11.24. The same may be said of sudden changes and narrow escapes from danger; for all these things excite wonder.
11.24. καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ ταῦτα.
11.25. And since that which is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and things which are akin are akin in accordance with nature, all things akin and like are for the most part pleasant to each other, as man to man; horse to horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the proverbs: “The old have charms for the old, the young for the young,”“Like to like,”“Beast knows beast,”“Birds of a feather flock together,” and all similar sayings.
11.25. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ, ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, [ὡς] ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα, καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.
11.26. And since things which are akin and like are always pleasant to one another, and every man in the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it must needs be that all men are more or less selfish; for it is in himself above all that such conditions are to be found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it follows that all find pleasure in what is their own, such as their works and words. That is why men as a rule are fond of those who flatter and love them, of honor, and of children; for the last are their own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is wanting, for then it becomes our work.
11.26. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑαυτῷ ἡδὺ ἅπαν, μάλιστα δὲ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστα. ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον ἔργα καὶ λόγους· διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλόμαιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργον τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ·
11.27. And since it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to be regarded as wise for practical wisdom is commanding, and philosophy consists In the knowledge of many things that excite wonder. Further, since men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also agreeable to find fault with our neighbors. And if a man thinks he excels in anything, he likes to devote his time to it; as Euripides says:And allotting the best part of each day to that in which he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.
11.27. αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι ἡδύ· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστιν δʼ ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλότιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ βέλτιστος αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ εἶναι, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησι κἀπὶ τοῦτʼ ἐπείγει,νέμων ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος,ἵνʼ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν.
11.29. Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words, or deeds—must also be pleasant. The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the Poetics. Let this suffice for things that are pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these.
11.29. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά.
12.1. Such are the motives of injustice; let us now state the frame of mind of those who commit it, and who are the sufferers from it. Men do wrong when they think that it can be done and that it can be done by them; when they think that their action will either be undiscovered, or if discovered will remain unpunished; or if it is punished, that the punishment will be less than the profit to themselves or to those for whom they care.
12.1. ὧν μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσιν, ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· πῶς δὲ ἔχοντες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν οἴωνται δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ αὑτοῖς δυνατόν, εἶτʼ ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, ἢ δοῦναι μὲν ἀλλʼ ἐλάττω τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους αὑτοῖς ἢ ὧν κήδονται.
12.2. As for the kind of things which seem possible or impossible, we will discuss them later, for these topics are common to all kinds of rhetoric. Now men who commit wrong think they are most likely to be able to do so with impunity, if they are eloquent, business-like, experienced in judicial trials, if they have many friends, and if they are wealthy.
12.2. ποῖα μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα ἀδύνατα, ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων)· αὐτοὶ δʼ οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι μάλιστα ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, κἂν πολύφιλοι ὦσιν, κἂν πλούσιοι.
12.3. They think there is the greatest chance of their being able to do so, if they themselves belong to the above classes; if not, if they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do; for thanks to these qualities they are able to commit wrong and to escape discovery and punishment.
12.3. καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ὦσιν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις οἴονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ πράττειν καὶ λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην.
12.4. Similarly, if they are friends of those who are being wronged, or of the judges; for friends are not on their guard against being wronged and, besides, they prefer reconciliation to taking proceedings; and judges favor those whom they are fond of, and either let them off altogether or inflict a small penalty.
12.4. καὶ ἐὰν φίλοι ὦσιν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι ἀφύλακτοί τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσκαταλλάττονται πρὶν ἐπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἂν φίλοι ὦσι, καὶ ἢ ὅλως ἀφιᾶσιν ἢ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν.
12.5. Those are likely to remain undetected whose qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for instance, if a man wanting in physical strength were accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an ugly man of adultery. Also, if the acts are done quite openly and in sight of all; for they are not guarded against, because no one would think them possible.
12.5. λαθητικὰ δʼ εἰσὶν οἵ τʼ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον ἀσθενεῖς περὶ αἰκίας [καὶ] ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας, καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ ὅλως μηδένα ἂν οἴεσθαι.
12.6. Also, if they are so great and of such a nature that no one would even be likely to attempt them, for these also are not guarded against; for all guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs, but no one takes precautions against those ailments from which no one has ever yet suffered.
12.6. καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα μηδʼ ἂν εἷς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα· πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα, ὥσπερ ἀρρωστήματα, φυλάττονται καὶ τἀδικήματα, ὃ δὲ μηδείς πω ἠρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται.
12.7. And those who have either no enemy at all or many; the former hope to escape notice because they are not watched, the latter do escape because they would not be thought likely to attack those who are on their guard and because they can defend themselves by the plea that they would never have attempted it.
12.7. καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆσαι φυλαττομένοις, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐνεχείρησαν.
12.8. And, those who have ways or places of concealment for stolen property, or abundant opportunities of disposing of it. And those who, even if they do not remain undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or corrupt the judges. And those who, if a fine be imposed, can get payment in full set aside or put off for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have nothing to lose.
12.8. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις ἢ τρόποις ἢ τόποις, ἢ διαθέσεις εὔποροι. καὶ ὅσοις μὴ λανθάνουσιν ἔστιν δίωσις δίκης ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἢ διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία, ἔστιν δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος. ἢ ⟨εἰ⟩ διʼ ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἔχει ὅ τι ἀπολέσει.
12.9. And in cases where the profit is certain, large, or immediate, while the punishment is small, uncertain, or remote. And where there can be no punishment equal to the advantages, as seems to be the case in a tyranny.
12.9. καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν κέρδη φανερὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ ἢ ἀφανεῖς ἢ πόρρω. καὶ ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν τιμωρία ἴση τῇ ὠφελείᾳ, οἷον δοκεῖ ἡ τυρρανίς.
12.10. And when the unjust acts are real gains and the only punishment is disgrace; and when, on the contrary, the unjust acts tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father or mother, as was the case with Zeno, while the punishment only involves loss of money, exile, or something of the kind. For men do wrong from both these motives and in both these conditions of mind; but the persons are not the same, and their characters are exactly opposite.
12.10. καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ὀνείδη μόνον. καὶ οἷς τοὐναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα εἰς ἔπαινόν τινα, οἷον εἰ συνέβη ἅμα τιμωρήσασθαι ὑπὲρ πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς χρήματα ἢ φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι· διʼ ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες, πλὴν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλʼ οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἤθεσιν.
12.11. And those who have often been undetected or have escaped punishment; and those who have often been unsuccessful; for in such cases, as in actual warfare, there are always men ready to return to the fight.
12.11. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μὴ ἐζημιωμένοι, καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες (εἰσὶ γάρ τινες καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οἷοι ἀναμάχεσθαι).
12.12. And all who hope for pleasure and profit at once, while the pain and the loss come later; such are the intemperate, intemperance being concerned with all things that men long for.
12.12. καὶ οἷς ἂν παραχρῆμα ᾖ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ ζημία ὕστερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἔστιν δὲ ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται.
12.13. And when, on the contrary, the pain or the loss is immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lasting; for temperate and wiser men pursue such aims.
12.13. καὶ οἷς ἂν τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ᾖ ἢ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ ὠφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν.
12.14. And those who may possibly be thought to have acted by chance or from necessity, from some natural impulse or from habit, in a word, to have committed an error rather than a crime.
12.14. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδέχηται διὰ τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ διʼ ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ διʼ ἔθος, καὶ ὅλως ἁμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν.
12.15. And those who hope to obtain indulgence; and all those who are in need, which is of two kinds; for men either need what is necessary, as the poor, or what is superfluous, as the wealthy.
12.15. καὶ οἷς ἂν ᾖ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὦσιν· διχῶς δέ εἰσιν ἐνδεεῖς· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἢ ὡς ὑπερβολῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ πλούσιοι.
12.16. And those who are highly esteemed or held in great contempt; the former will not be suspected, the latter no more than they are already.
12.16. καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦντες, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐ δόξοντες, οἱ δʼ ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀδοξοῦντες.
12.17. In such a frame of mind men attempt to do wrong, and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and circumstances of the following kind. Those who possess what they themselves lack, things either necessary, or superfluous, or enjoyable;
12.17. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν ⟨ἀδικεῖν⟩, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἔχοντας ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς·
12.18. both those who are far off and those who are near, for in the one case the gain is speedy, in the other reprisals are slow, as if, for instance, Greeks were to plunder Carthaginians.
12.18. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λῆψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δʼ ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἷον οἱ συλῶντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους.
12.19. And those who never take precautions and are never on their guard, but are confiding; for all these are easily taken unawares. And those who are indolent; for it requires a man who takes pains to prosecute. And those who are bashful; for they are not likely to fight about money.
12.19. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς· ῥᾴδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς ῥαθύμους· ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλούς· οὐ γὰρ μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους.
12.20. And those who have often been wronged but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, “Mysian booty.”
12.20. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικηθέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας, ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν.
12.21. And those who have never, or those who have often, suffered wrong; for both are off their guard, the one because they have never yet been attacked, the others because they do not expect to be attacked again.
12.21. καὶ τοὺς μηδεπώποτε καὶ τοὺς πολλάκις· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δʼ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι.
12.22. And those who have been slandered, or are easy to slander; for such men neither care to go to law, for fear of the judges, nor, if they do, can they convince them; to this class belong those who are exposed to hatred or envy.
12.22. καὶ τοὺς διαβεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους· οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οὔτε προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύνανται πείθειν, ὡς μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοι.
12.23. And those against whom the wrongdoer can pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves, or their friends, have either committed, or intended to commit, wrong either against himself, or his ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard; for, as the proverb says, “evil-doing only needs an excuse.”
12.23. καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ φίλων ἢ ποιησάντων κακῶς ἢ μελλησάντων, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ προγόνους ἢ ὧν κήδονται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, προφάσεως δεῖται μόνον ἡ πονηρία.
12.24. And both enemies and friends; for it is easy to injure the latter, and pleasant to injure the former. And those who are friendless. And those who are unskilled in speech or action; for either they make no attempt to prosecute, or come to terms, or accomplish nothing.
12.24. καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ῥᾴδιον, τοὺς δὲ ἡδύ. καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους, καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ἢ καταλλάττονται, ἢ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν.
12.25. And those to whom it is no advantage to waste time waiting for the verdict or damages, such as strangers or husbandmen; for they are ready to compromise on easy terms and to drop proceedings.
12.25. καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ διατρίβειν ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν, οἷον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτουργοί· ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταπαύονται.
12.26. And those who have committed numerous wrongs, or such as those from which they themselves are suffering; for it seems almost an act of justice that a man should suffer a wrong such as he had been accustomed to make others suffer; if, for instance, one were to assault a man who was in the habit of outraging others.
12.26. καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἠδικηκότας, ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἀδικοῦνται· ἐγγὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον ἀδικηθῇ τις οἷον εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δʼ οἷον εἴ τις τὸν εἰωθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο.
12.27. And those who have already injured us, or intended, or intend, or are about to do so; for in such a case vengeance is both pleasant and honorable, and seems to be almost an act of justice.
12.27. καὶ τοὺς ἢ πεποιηκότας κακῶς ἢ βουληθέντας ἢ βουλομένους ἢ ποιήσοντας· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται.
12.28. And those whom we wrong in order to ingratiate ourselves with our friends, or persons whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word, those by whom our life is ruled.
12.28. καὶ οἷς χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ θαυμαζομένοις ἢ ἐρωμένοις ἢ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί.
12.29. And those in reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining merciful consideration. And those against whom we have a complaint, or with whom we have had a previous difference, as Callippus acted in the matter of Dion; for in such cases it seems almost an act of justice.
12.29. καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγκεκληκότες ὦσιν καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἷον Κάλλιππος ἐποίησεν τὰ περὶ Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται.
12.30. And those who are going to be attacked by others, if we do not attack first, since it is no longer possible to deliberate; thus, Aenesidemus is said to have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to Gelon, who, having reduced a town to slavery, had anticipated him by doing what he had intended to do himself.
12.30. καὶ τοὺς ὑπʼ ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσίδημος Γέλωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ ⟨, ὅτι ἔφθασεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων.
12.31. And those to whom, after having injured them, we shall be enabled to do many acts of justice, in the idea that it will he easy to repair the wrong; as Jason the Thessalian said one should sometimes commit injustice, in order to be able also to do justice often.
12.31. καὶ οὓς ἀδικήσαντες δυνήσονται πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥᾳδίως ἰασόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.
12.32. Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or many are in the habit of committing, for they hope to be pardoned for their offences.
12.32. καὶ ἃ πάντες ἢ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν εἰώθασιν· συγγνώμης γὰρ οἴονται τεύξεσθαι.
12.33. They steal objects that are easy to conceal; such are things that are quickly consumed, as eatables; things which can easily be changed in form or color or composition;
12.33. καὶ τὰ ῥᾴδια κρύψαι· τοιαῦτα δὲ ὅσα ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον τὰ ἐδώδιμα, ἢ τὰ εὐμετάβλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώμασιν ἢ κράσεσιν, ἢ ἃ πολλαχοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὔπορον·
12.34. things for which there are many convenient hiding-places, such as those that are easy to carry or stow away in a corner;
12.34. τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ εὐβάστακτα καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις ἀφανιζόμενα.
12.35. those of which a thief already possesses a considerable number exactly similar or hard to distinguish. Or they commit wrongs which the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages upon the women of their family, upon themselves, or upon their children. And all those wrongs in regard to which appeal to the law would create the appearance of litigiousness; such are wrongs which are unimportant or venial. These are nearly all the dispositions which induce men to commit wrong, the nature and motive of the wrongs, and the kind of persons who are the victims of wrong.
12.35. καὶ οἷς ἀδιάφορα καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ προϋπῆρχεν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. καὶ ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὑτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν δόξειεν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξιών· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς συγγνώμη. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα καὶ ποίους καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτʼ ἐστίν.
13.1. Let us now classify just and unjust actions generally, starting from what follows. Justice and injustice have been defined in reference to laws and persons in two ways.
13.1. τὰ δʼ ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν. ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρός τε νόμους δύο καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστι διχῶς.
13.2. Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. By particular laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves, which again are divided into written and unwritten; by general laws I mean those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communication nor agreement between them. This is what Antigone in Sophocles evidently means, when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices, as being naturally just:For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from all eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came.And as Empedocles says in regard to not killing that which has life, for this is not right for some and wrong for others,But a universal precept, which extends without a break throughout the wide-ruling sky and the boundless earth.Alcidamas also speaks of this precept in his Messeniacus....
13.2. λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγραφον, τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένου θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει ὂν τοῦτο δίκαιον·οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλʼ ἀεί ποτεζῇ τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη·καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δʼ οὐ δίκαιον,ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τʼ εὐρυμέδοντοςαἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τʼ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς·καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας, ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν.
13.3. And in relation to persons, there is a twofold division of law; for what one ought to do or ought not to do is concerned with the community generally, or one of its members. Therefore there are two kinds of just and unjust acts, since they can be committed against a definite individual or against the community; he who commits adultery or an assault is guilty of wrong against a definite individual, he who refuses to serve in the army of wrong against the State.
13.3. πρὸς οὓς δέ, διώρισται δίχα· ὥρισται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἕνα τῶν κοινωνούντων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν· διὸ καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινα τῶν ὡρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν.
13.4. All kinds of wrong acts having been thus distinguished, some of which affect the State, others one or several individuals, let us repeat the definition of being wronged, and then go on to the rest.
13.4. ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διῃρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.
13.5. Being wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of one who voluntarily inflicts it, for it has been established that injustice is a voluntary act.
13.5. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι.
13.6. And since the man who suffers injustice necessarily sustains injury and that against his will, it is evident from what has been said in what the injuries consist; for things good and bad have already been distinguished in themselves, and it has been said that voluntary acts are all such as are committed with knowledge of the case. Hence it necessarily follows that all accusations concern the State or the individual, the accused having acted either ignorantly and against his will, or voluntarily and with knowledge, and in the latter case with malice aforethought or from passion.
13.6. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἑκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἴρηται καθʼ αὑτὰ πρότερον καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες, ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος.
13.8. We will speak of anger when we come to treat of the passions, and we have already stated in what circumstances and with what dispositions men act with deliberate purpose.
13.8. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες εἴρηται πρότερον.
13.9. But since a man, while admitting the fact, often denies the description of the charge or the point on which it turns—for instance, admits that he took something, but did not steal it; that he was the first to strike, but committed no outrage; that he had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a woman; or that he stole something but was not guilty of sacrilege, since the object in question was not consecrated; or that he trespassed, but not on public land; or that he held converse with the enemy, but was not guilty of treason—for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should be given of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we desire to prove that an offence has or has not been committed, we may be able to put the case in a true light.
13.9. ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλʼ οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλʼ οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον.
13.10. In all such instances the question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrongdoer and a worthless person, or not; for vice and wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose; for if a man has struck, it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he has taken it to injure another or to get something for himself. It is the same in all other cases as in these.
13.10. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον [ἡ] ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ⟨τούτου ἀφʼ οὗ ἔλαβε⟩ καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.
13.11. We have said that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are unwritten), and have spoken of those concerning which the laws are explicit; of those that are unwritten there are two kinds.
13.11. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δʼ ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δʼ ἀγράφων δύο ἔστιν εἴδη·
13.12. One kind arises from an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honor or dishonor, and rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, to help one's friends, and the like; the other kind contains what is omitted in the special written law.
13.12. ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφʼ οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι, καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί (οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα, καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα), τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα.
13.13. For that which is equitable seems to be just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the written law. These omissions are sometimes involuntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of the legislators; involuntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary when, being unable to define for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal statement, which is not applicable to all, but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult to give a definition owing to the infinite number of cases, as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instrument used in wounding; for life would not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities.
13.13. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἑκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἑκόντων δʼ ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ᾖ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ᾖ δέ, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι διʼ ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποίῳ τινί· ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντα.
13.14. If then no exact definition is possible, but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms; so that, if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually strikes, according to the written law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is not; and this is a case for equity.
13.14. ἂν οὖν ᾖ ἀόριστον, δέῃ δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτό ἐστιν.
13.15. If then our definition of equity is correct, it is easy to see what things and persons are equitable or not.
13.15. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνθρωποι·
13.16. Actions which should be leniently treated are cases for equity; errors, wrong acts, and misfortunes, must not be thought deserving of the same penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are unexpected and not vicious; errors are not unexpected, but are not vicious; wrong acts are such as might be expected and vicious, for acts committed through desire arise from vice.
13.16. ἐφʼ οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· [ἔστιν] ἀτυχήματα μὲν ⟨γὰρ⟩ ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν· τὰ γὰρ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας.
13.17. And it is equitable to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to the law but to the legislator; not to the letter of the law but to the intention of the legislator; not to the action itself, but to the moral purpose;
13.17. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ ποῖός τις ἦν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
13.18. not to the part, but to the whole; not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or generally; to remember good rather than ill treatment, and benefits received rather than those conferred; to bear injury with patience; to be willing to appeal to the judgement of reason rather than to violence;
13.18. καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὧν ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἢ ⟨ὧν⟩ ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ἢ ἔργῳ. καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἰέναι·
13.19. to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail. Let this manner of defining equity suffice.
13.19. ὁ γὰρ διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον· καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς εὑρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύῃ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
14.1. Wrong acts are greater in proportion to the injustice from which they spring. For this reason the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the charge brought by Callistratus against Melanopus that he had fraudulently kept back three consecrated half-obols from the temple-builders; whereas, in the case of just actions, it is quite the contrary. The reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the less; for he who has stolen three consecrated half-obols will commit any wrong whatever. Wrong acts are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes by the extent of the injury done.
14.1. ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀπὸ μείζονος ᾖ ἀδικίας· διὸ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἷον ὃ Μελανώπου Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει, ὅτι παρελογίσατο τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ τοὺς ναοποιούς· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοὐναντίον. ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει· ὁ γὰρ τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ κλέψας κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀδικήσειεν. ὁτὲ μὲν δὴ οὕτω τὸ μεῖζον, ὁτὲ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται.
14.2. A wrong act is greater when there is no adequate punishment for it, but all are insufficient; when there is no remedy, because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it; and when the person injured cannot obtain legal satisfaction, since it is irremediable; for justice and punishment are kinds of remedies.
14.2. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἴση τιμωρία, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἴασις· χαλεπὸν γὰρ †καὶ ἀδύνατον†. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν δίκην λαβεῖν τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις καὶ ἴασις.
14.3. And if the sufferer, having been wronged, has inflicted some terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person deserves greater punishment; wherefore Sophocles, when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered, declared that he would not assess the punishment at less than the victim had assessed it for himself.
14.3. καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μεγάλως ἐκόλασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μείζονι ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος κολασθῆναι, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὐκτήμονος συνηγορῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσειν ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ ὁ παθὼν ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν.
14.4. A wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, or the first of its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplices; and when it has been frequently committed; or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have been sought and found: thus, at Argos the citizen owing to whom a new law has been passed, is punished, as well as those on whose account a new prison had to be built.
14.4. καὶ ὃ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετʼ ὀλίγων πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνειν [μέγα]. καὶ διʼ ὃ ἂν ζητηθῇ καὶ εὑρεθῇ τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα, οἷον ἐν Ἄργει ζημιοῦται διʼ ὃν ἂν νόμος τεθῇ καὶ διʼ οὓς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ᾠκοδομήθη.
14.5. The crime is greater, the more brutal it is; or when it has been for a long time premeditated; when the recital of it inspires terror rather than pity. Rhetorical tricks of the following kind may be used:—the statement that the accused person has swept away or violated several principles of justice, for example, oaths, pledges of friendship, plighted word, the sanctity of marriage; for this amounts to heaping crime upon crime.
14.5. καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα μεῖζον. καὶ ὃ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά ἐστι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνῄρηκεν ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον ὅρκους, δεξιάς, πίστεις, ἐπιγαμίας· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή.
14.6. Wrong acts are greater when committed in the very place where wrongdoers themselves are sentenced, as is done by false witnesses; for where would a man not commit wrong, if he does so in a court of justice? They are also greater when accompanied by the greatest disgrace; when committed against one who has been the guilty person's benefactor, for in that case, the wrongdoer is guilty of wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong, but does not return good for good.
14.6. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὗ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδομαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀδικήσαιεν, εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ; καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς αἰσχύνη μάλιστα. καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφʼ οὗ εὖ πέπονθεν· πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι τε κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ εὖ.
14.7. So too, again, when a man offends against the unwritten laws of right, for there is greater merit in doing right without being compelled; now the written laws involve compulsion, the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way, wrongdoing is greater, if it violates the written laws; for a man who commits wrongs that alarm him and involve punishment, will be ready to commit wrong for which he will not be punished. Let this suffice for the treatment of the greater or less degree of wrongdoing.
14.7. καὶ ὃ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δίκαια· ἀμείνονος γὰρ μὴ διʼ ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι· τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δʼ ἄγραφα οὔ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ φοβερὰ ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ ἀζήμια ἀδικήσειεν ἄν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἴρηται.
15.1. Following on what we have just spoken of, we have now briefly to run over what are called the inartificial proofs, for these properly belong to forensic oratory.
15.1. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν δικανικῶν.
15.2. These proofs are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths.
15.2. εἰσὶν δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, νόμοι, μάρτυρες, συνθῆκαι, βάσανοι, ὅρκοι.
15.3. Let us first then speak of the laws, and state what use should be made of them when exhorting or dissuading, accusing or defending.
15.3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον.
15.4. For it is evident that, if the written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and equity, as more in accordance with justice;
15.4. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ᾖ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ χρηστέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις καὶ δικαιοτέροις.
15.5. and we must argue that, when the dicast takes an oath to decide to the best of his judgement, he means that he will not abide rigorously by the written laws;
15.5. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ τοῦτʼ ἐστίν, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις.
15.6. that equity is ever constant and never changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written laws often vary (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law:For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal... this I was not likely [to infringe through fear of the pride] of any man);
15.6. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδʼ ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις, ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνῃ· ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλʼ οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον,οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλʼ ἀεί ποτε …ταῦτʼ οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός ….
15.7. and further, that justice is real and expedient, but not that which only appears just; nor the written law either, because it does not do the work of the law; that the judge is like an assayer of silver, whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine justice;
15.7. καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τε καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν, ὥστʼ οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές.
15.8. that it is the part of a better man to make use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the written law.
15.8. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐμμένειν.
15.9. Again, it is necessary to see whether the law is contradictory to another approved law or to itself; for instance, one law enacts that all contracts should be binding, while another forbids making contracts contrary to the law.
15.9. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, οἷον ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἅττʼ ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δʼ ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον.
15.10. If the meaning of the law is equivocal, we must turn it about, and see in which way it is to be interpreted so as to suit the application of justice or expediency, and have recourse to that.
15.10. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ποτέραν [τὴν] ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι.
15.11. If the conditions which led to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while the law itself remains, one must endeavor to make this clear and to combat the law by this argument.
15.11. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφʼ οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.
15.12. But if the written law favors our case, we must say that the oath of the dicast “to decide to the best of his judgement” does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but is only intended to relieve him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of the meaning of the law; that no one chooses that which is good absolutely, but that which is good for himself; that there is no difference between not using the laws and their not being enacted; that in the other arts there is no advantage in trying to be wiser than the physician, for an error on his part does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying the authority; that to seek to be wiser than the laws is just what is forbidden in the most approved laws. Thus much for the laws.
15.12. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ᾖ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τό τε γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἕνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῇ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἰατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτως διωρίσθω·
15.13. Witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent; of the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are outside it. By ancient I mean the poets and men of repute whose judgements are known to all; for instance, the Athenians, in the matter of Salamis, appealed to Homer as a witness, and recently the inhabitants of Tenedos to Periander of Corinth against the Sigeans. Cleophon also made use of the elegiacs of Solon against Critias, to prove that his family had long been notorious for licentiousness, otherwise Solon would never have written:Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.
15.13. περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσιν διττοί, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου οἱ δʼ ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τούς τε ποιητὰς καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰσὶν κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος, καὶ Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος Περιάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς Σιγειεῖς, καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι πάλαι ἀσελγὴς ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλωνεἰπεῖν μοι Κριτίᾳ πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν.
15.14. One should appeal to such witnesses for the past, but also to interpreters of oracles for the future; thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea. Further, proverbs, as stated, are evidence; for instance, if one man advises another not to make a friend of an old man, he can appeal to the proverb, “Never do good to an old man.” And if he advises another to kill the children, after having killed the fathers, he can say,Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the children to live.
15.14. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἷον Θεμιστοκλῆς ὅτι ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μαρτύριά εἰσιν, οἷον εἴ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιεῖσθαι φίλον γέροντα, τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία,μήποτʼ εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα,καὶ τὸ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀναιρεῖν ὧν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας υἱοὺς καταλείπει.
15.15. By recent witnesses I mean all well-known persons who have given a decision on any point, for their decisions are useful to those who are arguing about similar cases. Thus for instance, Eubulus, when attacking Chares in the law courts, made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, “that the open confession of wickedness had increased in the city.”
15.15. πρόσφατοι δὲ ὅσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τούτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἷον Εὔβουλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο κατὰ Χάρητος ὃ Πλάτων εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖνπονηροὺς εἶναι.
15.16. And those who share the risk of the trial, if they are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only serve to establish whether an act has taken place or not, whether it is or is not the case; but if it is a question of the quality of the act, for instance, whether it is just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient, they are not competent witnesses; but witnesses from a distance are very trustworthy even in regard to this.
15.16. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἂν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τούτων μόνον μάρτυρές εἰσιν, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποῖον οὐ μάρτυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον·
15.17. But ancient witnesses are the most trustworthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted. In regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man has no witnesses, he can say that the decision should be given in accordance with probabilities, and that this is the meaning of the oath “according to the best of one's judgement”; that probabilities cannot be bribed to deceive, and that they cannot be convicted of bearing false witness. But if a man has witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that probabilities incur no responsibility, and that there would have been no need of evidence, if an investigation according to the arguments were sufficient.
15.17. οἱ δʼ ἄπωθεν περὶ τούτων πιστότεροι, πιστότατοι δʼ οἱ παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν· ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι.
15.18. Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our adversary, as to the fact itself or moral character; so that it is evident that one never need lack useful evidence. For, if we have no evidence as to the fact itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor against our opponent, it will always be possible to obtain some evidence as to character that will establish either our own respectability or the worthlessness of our opponent.
15.18. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν περὶ αὑτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέποτʼ ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὑτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἢ αὑτοῦ εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα.
15.19. As for all the other questions relative to a witness, whether he is a friend, an enemy, or neutral, of good or bad or middling reputation, and for all other differences of this kind, we must have recourse to the same topics as those from which we derive our enthymemes.
15.19. τὰ δʼ ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος, ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξύ, ἢ εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξύ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων λεκτέον ἐξ οἵων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.
15.20. As for contracts, argument may be used to the extent of magnifying or minimizing their importance, of proving that they do or do not deserve credit. If we have them on our side, we must try to prove them worthy of credit and authoritative; but if they are on the side of our opponent, we must do the opposite.
15.20. περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τῶν λόγων χρῆσίς ἐστιν ὅσον αὔξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν, ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους— ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τοὐναντίον.
15.21. In view of rendering them worthy or unworthy of credit, the method of procedure is exactly the same as in the case of witnesses; for contracts are trustworthy according to the character of their signatories or depositaries. When the existence of the contract is admitted, if it is in our favor, we must strengthen it by asserting that the contract is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that make the law authoritative, but it is the laws that give force to legal contracts. And in a general sense the law itself is a kind of contract, so that whoever disobeys or subverts a contract, subverts the laws.
15.21. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὁποῖοι γὰρ ἄν τινες ὦσιν οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες, τοιούτως αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταί εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δʼ εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ νόμους συνθήκας, καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συνθήκην τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ.
15.22. Further, most ordinary and all voluntary transactions are carried out according to contract; so that if you destroy the authority of contracts, the mutual intercourse of men is destroyed. All other arguments suitable to the occasion are easy to see.
15.22. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν.
15.23. But if the contract is against us and in favor of our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we should oppose to the law if it were against us; that it would be strange if, while we consider ourselves entitled to refuse to obey ill-made laws, whose authors have erred, we should be obliged to consider ourselves always bound by contracts.
15.23. ἂν δʼ ἐναντία ᾖ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μέν, ἅπερ ἄν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦτα ἁρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλʼ ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον.
15.24. Or, that the judge is the dispenser of justice; so that it is not the contents of the contract that he has to consider, but what is juster.
15.24. εἶτα ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτὴς ὁ δικαστής· οὔκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλʼ ὡς δικαιότερον·
15.25. Further, that one cannot alter justice either by fraud or compulsion, for it is based upon nature, whereas contracts may be entered into under both conditions. In addition to this, we must examine whether the contract is contrary to any written law of our own or foreign countries, or to any general law, or to other previous or subsequent contracts. For either the latter are valid and the former not, or the former are right and the latter fraudulent; we may put it in whichever way it seems fit. We must also consider the question of expediency—whether the contract is in any way opposed to the interest of the judges. There are a number of other arguments of the same kind, which are equally easy to discern.
15.25. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστιν μεταστρέψαι οὔτʼ ἀπάτῃ οὔτʼ ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γάρ ἐστιν), συνθῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστί τινι τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἢ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δʼ αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δʼ ὕστεραι ἠπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ που ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.
15.26. Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached to it. Nor is it difficult to see what may be said concerning it, and by what arguments, if it is in our favor, we can exaggerate its importance by asserting that it is the only true kind of evidence; but if it is against us and in favor of our opponent, we can destroy its value by telling the truth about all kinds of torture generally; for those under compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make false charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from torture. It is also necessary to be able to quote actual examples of the kind with which the judges are acquainted. It may also be said that evidence given under torture is not true; for many thick-witted and thick-skinned persons, and those who are stout-hearted heroically hold out under sufferings, while the cowardly and cautious, before they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough; wherefore evidence from torture may be considered utterly untrustworthy.
15.26. αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὔκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν οἰκεῖαι αὔξειν ἔστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσιν αὗται, ἐάν τε ὑπεναντίαι ὦσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, διαλύοι ἄν τις τἀληθῆ λέγων καθʼ ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγουσιν ἢ τἀληθῆ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τἀληθῆ, καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θᾶττον. δεῖ δὲ ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ἃ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες. δεῖ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παχύφρονες [οἱ] καὶ λιθόδερμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοὶ γενναίως ἐγκαρτεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρροῦσιν, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔστι πιστὸν ἐν βασάνοις.
15.27. As to oaths four divisions may be made; for either we tender an oath and accept it, or we do neither, or one without the other, and in the last case we either tender but do not accept, or accept but do not tender. Besides this, one may consider whether the oath has already been taken by us or by the other party.
15.27. περὶ δʼ ὅρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει, ἢ οὐδέτερον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τὸ δʼ οὔ, καὶ τούτων ἢ δίδωσιν μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἢ λαμβάνει μὲν δίδωσιν δὲ οὔ. ἔτι ἄλλως παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὀμώμοσται οὗτος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου.
15.28. If you do not tender the oath to the adversary, it is because men readily perjure themselves, and because, after he has taken the oath, he will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does not take the oath, you think that the dicasts will condemn him; and also because the risk incurred in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable, for you have confidence in them, but not in your adversary.
15.28. οὐ δίδωσιν μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὀμόσας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὀμόσαντος οἴεται καταδικάσειν, καὶ [ὡς] οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων, ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δʼ οὔ.
15.29. If you refuse to take the oath yourself, you may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money; that, if you had been a scoundrel, you would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a scoundrel for something than for nothing; that, if you take it, you will win your case, if not, you will probably lose it; consequently, your refusal to take it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing perjury. And the apophthegm of Xenophanes is apposite— that “it is unfair for an impious man to challenge a pious one,” for it is the same as a strong man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit.
15.29. οὐ λαμβάνει δʼ, ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημάτων ὅρκος, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν· κρεῖττον γὰρ ἂν ⟨ἦν⟩ ἕνεκά του φαῦλον εἶναι ἢ μηδενός· ὀμόσας μὲν οὖν ἕξει, μὴ ὀμόσας δʼ οὔ· οὕτως δὲ διʼ ἀρετὴν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλʼ οὐ διʼ ἐπιορκίαν, τὸ μή. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἁρμόττει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη τἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ, ἀλλʼ ὁμοία καὶ εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῆ πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι προκαλέσαιτο.
15.30. If you accept the oath, you may say that you have confidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, reversing the apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the only fair way is that the impious man should tender the oath and the pious man take it; and that it would be monstrous to refuse to take the oath yourself, while demanding that the judges should take it before giving their verdict.
15.30. εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὑτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δʼ οὔ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβὴς διδῷ, ὁ δʼ εὐσεβὴς ὀμνύῃ· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ ὀμόσαντας δικάζειν.
15.31. But if you tender the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to be willing to leave the matter to the gods; that your opponent has no need to look for other judges, for you allow him to make the decision himself;
15.31. εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἄλλων δικαστῶν δεῖσθαι (αὐτοῖς γὰρ δίδωσι κρίσιν), καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὀμνύναι περὶ ὧν ἄλλους ἀξιοῦσιν ὀμνύναι.
15.32. and that it would be ridiculous that he should be unwilling to take an oath in cases where he demands that the dicasts should take one. Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually, it is clear how we must deal with them when taken two and two; for instance, if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to accept and tender it, or to do neither the one nor the other. For such cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary.
15.32. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστον δῆλον ὅπως λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζομένων πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον, οἷον εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ γεγενημένος ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία· ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δʼ ἐπιορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια.
15.33. Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not in what is said. But if the opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what be has sworn subverts everything, for this is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before applying the laws; and [we may make this appeal]: “They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they themselves do not abide by theirs.” Further, we should employ all means of amplification. Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.
15.33. ἐνταῦθα οὖν συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλʼ οὐ τῷ στόματι. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ᾖ ὑπεναντίος καὶ ὀμωμοσμένος, ὅτι πάντα ἀναιρεῖ μὴ ἐμμένων οἷς ὤμοσεν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες. καὶ ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμμένειν οἷς ὀμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν. καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἄλλα αὔξων τις εἴπειεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.