---
title: "Rhetoric · Ῥητορική"
author: "Aristotle"
translator: "John Henry Freese"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 9 of 12
url: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/9/
cite: "Aristotle, tr. John Henry Freese, Rhetoric · Ῥητορική, section 9. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/9/"
---

# Rhetoric · Ῥητορική

*Aristotle, tr. John Henry Freese*

The art of persuasion: argument, character, and the emotions of the audience.

> Greek: ed. William David Ross, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0086.tlg038, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: John Henry Freese, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 9. Book II · chapters 23–26

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/9/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/aristotle-rhetoric/9/#p-N

[¶0] 23.12. Another topic is that from a previous judgement in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, if possible when the judgement was unanimous or the same at all times; if not, when it was at least that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or most, or of the good; or of the judges themselves or of those whose judgement they accept, or of those whose judgement it is not possible to contradict, for instance, those in authority, or of those whose judgement it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the gods, a father, or instructors; as Autocles said in his attack on Mixidemides, “If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides?” Or Sappho, “Death is an evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would die.” Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously, said, “Our friend at any rate never spoke like that,” referring to Socrates. Hegesippus, after having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, asked the god at Delphi whether his opinion was the same as his father's, meaning that it would be disgraceful to contradict him. Helen was a virtuous woman, wrote Isocrates, because Theseus so judged; the same applies to Alexander Paris, whom the goddesses chose before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates says, for at any rate Conon. in his misfortune, passing over everyone else, sought his assistance.

> Greek: 23.12. ἄλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου, μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι, ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οἷς μὴ οἷόν τε ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ οἷς μὴ καλὸν ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις, ὥσπερ ὃ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, [εἰ] ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς καλῶς εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι τὰ δίκαια, Μιξιδημίδῃ δʼ οὔ. ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἀρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γʼ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν, ἔφη, οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον, λέγων τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ Ἡγησίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν, πρότερον κεχρημένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν, καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς ἔκρινεν, καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὅτι αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν, καὶ περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν· Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν.

[¶1] 23.13. Another topic is that from enumerating the parts, as in the Topics: What kind of movement is the soul? for it must be this or that. There is an instance of this in the Socrates of Theodectes: “What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods recognized by the city has he neglected to honor?”

> Greek: 23.13. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ποία κίνησις ἡ ψυχή· ἥδε γὰρ ἢ ἥδε. παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;

[¶2] 23.14. Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the “Art” of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have been mentioned.

> Greek: 23.14. ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥστε ἕπεσθαί τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν, οἷον τῇ παιδεύσει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ κακὸν ⟨ὄν⟩, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ· δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ. ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη, προσλαβοῦσα τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τἆλλα ὡς εἴρηται.

[¶3] 23.15. Another topic may be employed when it is necessary to exhort or dissuade in regard to two opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; “For if,” said she, “you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will.” On the other hand, “you should speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men will.” This is the same as the proverb, “To buy the swamp with the salt”; and retorting a dilemma on its proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves.

> Greek: 23.15. ἄλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν ἢ προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέῃ, [καὶ] τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τἀναντία· οἷον ἱέρεια οὐκ εἴα τὸν υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ ἄνθρωποί σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί· δεῖ μὲν οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ θεοί σε φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἄνθρωποι. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ λεγομένῳ, τὸ ἕλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἅλας· καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις τοῦτο ἐστίν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίοιν ἑκατέρῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἕπηται, ἐναντία ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις.

[¶4] 23.16. Again, since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavoring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements. This topic is the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.

> Greek: 23.16. ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταὐτὰ φανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαινοῦσι μάλιστα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βούλονται, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι συνάγειν θάτερον· τῶν γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώτατός ἐστιν.

[¶5] 23.17. Another topic is derived from analogy in things. For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his son to perform public services because he was tall, although under the legal age, said: “If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are boys.” Similarly, Theodectes in his “law,” says: “Since you bestow the rights of citizenship upon mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on account of their merits, will you not banish those of them who have wrought such irreparable misfortunes?”

> Greek: 23.17. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, οἷον ὁ Ἰφικράτης, τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς ἡλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους τῶν παίδων ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν παῖδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται, καὶ Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ Νόμῳ, ὅτι πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ Χαρίδημον, διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δʼ οὐ ποιήσεσθε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους;

[¶6] 23.18. Another topic consists in concluding the identity of antecedents from the identity of results. Thus Xenophanes said: “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist.” And, generally speaking, one may always regard as identical the results produced by one or other of any two things: “You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy.” And, “to give earth and water is slavery,” and “to be included in the common peace implies obeying orders.” Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.

> Greek: 23.18. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ᾖ ταὐτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν συμβαίνει ταὐτά· οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἑκάστου λαμβάνειν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεί· μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον. ληπτέον δʼ ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον.

[¶7] 23.19. Another topic is derived from the fact that the same men do not always choose the same thing before and after, but the contrary. The following enthymeme is an example: “If, when in exile, we fought to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting”! This amounts to saying that at one time they preferred to hold their ground at the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price of not remaining.

> Greek: 23.19. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταὐτὸ ἀεὶ αἱρεῖσθαι ὕστερον καὶ πρότερον, ἀλλʼ ἀνάπαλιν, οἷον τόδε τὸ ἐνθύμημα, ἦ φεύγοντες μὲν ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα; ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι ᾑροῦντο, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν.

[¶8] 23.20. Another topic consists in maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might, be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it. Whence it has been said:
It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great blessings upon many, but in order that they may suffer more striking calamities.
And these verses from the Meleager of Antiphon:
Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be witnesses to Greece of the valor of Meleager.
And the following remark from the Ajax of Theodectes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all others, not to do him honor, but that his companion might be his inferior; for this may have been the reason.

> Greek: 23.20. ἄλλος τὸ οὗ ἕνεκʼ ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο, τούτου ἕνεκα φάναι εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι, οἷον εἰ δοίη [ἄν] τίς τινι ἵνʼ ἀφελόμενος λυπήσῃ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴρηται,
πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατʼ εὔνοιαν φέρων
μεγάλα δίδωσιν εὐτυχήματʼ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα
τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας.
καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,
οὐχ ὡς κτάνωσι θῆρʼ, ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες
ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα.
καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο Ὀδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ἥττων ᾖ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκα ποιῆσαι.

[¶9] 23.21. Another topic common to forensic and deliberative rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they exist, determine us to act, if not, not; for instance, if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we accuse and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence, what persuades, for accusation. This topic comprises the whole “Art” of Pamphilus and Callippus.

> Greek: 23.21. ἄλλος, κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν, οἷον, εἰ δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ φίλοις ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς, κἂν ᾖ ἐπιζήμιον, εἰ ἐλάττων ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ προτρέπονται [δʼ] ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπονται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δʼ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἥ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἡ Καλλίππου.

[¶10] 23.22. Another topic is derived from things which are thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought so, if they had not happened or almost happened. And further, these things are even more likely to be true; for we only believe in that which is, or that which is probable: if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will be true; for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true. Thus, Androcles of Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at when he said “the laws need a law to correct them,” went on, “and fishes need salt, although it is neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine; similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces oil should itself need oil.”

> Greek: 23.22. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἢ ἐγγὺς ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον· ἢ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· εἰ οὖν ἄπιστον καὶ μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν δοκεῖ οὕτως· οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατηγορῶν τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι, δέονται οἱ νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰχθύες ἁλός, καίτοι οὐκ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἅλμῃ τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι ἁλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα ἐλαίου, καίτοι ἄπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἔλαιον γίγνεται, ταῦτα δεῖσθαι ἐλαίου.

[¶11] 23.23. Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words, first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, “he says that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty;” next, separately in your own case, “he says that I am litigious, but he cannot prove that I have ever brought an action against anyone”; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and yourself together: “he has never yet lent anything, but I have ransomed many of you.”

> Greek: 23.23. ἄλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ τόπων καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, οἷον καὶ φησὶ μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώμοσεν δὲ τοῖς τριάκοντα, χωρὶς δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ φησὶ μὲν εἶναί με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἀποδεῖξαι δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην, χωρὶς δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε πώποτε οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν.

[¶12] 23.24. Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance, consists in stating the reason for the false opinion; for there must be a reason for the supposition of guilt. For example, a woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with him, but when the reason was explained, the slander was quashed. Again, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although really more courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so.

> Greek: 23.24. ἄλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασιν, ἢ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παραδόξου· ἔστιν γάρ τι διʼ ὃ φαίνεται· οἷον, ὑποβεβλημένης τινὸς τὸν αὑτῆς υἱόν, διὰ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι ἐδόκει συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, λεχθέντος δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή· καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι τῷ Θεοδέκτου Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα διότι ἀνδρειότερος ὢν τοῦ Αἴαντος οὐ δοκεῖ.

[¶13] 23.25. Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist; for the effect exists with the cause, and without cause there is nothing. For example, Leodamas, when defending himself against the accusation of Thrasybulus that his name had been posted in the Acropolis but that he had erased it in the time of the Thirty, declared that it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had more confidence in him if his hatred against the people had been graven on the stone.

> Greek: 23.25. ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἄν τε ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι ἔστι, κἂν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ οὗ αἴτιον, καὶ ἄνευ αἰτίου οὐθὲν ἔστιν, οἷον Λεωδάμας ἀπολογούμενος ἔλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος Θρασυβούλου ὅτι ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει, ἀλλʼ ἐκκέκοπται ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα· οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔφη· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὑτῷ τοὺς τριάκοντα ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον.

[¶14] 23.26. Another topic consists in examining whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been, carried out. For it is evident that, if this has not been done, a person has not committed a certain action; because no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad. However, this argument may be false; for often it is not until later that it becomes clear what was the better course, which previously was uncertain.

> Greek: 23.26. ἄλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως, ἢ ἐνδέχεται, ὧν ἢ συμβουλεύει ἢ πράττει ἢ πέπραχε σκοπεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ [μὴ] οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραχεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν τὰ φαῦλα καὶ γιγνώσκων προαιρεῖται. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· πολλάκις γὰρ ὕστερον γίγνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πρᾶξαι βέλτιον, πρότερον δὲ ἄδηλον.

[¶15] 23.27. Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together. For instance, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea, or not, he advised them that, if they believed her to be a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, but if they believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice to her.

> Greek: 23.27. ἄλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἅμα σκοπεῖν, οἷον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύωσι τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσιν ἢ μή, συνεβούλευεν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δʼ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν.

[¶16] 23.28. Another topic consists in making use of errors committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some accuse Medea of having killed her children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself pleads that she would have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first “Art” of Theodorus.

> Greek: 23.28. ἄλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου Μηδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς (ἥμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μήδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων), ἡ δʼ ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι οὐ [ἂν] τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰάσονα ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἥμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα, εἴπερ καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δʼ ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη.

[¶17] 23.29. Another topic is derived from the meaning of a name. For instance, Sophocles says,
Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.
This topic is also commonly employed in praising the gods. Conon used to call Thrasybulus “the man bold in counsel,” and Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, “Thou art ever bold in fight,” and of Polus, “Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt by nature,” and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon, so severe were they. Hecuba in Euripides speaks thus of Aphro-dite:
And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the word aphro-syne (folly);
and Chaeremon of Pentheus,
Pentheus named after his unhappy future.

> Greek: 23.29. ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἷον ὡς ὁ Σοφοκλῆς
σαφῶς σιδήρῳ καὶ φοροῦσα τοὔνομα,
καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν, καὶ ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ, καὶ Πῶλον ἀεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἶ, καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ [ἂν] ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος (χαλεποὶ γάρ)· καὶ ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην
καὶ τοὔνομʼ ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεᾶς,
καὶ ὡς Χαιρήμων
Πενθεὺς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος.

[¶18] 23.30. Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion of opposites in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.

> Greek: 23.30. εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρʼ ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα ἀρχόμενα προορῶσι μὴ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι (ἅμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς χαίρουσι προαισθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσων τοσοῦτον ὑστερίζουσιν ὥσθʼ ἅμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

[¶19] 24.1. But as it is possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only apparent, there must also be real and apparent enthymemes, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism.

> Greek: 24.1. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἐνθύμημα φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπείπερ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις.

[¶20] 24.2. Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no syllogistic process, “therefore it is neither this nor that,” “so it must be this or that”; and similarly in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be an enthymeme; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state the heads of several syllogisms: “He saved some, avenged others, and freed the Greeks”; for each of these propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a fresh conclusion. The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy. For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important animal, since from it is derived the most honored of all religious festivals, namely, the mysteries; or if, in praising the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or Pan, because Pindar said,
O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great Mother, taking every form,
or were to say that the dog is an honorable animal, since to be without a dog is most dishonorable. And to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the gods, because he alone is called common; and that words are most excellent, since good men are considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for λόγου ἄξιος has a double meaning.

> Greek: 24.2. τόποι δʼ εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἷς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, καὶ τούτου ἓν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα (ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος)· καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δʼ ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δʼ Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσε· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι. ἓν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, τὸ φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφʼ οὗ γʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμιωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη τελετή. ἢ εἴ τις κύνα ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸν Πᾶνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν
ὦ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν
καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι,
ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνʼ ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ κύνα δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον. καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆν εἶναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται.

[¶21] 24.3. Another fallacy consists in combining what is divided or dividing what is combined. For since a thing which is not the same as another often appears to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus, to prove, for example, that a man knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the existence of two things, the Piraeus and the trireme; or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows the word made of them, for word and letters are the same thing. Further, since twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount wholesome; for it would be absurd that two halves separately should be good, but bad combined. In this way the argument may be used for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if one were to say, one good thing cannot make two bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, that he deposed thirty tyrants, for here he combines them; or the example of the fallacy of division in the Orestes of Theodectes: “It is just that a woman who has killed her husband” should be put to death, and that the son should avenge the father; and this in fact is what has been done. But if they are combined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as an example of the fallacy of omission; for the name of the one who should put the woman to death is not mentioned.

> Greek: 24.3. ἄλλος τὸ ⟨τὸ⟩ διῃρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ὂν ταὐτὸ πολλάκις, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐμ Πειραεῖ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἓν φάναι ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν, ὧδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά· ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσε· συντίθησι γάρ. ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου· ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν·
δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἂν κτείνῃ πόσιν,
ἀποθνῄσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν υἱόν, οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πέπρακται· συντεθέντα γὰρ ἴσως οὐκέτι δίκαιον. εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος.

[¶22] 24.4. Another topic is that of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, without having proved that any crime has actually been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage. Therefore there is no enthymeme; for the hearer falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not, although neither has been proved.

> Greek: 24.4. ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν ⟨μηδʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίησεν⟩, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξῃ, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐξῇ. οὔκουν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ δεδειγμένου.

[¶23] 24.5. Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this argument also is illogical. For instance, if one were to say that those who love one another are useful to States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus; or that Dionysius is a thief, because he is a rascal; for here again the argument is inconclusive; not every rascal is a thief although every thief is a rascal.

> Greek: 24.5. ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο· οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως κατέλυσε τὸν τύραννον Ἵππαρχον, ἢ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύσιος· πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλὰ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός.

[¶24] 24.6. Another fallacy is derived from accident; for instance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that, they rendered great service by gnawing the bowstrings. Or if one were to say that nothing is more honorable than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was not invited Achilles was angry with the Achaeans at Tenedos; whereas he was really angry because he had been treated with disrespect, but this was an accident due to his not having been invited.

> Greek: 24.6. ἄλλος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὃ λέγει Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῦς, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς· ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώτατον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δʼ ὡς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι.

[¶25] 24.7. Another fallacy is that of the Consequence. For instance, in the Alexander Paris it is said that Paris was high-minded, because he despised the companionship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself; for because the high-minded are of this character, Paris also might be thought high-minded. Or, since a man pays attention to dress and roams about at night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the temples, exiles can live where they please; and since these things belong to those who are apparently happy, those to whom they belong may also be thought happy. But there is a difference in conditions; wherefore this topic also falls under the head of omission.

> Greek: 24.7. ἄλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχος· ὑπεριδὼν γὰρ τὴν πολλῶν ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ Ἴδῃ διέτριβεν καθʼ αὑτόν· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν. καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοιοῦτοι γάρ. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξεστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ὑπάρχει δόξαιεν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει.

[¶26] 24.8. Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened at the same time as, or after, another; for it is believed that what happens after is produced by the other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades declared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the evils that happened, since it was followed by the war.

> Greek: 24.8. ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν· μετʼ ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος.

[¶27] 24.9. Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. For instance, Alexander Paris had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only for the first time; for the father's authority only lasts till then. Or, if one should say that it is wanton outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always the case, but only when the assailant gives the first blow.

> Greek: 24.9. ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην· αἵρεσις γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ πάντως, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων.

[¶28] 24.10. Further, as in sophistical disputations, an apparent syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not is, for that which is not is that which is not; also, that the unknown can be known, for it can be known of the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly, in Rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases. But this is not to be understood absolutely, as Agathon says:
One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, that many things happen to men that are not probable;
for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless does happen, so that that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable will be probable. But not absolutely; but as, in the case of sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular cases.

> Greek: 24.10. ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν [ὄν], ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει
τάχʼ ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτʼ εἶναι λέγοι,
βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.
γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.

[¶29] 24.11. The “Art” of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his defence will be that the crime is not probable; but if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, if he is strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not probable, for the very reason that it was bound to appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what “making the worse appear the better argument” means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with the promise of Protagoras; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and Sophistic. So much for real or apparent enthymemes.

> Greek: 24.11. ἔστι δʼ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός), κἂν ἔνοχος ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν). ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἴρηται· καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτʼ ἔστιν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλʼ ⟨ἢ⟩ ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.

[¶30] 25.1. Next to what has been said we must speak of refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection.

> Greek: 25.1. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων, καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων, εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰπεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογισάμενον ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα.

[¶31] 25.2. It is clear that the same topics may furnish counter-syllogisms; for syllogisms are derived from probable materials and many probabilities are contrary to one another.

> Greek: 25.2. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν·

[¶32] 25.3. An objection is brought, as shown in the Topics, in four ways: it may be derived either from itself, or from what is similar, or from what is contrary, or from what has been decided.

> Greek: 25.3. αἱ δʼ ἐνστάσεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων.

[¶33] 25.4. In the first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended to prove that love is good, two objections might be made; either the general statement that all want is bad, or in particular, that Caunian love would not have become proverbial, unless some forms of love had been bad.

> Greek: 25.4. λέγω δὲ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπουδαῖος, ἡ ἔνστασις διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ καθόλου εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες.

[¶34] 25.5. An objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is that the good man does good to all his friends; it may be objected: But the bad man does not do harm [to all his friends].

> Greek: 25.5. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἷον, εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, ⟨ὅτι⟩ ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς.

[¶35] 25.6. An objection from what is similar is brought, if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing that those who have been benefited do not always love.

> Greek: 25.6. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, οἷον, εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν, ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν.

[¶36] 25.7. The fourth kind of objection is derived from the former decisions of well-known men. For instance, if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance for those who are drunk, for their offence is the result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he would not have laid down severer punishment for a man who commits an offence when drunk.

> Greek: 25.7. αἱ δὲ κρίσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.

[¶37] 25.8. Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, when based upon things which most commonly occur or seem to occur; from examples, when they are the result of induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and then concludes the particular by an example; from necessary signs, when based upon that which is necessary and ever exists; from signs, when their material is the general or the particular, whether true or not. Now, the probable being not what occurs invariably but only for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes of this character can always be refuted by bringing an objection.

> Greek: 25.8. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλλογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ⟨ἀεὶ⟩ ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου [ἢ] τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν τε ὂν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, τὸ δὲ εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν, ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεί·

[¶38] 25.9. But the objection is often only apparent, not real; for he who brings the objection endeavors to show, not that the argument is not probable, but that it is not necessary.

> Greek: 25.9. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον·

[¶39] 25.10. Wherefore, by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant always has an advantage over the accuser. For since the latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary, and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this manner, either that the argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide, being deceived by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments alone, but also upon probabilities; for this is what is meant by deciding according to the best of one's judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an argument by showing that it is not necessary; it must also be shown that it is not probable. This will be attained if the objection itself is specially based upon what happens generally.

> Greek: 25.10. διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν διὰ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀεὶ δʼ ἔχει ἔνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμʼ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον), ὁ δὲ κριτὴς οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ κριτέον, παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν), οὔκουν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.

[¶40] 25.11. This may take place in two ways, from consideration either of the time or of the facts. The strongest objections are those in which both are combined; for a thing is more probable, the greater the number of similar cases.

> Greek: 25.11. τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ εἰ ἀμφοῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ ⟨πλείω καὶ⟩ πλεονάκις οὕτως, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον.

[¶41] 25.12. Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated; for it is clear from the Analytics that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion.

> Greek: 25.12. λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, κἂν ᾖ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστιν πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν.

[¶42] 25.13. As for enthymemes derived from examples, they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single fact that contradicts the opponent's example, the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common occurrence, are otherwise; but if the majority and greater frequency of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not take place in the same way, or that there is some difference.

> Greek: 25.13. πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ εἰκότα· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν ⟨ἕν⟩ τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως, ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει.

[¶43] 25.14. But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the Analytics; the only thing that remains is to prove that the thing alleged is non-existent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for, by means of demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.

> Greek: 25.14. τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον οὐκ ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), λείπεται δʼ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἄλυτον ἤδη γίγνεται τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀπόδειξις ἤδη φανερά.

[¶44] 26.1. Amplification and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is a head under which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes which serve to show that a thing is great or small, just as others serve to show that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else.

> Greek: 26.1. τὸ δʼ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος στοιχεῖον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον· ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει. τὸ δʼ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν.

[¶45] 26.2. All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthymemes; so that if none of these is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation.

> Greek: 26.2. ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν πάντα περὶ ἃ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὥστʼ εἰ μηδὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνθυμήματος τόπος, οὐδὲ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν.

[¶46] 26.3. Nor are enthymemes by which arguments are refuted of a different kind from those by which they are established; for it is clear that demonstration or bringing an objection is the means of refutation. By the first the contrary of the adversary's conclusion is demonstrated; for instance, if he has shown that a thing has happened, his opponent shows that it has not; if he has shown that a thing has not happened, he shows that it has. This, therefore, will not be the difference between them; for both employ the same arguments; they bring forward enthymemes to show that the thing is or that it is not.

> Greek: 26.3. οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμήματος εἶδός τί ἐστιν [ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν]· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λύει μὲν ἢ δείξας ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκών, ἀνταποδείκνυσι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ ἔδειξε ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δὲ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν· ὥστε αὕτη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη [ἡ] διαφορά (τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται ἀμφότεροι· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα φέρουσιν)·

[¶47] 26.4. And the objection is not an enthymeme, but, as I said in the Topics, it is stating an opinion which is intended to make it clear that the adversary's syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed some false premise.

> Greek: 26.4. ἡ δʼ ἔνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλά, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τὸ εἰπεῖν δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ἧς ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἢ ὅτι ψεῦδός τι εἴληφεν.

[¶48] 26.5. Now, since there are three things in regard to speech, to which special attention should be devoted, let what has been said suffice for examples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns the intelligence generally; for the sources of a supply of arguments and the means of refuting them. It only remains to speak of style and arrangement.

> Greek: 26.5. ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως.