8. Also it is clear from the following considerations that voluntary action does not mean acting in accordance with purposive choice. It was proved that acting in accordance with one’s wish is not acting involuntarily, but rather everything that one wishes is also voluntary—it has only been proved that it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without wishing; but many things that we wish we do suddenly, whereas nobody makes a purposive choice suddenly.
8. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἑκούσιον τὸ κατὰ ὄρεξιν πράττειν, οὐδʼ ἀκούσιον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν, φανερόν· ὅτι δʼ οὐδὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πάλιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ βούλησιν ὡς οὐκ ἀκούσιον ἀπεδείχθη, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πᾶν ὃ βούλεται καὶ ἑκούσιον (ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἐνδέχεται πράττειν ἑκόντα, τοῦτο δέδεικται μόνον)·
But if as we said the voluntary must necessarily be one of three things—what is in conformity with appetition, or with purposive choice, or with thought—, and if it is not the two former, it remains that voluntariness consists in acting with some kind of thought.
πολλὰ δὲ βουλόμενοι πράττομεν ἐξαίφνης, προαιρεῖται δʼ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίφνης.
Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation of the voluntary and involuntary by carrying the thought argument a little further. Acting under compulsion and not under compulsion seem to be terms akin to the ones mentioned; for we say that everything forced is involuntary and everything involuntary is forced. So we must first consider the exact meaning of “forced,” and how what is forced is related to the voluntary and involuntary.
εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἦν τριῶν τούτων ἕν τι εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἢ κατʼ ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τούτων δὲ τὰ δύο μὴ ἐστί, λείπεται ἐν τῷ διανοούμενόν πως πράττειν εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον. ἔτι δὲ μικρὸν προαγαγόντες τὸν λόγον, ἐπιθῶμεν τέλος τῷ περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου διορισμῷ.
It seems, then, that in the sphere of conduct “forced” or “necessary,” and force or necessity, are the opposite of “voluntary,” and of persuasion. And we employ the terms force and necessity in a general sense even in the case of inanimate objects: we say that a stone travels upwards and fire downwards by force and under necessity, whereas when they travel according to their natural and intrinsic impulse we say that they do not move under force—although nevertheless they are not spoken of as moving voluntarily: the state opposite to forced motion has no name, but when they travel contrary to their natural impulse we say that they move by force.
δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ βίᾳ καὶ μὴ βίᾳ τι ποιεῖν οἰκεῖα τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἶναι· τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναι φαμέν. ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βίᾳ σκεπτέον πρῶτον, τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ τῇ πειθοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν·
Similarly also in the case of living things and of animals, we see many being acted on by force, and also acting under force when something moves them from outside, contrary to the impulse within the thing itself. In inanimate things the moving principle is simple, but in living things it is multiple, for appetition and rational principle are not always in harmony.
καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμέν. ταῦτα δʼ ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει καὶ τὴν καθʼ αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρηται, οὐ βίᾳ, οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ἑκούσια λέγεται, ἀλλʼ ἀνώνυμος ἡ ἀντίθεσις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βίᾳ φαμέν.
Hence whereas in the case of the other animals the factor of force is simple, as it is in the case of inanimate objects, for animals do not possess rational principle and appetition in opposition to it, but live by their appetition, in man both forms of force are present—that is, at a certain age, the age to which we attribute action in the proper sense; for we do not speak of a child as acting, any more than a wild animal, but only a person who has attained to acting by rational calculation.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ὁρῶμεν βίᾳ πολλὰ καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν ἔξωθέν τι κινῇ. ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἁπλῆ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ ὄρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ. ὥστʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἁπλοῦν τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ζῇ)·
So what is forced always seems to be painful, and no one acting under force acts gladly. Consequently there is a great deal of dispute about the self-controlled man and the uncontrolled. For each of them acts under a conflict of impulses within him, so that the self-controlled man, they say, acts under force in dragging himself away from the pleasures that he covets (for he feels pain in dragging himself away against the resistance of appetition), while the uncontrolled man acts under force in going contrary to his rational faculty.
ἐν δʼ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω, καὶ ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ, ᾗ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν. οὐ γάρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεὶς βίᾳ μὲν ποιεῖ, χαίρων δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις ἐστίν.
But he seems to feel less pain, because desire is for what is pleasant, and he follows his desire; so that the uncontrolled man rather acts voluntarily and not under force, because not painfully. On the other hand persuasion is thought to be the opposite of force and necessity; and the self-controlled man is led towards things that he has been persuaded to pursue, and proceeds not under force but voluntarily; whereas desire leads a man on without employing persuasion, since it possesses no element of rational principle.
ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμὰς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὑτῷ πράττει, ὥσθʼ ὅ τʼ ἐγκρατὴς βίᾳ, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὑτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν (ἀλγεῖ γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντιτείνουσαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), ὅ τʼ ἀκρατὴς βίᾳ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ἧττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ᾗ ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων, ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἑκὼν καὶ οὐ βίᾳ, ὅτι οὐ λυπηρῶς.
It has, then, been stated that these men only seem to act under force and involuntarily; and we have shown the reason—it is because their action has a certain resemblance to forced action, just as we speak of forced action even in the case of inanimate objects too.
ἡ δὲ πειθὼ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται. ὁ δʼ ἐγκρατὴς ἐφʼ ἃ πέπεισται ἄγει, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἑκών. ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία οὐ πείσασα ἄγει· οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγου.
Yet nevertheless if one added there also the addition made in our definition, the statement is refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced to act when something external moves it or brings it to rest, acting against the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no external motive, we do not say that it acts under force; and in the uncontrolled man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present in the man himself that drives him (for he has both impulses), so that as far as these considerations go neither of them would be acting under force, but voluntarily;
ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι μόνοι βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, ὅτι καθʼ ὁμοιότητά τινα τοῦ βίᾳ, καθʼ ἣν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἴ τις προσθῇ τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον, κἀκεῖ λύεται τὸ λεχθέν. ὅταν μὲν γάρ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν κινῇ ἢ ἠρεμίζῃ, βίᾳ φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μή, οὐ βίᾳ·
nor yet are they acting of necessity, for by necessity we mean an external principle that either checks or moves a man in opposition to his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B’s hand and with it strike C, B’s will and desire both resisting; whereas when the source of action is from within, we do not speak of the act as done under force.
ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ ἡ καθʼ αὑτὸν ὁρμὴ ἐνοῦσα ἄγει (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχει)· ὥστʼ οὐ βίᾳ οὐδέτερος, ἀλλʼ ἑκὼν διά γε ταῦτα πράττοι ἄν, οὐδʼ ἀναγκαζόμενος.
Again, both pleasure and pain are present in both cases; for a man exercising self-control both feels pain when he finally acts in opposition to his desire and enjoys the pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited later on, or is even being benefited already, by being in good health; and the uncontrolled man enjoys getting what he desires owing to his lack of self-control, but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is doing a bad thing.
τὴν γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἀρχήν, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ ἐμποδίζουσαν ἢ κινοῦσαν, ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτοι τινὰ ἀντιτείνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ὅταν δʼ ἔσωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, οὐ βίᾳ. ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπʼ ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφεληθήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων·
Hence it is reasonable to say that each does what he does under compulsion, and that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from motives both of appetition and of rational calculation—for calculation and appetition are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the other. Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, because they see something of this sort in the experiences of the spirit.
καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπʼ ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἴεται γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ἑκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἑκάτερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν·
Now it is admissible to say this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a whole both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled man acts voluntarily, and in neither case does the man act under compulsion, but one of the parts in them so acts—for we possess by nature both parts; since rational principle is a natural property, because it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and not stunted, and also desire is natural, because it accompanies and is present in us from birth;
κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἡ δʼ ὅλη ἑκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δʼ οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν.
and these are pretty nearly the two things by which we define the natural—it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is born, or else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on regularly, for example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of the two persons in a way acts not in accordance with nature, but absolutely each does act according to nature, though not according to the same nature.
καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος φύσει ὑπάρχει, ὅτι ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστιν.
The difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled and the self-controlled man are these: do both, or does one of them, act under compulsion, so that they either act not voluntarily or else voluntarily and under compulsion at the same time—and if what is done under compulsion is involuntary, act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time? And it is fairly clear from what has been said how these difficulties are to be met.
σχεδὸν δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε ὅσα εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίγνεται ἡμῖν, οἷον πολιὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὥστε μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερος πράττει, ἁπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν.
But there is another way in which people are said to act under compulsion and of necessity without disagreement between rational principle and appetition, when they do something that they consider actually painful and bad but they are faced by flogging or imprisonment or execution if they do not do it; for in these cases they say that they are acting under necessity.
αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ ἀπορίαι ⟨αὗται⟩ περὶ τοῦ βίᾳ πράττειν ἢ ἀμφοτέρους ἢ τὸν ἕτερον, ὥστε ἢ μὴ ἑκόντας ἢ ἅμα βίᾳ καὶ ἑκόντας, εἰ δὲ τὸ βίᾳ ἀκούσιον, ἅμα ἑκόντας καὶ ἄκοντας πράττειν· σχεδὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ἡμῖν ὡς ἀπαντητέον.
Possibly, however, this is not the case, but they all do the actual deeds willingly, since it is open to them not to do them but to endure the penalty threatened.
λέγονται δὲ κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι, οὐ διαφωνοῦντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως, ὅταν πράττωσιν ὃ καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἂν μὴ τοῦτο πράττωσι, πληγαὶ ἢ δεσμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὦσιν.
Moreover, perhaps someone might say that in some cases these actions are done of necessity and in others not. For in cases where the presence or absence of such circumstances depends on the agent himself, even the actions that he does without wishing to do them he does willingly and not under compulsion; but where in such cases the circumstances do not rest with himself, he acts under compulsion in a sense, though not indeed under compulsion absolutely, because he does not definitely choose the actual thing that he does but the object for which he does it; since even in the objects of action there is a certain difference.
ταῦτα γάρ φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι. ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἑκόντες ποιοῦσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο; ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ὑπομεῖναι τὸ πάθος. ἔτι ἴσως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δʼ οὔ. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι, ἀεὶ ὅσα πράττει ἃ μὴ βούλεται, ἑκὼν πράττει, καὶ οὐ βίᾳ·
For if someone were to kill a man to prevent his catching him by groping for him, it would be ridiculous for him to say that he had done it under compulsion and of necessity—there must be some greater and more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not do it. It is when a man does something evil for the sake of something good, or for deliverance from another evil, that he will be acting under necessity and by compulsion, or at all events not by nature; and then he will really be acting unwillingly, for these actions do not rest with himself.
ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τῶν τοιούτων, βίᾳ πώς, οὐ μέντοι γʼ ἁπλῶς, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρεῖται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλʼ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐστί τις διαφορά. εἰ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ λάβῃ ψηλαφῶν ἀποκτείνοι, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη, εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μεῖζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι, ὃ πείσεται μὴ ποιήσας.
On this account many reckon even love as involuntary, and some forms of anger, and natural impulses, because their power is even beyond nature; and we pardon them as naturally capable of constraining nature. And it would be thought that a man is acting more under compulsion and involuntarily when his object is to avoid violent pain than when it is to avoid mild pain, and in general more when his object is the avoidance of pain than when it is to gain enjoyment. For what rests with himself—and it wholly turns on this—means what his nature is able to bear; what his nature is not able to bear and what is not a matter of his own natural appetition or calculation does not rest with himself.
οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ [μὴ] βίᾳ πράξει, ἢ οὐ φύσει, ὅταν κακὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ ἄκων γε· οὐ γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον τιθέασιν, καὶ θυμοὺς ἐνίους καὶ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειε βίᾳ καὶ ἄκων πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ ἵνα μὴ ἠρέμα, καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα [μὴ] χαίρῃ.
On this account also in the case of persons who are inspired and utter prophecies, although they perform an act of thought, nevertheless we do not say that saying what they said and doing what they did rested with themselves.
τὸ γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὅλον, τοῦτʼ ἐστιν ὃ ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἵα τε φέρειν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἵα τε, μήδʼ ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὀρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ.
Nor yet do we say that what men do because of desire rests with themselves; so that some thoughts and emotions, or the actions that are guided by such thoughts and calculations, do not rest with ourselves, but it is as Philolaus said—“some arguments are too strong for us.”
διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, καίπερ διανοίας ἔργον ποιοῦντας, ὅμως οὔ φαμεν ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς εἶναι, οὔτʼ εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον, οὔτε πρᾶξαι ἃ ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν·
Hence if it was necessary to consider the voluntary and involuntary with reference also to acting under compulsion, let this be our decision of the matter (for those who cause most hindrance... the voluntary... as acting under compulsion, but voluntarily).
ὥστε καὶ διάνοιαί τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν εἰσίν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμούς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναί τινας λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.
9. Now that this is concluded, and as the voluntary has been found not to be defined by appetition, nor yet by purposive choice, it therefore remains to define it as that which is in accordance with thought. Now the voluntary seems to be the opposite of the involuntary; and acting with knowledge of either the person acted on or the instrument or the result (for sometimes the agent knows that it is his father but does not intend to kill him but to save him—as the Peliads did—or knows that what he is offering is a drink but offers it as a love-charm or wine, when really it is hemlock) seems to be the opposite of acting without knowing the person acted on, the instrument and the nature of the act, through ignorance and not by accident. But to act through ignorance of the act, the means and the person acted on is involuntary action. Therefore the opposite is voluntary. It follows then that all the things that a man does not in ignorance, and through his own agency, when it is in his power not to do them, are voluntary acts, and it is in this that the voluntary consists; and all the things that he does in ignorance, and through being in ignorance, he does involuntarily. But since to understand or know has two meanings, one being to have the knowledge and the other to use it, a man who has knowledge but is not using it would in one case be justly described as acting in ignorance but in another case unjustly— namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge were due to carelessness. And similarly one would be blamed for not having the knowledge, if it were something that was easy or necessary and his not having it is due to carelessness or pleasure or pain. These points therefore must be added to our definition. Let this, then, be our mode of definition about the voluntary and involuntary.
9. ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ βίᾳ ἔδει σκέψασθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὕτω διῃρήσθω (οἱ γὰρ μάλιστʼ ἐμποδίζοντες τὸ ἑκούσιον ὡς βίᾳ πράττοντες, ἀλλʼ ἑκόντες)· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ ὀρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἑκούσιον ὥρισται, λοιπὸν δὴ ὁρίσασθαι τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ, καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὃν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἤτοι ὡς τοδὶ μὲν πόμα, ἀλλʼ ὡς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δʼ ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὃ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, καὶ ὃ καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅν, ἀκούσιον· τὸ ἐναντίον ἄρʼ ἑκούσιον. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ ὂν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ διʼ αὑτόν, ἑκούσια ταῦτʼ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον τοῦτʼ ἐστίν· ὅσα δʼ ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον εἰ διʼ ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρῆτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἄν, εἰ ὃ ῥᾴδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, μὴ ἔχει διʼ ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. ταῦτʼ οὖν προσδιοριστέον.
10. Next let us speak about purposive choice, first raising various difficulties about it. For one might doubt to which class it naturally belongs and in what class it ought to be put, and whether the voluntary and the purposely chosen are different things or the same thing.
10. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο λέγωμεν, διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.
And a view specially put forward from some quarters, which on inquiry may seem correct, is that purposive choice is one of two things, either opinion or appetition; for both are seen to accompany it.
διστάσειε γὰρ ἄν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ποίῳ θεῖναι αὐτὴν χρή, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἢ ταὐτὸν ἐστίν.
Now it is evident that it is not appetition; for in that case it would be either wish or desire or passion, since nobody wants to get a thing without having experienced one of those feelings. Now even animals possess passion and desire, but they do not have purposive choice. And again, beings that possess both of these often make choices even without passion and desire; and while they are experiencing these feelings do not make a choice but hold out. Again, desire and passion are always accompanied by pain, but we often make a choice even without pain.
μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε δʼ ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἡ προαίρεσις, ἤτοι δόξα ἢ ὄρεξις· ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄρεξις φανερόν. ἢ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μηθὲν πεπονθὼς τούτων. θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει, προαίρεσις δʼ οὔ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἄμφω ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται·
But moreover purposive choice is not the same as wish either; for men wish for some things that they know to be impossible, for instance to be king of all mankind and to be immortal, but nobody purposively chooses a thing knowing it to be impossible, nor in general a thing that, though possible, he does not think in his own power to do or not to do. So that this much is clear—a thing purposively chosen must necessarily be something that rests with oneself.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ προαιροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταὐτόν. βούλονται μὲν γὰρ ἔνια [ταὐτὸν] καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δʼ οὐθεὶς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐδʼ ὅλως ἃ δυνατὸν μέν, μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ δʼ οἴεται πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι.
And similarly it is manifest that purposive choice is not opinion either, nor something that one simply thinks; for we saw that a thing chosen is something in one’s own power, but we have opinions as to many things that do not depend on us, for instance that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side;
ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τι εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδʼ ἁπλῶς εἴ τις οἴεταί τι.
and again, choice is not true or false. Nor yet is purposive choice an opinion about practicable things within one’s own power that makes us think that we ought to do or not to do something; but this characteristic is common to opinion and to wish.
τῶν γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τι ἦν τὸ προαιρετόν, δοξάζομεν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον. ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι προαίρεσις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν δόξα, ᾗ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν.
For no one purposively chooses any End, but the means to his End—I mean for instance no one chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit down for the sake of being healthy, no one chooses to be well off, but to go into business or to speculate for the sake of being well off; and generally, one who makes a choice always makes it clear both what his choice is and what its object is, “object” meaning that for the sake of which he chooses something else and “choice” meaning that which he chooses for the sake of something else.
κοινὸν δὲ περὶ δόξης τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· λέγω δʼ οἷον οὐθεὶς ὑγιαίνειν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ περιπατεῖν ἢ καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἕνεκεν, οὐδʼ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἕνεκα· καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος, οὗ ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρεῖται ἕνεκα ἄλλου.
Whereas clearly it is specially an End that a man wishes, and the feeling that he ought to be healthy and prosperous is an opinion. So these considerations make it clear that purposive choice is different from both opinion and wish. Forming wishes and forming opinions apply specially to one’s End; purposive choice is not of Ends.
βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, καὶ δοξάζει δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν. ὥστε φανερὸν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ βουλήσεως.
It is clear, then, that purposive choice is not either wish or opinion or judgement simply; but in what does it differ from them? and how is it related to the voluntary? To answer these questions will make it clear what purposive choice is.
βούλεσθαι μὲν ⟨γὰρ⟩ καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις οὔτε δόξα οὔθʼ ὑπόληψις ἁπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσις, δῆλον· τί δὲ διαφέρει τούτων, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἑκούσιον;
Now of things that can both be and not be, some are such that it is possible to deliberate about them, but about others it is not possible. Some things can either be or not be but their coming into being does not rest with us, but in some cases is due to the operation of nature and in others to other causes; and about these things nobody would deliberate unless in ignorance of the facts.
ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται, καὶ τί ἐστι προαίρεσις. ἔστι δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ ἐνίων δʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.
But with some things not only their existence or non-existence is possible, but also for human beings to deliberate about them; and these are all the things that it rests with us to do or not to do. Hence we do not deliberate about affairs in India, or about how to square the circle; for affairs in India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of choice and things practicable are among things resting with us, and squaring the circle is entirely impracticable (and thus it is clear that purposive choice is not simply opinion either). But purposive choice does not deal with all the practicable things resting with us either.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μέν ἐστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἡ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ διʼ ἄλλας αἰτίας γίνεται, περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν· περὶ ὧν δʼ ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι. διὸ οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ πῶς ἂν ὁ κύκλος τετραγωνισθείη. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· τὸ δʼ ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἁπάντων.]
Hence one might also raise the question, why is it exactly that, whereas doctors deliberate about things in their field of science, scholars do not? The reason is that since error occurs in two ways (for we err either in reasoning, or in perception when actually doing the thing), in medicine it is possible to err in both ways, but in grammar error only occurs in our perception and action, to investigate which would be an endless undertaking.
(ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἁπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσις ἐστίν)·, τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, τί δή ποθʼ οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ βουλεύονται περὶ ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὔ; αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι διχῇ γινομένης τῆς ἁμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἁμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἁμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ ἧς ἂν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξουσιν.
Since then purposive choice is not either opinion nor wish separately, nor yet both (for no one makes a deliberate choice suddenly, but men do suddenly think they ought to act and wish to act), therefore it arises as from both, for both of them are present with a person choosing.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησίς ἐστι προαίρεσίς ἐστιν ὡς ἑκάτερον, οὐδʼ ἄμφω (ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαιρεῖται μὲν οὐθείς, δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται)·
But how purposive choice arises out of opinion and wish must be considered. And indeed in a manner the actual term “choice” makes this clear. “Choice” is “taking,” but not taking simply—it is taking one thing in preference to another; but this cannot be done without consideration and deliberation; hence purposive choice arises out of deliberative opinion.
ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα. ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκεπτέον; δηλοῖ δέ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἵρεσις μὲν ἐστίν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δέ, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρου πρὸ ἑτέρου·
Now nobody deliberates about his End—this everybody has fixed; but men deliberate about the means leading to their End—does this contribute to it, or does this? or when a means has been decided on, how will that be procured? and this deliberation as to means we all pursue until we have carried the starting-point in the process of producing the End back to ourselves.
τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις. περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κεῖται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων, πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένου τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται.
If, then, nobody chooses without first preparing, and deliberating as to the comparative merits of the alternatives, and a man deliberates as to those among the means to the End capable of existing or not existing that are within our power, it is clear that purposive choice is deliberative appetition of things within one’s power. For we deliberate about everything that we choose, although of course we do not choose everything that we deliberate about. I call appetition deliberative when its origin or cause is deliberation, and when a man desires because of having deliberated.
βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντες, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν. εἰ δὴ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρασκευασάμενος μηδὲ βουλευσάμενος, εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλεύεται δὲ ὅσα ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ βουλευτική. ἅπαντες γὰρ βουλευόμεθα ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα προαιρούμεθα.
Therefore the faculty of purposive choice is not present in the other animals, nor in man at every age nor in every condition, for no more is the act of deliberation, nor yet the concept of cause: it is quite possible that many men may possess the faculty of forming an opinion whether to do or not to do a thing without also having the power of forming this opinion by process of reasoning.
λέγω δὲ βουλευτικήν, ἧς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσίς ἐστι, καὶ ὀρέγεται διὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι. διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, οὐδʼ ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί· ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι.
For the deliberative faculty is the spirit’s power of contemplating a kind of cause—for one sort of cause is the final cause, as although cause means anything because of which a thing comes about, it is the object of a thing’s existence or production that we specially designate as its cause: for instance, if a man walks in order to fetch things, fetching things is the cause of his walking. Consequently people who have no fixed aim are not given to deliberation.
ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός. ἡ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστίν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία· οὗ δʼ ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἢ γίγνεταί τι, τοῦτʼ αἴτιόν φαμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἡ κομιδὴ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα βαδίζει. διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικοί.
Hence inasmuch as if a man of his own accord and not through ignorance does or refrains from doing something resting with himself either to do or not to do, he acts or refrains from acting voluntarily, but yet we do many such things without deliberation or previous thought, it necessarily follows that, although all that has been purposively chosen is voluntary, “voluntary” is not the same as “chosen,” and, although all things done by purposive choice are voluntary, not all things voluntary are done by purposive choice.
ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ὂν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐάν τις πράττῃ ἢ ἀπρακτῇ διʼ αὑτὸν καὶ μὴ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, ἑκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἑκούσιον μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἑκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν.
And at the same time it is clear from these considerations that the classification of offences made by legislators as in voluntary, voluntary and premeditated is a good one; for even if it is not precisely accurate, yet at all events it approximates to the truth in a way.
ἅμα δʼ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἳ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια τὰ δʼ ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἅπτονταί γέ πῃ τῆς ἀληθείας.
But we will speak about this in our examination of justice. As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation. But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption,
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὔτε ἁπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε δόξα ἐστί, δῆλον, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὄρεξις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι συμπερανθῶσιν.
like the postulates in the theoretic sciences (we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning of this discourse, and in detail in Analytics ); whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go to war or not to go to war with a given person.
ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκα τινός, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις ἀεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς διʼ ἀκριβείασ)̓, περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἡ σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν τοῦτο βουλευομένοις.
And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is, the question of object, for instance wealth or pleasure or something else of that kind which happens to be our object. For one who deliberates deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.
ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ διʼ ὅ, τοῦτʼ ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον πλοῦτος ἢ ἡδονὴ ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ὃ τυγχάνει οὗ ἕνεκα. βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος, εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἔσκεπται, ⟨ἢ⟩ ὅ τι ἐκεῖ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὑτὸν ἀγάγῃ, ἢ αὐτὸς δύναται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
And by nature the End is always a good and a thing about which men deliberate step by step (for example a doctor may deliberate whether he shall give a drug, and a general where he shall pitch his camp) when their End is the good that is the absolute best;
τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν ἀεὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ κατὰ μέρος βουλεύονται, οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλεύσαιτο ἂν εἰ δῴη φάρμακον, καὶ στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατοπεδεύσηται, οἷς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς ἄριστον ἐστίν·
but in contravention of nature and by perversion not the good but the apparent good is the End. The reason is that there are some things that cannot be employed for something other than their natural objects, for instance sight—it is not possible to see a thing that is not visible, or to hear a thing that is not audible; but a science does enable us to do a thing that is not the object of the science. For health and disease are not the objects of the same science in the same way: health is its object in accordance with nature, and disease in contravention of nature.
παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ χρήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὄψει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τʼ ἰδεῖν οὗ μή ἐστιν ὄψις, οὐδʼ ἀκοῦσαι οὗ μή ἐστιν ἀκοή· ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ποιῆσαι καὶ οὗ μή ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νόσου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.
And similarly, by nature good is the object of wish, but evil is also its object in contravention of nature; by nature one wishes good, against nature and by perversion one even wishes evil.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστί, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν.
But moreover with everything its corruption and perversion are not in any chance direction, but leads to the contrary and intermediate states. For it is not possible to go outside these, since even error does not lead to any chance thing, but, in the case of things that have contraries, to the contraries, and to those contraries that are contrary according to their science.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἑκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφὴ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὅσοις ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἐστίν.
It therefore necessarily follows that both error and purposive choice take place from the middle point to the contraries (the contraries of the middle being the more and the less).—And the cause is pleasure and pain; for things are so constituted that the pleasant appears to the spirit good and the more pleasant better, the painful bad and the more painful worse.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἐναντία δὲ τῷ μέσῳ [καὶ] τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον).—αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἥδιον ἄμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κακὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον χεῖρον.
So from these things also it is clear that goodness and badness have to do with pleasures and pains; for they occur in connection with the objects of purposive choice, and this has to do with good and bad and what appears to be good and bad, and pleasure and pain are by nature things of that kind.
ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ προαιρετὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.
It therefore follows that since moral goodness is itself a middle state and is entirely concerned with pleasures and pains, and badness consists in excess and defect and is concerned with the same things as goodness, moral goodness or virtue is a state of purposively choosing the mean in relation to ourselves in all those pleasant and painful things in regard to which according as a person feels pleasure or pain he is described as having some particular moral quality (for a person is not said to have a particular moral character merely for being fond of sweets or savories).
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ αὐτή τε μεσότης τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ κακία ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς, καθʼ ὅσα ποῖός τις λέγεται τὸ ἦθος, ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος· ὁ γὰρ φιλόγλυκυς ἢ φιλόπικρος οὐ λέγεται ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος.
11. These things having been settled, let us say whether goodness makes the purposive choice correct and the End right in the sense of making the agent choose for the sake of the proper End, or whether (as some hold) it makes the rational principle right. But what does this is self-control—for that saves the rational principle from being corrupted; and goodness and self-control are different. But we must speak about this later, since all who do hold that goodness makes the rational principle right think so on the ground that that is the nature of self-control and self-control is a praiseworthy thing. Having raised this preliminary question let us continue. It is possible to have one’s aim right but to be entirely wrong in one’s means to the end aimed at; and it is possible for the aim to have been wrongly chosen but the means conducing to it to be right; and for neither to be right. But does goodness decide the aim or the means to it? Well, our position is that it decides the aim, because this is not a matter of logical inference or rational principle, but in fact this must be assumed as a starting-point. For a doctor does not consider whether his patient ought to be healthy or not, but whether he ought to take walking exercise or not, and the gymnastic trainer does not consider whether his pupil ought to be in good condition or not, but whether he ought to go in for wrestling or not; and similarly no other science either deliberates about its End. For as in the theoretic sciences the assumptions are first principles, so in the productive sciences the End is a starting-point and assumption: since it is required that so-and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be secured it is necessary for such-and-such a thing to be provided—just as in mathematics, if the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, such and such a consequence necessarily follows. Therefore the End is the starting-point of the process of thought, but the conclusion of the process of thought is the starting-point of action. If, then, of all rightness either rational principle or goodness is the cause, if rational principle is not the cause of the rightness of the End, then the End (though not the means to the End) will be right owing to goodness. But the End is the object for which one acts; for every purposive choice is a choice of something and for some object. The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the cause by its act of choice—though the choice is not of the End but of the means adopted for the sake of the End. Therefore though it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that must be done for the sake of the End, goodness is the cause of the End aimed at by choice being right. And owing to this it is by a man’s purposive choice that we judge his character—that is, not by what he does but what he does it for. Similarly also badness causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives. If therefore, when a man has it in his power to do what is honorable and refrain from doing what is base, he does the opposite, it is clear that this man is not virtuous. Hence it necessarily follows that both badness and goodness are voluntary; for there is no necessity to do wicked things. For this reason badness is a blameworthy thing and goodness praiseworthy; for involuntary baseness and evil are not blamed nor involuntary good things praised, but voluntary ones are. Moreover we praise and blame all men with regard to their purpose rather than with regard to their actions (although activity is a more desirable thing than goodness), because men may do bad acts under compulsion, but no one is compelled to choose to do them. Moreover because it is not easy to see the quality of a man’s purpose we are forced to judge his character from his actions; therefore activity is more desirable, but purpose more praiseworthy. And this not only follows from our assumptions but also is admitted by reason of observed facts.
11. τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισί, τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δʼ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. λεκτέον δʼ ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέχειν ἡ ἀρετή, τοῦτο αἴτιον. ἡ μὲν ⟨γὰρ⟩ ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δʼ ἡ ἐγκράτεια. λέγομεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον. πότερον δʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή, ἀλλʼ εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μή, ἀλλʼ εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή. ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδʼ ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἡ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη τὸ τέλος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινός. οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως [οὗ] ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει, ἀλλʼ οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δή τις, ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ὂν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακτεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά, τοὐναντίον ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τήν τε κακίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑκούσια. ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα· καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὅτι πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, προαιρεῖται δʼ οὐδείς. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποῖός τις. αἱρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δʼ ἡ προαίρεσις. ἔκ τε τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.