19.23. In regard to the future, it is clear that one can argue in the same way; for if we are able and wish to do a thing, it will be done; and so too will those things which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to do, if we have the power. For this reason also, if a man has an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it will probably be done; since, as a rule, things that are about to happen are more likely to happen than those which are not.
19.23. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον· τό τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐν βουλήσει ὂν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα, ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ὁρμῇ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ μελλήσει ἔσται· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα.
19.24. And if all the natural antecedents have happened; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it will probably rain.
19.24. καὶ εἰ προγέγονε ὅσα πρότερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς ὗσαι.
19.25. And if one thing has been done with a view to another, it is probable that the latter will also be done; for instance, if a foundation has been laid, a house will probably be built.
19.25. καὶ εἰ τὸ ἕνεκα τούτου γέγονε, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, οἷον εἰ θεμέλιος, καὶ οἰκία.
19.26. What we have previously said clearly shows the nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of the greater and less, and of things great and small generally. For, when treating of deliberative rhetoric, we spoke of greatness of goods, and of the greater and less generally. Therefore, since in each branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good, such as the expedient, the noble, or the just, it is evident that all must take the materials of amplification from these.
19.26. περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μείζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐστιν φανερόν. εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περί τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος, ὥστε ἐπεὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι διʼ ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν.
19.27. To make any further inquiry as to magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste of words; for the particular has more authority than the general for practical purposes. Let this suffice for the possible and impossible; for the question whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or not; and for the greatness or smallness of things.
19.27. τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους ἁπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστιν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων. περὶ μὲν οὖν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ πότερον γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.
20.1. It remains to speak of the proofs common to all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular proofs have been discussed. These common proofs are of two kinds, example and enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme).
20.1. λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων. εἰσὶ δʼ αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματός ἐστιν.
20.2. Let us then first speak of the example; for the example resembles induction, and induction is a beginning. There are two kinds of examples; namely, one which consists in relating things that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are subdivided into comparisons or fables, such as those of Aesop and the Libyan.
20.2. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δʼ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή. παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἴδη δύο· ἓν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν παραδείγματος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγενομένα, ἓν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. τούτου δὲ ἓν μὲν παραβολὴ ἓν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Αἰσώπειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί.
20.3. It would be an instance of the historical kind of example, if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and not to allow him to subdue Egypt; for Darius did not cross over to Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt; but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; consequently, if the present Great King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore it must not be allowed.
20.3. ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε τι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ πρότερον Δαρεῖος οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησεν πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται, διὸ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.
20.4. Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates; for instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those competent to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot, not by a man's knowledge.
20.4. παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἳ δύνανται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλʼ οἳ ἂν λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὅντινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον.
20.5. A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to them: “A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time became the man's slave. So then,” said he, “do you take care lest, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy, you be treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of Phalaris.”
20.5. λόγος δέ, οἷος ὁ Στησιχόρου περὶ Φαλάριδος καὶ ⟨ὁ⟩ Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ. Στησίχορος μὲν γὰρ ἑλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν Ἱμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελλόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι τοῦ σώματος, τἆλλα διαλεχθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος, ἐλθόντος δʼ ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἠρώτα τινὰ ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναιτʼ ἂν μετʼ αὐτοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον, ὁ δʼ ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ἔχων ἀκόντια· συνομολογήσας δὲ καὶ ἀναβάντος ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἔφη, ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε ἤδη, ἑλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα· ἑὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἤδη Φαλάριδι.
20.6. Aesop, when defending at Samos a demagogue who was being tried for his life, related the following anecdote. “A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable to get out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a number of dog-fleas clung to her skin. A hedgehog, wandering about, saw her and, moved with compassion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. The fox refused and when the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of me and draw little blood; but if you take them away, others will come that are hungry and will drain what remains to me.’ You in like manner, O Samians, will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is wealthy; but if you put him to death, others will come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds.”
20.6. Αἴσωπος δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ δημηγορῶν κρινομένου δημαγωγοῦ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ κυνοραιστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς, ἐχῖνον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν αὐτήν, κατοικτείραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραιστάς, τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν· ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν φάναι ἤδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἕλκουσιν αἷμα, ἐὰν δὲ τούτους ἀφέλητε, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν αἷμα. ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι βλάψει (πλούσιος γάρ ἐστιν), ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, ἕτεροι ἥξουσι πένητες, οἳ ὑμᾶς ἀναλώσουσι τὰ λοιπὰ κλέπτοντες.
20.7. Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to find similar things that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables; for they must be invented, like comparisons, if a man is capable of seizing the analogy; and this is easy if one studies philosophy.
20.7. εἰσὶ δʼ οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους δὲ ῥᾷον· ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἄν τις δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὅπερ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας.
20.8. Thus, while the lessons conveyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived from facts are more useful for deliberative oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past.
20.8. ῥᾴω μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.
20.9. If we have no enthymemes, we must employ examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these; but if we have them, examples must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue to the enthymemes. For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in very few cases; if they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to induce belief. Wherefore also it is necessary to quote a number of examples if they are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put last; for even a single trustworthy witness is of use. We have thus stated how many kinds of examples there are, and how and when they should be made use of.
20.9. δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐνθυμήματα ὡς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἡ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων), ἔχοντα δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν· προτιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός· διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἓν ἱκανόν· μάρτυς γὰρ χρηστὸς καὶ εἷς χρήσιμος. πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε χρηστέον, εἴρηται.
21.1. In regard to the use of maxims, it will most readily be evident on what subjects, and on what occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has been defined.
21.1. περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ῥηθέντος τί ἐστιν γνώμη μάλιστʼ ἂν γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἁρμόττει χρῆσθαι τῷ γνωμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
21.2. Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general; it does not even deal with all general things, as for instance that the straight is the opposite of the crooked, but with the objects of human actions, and with what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the enthymeme is, we may say, the syllogism dealing with such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example:No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be excessively clever,is a maxim; but when the why and the wherefore are added, the whole makes an enthymeme; for instance,for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against them, they earn jealous hostility from the citizens.Another example:There is no man who is happy in everything;or,There is no man who is really free.The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse it is an enthymeme:for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.
21.2. ἔστι δὴ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου, οὔτε περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ ⟨ἃ⟩ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὁ περὶ τοιούτων συλλογισμός ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τὰ συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷονχρὴ δʼ οὔ ποθʼ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκʼ ἀνήρπαῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί ἐνθύμημά ἐστιν τὸ ἅπαν, οἷονχωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,φθόνον παρʼ ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ,καὶ τὸοὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πάντʼ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ,καὶ τὸοὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅστις ἔστʼ ἐλεύθεροςγνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα,ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης.
21.3. Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it follows that maxims are of four kinds; for they are either accompanied by an epilogue or not.
21.3. εἰ δή ἐστιν γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι γνώμης· ἢ γὰρ μετʼ ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.
21.4. Now all those that state anything that is contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative proof; but those that do not, need no epilogue, either because they are already known, as, for instance,Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our opinion,for this is generally agreed; or because, no sooner are they uttered than they are clear to those who consider them, for instance,He is no lover who does not love always.
21.4. ἀποδείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί εἰσιν ὅσαι παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενον· ὅσαι δὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου. τούτων δʼ ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνῶσθαι μηδὲν δεῖσθαι ἐπιλόγου, οἷονἀνδρὶ δʼ ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἐστιν, ὥς γʼ ἐμὶν δοκεῖ(φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω), τὰς δʼ ἅμα λεγομένας δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἷονοὐδεὶς ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ.
21.6. As for the maxims that are accompanied by an epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, asNo one who is sensible, etc.,while others are enthymematic, but are not part of an enthymeme; and these are most highly esteemed. Such are those maxims in which the reason of what is said is apparent: for instance,Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath;to say that one should not always nourish immortal wrath is a maxim, but the addition “being a mortal” states the reason. It is the same withA mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.
21.6. τῶν δὲ μετʼ ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος εἰσίν, ὥσπερχρὴ δʼ οὔ ποθʼ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων,αἱ δʼ ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος· αἵπερ καὶ μάλιστʼ εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. εἰσὶν δʼ αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον ἐν τῷἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὤν·τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι μὴ δεῖν φυλάττειν γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσκείμενον θνητὸν ὄντα τὸ διὰ τί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶθνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν.
21.7. It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what it is appropriate to apply them in each case. For in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary to the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary; but either the epilogue may be put first and the conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one were to say, “As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated”; or put the maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases where the statements made, although not paradoxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as concisely as possible.
21.7. φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη γνώμης, καὶ περὶ ποῖον ἕκαστον ἁρμόττει· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλʼ ἢ προθέντα τὸν ἐπίλογον γνώμῃ χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι (οἷον εἴ τις εἴποι ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτʼ ἀργὸν εἶναι, οὔ φημι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι), ἢ τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπεῖν τὰ ἔμπροσθεν· περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ προστιθέντα τὸ διότι στρογγυλώτατα.
21.8. In such cases Laconic apophthegms and riddling sayings are suitable; as, for instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas should be forced to chirp from the ground.
21.8. ἁρμόττει δʼ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη, οἷον εἴ τις λέγει ὅπερ Στησίχορος ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβριστὰς εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ᾄδωσιν.
21.9. The use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced in years, and in regard to things in which one has experience; since the use of maxims before such an age is unseemly, as also is story-telling; and to speak about things of which one has no experience shows foolishness and lack of education. A sufficient proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of coining maxims and ready to make display of them.
21.9. ἁρμόττει δὲ γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβυτέρων, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὧν ἔμπειρός τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δὲ ὧν ἄπειρος, ἠλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δὲ ἱκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται.
21.10. To express in general terms what is not general is especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and then either at the beginning or after the demonstration.
21.10. καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἁρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ἀποδείξαντα.
21.11. One should even make use of common and frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful; for because they are common, they seem to be true, since all as it were acknowledge them as such; for instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to brave danger before having sacrificed may say,The best of omens is to defend one's country,and if they are inferior in numbers,The chances of war are the same for both,and if advising them to destroy the children of the enemy even though they are innocent of wrong,Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the children to live.
21.11. χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὦσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς ὁμολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένουςεἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης,καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττους ὄνταςξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος,καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντανήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.
21.12. Further, some proverbs are also maxims; for example, “An Attic neighbor.”
21.12. ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον παροιμία Ἀττικὸς πάροικος.
21.13. Maxims should also be used even when contrary to the most popular sayings, such as “Know thyself” and “Nothing in excess,” either when one's character is thereby likely to appear better, or if they are expressed in the language of passion. It would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, “It is not true that a man should know himself; at any rate, such a man as this, if he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command.” And one's character would appear better, if one were to say that it is not right, as men say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were bound to love.
21.13. δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν καὶ παρὰ τὰ δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα οἷον τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν), ὅταν ἢ τὸ ἦθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ βέλτιον ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη. ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μὲν οἷον εἴ τις ὀργιζόμενος φαίη ψεῦδος εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὑτόν· οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε στρατηγεῖν ἠξίωσε· τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ φασίν, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας.
21.14. The moral purpose also should be made clear by the language, or else one should add the reason; for example, either by saying “that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if one were going to love for ever, for the other kind of love would imply treachery”; or thus, “The maxim does not please me, for the true friend should love as if he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve the maxim ‘Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate the wicked too much.”
21.14. δεῖ δὲ τῇ λέξει τὴν προαίρεσιν συνδηλοῦν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, οἷον οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα· ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον, ἢ ὧδε, οὐκ ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς φιλήσοντα ἀεὶ φιλεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ τούς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν.
21.15. Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, first, because of the vulgarity of the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially hold. What I mean will be clear from the following, and also how one should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we have said, is a statement of the general; accordingly, the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general terms the opinion which they have already specially formed. For instance, a man who happened to have bad neighbors or children would welcome any one's statement that nothing is more troublesome than neighbors or more stupid than to beget children. Wherefore the speaker should endeavor to guess how his hearers formed their preconceived opinions and what they are, and then express himself in general terms in regard to them.
21.15. ἔχουσι δʼ εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν μὲν διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν· χαίρουσι γὰρ ἐάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὃ δὲ λέγω δῆλον ἔσται ὧδε, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἐστίν, χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὃ κατὰ μέρος προϋπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσι· οἷον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἢ τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδέξαιτʼ ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἠλιθιώτερον τεκνοποιίας, ὥστε δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι ποῖα τυγχάνουσι προϋπολαμβάνοντες, εἶθʼ οὕτως περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν.
21.16. This is one of the advantages of the use of maxims, but another is greater; for it makes speeches ethical. Speeches have this character, in which the moral purpose is clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because he who employs them in a general manner declares his moral preferences; if then the maxims are good, they show the speaker also to be a man of good character. Let this suffice for what we had to say concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of them there are, the way they should be used, and what their advantages are.
21.16. ταύτην τε δὴ ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἠθικοὺς γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ἦθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρέσεων, ὥστε, ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα. περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη ταύτης καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὠφέλειαν ἔχει, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.
22.1. Let us now speak of enthymemes in general and the manner of looking for them, and next of their topics; for each of these things is different in kind.
22.1. περὶ δʼ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον τούτων ἐστίν.
22.2. We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it differs from the dialectic syllogisms;
22.2. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς συλλογισμός, καὶ τί διαφέρει τῶν διαλεκτικῶν·
22.3. for the conclusion must neither be drawn from too far back nor should it include all the steps of the argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in the second, it is simply a waste of words, because it states much that is obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in the presence of crowds; as the poets say, “the ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a mob.” For the educated use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore one must not argue from all possible opinions, but only from such as are definite and admitted, for instance, either by the judges themselves or by those of whose judgement they approve. Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion of all or most of the hearers; and again, conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from those which are only true as a rule.
22.3. οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρʼ ὄχλῳ μουσικωτέρως λέγειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν, οἱ δʼ ἐξ ὧν ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς· ὥστʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν ὡρισμένων λεκτέον, οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται, καὶ τοῦτο διότι οὕτως φαίνεται δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις· καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
22.4. First of all, then, it must be understood that, in regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or of any other kind, it is necessary to be also acquainted with the elements of the question, either entirely or in part; for if you know none of these things, you will have nothing from which to draw a conclusion.
22.4. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθʼ ὁποιῳοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ τούτου ἔχειν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· μηδὲν γὰρ ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοις συνάγειν.
22.5. I should like to know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not know in what their strength consists, whether it is naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further, what wars they have already waged, with what success, and all similar things?
22.5. λέγω δʼ οἷον πῶς ἂν δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ πολεμητέον, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυτικὴ ἢ πεζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί, εἶτα τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα·
22.6. Again, how could we praise them, if we did not know of the naval engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other similar things? for men always base their praise upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious deeds.
22.6. ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες.
22.7. Similarly, they base their censure upon actions that are contrary to these, examining whether those censured have really, or seem to have, committed them; for example, that the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians, and all such acts, and whatever other similar offences may have been committed by them. Similarly, in accusation and defence, speakers argue from an examination of the circumstances of the case.
22.7. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἠνδραποδίσαντο, Αἰγινήτας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, [καὶ] εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπούμενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται.
22.8. It makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful; defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust; advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful.
22.8. οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει περὶ Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρᾶν· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ ψέγοντα, καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον, ἵνʼ ἐκ τούτων λέγωμεν, ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπάρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δʼ ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, συμβουλεύοντες δʼ εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν.
22.9. And similarly in regard to any subject whatever. For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in justice or the good.
22.9. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὁτουοῦν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ·
22.10. Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly or loosely—since they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove anything in any other way —it is evidently necessary, as has been stated in the Topics, to have first on each subject a selection of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable.
22.10. ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω φαίνονται ἀποδεικνύντες, ἐάν τε ἀκριβέστερον ἐάν τε μαλακώτερον συλλογίζωνται (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων λαμβάνουσιν ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπαρχόντων), καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως δεικνύναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἕκαστον ἔχειν ἐξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξ ὑπογυίου γιγνομένων ζητεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀόριστα ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφοντα ὅ τι πλεῖστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος·
22.11. As for those to be used in sudden emergencies, the same method of inquiry must be adopted; we must look, not at what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the subject; for the more facts one has, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable are they and less common. By common I mean, for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man, or one of the demigods, or because he went on the expedition against Troy; for this is applicable to many others as well, so that such praise is no more suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to no one else; for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from disembarking, being invulnerable; to have gone to the war when very young, and without having taken the oath; and all such things.
22.11. ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσούτῳ ῥᾷον δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ δʼ ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα καὶ ἧττον κοινά. λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ Ἴλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην· ἴδια δὲ ἃ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἕκτορα τὸν ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς ἐκώλυσεν ἅπαντας ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὤν, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὢν ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.
22.13. One method of selection then, and this the first, is the topical. Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks.
22.13. εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν· στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό. πρῶτον δὲ εἴπωμεν περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον.
22.14. There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one demonstrative, which proves that a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic.
22.14. ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ δʼ ἐλεγκτικά, καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός.
22.15. The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions from admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the adversary.
22.15. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν.
22.16. We know nearly all the general heads of each of the special topics that are useful or necessary; for the propositions relating to each have been selected, so that we have in like manner already established all the topics from which enthymemes may be derived on the subject of good or bad, fair or foul, just or unjust, characters, emotions, and habits.
22.16. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔχονται οἱ τόποι· ἐξειλεγμέναι γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν, ὥστε ἐξ ὧν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, ἢ καλοῦ ἢ αἰσχροῦ, ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθημάτων καὶ ἕξεων ὡσαύτως, εἰλημμένοι ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι.
22.17. Let us now endeavor to find topics about enthymemes in general in another way, noting in passing those which are refutative and those which are demonstrative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which are not really enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we will settle the question of solutions and objections, and whence they must be derived to refute enthymemes.
22.17. ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καθόλου περὶ ἁπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς, καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεί περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν. δηλωθέντων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.
23.1. One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites; for it is necessary to consider whether one opposite is predicable of the other, as a means of destroying an argument, if it is not, as a means of constructing one, if it is; for instance, self-control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful; or as in the Messeniacus, “If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must repair them with the aid of peace.” And,For if it is unfair to be angry with those who have done wrong unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to one who is forced to do us good.Or,If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is true.
23.1. ἔστι δὲ εἷς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν. ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι.εἴ περ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσινἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὀργὴν πεσεῖνοὐδʼ ἂν ἀναγκασθείς τις εὖ δράσῃ τινά,προσῆκον εἶναι τῷδʼ ὀφείλεσθαι χάριν.ἀλλʼ εἴ περ ἔστιν ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖνπιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τοὐναντίον,ἄπιστʼ ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.
23.2. Another topic is derived from similar inflections, for in like manner the derivatives must either be predicable of the subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly put to death is not desirable.
23.2. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων· ὁμοίως γὰρ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ δικαίως, νῦν δʼ οὐχ αἱρετὸν τὸ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν.
23.3. Another topic is derived from relative terms. For if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have suffered similarly may be predicated of the other; there is the same relation between having ordered and having carried out, as Diomedon the tax-gatherer said about the taxes, “If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is buying disgraceful for us.” And if rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated of the one who inflicts suffering; if of the latter, then also of the former. However, in this there is room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered justly, he has suffered justly, but perhaps not at your hands. Wherefore one must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves to suffer, and whether he who inflicts suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either way; for sometimes there is a difference in such a case, and nothing prevents [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes:And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother?Alcmaeon replied: “We must make a division before we examine the matter.” And when Alphesiboea asked “How?”, he rejoined,Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not for me to kill her.Another example may be found in the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor. For since it was decided that they had justly slain him, it was thought that he had been justly put to death. Again, in the case of the man who was murdered at Thebes, when the defendants demanded that the judges should decide whether the murdered man deserved to die, since a man who deserved it could be put to death without injustice.
23.3. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ καλῶς ἢ δικαίως ποιῆσαι, θατέρῳ τὸ πεπονθέναι, καὶ εἰ ⟨τὸ⟩ κελεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων περὶ τῶν τελῶν, εἰ γὰρ μηδʼ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδʼ ἡμῖν τὸ ὠνεῖσθαι. καὶ εἰ τῷ πεπονθότι τὸ καλῶς ἢ δικαίως ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ποιήσαντι. ἔστι δʼ ἐν τούτῳ παραλογίσασθαι· εἰ γὰρ δικαίως ἔπαθέν τι, [δικαίως πέπονθεν,] ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐχ ὑπὸ σοῦ· διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς εἰ ἄξιος ὁ παθὼν παθεῖν καὶ ὁ ποιήσας ποιῆσαι, εἶτα χρῆσθαι ὁποτέρως ἁρμόττει· ἐνίοτε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτουμητέρα δὲ τὴν σὴν οὔ τις ἐστύγει βροτῶν;φησὶ δὲ ἀποκρινόμενος ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῖν· ἐρομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀλφεσιβοίας πῶς, ὑπολαβών φησιντὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν, ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν.καὶ ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικάνορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἐκρίθησαν ἀποκτεῖναι, δικαίως ἔδοξεν ἀποθανεῖν. καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ κελεύει κρίνεσθαι εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.
23.4. Another topic is derived from the more and less. For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men; for this amounts to saying that if a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of which it is less probably affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his father also beats his neighbors, is an instance of the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists. Either of these arguments may be used, according as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not.
23.4. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον εἰ μηδʼ οἱ θεοὶ πάντα ἴσασιν, σχολῇ οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπάρχοι μὴ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδʼ ᾧ ἧττον. τὸ δʼ ὅτι τοὺς πλησίον τύπτει ὅς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τοῦ εἰ τὸ ἧττον ⟨ὑπάρχον⟩ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει· τοὺς γὰρ πατέρας ἧττον τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίον· ἢ δὴ οὕτως γε ἢ εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ ᾧ ἧττον ὑπάρχει ⟨ὑπάρχει⟩, ὁπότερον δεῖ δεῖξαι, εἴθʼ ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθʼ ὅτι οὔ.
23.5. Further, if there is no question of greater or less; whence it was said,Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children; is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious offspring?Other instances are: if Theseus did no wrong, neither did Alexander Paris; if the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander; and if Hector did no wrong in slaying Patroclus, neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles; if no other professional men are contemptible, then neither are philosophers; if generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated, neither are the sophists; or, if it behoves a private citizen to take care of your reputation, it is your duty to take care of that of Greece.
23.5. ἔτι εἰ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὅθεν εἴρηταικαὶ σὸς μὲν οἰκτρὸς παῖδας ἀπολέσας πατήρ·Οἰνεὺς δʼ ἄρʼ οὐχὶ [τὸν Ἑλλάδος] κλεινὸν ἀπολέσας γόνον;καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδʼ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηδʼ οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδʼ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἕκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος. καὶ εἰ μηδʼ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται φαῦλοι, οὐδʼ οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ εἰ μηδʼ οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι ὅτι θανατοῦνται πολλάκις, οὐδʼ οἱ σοφισταί. καὶ ὅτι εἰ δεῖ τὸν ἰδιώτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.
23.6. Another topic is derived from the consideration of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says: “If, before accomplishing anything, I had demanded the statue from you in the event of my success, you would have granted it; will you then refuse it, now that I have succeeded? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something, and break it when you have received it.” Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territory into Attica, they were told that “if he had made this request before helping them against the Phocians, they would have promised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and had trusted them.”
23.6. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν ποιῆσαι ἠξίουν τῆς εἰκόνος τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω, ἔδοτε ἄν· ποιήσαντι δʼ ἆρʼ οὐ δώσετε; μὴ τοίνυν μέλλοντες μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δʼ ἀφαιρεῖσθε. καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διιέναι Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς ἠξίου, ὑπέσχοντο ἄν· ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσεν μὴ διήσουσιν.
23.7. Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves; and this is an excellent method. For instance, in the Teucer... and Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would have betrayed the fleet for a bribe; when Aristophon said no, “Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so?” But the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as Aristides; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant; accordingly, it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself.
23.7. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθʼ αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ. διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος ᾧ ἐχρήσατο Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἂν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν· οὐ φάσκοντος δέ, εἶτα εἶπεν σὺ μὲν ὢν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ ἂν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δʼ ὢν Ἰφικράτης; δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἂν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μή, γελοῖον ἂν φανείη, ⟨οἷον⟩ εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα τοῦτό τις [ἂν] εἴπειεν ἄλλος πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· τοῦτʼ οὖν ἐξελέγχειν δεῖ. καθόλου δὲ ἄτοπός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειεν ἂν, ἢ προτρέπῃ ποιεῖν ἃ αὐτὸς μὴ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειεν ἄν.
23.8. Another topic is derived from definition. For instance, that the daimonion is nothing else than a god or the work of a god; but he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristogiton, before they did something noble; and, “I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours.” And as it is said in the Alexander that it would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman's person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favor as well as an injury. In all these cases, it is by definition and the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question.
23.8. ἄλλος ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ, οἷον τί τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστιν· ἆρα θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον; καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης, ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι πρᾶξαι. καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός· τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγγενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἢ τὰ σά. καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἑνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυσιν. καὶ διʼ ὃ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως καὶ εὖ παθόντας ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὁρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόντες τὸ τί ἐστι συλλογίζονται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν.
23.9. Another topic is derived from the different significations of a word, as explained in the Topics, where the correct use of these terms has been discussed.
23.9. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς.
23.10. Another, from division. For example, “There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from consideration as impossible; as for the third, not even the accusers assert it.”
23.10. ἄλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως, οἷον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἕνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν (ἢ τοῦδε γὰρ ἕνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε), καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδʼ αὐτοί φασιν.
23.11. Another, from induction. For instance, from the case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that in matters of parentage women always discern the truth; similarly, at Athens, when Mantias the orator was litigating with his son, the mother declared the truth; and again, at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis declared that Ismenias was its father, Thettaliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is another instance in the “law” of Theodectes: “If we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed to preserve the safety of others.” Similarly, in order to prove that men of talent are everywhere honored, Alcidamas said: “The Parians honored Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians Homer, although he had rendered no public services; the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a woman; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Chilon one of their senators; the Italiotes honored Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still hold him in honor... The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, as soon as those who had the conduct of affairs became philosophers, the city flourished.”
23.11. ἄλλος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἷον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ τῶν τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τἀληθές· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβητοῦντι πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέφηνεν ἡ μήτηρ, τοῦτο δὲ Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Στίλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων ἡ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμηνίου τὸν υἱόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ Νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμεληθεῖσι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόασι τοὺς οἰκείους, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς ⟨τὰς οἰκείας⟩, οὐκοῦν εἰ ὁμοίως ἐφʼ ἁπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν σωτηρίαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν· Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ γυναῖκα οὖσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα καὶ τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα φιλόλογοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσι ἔτι καὶ νῦν, καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησάμενοι εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν ἅμα οἱ προστάται φιλόσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ πόλις.