---
title: "Metaphysics · Τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά"
author: "Aristotle"
translator: "Hugh Tredennick"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 13 of 27
url: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-metaphysics/13/
cite: "Aristotle, tr. Hugh Tredennick, Metaphysics · Τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά, section 13. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-metaphysics/13/"
---

# Metaphysics · Τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά

*Aristotle, tr. Hugh Tredennick*

First philosophy: being as being, substance, cause, and the unmoved mover.

> Greek: ed. William David Ross, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0086.tlg025, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Hugh Tredennick, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0086.tlg025.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (line numbers), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 13. Book VII · 1032b–1037a

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-metaphysics/13/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-metaphysics/13/#p-N

[¶0] and this will be achieved if he is made hot. What does this entail? So-and-so; now this is potentially present, and the thing is now in his power. The thing which produces, and from which the process of recovering health begins, is the form in the soul, if the process is artificial; if spontaneous, it is whatever is the starting-point of the production for the artificial producer; as in medical treatment the starting-point is, perhaps, the heating of the patient; and this the doctor produces by friction. Heat in the body, then, is either a part of health, or is followed (directly or through several intermediaries) by something similar which is a part of health. This is the ultimate thing, namely that produces, and in this sense is a part of, health—or of the house (in the form of stones) or of other things. Therefore, as we say, generation would be impossible if nothing were already existent. It is clear, then, that some part must necessarily pre-exist; because the matter is a part, since it is matter which pre-exists in the product and becomes something.

> Greek: τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστι; τοδί. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοδὶ δυνάμει· τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη ἐπʼ αὐτῷ. τὸ δὴ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅθεν ἄρχεται ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἂν μὲν ἀπὸ τέχνης, τὸ εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐὰν δʼ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἀπὸ τούτου ὅ ποτε τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄρχει τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἰατρεύειν ἴσως ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμαίνειν ἡ ἀρχή (τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ τῇ τρίψει)· ἡ θερμότης τοίνυν ἡ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ ἕπεταί τι αὐτῇ τοιοῦτον ὅ ἐστι μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας, ἢ διὰ πλειόνων· τοῦτο δʼ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας,—καὶ τῆς οἰκίας (ὁἷον οἱ λίθοι) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ὥστε, καθάπερ λέγεται, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι εἰ μηδὲν προϋπάρχοι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τι μέρος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρξει φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη μέρος (ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ καὶ γίγνεται αὕτη).

[¶1] But then is matter part of the formula? Well, we define bronze circles in both ways; we describe the matter as bronze, and the form as such-and-such a shape; and this shape is the proximate genus in which the circle is placed. The bronze circle, then, has its matter in its formula. Now as for that from which, as matter, things are generated, some things when they are generated are called not “so-and-so,” but “made of so-and-so”; e.g., a statue is not called stone, but made of stone. But the man who becomes healthy is not called after that from which he becomes healthy. This is because the generation proceeds from the privation and the substrate, which we call matter (e.g., both “the man” and “the invalid” become healthy), but it is more properly said to proceed from the privation; e.g., a man becomes healthy from being an invalid rather than from being a man. Hence a healthy person is not called an invalid, but a man, and a healthy man. But where the privation is obscure and has no name—e.g. in bronze the privation of any given shape, or in bricks and wood the privation of the shape of a house—the generation is considered to proceed from these materials, as in the former case from the invalid. Hence just as in the former case the subject is not called that from which it is generated, so in this case the statue is not called wood, but is called by a verbal change not wood, but wooden; not bronze, but made of bronze; not stone, but made of stone; and the house is called not bricks, but made of bricks.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἆρα καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; ἀμφοτέρως δὴ λέγομεν τοὺς χαλκοῦς κύκλους τί εἰσι, καὶ τὴν ὕλην λέγοντες ὅτι χαλκός, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅτι σχῆμα τοιόνδε, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ γένος εἰς ὃ πρῶτον τίθεται. ὁ δὴ χαλκοῦς κύκλος ἔχει ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν ὕλην.—ἐξ οὗ δὲ ὡς ὕλης γίγνεται ἔνια λέγεται, ὅταν γένηται, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλʼ ἐκείνινον, οἷον ὁ ἀνδριὰς οὐ λίθος ἀλλὰ λίθινος, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ὑγιαίνων οὐ λέγεται ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ· αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, ὃ λέγομεν τὴν ὕλην (οἷον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ κάμνων γίγνεται ὑγιής), μᾶλλον μέντοι λέγεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως, οἷον ἐκ κάμνοντος ὑγιὴς ἢ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, διὸ κάμνων μὲν ὁ ὑγιὴς οὐ λέγεται, ἄνθρωπος δέ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιής· ὧν δʼ ἡ στέρησις ἄδηλος καὶ ἀνώνυμος, οἷον ἐν χαλκῷ σχήματος ὁποιουοῦν ἢ ἐν πλίνθοις καὶ ξύλοις οἰκίας, ἐκ τούτων δοκεῖ γίγνεσθαι ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐκ κάμνοντος· διὸ ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖ ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο οὐ λέγεται, οὐδʼ ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἀνδριὰς ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παράγεται ξύλινος, [οὐ ξύλον,] καὶ χαλκοῦς ἀλλʼ οὐ χαλκός, καὶ λίθινος ἀλλʼ οὐ λίθος, καὶ ἡ οἰκία πλινθίνη ἀλλʼ οὐ πλίνθοι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐκ ξύλου γίγνεται ἀνδριὰς ἢ ἐκ πλίνθων οἰκία, ἐάν τις ἐπιβλέπῃ σφόδρα, οὐκ ἂν ἁπλῶς εἴπειεν, διὰ τὸ δεῖν μεταβάλλοντος γίγνεσθαι ἐξ οὗ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑπομένοντος.

[¶2] For if we consider the matter carefully, we should not even say without qualification that a statue is generated from wood, or a house from bricks; because that from which a thing is generated should not persist, but be changed. This, then, is why we speak in this way. Now since that which is generated is generated by something (by which I mean the starting-point of the process of generation), and from something (by which let us understand not the privation but the matter; for we have already distinguished the meanings of these), and becomes something (i.e. a sphere or circle or whatever else it may be); just as the craftsman does not produce the substrate, i.e. the bronze, so neither does he produce the sphere; except accidentally, inasmuch as the bronze sphere is a sphere, and he makes the former. For to make an individual thing is to make it out of the substrate in the fullest sense. I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make the round or the sphere, but something else; i.e. to produce this form in another medium. For if we make the form, we must make it out of something else; for this has been assumed.

> Greek: διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο οὕτως λέγεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπό τινός τε γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον (τοῦτο δὲ λέγω ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεώς ἐστι) καὶ ἔκ τινος (ἔστω δὲ μὴ ἡ στέρησις τοῦτο ἀλλʼ ἡ ὕλη· ἤδη γὰρ διώρισται ὃν τρόπον τοῦτο λέγομεν) καὶ τὶ γίγνεται (τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἢ σφαῖρα ἢ κύκλος ἢ ὅ τι ἔτυχε τῶν ἄλλων), ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ποιεῖ, τὸν χαλκόν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν σφαῖραν, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὅτι ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα σφαῖρά ἐστιν ἐκείνην δὲ ποιεῖ. τὸ γὰρ τόδε τι ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλως ὑποκειμένου τόδε τι ποιεῖν ἐστίν (λέγω δʼ ὅτι τὸν χαλκὸν στρογγύλον ποιεῖν ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὴν σφαῖραν ποιεῖν ἀλλʼ ἕτερόν τι, οἷον τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ἐν ἄλλῳ· εἰ γὰρ ποιεῖ, ἔκ τινος ἂν ποιοίη ἄλλου, τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπέκειτο·

[¶3] E.g., we make a bronze sphere; we do this in the sense that from A, i.e. bronze, we make B, i.e. a sphere. If, then, we make the spherical form itself, clearly we shall have to make it in the same way; and the processes of generation will continue to infinity. It is therefore obvious that the form (or whatever we should call the shape in the sensible thing) is not generated—generation does not apply to it— nor is the essence generated; for this is that which is induced in something else either by art or by nature or by potency. But we do cause a bronze sphere to be, for we produce it from bronze and a sphere; we induce the form into this particular matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general is generated, something must be generated from something; for that which is generated will always have to be divisible, and be partly one thing and partly another; I mean partly matter and partly form. If then a sphere is the figure whose circumference is everywhere equidistant from the center, part of this will be the medium in which that which we produce will be contained, and part will be in that medium; and the whole will be the thing generated, as in the case of the bronze sphere. It is obvious, then, from what we have said, that the thing in the sense of form or essence is not generated, whereas the concrete whole which is called after it is generated; and that in everything that is generated matter is present, and one part is matter and the other form.

> Greek: οἷον ποιεῖ χαλκῆν σφαῖραν, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτως ὅτι ἐκ τουδί, ὅ ἐστι χαλκός, τοδὶ ποιεῖ, ὅ ἐστι σφαῖρα)· εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ αὐτό, δῆλον ὅτι ὡσαύτως ποιήσει, καὶ βαδιοῦνται αἱ γενέσεις εἰς ἄπειρον. φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὁτιδήποτε χρὴ καλεῖν τὴν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μορφήν, οὐ γίγνεται, οὐδʼ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ γένεσις, οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ γίγνεται ἢ ὑπὸ τέχνης ἢ ὑπὸ φύσεως ἢ δυνάμεως). τὸ δὲ χαλκῆν σφαῖραν εἶναι ποιεῖ· ποιεῖ γὰρ ἐκ χαλκοῦ καὶ σφαίρας· εἰς τοδὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο σφαῖρα χαλκῆ. τοῦ δὲ σφαίρᾳ εἶναι ὅλως εἰ ἔσται γένεσις, ἔκ τινος τὶ ἔσται. δεήσει γὰρ διαιρετὸν εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ εἶναι τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε, λέγω δʼ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὕλην τὸ δὲ εἶδος. εἰ δή ἐστι σφαῖρα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου σχῆμα ἴσον, τούτου τὸ μὲν ἐν ᾧ ἔσται ὃ ποιεῖ, τὸ δʼ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἅπαν τὸ γεγονός, οἷον ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται, ἡ δὲ σύνολος ἡ κατὰ ταύτην λεγομένη γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ἐν παντὶ τῷ γεννωμένῳ ὕλη ἔνεστι, καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε.—πότερον οὖν ἔστι τις σφαῖρα παρὰ τάσδε ἢ οἰκία παρὰ τὰς πλίνθους;

[¶4] Is there then some sphere besides the particular spheres, or some house besides the bricks? Surely no individual thing would ever have been generated if form had existed thus independently. Form means “of such a kind”; it is not a definite individual, but we produce or generate from the individual something “of such a kind”; and when it is generated it is an individual “of such a kind.” The whole individual, Callias or Socrates, corresponds to “this bronze sphere,” but “man” and “animal” correspond to bronze sphere in general. Obviously therefore the cause which consists of the Forms (in the sense in which some speak of them, assuming that there are certain entities besides particulars), in respect at least of generation and destruction, is useless; nor, for this reason at any rate, should they be regarded as self-subsistent substances. Indeed in some cases it is even obvious that that which generates is of the same kind as that which is generated—not however identical with it, nor numerically one with it, but formally one—e.g. in natural productions (for man begets man), unless something happens contrary to nature, as when a horse sires a mule. And even these cases are similar; for that which would be common to both horse and ass, the genus immediately above them, has no name; but it would probably be both, just as the mule is both.

> Greek: ἢ οὐδʼ ἄν ποτε ἐγίγνετο, εἰ οὕτως ἦν, τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σημαίνει, τόδε δὲ καὶ ὡρισμένον οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ γεννᾷ ἐκ τοῦδε τοιόνδε, καὶ ὅταν γεννηθῇ, ἔστι τόδε τοιόνδε; τὸ δὲ ἅπαν τόδε, Καλλίας ἢ Σωκράτης, ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἡ σφαῖρα ἡ χαλκῆ ἡδί, ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὥσπερ σφαῖρα χαλκῆ ὅλως. φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτία, ὡς εἰώθασί τινες λέγειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ ἔστιν ἄττα παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, πρός γε τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐθὲν χρησίμη· οὐδʼ ἂν εἶεν διά γε ταῦτα οὐσίαι καθʼ αὑτάς. ἐπὶ μὲν δή τινων καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ γεννῶν τοιοῦτον μὲν οἷον τὸ γεννώμενον, οὐ μέντοι τὸ αὐτό γε, οὐδὲ ἓν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς—ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ—ἂν μή τι παρὰ φύσιν γένηται, οἷον ἵππος ἡμίονον (καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοίως· ὃ γὰρ ἂν κοινὸν εἴη ἐφʼ ἵππου καὶ ὄνου οὐκ ὠνόμασται, τὸ ἐγγύτατα γένος, εἴη δʼ ἂν ἄμφω ἴσως, οἷον ἡμίονος)·

[¶5] Thus obviously there is no need to set up a form as a pattern (for we should have looked for Forms in these cases especially, since living things are in a special sense substances); the thing which generates is sufficient to produce, and to be the cause of the form in the matter. The completed whole, such-and-such a form induced in this flesh and these bones, is Callias or Socrates. And it is different from that which generated it, because the matter is different but identical in form, because the form is indivisible. The question might be raised why some things are generated both artificially and spontaneously—e.g. health—and others not; e.g. a house. The reason is that in some cases the matter—which is the starting-point of the process in the production and generation of artificial things, and in which some part of the result is already existent—is such that it can initiate its own motion, and in other cases it is not; and of the former kind some can initiate motion in a particular way, and some cannot. For many things can move themselves, but not in a particular way, e.g. so as to dance. It is impossible, then, for any things whose matter is of this kind (e.g. stones) to be moved in this particular way except by something else; but in that particular way it is possible. And it is so with fire. For this reason some things cannot exist apart from the possessor of the art, and others can;

> Greek: ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐθὲν δεῖ ὡς παράδειγμα εἶδος κατασκευάζειν (μάλιστα γὰρ ἂν ἐν τούτοις ἐπεζητοῦντο· οὐσίαι γὰρ αἱ μάλιστα αὗται) ἀλλὰ ἱκανὸν τὸ γεννῶν ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῦ εἴδους αἴτιον εἶναι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. τὸ δʼ ἅπαν ἤδη, τὸ τοιόνδε εἶδος ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ὀστοῖς, Καλλίας καὶ Σωκράτης· καὶ ἕτερον μὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην (ἑτέρα γάρ), ταὐτὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει (ἄτομον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος). ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δʼ οὔ, οἷον οἰκία. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἄρχουσα τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ γίγνεσθαί τι τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, ἐν ᾗ ὑπάρχει τι μέρος τοῦ πράγματος,—ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη ἐστὶν οἵα κινεῖσθαι ὑφʼ αὑτῆς ἡ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν ὡδὶ οἵα τε ἡ δὲ ἀδύνατος· πολλὰ γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν ὑφʼ αὑτῶν κινεῖσθαι ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡδί, οἷον ὀρχήσασθαι. ὅσων οὖν τοιαύτη ἡ ὕλη, οἷον οἱ λίθοι, ἀδύνατον ὡδὶ κινηθῆναι εἰ μὴ ὑπʼ ἄλλου, ὡδὶ μέντοι ναί—καὶ τὸ πῦρ. διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὴν τέχνην τὰ δὲ ἔσται· ὑπὸ γὰρ τούτων κινηθήσεται τῶν οὐκ ἐχόντων τὴν τέχνην, κινεῖσθαι δὲ δυναμένων αὐτῶν ὑπʼ ἄλλων οὐκ ἐχόντων τὴν τέχνην ἢ ἐκ μέρους.

[¶6] because the motion can be initiated by those things which do not indeed possess the art, but can themselves be moved either by other things which do not possess the art, or by the motion from the part of the product which pre-exists in them. It is clear also from what we have said that in a sense all artificial things are generated either from something which bears the same name (as is the case with natural objects) or from a part of themselves which bears the same name as themselves (e.g. a house from a house, inasmuch as it is generated by mind; for the art is the form), or from something which contains some part; that is if the generation is not accidental; for the direct and independent cause of the production is a part of the product. Heat in the motion produces heat in the body; and either this is health or a part of health, or a part of health or health accompanies it. And this is why heat is said to produce health, because it produces that of which health is a concomitant and consequence. Therefore as essence is the starting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms start from the “what” of a thing), so too generation proceeds from it. And it is the same with natural formations as it is with the products of art. For the seed produces just as do those things which function by art. It contains the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes has in some sense the same name as the product (for we must not expect that all should have the same name in the sense that “man” is produced by “man”—since woman is also produced by man); unless the product is a freak.

> Greek: δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ πάντα γίγνεται ἐξ ὁμωνύμου, ὥσπερ τὰ φύσει, ἢ ἐκ μέρους ὁμωνύμου (οἷον ἡ οἰκία ἐξ οἰκίας, ᾗ ὑπὸ νοῦ· ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος) [ἢ ἐκ μέρους] ἢ ἔχοντός τι μέρος,—ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνηται· τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν πρῶτον καθʼ αὑτὸ μέρος. θερμότης γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κινήσει θερμότητα ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐποίησεν· αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ὑγίεια ἢ μέρος, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῇ μέρος τι τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ ὑγίεια· διὸ καὶ λέγεται ποιεῖν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ [τὴν ὑγίειαν] ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ συμβέβηκε [θερμότης]. ὥστε, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, πάντων ἀρχὴ ἡ οὐσία· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ τί ἐστιν οἱ συλλογισμοί εἰσιν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ αἱ γενέσεις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φύσει συνιστάμενα τούτοις ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σπέρμα ποιεῖ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης (ἔχει γὰρ δυνάμει τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἀφʼ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα, ἐστί πως ὁμώνυμον—οὐ γὰρ πάντα οὕτω δεῖ ζητεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος·

[¶7] This is why a mule is not produced by a mule. Those natural objects which are produced, like artificial objects, spontaneously, are those whose matter can also initiate for itself that motion which the seed initiates. Those whose matter cannot do this cannot be generated otherwise than by their proper parents. It is not only with reference to substance that our argument shows that the form is not generated; the same argument is common in its application to all the primary divisions, i.e. quantity, quality and the other categories. For just as the bronze sphere is generated, but not the sphere nor the bronze; and as in the case of bronze, if it is generated the form and matter are not (because they must always pre-exist), so it is too with the “what” and the quality and quantity and the other categories similarly; for it is not the quality that is generated, but the wood of that quality; nor is it the size, but the wood or animal of that size. But a peculiarity of substance may be gathered from this: that some other substance must pre-exist in actuality which produces it; e.g. an animal, if an animal is being generated; but a quality or quantity need not pre-exist otherwise than potentially.

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἐξ ἀνδρός—ἐὰν μὴ πήρωμα ᾖ· διὸ ἡμίονος οὐκ ἐξ ἡμιόνου)· ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ γίγνεται, ὅσων ἡ ὕλη δύναται καὶ ὑφʼ αὑτῆς κινεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἣν τὸ σπέρμα κινεῖ· ὅσων δὲ μή, ταῦτα ἀδύνατα γίγνεσθαι ἄλλως πως ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν.—οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ τὸ μὴ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ὁμοίως τῶν πρώτων κοινὸς ὁ λόγος, οἷον ποσοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν. γίγνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα ἀλλʼ οὐ σφαῖρα οὐδὲ χαλκός, καὶ ἐπὶ χαλκοῦ, εἰ γίγνεται (ἀεὶ γὰρ δεῖ προϋπάρχειν τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ εἶδος), οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως κατηγοριῶν· οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιὸν ξύλον, οὐδὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ποσὸν ξύλον ἢ ζῷον. ἀλλʼ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἐκ τούτων λαβεῖν ἔστιν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον προϋπάρχειν ἑτέραν οὐσίαν ἐντελεχείᾳ οὖσαν ἣ ποιεῖ, οἷον ζῷον εἰ γίγνεται ζῷον· ποιὸν δʼ ἢ ποσὸν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀλλʼ ἢ δυνάμει μόνον.

[¶8] Since a definition is a formula, and every formula has parts; and since the formula is related to the thing in the same way as the part of the formula to the part of the thing, the question now arises: Must the formula of the parts be contained in the formula of the whole, or not? It seems clear that it is so in some cases, but not in others. The formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but the formula of the syllable includes that of the letters. And yet the circle is divisible into its segments in just the same way as the syllable into its letters. Again, if the parts are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle, and the finger part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the man. But it is considered that the latter are prior; for in the formula the parts are explained from them; and the wholes are prior also in virtue of their ability to exist independently. The truth probably is that “part” has several meanings, one of which is “that which measures in respect of quantity.” However, let us dismiss this question and consider of what, in the sense of parts, substance consists.

> Greek: ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστί, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὔ. ἐπʼ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνονται ἐνόντες ἐνίων δʼ οὔ. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· καίτοι διαιρεῖται καὶ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. ἔτι δὲ εἰ πρότερα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου, τῆς δὲ ὀρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα μέρος καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ζῴου, πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀξεῖα τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. δοκεῖ δʼ ἐκεῖνα εἶναι πρότερα· τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ λέγονται ἐξ ἐκείνων, καὶ τῷ εἶναι δὲ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων πρότερα.—ἢ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ μέρος, ὧν εἷς μὲν τρόπος τὸ μετροῦν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν—ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἀφείσθω· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ οὐσία ὡς μερῶν, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

[¶9] If then matter, form, and the combination of the two are distinct, and if both matter and form and their combination are substance, there is one sense in which even matter may be called “part” of a thing; and another in which it is not, but the only parts are those elements of which the formula of the form consists. E.g., flesh is not a part of concavity, because flesh is the matter in which concavity is induced; but it is a part of snubness. And bronze is part of the statue as a concrete whole, but not of the statue in the sense of form. We may speak of the form (or the thing as having a form) as an individual thing, but we may never so speak of that which is material by itself. This is why the formula of the circle does not contain that of the segments, whereas the formula of the syllable does contain that of the letters; for the letters are parts of the formula of the form; they are not matter; but the segments are parts in the sense of matter in which the form is induced. They approximate, however, more closely to the form than does the bronze when roundness is engendered in bronze. But there is a sense in which not even all the letters will be contained in the formula of the syllable; e.g. particular letters on wax or sounds in the air; for these too are part of the syllable in the sense that they are its sensible matter. For even if the line is divided and resolved into its halves, or if the man is resolved into bones and muscles and flesh, it does not follow that they are composed of these as parts of their essence, but as their matter; and these are parts of the concrete whole, but not of the form, or that to which the formula refers.

> Greek: εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δʼ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἴδους λόγος. οἷον τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι μέρος ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφʼ ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ σιμότητος μέρος· καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος μέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δʼ ὡς εἴδους λεγομένου ἀνδριάντος οὔ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δʼ ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθʼ αὑτὸ λεκτέον)· διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ τμήματα οὕτως μέρη ὡς ὕλη ἐφʼ ἧς ἐπιγίγνεται· ἐγγυτέρω μέντοι τοῦ εἴδους ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς ὅταν ἐν χαλκῷ ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐγγένηται. ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὐδὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα τῆς συλλαβῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνέσται, οἷον ταδὶ τὰ κήρινα ἢ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα μέρος τῆς συλλαβῆς ὡς ὕλη αἰσθητή. καὶ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ οὐκ εἰ διαιρουμένη εἰς τὰ ἡμίση φθείρεται, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὰ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ σάρκας, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἰσὶν ἐκ τούτων οὕτως ὡς ὄντων τῆς οὐσίας μερῶν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐξ ὕλης, καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου μέρη, τοῦ εἴδους δὲ καὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος οὐκέτι·

[¶10] Hence they are not in the formulae. Accordingly in some cases the formula will include the formula of such parts as the above, but in others it need not necessarily contain their formula, unless it is the formula of the concrete object. It is for this reason that some things are composed of parts in the sense of principles into which they can be resolved, while others are not. All things which are concrete combinations of form and matter (e.g. “the snub” or the bronze circle) can be resolved into form and matter, and the matter is a part of them; but such as are not concrete combinations with matter, but are without matter—whose formulae refer to the form only—cannot be resolved; either not at all, or at least not in this way. Thus these material components are principles and parts of the concrete objects, but they are neither parts nor principles of the form. For this reason the clay statue can be resolved into clay, and the sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh and bones, and the circle too into segments, because it is something which is combined with matter.

> Greek: διόπερ οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. τῷ μὲν οὖν ἐνέσται ὁ τῶν τοιούτων μερῶν λόγος, τῷ δʼ οὐ δεῖ ἐνεῖναι, ἂν μὴ ᾖ τοῦ συνειλημμένου· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔνια μὲν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἃ φθείρονται, ἔνια δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. ὅσα μὲν οὖν συνειλημμένα τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ σιμὸν ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς κύκλος, ταῦτα μὲν φθείρεται εἰς ταῦτα καὶ μέρος αὐτῶν ἡ ὕλη· ὅσα δὲ μὴ συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ ἀλλὰ ἄνευ ὕλης, ὧν οἱ λόγοι τοῦ εἴδους μόνον, ταῦτα δʼ οὐ φθείρεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ οὔτοι οὕτω γε· ὥστʼ ἐκείνων μὲν ἀρχαὶ καὶ μέρη ταῦτα τοῦ δὲ εἴδους οὔτε μέρη οὔτε ἀρχαί. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φθείρεται ὁ πήλινος ἀνδριὰς εἰς πηλὸν καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα εἰς χαλκὸν καὶ ὁ Καλλίας εἰς σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ, ἔτι δὲ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα· ἔστι γάρ τις ὃς συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ·

[¶11] For we use the same name for the absolute circle and for the particular circle, since there is no special name for the particular circles. We have now stated the truth; nevertheless let us recapitulate and state it more clearly. All constituents which are parts of the formula, and into which the formula can be divided, are prior to their wholes—either all or some of them. But the formula of the right angle is not divisible into the formula of an acute angle, but vice versa; since in defining the acute angle we use the right angle, because “the acute angle is less than a right angle.” It is the same with the circle and the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined by means of the circle. And the finger is defined by means of the whole body; for a finger is a particular kind of part of a man. Thus such parts as are material, and into which the whole is resolved as into matter, are posterior to the whole; but such as are parts in the sense of parts of the formula and of the essence as expressed in the formula, are prior; either all or some of them. And since the soul of animals (which is the substance of the living creature) is their substance in accordance with the formula, and the form and essence of that particular kind of body (at least each part, if it is to be properly defined, will not be defined apart from its function; and this will not belong to it apart from perception ); therefore the parts of the soul are prior, either all or some of them, to the concrete animal; and similarly in other individual cases.

> Greek: ὁμωνύμως γὰρ λέγεται κύκλος ὅ τε ἁπλῶς λεγόμενος καὶ ὁ καθʼ ἕκαστα διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον ὄνομα τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστον.—εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν τὸ ἀληθές, ὅμως δʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον εἴπωμεν ἐπαναλαβόντες. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας λόγον, ἀλλʼ ⟨ὁ⟩ τῆς ὀξείας εἰς ὀρθήν· χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὁριζόμενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ ὀρθῇ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὀρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον ἔχουσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἡμικύκλιον τῷ κύκλῳ ὁρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὅλῳ· τὸ γὰρ τοιόνδε μέρος ἀνθρώπου δάκτυλος. ὥσθʼ ὅσα μὲν μέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα· ὅσα δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχή (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἕκαστον γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὁρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὁριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια τοῦ συνόλου ζῴου, καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μόρια ὕστερα ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον,—τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνόλου πρότερα ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δύναται χωριζόμενα·

[¶12] But the body and its parts are posterior to this substance, and it is not the substance, but the concrete whole, which is resolved into these parts as into matter. Therefore in one sense these parts are prior to the concrete whole, and in another not; for they cannot exist in separation. A finger cannot in every state be a part of a living animal; for the dead finger has only the name in common with the living one. Some parts are contemporary with the whole: such as are indispensable and in which the formula and the essence are primarily present; e.g. the heart or perhaps the brain, for it does not matter which of them is of this nature. But “man” and “horse” and terms which are applied in this way to individuals, but universally, are not substance, but a kind of concrete whole composed of this particular formula and this particular matter regarded as universal. But individually Socrates is already composed of ultimate matter; and similarly in all other cases. A part, then, may be part of the form (by form I mean essence), or of the concrete whole composed of form and matter, or of the matter itself. But only the parts of the form are parts of the formula, and the formula refers to the universal;

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ ὁ πάντως ἔχων δάκτυλος ζῴου, ἀλλʼ ὁμώνυμος ὁ τεθνεώς)· ἔνια δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα κύρια καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία, οἷον εἰ τοῦτο καρδία ἢ ἐγκέφαλος· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐθὲν πότερον τοιοῦτον. ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα, καθόλου δέ, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τουδὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδὶ τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου· καθʼ ἕκαστον δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ὁ Σωκράτης ἤδη ἐστίν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.—μέρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ εἴδους (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) καὶ τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης ⟨καὶ τῆς ὕλης⟩ αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη τὰ τοῦ εἴδους μόνον ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου·

[¶13] for “circle” is the same as “essence of circle,” and “soul” the same as “essence of soul.” But when we come to the concrete thing, e.g. this circle—which is a particular individual, either sensible or intelligible (by intelligible circles I mean those of mathematics, and by sensible those which are of bronze or wood)—of these individuals there is no definition; we apprehend them by intelligence or perception; and when they have passed from the sphere of actuality it is uncertain whether they exist or not, but they are always spoken of and apprehended by the universal formula. But the matter is in itself unknowable. Some matter is sensible and some intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood and all movable matter; intelligible, that which is present in sensible things not qua sensible, e.g. the objects of mathematics. We have now discussed the case of the whole and part, and of prior and posterior. But we must answer the question, when we are asked which is prior—the right angle and circle and animal, or that into which they are resolved and of which they are composed, i.e. their parts—by saying that neither is absolutely prior. For if the soul also is the animal or living thing, or the soul of the individual is the individual, and “being a circle” is the circle, and “being a right angle” or the essence of the right angle is the right angle, then we must admit that the whole in one sense is posterior to the part in one sense:

> Greek: τὸ γὰρ κύκλῳ εἶναι καὶ κύκλος καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴ ταὐτό. τοῦ δὲ συνόλου ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ καὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστά τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ—λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἷον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἷον τοὺς χαλκοῦς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους—τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν· ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ. ἡ δʼ ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθʼ αὑτήν. ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους καὶ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, εἴρηται· πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀνάγκη ἀπαντᾶν, ὅταν τις ἔρηται πότερον ἡ ὀρθὴ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ζῷον πρότερον ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἰσί, τὰ μέρη, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς. εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ζῷον ἢ ἔμψυχον, ἢ ἕκαστον ἡ ἑκάστου, καὶ κύκλος τὸ κύκλῳ εἶναι, καὶ ὀρθὴ τὸ ὀρθῇ εἶναι καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τῆς ὀρθῆς, τὶ μὲν καὶ τινὸς φατέον ὕστερον, οἷον τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τινὸς ὀρθῆς (καὶ γὰρ ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης, ἡ χαλκῆ ὀρθή, καὶ ἡ ἐν ταῖς γραμμαῖς ταῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα), ἡ δʼ ἄνευ ὕλης τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑστέρα τῶν δʼ ἐν τῷ καθʼ ἕκαστα μορίων προτέρα, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὐ φατέον·

[¶14] e.g. to the parts in the formula and the parts of a particular right angle (since both the material right angle of bronze and the right angle included by individual lines are posterior to their parts), but the immaterial angle is posterior to the parts in the formula, but prior to the parts in the individual. We must not give an unqualified answer. And if the soul is not the animal but something else, even so we must say that some wholes are prior and some are not, as has been stated. The question naturally presents itself, what sort of parts belong to the form and what sort belong not to it but to the concrete object. Yet if this is not plain it is impossible to define the particular; because the definition refers to the universal and the form. Therefore if it is not clear what kind of parts are material and what kind are not, the formula of the thing will not be clear either. In the case of things which can be seen to be induced in specifically different materials, as, e.g., a circle is in bronze and stone and wood, it seems clear that these things, the bronze and the stone, are in no sense part of the essential substance of the circle, because it is separable from them. As for things which are not visibly separable, there is no reason why the same should not apply to them; e.g., if all the circles that had ever been seen were bronze;

> Greek: εἰ δʼ ἑτέρα καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ζῷον, καὶ οὕτω τὰ μὲν φατέον τὰ δʼ οὐ φατέον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἀπορεῖται δὲ εἰκότως καὶ ποῖα τοῦ εἴδους μέρη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνειλημμένου. καίτοι τούτου μὴ δήλου ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι ἕκαστον· τοῦ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὁ ὁρισμός· ποῖα οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν ὡς ὕλη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ φανερά, οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ἔσται φανερὸς ὁ τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν φαίνεται ἐπιγιγνόμενα ἐφʼ ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει, οἷον κύκλος ἐν χαλκῷ καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ, ταῦτα μὲν δῆλα εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅτι οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ κύκλου οὐσίας ὁ χαλκὸς οὐδʼ ὁ λίθος διὰ τὸ χωρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ὁρᾶται χωριζόμενα, οὐδὲν μὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως ἔχειν τούτοις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ οἱ κύκλοι πάντες ἑωρῶντο χαλκοῖ·

[¶15] for the bronze would be none the less no part of the form, but it is difficult to separate it in thought. For example, the form of “man” is always manifested in flesh and bones and elements of this kind; then are these actually parts of the form and formula, or are they not so, but matter, though since the form is not induced in other materials, we cannot separate it? Now since this seems to be possible, but it is not clear when, some thinkers are doubtful even in the case of the circle and the triangle, considering that it is not proper to define them by lines and continuous space, but that all these are to the circle or triangle as flesh or bone is to man, and bronze or stone to the statue; and they reduce everything to numbers, and say that the formula of “line” is the formula of 2. And of the exponents of the Forms, some make 2 the Ideal line, and some the form of the line; for they say that in some cases the form and that of which it is the form, e.g. 2 and the form of 2, are the same; but in the case of “line” this is no longer so. It follows, then, that there is one form of many things whose form is clearly different (a consequence which confronted the Pythagoreans too ), and that it is possible to make one supreme Form of everything, and not to regard the rest as forms.

> Greek: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἧττον ἦν ὁ χαλκὸς οὐδὲν τοῦ εἴδους· χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀφελεῖν τοῦτον τῇ διανοίᾳ. οἷον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος ἀεὶ ἐν σαρξὶ φαίνεται καὶ ὀστοῖς καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέρεσιν· ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἐστὶ ταῦτα μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλων ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ἀδυνατοῦμεν χωρίσαι; ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο δοκεῖ μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄδηλον δὲ πότε, ἀποροῦσί τινες ἤδη καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦ τριγώνου ὡς οὐ προσῆκον γραμμαῖς ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ τῷ συνεχεῖ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ὡσανεὶ σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ λίθος τοῦ ἀνδριάντος· καὶ ἀνάγουσι πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ γραμμῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν τῶν δύο εἶναί φασιν. καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογραμμὴν τὴν δυάδα, οἱ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γραμμῆς, ἔνια μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὗ τὸ εἶδος (οἷον δυάδα καὶ τὸ εἶδος δυάδος), ἐπὶ γραμμῆς δὲ οὐκέτι. συμβαίνει δὴ ἕν τε πολλῶν εἶδος εἶναι ὧν τὸ εἶδος φαίνεται ἕτερον (ὅπερ καὶ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις συνέβαινεν), καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἓν πάντων ποιεῖν αὐτὸ εἶδος, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα μὴ εἴδη·

[¶16] In this way, however, all things would be one. Now we have stated that the question of definitions involves some difficulty, and have shown why this is so. Hence to reduce everything in this way and to dispose of the matter is going too far; for some things are presumably a particular form in particular matter, or particular things in a particular state. And the analogy in the case of the living thing which the younger Socrates used to state is not a good one; for it leads one away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it is possible for a man to exist without his parts, as a circle does without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for the animal is sensible and cannot be defined without motion, and hence not unless its parts are in some definite condition; for it is not the hand in any condition that is a part of a man, but only when it can perform its function, and so has life in it. Without life in it it is not a part. And with respect to mathematical objects, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of the formulae of the whole; e.g., why are the formulae of the semicircles not parts of the formula of the circle? for they are not sensible. Probably this makes no difference; because there will be matter even of some things which are not sensible.

> Greek: καίτοι οὕτως ἓν πάντα ἔσται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς, καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διὸ καὶ τὸ πάντα ἀνάγειν οὕτω καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν ὕλην περίεργον· ἔνια γὰρ ἴσως τόδʼ ἐν τῷδʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ὡδὶ ταδὶ ἔχοντα. καὶ ἡ παραβολὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου, ἣν εἰώθει λέγειν Σωκράτης ὁ νεώτερος, οὐ καλῶς ἔχει· ἀπάγει γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ποιεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὡς ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἄνευ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸν κύκλον. τὸ δʼ οὐχ ὅμοιον· αἰσθητὸν γάρ τι τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι, διὸ οὐδʼ ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν ἐχόντων πώς. οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἡ χείρ, ἀλλʼ ἢ δυναμένη τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὖσα· μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος. περὶ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ διὰ τί οὐκ εἰσὶ μέρη οἱ λόγοι τῶν λόγων, οἷον τοῦ κύκλου τὰ ἡμικύκλια; οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα. ἢ οὐθὲν διαφέρει; ἔσται γὰρ ὕλη ἐνίων καὶ μὴ αἰσθητῶν·

[¶17] Indeed there will be matter in some sense in everything which is not essence or form considered independently, but a particular thing. Thus the semicircles will be parts not of the universal circle but of the particular circles, as we said before —for some matter is sensible, and some intelligible. It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance, and the body matter; and “man” or “animal” is the combination of both taken universally. And “Socrates” or “Coriscus” has a double sense, that is if the soul too can be called Socrates (for by Socrates some mean the soul and some the concrete person); but if Socrates means simply this soul and this body, the individual is composed similarly to the universal. Whether there is some other material component of these substances besides their matter, and whether we should look for some further substance in them, such as numbers or something of that kind, must be considered later. It is with a view to this that we are trying to determine the nature of sensible substances, since in a sense the study of sensible substances belongs to physics or secondary philosophy; for the physicist must know not only about the matter, but also about the substance according to the formula; this is even more essential. And in the case of definitions, in what sense the elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and why the definition is one formula (for the thing is clearly one, but in virtue of what is it one, seeing that it has parts?); this must be considered later.

> Greek: καὶ παντὸς γὰρ ὕλη τις ἔστιν ὃ μὴ ἔστι τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ εἶδος αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ τόδε τι. κύκλου μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ καθόλου, τῶν δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἔσται μέρη ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον· ἔστι γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἡ δὲ νοητή. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ οὐσία ἡ πρώτη, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὕλη, ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ ζῷον τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὡς καθόλου· Σωκράτης δὲ καὶ Κορίσκος, εἰ μὲν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ Σωκράτης, διττόν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ψυχὴν οἱ δʼ ὡς τὸ σύνολον), εἰ δʼ ἁπλῶς ἡ ψυχὴ ἥδε καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ σῶμα τόδε, ὥσπερ τὸ καθόλου [τε] καὶ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον. πότερον δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην τῶν τοιούτων οὐσιῶν τις ἄλλη, καὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν οὐσίαν ἑτέραν τινὰ οἷον ἀριθμοὺς ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, σκεπτέον ὕστερον. τούτου γὰρ χάριν καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν πειρώμεθα διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ δευτέρας φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας θεωρία· οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ μᾶλλον. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁρισμῶν πῶς μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ διὰ τί εἷς λόγος ὁ ὁρισμός (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἕν, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα τίνι ἕν, μέρη γε ἔχον;), σκεπτέον ὕστερον.

[¶18] We have stated, then, in a general account which covers all cases, what essence is, and how it is independent; and why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others does not; and we have shown that the material parts of a thing cannot be present in the formula of the substance (since they are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete substance; and of this in one sense there is a formula, and in another sense there is not. There is no formula involving the matter, for this is indeterminate; but there is a formula in accordance with the primary substance, e.g., in the case of a man, the formula of the soul; because the substance is the indwelling form, of which and of the matter the so called concrete substance is composed. E.g., concavity is such a form, since from this and “nose” is derived “snub nose” and “snubness”—for “nose” will be present twice over in these expressions); but in the concrete substance, e.g. snub nose or Callias, matter will be present too. We have stated also that the essence and the individual are in some cases the same, as in the case of the primary substances; e.g.

> Greek: τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ πῶς αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό, καθόλου περὶ παντὸς εἴρηται, καὶ διὰ τί τῶν μὲν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἔχει τὰ μόρια τοῦ ὁριζομένου τῶν δʼ οὔ, καὶ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὰ οὕτω μόρια ὡς ὕλη οὐκ ἐνέσται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκείνης μόρια τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς συνόλου, ταύτης δέ γʼ ἔστι πως λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν· μετὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἔστιν (ἀόριστον γάρ), κατὰ τὴν πρώτην δʼ οὐσίαν ἔστιν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἡ σύνολος λέγεται οὐσία, οἷον ἡ κοιλότης (ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῆς ῥινὸς σιμὴ ῥὶς καὶ ἡ σιμότης ἐστί [δὶς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὑπάρξει ἡ ῥίς])—ἐν δὲ τῇ συνόλῳ οὐσίᾳ, οἷον ῥινὶ σιμῇ ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἐνέσται καὶ ἡ ὕλη· καὶ ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τινῶν μὲν ταὐτό, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν, οἷον καμπυλότης καὶ καμπυλότητι εἶναι, εἰ πρώτη ἐστίν (λέγω δὲ πρώτην ἣ μὴ λέγεται τῷ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς ὕλῃ), ὅσα δὲ ὡς ὕλη ἢ ὡς συνειλημμένα τῇ ὕλῃ, οὐ ταὐτό, οὐδʼ ⟨εἰ⟩ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕν, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ τὸ μουσικόν·