὴν Τυρρηνίαν καὶ προύβαινεν ἐς τὸ μέρος τὸ ἐπὶ Ῥώμης. οἱ δὲ πλησιάζοντος αὐτοῦ πάνυ ἔδεισαν, οὐ παρούσης σφίσιν ἀξιομάχου δυνάμεως. ἐστράτευον δὲ ὅμως ἐκ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ὀκτακισχιλίους, καὶ Κεντήνιον αὐτοῖς τινὰ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἰδιωτῶν, οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς παρούσης, ἐπέστησάν τε καὶ ἐξέπεμπον ἐς Ὀμβρικοὺς ἐς τὴν Πλειστινην λίμνην, τὰ στενὰ προληψόμενον, ᾗ συντομώτατόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥώμην. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ Φλαμίνιος ὁ τοῖς τρισμυρίοις τὴν ἐντὸς Ἰταλίαν φυλάσσων, αἰσθόμενος τῆς σπουδῆς Ἀννίβου, μετέβαινεν ὀξέως, οὐ διαναπαύων τὴν στρατιάν. δέει τε περὶ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν ἀπειροπόλεμός τε καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ δημοκοπίας ᾑρημένος, ἠπείγετο Ἀννίβᾳ συμπλεκῆναι.
10. The latter, well aware of his rashness and inexperience, moved forward and took a position with a mountain and a lake [Thrasimenus] before him, concealing his light-armed troops and his cavalry in a ravine. Flaminius, seeing the enemy’s camp in the early morning, delayed a little to let his men rest from their toilsome march and to fortify his camp, after which he led them straightway to battle, although they were still weary with night-watches and hard labor. Caught between the mountain and the lake and the enemy (for the ambush suddenly appeared everywhere), he lost his own life, and 20,000 men were slain with him. The remaining 10,000 escaped to a village strongly fortified by nature. Maharbal, Hannibal’s lieutenant, who had himself acquired very great renown in war, not being able to take them easily and thinking it unwise to fight with desperate men, persuaded them to lay down their arms, agreeing that they should go free wherever they pleased. When they had complied with this agreement he brought them disarmed to Hannibal. The latter, denying that Maharbal had authority to make such an agreement without his consent, nevertheless treated the Roman allies with kindness and sent them home without ransom, in order to conciliate their towns. He kept all the Romans as prisoners. He gave the booty to the Gauls who were serving with him, in order to attach them to him by the hope of gain, and then marched forward. When this news reached the consul Servilius on the Po, he marched to Etruria with 40,000 men. Centenius, with his 8000, had already occupied the narrow passage previously mentioned.
10. ὁ δὲ αἰσθόμενος αὐτοῦ τῆς τε ὁρμῆς καὶ ἀπειρίας, ὄρος μέν τι καὶ λίμνην προυβάλετο πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ψιλοὺς δὲ καὶ ἱππέας ἐς φάραγγα ἀποκρύψας ἐστρατοπέδευεν. καὶ αὐτὸν ὁ Φλαμίνιος κατιδὼν ἅμα ἕῳ σμικρὸν μέν τι διέτριψε, τὸν στρατὸν ἀναπαύων ἐξ ὁδοιπορίας καὶ χαρακοποιούμενος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐξῆγεν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην αὔους ὄντας ὑπʼ ἀγρυπνίας καὶ κόπου. τῆς δʼ ἐνέδρας ἐκφανείσης ἐν μέσῳ ληφθεὶς τοῦ τε ὄρους καὶ τῆς λίμνης καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτός τε ἀνῃρέθη καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ δισμύριοι. τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἔτι μυρίους, ἔς τινα κώμην ὀχυρὰν συμφυγόντας, Μαάρβαλ ὁ ὑποστράτηγος Ἀννίβου, μεγίστην καὶ ὅδε ἐπὶ στρατηγίᾳ δόξαν ἔχων, οὐ δυνάμενος ἑλεῖν εὐχερῶς, οὐδὲ ἀξιῶν ἀπεγνωκόσι μάχεσθαι, ἔπεισε τὰ ὅπλα ἀποθέσθαι, συνθέμενος ἀπολύσειν ὅπῃ θέλοιεν. ὡς δὲ ἀπέθεντο, λαβὼν ἦγεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν γυμνούς. ὁ δʼ οὐ φάμενος εἶναι κύριον χωρὶς αὑτοῦ ταῦτα συνθέσθαι τὸν Μαάρβαλ, τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων φιλανθρωπευσάμενος ἀπέλυσεν ἐς τὰ ἑαυτῶν, θηρεύων τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἦσαν, εἶχε δήσας. τὴν δὲ λείαν τοῖς συστρατεύουσι Κελτοῖς ἀποδόμενος, ἵνα καὶ τούσδε θεραπεύσειε τῷ κέρδει, προύβαινεν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν, αἰσθομένου μὲν ἤδη τῶν γιγνομένων τοῦ περὶ Πάδον στρατηγοῦ Σερουιλίου, καὶ τετρακισμυρίοις ἐπὶ Τυρρηνίας ἐπειγομένου, Κεντηνίου δὲ ἤδη τοῖς ὀκτακισχιλίοις τὰ στενὰ προειληφότος.
11. When Hannibal saw the Plestine marsh and the mountain overhanging it, and Centenius between them guarding the passage, he inquired of the guides whether there was any way around. When they said there was no path but that the whole region was rugged and precipitous, he, nevertheless, sent a body of light-armed troops, under the command of Maharbal, to explore the district and pass around the mountain by night. When he judged that they had reached their destination he attacked Centenius in front. While the engagement was in progress, Maharbal was seen pushing forward strenuously on the summit above, where he raised a shout. The Romans thus surrounded took to flight, and there was a great slaughter among them, 3000 being killed and 800 taken prisoners. The remainder escaped with difficulty. When this news reached the city they feared lest Hannibal should march against them at once. They collected stones upon the walls, and the old men armed themselves. Being in want of arms they took down from the temples those that had been hung there as trophies of former wars, and, as was customary in times of great danger, they chose a dictator, Fabius Maximus being selected.
11. Ἀννίβας δὲ ἐπειδὴ τήν τε λίμνην εἶδε τὴν Πλειστίνην καὶ τὸ ὄρος τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτήν, καὶ τὸν Κεντήνιον ἐν μέσῳ κρατοῦντα τῆς διόδου, τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν ὁδῶν ἐξήταζεν εἴ τις εἴη περίοδος. οὐδεμίαν δὲ φαμένων εἶναι τρίβον, ἀλλʼ ἀπόκρημνα πάντα καὶ φαραγγώδη, διʼ αὐτῶν ὅμως ἔπεμπε τοὺς ψιλοὺς νύκτωρ τὸ ὄρος περιιέναι, καὶ Μαάρβαλ μετʼ αὐτῶν. τεκμηράμενος δʼ ὅτε δύναιντο περιελθεῖν, προσέβαλε τῷ Κεντηνίῳ κατὰ μέτωπον. καὶ συνεστώτων ἑκατέρων, πάνυ προθύμως ὁ Μαάρβαλ ἐκ κορυφῆς ἄνωθεν ὤφθη τε καὶ ἠλάλαξεν. Ῥωμαίων δʼ εὐθὺς ἦν φυγὴ καὶ φόνος κεκυκλωμένων, καὶ τρισχίλιοι μὲν ἔπεσον ὀκτακόσιοι δʼ ἐλήφθησαν· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ μόλις διέφυγον. πυθόμενοι δὲ οἱ ἐν ἄστει, καὶ δείσαντες μὴ εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁ Ἀννίβας ἔλθοι, τό τε τεῖχος ἐπλήρουν λίθων καὶ τοὺς γέροντας ὥπλιζον, ὅπλων μὲν ἀποροῦντες, τὰ δὲ λάφυρα ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν καταφέροντες, ἃ ἐκ πολέμων ἄλλων κόσμος αὐτοῖς περιέκειτο· δικτάτορά τε, ὡς ἐν κινδύνῳ, Φάβιον εἵλοντο Μάξιμον.
12. But divine Providence turned Hannibal away toward the Adriatic, where he ravaged the sea-coast and gathered vast plunder. The consul Servilius, marching parallel with him, came to Ariminum, being distant from Hannibal by one day’s march. He retained his army there in order to hearten those Gauls who were still friendly to Rome. When Fabius Maximus, the dictator, arrived, he sent to Rome Servilius, who could be no longer either consul or general after a dictator had been chosen. Fabius followed Hannibal closely, but did not come to an engagement with him, although often challenged. He kept careful watch on his enemy’s movements, and lay near him and prevented him from besieging any town. After the country was exhausted Hannibal began to be short of provisions. So he traversed it again, drawing his army up each day and offering battle. Fabius would not come to an engagement, although his master of horse, Minucius Rufus, disapproved of his policy, and wrote to his friends in Rome that Fabius held back on account of cowardice. As Fabius had occasion to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, the command of the army fell to Minucius, and he had a sort of a fight with Hannibal, and as he thought he had the best of it he grew bolder and wrote to the Senate accusing Fabius of not wanting to win a victory; and the Senate, when Fabius had returned to the camp, voted that his master of horse should share the command equally with him.
12. Ἀννίβας δέ, θεοῦ παράγοντος αὐτόν, ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον αὖθις ἐτράπη, καὶ τὴν παράλιον ὁδεύων ἐπόρθει, λείαν τε περιήλαυνε πολλήν. Σερουίλιος δʼ ὕπατος ἀντιπαριὼν αὐτῷ κατῇρεν ἐς Ἀρίμινον, ἀπέχων Ἀννίβου μίαν ἡμέραν· ἔνθα τὴν στρατιὰν συνεῖχε καὶ τοὺς ἔτι φίλους Κελτῶν ἀπεθάρρυνεν, ἕως ἀφικόμενος Φάβιος Μάξιμος ὁ δικτάτωρ Σερουίλιον μὲν ἐς Ῥώμην ἔπεμπεν ὡς οὔτε ὕπατον οὔτε στρατηγὸν ἔτι ὄντα δικτάτορος ᾑρημένου, αὐτὸς δὲ τῷ Ἀννίβᾳ παρακολουθῶν ἐς μὲν χεῖρας οὐκ ᾔει, πολλάκις ἐκείνου προκαλουμένου, πολιορκεῖν δʼ οὐδένα εἴα, παραφυλάσσων καὶ ἐπικείμενος. ὁ δέ, τῆς χώρας ἐξαναλωμένης, τροφῶν ἠπόρει, καὶ αὐτὴν αὖθις περιιὼν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἐξέτασσε, προκαλούμενος ἐς μάχην. Φάβιος δʼ οὐ συνεπλέκετο, καταγιγνώσκοντος αὐτοῦ Μινουκίου Ῥούφου, ὃς ἵππαρχος μὲν ἦν αὐτῷ, ἔγραφε δʼ ἐς Ῥώμην τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ὀκνοίη Φάβιος ὑπὸ δειλίας. διαδραμόντος δʼ ἐς Ῥώμην ἐπὶ θυσίας τινὰς τοῦ Φαβίου, ὁ Μινούκιος ἡγούμενος τοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπλέκη τινὰ μάχην τῷ Ἀννίβᾳ, καὶ δόξας πλέον ἔχειν θρασύτερον ἐς Ῥώμην ἐπέστελλε τῇ βουλῇ, τὸν Φάβιον αἰτιώμενος οὐκ ἐθέλοντα νικῆσαι. καὶ ἡ βουλή, ἐπανεληλυθότος ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἤδη τοῦ Φαβίου, ἴσον ἰσχύειν αὐτῷ τὸν ἵππαρχον ἀπέφηνεν.
13. They accordingly divided the army and encamped near each other; and each held to his own opinion, Fabius seeking to exhaust Hannibal by the lapse of time and meanwhile to receive no damage from him, while Minucius was eager for a decisive fight. Shortly afterward Minucius joined battle, and Fabius looked on to see what would happen, holding his own forces well in hand. In this way he was enabled to receive Minucius when he was beaten, and to drive Hannibal’s men back from the pursuit. Thus did Fabius save Minucius from a great disaster, bearing him no malice for his slander. Then Minucius, recognizing his own want of experience, laid down his command and delivered his part of the army to Fabius, who held to the belief that the only time for a skilful captain to fight is when it is necessary. This maxim, at a later time, was often brought to mind by Augustus, who was slow to fight and preferred to win by art rather than by valor. Fabius continued to watch Hannibal as before and prevented him from ravaging the country, not coming to an engagement with his whole army but merely cutting off stragglers, well knowing that Hannibal would soon be short of supplies.
13. οἱ μὲν δὴ μερισάμενοι τὴν στρατιὰν πλησίον ἀλλήλων ἐστρατοπέδευον, καὶ τῆς γνώμης ἑκάτερος εἴχοντο τῆς ἑαυτοῦ, Φάβιος μὲν ἐκτρύχειν Ἀννίβαν τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι μηδὲν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ παθεῖν, ὁ δὲ Μινούκιος μάχῃ διακριθῆναι. συνιόντος δὲ ἐς μάχην τοῦ Μινουκίου, Φάβιος τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προορῶν ἐν μέσῳ τὴν στρατιὰν ἀτρεμοῦσαν ἔστησε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Μινουκίου τραπέντας ἀνελάμβανε, τοὺς δʼ Ἀννίβου διώκοντας ἀπεκρούετο. καὶ Φάβιος μὲν ὧδε τὴν συμφορὰν ἐπεκούφισε τῷ Μινουκίῳ, οὐδὲν ἐπιμηνίσας τῆς διαβολῆς· ὁ δὲ Μινούκιος αὑτοῦ καταγνους ἀπειρίαν ἀπέθετο τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ στρατοῦ παρέδωκε τῷ Φαβίῳ, ἡγουμένῳ πρὸς ἄνδρα τεχνίτην μάχης ἕνα καιρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀνάγκην. οὗ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σεβαστὸς ὕστερον πολλάκις ἐμέμνητο, οὐκ ὢν εὐχερὴς οὐδʼ οὗτος ἐς μάχας μᾶλλον τόλμῃ ἢ τέχνῃ χρῆσθαι. Φάβιος μὲν οὖν αὖθις ὁμοίως ἐφύλασσε τὸν Ἀννίβαν, καὶ τὴν χώραν πορθεῖν ἐκώλυεν, οὐ συμπλεκόμενος αὐτοῦ τῷ στρατῷ παντί, τοῖς δʼ ἀποσκιδναμένοις μόνοις ἐπιτιθέμενος, καὶ σαφῶς εἰδὼς ἀπορήσοντα τροφῶν αὐτίκα τὸν Ἀννίβαν.
14. They were now approaching a narrow pass of which Hannibal was ignorant. Fabius sent forward 4000 men to occupy it, keeping the remainder of his force at the other extremity where he encamped on a strong hill. When Hannibal discovered that he had been caught between Fabius and the defended pass he was more alarmed than he had ever been before, for there was no way of escape, but all the country round about was rugged and precipitous. He could not hope to overcome Fabius or those defending the pass, on account of the difficulties of the ground. In this desperate situation he put to death his 5000 prisoners lest they should add a new tumult to the danger. Then he tied torches to the horns of all the cattle he had in the camp (and there were many), and when night came he lighted the torches, extinguished all the camp fires, and commanded the strictest silence. Then he ordered the most courageous of his young men to drive the cattle up the rocky places between Fabius and the pass. These, urged on by their drivers and burned by the torches, ran furiously up the mountain side, and if any of them fell down they would get up and run on again.
14. στενῆς δὲ διόδου πλησιαζούσης, ὁ μὲν Ἀννίβας αὐτὴν οὐ προείδετο, Φάβιος δὲ προπέμψας τετρακισχιλίους κατέλαβε, καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς αὐτὸς ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐστρατοπέδευεν ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ. ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ὡς ᾔσθετο ληφθεὶς ἐν μέσῳ Φαβίου τε καὶ τῶν στενῶν φυλασσομένων, ἔδεισε μὲν ὡς οὔ ποτε πρότερον· οὐ γὰρ εἶχε διέξοδον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἦν ἀπόκρημνα καὶ δύσβατα, οὐδʼ ἤλπιζε Φάβιον ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν στενῶν βιάσεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν χωρίων ὀχυρότητα. ὧδε δʼ ἔχων ἀπορίας τοὺς μὲν αἰχμαλώτους ἐς πεντακισχιλίους ὄντας κατέσφαξεν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ νεωτερίσειαν, βοῦς δὲ ὅσας εἶχεν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ (πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος ἦν), τοῖς κέρασιν αὐτῶν δᾷδας περιέθηκε, καὶ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης τὰς δᾷδας ἐξάψας τὸ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ πῦρ ἔσβεσε, καὶ σιγὴν βαθεῖαν ἔχειν παρήγγειλε, τοῖς δʼ εὐτολμοτάτοις τῶν νέων ἐκέλευσε τὰς βοῦς ἐλαύνειν μετὰ σπουδῆς ἄνω πρὸς τὰ ἀπόκρημνα, ἃ ἦν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε Φαβίου καὶ τῶν στενῶν. αἱ δʼ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐλαυνόντων ἐπειγόμεναι, καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκκαίοντος αὐτάς, ἀνεπήδων ἐπὶ τοὺς κρημνοὺς ἀφειδῶς καὶ βιαίως, εἶτα κατέπιπτον καὶ αὖθις ἀνεπήδων.
15. The Romans on either side when they observed the silence and darkness in Hannibal’s camp and the many and various lights on the mountain side, could not exactly make out what was taking place, because it was night. Fabius, indeed, suspected that it was some stratagem of Hannibal’s, but not being sure he kept his army in its position on account of the darkness. But those who held the pass imagined, just as Hannibal wished, that in his extremity he was trying to escape by scaling the cliffs above. So they hastened away to the place where they saw the lights, in order to catch Hannibal there in difficulties. The latter, when he discovered that the pass was deserted, advanced with a flying detachment, in dead silence and without light, in order to conceal the movement. Having seized the pass and strengthened his position he made a signal by trumpet, and the army in camp answered him with a shout and immediately relighted the fires. Then the Romans saw that they had been deceived. The remainder of Hannibal’s army and those who drove the cattle now advanced to the pass without fear, and when he had brought them all together he moved forward. Thus did Hannibal succeed beyond expectation and rescue his army from danger. Thence he advanced to Geronia, a city of Apulia, which was well stored with provisions. This town he captured, and here went into winter quarters in the midst of abundance.
15. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ οἱ ἑκατέρωθεν, ὁρῶντες ἐν μὲν τῷ Ἀννίβου στρατοπέδῳ σιγὴν καὶ σκότον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὄρεσι πῦρ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὡς ἐν νυκτὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀκριβῶς ἐπινοῆσαι, ὁ μὲν Φάβιος εἴκαζεν εἶναί τι στρατήγημα τοῦτο Ἀννίβου, καὶ συνεῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἀτρέμα συνεῖχε τὴν στρατιάν, τὴν νύκτα ὑφορώμενος· οἱ δʼ ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς ὑπέλαβον, ἅπερ ἤθελεν ὁ Ἀννίβας, φεύγειν αὐτὸν ὡς ἐν ἀπόροις, ἄνω διὰ τῶν κρημνῶν βιαζόμενον, καὶ μετεπήδων ἐπὶ τὴν φαντασίαν τοῦ πυρὸς καταθέοντες ὡς ἐκεῖ ληψόμενοι τὸν Ἀννίβαν κακοπαθοῦντα. ὁ δὲ ὡς εἶδε καταβάντας αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν στενῶν, διέδραμεν ἐς αὐτὰ τοῖς ταχυτάτοις ἄνευ φωτὸς μετὰ σιωπῆς, ἵνα διαλάθοι, καταλαβὼν δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ κρατυνάμενος ἐσήμηνε τῇ σάλπιγγι· καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀντεβόησεν αὐτῷ, καὶ πῦρ αἰφνίδιον ἐξέφηναν. Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν δὴ τότε ᾔσθοντο τῆς ἀπάτης, ὁ δὲ στρατὸς ὁ ἄλλος Ἀννίβου καὶ οἱ τὰς βοῦς ἐλαύνοντες ἐπὶ τὰ στενὰ ἀδεῶς διέδραμον. καὶ αὐτοὺς συναγαγὼν ἀπῇρεν ἐς τὸ πρόσω. οὕτω μὲν ἐξ ἀέλπτου τότε ὁ Ἀννίβας αὐτός τε περιῆν καὶ τὸν στρατὸν περιέσωζε, καὶ ἐς Γερωνίαν τῆς Ἰαπυγίας ἐπειχθείς, ἣ σίτου πλήρης ἦν, ἐξεῖλεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις ἀδεῶς ἐχείμαζεν.
16. Fabius, pursuing the same policy as before, followed and encamped at a distance of ten stades from Geronia, with the river Aufidus flowing between them. The six months which limited the terms of dictators among the Romans now expired, and the consuls Servilius and Atilius resumed their offices and came to the camp, and Fabius returned to Rome. During the winter frequent skirmishes took place between Hannibal and the Romans in which the latter were generally successful, and showed to the better advantage. Hannibal was all the time writing exultingly to the Carthaginians about the events of the war, but now, having lost many men and being in want of assistance, he asked them to send him soldiers and money. But his enemies, who had jeered at all of his doings, replied that they could not understand how Hannibal should be asking for help when he said he was winning victories, since victorious generals did not ask for money but sent it home to their own people. The Carthaginians followed their suggestion and sent neither soldiers nor money. Hannibal, lamenting this short-sighted policy, wrote to his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, telling him to make an incursion into Italy at the beginning of summer with what men and money he could raise, and ravage the other extremity so that the whole country might be wasted at once and the Romans exhausted by the double encounter. Such was the situation of Hannibal’s affairs.
16. ὁ δὲ Φάβιος καὶ τότε τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἐχόμενος εἵπετο, καὶ τῆς Γερωνίας ἀποσχὼν δέκα σταδίους ἐστρατοπέδευε, λαβὼν ἐν μέσῳ ποταμὸν Αὔφιδον. ληγόντων δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἓξ μηνῶν ἐφʼ οὓς αἱροῦνται Ῥωμαῖοι τοῦς δικτάτορας, οἱ μὲν ὕπατοι Σερουίλιός τε καὶ Ἀτίλιος ἐπὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὰς ἐπανῄεσαν, καὶ ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ ὁ Φάβιος ἐς Ῥώμην ἀπῄει, γίγνονται δέ τινες ἐν τῷδε τῷ χειμῶνι Ἀννίβᾳ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἀκροβολισμοὶ συνεχεῖς ἐς ἀλλήλους· καὶ τὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐπικυδέστερα καὶ εὐθαρσέστερα ἦν. ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἐπέστελλε μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα Καρχηδονίοις ὑπερεπαίρων, τότε δὲ ἀπολωλότων αὐτῷ πολλῶν ἠπόρει, καὶ στρατιὰν ᾔτει καὶ χρήματα. οἱ δὲ ἐχθροὶ πάντα ἐπισκώπτοντες τὰ Ἀννίβου, καὶ τότε ὑπεκρίνοντο ἀπορεῖν ὅτι, τῶν νικώντων οὐκ αἰτούντων χρήματα ἀλλὰ πεμπόντων ἐς τὰς πατρίδας, ὁ Ἀννίβας αἰτοίη, λέγων νικᾶν. οἷς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πεισθέντες οὔτε στρατιὰν ἔπεμπον οὔτε χρήματα. καὶ ὁ Ἀννίβας ταῦτʼ ὀδυρόμενος ἔγραφεν ἐς Ἰβηρίαν Ἀσδρούβᾳ τῷ ἀδελφῷ, παρακαλῶν αὐτὸν ἀρχομένου θέρους μεθʼ ὅσης δύναιτο στρατιᾶς καὶ χρημάτων ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ πορθεῖν αὐτῆς τὰ ἐπέκεινα, ἵνα δῃῷτο πᾶσα καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι κάμνοιεν ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρωθεν.
17. The Romans, distressed by the magnitude of the disasters to Flaminius and Centenius, and considering such a succession of surprising defeats unworthy of their dignity, and that a war within their own territory was not to be tolerated, and furious against Hannibal, levied four new legions in the city to serve against him, and hurried the allied forces from all quarters to Apulia. As consuls they chose Lucius Aemilius, who had acquired military fame in the war against the Illyrians, and Terentius Varro, a demagogue who had won popular favor by the usual high-sounding promises. When they sent the consuls forward they begged them as they were leaving the city to end the war by battle, and not to exhaust the city by delay, by conscriptions, by taxes, and by hunger and idleness due to the devastation of the fields. The consuls on taking command of the army in Apulia had altogether 70,000 foot and 6000 horse, and they encamped near a village called Cannae. Hannibal’s camp was near by. Hannibal, who was always ready to fight and impatient of idleness, was especially so now because he was troubled lest his supplies should fail, for which reason he continually offered battle. He feared also lest his mercenaries should desert him, as they had not received their pay, or disperse through the country in search of food. For this reason he challenged the enemy daily.
17. καὶ τάδε μὲν ἦν περὶ Ἀννίβαν, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τῷ τε μεγέθει τῆς ἥττης τῆς Φλαμινίου καὶ Κεντηνίου περιαλγοῦντες ὡς ἀνάξια σφῶν καὶ παράλογα καὶ ἀθρόα παθόντες, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὅλως οὐ φέροντες ἔνδον ὄντα παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς, ἄλλα τε κατέλεγον ἐκ Ῥώμης τέλη στρατιωτῶν τέσσαρα μετʼ ὀργῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους πανταχόθεν ἤγειρον ἐς Ἰαπυγίαν. ὑπάτους τε αἱροῦνται ἐκ μὲν δόξης πολεμικῆς Λεύκιον Αἰμίλιον τὸν Ἰλλυριοῖς πολεμήσαντα, ἐκ δὲ δημοκοπίας Τερέντιον Οὐάρρωνα, πολλὰ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς συνήθους δοξοκοπίας ὑπισχνούμενον. καὶ αὐτοὺς παραπέμποντες ἐξιόντας ἐδέοντο κρῖναι τὸν πόλεμον μάχῃ, καὶ μὴ τὴν πόλιν ἐκτρύχειν χρόνῳ τε καὶ στρατείαις συνεχέσι καὶ ἐσφοραῖς καὶ λιμῷ καὶ ἀργίᾳ τῆς γῆς δῃουμένης. οἱ δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν ἐν Ἰαπυγίᾳ προσλαβόντες, καὶ τὸ σύμπαν ἔχοντες πεζοὺς μὲν ἑπτακισμυρίους ἱππέας δʼ ἑξακισχιλίους, ἐστρατοπέδευον ἀμφὶ κώμῃ τινὶ καλουμένῃ Κάνναις. καὶ ὁ Ἀννίβας αὐτοῖς ἀντεστρατοπέδευεν. φύσει δὲ ὢν φιλοπόλεμος ὁ Ἀννίβας καὶ οὔ ποτε φέρων ἀργίαν, τότε μάλιστα τῆς ἀπορίας αὐτὸν ἐνοχλούσης ἐξέτασσε συνεχῶς ἐς μάχην, δεδιὼς μὴ οἱ μισθοφόροι μετάθοιντο διὰ τὴν ἀμισθίαν ἢ σκεδασθεῖεν ἐπὶ συλλογὴν ἀγορᾶς. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὕτω προὐκαλεῖτο τοὺς πολεμίους.
18. The opinions of the consuls were diverse. Aemilius thought that it was best to exhaust Hannibal by delay, as he could not hold out long for want of provisions, rather than come to an engagement with a general so skilled in war and an army so accustomed to victory. But Varro, like the demagogue he was, reminded his colleague of the charge which the people had laid upon them at their departure, that they should bring matters to a speedy decision by battle. Servilius, the consul of the previous year, who was still present, alone sustained the opinion of Aemilius. All the senators and the so-called knights who held offices in the army agreed with Varro. While they were still disputing, Hannibal set upon some detachments of theirs that were collecting wood and forage, and he pretended to be defeated, and about the last watch put the bulk of his army in motion as if in retreat. Varro, seeing this, led out the army with the thought of pursuing Hannibal in his flight. Aemilius even then forbade the movement, and as Varro did not obey he consulted the omens alone, according to the Roman custom, and sent word to Varro, just as he was starting, that the day was unpropitious. The latter thereupon came back, not venturing to disregard the omen, but he tore his hair in the sight of the whole army, and cried out that victory had been snatched from him by the envy of his colleague; and the whole crowd shared his anger.
18. γνώμη δὲ τῶν ὑπάτων ἦν, Αἰμιλίου μὲν ὑπομένειν ἐκτρύχοντας Ἀννίβαν οὐ δυνησόμενον ἀντέχειν ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν, μηδὲ διὰ χειρὸς ἔρχεσθαι γεγυμνασμένῳ πολέμοις καὶ εὐτυχίαις ἀνδρὶ καὶ στρατῷ, Τερεντίου δʼ, οἷα δημοκόπου, μνημονεύειν ὧν ὁ δῆμος ἐξιοῦσιν ἐνετέλλετο, καὶ κρῖναι τὴν μάχην ὀξέως. τούτοιν Αἰμιλίῳ μὲν προσετίθετο Σερουίλιος ὁ πέρυσιν ὕπατος ἔτι παρών, Τερεντίῳ δὲ ὅσοι τε ἀπὸ βουλῆς καὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἱππέων ἡγοῦντο τῆς στρατιᾶς. ἀντεχόντων δʼ ἔτι τῶν ἑτέρων, ὁ Ἀννίβας τοῖς χορτολογοῦσιν αὐτῶν ἢ ξυλευομένοις ἐπιτιθέμενος ὑπεκρίνετο ἡττᾶσθαι, καὶ περὶ ἐσχάτην ποτὲ φυλακὴν ἐκίνει τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀναζευγνύς. ὁ δὲ Τερέντιος ἰδὼν ἐξῆγε τὴν στρατιὰν ὡς ἐπὶ φεύγοντα τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἀπαγορεύοντος αὐτῷ καὶ τότε τοῦ Αἰμιλίου. ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν, οἰωνίζετο ὁ Αἰμίλιος ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ, καθάπερ εἰώθασι, καὶ πέμψας ὁδεύοντι ἤδη τῷ Τερεντίῳ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀπαίσιον ἔλεγεν εἶναι. ὁ δʼ ἐπανῄει μέν, αἰδούμενος οἰωνοῖς ἀπειθῆσαι, τὰς δὲ κόμας ἐν ὄψει τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐτίλλετο καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔφερεν ὡς τὴν νίκην ἀφῃρνμένος ὑπὸ ζηλοτυπίας τοῦ συνάρχου. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ συνηγανάκτει.
19. Hannibal, when his scheme failed, returned forth-with to his camp, thus showing that his retreat was feigned, but this did not teach Varro to suspect every movement of Hannibal. Hurrying armed as he was to the praetorium, he complained in the presence of senators, centurions, and tribunes that Aemilius had made a pretence about the omen in order to snatch a sure victory from the city, either hesitating from cowardice or moved by jealousy toward himself. While he was thus venting his wrath the soldiers standing around the tent listened to him and joined in the censure of Aemilius. The latter nevertheless continued to give good advice to those within, but in vain. When all the others, Servilius alone excepted, sided with Varro, he yielded, and on the following day he himself drew up the army in order of battle as commander, for Varro yielded to him that title. Hannibal perceived the movement but he did not come out of his camp because he was not quite ready for battle. On the next day both armies came down to the open field. The Romans were drawn up in three lines with a small interval between them, each part having infantry in the centre, with light-armed troops and cavalry on the wings. Aemilius commanded the centre, Servilius the left wing, and Varro the right. Each had a thousand picked horse at hand to carry aid wherever it should be needed. Such was the Roman formation.
19. Αννίβου δʼ, ἐπεὶ τῆς πείρας ἐξέπιπτεν, αὐτίκα ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐπανελθόντος καὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ἐκφήναντος, οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἐδίδασκε τὸν Τερέντιον πάνθʼ ὑπονοεῖν τὰ Ἀννίβου, ἀλλʼ ὡς εἶχεν, ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐς τὸ στρατήγιον ἐσδραμών, παρόντων ἔτι τῶν τε ἀπὸ βουλῆς καὶ ταξιάρχων καὶ χιλιάρχων, ᾐτιᾶτο περὶ τῶν οἰωνῶν τὸν Αἰμίλιον προφασίσασθαι καὶ νίκην φανερὰν ἀφελέσθαι τὴν πόλιν, ὀκνοῦντα ὑπὸ δειλίας, ἢ οἱ φθονοῦντα διὰ ζηλοτυπίαν. οὕτω δʼ αὐτοῦ βοῶντος ὑπʼ ὀργῆς ἡ στρατιὰ περιεστῶσα τὴν σκηνὴν ἐπήκουε, καὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἐβλασφήμουν. ὁ δὲ πολλὰ μὲν εἶπε τοῖς ἔνδον συμφέροντα μάτην, Τερεντίῳ δέ, πλὴν Σερουιλίου, τῶν ἄλλων συντιθεμένων εἶξεν. καὶ τῆς ἐπιούσης ἐξέτασσεν αὐτὸς ἡγούμενος· παρεχώρει γὰρ ὁ Τερέντιος. Ἀννίβας δʼ ᾔσθετο, καὶ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐπεξῆλθεν (οὐ γάρ πω πρὸς μάχην διετέτακτο), τῇ δʼ ἐπιούσῃ κατέβαινον ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἑκάτεροι, Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ἐς τρία τεταγμένοι, μικρὸν ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων διεστῶτες, καὶ μέρος ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶχε τοὺς πεζοὺς ἐν μέσῳ, τοὺς δὲ ψιλοὺς καὶ ἱππέας ἑκατέρωθεν. στρατηγοὶ δʼ ἐφειστήκεσαν τῷ μέσῳ μὲν Αἰμίλιος, τῷ δὲ λαιῷ Σερουίλιος, Τερέντιος δὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ δεξιά, χιλίους ἀμφʼ αὑτὸν ἕκαστος ἔχων ἱππέας ἐπειλεγμένους, ἐπικουρεῖν ὅπῃ τι πονοίη. οὕτω μὲν ἐτάξαντο Ῥωμαῖοι·
20. Hannibal had previously observed that a stormy east wind began to blow in that region regularly about noon. So he chose the ground where he should have the wind at his back. Then on a wooded hill cut by ravines he placed some cavalry and light-armed troops in ambush, to whom he gave orders that when the battle was joined and the wind had risen, they should fall upon the enemy’s rear. With them were placed 500 Celtiberians who had, in addition to the long swords at their belts, short daggers under their garments. These they were not to use till he himself gave the signal. He divided his whole army into three lines of battle and extended his horse at long distances on the wings in order to outflank the enemy if possible. He gave the command of the right wing to his brother Mago, and of the left to his nephew Hanno, retaining the centre for himself on account of Aemilius’ reputation as an experienced commander. He had 2000 picked horse and Maharbal had 1000, who were ordered to move about and give assistance wherever they saw any part of the army in difficulties. In making these arrangements he protracted the time till about the second hour so that the wind might come to his aid the sooner.
20. ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας πρῶτα μέν, εἰδὼς περὶ μεσημβρίαν εὖρον ζοφώδη τὸν χῶρον ἐξ ἔθους ἐπιπνέοντα, προύλαβεν ὅπῃ κατὰ νώτου τὸ πνεῦμα ἔμελλεν ἕξειν· ἔπειτα ἐς ὄρος περίφυτον καὶ φαραγγῶδες ἱππέας προενήδρευσε καὶ ψιλούς, οἷς εἴρητο, ὅταν αἱ φάλαγγες ἔργων ἔχωνται καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐπίῃ, κατόπιν γίγνεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων. ἄνδρας τε πεντακοσίους Κελτίβηρας ἐπὶ τοῖς μακροῖς ξίφεσιν ὑπὸ τοῖς χιτῶσιν ἄλλα ξίφη βραχύτερα περιέζωσεν, οἷς ἔμελλεν αὐτὸς ὅτε δέοι χρῆσθαι σημανεῖν. σύμπασαν δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν κἀκεῖνος ἐς τρία διῄρει, καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας τοῖς κέρασιν ἐπέτασσεν ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων, εἰ δύναιντο κυκλώσασθαι τοὺς πολεμίους. ἐπέστησε δὲ τῷ μὲν δεξιῷ Μάγωνα τὸν ἀδελφόν, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν Ἄννωνα· τὸ δὲ μέσον αὐτὸς εἶχε κατὰ δόξαν Αἰμιλίου τῆς ἐμπειρίας. δισχίλιοί τε ἱππεῖς ἐπίλεκτοι παρέθεον αὐτῷ, καὶ Μαάρβαλ ἑτέρους ἔχων χιλίους ἐφήδρευεν ὅπῃ τι πονούμενον ἴδοι. καὶ τάδε πράσσων ἐς δευτέραν παρέτεινεν ὥραν, ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα θᾶσσον ἐπέλθοι.