SCRIPTURA

Aristotle · Politics · 9 of 21

Book IV · 1288b–1292b

Translated by Harris Rackham

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In all the arts and the sciences that are not merely sectional but that in relation to some one class of subject are complete, it is the function of a single art or science to study what is suited to each class, for instance what sort of gymnastic exercise is beneficial for what sort of bodily frame, and what is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the person of the finest natural endowment and equipment), and also what one exercise taken by all is the best for the largest number (for this is also a question for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge of athletic exercises that are not the ones adapted to him, it is clearly just as much the task of the trainer and gymnastic master to produce this capacity also;

ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἕν τι τελείαις οὔσαις, μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἁρμόττον, οἷον ἄσκησις σώματι ποία τε ποίῳ συμφέρει, καὶ τίς ἀρίστη (τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκότι καὶ κεχορηγημένῳ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἁρμόττειν), καὶ τίς τοῖς πλείστοις μία πᾶσιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν), ἔτι δʼ ἐάν τις μὴ τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἐπιθυμῇ μήθʼ ἕξεως μήτʼ ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν, μηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι γε καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγίαν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον.

and we notice this also happening similarly in regard to medicine, and shipbuilding, and the making of clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear that in the case of the constitution as well it is the business of the same science to study which is the best constitution and what character it must have to be the most ideal if no external circumstance stands in the way, and what constitution is adapted to what people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must be acquainted with both the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely and that which is best under assumed conditions), and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a certain supposition (for he must be also capable of considering both how some given constitution could be brought into existence originally and also in what way having been brought into existence it could be preserved for the longest time: I mean for example if it has befallen some state not only not to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided even with the things necessary for it, but also not to have the constitution that is practicable under the circumstances but an inferior one); and beside all these matters he must ascertain the form of constitution most suited to all states, since most of those who make pronouncements about the constitution, even if the rest of what they say is good, entirely miss the points of practical utility. For it is proper to consider not only what is the best constitution but also what is the one possible of achievement, and likewise also what is the one that is easier and more generally shared by all states. But as it is, some students inquire which is the highest form of all even though requiring much material equipment, while those who rather state some general form sweep aside the constitutions actually existing and praise that of Sparta or some other;

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἐστι καὶ ποία τις ἂν οὖσα μάλιστʼ εἴη κατʼ εὐχὴν μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός, καὶ τίς τίσιν ἁρμόττουσα (πολλοῖς γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίστην τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν), ἔτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γενομένη τίνα τρόπον ἂν σῴζοιτο πλεῖστον χρόνον· λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τινι πόλει συμβέβηκε μήτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν, ἀχορήγητον δὲ εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, μήτε τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλά τινα φαυλοτέραν), παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὴν μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁρμόττουσαν δεῖ γνωρίζειν, ὥσθʼ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας, καὶ εἰ τἆλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, τῶν γε χρησίμων διαμαρτάνουσιν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν ἀρίστην δεῖ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δυνατήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις· νῦν δʼ οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον, οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον κοινήν τινα λέγοντες, τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιροῦντες πολιτείας, τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἐπαινοῦσι·

but the proper course is to bring forward an organization of such a sort that men will easily be persuaded and be able in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame one from the beginning, just as to re-learn a science is just as hard as to learn it originally; in addition therefore to the things mentioned the student of politics must also be able to render aid to the constitutions that exist already, as was also said before. But this is impossible if he does not know how many kinds of constitution there are; but at present some people think that there is only one kind of democracy and one kind of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence he must take in view the different varieties of the constitutions, and know how many there are and how many are their combinations. And after this it needs this same discrimination also to discern the laws that are the best, and those that are suited to each of the forms of constitution. For the laws should be laid down, and all people lay them down, to suit the constitutions—the constitutions must not be made to suit the laws; for a constitution is the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the mode of their distribution and to the question what is the sovereign power in the state and what is the object of each community, but laws are distinct from the principles of the constitution, and regulate how the magistrates are to govern and to guard against those who transgress them.

χρὴ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν ἧς ῥᾳδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν ἢ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· διὸ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἔστιν εἴδη. νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴονταί τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀληθές. ὥστε δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν, πόσαι, καὶ συντίθενται ποσαχῶς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἑκάστῃ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἁρμόττοντας. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν· νόμοι δʼ οἱ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολιτείαν, καθʼ οὓς δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἄρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς.

So that clearly it is necessary to be in possession of the different varieties of each form of constitution, and the number of these, even for the purpose of legislation; for it is impossible for the same laws to be expedient for all oligarchies or democracies if there are really several kinds of them, and not one sort of democracy or oligarchy only. And inasmuch as in our first inquiry about the forms of the constitution we classified the right constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and constitutional government, and the deviations from these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from constitutional government, and about aristocracy and kingship we have spoken (for to study the best constitution is the same thing as to speak about the forms that bear those names, since each of them means a system based on the qualification of virtue equipped with means), and as also the question what constitutes the difference between aristocracy and kingship and when a royal government is to be adopted has been decided before, it remains to discuss the form of constitution designated by the name common to them all, and the other forms, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Now it is manifest also which of these deviations is the worst and which the second worst. For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine must be the worst, and kingship must of necessity either possess the name only, without really being kingship, or be based on the outstanding superiority of the man who is king; so that tyranny being the worst form must be the one farthest removed from constitutional government, and oligarchy must be the second farthest (for aristocracy is widely separated from that constitution), while democracy must be the most moderate.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους συμφέρειν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἴπερ δὴ πλείους καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία μόνον ἔστιν. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων· βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα κατʼ ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία, καὶ πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευομένης ὀνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων τίς χειρίστη καὶ δευτέρα τίς. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστην, τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ οὖσαν, ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος·

An account of their relative merits has indeed already been given also by one of the former writers, though not on the same principle as ours; for he inclined to judge that there were good varieties of all the forms, for instance a good sort of oligarchy and so on, and that democracy was the worst among these, but the best among the bad varieties, whereas we say that the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not right to speak of one form of oligarchy as better than another, but only as less bad. But let us for the present dismiss the question of a classification of this nature. Our business is first to distinguish how many different forms of the constitutions there are, assuming that there do exist several kinds of democracy and of oligarchy; next, which form is most general, and which most desirable after the best constitution, and also if there exists some other form that is aristocratic in nature and well constructed but not fitted to the largest number of cities, which this is; next, which of the other forms too is desirable for what people (since probably for some democracy is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others oligarchy more than democracy);

ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτημένας εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν λέγειν, ἧττον δὲ φαύλην. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρίσεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλʼ οὐ ταῖς πλείσταις ἁρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἐστιν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημοκρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δʼ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθʼ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας·

and after this, in what way should one proceed who wishes to set up these constitutions, I mean the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy; and finally, when as far as possible we have concisely touched upon all these questions, we must endeavor to review what are the agencies that destroy and what are those that preserve constitutions generally and each variety of constitution in particular, and what are the causes by which it is most natural for these events to be brought about. Now the reason of there being several forms of constitution is that every city has a considerable number of parts. For in the first place we see that all the cities are composed of households, and then again that of this multitude some must necessarily be rich and some poor and some between the two, and also of the rich and the poor the former class is heavy-armed and the latter without armor. And we see that one portion of the common people is agricultural, another engaged in trade and another mechanic. And the upper classes have distinctions also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts of their property (for example in a stud of horses—for it is not easy to rear horses without being rich, and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies in all the states whose strength lay in their cavalry, and they used to use horses for their wars against their neighbors, as for instance did the Eretrians and Chalcidians and the people of Magnesia on the Maeander and many of the other Asiatic peoples). Moreover in addition to differences in wealth there is the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue, and indeed any other similar distinction that in the discussion of aristocracy has been stated to constitute a part of the state (for there we distinguished how many necessary parts there are of which every state must consist); for sometimes all of these parts participate in the constitution and sometimes a smaller or a larger number ofthem.

τέλος δέ, πάντων τούτων ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν. τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἴτιον ὅτι πάσης ἔστι μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκιῶν συγκειμένας πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις, ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δʼ ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὁπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τὸν δʼ ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ἱπποτροφίας (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν· ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας, οἷον Ἐρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν)· ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ κατʼ ἀρετήν, κἂν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν·

It is clear therefore that there must necessarily be several forms of constitution differing in kind from one another, inasmuch as these parts differ in kind among themselves. For a constitution means the arrangement of the magistracies, and this all people plan out either according to the power of those who share political rights, or according to some common equality between them, I mean for example between the poor or between the rich, or some equality common to them both. It follows therefore that there are as many forms of constitution as there are modes of arrangement according to the superiorities and the differences of the sections. But the forms mostly are thought to be two—just as in the case of the winds we speak of some as north and some as south and regard the rest as deviations from these, so also of constitutions there are held to be two forms, democracy and oligarchy; for men reckon aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy because it is oligarchy of a sort, and what is called constitutional government as democracy, just as in the case of the winds they reckon the west wind as a kind of north wind and the east wind as a kind of south wind.

ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις· τούτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πάντα μετέχει τῆς πολιτείας ὁτὲ δʼ ἐλάττω ὁτὲ δὲ πλείω. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτʼ εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστί, ταύτας δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἢ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατά τινʼ αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινήν, λέγω δʼ οἷον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων ἢ κοινήν τινʼ ἀμφοῖν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων. μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. τὴν γὰρ ἀριστοκρατίαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος τιθέασιν ὡς οὖσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν τινά, καὶ τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον. ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας, ὥς φασί τινες·

And the case is similar with musical modes, as some people say: for there too they posit two kinds, the Dorian mode and the Phrygian, and call the other scales some of them Dorian and the others Phrygian. For the most part therefore they are accustomed to think in this way about the constitutions; but it is truer and better to class them as we did, and assuming that there are two well-constructed forms, or else one, to say that the others are deviations, some from the well-blended constitution and the others from the best one, the more tense and masterful constitutions being oligarchic and the relaxed and soft ones demotic. But it is not right to define democracy, as some people are in the custom of doing now, merely as the constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for even in oligarchies and everywhere the majority is sovereign) nor oligarchy as the constitution in which a few are sovereign over the government. For if the whole number were thirteen hundred, and a thousand of these were rich and did not give the three hundred poor a share in the government although they were free-born and like themselves in all other respects, no one would say that this people was governed democratically; and similarly also if there were few poor, but these more powerful than the rich who were more numerous, no one would call such a government a democracy either, if the other citizens being rich had no share in the honors. Rather therefore ought we to say that it is a democracy when the free are sovereign and an oligarchy when the rich are, but that it comes about that the sovereign class in a democracy is numerous and that in an oligarchy small because there are many men of free birth and few rich.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται εἴδη δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ τὴν φρυγιστί, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δώρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν εἰώθασιν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν· ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, δυοῖν ἢ μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης [ἁρμονίασ?] τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δʼ ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς. οὐ δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ εἰώθασί τινες νῦν, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὅπου κύριον τὸ πλῆθος (καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλέον μέρος κύριον), οὐδʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου κύριοι ὀλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ εἴησαν οἱ πάντες χίλιοι καὶ τριακόσιοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ χίλιοι πλούσιοι, καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἀρχῆς τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν ἐλευθέροις οὖσι καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοίοις, οὐθεὶς ἂν φαίη δημοκρατεῖσθαι τούτους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πένητες ὀλίγοι μὲν εἶεν, κρείττους δὲ τῶν εὐπόρων πλειόνων ὄντων, οὐδεὶς ἂν ὀλιγαρχίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην, εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὖσι πλουσίοις μὴ μετείη τῶν τιμῶν. μᾶλλον τοίνυν λεκτέον ὅτι δῆμος μέν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους·

For otherwise, suppose people assigned the offices by height, as some persons say is done in Ethiopia, or by beauty, that would be an oligarchy, because both the handsome and the tall are few in number. Nevertheless it is not enough to define these constitutions even by wealth and free birth only; but inasmuch as there are more elements than one both in democracy and in oligarchy, we must add the further distinction that neither is it a democracy if the free being few govern the majority who are not of free birth, as for instance at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and at Thera (for in each of these cities the offices of honor were filled by the specially noble families who had been the first settlers of the colonies, and these were few out of many), nor is it a democracy if the rich rule because they are in a majority, as in ancient times at Colophon (for there the majority of the population owned large property before the war against the Lydians took place), but it is a democracy when those who are free are in the majority and have sovereignty over the government, and an oligarchy when the rich and more well born are few and sovereign.

ἐλεύθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δʼ ὀλίγοι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασί τινες, ἢ κατὰ κάλλος, ὀλιγαρχία ἦν ἄν· ὀλίγον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν μεγάλων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον ἱκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι τὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰσίν, ἔτι διαληπτέον ὡς οὔτʼ ἂν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἄρχωσι, δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ (ἐν τούτων γὰρ ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἦσαν οἱ διαφέροντες κατʼ εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας, ὀλίγοι ὄντες, πολλῶν), οὔτε ἂν οἱ πλούσιοι διὰ τὸ κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Κολοφῶνι τὸ παλαιόν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο μακρὰν οὐσίαν οἱ πλείους πρὶν γενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδούς), ἀλλʼ ἔστι δημοκρατία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες.

It has then been stated that there are several forms of constitution, and what is the cause of this; but let us take the starting-point that was laid down before and say that there are more forms than those mentioned, and what these forms are, and why they vary. For we agree that every state possesses not one part but several. Therefore just as, in case we intended to obtain a classification of animals, we should first define the properties necessarily belonging to every animal (for instance some of the sense organs, and the machinery for masticating and for receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and in addition to these the locomotive organs of the various species), and if there were only so many necessary parts, but there were different varieties of these (I mean for instance certain various kinds of mouth and stomach and sensory organs, and also of the locomotive parts as well), the number of possible combinations of these variations will necessarily produce a variety of kinds of animals (for it is not possible for the same animal to have several different sorts of mouth, nor similarly of ears either), so that when all the possible combinations of these are taken they will all produce animal species, and there will be as many species of the animal as there are combinations of the necessary parts:— so in the same way also we shall classify the varieties of the constitutions that have been mentioned. For states also are composed not of one but of several parts, as has been said often. One of these parts therefore is the mass of persons concerned with food who are called farmers,

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προῃρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἴδη, πρῶτον ἂν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ἅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῷον (οἷον ἔνιά τε τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικόν, οἷον στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις ἕκαστον αὐτῶν)· εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα εἴη μόνον, τούτων δʼ εἶεν διαφοραί (λέγω δʼ οἷον στόματός τινα πλείω γένη καὶ κοιλίας καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων), ὁ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζῴων (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδʼ ὤτων), ὥσθʼ ὅταν ληφθῶσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἴδη ζῴου, καὶ τοσαῦτʼ εἴδη τοῦ ζῴου ὅσαι περ αἱ συζεύξεις τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν—τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μερῶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις. ἓν μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυσον (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι·

and second is what is called the mechanic class (and this is the group engaged in the arts without which it is impossible for a city to be inhabited, and some of these arts are indispensably necessary, while others contribute to luxury or noble living), and third is a commercial class (by which I mean the class that is engaged in selling and buying and in wholesale and retail trade), and fourth is the class of manual laborers, and the fifth class is the one to defend the state in war, which is no less indispensable than the others if the people are not to become the slaves of those who come against them; for surely it is quite out of the question that it should be proper to give the name of state to a community that is by nature a slave, for a state is self-sufficient, but that which is a slave is not self-sufficient. Therefore the statement made in the Republic is witty but not adequate. For Socrates says that the most necessary elements of which a state is composed are four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker and a builder; and then again he adds, on the ground that these are not self-sufficient, a copper-smith and the people to look after the necessary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a retail trader. These elements together constitute the full complement of his first city, implying that every city is formed for the sake of the necessaries of life and not rather for the sake of what is noble, and that it has equal need of both shoemakers and farmers; but the warrior class he does not assign to it until as the territory is increased and comes into contact with that of the neighbors they are brought into war.

τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ⟨τὸ⟩ ἀγοραῖον (λέγω δʼ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρῖβον), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσον, ὃ τούτων οὐθὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν. μὴ γὰρ ἓν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ᾖ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δούλην· αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὔταρκες. διόπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλιν συγκεῖσθαι, λέγει δὲ τούτους ὑφάντην καὶ γεωργὸν καὶ σκυτοτόμον καὶ οἰκοδόμον· πάλιν δὲ προστίθησιν, ὡς οὐκ αὐτάρκων τούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις βοσκήμασιν, ἔτι δʼ ἔμπορόν τε καὶ κάπηλον· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι μέρος πρὶν ἢ τῆς χώρας αὐξομένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίον ἁπτομένης εἰς πόλεμον καταστῶσιν.

But yet even among the four partners or whatever their number be there must necessarily be somebody to assign justice and to judge their claims; inasmuch therefore as one would count the soul of an animal to be more a part of it than the body, so also the factors in states corresponding to the soul must be deemed to be parts of them more than those factors which contribute to necessary utility,—the former being the military class and the class that plays a part in judicial justice, and in addition to these the deliberative class, deliberation being a function of political intelligence. And it makes no difference to the argument whether these functions are held by special classes separately or by the same persons; for it often happens for the same men to be both soldiers and farmers. Hence inasmuch as both groups of classes must be counted parts of the state, it is clear that the heavy-armed soldiery at any rate must be a part of the state. And a seventh class is the one that serves the community by means of its property, the class that we call the rich. And an eighth is the class of public servants, that is, those who serve in the magistracies, inasmuch as without rulers it is impossible for a city to exist; it is therefore necessary that there should be some men who are able to govern and who render this service to the state either continuously or in turn. And there remain the classes which we happen to have defined just before, the deliberative class and the one that judges the claims of litigants. If therefore it is proper for the states to have these functions performed, and well and justly performed, it is necessary for there also to be some men possessing virtue in the form of political excellence.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι καὶ τοῖς ὁποσοισοῦν κοινωνοῖς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα τὸν ἀποδώσοντα καὶ κρινοῦντα τὸ δίκαιον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ψυχὴν ἄν τις θείη ζῴου μόριον μᾶλλον ἢ σῶμα, καὶ πόλεων τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον θετέον τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντεινόντων, τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ βουλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. καὶ ταῦτʼ εἴτε κεχωρισμένως ὑπάρχει τισὶν εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ ὁπλιτεύειν καὶ γεωργεῖν συμβαίνει τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολλάκις. ὥστε εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα θετέα μόρια τῆς πόλεως, φανερὸν ὅτι τό γε ὁπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μόριον τῆς πόλεως. ἕβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὃ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους. ὄγδοον δὲ τὸ δημιουργικὸν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν, εἴπερ ἄνευ ἀρχόντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν εἶναί τινας τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν καὶ λειτουργοῦντας ἢ συνεχῶς ἢ κατὰ μέρος τῇ πόλει ταύτην τὴν λειτουργίαν. λοιπὰ δὲ περὶ ὧν τυγχάνομεν διωρικότες ἀρτίως, τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. εἴπερ οὖν ταῦτα δεῖ γινέσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ καλῶς γενέσθαι καὶ δικαίως, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναί τινας ἀρετῆς τῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν.

Now as to the other capacities many people think that it is possible for them to be possessed in combination, for example, for the same men to be the soldiers that defend the state in war and the farmers that till the land and the artisans, and also the councillors and judges, and indeed all men claim to possess virtue and think themselves capable of filling most of the offices of state; but it is not possible for the same men to be poor and rich. Hence these seem to be in the fullest sense the parts of the state, the rich and the poor. And also the fact that the rich are usually few and the poor many makes these two among the parts of the state appear as opposite sections; so that the superior claims of these classes are even made the guiding principles upon which constitutions are constructed, and it is thought that there are two forms of constitution, democracy and oligarchy. That there are then several forms of constitution, and what are the reasons for this, has been stated before; let us now say that there are several varieties both of democracy and of oligarchy. And this is clear even from what has been said already. For there are several classes both of the people and of those called the notables; for instance classes of the people are, one the farmers, another the class dealing with the arts and crafts, another the commercial class

τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἷον τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχνίτας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς βουλευομένους τε καὶ κρίνοντας· ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες, καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι· ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὔποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσι πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅτι δὲ ἔστι καὶ δημοκρατίας εἴδη πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, λέγωμεν. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἴδη γὰρ πλείω τοῦ τε δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγομένων γνωρίμων ἔστιν, οἷον δήμου μὲν εἴδη ἓν μὲν οἱ γεωργοί, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ ὠνὴν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρῖβον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν τὸ δὲ πορθμευτικὸν τὸ δʼ ἁλιευτικόν (πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἕκαστα τούτων πολύοχλα, οἷον ἁλιεῖς μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ, τριηρικὸν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν, ἐμπορικὸν δὲ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ καὶ Χίῳ, πορθμευτικὸν δʼ ἐν Τενέδῳ), πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ χερνητικὸν καὶ τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων [πολιτῶν] ἐλεύθερον, κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον πλήθους εἶδος·

occupied in buying and selling and another the one occupied with the sea—and this is divided into the classes concerned with naval warfare, with trade, with ferrying passengers and with fishing (for each of these classes is extremely numerous in various places, for instance fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, navy men at Athens, the mercantile class at Aegina and Chios, and the ferryman-class at Tenedos), and in addition to these the hand-working class and the people possessing little substance so that they cannot live a life of leisure, also those that are not free men of citizen parentage on both sides, and any other similar class of common people; while among the notables wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions that are spoken of in the same group as these, form the classes. The first kind of democracy therefore is the one which receives the name chiefly in respect of equality. For the law of this sort of democracy ascribes equality to the state of things in which the poor have no more prominence than the rich, and neither class is sovereign, but both are alike; for assuming that freedom is chiefly found in a democracy, as some persons suppose, and also equality, this would be so most fully when to the fullest extent all alike share equally in the government. And since the people are in the majority, and a resolution passed by a majority is paramount, this must necessarily be a democracy. This therefore is one kind of democracy, where the offices are held on property qualifications, but these low ones, although it is essential that the man who acquires the specified amount should have the right to hold office, and the man who loses it should not hold office.

τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος εὐγένεια ἀρετὴ παιδεία καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν. δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπερέχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὁποτερουσοῦν, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίους ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστʼ ἔστιν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούτων ἁπάντων μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας τοῦτο, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἴναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὄντων· δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ μετέχειν·

And another kind of democracy is for all the citizens that are not open to challenge to have a share in office, but for the law to rule; and another kind of democracy is for all to share in the offices on the mere qualification of being a citizen, but for the law to rule. Another kind of democracy is where all the other regulations are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not the law; and this comes about when the decrees of the assembly over-ride the law. This state of things is brought about by the demagogues; for in the states under democratic government guided by law a demagogue does not arise, but the best classes of citizens are in the most prominent position; but where the laws are not sovereign, then demagogues arise; for the common people become a single composite monarch, since the many are sovereign not as individuals but collectively. Yet what kind of democracy Homer means by the words “no blessing is the lordship of the many”—whether he means this kind or when those who rule as individuals are more numerous, is not clear. However, a people of this sort, as being monarch, seeks to exercise monarchic rule through not being ruled by the law, and becomes despotic, so that flatterers are held in honor. And a democracy of this nature is comparable to the tyrannical form of monarchy, because their spirit is the same, and both exercise despotic control over the better classes, and the decrees voted by the assembly are like the commands issued in a tyranny, and the demagogues and the flatterers are the same people or a corresponding class, and either set has the very strongest influence with the respective ruling power, the flatterers with the tyrants and the demagogues with democracies of this kind.

ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ παντὶ μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τἆλλα μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, κύριον δʼ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλʼ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δʼ οἱ νόμοι μή εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος, ἄδηλον. ὁ δʼ οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὤν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διότι καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄμφω δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον.

And these men cause the resolutions of the assembly to be supreme and not the laws, by referring all things to the people; for they owe their rise to greatness to the fact that the people is sovereign over all things while they are sovereign over the opinion of the people, for the multitude believes them. Moreover those who bring charges against the magistrates say that the people ought to judge the suits, and the people receive the invitation gladly, so that all the magistracies are put down. And it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that such a democracy is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not govern there is no constitution, as the law ought togovern all things while the magistrates control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be constitutional government; if then democracy really is one of the forms of constitution, it is manifest that an organization of this kind, in which all things are administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the proper sense, for it is impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal rule. Let this be our discussion of the different kinds of democracy. Of the kinds of oligarchy, one is for the magistracies to be appointed from property-assessments so high that the poor who are the majority have no share in the government, but for the man who acquires the requisite amount of property to be allowed to take part in it;

καὶ μάλιστα δʼ ἑκάτεροι παρʼ ἑκατέροις ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ παρὰ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. αἴτιοι δέ εἰσι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους οὗτοι, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλοις διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δῆμον πάντων εἶναι κύριον, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δήμου δόξης τούτους· πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις. ἔτι δʼ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν, ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί. εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων τῶν δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ ταύτην πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερὸν ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἴδη ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν, πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, ἄλλο δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτʼ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν)·

another is when the magistracies are filled from high assessments and the magistrates themselves elect to fill vacancies (so that if they do so from all the citizens of this assessment, this appears rather to be of the nature of an aristocracy, but if from a particular section of them, it is oligarchical); another variety of oligarchy is when son succeeds father in office; and a fourth kind is when the hereditary system just mentioned exists and also the magistrates govern and not the law. This among oligarchies is the form corresponding to tyranny among monarchies and to the form of democracy about which we spoke last among democracies, and indeed oligarchy of this sort has the special name of dynasty. So many therefore are the kinds of oligarchy and of democracy; butit must not escape notice that in many places it has come about that although the constitution as framed by the laws is not democratic, yet owing to custom and the social system it is democratically administered, and similarly by a reverse process in other states although the legal constitution is more democratic, yet by means of the social system and customs it is carried on rather as an oligarchy. This occurs chiefly after alterations of the constitutions have taken place; for the people do not change over to the new system immediately but are content at the first stages to gain small advantages from the other party, so that the previously existing laws continue although power is in the hands of the party that is changing the constitution.

ἕτερον δʼ εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ, τέταρτον δʼ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τε τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλʼ οἱ ἄρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις, καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἴπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν. ὀλιγαρχίας μὲν οὖν εἴδη τοσαῦτα καὶ δημοκρατίας· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρʼ ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δʼ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα μετὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρʼ ἀλλήλων, ὥσθʼ οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες, κρατοῦσι δʼ οἱ μεταβαλόντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

And that these various kinds of democracy and oligarchy exist ismanifest from the actual things that have been said. For necessarily either all the parts of the population that have been mentioned must have a share in the government, or some and not others. When therefore the farmer class and the class possessed of moderate property is sovereign over the government, they govern according to laws; for they have a livelihood if they work, but are not able to be at leisure, so that they put the law in control and hold the minimum of assemblies necessary; and the other persons have the right to take part when they have acquired the property-assessment fixed by the laws, so that to take part in the government is open to all who have got that amount of property; since for it not to be open to everybody on any terms at all is a characteristic of oligarchy, but then on the other hand it is impossible for it to be open to them to have leisure if there are no revenues. This then is one kind of democracy for these reasons. Another kind is due to the distinction that comes next: it is possible that all the citizens not liable to objection on the score of birth may have the right to take part in the assembly, but may actually take part only when they are able to be at leisure; hence in a democracy of this nature the laws govern because there is no revenue. A third kind is when all those who are free men have the right to take part in the government yet do not do so because of the aforesaid reason, so that it follows that in this form of democracy also the law governs.

ὅτι δʼ ἔστι τοσαῦτα εἴδη δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη τοῦ δήμου κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν κύριον ᾖ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους (ἔχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὥστε τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας), τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν ὅταν κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων· διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν· ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἓν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν· διόπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δημοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόμοι ἄρχουσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον. τρίτον δʼ εἶδος τὸ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι, ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι, μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν, ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον. τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη.