But the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that between god and man and between benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject.
πατρὸς δὲ καὶ υἱοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον· ἣ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑταιρικὴ μάλιστα ἡ κατʼ ἰσότητα.
That between brothers is principally the friendship of comrades, as being on a footing of equality—For never did he make me out a bastard,But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sireOf both—for these are the words of men seeking equality. Hence in the household are first found the origins and springs of friendship, of political organization and of justice.
οὐ γάρ τι νόθος τῷδʼ ἀπεδείχθην·ἀμφοῖν δὲ πατὴρ αὑτὸς ἐκλήθηΖεὺς ἐμὸς ἄρχων.ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. διὸ ἐν οἰκίᾳ πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δικαίου.
And since there are three sorts of friendship, based on goodness, on utility and on pleasure, and two varieties of each sort (for each of them is either on a basis of superiority or of equality), and what is just in relation to them is clear from our discussions, in the variety based on superiority the proportionate claims are not on the same lines, but the superior party claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude being that of ruler to subject;
ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίαι τρεῖς, κατʼ ἀρετήν, κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, τούτων δὲ ἑκάστης δύο διαφοραί (ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν ἣ δὲ κατʼ ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων δῆλον), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρʼ αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος ὥσπερ ἄρχων πρὸς ἀρχόμενον·
or if not that, at all events he claims a numerically equal share (for in fact it happens in this way in other associations too—sometimes the shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally: if the parties contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and makes a diagonal conjunction;
εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον κατʼ ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ λόγῳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον ἀριθμῷ εἰσήνεγκον ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσον, ἀνάλογον.
but it would seem that in this way the superior comes off worse, and the friendship or partnership is a charitable service. Therefore equality must be restored and proportion secured by some other means;
ὁ δʼ ὑπερεχόμενος τοὐναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. δόξειε δʼ ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία.
and this means is honor, which belongs by nature to a ruler and god in relation to a subject. But the profit must be made equal to the honor.
δεῖ ἄρα τινὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀνισάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀνάλογον. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον.
Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friendship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, and fellow-citizens are one another’s friends in the same way as different cities are, and "Athens no longer knoweth Megara," nor similarly do citizens know one another, when they are not useful to one another; their friendship is a ready-money transaction.
δεῖ δὲ ἰσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν. ἡ δὲ κατʼ ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτική. ἡ δὲ πολιτική ἐστι μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίωςοὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆαςκαὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλʼ ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἡ φιλία·
Nevertheless there is present here a ruling factor and a ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality.
ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῇ ὁ θεός, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ἴσον ᾖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας.
But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do—hence the sayingUnto a friend his wage—.
κατʼ ἰσότητα δὴ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας εἴδη δύο, ἣ μὲν νομικὴ ἣ δʼ ἠθική.
When, therefore, it is based on a definite agreement, this is civic and legal friendship; but when they trust each other for repayment, it tends to be moral friendship, that of comrades. Hence this is the kind of friendship in which recriminations most occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature; for friendship based on utility and friendship based on goodness are different, but these people wish to have it both ways at once—they associate together for the sake of utility but make it out to be a moral friendship as between good men, and so represent it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter of trust.
βλέπει δʼ ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηταιμισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθʼ ὁμολογίαν ⟨ᾖ⟩ ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, [καὶ] νομική· ὅταν δʼ ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική. διὸ μάλιστα ἔγκλημα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν. ἕτεραι γὰρ φιλίαι ἡ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν·
For in general, of the three kinds of friendship, it is in useful friendship that most recriminations occur (for goodness is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got and given their share break it off, but useful friends do not dissolve the association at once, if their intercourse is on comradely and not merely legal lines);
οἳ δʼ ἀμφότερα βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου ἕνεκα, ἠθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικεῖς, διὸ ὡς πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλεῖστα ἐγκλήματα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δʼ ἡδεῖς ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται·
nevertheless the legal sort of useful friendship is not given to recrimination. The legal method of discharging the obligation is a matter of money, for that serves as a measure of equality; but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of this sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to law, and these men make their contracts as good men and as dealing with trustworthy people.
οἱ δὲ χρήσιμοι οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἑταιρικῶς προσφέρωνται)· ὅμως δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἡ νομικὴ ἀνέγκλητος. ἔστι δʼ ἡ μὲν νομικὴ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἴσον), ἡ δʼ ἠθικὴ ἑκούσιος. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι δίκας τῶν ἑκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὀρθῶς·
And in fact in this sort of friendship the recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of accusation each party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of a moral kind and not merely legal.
τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε δίκαιον εἶναι, οἳ δʼ ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττουσιν. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, πῶς ἑκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν.
Indeed it is a question in which of two ways one ought to judge what is a just return, whether by looking at the actual amount or quality of the service rendered, or by its amount or quality for the recipient; for it may be as Theognis says—Goddess,’tis small to thee, but great to me, and also the result may be opposite, as in the saying “This is sport to you but death to me.”
καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθὲν, πόσον, ἢ ποῖον ἦν τῷ πεπονθότι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θέογνις·σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα.
Hence recriminations, as has been said; for one party claims recompense as having rendered a great service, because he did it for his friend in need, or saying something else of the sort as to how much it was worth in relation to the benefit given to the recipient and not what it was to himself, while the other party on the contrary speaks of how much it was to the donor and not bow much it was to himself.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτʼ εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δʼ εἴρηται τὰ ἐγκλήματα. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας, ὅτι δεομένῳ ἐποίησιν, ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο, λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἠδύνατο, ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ·
And at other times the position is reversed: the one says how little he got out of it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for instance, if by taking a risk he did the other a shilling’s worth of benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk and the other about the amount of the cash; just as in the repayment of a money loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to be repaid the value that the money had when lent, the other claims to repay it at the present value, unless they have put a proviso in the contract.
ὃ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅσον αὐτῷ. ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ὃ δʼ ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα ἐδύνατο, οἷον εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον ὠφέλησεν, ὃ μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὃ δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα περὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότʼ ἦν, ὃ δὲ πῶς νῦν, ἂν μὴ διείπωνται.
Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and to the thing, but moral friendship at the intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly justice.
ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἡ δʼ ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν.
The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is nobler but friendship of utility more necessary; and men begin as being moral friends and friends on grounds of goodness, but when some private interest comes into collision it becomes clear that really they were different. For most men pursue what is fine only when they have a good margin in hand, and so with the finer sort of friendship too.
ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστί, καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλική. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, διότι καλλίων μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ χρησίμη. οἳ δʼ ἄρχονται μὲν ὡς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ διʼ ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δʼ ἄντικρυς ᾖ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν.
Hence it is clear how these cases must be decided. If they are moral friends, we must consider if their intentions are equal, and nothing else must be claimed by either from the other; and if they are friends on the ground of utility or civic friends, we must consider what form of agreement would have been profitable for them. But if one says they are friends on one footing and the other on another, it is not honorable, when an active return is due, merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in the other case;—
ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ καλόν· διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλεπτέον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιωτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου· εἰ δʼ ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει ὁμολογοῦσιν·
but since they did not provide for this in the contract, on the ground that it was a moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither party must cheat by pretending; so that each must be content with his luck.
ἂν δʼ ὃ μὲν φῇ ὧδε ὃ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν ἀντιποιῆσαι, δέον τοὺς καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ οὐ διείποντο ὡς ἠθικῶς, δεῖ κρίνειν τίνα, μηδʼ ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐξαπατᾶν.
But it is clear that moral friendship is a matter of intention, since even if a man after having received great benefits owing to inability did not repay them, but only repaid as much as he was able, he acts honorably; for even God is content with getting sacrifices in accordance with our ability.
ὥστε δεῖ στέργειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδῴη διʼ ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἠδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας.
But a seller will not be satisfied if a man says he cannot pay more, nor will one who has made a loan.
ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἕξει, ἂν μὴ φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.
In friendships not based on direct reciprocity many causes of recrimination occur, and it is not easy to see what is just; for it is difficult to measure by one given thing relations that are not directly reciprocal.
πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις τοῖς μὴ κατʼ εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον. χαλεπὸν γὰρ μετρῆσαι ἑνὶ τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατʼ εὐθυωρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν.
This is how it happens in love affairs, since in them one party pursues the other as a pleasant person to live with, but sometimes the other the one as useful, and when the lover ceases to love, he having changed the other changes, and then they calculate the quid pro quo, and quarrel as Pytho and Pammenes used, and as teacher and pupil do in general (for knowledge and money have no common measure), and as Herodicus the doctor did with the patient who offered to pay his fee with a discount, and as the harpist and the king fell out.
ὃ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὡς [τὸν] ἡδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὃ δʼ ἐκεῖνον ἐνίοτε ὡς χρήσιμον· ὅταν δὲ παύσηται τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἄλλου γινομένου ἄλλος γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται παντί τινος, καὶ ὡς Πύθων καὶ Παμμένης διεφέροντο καὶ ὡς διδάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἑνὶ μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Ἡρόδικος ὁ ἰατρὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθόν, καὶ ὡς ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς.
The king associated with the harpist as pleasant and the harpist with the king as useful; but the king, when the time came for him to pay, made out that he was himself of the pleasant sort, and said that just as the harpist had given him pleasure by his singing, so he had given the harpist pleasure by his promises to him.
ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδεῖ, ὃ δʼ ὡς χρησίμῳ ὡμίλει· ὃ δʼ ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον ᾄσαντα εὐφρᾶναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνῳ.
Nevertheless here too it is clear how we must decide: here too we must measure by one standard, but by a ratio, not a number. For we must measure by proportion, as also the civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoemaker to be partner with a farmer unless their products are equalized by proportion?
ὅμως δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστέον· ἑνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθʼ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅρῳ, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογον γὰρ μετρητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία.
Therefore the measure for partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for example if one party complains that he has given wisdom and the other says he has given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom to being rich? and then, what is the amount given for each? for if one party has given half of the smaller amount but the other not even a small fraction of the larger, it is clear that the latter is cheating.
πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσει γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα; τοῖς δὲ μὴ κατʼ εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὃ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὃ δʼ ἐκείνῳ ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἶτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς ἑκάτερον. εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἥμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὃ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ.
But here too there is a dispute at the outset, if one says that they came together on grounds of utility and the other denies it and says it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship.
ἔστι δὲ κἀνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῇ ὃ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὃ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ὡς κατʼ ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.
11. About the good friend and the friend on the basis of goodness, we must consider whether one ought to render useful services and assistance to him or to the friend who is able to make an equal return. This is the same problem as whether it is more one’s duty to benefit a friend or a virtuous man. If a man is a friend and virtuous, perhaps it is not over-difficult, provided one does not exaggerate the one factor and underrate the other, benefiting him greatly as friend but only slightly as good. But in other cases many problems arise, for instance, if A was a friend but is going not to be and B is going to be but is not now, or if A became one but is not one now and B is one now but was not and is going not to be. But the former problem is more difficult. For possibly there is something in the lines of Euripides:Prithee take words as thy just pay for words,But he, that gave a deed, a deed shall have;and it is not one’s duty to give everything to one’s father, but there are other things that one ought to give to one’s mother, although the father is the superior; for even to Zeus not all the sacrifices are offered, nor does he have all the honors but some particular ones. Perhaps, therefore, there are some services that ought to be rendered to the useful friend and others to the good friend: for instance, if a friend gives you food and necessaries you are not therefore bound to give him your society, and accordingly also you are not bound to render to the friend to whom you give your society the things that you do not get from him but from the useful friend; but those who by so doing wrongly give everything to one whom they love are good-for-nothing people. And the defining marks of friendship stated in the discourses all belong to friendship in some sense, but not to the same kind of friendship. It is a mark of the useful friend that one wishes the things good for him, and so of the benefactor, and in fact a friend of any sort (for this definition of friendship is not distinctive); of another friend, that one wishes his existence, of another that one wishes his society; of the friend on the ground of pleasure, that one shares his grief and his joy. All these defining marks are predicated in the case of some friendship, but none of them with reference to friendship as a single thing. Hence there are many of them, and each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though it does not: for instance, the desire for the friend’s existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes existence to belong to his own work —and to him who gave one existence it is one’s duty to give existence in return; but he wishes the society not of this friend but of the pleasant one. Friends in some cases wrong each other, because they love things more, not the possessor of them, and are friends of the possessor too on this account (just as a man chose his wine because it was sweet and chose his wealth because it was useful), for he is more useful. Hence naturally he is annoyed, just as if they had preferred his possessions to himself as being inferior; and they complain, for now they look to find in him the good man, having previously looked for the pleasant or the useful man.
11. περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φίλου, σκεπτέον πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ ἀντιποιοῦντι καὶ δυναμένῳ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημα ἐστί, πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ἂν μὲν γὰρ ⟨ὁ⟩ φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπόν, ἂν μή τις τὸ μὲν αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποιῶν, ἐπιεικῆ δὲ ἠρέμα· εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὃ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὃ δὲ ἔσται, οὔπω δέ, ἢ ὃ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δʼ οὔ, ὃ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης, ποιήσαςλόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,ἔργον δʼ ἐκεῖνος ἔργον ⟨ὃς⟩ παρέσχετο.καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἄλλʼ ἃ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι βελτίων ὁ πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδʼ ἔχει πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινάς· ἴσως οὖν ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἄλλα δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. οἷον οὐχ εἰ σῖτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ· οὐδʼ ᾧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος. ἀλλʼ οἳ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες τούτῳ πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον, οὐδενός εἰσιν ἄξιοι. καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μέν πώς εἰσι φιλίας, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῷ εὖ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ ὁρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθʼ ἡδονὴν τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν· πάντες δʼ οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι κατὰ φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δʼ οὐδείς. διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσί, καὶ ἕκαστος μιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὤν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ εἶναι προαίρεσις. καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ βούλεται τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ αὑτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ συζῆν οὐ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ. ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἔνιοι· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κἀκείνους οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον εἵλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο· χρησιμώτερος γάρ. διὸ ⟨οὐ⟩ δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον εἵλετο ἀντὶ ἥττονος. οἳ δʼ ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητήσαντες τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.
12. We must also consider self-sufficiency and friendship, and the interrelationship of their potentialities. For one may raise the question whether if a person be self-sufficing in every respect he will have a friend, or whether on the contrary a friend is sought for in need, and the good man will be most self-sufficing. If the life that is combined with goodness is happy, what need would there be of a friend? For it does not belong to the self-sufficing man to need either useful friends or friends to amuse him and society, for he is sufficient society for himself.
12. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας καὶ φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον, εἴ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ φίλος. εἰ κατʼ ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς αὐταρκέστατος, εἰ ὁ μετʼ ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν· αὐτὸς γὰρ αὑτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι.
This is most manifest in the case of God; for it is clear that as he needs nothing more he will not need a friend, and that supposing he has no need of one he will not have one. Consequently the happiest human being also will very little need a friend, except in so far as to be self-sufficing is impossible.
μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδενὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδʼ ἔσται αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν δεσπότου. ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλʼ ἢ καθʼ ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη.
Of necessity, therefore, he who lives the best life will have fewest friends, and they will constantly become fewer, and he will not be eager to have friends but will think lightly not only of useful friends but also of those desirable for society. But assuredly even his case would seem to show that a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit but that one loved on account of goodness is the only real friend.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως ὦσι φίλοι, ἀλλʼ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ συζῆν αἱρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε φανερὸν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδʼ ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος.
For when we are not in need of something, then we all seek people to share our enjoyments, and beneficiaries rather than benefactors; and we can judge them better when we are self-sufficing than when in need, and we most need friends who are worthy of our society.
ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπλαυσομένους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ποιήσοντας. ἀμείνω δʼ ἔχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετʼ ἐνδείας, ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν ἀξίων δεόμεθα φίλων.
But about this question we must consider whether perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound, in part the truth escapes us because of the comparison. The matter is clear if we ascertain what life in the active sense and as an End is.
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον, μή ποτε τὸ μέν τι λέγεται καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν.
It is manifest that life is perception and knowledge, and that consequently social life is perception and knowledge in common. But perception and knowledge themselves are the thing most desirable for each individually (and it is owing to this that the appetition for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must be deemed a mode of knowing).
δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὑτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὑτὸν γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτατον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ ὄρεξις·
If therefore one were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge and its negation (though this, it is true, is obscure in the argument as we have written it, but it may be observed in experience), there would be no difference between absolute knowledge and another person’s knowing instead of oneself; but that is like another person’s living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable. For two things must be taken into consideration together, that life is desirable and that good is desirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for ourselves to possess a nature of that quality.
τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γνῶσιν τινά. εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμοι καὶ ποιήσειε τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἔστι μὴ λανθάνειν), οὐθὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθʼ αὑτοῦ· τὸ δʼ ὅμοιον τοῦ ζῆν ἀνθʼ αὑτοῦ ἄλλον. εὐλόγως δὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτερον. δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ ζῆν [καὶ] αἱρετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν.
If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series of this kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their participation in the “determined” nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives, in the manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object known.
εἰ οὖν ἐστιν ἀεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἡ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἱρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως· ὥστε τὸ αὑτοῦ βούλεσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὑτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ βούλεσθαι ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατʼ αὐτούς ἐσμεν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ᾗ καὶ οὗ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)·
To choose to live in the society of others might, therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (first in the case of the things common to the other animals also, for instance eating together or drinking together, for what difference does it make whether these things take place when we are near together or apart, if you take away speech? but even to share in speech that is merely casual is a thing indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing, since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in one’s friend, and likeness is friendship)—
ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν ἀεὶ βούλεται, ὅτι βούλεται ἀεὶ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστόν. τὸ δὴ συζῆν αἱρεῖσθαι δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοπουμένοις πως εὔηθες (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθίειν ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὖσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χωρίς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον· ἅμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκέσι φίλοις οἷόν τε·
but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it pleasanter to share good things with our friends, as far as these fall to each, and the best that each can—
μανθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δʼ ὁ φίλος, ἡ δʼ ὁμοιότης φιλία)·
but among these, it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one’s friend (whence the saying “Distant friends a burden are” ), so that they must not be separated when this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner.
ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεταί γε, καὶ πάντες ἥδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθʼ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὗ δύναται ἀρίστου, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς, τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας. καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ. διό φησι "μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι", ὥστʼ οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων τούτου γινομένου. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλίᾳ ὅμοιον εἶναι·
Therefore the argument in raising the question asserts the former position, but the facts of experience are obviously on the latter lines, so that it is clear that the raiser of the question in a way misleads us.
τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατʼ αἴσθησιν.
We must therefore examine the truth from the following consideration: “friend” really denotes, in the language of the proverb, 'another Hercules'—another self; but the characteristics are scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in the case of one person; though by nature a friend is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend in body and another in spirit, and one in one part of the body or spirit, another in another. But still none the less a friend really means as it were a separate self.
ὁ μὲν τοίνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δʼ ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παρακρούεταί πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν. σκεπτέον ἔνθεν τἀληθές. ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησίν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός. διέσπασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφʼ ἑνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὅμοιος ἕτερος, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μόριον ἕτερος ἕτερον.
To perceive and to know a friend, therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently to share even vulgar pleasures and ordinary life with a friend is naturally pleasant (for it always involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend), but more so to share the more divine pleasures; the reason of which is that it is always more pleasant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good, and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes an active experience, sometimes something else. But if it is pleasant to live well oneself and for one’s friend also to live well, and if living together involves working together, surely their partnership will be pre-eminently in things included in the End. Hence we should study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures (for such partnerships do not seem to be real social intercourse but mere enjoyment),
ἀλλʼ οὐθέν τε ἧττον βούλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὑτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ⟨τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ⟩ αὑτόν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήδεσθαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου ἅμα αἴσθησις ἀεί), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας ἡδονάς. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἀεὶ ἥδιον ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὁτὲ μὲν πάθος, ὁτὲ δὲ πρᾶξις, ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι. εἰ δʼ αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν συνεργεῖν, ἡ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστά γε. διὸ ⟨δεῖ⟩ συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευωχεῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα·
but each really wishes to share with his friends the End that he is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose most of all to benefit their friends and to be benefited by them. It is therefore manifest that to live together is actually a duty, and that all people wish it very much, and that this is most the case with the man that is the happiest and best. But that the contrary appeared to be the conclusion of the argument was also reasonable, the statement being true. For the solution is on the line of the comparison, the correspondence being true; for the fact that God is not of such a nature as to need a friend postulates that man, who is like God, also does not need one.
αἱ τοιαῦται ὁμιλίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολαύσεις. ἀλλʼ ἕκαστος οὗ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἱροῦνται μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερόν· ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῦτʼ εὐλόγως συνέβαινε λέγοντος ἀληθῆ. κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβολῆς ἀληθοῦς οὔσης ἡ λύσις ⟨οὐκ⟩ ἔστιν.
Yet according to this argument the virtuous man will not think of anything; for God’s perfection does not permit of this, but he is too perfect to think of anything else beside himself. And the reason is that for us well-being has reference to something other than ourselves, but in his case he is himself his own well-being.
ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ τοιοῦτος οἷος δεῖσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἀξιοῦμεν. καίτοι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ νοήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρʼ αὐτὸς αὑτόν. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθʼ ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν.
As to seeking for ourselves and praying for many friends, and at the same time saying that one who has many friends has no friend, both statements are correct. For if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at once, it is most desirable for them to be the largest possible number; but as that is very difficult, active community of perception must of necessity be in a smaller circle,
καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὔχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἄμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς. ἐνδεχομένου γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείστοις αἱρετώτατον·
so that it is not only difficult to acquire many friends (for probation is needed), but also to use them when one has got them.
ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστʼ οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ πολλοὺς κτήσασθαι (πείρας γὰρ δεῖ), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖσι χρήσασθαι.
One for whom we feel affection we sometimes wish to prosper in absence from us, but sometimes to share the same experiences. And to wish to be together is a mark of friendship, for if it is possible to be together and to prosper all choose this; but if it is not possible to prosper together, then we choose as the mother of Heracles perhaps would have chosen for her son, to be a god rather than to be with her but in service to Eurystheus.
καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπεῖναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα, ὁτὲ δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν. ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο πάντες αἱροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ ἴσως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ εἵλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετʼ αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν.
For men would say things like the jest which the Spartan made when somebody told him to invoke the Dioscuri in a storm.
ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴπειεν καὶ ὃν ὁ Λάκων ἔσκωψεν, ἐπεί τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους.
It seems to be characteristic of one who feels affection for another to debar him from sharing his troubles, and of the person for whom affection is felt to wish to share them. Both these things happen reasonably; for to a friend nothing ought to give so much pain as his friend gives pleasure, yet it is felt that he ought not to choose his own interest.
δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς συμμεθέξεως τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα συμβαίνει εὐλόγως. δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μηθὲν εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὡς ⟨μὴ⟩ ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον·
Hence people hinder their friends from sharing their sorrows; they are content to be in trouble by themselves, in order that they may not appear from selfish considerations actually to choose the joy of their friend’s grief and furthermore to find it a relief not to bear their misfortunes alone.
δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὑτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὑτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπουμένου τοῦ φίλου.
And as both well-being and companionship are desirable, it is clear that companionship combined with even a lesser good is in a way more desirable than separation with a greater good. But as it is not clear how much value companionship has, at this point men differ, and some think it is friendly to share everything in company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter to dine with company though having the same food; others wish to share only in well-being, because, they say, if one supposes extreme cases, people experiencing great adversity in company or great prosperity separately are on a par.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά. ἐπεὶ δʼ αἱρετὸν τό τʼ εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετʼ ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερόν πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἤδη διαφέρονται καὶ οἴονται τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, [καὶ] ὥσπερ συνδειπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν ἥδιον ταὐτὰ ἔχοντας· οἳ δʼ ἂν μέντοι οὐ βούλονται. ἐπεὶ δʼ εἴ γέ τις ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσει, ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ εὖ σφόδρα χωρίς.
And it is much the same as this in regard to misfortunes also; sometimes we wish our friends to be absent, and do not want to give them pain when their presence is not going to do any good, but at other times for them to be present is most pleasant. And the reason of this contrariety is very easily explained; it comes about because of the things stated before, and because to behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing we absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case, but to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can be, for the reason stated, and indeed to see him ill if one is ill oneself;
παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπεῖναι οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μηθὲν μέλλωσι ποιήσειν πλέον· ὁτὲ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἥδιστον παρεῖναι. τὸ δὲ τῆς ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλʼ εὔλογον. διὰ γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἕξει τὸν φίλον θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δʼ ὁρᾶν τὸν φίλον ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴ κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός·
so that whichever of these is more pleasant, it sways the balance of wishing him to be present or not. And it fits in that the former occurs in the case of inferior people, and for the same reason; they are most eager for their friends not to prosper and not to be absent if they themselves have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes suicides kill those whom they love with themselves, as they think that they feel their own misfortune more if their loved ones are to survive; just as, if a man in trouble had the memory that he had once been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his trouble than if he thought that he had always done badly.
ὥστε ὁπότερον ἂν τούτων ᾖ μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν ῥοπὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρεῖναι ἢ μή. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδʼ εἶναι ἀνάγκαι αὐτοῖς κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποτιννύασι. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ποτὲ εὖ ἔπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν.