Also many governments have been put down by some of their members who had become resentful because the oligarchies were too despotic; this is how the oligarchies fell at Cnidus and at Chios. And revolutions also occur from an accident, both in what is called a constitutional government and in those oligarchies in which membership of the council and the law-courts and tenure of the other offices are based on a property-qualification. For often the qualification first having been fixed to suit the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members and in a constitutional government the middle classes, when peace or some other good fortune leads to a good harvest it comes about that the same properties become worth many times as large an assessment, so that all the citizens share in all the rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually and little by little and not being noticed, but at other times more quickly. Such then are the causes that lead to revolutions and factions in oligarchies (and generally, both democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered not into the opposite forms of constitution but into ones of the same class, for instance from legitimate democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and from the latter into the former).
πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τινῶν δυσχερανάντων κατελύθησαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία. γίγνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ἐν ὅσαις ἀπὸ τιμήματος βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἄρχουσιν. πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρῶτον τίμημα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας καιρούς, ὥστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὀλίγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, εὐετηρίας γιγνομένης διʼ εἰρήνην ἢ διʼ ἄλλην τινʼ εὐτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλασίου γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος ἀξίας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὥστε πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν γινομένης τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λανθανούσης, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ θᾶττον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ στασιάζουσι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας (ὅλως δὲ καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἷον ἐκ τῶν ἐννόμων δημοκρατιῶν καὶ ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰς τὰς κυρίους καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας).
In aristocracies factions arise in some cases because few men share in the honors (which has also been said to be the cause of disturbances in oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort of oligarchy, for in both those who govern are few—although the reason for this is not the same in both—since this does cause it to be thought that aristocracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most bound to come about when there is a considerable number of people who are proud-spirited on the ground of being equals in virtue (for example the clan called the Maidens’ Sons at Sparta—for they were descended from the Equals—whom the Spartans detected in a conspiracy and sent away to colonize Tarentum); or when individuals although great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are treated dishonorably by certain men in higher honor (for example Lysander by the kings ); or when a person of manly nature has no share in the honors (for example Cinadon, who got together the attack upon the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus). Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the well-born are too poor and others too rich (which happens especially during wars, and this also occurred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War—as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitledLaw and Order;
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίνονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν, ὅπερ εἴρηται κινεῖν καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναί πως (ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταὐτὸν ὀλίγοι)· ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ὅταν ᾖ τι πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς ὁμοίων κατʼ ἀρετήν, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρθενίαι (ἑκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν), οὓς φωράσαντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς, ἢ ὅταν τινὲς ἀτιμάζωνται μεγάλοι ὄντες καὶ μηθενὸς ἥττους κατʼ ἀρετὴν ὑπό τινων ἐντιμοτέρων, οἷον Λύσανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων, ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπʼ Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας· ἔτι ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀπορῶσι λίαν οἱ δʼ εὐπορῶσιν (καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται· συνέβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὑπὸ τὸν Μεσηνιακὸν πόλεμον· δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο] ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας·
for some men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a re-division of the land of the country). Also if a man is great and capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler (as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and Hanno at Carthage). But the actual overthrow of both constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a departure from justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements (I mean popular government and oligarchy), for both constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies aim at blending these. For this is the point of distinction between aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to this that some of them are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior position, seek to behave insolently and to gain money.
θλιβόμενοι γάρ τινες διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἠξίουν ἀνάδαστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν)· ἔτι ἐάν τις μέγας ᾖ καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι, ἵνα μοναρχῇ, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄννων. λύονται δὲ μάλιστα αἵ τε πολιτεῖαι καὶ αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ μὴ μεμεῖχθαι καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο· λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαί τε πειρῶνται μιγνύναι καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτειῶν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἧττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν· τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας· διόπερ ἀσφαλέστεραι αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἑτέρων εἰσίν· κρεῖττόν τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες, οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἂν ἡ πολιτεία διδῷ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ὑβρίζειν ζητοῦσι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν.
And speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy (for the poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the opposite) and constitutional governments to oligarchy (for the only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of what is their own). And the change mentioned came about at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for honors was too high, the constitution was altered to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land (for the constitution was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at wealth)... And the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it. Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands); and the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage connections with whom they like (which was the cause of the fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage with Dionysius, which would not have taken place in a democracy; nor in a well-blended aristocracy).
ὅλως δʼ ἐφʼ ὁπότερον ἂν ἐγκλίνῃ ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ τοῦτο μεθίσταται ἑκατέρων τὸ σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἷον ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον, ἀριστοκρατία δʼ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἢ εἰς τἀναντία, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον (ὡς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περισπῶσιν εἰς τοὐναντίον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι), αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν (μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν)· συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἔλαττον μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία ὀλιγαρχικωτέρα ἦν, ὥστε ἐδύναντο πλεονεκτεῖν) ὁ δὲ δῆμος γυμνασθεὶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο κρείττων, ἕως ἀφεῖσαν τῆς χώρας ὅσοι πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες. ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται· καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσιν, διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας, ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμειγμένῃ. μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσαι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρόν, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, ὅτι αἴτιον τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρόν ἐστιν·
And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolution unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as it has been said in what has gone before about all forms of constitution in general, that even a small change may cause a revolution. For when they give up one of the details of the constitution, afterwards they also make another slightly bigger change more readily, until they alter the whole system. This occurred for instance with the constitution of Thurii. There was a law that the office of general could be held at intervals of four years, but some of the younger men, becoming warlike and winning high repute with the mass of the guards, came to despise the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they would easily get control; so first they tried to repeal the law referred to, so as to enable the same persons to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that the people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm. And though the magistrates in charge of this matter, called the Councillors, at first made a movement to oppose them, they were won over, believing that after repealing this law they would allow the rest of the constitution to stand; but later, though they wished to prevent them when other laws were being repealed, they could no longer do anything more, but the whole system of the constitution was converted into a dynasty of the men who had initiated the innovations. And constitutions of all forms are broken up some times from movements initiating from within themselves, but sometimes from outside, when there is an opposite form of constitution either near by or a long way off yet possessed of power.
ὅταν γάρ τι προῶνται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μεῖζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων πολιτείας. νόμου γὰρ ὄντος διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γενόμενοί τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως κατασχήσειν, τοῦτον τὸν νόμον λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὥστʼ ἐξεῖναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὁρῶντες τὸν δῆμον αὐτοὺς χειροτονήσοντα προθύμως. οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι, ὁρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιοῦσθαι συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοῦτον κινήσαντας τὸν νόμον ἐάσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν, ὕστερον δὲ βουλόμενοι κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὐθέν, ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. πᾶσαι δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι λύονται ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν ὁτὲ δʼ ἔξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναντία πολιτεία ᾖ ἢ πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν.
This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans democracies. We have then approximately stated the causes that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of states and to party factions. The next thing to speak about is security both in general and for each form of constitution separately. First then it is clear that if we know the causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes by which they are preserved; for opposites create opposites, and destruction is the opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions therefore, if care must be taken to prevent men from committing any other breach of the law, most of all must a small breach be guarded against, for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expenditure occurring often ruins men’s estates; for the expense is not noticed because it does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic puzzle, “if each is little, then all are alittle.” This is true in one way but in another it is not; for the whole or total is not little, but made up of little parts. One thing therefore that we must guard against is this beginning; and the next point is that we must not put faith in the arguments strung together for the sake of tricking the multitude, for they are refuted by the facts (and what sort of constitutional sophistries we refer to hasbeen said before).
ὅπερ συνέβαινεν ἐπʼ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους κατέλυον. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἴρηται σχεδόν. περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης πολιτείας ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἔχομεν διʼ ὧν φθείρονται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἔχομεν καὶ διʼ ὧν σῴζονται· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ σωτηρίᾳ ἐναντίον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις, εἰπερ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τηρεῖν ὅπως μηθὲν παρανομῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν· λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυομένη ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον. λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ δαπάνη διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος εἰ ἕκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα· τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ μικρῶν. μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλακὴν ταύτην πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι· ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς σοφίσματος χάριν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος συγκειμένοις, ἐξελέγχεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, πρότερον εἴρηται).
And again we must observe that not only some aristocracies but also some oligarchies endure not because the constitutions are secure but because those who get in the offices treat both those outside the constitution and those in the government well, on the one hand by not treating those who are not members of it unjustly and by bringing their leading men into the constitution and not wronging the ambitious ones in the matter of dishonor or the multitude in the matter of gain, and on the other hand, in relation to themselves and those who are members, by treating one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality which men of democratic spirit seek for in the case of the multitude is not only just but also expedient in the case of their compeers. Hence if there are a greater number in the governing class, many of the legislative enactments of a democratic nature are advantageous, for example for the offices to be tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to participate in them; for the compeers in this case are as it were the people (owing to which demagogues often arise even among them, as has been said already), and also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dynasties less (for it is not so easy to do wrongs when in office for a short time as when in for a long time, since it is long tenure of office that causes tyrannies to spring up in oligarchies and democracies; for either those who are the greatest men in either sort of state aim at tyranny, in the one sort the demagogues and in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the greatest offices, when they are in office for along time).
ἔτι δʼ ὁρᾶν ὅτι ἔνιαι μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀριστοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εὖ χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τῷ τοὺς ἡγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὑτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλήλοις δημοτικῶς. ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ δημοτικοί, τὸ ἴσον, τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν. διὸ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημάτων, οἷον τὸ ἑξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ ὅμοιοι μετέχωσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι (διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγνονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον), ἔπειθʼ ἧττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον κακουργῆσαι ὀλίγον χρόνον ἄρχοντας καὶ πολύν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίγνονται τυραννίδες·
And constitutions are kept secure not only through being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also through being near them, for when they are afraid the citizens keep a closer hold on the government; hence those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear, in order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the constitution like a watch in the night, and they must make the distant near. Again, they must also endeavor to guard against the quarrels and party struggles of the notables by means of legislation, and to keep out those who are outside the quarrel before they too have taken it over; since to discern a growing evil at the commencement is not any ordinary person’s work but needs a statesman. And to deal with the revolution from oligarchy and constitutional government that arises because of the property-qualifications, when this occurs while the rates of qualification remain the same but money is becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total amount of the rated value of the community as compared with the past amount, in states where the assessment is made yearly, over that period, and three years or five years ago in the larger states, and if the new total is many times larger or many times smaller than the former one at the time when the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is advantageous that there should be a law for the magistrates correspondingly to tighten up or to relax the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the ratio of increase if the new total rated value exceeds the old, and relaxing them and making the qualification lower if the new total falls below theold.
ἢ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ ἐπιτίθενται τυραννίδι, ἔνθα μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἔνθα δʼ οἱ δυνάσται, ἢ οἱ τὰς μεγίστας ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὅταν πολὺν χρόνον ἄρχωσιν). σῴζονται δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς· φοβούμενοι γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε δεῖ τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα φυλάττωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακὴν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν. ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας ὄντας πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακὸν γνῶναι οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλὰ πολιτικοῦ ἀνδρός. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα γιγνομένην μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τοῦτο μενόντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τιμημάτων εὐπορίας δὲ νομίσματος γιγνομένης, συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατʼ ἐνιαυτόν, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος, κἂν ᾖ πολλαπλάσιον ἢ πολλοστημόριον τοῦ πρότερον, ἐν ᾧ αἱ τιμήσεις κατέστησαν τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμήματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἐπιτείνοντας κατὰ τὴν πολλαπλασίωσιν, ἐὰν δʼ ἐλλείπῃ, ἀνιέντας καὶ ἐλάττω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν.
For in oligarchies and constitutional states, when they do not do this, in the one case the result is that in the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in the former a dynasty, and in the other case a constitutional government turns into a democracy and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or a government of the people. But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy [and to monarchy], and every form of constitution not to raise up any man too much beyond due proportion, but rather to try to assign small honors and of long tenure or great ones quickly (for officials grow corrupt, and not every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at all events not to bestow honors in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process; and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to cause their periods out of office to be spent abroad.
ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις, μὴ ποιούντων οὕτως μὲν ἔνθα μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔνθα δὲ δυναστείαν γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, ἐκείνως δὲ ἐκ μὲν πολιτείας δημοκρατίαν, ἐκ δʼ ὀλιγαρχίας πολιτείαν ἢ δῆμον. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ [καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ] καὶ πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ μήτʼ αὐξάνειν λίαν μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πειρᾶσθαι μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ ταχὺ μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχίαν), εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γʼ ἀθρόας δόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι πάλιν ἀθρόας, ἀλλʼ ἐκ προσαγωγῆς· καὶ μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν ὥστε μηδένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.
And since men also cause revolutions through their private lives, some magistracy must be set up to inspect those whose mode of living is unsuited to the constitution—unsuited to democracy in a democracy, to oligarchy in an oligarchy, and similarly for each of the other forms of constitution. And also sectional prosperity in the state must be guarded against for the same reasons; and the way to avert this is always to entrust business and office to the opposite sections (I mean that the respectable are opposite to the multitude and the poor to the wealthy), and to endeavor either to mingle together the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy or to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party factions due to inequality). And in every form of constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so framed both by its laws and by its other institutions that it is impossible for the magistracies to make a profit. And this has most to be guarded against in oligarchies; for the many are not so much annoyed at being excluded from holding office (but in fact they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to spend on their own affairs) as they are if they think that the magistrates are stealing the common funds, but then both things annoy them, exclusion from the honors of office and exclusion from its profits. And indeed the sole way in which a combination of democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone could contrive this arrangement;
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους νεωτερίζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ἀρχήν τινα τὴν ἐποψομένην τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ἑκάστῃ· καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· τούτου δʼ ἄκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (λέγω δʼ ἀντικεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς τῷ πλήθει, καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις), καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσον αὔξειν (τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις). μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ οὕτω τετάχθαι ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχικαῖς δεῖ τηρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγανακτοῦσιν εἰργόμενοι τοῦ ἄρχειν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρουσιν ἐάν τις ἐᾷ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν, ὥστʼ ἐὰν οἴωνται τὰ κοινὰ κλέπτειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, τότε γʼ ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τό τε τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν· μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσειέ τις. ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἔχειν ἃ βούλονται ἀμφοτέρους.
for it would then be possible for the notables and also the multitude both to have what they want; for it is the democratic principle for all to have the right to hold office and the aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by the notables, and this will be the case when it is impossible to make money from office; for the poor will not want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result will be that the poor will become well-off through spending their time upon their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons. Therefore to prevent peculation of the public property, let the transfer of the funds take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the lists be deposited for each brotherhood, company and tribe; and to get men to hold office without profit there must be honors assigned by law to officials of good repute. And in democracies it is necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by not causing properties to be divided up, but not incomes either (which under some constitutions takes place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men from undertaking costly but useless public services like equipping choruses and torch-races and all other similar services, even if they wish to;
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται ὅταν μὴ ᾖ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν· οἱ γὰρ ἄποροι οὐ βουλήσονται ἄρχειν τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ εὔποροι δυνήσονται διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν· ὥστε συμβήσεται τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις γίγνεσθαι εὐπόροις διὰ τὸ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις, τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἡ παράδοσις γιγνέσθω τῶν χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιθέσθωσαν· τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν τιμὰς εἶναι δεῖ νενομοθετημένας τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. δεῖ δʼ ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, ὃ ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν λανθάνει γιγνόμενον, βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας, οἷον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται·
in an oligarchy on the other hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against them must be greater than if it is done by one of themselves, and inheritance must not go by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one estate, for so estates would be more on a level, and more of the poor would establish themselves as prosperous. And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have a smaller share in the government—in a democracy to the wealthy and in anoligarchy to the poor—either equality or precedence in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state; but these should be entrusted to those prescribed by the constitution exclusively, or to them for the most part. There are some three qualities which those who are to hold the supreme magistracies ought to possess, first, loyalty to the established constitution, next, very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and third, virtue and justice—in each constitution the sort of justice suited to the constitution (for if the rules of justice are not the same under all constitutions, it follows that there must be differences in the nature of justice also). It is a difficult question how the choice ought to be made when it happens that all these qualities are not found in the same person;
ἐν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι πολλήν, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφʼ ὧν λήμματα ⟨ἔστι⟩ τούτοις ἀπονέμειν, κἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας μὴ κατὰ δόσιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, μηδὲ πλειόνων ἢ μιᾶς τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁμαλώτεραι αἱ οὐσίαι εἶεν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἂν καθίσταιντο πλείους. συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ἰσότητα ἢ προεδρίαν νέμειν τοῖς ἧττον κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν μὲν δήμῳ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας, ταύτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγχειρίζειν μόνοις ἢ πλείοσιν. τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, τρίτον δʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς). ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ ταῦτα πάντα περὶ τὸν αὐτόν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν·
for instance, if one man is a good military commander but a bad man and no friend of the constitution, and the other is just and loyal, how should the choice be made? It seems that two things ought to be considered, what is the quality of which all men have a larger share, and what the one of which all have a smaller share? Therefore in the case of military command one must consider experience more than virtue, for men have a smaller share of military experience and a larger share of moral goodness; but in the case of a trusteeship or a stewardship the opposite, for these require more virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge required is common to all men. And somebody might raise the question, why is virtue needed if both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are forthcoming, as even these two qualities will do what is suitable? May not the answer be, because those who possess these two qualities may possibly lack self-control, so that just as they do not serve themselves well although they know how to and although they love themselves, so possibly in some cases they may behave in this way in regard to the community also? And broadly, whatever provisions in the laws we describe as advantageous to constitutions, these are all preservative of the constitutions, and so is the supreme elementary principle that has been often stated, that of taking precautions that the section desirous of the constitution shall be stronger in numbers than the section not desirous off it. And beside all these matters one thing must not be overlooked which at present is overlooked by the, deviation-forms of constitution—the middle party;
οἷον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μέν τις εἴη, πονηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῇ πολιτείᾳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν; ἔοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τίνος πλεῖον μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἔλαττον· διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς (ἔλαττον γὰρ στρατηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δʼ ἐπιεικείας πλεῖον), ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ καὶ ταμιείᾳ τἀναντία (πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἢ ὅσην οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πᾶσιν). ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, ἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία, τί δεῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς; ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο. ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχοντας ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι, ὥστε καθάπερ καὶ αὑτοῖς οὐχ ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰδότες καὶ φιλοῦντες αὑτούς, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὐθὲν κωλύει ἔχειν ἐνίους; ἁπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σῴζει τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὃ νῦν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ μέσον·
for many of the institutions thought to be popular destroy democracies, and many of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies. But the adherents of the deviation-form, thinking that this form is the only right thing, drag it to excess, not knowing that just as there can be a nose that although deviating from the most handsome straightness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is still beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, if a sculptor carries it still further in the direction of excess, he will first lose the symmetry of the feature and finally will make it not even look like a nose at all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two opposite qualities (and the same is the ease also in regard to the other parts of the body), so this is what happens about constitutions likewise; for it is possible for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best structure, but if one strains either of them further, first he will make the constitution worse, and finally he will make it not a constitution at all. Therefore the legislator and the statesman must not fail to know what sort of democratic institutions save and what destroy a democracy, and what sort of oligarchical institutions an oligarchy; for neither constitution can exist and endure without the well-to-do and the multitude, but when an even level of property comes about, the constitution resulting must of necessity be another one, so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy the constitutions.
πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκούντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. οἱ δʼ οἰόμενοι ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετὴν ἕλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι, καθάπερ ῥὶς ἔστι παρεκβεβηκυῖα μὲν τὴν εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμόν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἔτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἐπιτείνῃ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀποβαλεῖ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ μορίου, τέλος δʼ οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲ ῥῖνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς [ἄλλας] πολιτείας. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἔστιν ὥστʼ ἔχειν ἱκανῶς, καίπερ ἐξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶτον μὲν χείρω ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δʼ οὐδὲ πολιτείαν. διὸ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν, ποῖα σῴζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποῖα φθείρει τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἄνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ὁμαλότης γένηται τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλην ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν, ὥστε φθείροντες τοῖς καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις φθείρουσι τὰς πολιτείας.
And a mistake is made both in democracies and in oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the oligarchics ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, “And I will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against them,” but they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.” But the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical; for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state, as well as in an individual. But to have been educated to suit the constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents of oligarchy or to the supportersof democracy, but the things that will enable the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves democratically.
ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγωγοί, ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων· δύο γὰρ ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ τὴν πόλιν, μαχόμενοι τοῖς εὐπόροις, δεῖ δὲ τοὐναντίον αἰεὶ δοκεῖν λέγειν ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς, καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους ἐναντίους ἢ νῦν ὀμνύναι τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις ὀμνύουσι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν, χρὴ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τοὐναντίον, ἐπισημαινομένους ἐν τοῖς ὅρκοις ὅτι οὐκ ἀδικήσω τὸν δῆμον. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὰς πολιτείας, οὗ νῦν ὀλιγωροῦσι πάντες, τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. ὄφελος γὰρ οὐθὲν τῶν ὠφελιμωτάτων νόμων καὶ συνδεδοξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πολιτευομένων, εἰ μὴ ἔσονται εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικῶς, εἰ δʼ ὀλιγαρχικοί, ὀλιγαρχικῶς. εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφʼ ἑνὸς ἀκρασία, ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τοῦτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ ὀλιγαρχοῦντες ἢ οἱ δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι, ἀλλʼ οἷς δυνήσονται οἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχεῖν οἱ δὲ δημοκρατεῖσθαι.
But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labor, so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about; while in the democracies thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly (for there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the majority and liberty); for justice is supposed to be equality, and equality the sovereignty of what ever may have been decided by the multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and “unto what end he listeth,” as Euripides says. But this is bad; for to live in conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but safety. This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of constitutions, and of those that cause their “security and continuance.” It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation.
νῦν δʼ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων υἱοὶ τρυφῶσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων γίγνονται γεγυμνασμένοι καὶ πεπονηκότες, ὥστε καὶ βούλονται μᾶλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτερίζειν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατικαῖς τοὐναντίον τοῦ συμφέροντος καθέστηκεν, αἴτιον δὲ τούτου ὅτι κακῶς ὁρίζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον. δύο γάρ ἐστιν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεῖ ὡρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἴσον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἴσον δʼ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλήθει, τοῦτʼ εἶναι κύριον, ἐλεύθερον δὲ [καὶ ἴσον] τὸ ὅ τι ἂν βούληταί τις ποιεῖν· ὥστε ζῇ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, καὶ εἰς ὃ χρῄζων, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ φαῦλον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οἴεσθαι δουλείαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίαν. ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν αἱ πολιτεῖαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ φθείρονται, καὶ διὰ τίνων σῴζονται καὶ διαμένουσιν, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τοσαῦτά ἐστιν. λείπεται δʼ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε φθείρεται καὶ διʼ ὧν σῴζεσθαι πέφυκεν. σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας.
And the things that happen about royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar to those that have been narrated about constitutional governments. For royal government corresponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combination of the last form of oligarchy and of democracy; and for that very reason it is most harmful to its subjects, inasmuch as it is a combination of two bad things, and is liable to the deviations and errors that spring from both forms of constitution. And these two different sorts of monarchy have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them. And this is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues, having won the people’s confidence by slandering the notables. For some tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states had already grown great, but others that came before them arose from kings departing from the ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic rule, and others from the men elected to fill the supreme magistracies (for in old times the peoples used to appoint the popular officials and the sacred embassies for long terms of office), and others from oligarchies electing some one supreme official for the greatest magistracies.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας· διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐστίν, ἅτε ἐκ δυοῖν συγκειμένη κακῶν καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἔχουσα τὰς παρʼ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὑπάρχει δʼ ἡ γένεσις εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐναντίων ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν μοναρχιῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι γέγονεν, καὶ καθίσταται βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους, ὁ δὲ τύραννος ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους, ὅπως ὁ δῆμος ἀδικῆται μηδὲν ὑπʼ αὐτῶν. φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων, ἤδη τῶν πόλεων ηὐξημένων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἐκ [τε] τῶν βασιλέων παρεκβαινόντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας ἀρχῆς ὀρεγομένων, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν αἱρετῶν ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς (τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον οἱ δῆμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας), αἱ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, αἱρουμένων ἕνα τινὰ κύριον ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς.
For in all these methods they had it in their powerto effect their purpose easily, if only they wished, because they already possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of cases and of their honorable office in the other, for example Phidon in Argos and others became tyrants when they possessed royal power already, while the Ionian tyrants and Phalaris arose from offices of honor, and Panaetius at Leontini and Cypselus at Corinth and Pisistratus at Athens and Dionysius at Syracuse and others in the same manner from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we said, royalty is ranged in correspondence with aristocracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue or by family or by services or by a combination of these things and ability. For in every instance this honor fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus, others having set them free, for instance Cyrus, or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings of Sparta and Macedon and the Molossians. And a king wishes to be a guardian, to protect the owners of estates from suffering injustice and the people from suffering insult, but tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays regard to no common interest unless for the sake of its private benefit; and the aim of tyranny is what is pleasant, that of royalty what is noble.
πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπῆρχε τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ κατεργάζεσθαι ῥᾳδίως, εἰ μόνον βουληθεῖεν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν προϋπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς τοῖς δὲ τὴν τῆς τιμῆς· οἷον Φείδων μὲν περὶ Ἄργος καὶ ἕτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας ὑπαρχούσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δʼ ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθήνησι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις καὶ ἕτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν. κατʼ ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἢ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένος, ἢ κατʼ εὐεργεσίας, ἢ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἅπαντες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δʼ ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δʼ ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηθὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηθέν·
Hence even in their requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather marks of honor that of kings; and a king’s body-guard consists of citizens, a tyrant’s of foreign mercenaries. And it is manifest that tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy; it copies oligarchy in making wealth its object (for inevitably that is the only way in which the tyrant’s body-guard and his luxury can be kept up) and in putting no trust in the multitude (which is why they resort to the measure of stripping the people of arms, and why ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion from the city and settlement in scattered places is common to both forms of government, both oligarchy and tyranny), while it copies democracy in making war on the notables and destroying them secretly and openly and banishing them as plotting against it and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them that counter-movements actually spring, some of them wishing themselves to rule, and others not to be slaves.
ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ μὲν χρήματα τυραννικὰ, τὰ δʼ εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικὰ μᾶλλον· καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτική, τυραννικὴ δὲ διὰ ξένων. ὅτι δʼ ἡ τυραννὶς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερόν· ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμένειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφήν), καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν (διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅπλων), καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος· ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθείρειν λάθρᾳ καὶ φανερῶς καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίους. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλάς, τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν.
Hence comes the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus, his docking of the prominent cornstalks, meaning that the prominent citizens must always be made away with. Therefore, as was virtually stated, the causes of revolutions in constitutional and in royal governments must be deemed to be the same; for subjects in many cases attack monarchies because of unjust treatment and fear and contempt, and among the forms of unjust treatment most of all because of insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure of private property. Also the objects aimed at by the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and of royal governments are the same as in revolts against constitutional government; for monarchs possess great wealth and great honor, which are desired by all men. And in some cases the attack is aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their office. Risings provoked by insolence are aimed against the person; and though insolence has many varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and when men are angry they mostly attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the attack on the Pisistratidae took place because they outraged Harmodius’s sister and treated Harmodius with contumely (for Harmodius attacked them because of his sister and Aristogiton because of Harmodius, and also the plot was laid against Periander the tyrant in Ambracia because when drinking with his favorite he asked him if he was yet with child by him), and the attack on Philip by Pausanias was because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, and that on Amyntas the Little by Derdas because he mocked at his youth, and the attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of Cyprus was for revenge, for he murdered him as being insulted, because Evagoras’s son had taken away his wife.
ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμά ἐστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων σταχύων κόλουσις, ὡς δέον αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. καθάπερ οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περί τε τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας· διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ διὰ καταφρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ταῖς μοναρχίαις, τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας μάλιστα διʼ ὕβριν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταὐτά, καθάπερ κἀκεῖ, καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας· μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις, ὧν ἐφίενται πάντες. τῶν δʼ ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα γίγνονται τῶν ἀρχόντων, αἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν διʼ ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. τῆς δʼ ὕβρεως οὔσης πολυμεροῦς, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δʼ ὀργιζομένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προπηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἁρμοδίου ἀδελφὴν ἐπηρεάσαι δʼ Ἁρμόδιον (ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἁρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφήν, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστογείτων διὰ τὸν Ἁρμόδιον), ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίνοντα μετὰ τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν εἰ ἤδη ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύει·
And many risings have also occurred because of shameful personal indignities committed by certain monarchs. One instance is the attack of Crataeas on Archelaus; for he was always resentful of the association, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient, or perhaps it was because he did not give him the hand of one of his daughters after agreeing to do so, but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that thus Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his son by Cleopatra; but at all events Crataeas’s estrangement was primarily caused by resentment because of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of Larisa also joined in the attack for the same reason; for because while enjoying his favors Archelaus would not restore him to his home although he had promised to do so, he thought that the motive of the familiarity that had taken place had been insolence and not passionate desire.
ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Παυσανίου διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Δέρδα διὰ τὸ καυχήσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολλαὶ δʼ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχῦναι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς. οἷον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέλαον· αἰεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἶχε πρὸς τὴν ὁμιλίαν, ὥστε ἱκανὴ καὶ ἐλάττων ⟨ἂν⟩ ἐγένετο πρόφασις—ἢ διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδεμίαν ἔδωκεν ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν, κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον, ἔδωκε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλιμείας, τὴν δὲ νεωτέραν τῷ υἱεῖ Ἀμύντᾳ, οἰόμενος οὕτως ἂν ἐκεῖνον ἥκιστα διαφέρεσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας· ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριότητος ὑπῆρχεν ἀρχὴ τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν χάριν. συνεπέθετο δὲ καὶ Ἑλλανοκράτης ὁ Λαρισαῖος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· ὡς γὰρ χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐ κατῆγεν ὑποσχόμενος, διʼ ὕβριν καὶ οὐ διʼ ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ᾤετο εἶναι τὴν γεγενημένην ὁμιλίαν.