We have already discussed how many and what are the varieties of the deliberative body or sovereign power in the state, and of the system of magistracies and of law-courts, and which variety is adapted to which form of constitution, and also the destruction of constitutions and their preservation, from what sort of people they originate and what are their causes. But as a matter of fact since there have come into existence several kinds of democracy and similarly of the other forms of constitution, it will be well at the same time to consider any point that remains about these varieties, and also determine the mode of organization appropriate and advantageous for each. And further we must also investigate the combinations of all the modes of organizing the actual departments of state that have been mentioned, for these modes when coupled together make the constitutions overlap, so as to produce oligarchical aristocracies and republics inclining towards democracy.
πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποίαν συντέτακται πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν εἴδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὄντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέον πάντων τῶν τρόπων·
I refer to the combinations which ought to be investigated but have not at present been studied, for example if the deliberative body and the system of electing magistrates are organized oligarchically but the regulations as to the law-courts aristocratically, or these and the structure of the deliberative body oligarchically and the election of magistracy aristocratically, or if in some other manner not all the parts of the constitution are appropriately combined Now it has been stated before what kind of democracy is suited to what kind of state, and similarly which of the kinds of oligarchy is suited to what kind of populace, and also which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous for which people; but nevertheless since it must not only be made clear which variety of these constitutions is best for states, but also how both these best varieties and the other forms must be established, let us briefly pursue the subject. And first let us speak about democracy; for at the same time the facts will also become clear about the opposite form of constitution, that is, the constitution which some people call oligarchy. And for this inquiry we must take into view all the features that are popular and that are thought to go with democracies; for it comes about from combinations of these that the kinds of democracy are formed, and that there are different democracies and more than one sort.
ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνδυασμοὺς οὓς δεῖ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν, οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δʼ εἰσὶ νῦν, οἷον ἂν τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ὀλιγαρχικῶς ᾖ συντεταγμένον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ὀλιγαρχικῶς, ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας, ἢ κατʼ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεῖα. ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν ἁρμόττει πόλιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅμως δʼ ἐπεὶ δεῖ γενέσθαι δῆλον μὴ μόνον ποία τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστη ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πῶς δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἐπέλθωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας εἴπωμεν· ἅμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης πολιτείας φανερόν, αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσί τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. ληπτέον δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ δημοτικὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθεῖν·
In fact there are two causes for there being several kinds of democracy, first the one stated before, the fact that the populations are different (for we find one multitude engaged in agriculture and another consisting of handicraftsmen and day-laborers, and when the first of these is added to the second and again the third to both of them it not only makes a difference in that the quality of the democracy becomes better or worse but also by its becoming different in kind); and the second cause is the one about which we now speak. For the institutions that go with democracies and seem to be appropriate to this form of constitution make the democracies different by their combinations; for one form of democracy will be accompanied by fewer, another by more, and another by all of them. And it is serviceable to ascertain each of them both for the purpose of instituting whichever of these kinds of democracy one happens to wish and for the purpose of amending existing ones. For people setting up constitutions seek to collect together all the features appropriate to their fundamental principle, but in so doing they make a mistake, as has been said before in the passage dealing with the causes of the destruction and the preservation of constitutions. And now let us state the postulates, the ethical characters and the aims of the various forms of democracy. Now a fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in liberty, for they assert this as the aim of every democracy.
ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντιθεμένων τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ πλείους δημοκρατίας μιᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γάρ εἰσιν αἰτίαι διʼ ἅσπερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους εἰσί, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ λεχθεῖσα πρότερον, ὅτι διάφοροι οἱ δῆμοι (γίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος, τὸ δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητικόν· ὧν τοῦ πρώτου τῷ δευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου πάλιν τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίω καὶ χείρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν), δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγομεν. τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντʼ εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεῖα ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω, τῇ δʼ ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δʼ ἅπαντα ταῦτα. χρήσιμον δʼ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρός τε τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἣν ἄν τις αὐτῶν τύχῃ βουλόμενος, καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴρηται πρότερον. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν. ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία (τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν, ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας·
But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich, because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is sovereign. This then is one mark of liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes to equalitarian liberty. And these principles having been laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all; government of each by all,
τούτου γὰρ στοχάζεσθαί φασι πᾶσαν δημοκρατίαν)· ἐλευθερίας δὲ ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατʼ ἀξίαν, τούτου δʼ ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτʼ εἶναι τέλος καὶ τοῦτʼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν· ὥστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων· πλείους γάρ εἰσι, κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς πλείοσι δόξαν. ἓν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας σημεῖον τοῦτο, ὃν τίθενται πάντες οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρον· ἓν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔργον εἶναί φασιν, εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύοντος τὸ ζῆν μὴ ὡς βούλεται. τῆς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅρος οὗτος δεύτερος· ἐντεῦθεν δʼ ἐλήλυθε τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ μηθενός, εἰ δὲ μή, κατὰ μέρος, καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. τούτων δʼ ὑποκειμένων καὶ τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα δημοτικά· τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων, τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν ἑκάστου ἕκαστον δʼ ἐν μέρει πάντων, τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης, τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος μηθενὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ ὅτι μικροτάτου, τὸ μὴ δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλιγάκις ἢ ὀλίγας ἔξω τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων, καὶ περὶ πάντων, ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων, τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων, ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηθενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων, ἢ τῶν μεγίστων βουλὴν κυρίαν (τῶν δʼ ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον βουλή, ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν·
and of all by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few; or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters (and a council is the most democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty of pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this one ); also payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts, magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are bound to have common mess tables. Also inasmuch as oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life, and if any life-office has been left after an ancient revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election by lot for election by vote.
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν δύναμιν· εἰς αὑτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δῆμος εὐπορῶν μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης), ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαν δικαστήρια ἀρχάς, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ ⟨τὴν⟩ βουλὴν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὰς κυρίας, ἢ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἃς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετʼ ἀλλήλων. ἔτι ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται, τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τἀναντία τούτων εἶναι, ἀγένεια πενία βαναυσία· ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀίδιον εἶναι, ἐὰν δέ τις καταλειφθῇ ἐξ ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς, τό γε περιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς ποιεῖν.
These then are the features common to democracies. But what is thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic, and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty. But the question follows, how will they have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five hundred? or is equality on this principle not to be arranged in this manner, but the division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads? For democrats say that justice is whatever seems good to the larger number, but advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount of property.
τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτʼ ἐστί· συμβαίνει δʼ ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ (τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἅπαντας κατʼ ἀριθμόν) ἡ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος. ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μηθὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἴσου [κατʼ ἀριθμόν]· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν τήν τʼ ἰσότητα τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἕξουσι τὸ ἴσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἱρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων. πότερον οὖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος; φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, οἱ δʼ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείονι οὐσίᾳ·
But both views involve inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men, according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich minority, as has been said before. What form of equality therefore would be one on which both parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority of the citizens ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose total property assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if there are ten rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on either side are added together carries the voting. But if the totals fall out exactly equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided;
κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν. ἔχει δʼ ἀμφότερα ἀνισότητα καὶ ἀδικίαν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννίς (καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἷς ἔχῃ πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος), εἰ δʼ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους κατʼ ἀριθμόν, ἀδικήσουσι δημεύοντες τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. τίς ἂν οὖν εἴη ἰσότης ἣν ὁμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτέον ἐξ ὧν ὁρίζονται δικαίων ἀμφότεροι. λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτʼ εἶναι δεῖ κύριον· ἔστω δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι πάντως, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τετύχηκεν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πόλις, πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες, ὅ τι ἂν ἀμφοτέροις δόξῃ ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ τἀναντία δόξῃ, ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὧν τὸ τίμημα πλεῖον· οἷον, εἰ οἱ μὲν δέκα οἱ δὲ εἴκοσιν, ἔδοξε δὲ τῶν μὲν πλουσίων τοῖς ἓξ τῶν δʼ ἀπορωτέρων τοῖς πεντεκαίδεκα, προσγεγένηνται τοῖς μὲν πένησι τέτταρες τῶν πλουσίων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις πέντε τῶν πενήτων· ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέροις, τοῦτο κύριον. ἐὰν δὲ ἴσοι συμπέσωσι, κοινὴν εἶναι ταύτην νομιστέον ἀπορίαν ὥσπερ νῦν ἐὰν δίχα ἡ ἐκκλησία γένηται ἢ τὸ δικαστήριον· ἢ γὰρ ἀποκληρωτέον ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον.
either a decision must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper hand pay no attention to them. There being four kinds of democracy, the best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses preceding these; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to their having the necessaries of life they pass their time attending to their farm work and do not covet their neighbors’ goods, but find more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office, where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of mankind are more covetous of gain than of honor. And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not preventthem from working or rob them; for then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, κἂν ᾖ πάνυ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅμως ῥᾷον τυχεῖν ἢ συμπεῖσαι τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. δημοκρατιῶν δʼ οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη μὲν ἡ πρώτη τάξει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὕτη. λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὥσπερ ἄν τις διέλοι τοὺς δήμους. βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν ὅπου ζῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τἀναγκαῖα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἥδιον αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, ὅπου ἂν μὴ ᾖ λήμματα μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπομένουσιν, ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ μηδʼ ἀφαιρῆται μηθέν·
And also, if they have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at Mantinea, yet if they have the power of deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. (And this too must be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at Mantinea.) Indeed it is for this reason that it is advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed well (for the offices will always be administered by the best men with the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper classes), and this arrangement is certain to be satisfactory for the upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class will be in control of the audits— since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man’s character.
ταχέως γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἱ δʼ οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ ἑλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν ἔνδειαν, εἴ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν, ἐπεὶ παρʼ ἐνίοις δήμοις, κἂν μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλά τινες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ βουλεύεσθαι κύριοι ὦσιν, ἱκανῶς ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς· καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἶναι σχῆμά τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτʼ ἦν. διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ῥηθείσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴωθεν, αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ δικάζειν πάντας, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας αἱρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ πολιτευομένους οὕτω πολιτεύεσθαί καλῶς (αἱ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται, τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος), καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις ἀρκοῦσαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν τάξιν· ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλων χειρόνων, καὶ ἄρξουσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους ἑτέρους. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι, καὶ μὴ πᾶν ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ, συμφέρον ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία τοῦ πράττειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις οὐ δύναται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον.
Hence there necessarily results the condition of affairs that is the most advantageous in the government of states—for the upper classes to govern without doing wrong, the common people not being deprived of any rights. It is manifest therefore that this is the best of the forms of democracy, and why this is so—namely, because in it the common people are of a certain kind. For the purpose of making the people an agricultural community, not only were some of the laws that were enacted in many states in early times entirely serviceable, prohibiting the ownership of more than a certain amount of land under any conditions or else of more than a certain amount lying between a certain place and the citadel or city (and in early times at all events in many states there was even legislation prohibiting the sale of the original allotments; and there is a law said to be due to Oxylus with some similar provision, forbidding loans secured on a certain portion of a man’s existing estate), but at the present day it would also be well to introduce reform by means of the law of the Aphytaeans, as it is serviceable for the purpose of which we are speaking; the citizens of Aphytis although numerous and possessing a small territory nevertheless are all engaged in agriculture, for they are assessed not on the whole of their estates, but on divisions of them so small that even the poor can exceed the required minimum in their assessments. After the agricultural community the best kind of democracy is where the people are herdsmen and get their living from cattle; for this life has many points of resemblance to agriculture, and as regards military duties pastoral people are in a very well trained condition and serviceable in body and capable of living in the open.
ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἄρχειν τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας, μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ πλήθους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν ἀρίστη, φανερόν, καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν δῆμον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν παρὰ πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρχαῖον χρήσιμοι πάντως, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπό τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν (ἦν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι νενομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ὀξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτόν τι δυνάμενος, τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἴς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἑκάστῳ γῆς), νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ, πρὸς γὰρ ὃ λέγομέν ἐστι χρήσιμος· ἐκεῖνοι γάρ, καίπερ ὄντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὅμως πάντες γεωργοῦσιν· τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τηλικαῦτα μόρια διαιροῦντες ὥστʼ ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμήσεσι καὶ τοὺς πένητας. μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος βέλτιστος δῆμός ἐστιν ὅπου νομεῖς εἰσι καὶ ζῶσιν ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων·
But almost all the other classes of populace, of which the remaining kinds of democracy are composed, are very inferior to these, for their mode of life is mean, and there is no element of virtue in any of the occupations in which the multitude of artisans and market-people and the wage-earning class take part, and also owing to their loitering about the market-place and the city almost all people of this class find it easy to attend the assembly; whereas the farmers owing to their being scattered over the country do not attend, and have not an equal desire for this opportunity of meeting. Andwhere it also happens that the lie of the land is such that the country is widely separated from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy and also a good constitutional government, for the multitude is forced to live at a distance on the farms; and so, even if there is a crowd that frequents the market-place, it is best in democracies not to hold assemblies without the multitude scattered over the country. It has then been stated how the best and first kind of democracy is to be organized, and it is clear how we ought to organize the other kinds also. For they must diverge in a corresponding order, and at each stage we must admit the next inferior class.
πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις μάλισθʼ οὗτοι γεγυμνασμένοι τὰς ἕξεις καὶ χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα καὶ δυνάμενοι θυραυλεῖν. τὰ δʼ ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι, πολλῷ φαυλότερα τούτων· ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετʼ ἀρετῆς ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίεσθαι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾳδίως ἐκκλησιάζει· οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὔτʼ ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθʼ ὁμοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε [τὴν χώραν] πολὺ τῆς πόλεως ἀπηρτῆσθαι, ῥᾴδιον καὶ δημοκρατίαν ποιεῖσθαι χρηστὴν καὶ πολιτείαν· ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, ὥστε δεῖ, κἂν ἀγοραῖος ὄχλος ᾖ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκκλησίας ἄνευ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευάζειν τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, εἴρηται· φανερὸν δὲ καὶ πῶς τὰς ἄλλας. ἑπομένως γὰρ δεῖ παρεκβαίνειν καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν.
The last kind of democracy, because all the population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to endure, and it is not easy for it to persist if it is not well constituted in its laws and customs (but the things that result in destroying both this state and the other forms of constitution have been nearly all of them spoken of before ). With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born and those of citizen-birth on one side, I mean those whose father or mother is a citizen; for all this element is specially congenial to a to democracy of this sort. Popular leaders therefore regularly introduce such institutions; they ought however only to go on adding citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumbers the notables and the middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy, which actually took place and caused the revolution at Cyrene; for a small base element is overlooked, but when it grows numerous it is more in evidence.
τὴν δὲ τελευταίαν, διὰ τὸ πάντας κοινωνεῖν, οὔτε πάσης ἐστὶ πόλεως φέρειν, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον διαμένειν μὴ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν εὖ συγκειμένην (ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλεῖστα σχεδόν). πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν εἰώθασιν οἱ προεστῶτες προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον τοὺς γνησίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὁποτερουοῦν πολίτου, λέγω δὲ οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι μὲν οὖν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ κατασκευάζειν οὕτω, δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν μέχρι ἂν ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέσων, καὶ τούτου μὴ πέρα προβαίνειν· ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ ἀτακτοτέραν τε ποιοῦσι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους πρὸς τὸ χαλεπῶς ὑπομένειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν παροξύνουσι μᾶλλον, ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἴτιον γενέσθαι περὶ Κυρήνην· ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παρορᾶται, πολὺ δὲ γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷς Κλεισθένης τε Ἀθήνησιν ἐχρήσατο βουλόμενος αὐξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ περὶ Κυρήνην οἱ τὸν δῆμον καθιστάντες.
A democracy of this kind will also find useful such institutions as were employed by Cleisthenes at Athens when he wished to increase the power of the democracy, and by the party setting up the democracy at Cyrene; different tribes and brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously existing groups of associates. Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children, and indulgence to live as one likes; a constitution of this sort will have a large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of mankind than sober living. But it is not the greatest or only task of the legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We must therefore employ the results obtained in the inquiries that we have made already into the causes of the preservation and the destruction of constitutions, and attempt in the light of those results to establish the safety of the state, carefully avoiding the things that cause destruction, and enacting such laws both written and unwritten as shall best compass the results preservative of constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time.
φυλαί τε γὰρ ἕτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους καὶ φατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναμειχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις, αἱ δὲ συνήθειαι διαζευχθῶσιν αἱ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάσματα δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δʼ οἷον ἀναρχία τε δούλων (αὕτη δʼ ἂν εἴη μέχρι του συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅπως τις βούλεται παρορᾶν· πολὺ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν· ἥδιον γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως. ἔστι δὲ [ἔργον] τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλομένων συνιστάναι τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ καταστῆσαι μέγιστον ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλʼ ὅπως σῴζηται μᾶλλον· μίαν γὰρ ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας οὐ χαλεπὸν μεῖναι πολιτευομένους ὁπωσοῦν. διὸ δεῖ, περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα, τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους, καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους, οἳ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σῴζοντα τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν τοῦτʼ εἶναι δημοτικὸν μηδʼ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὃ ποιήσει τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ὃ πλεῖστον χρόνον.