---
title: "Nicomachean Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια"
author: "Aristotle"
translator: "Harris Rackham"
title_ru: "Никомахова этика"
author_ru: "Аристотель"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 17 of 20
url: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/17/
cite: "Aristotle, tr. Harris Rackham, Nicomachean Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια, section 17. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/17/"
---

# Nicomachean Ethics · Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια

*Aristotle, tr. Harris Rackham*

Russian: Никомахова этика, Аристотель

What is the good life for a human being? Happiness, virtue, friendship and contemplation, by Bekker page and line.

> Greek: ed. Ingram Bywater, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0086.tlg010, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harris Rackham, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0086.tlg010.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (line numbers), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 17. Book IX · 1163b–1168a

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/17/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/17/#p-N

[¶0] In all dissimilar friendships, it is proportion, as has been said, that establishes equality and preserves the friendship; just as, in the relations between fellow-citizens, the shoemaker receives payment for his shoes, and the weaver and the other craftsmen for their products, according to value rendered.

> Greek: ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατʼ ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς.

[¶1] In these business relationships then a common measure has been devised, namely money, and this is a standard to which all things are referred and by which they are measured. But in sentimental friendships, the lover sometimes complains that his warmest affection meets with no affection in return, it may be because there is nothing in him to arouse affection; while the person loved frequently complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now fulfils none of his promises. Such disputes occur when pleasure is the motive of the friendship on the lover’s side and profit on the side of the beloved, and when they no longer each possess the desired attribute. For in a friendship based on these motives, a rupture occurs as soon as the parties cease to obtain the things for the sake of which they were friends; seeing that neither loved the other in himself, but some attribute he possessed that was not permanent; so that these friendships are not permanent either. But friendship based on character is disinterested, and therefore lasting, as has been said. Differences arise when the friends do not obtain what they desire, but something else; for not to get what you want is almost the same as not to get anything at all. For instance, there is the story of the man who hired a harper, and promised that the better he played the more he would pay him; but next morning, when the harper asked him to fulfil his promise, he said that he had already paid for the pleasure he had received by the pleasure he had given. This would have been all right if both had wanted pleasure; but when one wants amusement and the other gain, and one gets what he wants and the other does not, it would not be a fair bargain; for it is the thing that a man happens to need that he sets his heart on, and only to get that is he ready to give what he does.

> Greek: ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δʼ ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν διʼ ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθʼ αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δʼ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἕω δʼ ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθʼ ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δʼ ὃ μὲν τέρψιν ὃ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἔχει ὃ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς·

[¶2] Which party’s business is it to decide the amount of the return due? Should it be assessed by the one who proffers the initial service? Or rather by the one who receives it, since the other by proffering it seems to leave the matter to him? This we are told was the practice of Protagoras; when he gave lessons in any subject, he used to tell his pupil to estimate the value he set upon his knowledge, and accepted a fee of that amount. In such matters however some people prefer the principle of “the wage stated.” But people who take the money in advance, and then, having made extravagant professions, fail to perform what they undertook, naturally meet with complaints because they have not fulfilled their bargain. Perhaps however the sophists are bound to demand their fees in advance, since nobody would pay money for the knowledge which they possess. Persons paid in advance then naturally meet with complaints if they do not perform the service for which they have taken the pay. But in cases where no agreement is come to as to the value of the service, if it is proffered for the recipient’s own sake, as has been said above, no complaint arises, for a friendship based on virtue does not give rise to quarrels;

> Greek: ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικʼ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἁδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δʼ ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ μισθὸς δʼ ἀνδρί. οἱ δὲ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δʼ ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν διʼ αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φιλία), τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)·

[¶3] and the return made should be in proportion to the intention of the benefactor, since intention is the measure of a friend, and of virtue. This is the principle on which it would seem that payment ought to be made to those who have imparted instruction in philosophy; for the value of their service is not measurable in money, and no honor paid them could be an equivalent, but no doubt all that can be expected is that to them, as to the gods and to our parents, we should make such return as is in our Power. When on the other hand the gift is not disinterested but made with a view to a recompense, it is no doubt the best thing that a return should be made such as both parties concur in thinking to be what is due. But failing such concurrence, it would seem to be not only inevitable but just that the amount of the return should be fixed by the party that received the initial service, since the donor will have recovered what the recipient really owes when he has been paid the value of the service to him, or the sum that he would have been willing to pay as the price of the pleasure. For in buying and selling also this seems to be the practice; and in some countries the law does not allow actions for the enforcement of voluntary covenants, on the ground that when you have trusted a man you ought to conclude the transaction as you began it. For it is thought fairer for the price to be fixed by the person who received credit than by the one who gave credit. For as a rule those who have a thing value it differently from those who want to get it. For one’s own possessions and gifts always seem to one worth a great deal; but nevertheless the repayment is actually determined by the valuation of the recipient.

> Greek: οὕτω δʼ ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθʼ ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμή τʼ ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δʼ οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλʼ ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατʼ ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθʼ ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵλετʼ ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τʼ εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες.

[¶4] But he ought no doubt to estimate the gift not at what it seems to him to be worth now that he has received it, but at the value he put on it before he received it. Other questions that may be raised are such as these: Does a man owe his father unlimited respect and obedience, or ought he when ill to take the advice of a physician, and when electing a general to vote for the best soldier? and similarly, ought he to do a service to a friend rather than to a virtuous man, and ought he to repay his obligation to a benefactor rather than make a present to a comrade, when he is not in a position to do both? Now perhaps with all these matters it is not easy to lay down an exact rule, because the cases vary indefinitely in importance or unimportance, and in nobility or urgency. But it is quite clear that no one person is entitled to unlimited consideration. As a general rule one ought to return services rendered rather than do favors to one’s comrades, just as one ought to pay back a loan to a creditor rather than give the money to a friend. Yet perhaps even this rule is not without exceptions. For example, (a) suppose one has been ransomed from brigands; ought one to ransom one’s ransomer in turn, whoever he may be—or even if he has not been captured himself but asks for his money back, ought one to repay him— or ought one to ransom one’s own father?

> Greek: δεῖ δʼ ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλʼ ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα. ἀπορίαν δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ πιστεύειν, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ προετέον, ἐὰν ἄμφω μὴ ἐνδέχηται. ἆρʼ οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δʼ οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δʼ οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ μὴ ἑαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον;

[¶5] for it might be thought to be a man’s duty to ransom his father even before himself. As a general rule then, as has been said, one ought to pay back a debt, but if the balance of nobility or urgency is on the side of employing the money for a gift, then one ought to decide in favor of the gift. For (b) there are occasions when it would be actually unfair to return the original service; as for instance when A has done B a service knowing him to be a good man, and B is called upon to return the service to A whom he believes to be a bad man. For even when A has lent B a loan, B is not always bound to lend A a loan in turn: A may have lent money to B, who is an honest man, expecting to get his money back, while B would have no hope of recovering from A, who is a rascal. If A is really a rascal, the return he asks for is not a fair one; and even if A is not a rascal, but people think he is, it would not be deemed unreasonable for B to refuse. Hence, as has been frequently remarked already, discussions about our emotions and actions only admit of such degree of definiteness as belongs to the matters with which they deal. It is quite clear therefore that all people have not the same claim upon us, and that even a father’s claim is not unlimited, just as Zeus does not have all the sacrifices. Since the claims of parents and brothers, comrades and benefactors, are different, we ought to render to each that which is proper and suitable to each. This is in fact the principle on which men are observed to act. They invite their relatives to a wedding, because they are members of the family, and therefore concerned in the family’s affairs; also it is thought to be specially incumbent on relations to attend funerals, for the same reason.

> Greek: δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δʼ ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἀποκλιτέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδʼ ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὃ δʼ οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτʼ ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις·

[¶6] It would be felt that our parents have the first claim on us for maintenance, since we owe it to them as a debt, and to support the authors of our being stands before self-preservation in moral nobility. Honor also is due to parents, as it is to the gods, though not indiscriminate honor: one does not owe to one’s father the same honor as to one’s mother, nor yet the honor due to a great philosopher or general, but one owes to one’s father the honor appropriate to a father, and to one’s mother that appropriate to her. Again, we should pay to all our seniors the honor due to their age, by rising when they enter, offering them a seat, and so on. Towards comrades and brothers on the other hand we should use frankness of speech, and share all our possessions with them. Kinsmen also, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and the rest—to all we must always endeavor to render their due, comparing their several claims in respect of relationship and of virtue or utility. Between persons of the same kind discrimination is comparatively easy; but it is a harder matter when they are differently related to us. Nevertheless we must not shirk the task on that account, but must decide their claims as well as we are able. Another question is, whether a friendship should or should not be broken off when the friends do not remain the same.

> Greek: καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστʼ οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό. δόξειε δʼ ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστʼ ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτʼ ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδʼ αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθʼ ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἑταίρους δʼ αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατʼ οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ σύγκρισις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον. ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας.

[¶7] It may be said that where the motive of the friendship is utility or pleasure, it is not unnatural that it should be broken off when our friends no longer possess the attribute of being useful or agreeable. It was those attributes that we loved, and when they have failed it is reasonable that love should cease. But a man might well complain, if, though we really liked him for the profit or pleasure he afforded, we had pretended to love him for his character. As was said at the outset, differences between friends most frequently arise when the nature of their friendship is not what they think it is. When therefore a man has made a mistake, and has fancied that he was loved for his character, without there having been anything in his friend’s behavior to warrant the assumption, he has only himself to blame. But when he has been deceived by his friend’s pretence, there is ground for complaint against the deceiver: in fact he is a worse malefactor than those who counterfeit the coinage, inasmuch as his offence touches something more precious than money. Again, supposing we have admitted a person to our friendship as a good man, and he becomes, or we think he has become, a bad man: are we still bound to love him? Perhaps it is impossible to do so, since only what is good is lovable; and also wrong, for we ought not to be lovers of evil, nor let ourselves become like what is worthless; and, as has been said above, like is the friend of like. Should we therefore break off the friendship at once? Perhaps not in every case, but only when our friends have become incurably bad; for so long as they are capable of reform we are even more bound to help them morally than we should be to assist them financially, since character is a more valuable thing than wealth and has more to do with friendship.

> Greek: ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτʼ ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος. ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῷτʼ ἄν· ὅταν δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία. ἐὰν δʼ ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἆρʼ ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν ⟨τὸ⟩ πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδʼ ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δʼ ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἆρʼ οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δʼ ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον.

[¶8] However, one could not be held to be doing anything unnatural if one broke off the friendship; for it was not a man of that sort that one loved: he has altered, and if one cannot restore him, one gives him up. On the other hand, suppose one friend to have remained the same while the other has improved, and become greatly the superior in virtue: ought the latter to keep up the friendship? Perhaps it is out of the question; and this becomes especially clear when the gap between them is a wide one, as may happen with two people who were friends in boyhood. One may have remained a boy in mind, while the other is a man of the highest ability; how can they be friends, when they have different tastes and different likes and dislikes? They will no longer even enjoy each other’s society; but without this, intercourse and therefore friendship are, as we saw, impossible. But this has been discussed already. Are we then to behave towards a former friend in exactly the same way as if he had never been our friend at all? Perhaps we ought to remember our past intimacy, and just as we think it right to show more kindness to friends than to strangers, so likewise some attention should be paid, for the sake of old times, to those who were our friends in the past, that is, if the rupture was not caused by extreme wickedness on their part.

> Greek: δόξειε δʼ ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δʼ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι ὃ δʼ ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὃ δʼ ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτʼ ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθʼ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ διʼ ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.

[¶9] The forms which friendly feeling for our neighbors takes, and the marks by which the different forms of friendship are defined, seem to be derived from the feelings of regard which we entertain for ourselves. A friend is defined as (a) one who wishes, and promotes by action, the real or apparent good of another for that other’s sake; or (b) one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend’s sake. (This is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of former friends who have quarrelled. ) Others say that a friend is (c) one who frequents another’s society, and (d) who desires the same things as he does, or (e) one who shares his friend’s joys and sorrows. (This too is very characteristic of mothers.) Friendship also is defined by one or other of these marks. But each of them is also found in a good man’s feelings towards himself (and in those of all other men as well, in so far as they believe themselves to be good; but, as has been said, virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything). For (d) the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with every part of his nature. Also (a) he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by action (for it is a mark of a good man to exert himself actively for the good); and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a man’s real self). Also (b) he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his rational part. For existence is good for the virtuous man; and everyone wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the world on condition of becoming somebody else (for God possesses the good even as it is), but only while remaining himself, whatever he may be; and it would appear that the thinking part is the real self, or is so more than anything else.

> Greek: τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἳ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δʼ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δʼ ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντʼ ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον] (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν) ἀλλʼ ὢν ὅ τι ποτʼ ἐστίν·

[¶10] And (c) the good man desires his own company; for he enjoys being by himself, since he has agreeable memories of the past, and good hopes for the future, which are pleasant too; also his mind is stored with subjects for contemplation. And (e) he is keenly conscious of his own joys and sorrows; for the same things give him pleasure or pain at all times, and not different things at different times, since he is not apt to change his mind. It is therefore because the good man has these various feelings towards himself, and because he feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself (for a friend is another self), that friendship also is thought to consist in one or other of these feelings, and the possession of them is thought to be the test of a friend. Whether a man can be said actually to feel friendship for himself is a question that may be dismissed for the present; though it may be held that he can do so in so far as he is a dual or composite being, and because very intense friendship resembles self regard.

> Greek: δόξειε δʼ ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δʼ ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δʼ εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθʼ ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δʼ ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.

[¶11] As a matter of fact, the feelings of self-regard described appear to be found in most people, even though they are of inferior moral worth. Perhaps men share them in so far as they have their own approval and believe in their own virtue; since the utterly worthless and criminal never possess them, or even have the appearance of doing so. Indeed it may almost be said that no morally inferior persons possess them. For (d) such persons are at variance with themselves, desiring one thing and wishing another: this is the mark of the unrestrained, who choose what is pleasant but harmful instead of what they themselves think to be good. (a) Others again, out of cowardice and idleness, neglect to do what they think best for their own interests. And (b) men who have committed a number of crimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make away with themselves. Also (c) bad men constantly seek the society of others and shun their own company, because when they are by themselves they recall much that was unpleasant in the past and anticipate the same in the future, whereas with other people they can forget. Moreover they feel no affection for themselves, because they have no lovable qualities. Hence (e) such men do not enter into their own joys and sorrows, as there is civil war in their souls;

> Greek: φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἆρʼ οὖν ᾗ τʼ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα· οἳ δʼ αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθʼ ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθʼ ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθʼ ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθʼ ἑτέρων δʼ ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δʼ ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δʼ ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα.

[¶12] one part of their nature, owing to depravity, is pained by abstinence from certain indulgences while another part is pleased by it; one part pulls them one way and another the other, as if dragging them asunder. Or if it be impossible to feel pain and pleasure at the same time, at all events after indulging in pleasure they regret it a little later, and wish they had never acquired a taste for such indulgences; since the bad are always changing their minds. Thus a bad man appears to be devoid even of affection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature. If then such a state of mind is utterly miserable, we should do our utmost to shun wickedness and try to be virtuous. That is the way both to be friends with ourselves and to win the friendship of others. Goodwill appears to be an element of friendly feeling, but it is not the same thing as friendship; for it can be felt towards strangers, and it can be unknown to its object, whereas friendship cannot. But that has been discussed already. Neither is goodwill the same as affection. For it has no intensity, nor does it include desire, but these things are necessarily involved in affection. Also affection requires intimate acquaintance, where as goodwill may spring up all of a sudden, as happens for instance in regard to the competitors in a contest;

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὑτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο. ἡ δʼ εὔνοια φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δʼ οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτʼ εἴρηται. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδʼ ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτʼ ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ δʼ εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει·

[¶13] the spectators conceive goodwill and sympathy for them, though they would not actively assist them, for as we said, their goodwill is a sudden growth, and the kindly feeling is only superficial. Goodwill seems therefore to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. No one falls in love without first being charmed by beauty, but one may delight in another’s beauty without necessarily being in love: one is in love only if one longs for the beloved when absent, and eagerly desires his presence. Similarly men cannot be friends without having conceived mutual goodwill, though well-wishers are not necessarily friends: they merely desire the good of those whose well-wishers they are, and would not actively assist them to attain it, nor be put to any trouble on their behalf. Hence extending the meaning of the term friendship we may say that goodwill is inoperative friendship, which when it continues and reaches the point of intimacy may become friendship proper—not the sort of friendship whose motive is utility or pleasure, for these do not arouse goodwill. Goodwill is indeed rendered in return for favors received, but this is merely the payment of a due; and that desire for an other’s welfare which springs from the anticipation of favors to come does not seem really to show goodwill for one’s benefactor, but rather for oneself; just as to court a man for some interested motive is not friendship. Speaking generally, true goodwill is aroused by some kind of excellence or moral goodness: it springs up when one person thinks another beautiful or brave or the like, as in the case we mentioned of competitors in a contest.

> Greek: εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δʼ ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλʼ ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δʼ εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δʼ ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδʼ ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθʼ ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τινʼ εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας διʼ ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικʼ εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν. ὅλως δʼ εὔνοια διʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

[¶14] Concord also seems to be a friendly feeling. Hence it is not merely agreement of opinion, for this might exist even between strangers. Nor yet is agreement in reasoned judgements about any subject whatever, for instance astronomy, termed concord; to agree about the facts of astronomy is not a bond of friendship. Concord is said to prevail in a state, when the citizens agree as to their interests, adopt the same policy, and carry their common resolves into execution. Concord then refers to practical ends, and practical ends of importance, and able to be realized by both or all the parties: for instance, there is concord in the state when the citizens unanimously decree that the offices of state shall be elective, or that an alliance shall be made with Sparta, or that Pittacus shall be dictator (when Pittacus was himself willing to be dictator ). When each of two persons wishes himself to rule, like the rivals in the Phoenissae, there is discord; since men are not of one mind merely when each thinks the same thing (whatever this may be), but when each thinks the same thing in relation to the same person: for instance, when both the common people and the upper classes wish that the best people shall rule; for only so can all parties get what they desire.

> Greek: φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν δʼ ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν·

[¶15] Concord appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens, which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life. Now concord in this sense exists between good men, since these are of one mind both with themselves and with one another, as they always stand more or less on the same ground; for good men’s wishes are steadfast, and do not ebb and flow like the tide, and they wish for just and expedient ends, which they strive to attain in common. The base on the other hand are incapable of concord, except in some small degree, as they are of friendship, since they try to get more than their share of advantages, and take less than their share of labors and public burdens. And while each desires this for himself, he spies on his neighbor to prevent him from doing likewise; for unless they keep watch over one another, the common interests go to ruin. The result is discord, everybody trying to make others do their duty but refusing to do it themselves. Benefactors seem to love those whom they benefit more than those who have received benefits love those who have conferred them; and it is asked why this is so, as it seems to be unreasonable. The view most generally taken is that it is because the one party is in the position of a debtor and the other of a creditor; just as therefore in the case of a loan, whereas the borrower would be glad to have his creditor out of the way, the lender actually watches over his debtor’s safety, so it is thought that the conferrer of a benefit wishes the recipient to live in order that he may receive a return, but the recipient is not particularly anxious to make a return.

> Greek: οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα. ἔστι δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὔριπος), βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δʼ ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν. οἱ δʼ εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται ὅτι οἳ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται·

[¶16] Epicharmus no doubt would say that people who give this explanation are “looking at the seamy side” of life; but all the same it appears to be not untrue to human nature, for most men have short memories, and are more desirous of receiving benefits than of bestowing them. But it might be held that the real reason lies deeper, and that the case of the creditor is not really a parallel. With him it is not a matter of affection, but only of wishing his debtor’s preservation for the sake of recovering his money; whereas a benefactor feels friendship and affection for the recipient of his bounty even though he is not getting anything out of him and is never likely to do so. The same thing happens with the artist: every artist loves his own handiwork more than that handiwork if it were to come to life would love him.

> Greek: καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δʼ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχʼ ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δʼ ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δʼ ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐδʼ ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δʼ εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας κἂν μηδὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδʼ εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντʼ ἄν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου·

[¶17] This is perhaps especially true of poets, who have an exaggerated affection for their own poems and love them as parents love their children. The position of the benefactor then resembles that of the artist; the recipient of his bounty is his handiwork, and he therefore loves him more than his handiwork loves its maker. The reason of this is that all things desire and love existence; but we exist in activity, since we exist by living and doing; and in a sense one who has made something exists actively, and so he loves his handiwork because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental principle of nature: what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality. Moreover for the benefactor there is an element of nobility in the act, and so he feels pleased with the person who is its object; but there is nothing noble for the recipient of the benefit in his relation to his benefactor: at most, it is profitable; and what is profitable is not so pleasant or lovable as what is noble. The doer’s achievement therefore remains, for nobility or beauty is long-lived, but its utility to the recipient passes away. But while the actuality of the present, the hope of the future, and the memory of the past are all pleasant, actuality is the most pleasant of the three, and the most loved. Also whereas the memory of noble things is pleasant, that of useful ones is hardly at all so, or at least less so; although with anticipation the reverse seems to be the case. Again, loving seems to be an active experience, being loved a passive one; hence affection and the various forms of friendly feeling are naturally found in the more active party to the relationship.

> Greek: μάλιστα δʼ ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δʼ ἐνεργείᾳ (τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν), ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δʼ ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. ἡδεῖα δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δʼ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν·