5.10. And those who are feared by those who are stronger than we are, for they would be better able to injure us, if they could injure those stronger than ourselves and those whom those who are stronger than ourselves are afraid of, for the same reason.
5.10. καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν φοβεροί· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τοὺς κρείττους. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττους αὐτῶν, διὰ ταὐτό.
5.11. And those who have overthrown those who are stronger than us and those who attack those who are weaker, for they are either already to be feared, or will be, when they have grown stronger. And among those whom we have wronged, or are our enemies or rivals, we should fear not the hot-tempered or outspoken, but those who are mild, dissemblers, and thorough rascals; for it is uncertain whether they are on the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it.
5.11. καὶ οἱ τοὺς κρείττους αὐτῶν ἀνῃρηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῖς ἥττοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι· ἢ γὰρ ἤδη φοβεροὶ ἢ αὐξηθέντες. καὶ τῶν ἠδικημένων καὶ ἐχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλὰ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἴρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι· ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς, ὥστε οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω.
5.12. All things that are to be feared are more so when, after an error has once been committed, it is impossible to repair it, either because it is absolutely impossible, or no longer in our power, but in that of our opponents; also when there is no possibility of help or it is not easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be feared which, when they happen, or are on the point of happening, to others, excite compassion. These are, so to say, nearly all the most important things which are to be feared and which men fear. Let us now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear.
5.12. πάντα δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτερα ὅσα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπανορθώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ ὧν βοήθειαι μή εἰσιν ἢ μὴ ῥᾴδιαι. ὡς δʼ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφʼ ἑτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ καὶ ἃ φοβοῦνται σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ μέγιστα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν λέγωμεν.
5.13. If then fear is accompanied by the expectation that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is evident that none of those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those things which he does not think will happen to him, or of those from whom he does not expect them, or at a time when he does not think them likely to happen. It therefore needs be that those who think they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid, either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, or of certain things, and at certain times.
5.13. εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τινὸς τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται ⟨ἂν⟩ παθεῖν οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφʼ ὧν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε.
5.14. Those who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do not think they are likely to suffer anything; wherefore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number of friends, power. It is the same with those who think that they have already suffered all possible ills and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those who are being beaten to death; for it is a necessary incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved from the cause of their distress. A sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate, whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless.
5.14. οὐκ οἴονται δὲ παθεῖν ἂν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὄντες καὶ δοκοῦντες (διὸ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς, ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς πολυφιλία δύναμις), οὔτε οἱ ἤδη πεπονθέναι πάντα νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀποτυμπανιζόμενοι ἤδη· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων·
5.15. So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when they did not think it likely.
5.15. ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ᾖ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἷον παθεῖν (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον), καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφʼ ὧν οὐκ ᾤοντο, καὶ ταῦτα ⟨ἃ⟩ καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾤοντο.
5.16. Now, since we have made clear what fear and fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each case which makes men fear, one can see from this what confidence is, what are the things that give it, and the frame of mind of those who possess it; for confidence is the contrary of fear and that which gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that the hope of what is salutary is accompanied by an impression that it is quite near at hand, while the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.
5.16. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερὸν τί ἐστιν, καὶ τῶν φοβερῶν, καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔχοντες δεδίασι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ποῖα θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ καὶ πῶς διακείμενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν· τό τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ⟨φόβῳ, καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον τῷ⟩ φοβερῷ, ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν ⟨ὡς⟩ ἢ μὴ ὄντων ἢ πόρρω ὄντων.
5.17. Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful things, or by the nearness of things that justify it. If remedies are possible, if there are means of help, either great or numerous, or both; if we have neither committed nor suffered wrong if we have no rivals at all, or only such as are powerless, or, if they have power, are our friends, or have either done us good or have received it from us; if those whose interests are the same as ours are more numerous, or stronger, or both.
5.17. ἔστι δὲ θαρραλέα τά τε δεινὰ πόρρω ὄντα καὶ τὰ σωτήρια ἐγγύς, καὶ ἐπανορθώσεις ἂν ὦσι καὶ βοήθειαι πολλαὶ ἢ μεγάλαι ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ μήτε ἠδικημένοι μήτε ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν, ἀνταγωνισταί τε ἢ μὴ ὦσιν ὅλως, ἢ μὴ ἔχωσιν δύναμιν, ἢ δύναμιν ἔχοντες ὦσι φίλοι ἢ πεποιηκότες εὖ ἢ πεπονθότες, ἢ ἂν πλείους ὦσιν οἷς ταὐτὰ συμφέρει, ἢ κρείττους, ἢ ἄμφω.
5.18. We feel confidence in the following states of mind: if we believe that we have often succeeded and have not suffered, or if we have often been in danger and escaped it; for men are unaffected by fear in two ways, either because they have never been tested or have means of help; thus, in dangers at sea, those who have never experienced a storm and those who have means of help as the result of experience have confidence as to the future.
5.18. αὐτοὶ δʼ οὕτως ἔχοντες θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ἂν πολλὰ κατωρθωκέναι οἴωνται καὶ μὴ πεπονθέναι, ἢ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες εἰς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ διαπεφευγότες ὦσι· διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖς γίγνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τῷ μὴ πεπειρᾶσθαι ἢ τῷ βοηθείας ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνοις οἵ τε ἄπειροι χειμῶνος θαρροῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.
5.19. We are also reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear in our equals, our inferiors, or those to whom we think ourselves superior; and we think ourselves superior to those whom we have conquered, either themselves or their superiors or equals.
5.19. καὶ ὅταν τοῖς ὁμοίοις φοβερὸν μὴ ᾖ, μηδὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι καὶ ὧν κρείττους οἴονται εἶναι·
5.20. And if we think we possess more or more considerable advantages, such as make their possessors formidable; such are abundance of money, strength of body, friends, territory, military equipments, either all or the most important. And if we have never done wrong to anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be feared;
5.20. οἴονται δὲ ὧν κεκρατήκασιν ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν κρειττόνων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ ἂν ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς οἴωνται πλείω καὶ μείζω, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροί εἰσιν· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι πλῆθος χρημάτων καὶ ἰσχὺς σωμάτων καὶ φίλων καὶ χώρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον παρασκευῶν, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν μεγίστων. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν μηδένα ἢ μὴ πολλοὺς ἢ μὴ τούτους παρʼ ὧν φοβοῦνται, καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχῃ, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σημείων καὶ λογίων·
5.21. and, generally, if it is well with us in regard to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs and oracles, and everything else of the kind; for anger inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those who are wronged.
5.21. θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὀργῆς ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνεται βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις.
5.22. Lastly, we feel confidence when, at the beginning of any undertaking, we do not expect disaster either in the present or future, or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire fear or confidence.
5.22. καὶ ὅταν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἢ μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν [μηδὲ πείσεσθαι] ἢ κατορθώσειν οἴωνται. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται.
6.1. What are the things of which men are ashamed or the contrary, and before whom, and in what frame of mind, will be clear from the following considerations.
6.1. ποῖα δʼ αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, καὶ πρὸς τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
6.2. Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonor; and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in regard to these same things.
6.2. ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἡ δʼ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.
6.3. If this definition of shame is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful, either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such are all those that are due to vice, such as throwing away one's shield or taking to flight, for this is due to cowardice; or withholding a deposit, for this is due to injustice.
6.3. εἰ δή ἐστιν αἰσχύνη ἡ ὁρισθεῖσα, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν φροντίζει· τοιαῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν ἀσπίδα ἢ φυγεῖν· ἀπὸ δειλίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ ἀποστερῆσαι παρακαταθήκην [ἢ ἀδικῆσαι]· ἀπὸ ἀδικίας γάρ.
6.4. And illicit relations with any persons, at forbidden places or times, for this is due to licentiousness.
6.4. καὶ τὸ συγγενέσθαι αἷς οὐ δεῖ ἢ οὗ οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ· ἀπὸ ἀκολασίας γάρ.
6.5. And making profit out of what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the indigent or dead; whence the proverb, “to rob even a corpse,” for this is due to base love of gain and stinginess.
6.5. καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ αἰσχρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ ἀδυνάτων, οἷον πενήτων ἢ τεθνεώτων, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν· ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας γὰρ καὶ ἀνελευθερίας.
6.6. And to refuse assistance in money matters when we are able to render it, or to give less than we can; to accept assistance from those less able to afford it than ourselves;
6.6. καὶ τὸ μὴ βοηθεῖν, δυνάμενον, εἰς χρήματα, ἢ ἧττον βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν ἧττον εὐπόρων, καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ὅτε αἰτεῖν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἃ δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν ἧττον·
6.7. to borrow when anyone seems likely to ask for a loan, to ask for a loan from one who wants his money back, and asking for repayment from one who wants to borrow; to praise in order to seem to be asking for a loan, and when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking; for all these are signs of stinginess.
6.7. πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα σημεῖα, τὸ δʼ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας κολακείας, καὶ τὸ τἀγαθὰ μὲν ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείφειν, καὶ τὸ ὑπεραλγεῖν ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα τοιαῦτα·
6.8. And to praise people when they are present, to overpraise their good qualities and to palliate the bad, to show excessive grief at another's grief when present, and all similar actions; for they are signs of flattery. And not to submit to toils, which those put up with who are older or live luxuriously or hold higher positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to do so; for all these are signs of effeminacy.
6.8. κολακείας γὰρ σημεῖα. καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν πόνους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ἢ τρυφῶντες ἢ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὅλως οἱ ἀδυνατώτεροι· πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα.
6.10. To accept favors from another and often, and then to throw them in his teeth; for all these things are signs of littleness and abasement of soul.
6.10. καὶ τὸ ὑφʼ ἑτέρου εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ ὃ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὀνειδίζειν· μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα καὶ ταπεινότητος σημεῖα.
6.11. And to speak at great length about oneself and to make all kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what another has done; for this is a sign of boastfulness. Similarly, in regard to each of all the other vices of character, the acts resulting from them, their signs, and the things which resemble them, all these are disgraceful, and should make us ashamed.
6.11. καὶ τὸ περὶ αὑτοῦ πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τἀλλότρια αὑτοῦ φάσκειν· ἀλαζονείας γάρ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἤθους κακιῶν τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· αἰσχρὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναίσχυντα.
6.12. It is also shameful not to have a share in the honorable things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the majority of them, have a share in. By those who resemble us I mean those of the same race, of the same city, of the same age, of the same family, and, generally speaking, those who are on an equality; for then it is disgraceful not to have a share, for instance, in education and other things, to the same extent. All these things are the more disgraceful, if the fault appears to be our own; for they are at once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if we ourselves are the cause of past, present, or future defects.
6.12. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν καλῶν ὧν πάντες μετέχουσιν, ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, μὴ μετέχειν—ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω ὁμοεθνεῖς, πολίτας, ἡλικιώτας, συγγενεῖς, ὅλως τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου—αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἤδη τὸ μὴ μετέχειν οἷον παιδεύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ἂν διʼ ἑαυτὸν φαίνηται· οὕτω γὰρ ἤδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἂν αὐτὸς ᾖ αἴτιος τῶν ὑπαρξάντων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μελλόντων.
6.13. And we are ashamed when we suffer or have suffered or are likely to suffer things which tend to ignominy and reproach; such are prostituting one's person or performing disgraceful actions, including unnatural lust. And of these actions those that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary (the latter being those that are done under compulsion), since meek endurance and the absence of resistance are the result of unmanliness or cowardice. These and similar things are those of which men are ashamed.
6.13. πάσχοντες δὲ ἢ πεπονθότες ἢ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσχύνονται ὅσα εἰς ἀτιμίαν φέρει καὶ ὀνείδη· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ εἰς ὑπηρετήσεις ἢ σώματος ἢ ἔργων αἰσχρῶν, ὧν ἐστιν τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα, τὰ δʼ εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα· ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἢ δειλίας ἡ ὑπομονὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι. ἃ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·
6.14. And since shame is an impression about dishonor, and that for its own sake and not for its results; and since no one heeds the opinion of others except on account of those who hold it, it follows that men feel shame before those whom they esteem.
6.14. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἀλλʼ ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους αἰσχύνεσθαι ὧν λόγον ἔχει·
6.15. Now men esteem those who admire them and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and whose opinion they do not despise.
6.15. λόγον δὲ ἔχει τῶν θαυμαζόντων, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει, καὶ ὑφʼ ὧν βούλεται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμεῖται, καὶ ὧν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης·
6.16. They desire to be admired by those, and admire those who possess anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from whom they urgently require something which it is in their power to give, as is the case with lovers.
6.16. θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν οὖν βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμάζουσι τούτους ὅσοι τι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμίων, ἢ παρʼ ὧν τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὧν ἐκεῖνοι κύριοι, οἷον οἱ ἐρῶντες·
6.17. And they are rivals of those who are like them; and they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as likely to be truthful; such are the older and well educated.
6.17. φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους· φροντίζουσι δʼ ὡς ἀληθευόντων τῶν φρονίμων, τοιοῦτοι δʼ οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι.
6.18. They are also more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in broad daylight; whence the proverb, The eyes are the abode of shame. That is why they feel more ashamed before those who are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases they are under the eyes of others.
6.18. καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον (ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ)· διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα.
6.19. Men are also ashamed before those who are not open to the same accusations, for it is evident that their feelings are contrary. And before those who are not indulgent towards those who appear to err; for a man is supposed not to reproach others with what he does himself, so it is clear that what he reproaches them with is what he does not do himself.
6.19. καὶ τοὺς μὴ περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐνόχους· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τἀναντία δοκεῖ τούτοις. καὶ τοὺς μὴ συγγνωμονικοὺς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἁμαρτάνειν· ἃ γάρ τις αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοῖς πέλας οὐ νεμεσᾶν, ὥστε ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι νεμεσᾷ.
6.20. And before those who are fond of gossiping generally; for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts to not regarding it as a fault at all. Now those who are inclined to gossip are those who have suffered wrong, because they always have their eyes upon us; and slanderers, because, if they traduce the innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty. And before those who spend their time in looking for their neighbors' faults, for instance, mockers and comic poets; for they are also in a manner slanderers and gossips. And before those from whom they have never asked anything in vain, for they feel as if they were greatly esteemed. For this reason they feel ashamed before those who ask them for something for the first time, as never yet having lost their good opinion. Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have only seen what is best in them, which is the point of the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans), or old acquaintances who know nothing against us.
6.20. καὶ τοὺς ἐξαγγελτικοὺς πολλοῖς· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μὴ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐξαγγέλλειν· ἐξαγγελτικοὶ δὲ οἵ τε ἠδικημένοι, διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν, καὶ οἱ κακολόγοι· εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας. καὶ οἷς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας ἁμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ πως οὗτοι καὶ ἐξαγγελτικοί. καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχήκασιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκεινται· διὸ καὶ τοὺς πρῶτον δεηθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται ὡς οὐδέν πω ἠδοξηκότες ἐν αὐτοῖς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἄρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ βέλτιστα τεθέανται· διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους), καὶ τῶν πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν συνειδότες.
6.21. And men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful things we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, for instance, not only of sensual pleasures, but also of the indications of them; and not only of doing, but also of saying disgraceful things.
6.21. αἰσχύνονται δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰσχυντηλὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδισιάζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντες τὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες.
6.22. Similarly, men are ashamed not only before those who have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them, such as their servants or friends.
6.22. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐτοῖς, οἷον θεράποντας καὶ φίλους τούτων.
6.23. In a word, they are not ashamed either before those whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them and those who are not; before the former, they are ashamed of things that appear really disgraceful, before strangers, of those which are only condemned by convention.
6.23. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὔθʼ ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν (οὐδεὶς γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται), οὔτε ταὐτὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν δοκοῦντα τοὺς δʼ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.
6.24. Men are likely to feel shame in the following situations; first, if there are any who are so related to them as those before whom we said that they feel shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are admired by them or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they need some service, which they will not obtain if they lose their reputation. These, again, are either persons who directly see what is going on (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the territory of Samos, begged the Athenians to picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing round them and would not only hear, but also see what they were going to decree); or neighbors; or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. That is why men do not like, when unfortunate, to be seen by those who were once their rivals, for rivalry presumes admiration.
6.24. αὐτοὶ δὲ ὧδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἄν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ὑπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτως τινὲς οἵους ἔφαμεν εἶναι οὓς αἰσχύνονται. ἦσαν δʼ οὗτοι ἢ ⟨οἱ⟩ θαυμαζόμενοι ἢ θαυμάζοντες ἢ ὑφʼ ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ ὧν δέονταί τινα χρείαν ἧς μὴ τεύξονται ἄδοξοι ὄντες, καὶ οὗτοι ἢ ὁρῶντες (ὥσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγόρησεν· ἠξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖντοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὡς ὁρῶντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἃ ἂν ψηφίσωνται), ἢ ἂν πλησίον ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἢ μέλλωσιν αἰσθήσεσθαι· διὸ καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες ὑπὸ τῶν ζηλούντων ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ οἱ ζηλωταί.
6.25. Men also feel shame when they are connected with actions or things which entail disgrace, for which either they themselves, or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are closely connected are responsible. In a word, men feel shame for those whom they themselves respect; such are those mentioned and those who have any relation to them, for instance, whose teachers or advisers they have been; similarly, when they are in rivalry with others who are like them;
6.25. καὶ ὅταν ἔχωσιν ἃ καταισχύνουσιν ἔργα καὶ πράγματα ἢ αὑτῶν ἢ προγόνων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγχιστεία τις. καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί· εἰσὶ δʼ οὗτοι οἱ εἰρημένοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι, ἢ ὧν διδάσκαλοι ἢ σύμβουλοι γεγόνασιν, ἢ ἐὰν ὦσιν ἕτεροι ὅμοιοι πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται·
6.26. for there are many things which they either do or do not do owing to the feeling of shame which these men inspire.
6.26. πολλὰ γὰρ αἰσχυνόμενοι διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν.
6.27. And they are more likely to be ashamed when they have to be seen and to associate openly with those who are aware of their disgrace. Wherefore the tragic poet Antiphon, when he was about to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing that those who were to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the gates, said, “Why cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that one of the crowd should see you tomorrow?” Let this account of shame suffice; as for shamelessness, it is evident that we shall be able to obtain ample knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.
6.27. καὶ μέλλοντες ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν φανερῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ μᾶλλον εἰσίν· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, μέλλων ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου, εἶπεν, ἰδὼν τοὺς συναποθνῄσκειν μέλλοντας ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς ᾔεσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, τί ἐγκαλύπτεσθε; ἔφη· ἦ μὴ αὔριόν τις ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ τούτων; περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνης ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυντίας δῆλον ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐπορήσομεν.
7.1. The persons towards whom men feel benevolent, and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what favor is.
7.1. τίσιν δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, ὁρισαμένοις τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται.
7.2. Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a service to one who needs it, not in return for something nor in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of the recipient. And the favor will be great if the recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree.
7.2. ἔστω δὴ χάρις, καθʼ ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργία τῷ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, μηδʼ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλʼ ἵνα τι ἐκείνῳ· μεγάλη δὲ ἂν ᾖ σφόδρα δεόμενος, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα.
7.3. By needs I mean longings, especially for things the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain; such are the desires, for instance, love; also those which arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for when a man is in pain or danger he desires something. That is why those who help a man who is poor or an exile, even if the service be ever so small, are regarded with favor owing to the urgency and occasion of the need; for instance, the man who gave the mat to another in the Lyceum.
7.3. δεήσεις δέ εἰσιν αἱ ὀρέξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου. τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἷον ἔρως, καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσιν καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος· διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ φυγαῖς, κἂν μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν δούς.
7.4. It is necessary then, if possible, that the service should be in the same direction; if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or greater need. Since then it is evident on what occasions, for what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need. It is evident also by what means it is possible to make out that there is no favor at all, or that those who render it are not actuated by benevolence; for it can either be said that they do, or have done so, for their own sake, in which case there is no favor; or that it was mere chance; or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return, so that in this case also there is no favor.
7.4. ἀνάγκη οὖν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταὐτὰ ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἴσα ἢ μείζω· ὥστε ἐπεὶ φανερὸν καὶ οἷς καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τοὺς μὲν δεικνύντας ἢ ὄντας ἢ γεγενημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ λύπῃ καὶ δεήσει, τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετηκότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρείᾳ τοιοῦτόν τι ἢ ὑπηρετοῦντας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀχαρίστους· ἢγὰρ ὅτι αὑτῶν ἕνεκα ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἢ ὑπηρέτησαν (τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἦν χάρις), ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἢ συνηναγκάσθησαν, ἢ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτε εἰδότες εἴτε μή· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὸ ἀντί τινος, ὥστε οὐδʼ οὕτως ἂν εἴη χάρις.
7.6. And the action must be considered in reference to all the categories; for if there is a favor it is so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or place. And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons have not rendered a smaller service, or if they have rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our enemies; for it is evident that they do not act for our sake in this case either. Or if the service was insignificant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no one admits that he has need of what is insignificant.
7.6. καὶ περὶ ἁπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκεπτέον· ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἢ τοσόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἢ πότε ἢ ποῦ. σημεῖον δὲ εἰ ἔλαττον μὴ ὑπηρέτησαν, καὶ εἰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἴσα ἢ μείζω· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἕνεκα. ἢ εἰ φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ δεῖσθαι φαύλων.
8.1. Let this suffice for benevolence and the opposite. We will now state what things and persons excite pity, and the state of mind of those who feel it.
8.1. καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἴρηται· ποῖα δʼ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν.
8.2. Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or one similar, or nearly similar.
8.2. ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον οἷον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἷον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον·
8.3. Wherefore neither those who are utterly ruined, are capable of pity, for they think they have nothing more to suffer, since they have exhausted suffering; nor those who think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather are insolent. For if they think that all good things are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things.
8.3. διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ), οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλʼ ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἅπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τἀγαθά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν μηδὲν κακόν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
8.4. Now those persons who think they are likely to suffer are those who have already suffered and escaped; the advanced in age, by reason of their wisdom and experience; and the weak, and those who are rather more timid; and the educated, for they reckon rightly;
8.4. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἷοι νομίζειν παθεῖν ἄν, οἵ τε πεπονθότες ἤδη καὶ διαπεφευγότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διʼ ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· εὐλόγιστοι γάρ.
8.5. and those who have parents, children, or wives, for these are part of them and likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken;
8.5. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχουσι γονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα.
8.6. and those who are not influenced by any courageous emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these emotions do not take thought of the future and those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of mind, for they also take no thought of future suffering; but it is those who are between the two extremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great fear; for those who are panic-stricken are incapable of pity, because they are preoccupied with their own emotion.
8.6. καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρείας πάθει ὄντες, οἷον ἐν ὀργῇ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μήτε ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι), ἀλλʼ οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων, μήτʼ αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι, διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει.
8.7. And men feel pity if they think that some persons are virtuous; for he who thinks that no one is will think that all deserve misfortune. And, generally speaking, a man is moved to pity when he is so affected that he remembers that such evils have happened, or expects that they may happen, either to himself or to one of his friends.
8.7. κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενοςπάντας οἰήσεται ἀξίους εἶναι κακοῦ. καὶ ὅλως δὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ οὕτως ὥστʼ ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὑτῷ ἤ ⟨τῳ⟩ τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι αὑτῷ ἤ τῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ.
8.8. We have stated the frame of mind which leads men to pity; and the things which arouse this feeling are clearly shown by the definition. They are all painful and distressing things that are also destructive, and all that are ruinous; and all evils of which fortune is the cause, if they are great.
8.8. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεοῦσιν εἴρηται, ἃ δʼ ἐλεοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον· ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων.
8.9. Things distressing and destructive are various kinds of death, personal ill-treatment and injuries, old age, disease, and lack of food. The evils for which fortune is responsible are lack of friends, or few friends (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation; if some misfortune comes to pass from a quarter whence one might have reasonably expected something good;
8.9. ἔστι δὲ ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια, ὧν δʼ ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν ἀφιλία, ὀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ διασπᾶσθαι ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἐλεεινόν), αἶσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρξαι κακόν τι συμβῆναι,
8.11. and if this happens often; and if good fortune does not come until a man has already suffered, as when the presents from the Great King were not dispatched to Diopithes until he was dead. Those also are to be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who are unable to enjoy it when it has. These and the like things, then, excite pity.
8.11. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι τι ἀγαθόν, οἷον Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως τεθνεῶτι κατεπέμφθη, καὶ τὸ ἢ μηδὲν γεγενῆσθαι ἀγαθὸν ἢ γενομένων μὴ εἶναι ἀπόλαυσιν. ἐφʼ οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν·
8.12. The persons men pity are those whom they know, provided they are not too closely connected with them for if they are, they feel the same as if they themselves were likely to suffer. This is why Amasis is said not to have wept when his son was led to execution, but did weep at the sight of a friend reduced to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former terror. The terrible is different from the pitiable, for it drives out pity, and often serves to produce the opposite feeling.
8.12. ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τούς τε γνωρίμους, ἂν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν οἰκειότητι (περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ περὶ αὑτοὺς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἀμάσιος ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱεῖ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσαιτοῦντι· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον·
8.13. Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity. Men also pity those who resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in general, here also we may conclude that all that men fear in regard to themselves excites their pity when others are the victims.
8.13. ⟨οὐ γὰρ⟩ ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ δεινοῦ ὄντος), καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσιν κατὰ ἡλικίαν, κατὰ ἤθη, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἂν ὑπάρξαι· ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ὅσα ἐφʼ αὑτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπʼ ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν.
8.14. And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand, while those that are past or future, ten thousand years backwards or forwards, either do not excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because men neither expect the one nor remember the other, it follows that those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable; for they make the evil appear close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either future or past.
8.14. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη ἐλεεινά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα οὔτε ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένοι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὅλως ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι (ἐγγὺς γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸκακόν, πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιοῦντες ἢ ὡς μέλλοντα ἢ ὡς γεγονότα·
8.15. And disasters that have just happened or are soon about to happen excite more pity for the same reason. Pity is also aroused by signs and actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And when men show themselves undaunted at such critical times it is specially pitiable; for all these things, because they come immediately under our observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the suffering is before our eyes.
8.15. καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα), ⟨καὶ⟩ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων, οἷον ἤδη τελευτώντων. καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ὄντας ἐλεεινόν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ ὡς ἀναξίου ὄντος καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους.
9.1. Now what is called indignation is the antithesis to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions show good character, for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods.
9.1. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις. καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν· ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσᾶν.
9.3. It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different; envy also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and like. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbor; for it will cease to be indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune.
9.3. δόξειε δʼ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δʼ ἕτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ διʼ αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν φθόνος, τὸ δὲ νέμεσις, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας.
9.4. And it is evident that these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feelings; for he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at the sight of those who are deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished; we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate; for both these are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his like may also happen to himself.
9.4. φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατʼ ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὑτῷ.
9.5. And all these feelings arise from the same character and their contraries from the contrary; for he who is malicious is also envious, since, if the envious man is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they differ for the reasons stated; so that they are all equally useful for preventing any feeling of pity.
9.5. καὶ ἔστιν τοῦαὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφʼ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν· διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτʼ ἐστί, διαφέρει δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.
9.6. Let us then first speak of indignation, the persons with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons, and in what frame of mind; and then proceed to the rest of the emotions.
9.6. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσιν τε νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
9.7. What we have just said will make matters clear. For if indignation is being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved, in the first place it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good things;
9.7. φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν·
9.8. for no one will be indignant with a man who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities), but men are indignant at wealth, power, in a word, at all the advantages of which good men are worthy. [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such things.]
9.8. οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
9.9. And since that which is old seems closely to resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if two parties have the same good, men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes his prosperity to it; for the newly rich cause more annoyance than those who have long possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to offices of state, power, numerous friends, virtuous children, and any other advantages of the kind. And if these advantages bring them some other advantage, men are equally indignant; for in this case also the newly rich who attain to office owing to their wealth cause more annoyance than those who have long been wealthy; and similarly in all other cases of the same kind.
9.9. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐγγύς τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει, ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ λυποῦσιν οἱ νεωστὶ πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι καὶ εὔτεκνοι καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. καὶ ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλουτοι ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιόπλουτοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
9.10. The reason is that the latter seem to possess what belongs to them, the former not; for that which all along shows itself in the same light suggests a reality, so that the former seem to possess what is not theirs.
9.10. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν οἱ δʼ οὔ· τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν.
9.11. And since every kind of good is not suitable to the first comer, but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to the courageous man, and distinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to the nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him, we feel indignant. Similarly, if the inferior contends with the superior, especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying of the poet,He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon, for Zeus was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better man;or, if the pursuit is not the same, wherever the inferior contends with the superior in anything whatever, as for instance, the musician with the just man; for justice is better than music. From this it is clear, then, with whom men are indignant and for what reasons; they are these or of such a kind.
9.11. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον, ἀλλά τις ἔστιν ἀναλογία καί τι ἁρμόττον, οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἁρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ, καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουσίοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς εὐγενέσιν· ἂν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν μὴ τοῦ ἁρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, νεμεσητόν. καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴρηται,Αἴαντος δʼ ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·Ζεὺς γὰρ οἱ νεμέσασχʼ, ὅτʼ ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο·εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ὁ ἥττων τῷ κρείττονι, οἷον εἰ ὁ μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ· βέλτιον γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς μουσικῆς.
9.12. Men are prone to indignation, first, if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest advantages, for it is not just that those who do not resemble them should be deemed worthy of the same advantages;
9.12. οἷς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ διὰ τί, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. αὐτοὶ δὲ νεμεσητικοί εἰσιν, ἐὰν ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα κεκτημένοι· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἠξιῶσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ δίκαιον.
9.13. secondly, if they happen to be virtuous and worthy, for they both judge correctly and hate what is unjust.
9.13. δεύτερον δέ, ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγχάνωσιν· κρίνουσί τε γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσι.
9.14. And those who are ambitious and long for certain positions, especially if they are those which others, although unworthy, have obtained.
9.14. καὶ ἐὰν φιλότιμοι καὶ ὀρεγόμενοί τινων πραγμάτων, καὶ μάλιστʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ περὶ ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὦσιν ὧν ἕτεροι ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγχάνουσιν.
9.15. And, in general, those who think themselves worthy of advantages of which they consider others unworthy, are inclined to be indignant with the latter and because of these advantages. This is why the servile and worthless and unambitious are not inclined to indignation; for there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy.
9.15. καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς ὧν ἑτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, νεμεσητικοὶ τούτοις καὶ τούτων· διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι οὐ νεμεσητικοί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὗ ἑαυτοὺς οἴονται ἀξίους εἶναι.
9.16. It is evident from this what kind of men they are whose ill fortunes, calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice or at least feel no pain; for the opposites are clear from what has been said. If then the speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves that those who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve that it should be refused them, then pity will be impossible.
9.16. φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ κακοπραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπως ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι δῆλα, ὥστʼ ἐὰν τούς τε κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους ὄντας τυγχάνειν ἀξίους δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν.
10.1. It is equally clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious, if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be envious who have, or seem to have, others “like” them.
10.1. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινομένῃ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐκείνους· φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσί τινες ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται·