---
title: "Eudemian Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια"
author: "Aristotle"
translator: "Harris Rackham"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 7 of 9
url: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/7/
cite: "Aristotle, tr. Harris Rackham, Eudemian Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια, section 7. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/7/"
---

# Eudemian Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια

*Aristotle, tr. Harris Rackham*

Aristotle’s other ethics: happiness, virtue, friendship and good fortune.

> Greek: ed. Franz Susemihl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0086.tlg009, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harris Rackham, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0086.tlg009.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 7. Book VII · sections 3–10

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/7/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-eudemian-ethics/7/#p-N

[¶0] 3. These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of goodness. But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man, for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically. The friendship of father for son is in this class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous if one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to love in another way. And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same. And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure. This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus has said: “A loved one so would speak, but not a lover.” But they think that the reason is the same.

> Greek: 3. τρία μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις κατʼ ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία. καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πώς εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις. ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἡ καθʼ ὑπερβολήν, ὥσπερ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅλως ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον· κατʼ ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατʼ ἀριθμὸν δʼ οὐκ ἴσον. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων διαφοραὶ εἰσίν· ἄλλη πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἣ δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα. ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. γελοῖον γάρ, εἴ τις ἐγκαλοίη τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. καὶ ἡδονὴ διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἥ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδί, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ. ὡς δʼ αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διʼ ἡδονὴν οἳ μὲν κατʼ ἰσότητα εἰσίν, οἳ δὲ καθʼ ὑπεροχήν. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁμοίως χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. δῆλον δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις. ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν. διὸ εὑρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ ἐρώμενος· τοιαῦτʼ ἂν οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι. οἳ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

[¶1] 4. There being then, as has been said, three kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of superiority. Though both sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality are the parties friends; for it would be absurd for a man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel affection for him and receive it from him. In some cases, while the superior partner ought to receive affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an unworthy object; for affection is measured by the worth of the friends and by one sort of equality. So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity of affection because of inferiority of age, in others on the ground of goodness or birth or some other such superiority; it is right for the superior to claim to feel either less affection or none, alike in a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and one based on goodness. So in cases of small degrees of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small amount is not of importance in some matters, as in weighing timber, though in gold plate it is; but people judge smallness of amount badly, since one’s own good because of its nearness appears big and that of others because of its remoteness small); but when there is an excessive amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love from God. It is manifest, therefore, that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return of affection is possible without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek friendship on a basis of superiority more than that on one of equality; for in the former case they score both affection and a sense of superiority at the same time. Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed than the friend, for he makes the person flattered appear to score both advantages. And this most of all characterizes men ambitious of honors, since to be admired implies superiority. Some persons grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious; one who enjoys loving more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved more. So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving. For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity of loving; for being loved is an accident, as one can be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love without knowing it. Loving depends, more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved corresponds with the nature of the object. A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were not possible, would choose to know the other person rather than to be known by him, as for example women do when they allow others to adopt their children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Antiphon. Indeed the wish to be known seems to be selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and bestowing affection. For this reason we praise those who remain constant in affection towards the dead; for they know, but are not known. It has, then, been stated that there are several modes of friendship, and how many modes there are, namely three, and that receiving affection and having one’s affection returned, and friends on an equality and those on a footing of superiority, are different.

> Greek: 4. ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, τριῶν ὄντων εἰδῶν φιλίας, κατʼ ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὗται πάλιν διῄρηνται εἰς δύο· αἳ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἳ δὲ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν εἰσίν. φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεραι, φίλοι δʼ οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φιλῇ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον φιλῶν. τῇ γὰρ ἀξίᾳ τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καί τινι ἴσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν διʼ ἡλικίας ἔλλειψιν ἀνάξια ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ὑπεροχήν. ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἧττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ κατʼ ἀρετήν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται ἀμφισβητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλʼ ἐν χρυσίῳ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς μέγα, τὸ δʼ ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν)· ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ ᾖ, οὐδʼ αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν. φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μέν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ, τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δʼ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι. δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατʼ ἰσότητα· ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή. διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρʼ ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου· ἄμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ κολακευομένῳ. μάλιστα δʼ οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἳ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἳ δὲ φιλότιμοι. φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός. ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δʼ οὔ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημεῖον δέ· ἕλοιτʼ ἂν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἄμφω, γιγνώσκειν ἢ γιγνώσκεσθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἡ Ἀντιφῶντος. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἕνεκα. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλʼ οὐ γινώσκονται.

[¶2] 5. But as the term “friend” is used in a more universal sense as well, as was also said at the beginning, by those who take in wider considerations (some saying that what is like is dear, others what is opposite), we must also speak about these forms of friendship and their relation to the kinds that have been discussed. As for likeness, it connects with pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good is simple, whereas the bad is multiform; and also the good man is always alike and does not change in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning. Hence if wicked men do not hit it off together, they are not friends with one another but they separate; yet an insecure friendship is not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in this way, because the good is like. But in a way it is also dear on the score of pleasantness; for to those who are alike the same things are pleasant, and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself. Owing to this relations find one another’s voices and characters and society pleasantest, and so with the lower animals; and in this way it is possible even for bad men to feel affection for each other: “But pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.” But opposite is dear to opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need one another; and the opposite is pleasant and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the cold and the wet the dry. But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the good. For opposites strive to reach one another through the middle point, for they strive after each other as tallies, because in that way one middle thing results from the two. Hence accidentally love of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive to reach one another but the middle. If when people have got too cold they are subjected to heat, and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters; but without such treatment they are always in a state of desire, because they are not at the middle points. But a man in the middle enjoys without passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas the others enjoy everything that takes them outside their natural state. This kind of relationship, then, exists even between inanimate things; but when it occurs in the case of living things it becomes affection. Hence sometimes people take delight in persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are brought by one another into the middle state. Hence accidentally, as was said, opposites are dear to opposites also on account of the good. It has, then, been said how many kinds of friendship there are, and what are the different senses in which people are termed friends, and also givers and objects of affection, both in a manner that makes them actually friends and without being friends.

> Greek: 5. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φί λοι διαφέρουσιν, οἵ τε κατʼ ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθʼ ὑπεροχήν, εἴρηται· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπαραλαμβανόντων (οἳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιόν φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἳ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον), λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσι πρὸς τὰς εἰρημένας φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὅμοιος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἦθος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ ἄφρων οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἕωθεν καὶ ἑσπέρας. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ φαῦλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ διίστανται· ἡ δʼ οὐ βέβαιος φιλία οὐ φιλία. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, ὅτι ⟨τὸ⟩ ἀγαθὸν ὅμοιον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις ταὔθʼ ἡδέα, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ φύσει αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν ἥδισται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις· καὶ ταύτῃ ἐνδέχεται καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν. κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ. τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον ὡς τὸ χρήσιμον· αὐτὸ γὰρ αὑτῷ τὸ ὅμοιον ἄχρηστον. διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται καὶ δοῦλος δεσπότου, καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ὡς χρήσιμον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τέλει ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τύχῃ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ. ἔστι δέ πως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἓν μέσον. ἔτι κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθʼ αὑτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος. ὀρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλήλων τἀναντία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερψυχθέντες γάρ, ἐὰν θερμανθῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερθερμανθέντες, ἐὰν ψυχθῶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ χαίρει ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσει ἡδέσιν, οἳ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξιστᾶσι τῆς φύσει ἕξεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστίν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ᾖ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων. διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥαθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

[¶3] 6. The question whether one is one’s own friend or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly similar. For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one’s spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing, whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly. For all these relations involve two separate factors; in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not. From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses. For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other’s sake; and in another way when a man wishes another’s existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone existence—for that other’s sake and not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other; and in another way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake of his company and not for something else, as fathers desire their children’s existence, though they associate with other people. All these cases conflict with one another; some men do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their existence is desired, others unless their society. Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for their masters’ own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and birds that share each other’s pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same as may be. The same principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is rejoicing. Again there are sayings about friendship such as “Amity is equality” and “True friends have one spirit.” All these sayings refer back to the single individual; for that is the way in which the individual wishes good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such and such a consideration, because he acted as an individual; for one who displays his affection wishes not to be but to be thought affectionate. And wishing for the other to exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and “being one spirit” and being unable even to live without one another but dying together—for this is the case with the single individual, and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself. In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man actually to be his own enemy; but as being one and indivisible he is desirable to himself. This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man’s affection for himself carries back to love of the good; for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature. But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his former, like the liar— (and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as “John Styles” is related to “good John Styles”; for it is clear that the same amount of “John Styles” is good as of “good John Styles” )—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said, because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw asunder. Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself... so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with the appetite. And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connection is in people’s own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives. From what has been said, then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term “affection,” and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one.

> Greek: 6. πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθʼ ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ δοκοῦνθʼ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δʼ ὅμοια φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γάρ πως κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη ἡ φιλία, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὔ. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διῃρημένοις τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν· διʼ ἃ μᾶλλον οὕτως αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ⟨ὡς⟩ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται πῶς ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὑτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ ταῦτα καὶ διῃρημένοις· ᾗ δὴ δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα, ᾗ δʼ οὐ διῃρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕξεως [ὡς] οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν διωρισμένοι, καθʼ οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τἀγαθὰ ἢ οἷα οἴεται ἀγαθά, μὴ διʼ αὑτὸν, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται διʼ ἐκεῖνον καὶ μὴ διʼ αὑτὸν, κἂν εἰ μὴ διανέμων τἀγαθά, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἱρεῖται διʼ αὐτὴν τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ διʼ ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δʼ ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα. οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς, οἳ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἳ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται φιλεῖσθαι. ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ διʼ ἕτερόν τι ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν—οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ διʼ αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστά γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, ὅτι [μὴ] ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν· ⟨τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν⟩ μὴ διʼ ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐκεῖνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν. ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ [μὴ] μίαν ψυχὴν εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα. καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιεῖ διά τι ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριτος. οὐ δὲ λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν ᾗ εἷς· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλεῖν. καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν.— οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὁ εἷς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ.—πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πονηρῷ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἐχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι· ᾗ δʼ εἷς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, ὀρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος. ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γάρ πῃ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός, ταύτῃ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος καὶ ὀρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλʼ ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δʼ ἀγαθὸς οὔθʼ ἅμα λοιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής, οὔτε ὁ ὕστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἔμπροσθεν τῷ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψεύστης. ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὑτοῖς, ἀποκτιννύασιν αὑτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός. ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἁπλῶς ὢν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δύʼ ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ ἃ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ⟨οὔ⟩, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ …, οὐκ ἄρα φίλος. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἤδη ἔχῃ προαίρεσιν· ἤδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἔοικε δʼ ἡ φιλία ἡ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ κατὰ συγγένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαφέρωνται, ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν ἔτι συγγενεῖς, ὃ δὲ ἔτι εἷς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ.

[¶4] 7. It is relative to our inquiry to consider also the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly feeling; for some people think that they are the same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart. Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friendship nor yet identical with it. If friendship is divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not found in the friendship of utility nor in friendship for pleasure. If A wishes B prosperity because he is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B’s interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly feeling like... is not for the sake of the person who feels it himself but for the sake of him for whom he feels kindly; and if kindly feeling were found in friendship for the pleasant, men would feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the friendship that is based on character. But it is the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good, whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the good that he wishes; for kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, but it is not friendship. For it is thought that friends agree in feeling, and that those who agree in feeling are friends. But the agreement of friendship is not in regard to everything, but to things practicable for the parties, and the good to all that contributes to their association. Nor is it only agreement in thought or in appetition, for it is possible to think and to desire opposite things, as in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire also. Agreement occurs in the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and desire the same things they harm one another. And it appears that agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement shown even by bad men when their purpose and desire are for the same objects. But it is only proper for them to aim at the same objects in cases when it is possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel. Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship. So much for the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.

> Greek: 7. ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, τοῖς δʼ οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων. ἔστι δʼ ἡ εὔνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν. διῃρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὔτʼ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτʼ ἐν τῇ καθʼ ἡδονὴν ἐστίν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τἀγαθά, οὐ διʼ ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ διʼ αὑτὸν βούλοιτʼ ἄν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ … καὶ ἡ εὔνοια οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὔνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ εὐνοεῖ· εἰ δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος φιλίᾳ, κἂν τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνόουν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὔνοια ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εὔνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὔνους, ὁ δʼ εὔνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας, ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλία. δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἵ τε φίλοι ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες φίλοι εἶναι. ἔστι δʼ οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν (ἔστι γὰρ τἀναντία τὸ κινοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο), οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια· οἵ γε φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμονοία οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ φιλία· ἀλλʼ ἣ μὲν πρώτη καὶ φύσει σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθʼ ἣν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὗ ὀρέγονται. ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται, ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δʼ οὐ μαχοῦνται. ἔστι δʼ ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾖ, μὴ τοῦ ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία πολιτική.

[¶5] 8. The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who have received it than those who have received it feel for those who have conferred it; whereas justice seems to require the opposite. One might conceive that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the other party’s duty to repay it. But really it is not this alone; it is also a law of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and activity as between the parties here: the person benefited is as it were the product of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and also to protect the offspring produced. And in fact fathers love their children more than they are loved by them (mothers more so than fathers) and these in their turn love their children more than their parents, because activity is the greatest good. And mothers love their children more than fathers, because they think that the children are more their work; for people estimate work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child the mother has more pain. Such may be our decision on the subject of friendship for oneself and of friendship among more than one.

> Greek: 8. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὖ τοὺς ποιήσαντας. δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι τοὐναντίον. τοῦτο δʼ ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἄν τις διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀφείλεται, τὸν δʼ ἀποδοῦναι δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αἱρετώτερον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὁ δʼ εὖ παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα σπουδὴ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ ⟨τὰ⟩ γεννώμενα σῴζειν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ τέκνα (καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων) ἢ φιλοῦνται· καὶ οὗτοι πάλιν τὰ αὑτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον· καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον οἴονται αὑτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διορίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.

[¶6] 9. It is thought that what is just is something that is equal, and also that friendship is based on equality, if there is truth in the saying “Amity is equality.” And all constitutions are some species of justice; for they are partnerships, and every partnership is founded on justice, so that there are as many species of justice and of partnership as there are of friendship, and all these species border on each other and have their differentia closely related. But since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and tool, and master and slave are similar, between the two terms of each of these pairs there is no partnership; for they are not two, but the former is one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself; nor is the good divisible between them, but that of both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist. For the body is the soul’s tool born with it, a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate slave. The other partnerships are a constituent part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or with business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same thing is found in constitutions as in the case of musical modes) — paternal authority being royal, the relationship of man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of justice. And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical and proportional, there will also be various species of justice and of partnership and friendship. The partnership of democracy is based on numerical equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it is measured by the same standard; whereas the aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and inferior to have not the same share but proportional shares; and similarly also the friendship of father and son, and the same way in partnerships.

> Greek: 9. καὶ περὶ μὲν φιλίας τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ τῆς ἐν πλείοσι διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· δοκεῖ δὲ τό τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἴσον τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἰσότης [ἡ] φιλότης. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν, ὥστε ὅσα εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐγγὺς ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς. ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δύʼ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἕν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνός [οὐδέν]. οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἑνὸς οὗ ἕνεκα ἐστίν. τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δʼ ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἄψυχος. αἱ δʼ ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι εἰσὶν [ἢ] μόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν φρατέρων ἢ τῶν ὀργίων, ἢ αἱ χρηματιστικαὶ ἔτι πολιτεῖαι. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι ἐν οἰκείοις συνυπάρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις)· βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δʼ ἡ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, πολιτεία δʼ ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννὶς ὀλιγαρχία δῆμος. καὶ τὰ δίκαια δὴ τοσαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατʼ ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἴδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας. κατʼ ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ⟨δημοκρατικὴ⟩ κοινωνία καὶ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ φιλία, τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὅρῳ μετρεῖται· κατʼ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἀρίστη καὶ βασιλική. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δίκαιον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. καὶ ἡ φιλία δὲ ὁμοίως πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.

[¶7] 10. Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really friendship of relatives has more than one species, one as between brothers, another as of father and son: it may be proportional, for example paternal friendship, or based on number, for example the friendship of brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of seniority.

> Greek: 10. λέγονται δὲ φιλίαι συγγενικὴ ἑταιρικὴ κοινωνικὴ ἡ λεγομένη πολιτική. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα εἴδη, ἣ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἣ δʼ ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν (καὶ γὰρ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ἡ πατρική, καὶ κατʼ ἀριθμόν, οἷον ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἑταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρέσβειον)·

[¶8] Civic friendship on the other hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seems to be the individual’s lack of self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent—since they would have been formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of superiority.

> Greek: ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐταρκεῖν δοκοῦσι συνελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ συνῆλθόν γʼ ἂν καὶ τοῦ συζῆν χάριν. μόνη δʼ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρʼ αὐτὴν παρέκβασις οὐ μόνον φιλίαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν· αἱ δʼ ἄλλαι καθʼ ὑπεροχήν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ τῶν χρησίμων φιλίᾳ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτʼ εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

[¶9] The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them.

> Greek: ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνῆλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινοῦ τινος (οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου ἕνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἧς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἐστίν.

[¶10] It does indeed come about that even the tool itself receives attention which it deserves with a view to its work, since it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important half being its activity, boring. And the body and the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said before.

> Greek: καὶ τὸ τρυπάνῳ εἶναι διττόν, ὧν τὸ κυριώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ εἴδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. τὸ δὴ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὁμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν δίκαιόν τι ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς φίλον.

[¶11] Therefore to seek the proper way of associating with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice. In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons; and persons who are partners, and a friend is a partner, either in one’s family or in one’s life. For man is not only a political but also a house-holding animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple occasionally and with any chance female or male,

> Greek: τό τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τισι καὶ κοινωνοῖς, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός, ὃ μὲν γένους, ὃ δὲ βίου. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῷον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τἆλλά ποτε συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι [καὶ] θήλει καὶ ἄρρενι ἀλλʼ αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν, ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πρὸς οὓς φύσει συγγένεια ἐστίν·

[¶12] but man is in a special way not a solitary but a gregarious animal, associating with the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there would be partnership; and justice of a sort, even if there were no state.

> Greek: καὶ κοινωνία τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πόλις εἴη· οἰκία δʼ ἐστί τις φιλία.

[¶13] And a household is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of master and slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body, and such relationships are not friendships or forms of justice but something analogous, just as health is not justice but analogous to it.

> Greek: δεσπότου μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλου ἥπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται οὔτε φιλίαι οὔτε δικαιοσύναι, ἀλλʼ ἀνάλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλʼ ἀνάλογον· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία·