---
title: "Eudemian Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια"
author: "Aristotle"
translator: "Harris Rackham"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 4 of 9
url: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/4/
cite: "Aristotle, tr. Harris Rackham, Eudemian Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια, section 4. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/4/"
---

# Eudemian Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια

*Aristotle, tr. Harris Rackham*

Aristotle’s other ethics: happiness, virtue, friendship and good fortune.

> Greek: ed. Franz Susemihl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0086.tlg009, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harris Rackham, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0086.tlg009.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 4. Book III · sections 1–2

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/4/#p-N

[¶0] 1. It has then been stated in general terms that there are middle states in the virtues and that these are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions are vices and what these are. But let us take them separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let us speak about Courage.

> Greek: 1. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές εἰσί τε ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, καὶ αὗται προαιρετικαί, καὶ αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, καθόλου εἴρηται· καθʼ ἑκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας.

[¶1] Now almost everybody holds that the brave man is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. And in our schedule previously we distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed to one another.

> Greek: σχεδὸν δὴ δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὅ τʼ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι περὶ φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν δʼ ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον καὶ θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία·

[¶2] It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper and more daring than is proper—and from this the name is derived, as the word “daring” is cognate with the word “dare”).

> Greek: καὶ γάρ ἐστί πως ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις ταύτας λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείσονται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς (οὗτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἧττον ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασύς· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἧττον ἢ δεῖ, θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

[¶3] So that since courage is the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear and daring, and the proper character is neither that of the daring (for they fall short in one respect and exceed in another) nor that of the cowardly (for they also do the same, only not as regards the same things but inversely— they fall short in daring and exceed in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state of character between daring and cowardice is courage, for this is the best state.

> Greek: διὸ καὶ παρωνυμιάζεται· ὁ γὰρ θρασὺς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως. ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, δεῖ δὲ μήθʼ οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι, τὰ δʼ ὑπερβάλλουσι) μήθʼ οὕτως ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταὐτὸ ποιοῦσι, πλὴν οὐ περὶ ταὐτὰ ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἐναντίας·

[¶4] And it seems that the brave man is in general fearless, and the coward liable to fear; and that the latter fears things when they are few in number and small in size as well as when numerous and great, and fears violently, and gets frightened quickly, whereas the former on the contrary either never feels fear at all or only slightly and reluctantly and seldom, and in regard to things of magnitude; and he endures things that are extremely formidable, whereas the other does not endure even those that are slightly formidable.

> Greek: τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουσι, τῷ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δῆλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη. δοκεῖ δʼ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἄφοβος εἶναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὃ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὃ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἠρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ ὀλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα, καὶ ὃ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερὰ σφόδρα, ὃ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἠρέμα.

[¶5] What sort of things, then, does the brave man endure? First, is it the things that are formidable to himself or formidable to somebody else? If the things formidable to somebody else, one would not indeed call it anything remarkable; but if it is those that are formidable to himself, what is formidable to him must be things of great magnitude and number. But formidable things are productive of fear in the particular person to whom they are formidable—that is, if they are very formidable, the fear they produce will be violent, if slightly formidable, it will be weak; so it follows that the brave man’s fears are great and many. Yet on the contrary it appeared that courage makes a man fearless, and that fearlessness consists in fearing nothing, or else few things, and those slightly and reluctantly.

> Greek: ποῖα οὖν ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; πρῶτον πότερον τὰ ἑαυτῷ φοβερὰ ἢ τὰ ἑτέρῳ; εἰ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἑτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἄν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὑτῷ, εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά. φόβου ποιητικὰ ἑκάστῳ ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὁ φόβος, εἰ δʼ ἠρέμα, ἀσθενής. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον μεγάλους φόβους καὶ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. ἐδόκει δὲ τοὐναντίον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρασκευάζειν, τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἠρέμα καὶ μόλις. ἀλλʼ ἴσως τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, διχῶς.

[¶6] But perhaps “formidable” is an ambiguous term, like “pleasant” and “good.” Some things are pleasant and good absolutely, whereas others are so to a particular person but absolutely are not so, but on the contrary are bad and unpleasant—all the things that are beneficial for the base, and all those that are pleasant to children qua children.

> Greek: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ᾗ παιδία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστί, τὰ δὲ τινί.

[¶7] And similarly some things are formidable absolutely and others to a particular person: thus the things that the coward qua coward fears are some of them not formidable to anybody and others only slightly formidable, but things that are formidable to most men, and all that are formidable to human nature, we pronounce to be formidable absolutely.

> Greek: ἃ μὲν δὴ δειλὸς φοβεῖται ᾗ δειλός, τὰ μὲν οὐδενί ἐστι φοβερά, τὰ δʼ ἠρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθʼ ἁπλῶς φοβερὰ λέγομεν. ὁ δʼ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερὰ αὐτῷ, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ, ᾗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φοβερά, ᾗ δʼ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐ φοβερὰ ἀλλʼ ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς.

[¶8] But the brave man is fearless in regard to them, and endures formidable things of this sort, which are formidable to him in one way but in another way are not—they are formidable to him qua human being, but qua brave not formidable except slightly, or not at all. Yet such things really are formidable, for they are formidable to most men.

> Greek: ἔστι μέντοι φοβερὰ ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται ἡ ἕξις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑγιεινὸς ἔχει.

[¶9] Owing to this the brave man’s state of character is praised, because it resembles that of the strong and the healthy. These have those characters not because no labor in the one case or extreme of temperature in the other can crush them, but because they are not affected at all, or only affected slightly, by the things that affect the many or the majority.

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι οὐ τῷ ὑπὸ μηθενὸς ὃ μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι, ὃ δʼ ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπερβολῆς, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἠρέμα, ὑφʼ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλὴν θᾶττόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ ἔτι ὑφʼ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἠρέμα.

[¶10] Therefore whereas the sickly and weak and cowardly are affected also by the afflictions commonly felt, only more quickly and to a greater extent than the mass of men, the healthy, strong and brave, although affected by the very great afflictions, are affected by them more slowly and less than the mass of men, and moreover they are entirely unaffected or only slightly affected by things that affect the mass.

> Greek: ἀπορεῖται δʼ εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, οὐδʼ ἂν φοβηθείη. ἢ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον; ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἱρεῖσθαι κελεύει.

[¶11] But the question is raised whether to the brave man nothing is formidable, and whether he would be insensible to fear. Or is it not possible that he may feel fear in the way described? For courage is following reason, and reason bids us choose what is fine. Hence he who endures formidable things not on account of reason is either out of his mind or daring,

> Greek: διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἤτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ θαρρεῖ· ὁ δʼ ἀνδρεῖος ἄμφω ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἐστίν. ἃ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται.

[¶12] but only he who does so from motives of honor is fearless and brave. The coward, therefore, fears even things that he ought not to fear, and the daring man is bold even about things about which he ought not to be bold, but the brave man alone does both as he ought, and is intermediate in this respect, for he feels both confidence and fear about what ever things reason bids; but reason does not bid him endure things that are extremely painful and destructive, unless they are fine.

> Greek: ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει, ταῦτα θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδʼ ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος, ἐὰν κελεύῃ. ἔστι δʼ εἴδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθʼ ὁμοιότητα· ⟨τὰ⟩ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ διʼ αἰδῶ οὖσα.

[¶13] The daring man, therefore, faces such things with confidence even if reason does not bid him face them, and the coward does not face them even if it does, but only the brave man faces them if reason bids.

> Greek: δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ διʼ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν.

[¶14] There are five kinds of courage so called by analogy, because brave men of these kinds endure the same things as the really courageous but not for the same reasons. One is civic courage; this is courage due to a sense of shame. Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of what is formidable, as Socrates said, but of ways of encountering what is formidable.

> Greek: τρίτη δʼ ἡ διʼ ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, διʼ ἣν τὰ παιδία καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἳ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ φερόμενα, οἳ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὄφεις. ἄλλη δʼ ἡ κατʼ ἐλπίδα, καθʼ ἣν οἵ τε κατευτυχηκότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος.

[¶15] Third is the courage due to inexperience and ignorance, that makes children and madmen face things rushing on them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by hope, which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure dangers, and those who are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine.

> Greek: ἄλλη δὲ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον διʼ ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἄν τε γὰρ ἐρᾷ, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ διʼ ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως.

[¶16] Another is due to some irrational emotion, for example love or passion. For if a man is in love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers, like the man who murdered the tyrant at Metapontium and the person in Crete in the story; and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him beside himself. Hence wild boars are thought to be brave, though they are not really, for they are so when they are beside themselves, but otherwise they are variable, like daring men.

> Greek: ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σύες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. κατʼ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.

[¶17] But nevertheless the courage of passion is in the highest degree natural; passion is a thing that does not know defeat, owing to which the young are the best fighters. Civic courage is due to law.

> Greek: περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου.

[¶18] But none of these is truly courage, though they are all useful for encouragement in dangers.

> Greek: τοιαῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς·

[¶19] Up to this point we have spoken about things formidable in general terms, but it will be better to define them more precisely. As a general term the formidable denotes what causes fear, and that is of a property of things that appear capable of causing pain of a destructive kind: for persons expecting some other pain might perhaps experience a different sort of pain and a different feeling, but will not have fear—for example if a man foresaw that he was going to feel the pain felt by the jealous, or the sort of pain felt by the envious or by those who are ashamed.

> Greek: τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἄν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δʼ οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῷτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἵαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι. ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσί, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ [καὶ] δειλοί.

[¶20] But fear only occurs in the case of pains that seem likely to be of the kind whose nature it is to destroy life. Hence some people who are even very soft about certain things are brave, and some who are hard and enduring are also cowardly.

> Greek: καὶ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτου λύπην ἔχειν πώς.

[¶21] Moreover it is thought to be almost a special property of courage to be of a certain disposition in regard to death and the pain of death; for if a man were such as to be capable of rational endurance in respect of heat and cold and pains of that sort that are not dangerous, but at the same time soft and excessively timid about death, not because of any other feeling but just because it brings destruction, while another man was soft in regard to those pains but impassive as regards death, the former would be thought a coward and the latter brave.

> Greek: εἰ γάρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος πρὸς ἀλέας καὶ ψύχη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικός, ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀκινδύνους οὔσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ διʼ ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ διʼ αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής· ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξειε δειλός, οὗτος δʼ ἀνδρεῖος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν.

[¶22] For we speak of danger only in the case of such formidable things as bring near to us what causes destruction of that sort, and when this appears near it appears to be danger.

> Greek: φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται. τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ λύπης τῆς φθαρτικῆς·

[¶23] The formidable things, therefore, in relation to which we speak of a man as brave are, we have said, those that appear likely to cause pain of the destructive kind—provided that these appear close at hand and not far off, and are or appear to be of a magnitude proportionate to a human being;

> Greek: ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα ὥστʼ εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. ἔνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερὰ καὶ διαταράττειν.

[¶24] for some things must necessarily appear fearful to every human being and throw everybody into alarm, since it is quite possible that, just as heat and cold and some of the other forces are above us and above the conditions of the human body, so also are some mental sufferings.

> Greek: οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, ὥσπερ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἕξεις· οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.

[¶25] Therefore whereas the cowardly and the daring are mistaken owing to their characters, since the coward thinks things not formidable formidable and things slightly formidable extremely formidable, and the daring man on the contrary thinks formidable things perfectly safe and extremely formidable things only slightly formidable, to the brave man on the other hand things seem exactly what they are.

> Greek: οἱ μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς ἐπιψεύδονται διὰ τὰς ἕξεις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τά τε μὴ φοβερὰ δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἠρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τά τε φοβερὰ θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἠρέμα, τῷ δʼ ἀνδρείῳ τἀληθῆ μάλιστα.

[¶26] Hence a man is not brave if he endures formidable things through ignorance (for instance, if owing to madness he were to endure a flight of thunderbolts), nor if he does so owing to passion when knowing the greatness of the danger, as the Celts “take arms and march against the waves”; and in general, the courage of barbarians has an element of passion.

> Greek: διόπερ οὔτʼ εἴ τις ὑπομένοι τὰ φοβερὰ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρεῖος, οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένοι φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὔτʼ εἰ γιγνώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ διʼ ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν.

[¶27] And some men endure terrors for the sake of other pleasures also—for even passion contains pleasure of a sort, since it is combined with hope of revenge. But nevertheless neither if a man endures death for the sake of this pleasure nor for another, nor for the sake of avoiding greater pains, would any of these persons justly be termed brave.

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετʼ ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὔτʼ εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτʼ εἰ διʼ ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων.

[¶28] For if dying were pleasant, profligates would be dying constantly, owing to lack of self-control, just as even as it is, when, although death itself is not pleasant, things that cause it are, many men through lack of self control knowingly encounter it; none of whom would be thought brave, even though he were thought to die quite readily. Nor yet are any of those brave who, as many men do, commit suicide to escape from trouble, as Agathon says:
The base among mankind, by toil o'ercome,
Conceive a love of death. As also Cheiron, in the legendary story of the poets, because of the pain from his wound prayed that though immortal he might die.

> Greek: εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἂν διʼ ἀκρασίαν ἀπέθνησκον οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος, τῶν ποιητικῶν δʼ αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ διʼ ἀκρασίαν περιπίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὧν οὐθεὶς ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἑτοίμως ἀποθνήσκειν. οὔτʼ εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς ἀνδρεῖος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσσώμενοι,
θανεῖν ἐρῶσιν.

[¶29] And in like manner to these, all who face dangers because of experience are not brave; this is how perhaps most of the military class face dangers. For the fact is the exact opposite of the view of Socrates, who thought that bravery was knowledge: sailors who know how to go aloft are not daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know how to protect themselves against the dangers; also courage is not merely what makes men more daring fighters,

> Greek: ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕλκους ὀδύνην εὔξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι διʼ ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὐναντίον ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

[¶30] for in that case strength and wealth would be courage—as Theognis puts it:
For every man by poverty subdued.

> Greek: οὔτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἴσασι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν·

[¶31] But manifestly some men do face emergencies in spite of being cowards, owing to experience, and they do so because they do not think that there is any danger, as they know how to protect themselves. A proof of this is that when they think that they have no protection and that the cause of alarm is now close at hand, they turn tail.

> Greek: οὔτε διʼ ὃ θαρραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ Θέογνιν ἀνδρεία εἶεν·
πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος.
φανερῶς ⟨δʼ⟩ ἔνιοι δειλοὶ ὄντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι διʼ ἐμπειρίαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον εἶναι·

[¶32] But among all such causes, it is when shame makes men face what is alarming that they would appear to be bravest, as Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering Achilles:
And shame on Hector seized—
Source unknown and
Polydamas will be the first to taunt me.

> Greek: ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλʼ ἤδη πλησίον ᾖ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν.

[¶33] Civic courage is this kind. But true courage is neither this nor any of the others, though it resembles them, as does the courage of wild animals, which are led by passion to rush to meet the blow. For it is not from fear that he will incur disgrace that a man ought to stand his ground, nor from motives of anger, nor because he does not think that he will be killed or because he has forces to protect him, for in that case he will not think that there is really anything to be afraid of.

> Greek: ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖεν ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀνδρεῖοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἕκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα·
Ἕκτορα δʼ αἰδὼς εἷλε·
⟨καὶ⟩
Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.
καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δʼ ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτʼ ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται.

[¶34] But, since indeed all goodness involves purposive choice (it has been said before what we mean by this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of some object, and that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage being a form of goodness will make a man face formidable things for some object, so that he does not do it through ignorance (for it rather makes him judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure, but because it is fine, since in a case where it is not fine but insane he will not face them, for then it would be base to do so.

> Greek: οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε διʼ ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστʼ οὔτε διʼ ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε διʼ ἡδονήν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ᾖ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, οὐχ ὑπομένει·

[¶35] We have now given an account that is fairly adequate for our present procedure of the kind of things in relation to which Courage is a middle state, and between what vices and for what reason it is this, and what is the power that formidable things exercise.

> Greek: αἰσχρὸν γάρ.

[¶36] 2. We must next attempt to decide about Temperance and Profligacy. The term “profligate” (unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means the man who has not been (as it were) “chastised” or cured, just as “undivided” means one that has not been divided; and these terms include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it: “undivided” means both that which cannot be divided and that which though it can be has not been; and similarly with “unchaste” —it denotes both that which is by nature incapable of chastening and that which, though capable, has not actually been chastened in respect of the errors as regards which the temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with children; for of them it is in this sense that the term “unchaste” is used, whereas another use of it again refers to persons hard to cure or entirely incurable by chastisement. But though “profligacy” has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and that they differ from one another and from the other vicious characters in being disposed in a certain manner towards these; and we described previously the way in which we apply the term “profligacy” by analogy. Persons on the other hand who owing to insensitiveness are uninfluenced by these pleasures are called by some people “insensitive” and by others are designated by other names of the same sort; but the state is not a very familiar one nor of common occurrence, because all men err more in the other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness to pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It specially attaches to persons like the boors who are a stock character in comedy— people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary indulgences. And since the temperate character is shown in connection with pleasures, it follows that it is also related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascertain what these are. For the temperate man is not temperate about all pleasures nor about everything pleasant, but apparently about the objects of two of the senses, taste and touch, and in reality about the objects of touch. For the temperate man is not concerned with the pleasure of beautiful things (apart from sexual desire) or pain caused by ugly things, the medium of which is sight, nor with the pleasure of harmonious sounds or pain of discords conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet with the pleasures and pains of smell, derived from good and bad scents; for neither is anyone termed profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive to sensations of that sort— for example, a man would not be considered profligate if when looking at a beautiful statue or horse or person, or listening to someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink or sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the beautiful objects or listen to the music,—any more than the persons held spell-bound in the abode of the Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which alone the lower animals also happen to be sensitive and to feel pleasure and pain—the objects of taste and of touch, whereas about virtually all the pleasures of the other senses alike animals are clearly so constituted as to be insensitive— e.g. harmonious sound, or beauty; for clearly they are not affected in any degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of beautiful objects or by listening to musical sounds, except possibly in the case of some miraculous occurrences. Nor yet are they sensitive to good or bad smells, although it is true that all their senses are keener than man’s; but even the smells they enjoy are those that have agreeable associations, and are not intrinsically agreeable. By smells not intrinsically agreeable I mean those that we enjoy because of either anticipation or recollection, for example the smell of things to eat or drink, for we enjoy these scents on account of a different pleasure, that of eating or drinking; by intrinsically agreeable I mean scents such as those of flowers (this is the reason of Stratonicus’s neat remark that the scent of flowers is beautiful but that of things to eat and drink sweet). For even the pleasures of taste are not all attractive to animals, nor are those perceived with the tip of the tongue, but those perceived by the throat, the sensation of which seems more like touch than taste; so that gourmands do not pray that they may have a long tongue but a crane’s gullet, like Philoxenus son of Eryxis. It follows that broadly speaking profligacy must be considered to be related to the objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of that sort that the profligate is concerned; for tippling and gluttony and lechery and gormandizing and the like all have to do with the sensations specified, and these are the departments into which profligacy is divided. But nobody is called profligate if he exceeds in regard to the pleasures of sight or hearing or smell; those errors we criticize without severe rebuke, and generally all the things included under the term “lack of self-control”: the uncontrolled are not profligate, yet they are not temperate. Therefore the person of such a character as to be deficient in all the enjoyments which practically everybody must share and must enjoy, is insensitive (or whatever the proper term is), and he that exceeds in them is profligate. For all people by nature enjoy these things, and conceive desires for them, without being or being called profligate, for they do not exceed by feeling more joy than they ought when they get them nor more pain than they ought when they do not get them; nor yet are they unfeeling, for they do not fall short in feeling joy or pain, but rather exceed. And since there are excess and deficiency in regard to these things, it is clear that there is also a middle state, and that this state of character is the best one, and is the opposite of both the others. Hence if temperance is the best state of character in relation to the things with which the profligate is concerned, the middle state in regard to the pleasant objects of sense mentioned will be Temperance, being a middle state between profligacy and insensitiveness: the excess will be Profligacy, and the deficiency will either be nameless or will be denoted by the terms mentioned. We shall have to define the class of pleasures concerned more exactly in our discussion of Self-control and Lack of Control later on.

> Greek: 2. περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἔφοδον ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον. λέγεται δʼ ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. ὅ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μηδʼ ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὃ μὲν δυνατός, ὃ δʼ ἀδύνατος· ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκοκασίαν. ἔτι δʼ ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως. πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακεῖσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας διʼ ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἳ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους, οἳ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δʼ οὐ πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδʼ ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἁμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων ἧτταν καὶ αἴσθησιν. μάλιστα δʼ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἵους οἱ κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἳ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν. ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνας. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περί τε τὸ γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, τῇ δʼ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἁπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς διʼ ὀσφρήσεως, τάς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσωδίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος ἢ ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ᾄδοντος, μὴ βούλοιτο μήτε ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν μήτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δʼ ᾀδόντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ οἱ κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρῆσιν. ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τἆλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἁπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθήτως διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μή τί που συμβέβηκε τερατῶδες· ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τάς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθʼ αὑτάς. λέγω δὲ ⟨μὴ⟩ καθʼ αὑτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (διʼ ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθʼ αὑτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν εἰσίν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν τὰς δὲ ἡδύ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδʼ ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλʼ ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἁφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἁπτόμενα, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν. οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία καὶ ὀψοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅπερ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται. περὶ δὲ τὰς διʼ ὄψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐθεὶς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος, ἐὰν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἀλλʼ ἄνευ ὀνείδους τὰς ἁμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς· οἱ δʼ ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες. ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων ἀκόλαστος. πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδʼ ἀνάλγητοι (οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν). ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἡ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία. ὥστʼ εἰ σωφροσύνη ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις, περὶ ἃ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσότης οὖσα ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας· ἡ δʼ ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία· ἡ δʼ ἔλλειψις ἤτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευομένη. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.