---
title: "Rhetoric · Ῥητορική"
author: "Aristotle"
translator: "John Henry Freese"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 11 of 12
url: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/11/
cite: "Aristotle, tr. John Henry Freese, Rhetoric · Ῥητορική, section 11. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/11/"
---

# Rhetoric · Ῥητορική

*Aristotle, tr. John Henry Freese*

The art of persuasion: argument, character, and the emotions of the audience.

> Greek: ed. William David Ross, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0086.tlg038, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: John Henry Freese, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 11. Book III · chapters 8–13

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/11/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/11/#p-N

[¶0] 8.5. All the other meters then are to be disregarded for the reasons stated, and also because they are metrical; but the paean should be retained, because it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned which is not adapted to a metrical system, so that it is most likely to be undetected.

> Greek: 8.5. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι, καὶ διότι μετρικοί· ὁ δὲ παιὰν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι μέτρον τῶν ῥηθέντων ῥυθμῶν, ὥστε μάλιστα λανθάνειν.

[¶1] 8.6. At the present day one kind of paean alone is employed, at the beginning as well as at the end; the end, however, ought to differ from the beginning. Now there are two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The one is appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it is used. It begins with a long syllable and ends with three short:
Δα¯λο˘γε˘νε˘ς εἴτε Λυ˘κι˘αν, (“O Delos-born, or it may be Lycia”),
and
Χρυ¯σε˘ο˘κό˘μα¯ Ἕ˘κα˘τε˘ παῖ Διό˘ς (“Golden-haired far-darter, son of Zeus”).
The other on the contrary begins with three short syllables and ends with one long one:
με˘τὰ˘ δε˘ γᾶν ὕ˘δα˘τά˘ τ’ ὠκε˘α˘νὸν ἠφά˘νι˘σε˘νύξ (“after earth and waters, night obscured ocean”).
This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being incomplete, mutilates the cadence. But the period should be broken off by a long syllable and the end should be clearly marked, not by the scribe nor by a punctuation mark, but by the rhythm itself.

> Greek: 8.6. νῦν μὲν οὖν χρῶνται τῷ ἑνὶ παιᾶνι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι ⟨καὶ τελευτῶντες⟩, δεῖ δὲ διαφέρειν τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἔστιν δὲ παιᾶνος δύο εἴδη ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἓν ἀρχῇ ἁρμόττει, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶνται· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν οὗ ἄρχει μὲν ἡ μακρά, τελευτῶσιν δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαι,
Δαλογενὲς εἴτε Λυκίαν,
καὶ
Χρυσεοκόμα Ἕκατε παῖ Διός· ἕτερος δʼ ἐξ ἐναντίας, οὗ βραχεῖαι ἄρχουσιν τρεῖς, ἡ δὲ μακρὰ τελευταία·
μετὰ δὲ γᾶν ὕδατά τʼ ὠκεανὸν ἠφάνισε νύξ.
οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ· ἡ γὰρ βραχεῖα διὰ τὸ ἀτελὴς εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβόν.

[¶2] 8.7. That the style should be rhythmical and not unrhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrangement of them make it of this character, has now been sufficiently shown.

> Greek: 8.7. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι, καὶ δήλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτὴν μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ῥυθμόν.

[¶3] 9.1. The style must be either continuous and united by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic preludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The continuous style is the ancient one; for example, “This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus of Thurii.”

> Greek: 9.1. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὔρυθμον δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὔρυθμον ποιοῦσι ῥυθμοὶ καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴρηται· τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ εἰρομένην καὶ τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν τοῖς διθυράμβοις ἀναβολαί, ἢ κατεστραμμένην καὶ ὁμοίαν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις.

[¶4] 9.2. It was formerly used by all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous style I mean that which has no end in itself and only stops when the sense is complete. It is unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in sight. That explains why runners, just when they have reached the goal, lose their breath and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show no signs of fatigue.

> Greek: 9.2. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν [Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἥδʼ ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις] (ταύτῃ γὰρ πρότερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται)· λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην ἣ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθʼ αὑτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα ⟨τὸ⟩ λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὴς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτῆρσιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον.

[¶5] 9.3. Such is the continuous style. The other style consists of periods, and by period I mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped. What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that which is unlimited, because the hearer at every moment thinks he is securing something for himself and that some conclusion has been reached; whereas it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end of anything. It is easy to learn, because it can be easily retained in the memory. The reason is that the periodic style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember; that explains why all learn verse with greater facility than prose, for it has number by which it can be measured.

> Greek: 9.3. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη [τῆς λέξεώς] ἐστιν ἥδε, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθʼ αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἡδεῖα δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής, ἡδεῖα μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι ἀεί τὶ οἴεται ἔχειν ὁ ἀκροατὴς καὶ πεπερθ́νθαι τι αὑτῷ, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν προνοεῖν μηδὲ ἀνύειν ἀηδές· εὐμαθὴς δὲ ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις, ὃ πάντων εὐμνημονευτότατον. διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μνημονεύουσιν μᾶλλον τῶν χύδην· ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει ᾧ μετρεῖται.

[¶6] 9.4. But the period must be completed with the sense and not stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,
This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops;
for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose the contrary of the fact, as in the example, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

> Greek: 9.4. δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον †καὶ τῇ διανοία† τετελειῶσθαι, καὶ μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἰαμβεῖα,
Καλυδὼνμὲν ἥδε γαῖα· Πελοπίας χθονός·
τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

[¶7] 9.5. A period may be composed of clauses, or simple. The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its parts and easy to repeat in a breath, not divided like the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when it is taken as a whole. By clause I mean one of the two parts of this period, and by a simple period one that consists of only one clause.

> Greek: 9.5. περίοδος δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν κώλοις ἡ δʼ ἀφελής. ἔστιν δʼ ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διῃρημένη καὶ εὐανάπνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει †ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περίοδος,† ἀλλʼ ὅλη (κῶλον δʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον μόριον ταύτης)· ἀφελῆ δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον.

[¶8] 9.6. But neither clauses nor periods should be curtailed or too long. If too short, they often make the hearer stumble; for when he is hurrying on towards the measure of which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked by the speaker stopping, a sort of stumble is bound to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. If too long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do not turn till past the ordinary limit leave behind those who are walking with them. Similarly long periods assume the proportions of a speech and resemble dithyrambic preludes. This gives rise to what Democritus of Chios jokingly rebuked in Melanippides, who instead of antistrophes composed dithyrambic preludes:
A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another, and a long prelude is most deadly to one who composes it;
for these verses may be applied to those who employ long clauses. Again, if the clauses are too short, they do not make a period, so that the hearer himself is carried away headlong.

> Greek: 9.6. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μυούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὅταν, ἔτι ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον οὗ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅρον, ἀντισπασθῇ παυσαμένου, οἷον πρόσπταισιν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν)· τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὖσαι λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολῇ ὅμοιον, ὥστε γίνεται ὃ ἔσκωψεν Δημόκριτος ὁ Χῖος εἰς Μελανιππίδην ποιήσαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς
οἷ τʼ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων,
ἡ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη·
ἁρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τὰς μακροκώλους λέγειν. αἵ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίνεται· προπετῆ οὖν ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατήν.

[¶9] 9.7. The clauses of the periodic style are divided or opposed; divided, as in the following sentence: “I have often wondered at those who gathered together the general assemblies and instituted the gymnastic contests”; opposed, in which, in each of the two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another, or the same word is coupled with both contraries; for instance, “They were useful to both, both those who stayed and those who followed; for the latter they gained in addition greater possessions than they had at home, for the former they left what was sufficient in their own country.” Here “staying behind,” “following,” “sufficient,” “more” are contraries. Again: “to those who need money and those who wish to enjoy it”; where “enjoying” is contrary to “acquiring.” Again: “It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are unsuccessful, while fools succeed”: “At once they were deemed worthy of the prize of valor and not long after won the command of the sea”: “To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the sea, bridging over the Hellespont and digging through Athos”: “And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights of citizenship by law”: “For some of them perished miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully”: “Privately to employ barbarians as servants, but publicly to view with indifference many of the allies reduced to slavery”: “Either to possess it while living or to leave it behind when dead.” And what some one said against Pitholaus and Lycophron in the lawcourt: “These men, who used to sell you when they were at home, having come to you have bought you.” All these passages are examples of antithesis.

> Greek: 9.7. τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἡ μὲν διῃρημένη ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἀντικειμένη, διῃρημένη μὲν, οἷον πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων, ἀντικειμένη δέ, ἐν ᾗ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κώλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταὐτὸ ἐπέζευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἷον ἀμφοτέρους δʼ ὤνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείω τῆς οἴκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δʼ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον· ἐναντία ὑπομονὴ ἀκολούθησις, ἱκανὸν πλεῖον. ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις· ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν. εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἠξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον. πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δʼ Ἄθω διορύξας. καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δʼ αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν. καὶ ἰδίᾳ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας. ἢ ζῶντας ἕξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν. καὶ ὃ εἰς Πειθόλαόν τις εἶπεν καὶ Λυκόφρονα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, οὗτοι δʼ ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν, ἐλθόντες δʼ ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώνηνται. ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον.

[¶10] 9.8. This kind of style is pleasing, because contraries are easily understood and even more so when placed side by side, and also because antithesis resembles a syllogism; for refutation is a bringing together of contraries.

> Greek: 9.8. ἡδεῖα δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, ὅτι τἀναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρʼ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικεν συλλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν.

[¶11] 9.9. Such then is the nature of antithesis; equality of clauses is parisosis; the similarity of the final syllables of each clause paromoiosis. This must take place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At the beginning the similarity is always shown in entire words; at the end, in the last syllables, or the inflections of one and the same word, or the repetition of the same word. For instance, at the beginning: Ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ, “for he received from him land untilled”;
δωρητοί τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν, “they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words;”
at the end: ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι, “they thought that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it”; ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν, “in the greatest anxiety and the smallest hopes.” Inflections of the same word: ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ, “worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass farthing.” Repetition of a word: σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς, “while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of him.” Resemblance of one syllable: τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ’ εἶδες ἀργόν, “what ill would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man?” All these figures may be found in the same sentence at once— antithesis, equality of clauses, and similarity of endings. In the Theodectea nearly all the beginnings of periods have been enumerated.

> Greek: 9.9. ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστίν, παρίσωσις δʼ ἐὰν ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δὲ ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχῃ ἑκάτερον τὸ κῶλον· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἔχειν, καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ δὲ τελευτῆς τὰς ἐσχάτας συλλαβὰς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα· ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρʼ αὐτοῦ,
δωρητοί τʼ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τʼ ἐπέεσσιν·
ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δέ ᾠήθης ἂν αὐτὸν ⟨οὐ⟩ παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν παιδίον γεγονέναι, ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν. πτώσεις δὲ ταὐτοῦ ἀξιοῖ δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ; ταὐτὸ δʼ ὄνομα σὺ δʼ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς. ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δέ τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρʼ εἶδες ἀργόν; ἔστιν δὲ ἅμα πάντα ἔχειν ταὐτό, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάρισον καὶ ὁμοιοτέλευτον. αἱ δʼ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται.

[¶12] 9.10. There are also false antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus:
τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών, “at one time I was in their house, at another I was with them.”

> Greek: 9.10. εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει,
τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών.

[¶13] 10.1. Having settled these questions, we must next state the sources of smart and popular sayings. They are produced either by natural genius or by practice; to show what they are is the function of this inquiry.

> Greek: 10.1. ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν τοῦ εὐφυοῦς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

[¶14] 10.2. Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them, and let our starting-point be the following. Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean something, so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant. Now we do not know the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we know already. It is metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect; for when Homer calls old age stubble, he teaches and informs us through the genus; for both have lost their bloom.

> Greek: 10.2. εἴπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα· ἀρχὴ δʼ ἔστω ἡμῖν αὕτη. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνῶτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν· ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησεν μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα.

[¶15] 10.3. The similes of the poets also have the same effect; wherefore, if they are well constructed, an impression of smartness is produced. For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word, wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer; it does not say that this is that, so that the mind does not even examine this.

> Greek: 10.3. ποιοῦσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτό· διόπερ ἂν εὖ, ἀστεῖον φαίνεται. ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ εἰκών, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προθέσει· διὸ ἧττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή.

[¶16] 10.4. Of necessity, therefore, all style and enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only those which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which the meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later; for from the latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the other.

> Greek: 10.4. ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταῦτʼ εἶναι ἀστεῖα ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχεῖαν· διὸ οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι), οὔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἀλλʼ ὅσων ἢ ἅμα λεγομένων ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ μικρὸν ὑστερίζει ἡ διάνοια· γίγνεται γὰρ οἷον μάθησις, ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδετέρου.

[¶17] 10.5. In regard to the meaning of what is said, then, such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popularity of form is due to antithetical statement; for instance, “accounting the peace that all shared to be a war against their private interests,” where “war” is opposed to “peace”;

> Greek: 10.5. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται, οἷον καὶ τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς αὑτῶν ἰδίοις πόλεμον· ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ·

[¶18] 10.6. as to words, they are popular if they contain metaphor, provided it be neither strange, for then it is difficult to take in at a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer; further, if they set things “before the eyes”; for we ought to see what is being done rather than what is going to be done. We ought therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.

> Greek: 10.6. τοῖς δʼ ὀνόμασιν, ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην μήτʼ ἀλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν, μήτʼ ἐπιπόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἔτι εἰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ [τὰ] πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας.

[¶19] 10.7. Of the four kinds of metaphor the most popular are those based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that the youth that had perished during the war had disappeared from the State as if the year had lost its springtime. Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not let the Athenians stand by and see Greece deprived of one of her eyes. When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the Olynthian war examined, Cephisodotus indignantly exclaimed that, now he had the people by the throat, he was trying to get his accounts examined; on another occasion also he exhorted the Athenians to set out for Euboea without delay “and provision themselves there, like the decree of Miltiades.” After the Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared “that they had deprived themselves of provisions for the war.” Pitholaus called the Paralus “the bludgeon of the people,” and Sestos “the corn-chest of the Piraeus.” Pericles recommended that Aegina, “the eyesore of the Piraeus,” should be removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very “respectable” person by name, declared that he was as much a scoundrel as himself; for whereas that honest man played the scoundrel at 33 per cent. he himself was satisfied with 10 per cent. And the iambic of Anaxandrides, on girls who were slow to marry,
My daughters are “past the time” of marriage.
And the saying of Polyeuctus upon a certain paralytic named Speusippus, “that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound him in a five-holed pillory of disease.” Cephisodotus called the triremes “parti-colored mills,” and [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the taverns were “the messes” of Attica. Aesion used to say that they had “drained” the State into Sicily, which is a metaphor and sets the thing before the eyes. His words “so that Greece uttered a cry” are also in a manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold their “concourses” too often; and in the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those “who rush together” in the assemblies. And as Lysias says in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom was buried along with their valor. If the speaker had said that it was fitting that Greece should weep, her valor being buried with them, it would have been a metaphor and a vivid one, whereas “freedom” by the side of “valor” produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, “The path of my words leads through the center of the deeds of Chares”; here the metaphor is proportional and the words “through the center” create vividness. Also, to say that one “calls upon dangers to help against dangers” is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of Chabrias said, “not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his statue of bronze,” a metaphor for the moment, not for all time, but still vivid; for when Chabrias is in danger, the statue intercedes for him, the inanimate becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done for the State. And “in every way studying poorness of spirit,” for “studying” a thing implies to increase it. And that “reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul,” for both the words reason and light make something clear. “For we do not put an end to wars, but put them off,” for both ideas refer to the future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a metaphor to say that such a treaty is “a trophy far more splendid than those gained in war; for the latter are raised in memory of trifling advantages and a single favor of fortune, but the former commemorates the end of the whole war”; for both treaty and trophy are signs of victory. Again, that cities also render a heavy account to the censure of men; for rendering an account is a sort of just punishment.

> Greek: 10.7. τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εὐδοκιμοῦσι μάλιστα αἱ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλοι. καὶ Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἑτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος, σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας δοῦναι περὶ τὸν Ὀλυνθιακὸν πόλεμον, ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων εἰς πνῖγμα τὸν δῆμον ἄγχοντα τὰς εὐθύνας πειρᾶσθαι δοῦναι. καὶ παρακαλῶν ποτὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰς Εὔβοιαν ἐπισιτισαμένους ἔφη δεῖν ἐξιέναι τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἰφικράτης σπεισαμένων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἐπίδαυρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων αὐτοὺς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρῃρῆσθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος τὴν πάραλον ῥόπαλον τοῦ δήμου, Σηστὸν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ Πειραιέως. καὶ Περικλῆς τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε, τὴν λήμην τοῦ Πειραιέως. καὶ Μοιροκλῆς οὐθὲν ἔφη πονηρότερος εἶναι, ὀνομάσας τινὰ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ἐκεῖνον μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρίτων τόκων πονηρεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιδεκάτων. καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου ἰαμβεῖον ὑπὲρ τῶν θυγατέρων πρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐγχρονιζουσῶν
ὑπερήμεροί μοι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι.
καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικόν τινα Σπεύσιππον, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν πεντεσυρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος τὰς τριήρεις ἐκάλει μύλωνας ποικίλους, ὁ Κύων δὲ τὰ καπηλεῖα τὰ Ἀττικὰ φιδίτια· Αἰσίων δέ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν· τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευεν μὴ πολλὰς ποιήσωσιν τὰς συνδρομάς [ἐκκλησίας]. καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρῦσαι συγκαταθαπτομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντίθεσίν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης εἶπεν ἡ γὰρ ὁδός μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν Χάρητι πεπραγμένων ἐστίν μεταφορὰ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὸ διὰ μέσου πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων ⟨καὶ⟩ μεταφορά. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου οὐδὲ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν· μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱκετεύει ἡ εἰκών, τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ ἄψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες· τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὔξειν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι. οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλʼ ἀναβαλλόμεθα· ἄμφω γάρ ἐστιν μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὗται δʼ ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου· ἄμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. καὶ ὅτι αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ εὔθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν.

[¶20] 11.1. We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of “before the eyes,” and what must be done to produce this.

> Greek: 11.1. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνάλογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται· λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο.

[¶21] 11.2. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality. For instance, to say that a good man is “four-square” is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but the phrase does not express actuality, whereas “of one having the prime of his life in full bloom” does; similarly, “thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will” expresses actuality, and in
Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feet
the word “shooting” contains both actuality and metaphor.

> Greek: 11.2. λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει, οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, (ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια), ἀλλʼ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ σὲ δʼ ὥσπερ ἄφετον [ἐλεύθερον] ἐνέργεια, καὶ
⟨τοὐντεῦθεν οὖν⟩ Ἕλληνες ᾄξαντες ποσίν·
τὸ ᾄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά· ταχὺ γὰρ λέγει.

[¶22] 11.3. And as Homer often, by making use of metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate; and it is to creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the following examples:
Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain.
The arrow flew.
[The arrow] eager to fly [towards the crowd].
[The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh.
The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast.. For in all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the objects are represented as animate: “the shameless stone,” “the eager spear-point,” and the rest express actuality. Homer has attached these attributes by the employment of the proportional metaphor; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is shamelessly treated.

> Greek: 11.3. καὶ ὡς κέχρηται πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος, τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε,
αὖτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής,
καὶ
ἔπτατʼ ὀιστός,
καὶ
ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων,
καὶ
ἐν γαίῃ ἵσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἆσαι,
καὶ
αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα.
ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατʼ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον.

[¶23] 11.4. In his popular similes also he proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things:
Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind;
for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality is movement.

> Greek: 11.4. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταὐτά·
κυρτά, φαληριόωντα· πρὸ μέν τʼ ἄλλʼ, αὐτὰρ ἐπʼ ἄλλα·
κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἡ δʼ ἐνέργεια κίνησις.

[¶24] 11.5. As we have said before, metaphors should be drawn from objects which are proper to the object, but not too obvious; just as, for instance, in philosophy it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no difference between an arbitrator and an altar, for the wronged betakes itself to one or the other. Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook hung up were identical; for both are the same sort of thing, but they differ in this—that one is hung up above and the other below. And if one were to say “the cities have been reduced to the same level,” this amounts to the same in the case of things far apart—the equality of “levelling” in regard to superficies and resources.

> Greek: 11.5. δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου, ὥσπερ Ἀρχύτας ἔφη ταὐτὸν εἶναι διαιτητὴν καὶ βωμόν· ἐπʼ ἄμφω γὰρ τὸν ἀδικούμενον καταφεύγειν. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρεμάθραν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἄμφω γὰρ ταὐτό τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῷ ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολὺ διέχουσιν ταὐτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον.

[¶25] 11.6. Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, and also from misleading the hearer beforehand. For it becomes more evident to him that he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to say, “How true it is! but I missed it.” And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that “the grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the ground.” And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls “novel expressions” arise when what follows is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectation; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter; for they are deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance, the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected:
And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains,
whereas the hearer thought he was going to say “sandals.” This kind of joke must be clear from the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara, “you are troubled” ( θράττει); for while pretending to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us; for he means something else. Therefore the joke is only agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it.

> Greek: 11.6. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δῆλον ὅ τι ἔμαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικεν λέγειν ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἥμαρτον. καὶ τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων δὲ τὰ ἀστεῖά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅ φησι λέγειν, οἷον τὸ Στησιχόρου, ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες ἑαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ᾄσονται. καὶ τὰ εὖ ᾐνιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα (μάθησις γάρ ἐστι καὶ μεταφορἄ, καὶ (ὃ λέγει Θεόδωρος) τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ ὅταν παράδοξον ᾖ, καὶ μή, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα (ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· ἐξαπατᾷ γάρ), καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν·
ἔστειχε δʼ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα·
ὁ δʼ ᾤετο πέδιλα ἐρεῖν. τούτου δʼ ἅμα λεγομένου δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὃ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ὃ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου εἰς Νίκωνα τὸν κιθαρῳδὸν θράξει σε, προσποιεῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ Θρᾷξ εἶ σύ καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ· ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει. διὸ μαθόντι ἡδύ, ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνει Θρᾷκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον εἶναι.

[¶26] 11.7. Similarly, “you wish to destroy him ( πέρσαι).” Jokes of both these kinds must be suitably expressed. Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that “the empire of the sea” was not “the beginning of misfortunes” for the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with Isocrates, that “empire” was “the beginning of misfortunes for the city”; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said is said, and recognized as true. For, in the second example, to say that “empire is empire” shows no cleverness, but this is not what he means, but something else; in the first, the ἀρχή which is negatived is used in a different sense.

> Greek: 11.7. καὶ τὸ βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι. δεῖ δὲ ἀμφότερα προσηκόντως λεχθῆναι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, οἷον τὸ φάναι Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾠήθη τις ἐρεῖν, τοῦτʼ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι ἀληθές· τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐθὲν σοφόν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλʼ ἄλλως, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὃ εἶπεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλʼ ἄλλως.

[¶27] 11.8. In all these cases, success is attained when a word is appropriately applied, either by homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable, there is a contradiction of the homonym, which is only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, “Thou shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger,” or “not more than you should be,” which is the same thing. And again,
The stranger must not always be a stranger,
for here too the word repeated is taken in a different sense. It is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides,
It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death;
for this is the same as saying that “it is worthy to die when one does not deserve to die,” or, that “it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death,” or, “when one does nothing that is worthy of death.”

> Greek: 11.8. ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τούτοις, ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ ὁμωνυμίᾳ ἢ μεταφορᾷ, τότε τὸ εὖ. οἷον Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνασχετός ὁμωνυμίᾳ ἀπέφησε, ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἀηδής. καὶ
οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ ξένος·
ξένος ⟨γὰρ⟩ οὐ μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ τὸν ξένον ξένον ἀεὶ εἶναι· ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον,
καλόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον·
ταὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν ἄξιόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ὄντα ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ ἄξιόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανάτου ἄξιον ὄντα, ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια.

[¶28] 11.9. Now the form of expression of these sayings is the same; but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed, the greater is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly.

> Greek: 11.9. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλʼ ὅσῳ ἂν ⟨ἐν⟩ ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσούτῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ θᾶττον γίνεται.

[¶29] 11.10. Further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial, it must always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed; for it is possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance, “One ought to die guiltless of any offence,” “The worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife.” There is no smartness in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are fulfilled: “It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of death.” The more special qualities the expression possesses, the smarter it appears; for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality.

> Greek: 11.10. δεῖ δʼ ἀεὶ προσεῖναι [ἢ] τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται [ἢ] ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον ⟨ἔσται⟩· ἔστιν γὰρ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἔχειν, οἷον ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἁμαρτάνοντα [ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀστεῖον], τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀστεῖον, ἀλλʼ ⟨ἢ⟩ ἐὰν ἅμα ἄμφω ἔχῃ· ἄξιόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν. ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ, τοσούτῳ ἀστειότερον φαίνεται, οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα μεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ καὶ ἀντίθεσις καὶ παρίσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.

[¶30] 11.11. Similes also, as said above, are always in a manner approved metaphors; since they always consist of two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of Ares, and the bow a lyre without strings. But such an expression is not simple, but when we call the bow a lyre, or the shield a goblet, it is.

> Greek: 11.11. εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω, αἱ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά, οἷον ἡ ἀσπίς, φαμέν, ἐστι φιάλη Ἄρεως, καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ τόξον φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δʼ εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἁπλοῦν.

[¶31] 11.12. And similes may be formed as follows: a flute-player resembles an ape, a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp; for in both cases there is contraction.

> Greek: 11.12. καὶ εἰκάζουσιν δὲ οὕτως, οἷον πιθήκῳ αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ [εἰς] μύωπα· ἄμφω γὰρ συνάγεται.

[¶32] 11.13. But they are excellent when there is a proportional metaphor; for it is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of Ares and a ruin to the rag of a house; to say that Niceratus is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of Thrasymachus, when he saw Niceratus, defeated by Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with his hair uncut. It is herein that poets are especially condemned if they fail, but applauded if they succeed. I mean, for instance, when they introduce an answering clause:
He carries his legs twisted like parsley,
or again,
Like Philammon punching the leather sack.
All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has been often said, are metaphors of a kind.

> Greek: 11.13. τὸ δὲ εὖ ἐστὶν ὅταν μεταφορὰ ᾖ· ἔστιν γὰρ εἰκάσαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλῃ Ἄρεως καὶ τὸ ἐρείπιον ῥάκει οἰκίας, καὶ τὸ τὸν Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτήτην εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος, ὥσπερ εἴκασεν Θρασύμαχος ἰδὼν τὸν Νικήρατον ἡττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ῥαψῳδοῦντα, κομῶντα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι. ἐν οἷς μάλιστά τʼ ἐκπίπτουσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν· λέγω δʼ ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν·
ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ.
ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντʼ εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δʼ εἰκόνες ὅτι μεταφοραί, εἴρηται πολλάκις.

[¶33] 11.14. Proverbs also are metaphors from species to species. If a man, for instance, introduces into his house something from which he expects to benefit, but afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as the Carpathian says of the hare; for both have experienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and the reasons which make them so.

> Greek: 11.14. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ μεταφοραὶ ἀπʼ εἴδους ἐπʼ εἶδος εἰσίν· οἷον ἄν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγάγηται, εἶτα βλαβῇ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιός, φασιν, τὸν λαγώ· ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα λέγεται καὶ διότι, σχεδὸν εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον·

[¶34] 11.15. Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, “you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries,” because the black eye is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole. Again, when one says “like this or that” there is a hyperbole differing only in the wording:
Like Philammon punching the leather sack,
or, “you would have thought that he was Philammon fighting the sack”;
Carrying his legs twisted like parsley,
or, “you would have thought that he had no legs, but parsley, they being so twisted.” There is something youthful about hyperboles;

> Greek: 11.15. εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ ⟨αἱ⟩ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι ὑπερβολαὶ μεταφοραί, οἷον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον ᾠήθητε δʼ ἂν αὐτὸν εἶναι συκαμίνων κάλαθον· ἐρυθρὸν γάρ τι τὸ ὑπώπιον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πολὺ σφόδρα. τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ καὶ τὸ ὑπερβολὴ τῇ λέξει διαφέρουσα.
ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ,
ᾠήθης δʼ ἂν αὐτὸν Φιλάμμωνα εἶναι μαχόμενον τῷ κωρύκῳ.
ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖν,
ᾠήθης δʼ ἂν οὐ σκέλη ἀλλὰ σέλινα ἔχειν, οὕτως οὖλα.

[¶35] 11.16. for they show vehemence. Wherefore those who are in a passion most frequently make use of them:
Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as the sand and dust... but a daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, I will not wed, not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.
(Attic orators are especially fond of hyperbole. ) Wherefore it is unbecoming for elderly people to make use of them.

> Greek: 11.16. εἰσὶ δʼ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γὰρ δηλοῦσιν. διὸ ὀργιζόμενοι λέγουσιν μάλιστα·
οὐδʼ εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε.
κούρην δʼ οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο,
οὐδʼ εἰ χρυσείῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ κάλλος ἐρίζοι,
ἔργα δʼ Ἀθηναίῃ·
διὸ πρεσβυτέρῳ λέγειν ἀπρεπές· χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.

[¶36] 12.1. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric. That of written compositions is not the same as that of debate; nor, in the latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both; for the one requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we wish to communicate something to others, which happens to those who do not know how to write.

> Greek: 12.1. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἑκάστῳ γένει ἁρμόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγωνιστική, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ καὶ δικανική. ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν ἄν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν.

[¶37] 12.2. The style of written compositions is most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the latter there are two kinds, ethical and emotional; this is why actors are always running after plays of this character, and poets after suitable actors. However, poets whose works are only meant for reading are also popular, as Chaeremon, who is as precise as a writer of speeches, and Licymnius among dithyrambic poets. When compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre in public debates, while those of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are amateurish when read. The reason is that they are only suitable to public debates; hence speeches suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not fulfil their proper function and appear silly. For instance, asyndeta and frequent repetition of the same word are rightly disapproved in written speech, but in public debate even rhetoricians make use of them, for they lend themselves to acting.

> Greek: 12.2. ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη (τ̔αύτης δὲ δύο εἴδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ παθητική)· διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. βαστάζονται δὲ οἱ ἀναγνωστικοί, οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβὴς γὰρ ὥσπερ λογογράφος), καὶ Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφέων ⟨λόγοι⟩ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων, εὖ λεχθέντες, ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἁρμόττει τὰ ὑποκριτικά· διὸ καὶ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τά τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ οὔ, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ ὑποκριτική.

[¶38] 12.3. (But one must vary the expression when one repeats the same thing, for this as it were paves the way for declamation: as, “This is he who robbed you, this is he who deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you.” This is what Philemon the actor did in The Old Man's Folly of Anaxandrides, when he says “Rhadamanthus and Palamedes,” and when he repeats the word “I” in the prologue to The Pious. For unless such expressions are varied by action, it is a case of “the man who carries the beam” in the proverb.)

> Greek: 12.3. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας, ὅπερ ὥσπερ ὁδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐξαπατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἔσχατον προδοῦναι ἐπιχειρήσας, οἷον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐποίει ἔν τε τῇ Ἀναξανδρίδου Γεροντομαχίᾳ, ὅτε λέγοι Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Παλαμήδης, καὶ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν Εὐσεβῶν τὸ ἐγώ· ἐὰν γάρ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίγνεται ὁ τὴν δοκὸν φέρων.

[¶39] 12.4. It is the same with asyndeta: “I came, I met, I entreated.” For here delivery is needed, and the words should not be pronounced with the same tone and character, as if there was only one clause. Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic; for in an equal space of time many things appear to be said, because the connecting particle makes many things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that the contrary will be the case, and that the one will become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces amplification: thus, in “I came, I conversed, I besought,” the hearer seems to be surveying many things, all that the speaker said. This also is Homer's intention in the passage
Nireus, again, from Syme...,
Nireus son of Aglaia...,
Nireus, the most beautiful...;
for it is necessary that one of whom much has been said should be often mentioned; if then the name is often mentioned, it seems as if much has been said; so that, by means of this fallacy, Homer has increased the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions him in one passage; he has perpetuated his memory, though he never speaks of him again.

> Greek: 12.4. καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὡσαύτως· ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς ἓν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἤθει καὶ τόνῳ εἰπεῖν. ἔτι ἔχει ἴδιόν τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ δοκεῖ εἰρῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἓν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά, ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἓν πολλά. ἔχει οὖν αὔξησιν· ἦλθον, διελέχθην, ἱκέτευσα (πολλὰ δοκεῖ), ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον. τοῦτο δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ
Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν,
Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης,
Νιρεὺς ὃς κάλλιστος.
περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ λέγεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις εἰρῆσθαι· εἰ οὖν [καὶ] πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὥστε ηὔξηκεν, ἅπαξ μνησθείς, διὰ τὸν παραλογισμόν, καὶ μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον ποιησάμενος.

[¶40] 12.5. The deliberative style is exactly like a rough sketch, for the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view; wherefore in both too much refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. But the forensic style is more finished, and more so before a single judge, because there is least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it; there is no discussion, so the judgement is clear. This is why the same orators do not excel in all these styles; where action is most effective, there the style is least finished, and this is a case in which voice, especially a loud one, is needed. The epideictic style is especially suited to written compositions, for its function is reading;

> Greek: 12.5. ἡ μὲν οὖνδημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικεν τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ᾖ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρώτερον ἡ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περίεργα καὶ χείρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ⟨ἐν⟩ ἑνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἔνεστι ῥητορικῆς· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν ἄπεστιν, ὥστε καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐν πᾶσιν τούτοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν ῥήτορες· ἀλλʼ ὅπου μάλιστα ὑπόκρισις, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἔνι. τοῦτο δὲ ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις·

[¶41] 12.6. and next to it comes the forensic style. It is superfluous to make the further distinction that style should be pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than temperate, liberal, or anything else that indicates moral virtue? For it is evident that, if virtue of style has been correctly defined, what we have said will suffice to make it pleasant. For why, if not to please, need it be clear, not mean, but appropriate? If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be clear; but it is plain that the mean is most suitable. What we have said will make the style pleasant, if it contains a happy mixture of proper and “foreign” words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting from propriety. This finishes what we had to say about style; of all the three kinds of Rhetoric in general, and of each of them in particular. It only remains to speak of arrangement.

> Greek: 12.6. δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανική. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περίεργον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ σώφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη ἤθους ἀρετή; τὸ δὲ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δηλονότι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ὥρισται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δεῖ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν; ἄν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῇ, οὐ σαφής, οὐδὲ ἂν σύντομος, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἁρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ ξενικόν, καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἴρηται, καὶ κοινῇ περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου γένους· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τάξεως εἰπεῖν.

[¶42] 13.1. A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without first putting it forward; for both he who proves proves something, and he who puts something forward does so in order to prove it.

> Greek: 13.1. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀποδεῖξαι. διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδεῖξαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι μὴ προειπόντα ἀδύνατον· ὅ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι προλέγει.

[¶43] 13.2. The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the proof, a similar division to that of problem and demonstration.

> Greek: 13.2. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσίς ἐστι τὸ δὲ πίστις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα τὸ δὲ ἀπόδειξις.

[¶44] 13.3. But the division now generally made is absurd; for narrative only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in epideictic or deliberative speech how is it possible that there should be narrative as it is defined, or a refutation; or an epilogue in demonstrative speeches? In deliberative speeches, again, exordium, comparison, and recapitulation are only admissible when there is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation and defence are often found in deliberative, but not qua deliberative speech. And further, the epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is short, or the matter is easy to recollect; for in the epilogue what happens is that there is a reduction of length.

> Greek: 13.3. νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις γάρ που τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν, ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ καὶ δημηγορικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἵαν λέγουσιν, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν; προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολλάκις, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή· ἀλλʼ ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός, οἷον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐμνημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

[¶45] 13.4. So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium, statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory.

> Greek: 13.4. ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις. ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν πίστεών ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὔξησις τῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων (ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο), ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδʼ ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλʼ ἀναμιμνήσκει.

[¶46] 13.5. Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following Theodorus and his school, who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms introduced by Licymnius in his “Art,” where he speaks of “being wafted along,” “wandering from the subject,” and “ramifications.”

> Greek: 13.5. ἔσται οὖν, ἄν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ [ἡ] ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις, καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα τίθεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους.