1. With regard to problems, and the various solutions of them, how many kinds there are, and the nature of each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like this.
1. περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ ποίων εἰδῶν ἐστιν, ὧδ’ ἂν θεωροῦσιν γένοιτ’ ἂν φανερόν.
2. Since the poet represents life, as a painter does or any other maker of likenesses, he must always represent one of three things—either things as they were or are; or things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be.
2. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι μιμητὴς ὁ ποιητὴς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἤ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἕν τι ἀεί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ.
3. These are expressed in diction with or without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of which we allow the poet to use.
3. ταῦτα δ’ ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἐν ᾗ καὶ γλῶτται καὶ μεταφοραὶ καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστι·
4. Moreover, the standard of what is correct is not the same in the art of poetry as it is in the art of social conduct or any other art.
4. δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς.
5. In the actual art of poetry there are two kinds of errors, essential and accidental.
5. αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία, ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὑτήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
6. If a man meant to represent something and failed through incapacity, that is an essential error. But if his error is due to his original conception being wrong and his portraying, for example, a horse advancing both its right legs, that is then a technical error in some special branch of knowledge, in medicine, say, or whatever it may be; or else some sort of impossibility has been portrayed, but that is not an essential error.
6. εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι... ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία· εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ⟨ἅμ’⟩ ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, ἢ τὸ καθ’ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα, οἷον τὸ κατ’ ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην [ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται] ὁποιανοῦν, οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτήν.
7. These considerations must, then, be kept in view in meeting the charges contained in these objections. Let us first take the charges against the art of poetry itself. If an impossibility has been portrayed, an error has been made.
7. ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην· ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, ἡμάρτηται·
8. But it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the object of poetry—what that is has been already stated—and makes that part or some other part of the poem more striking. The pursuit of Hector is an example of this.
8. ἀλλ’ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὑτῆς (τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται), εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος. παράδειγμα ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος δίωξις.
9. If, however, the object could have been achieved better or just as well without sacrifice of technical accuracy, then it is not justifiable, for, if possible, there should be no error at all in any part of the poem.
9. εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ⟨μὴ⟩ ἧττον ἐνεδέχετο ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, [ἡμαρτῆσθαι] οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτῆσθαι.
10. Again one must ask of which kind is the error, is it an error in poetic art or a chance error in some other field? It is less of an error not to know that a female stag has no horns than to make a picture that is unrecognizable.
10. ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός; ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰ μὴ ᾔδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν.
11. Next, supposing the charge is “That is not true,” one can meet it by saying “But perhaps it ought to be,” just as Sophocles said that he portrayed people as they ought to be and Euripides portrayed them as they are.
11. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ’ ἴσως ⟨ὡς⟩ δεῖ, οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷοι εἰσίν, ταύτῃ λυτέον.
12. If neither of these will do, then say, “Such is the tale”; for instance, tales about gods.
12. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασίν, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν·
13. Very likely there is no advantage in telling them, and they are not true either, but may well be what Xenophanes declared —all the same such is the tale.
13. ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν οὔτ’ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει· ἀλλ’ οὖν φασι.
14. In another case, perhaps, there is no advantage but “such was the fact,” e.g. the case of the arms, “Their spears erect on butt-spikes stood,” for that was then the custom, as it still is in Illyria.
14. τὰ δὲ ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον μέν, ἀλλ’ οὕτως εἶχεν, οἷον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὅπλων, ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ’ ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος· οὕτω γὰρ τότ’ ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί.
15. As to the question whether anything that has been said or done is morally good or bad, this must be answered not merely by seeing whether what has actually been done or said is noble or base, but by taking into consideration also the man who did or said it, and seeing to whom he did or said it, and when and for whom and for what reason; for example, to secure a greater good or to avoid a greater evil.
15. περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς εἰ εἴρηταί τινι ἢ πέπρακται, οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, οἷον εἰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γένηται, ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται.
16. Some objections may be met by reference to the diction, for example, by pleading “rare word,” e.g. οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον, for perhaps he means not mules but sentinels. And Dolon, “One that was verily evil of form,” it may be not his deformed body but his ugly face, for the Cretans use “fair-formed” for “fair-featured.” And again “Livelier mix it” may mean not undiluted as for drunkards but quicker.
16. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλώττῃ τὸ οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον· ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας· καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, ὅς ῥ’ ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες τὸ εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι· καὶ τὸ ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ θᾶττον.
17. Other expressions are metaphorical, for example:Then all the other immortals and men lay all night in slumber,while yet he says:Yea, when indeed he gazed at the Trojan plain AgamemnonMarvelled at voices of flutes...“All” is used instead of “many” metaphorically, “all” being a species of “many.” And again, “Alone unsharing” is metaphorical; the best known is called the only one.
17. τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, οἷον πάντες μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὗδον παννύχιοι· ἅμα δέ φησιν ἦ τοι ὅτ’ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τε ὅμαδον· τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοί κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τι. καὶ τὸ οἴη δ’ ἄμμορος κατὰ μεταφοράν, τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον.
18. By intonation also; for example, the solutions of Hippias of Thasos, his “δίδομεν δέ οἱ” and τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ;
18. κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν, ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος, τὸ δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.
19. and by punctuation; for example, the lines of Empedocles:Soon mortal grow they that aforetime learntImmortal ways, and pure erstwhile commingled.
19. τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς αἶψα δὲ θνήτ’ ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο.
20. Or again by ambiguity, e.g. παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ, where πλείω is ambiguous.
20. τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ, παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ· τὸ γὰρ πλείω ἀμφίβολόν ἐστιν.
21. Others according to the habitual use of the phrase, e.g. wine and water is called “wine” so you get the phrase “greaves of new-wrought tin”; or workers in iron are called “braziers,” and so Ganymede is said to pour wine for Zeus, though they do not drink wine. This last might however be metaphorical.
21. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως. τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποίηται κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο· καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους, ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε ⟨καὶ⟩ κατὰ μεταφοράν.
22. Whenever a word seems to involve a contradiction, one should consider how many different meanings it might bear in the passage, e.g. in “There the bronzen shaft was stayed,” we should ask in how many ways “being stayed” might be taken, interpreting the passage in this sense or in that, and keeping as far as possible from the attitude which Glaucon describes when he says that people make some unwarrantable presupposition and having themselves given an adverse verdict proceed to argue from it, and if what they think the poet has said does not agree with their own preconceived ideas, they censure him, as if that was what he had said.
22. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά τι ὑπεναντίωμά τι δοκῇ σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, οἷον τῷ τῇ ῥ’ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος τὸ ταύτῃ κωλυθῆναι ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται, ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί, ὡς μάλιστ’ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι· κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ ἢ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, ὅτι ἔνιοι ἀλόγως προϋπολαμβάνουσί τι καὶ αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότος ὅ τι δοκεῖ ἐπιτιμῶσιν, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει.
25. This is what has happened in the case of Icarius. They assume that he was a Spartan and therefore find it odd that when Telemachus went to Sparta he did not meet him. But the truth may be, as the Cephallenians say, that Odysseus married a wife from their country and that the name was not Icarius but Icadius. So the objection is probably due to a mistake.
25. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον. οἴονται γὰρ αὐτὸν Λάκωνα εἶναι· ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ ἐντυχεῖν τὸν Τηλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθόντα. τὸ δ’ ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ οἱ Κεφαλλῆνές φασι· παρ’ αὑτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι λέγουσι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ εἶναι Ἰκάδιον ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἰκάριον· δι’ ἁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα † εἰκός ἐστιν †.
26. In general any “impossibility” may be defended by reference to the poetic effect or to the ideal or to current opinion.
26. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν.
27. For poetic effect a convincing impossibility is preferable to that which is unconvincing though possible.
27. πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν·
28. It may be impossible that there should be such people as Zeuxis used to paint, but it would be better if there were; for the type should improve on the actual.
28. ... τοιούτους εἶναι οἷον Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
29. Popular tradition may be used to defend what seems irrational, and you can also say that sometimes it is not irrational, for it is likely that unlikely things should happen.
29. πρὸς ἅ φασιν τἄλογα·οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν· εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι.
30. Contradictions in terms must be examined in the same way as an opponent’s refutations in argument, to see whether the poet refers to the same thing in the same relation and in the same sense, and has contradicted either what he expressly says himself or what an intelligent person would take to be his meaning.
30. τὰ δ’ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥστε καὶ † αὐτὸν † ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται.
31. It is right, however, to censure both improbability and depravity where there is no necessity and no use is made of the improbability. An example is Euripides’ intro duction of Aegeus or(of depravity)the character of Menelans in the Orestes.
31. ὀρθὴ δ’ ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ, ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ, ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ ⟨τῇ⟩ τοῦ Μενελάου.
32. The censures they bring are of five kinds; that things are either impossible or irrational or harmful or inconsistent or contrary to artistic correctness. The solutions must be studied under the heads specified above, twelve in number.
32. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς ἄλογα ἢ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἢ ὡς ὑπεναντία ἢ ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. αἱ δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι. εἰσὶν δὲ δώδεκα.