Whether Bodily Suffering Necessarily Terminates in the Destruction of the Flesh.

Chapter 3.—Whether Bodily Suffering Necessarily Terminates in the Destruction of the Flesh.

Caput III. An consequens sit, ut corporeum dolorem sequatur carnis interitus.

But, say they, there is no body which can suffer and cannot also die. How do we know this? For who can say with certainty that the devils do not suffer in their bodies, when they own that they are grievously tormented? And if it is replied that there is no earthly body—that is to say, no solid and perceptible body, or, in one word, no flesh—which can suffer and cannot die, is not this to tell us only what men have gathered from experience and their bodily senses? For they indeed have no acquaintance with any flesh but that which is mortal; and this is their whole argument, that what they have had no experience of they judge quite impossible. For we cannot call it reasoning to make pain a presumption of death, while, in fact, it is rather a sign of life. For though it be a question whether that which suffers can continue to live for ever, yet it is certain that everything which suffers pain does live, and that pain can exist only in a living subject. It is necessary, therefore, that he who is pained be living, not necessary that pain kill him; for every pain does not kill even those mortal bodies of ours which are destined to die. And that any pain kills them is caused by the circumstance that the soul is so connected with the body that it succumbs to great pain and withdraws; for the structure of our members and vital parts is so infirm that it cannot bear up against that violence which causes great or extreme agony. But in the life to come this connection of soul and body is of such a kind, that as it is dissolved by no lapse of time, so neither is it burst asunder by any pain. And so, although it be true that in this world there is no flesh which can suffer pain and yet cannot die, yet in the world to come there shall be flesh such as now there is not, as there will also be death such as now there is not. For death will not be abolished, but will be eternal, since the soul will neither be able to enjoy God and live, nor to die and escape the pains of the body. The first death drives the soul from the body against her will: the second death holds the soul in the body against her will. The two have this in common, that the soul suffers against her will what her own body inflicts.

Sed nullum est, inquiunt, corpus, quod dolere possit nec possit mori. Et hoc unde scimus? Nam de corporibus quis certus est daemonum, utrum in eis doleant, quando se adfligi magnis cruciatibus confitentur? Quod si respondetur terrenum corpus solidum scilicet adque conspicuum nullum esse, adque ut uno potius nomine id explicem, nullam esse carnem, quae dolere possit morique non possit: quid aliud dicitur, nisi quod sensu corporis homines et experientia collegerunt? Nullam namque carnem nisi mortalem sciunt; et haec est eorum tota ratio, ut, quod experti non sunt, nequaquam esse posse arbitrentur. Nam cuius rationis est dolorem facere mortis argumentum, cum uitae potius sit indicium? Etsi enim quaerimus, utrum semper possit uiuere: certum tamen est uiuere omne quod dolet doloremque omnem nisi in re uiuente esse non posse. Necesse est ergo ut uiuat dolens, non est necesse ut occidat dolor, quia nec corpora ista mortalia et utique moritura omnis dolor occidit, et ut dolor aliquis possit occidere. illa causa est, quoniam sic est anima conexa huic corpori, ut summis doloribus cedat adque discedat; quoniam et ipsa conpago membrorum adque uitalium sic infirma est, ut eam uim, quae magnum uel summum dolorem facit, non ualeat sustinere. Tunc autem tali corpori anima et eo conectetur modo, ut illud uinculum, sicut nulla temporis longitudine soluetur, ita nullo dolore rumpatur. Proinde etiamsi caro nunc talis nulla est, quae sensum doloris perpeti possit mortemque non possit: erit tamen tunc talis caro, qualis nunc non est, sicut talis erit et mors qualis nunc non est. Non enim nulla, sed sempiterna mors erit, quando nec uiuere anima poterit Deum non habendo nec doloribus corporis carere moriendo. Prima mors animam nolentem pellit e corpore, secunda mors animam nolentem tenet in corpore; ab utraque morte communiter id habetur, ut quod non uult anima de suo corpore patiatur.

Our opponents, too, make much of this, that in this world there is no flesh which can suffer pain and cannot die; while they make nothing of the fact that there is something which is greater than the body. For the spirit, whose presence animates and rules the body, can both suffer pain and cannot die. Here then is something which, though it can feel pain, is immortal. And this capacity, which we now see in the spirit of all, shall be hereafter in the bodies of the damned. Moreover, if we attend to the matter a little more closely, we see that what is called bodily pain is rather to be referred to the soul. For it is the soul not the body, which is pained, even when the pain originates with the body,—the soul feeling pain at the point where the body is hurt. As then we speak of bodies feeling and living, though the feeling and life of the body are from the soul, so also we speak of bodies being pained, though no pain can be suffered by the body apart from the soul. The soul, then, is pained with the body in that part where something occurs to hurt it; and it is pained alone, though it be in the body, when some invisible cause distresses it, while the body is safe and sound. Even when not associated with the body it is pained; for certainly that rich man was suffering in hell when he cried, “I am tormented in this flame.” But as for the body, it suffers no pain when it is soulless; and even when animate it can suffer only by the soul’s suffering. If, therefore, we might draw a just presumption from the existence of pain to that of death, and conclude that where pain can be felt death can occur, death would rather be the property of the soul, for to it pain more peculiarly belongs. But, seeing that that which suffers most cannot die, what ground is there for supposing that those bodies, because destined to suffer, are therefore, destined to die? The Platonists indeed maintained that these earthly bodies and dying members gave rise to the fears, desires, griefs, and joys of the soul. “Hence,” says Virgil (i.e., from these earthly bodies and dying members),

Adtendunt autem isti contradictores nullam esse nunc caris, quae dolorem pati possit mortemque non possit, et non adtendunt esse tamen aliquid tale quod corpore maius sit. Ipse quippe animus, cuius praesentia corpus uiuit et regitur, et dolorem pati potest et mori non potest. Ecce inuenta res est, quae, cum sensum doloris habeat, inmortalis est. Hoc igitur erit tunc etiam in corporibus damnatorum, quod nunc esse scimus in animis omnium. Si autem consideremus diligentius, dolor, qui dicitur corporis, magis ad animam pertinet. Animae est enim dolere, non corporis, etiam quando ei dolendi causa exsistit a corpore, cum in eo loco dolet, ubi laeditur corpus. Sicut ergo dicimus corpora sentientia et corpora uiuentia, cum ab anima sit corpori sensus et uita: ita corpora dicimus et dolentia, cum dolor corpori nisi ab anima esse non possit. Dolet itaque anima cum corpore in eo loco eius, ubi aliquid contingit ut doleat; dolet et sola, quamuis sit in corpore, cum aliqua causa etiam inuisibili tristis est ipsa corpore incolumi; dolet etiam non in corpore constituta; nam utique dolebat diues ille aput inferos, quando dicebat: Crucior in hac flamma. Corpus autem nec exanime dolet nec animatum sine anima dolet. Si ergo a dolore argumentum recte sumeretur ad mortem, ut ideo mors possit accidere. quia potuit accidere et dolor, magis ad animam pertineret mori, ad quam magis pertinet et dolere. Cum uero illa, quae magis dolere potest, non possit mori, quid momenti adfert quur illa corpora, quoniam futura sunt in doloribus, ideo etiam moritura esse credamus?

“Hence wild desires and grovelling fears,

Dixerunt quidem Platonici ex terrenis corporibus moribundisque membris esse animae et metuere et cupere et dolere adque gaudere; unde Vergilius: lHinc, inquit, (id est ex moribundis terreni corporis membris) metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque.’ Sed conuicimus eos in duodecimo huius operis libro, habere animas secundum ipsos ab omni etiam corporis labe purgatas diram cupiditatem. quae rursus incipiunt in corpora uelle reuerti.

And human laughter, human tears.”

But in the fourteenth book of this work we have proved that, according to the Platonists’ own theory, souls, even when purged from all pollution of the body, are yet pos sessed by a monstrous desire to return again into their bodies. But where desire can exist, certainly pain also can exist; for desire frustrated, either by missing what it aims at or losing what it had attained, is turned into pain. And therefore, if the soul, which is either the only or the chief sufferer, has yet a kind of immortality of its own, it is inconsequent to say that because the bodies of the damned shall suffer pain, therefore they shall die. In fine, if the body causes the soul to suffer, why can the body not cause death as well as suffering, unless because it does not follow that what causes pain causes death as well? And why then is it incredible that these fires can cause pain but not death to those bodies we speak of, just as the bodies themselves cause pain, but not therefore death, to the souls? Pain is therefore no necessary presumption of death.

Ubi autem potest esse cupiditas, profecto etiam dolor potest. Frustrata quippe cupiditas, siue non perueniendo quo tendebat, siue amittendo quo peruenerat, uertitur in dolorem. Quapropter si anima, quae uel sola uel maxime dolet, habet tamen quandam pro suo modo inmortalitatem suam, non ideo mori poterunt illa corpora, quia dolebunt. Postremo si corpora faciunt, ut animae doleant, quur eis dolorem possunt. mortem uero inferre non possunt, nisi quia non est consequens, ut mortem faciat quod dolorem facit? Quur ergo incredibile est ita ignes illis corporibus dolorem posse inferre, non mortem, sicut ipsa corpora dolere animas faciunt, quas tamen non ideo mori cogunt? Non est igitur necessarium futurae mortis argumentum dolor.

Chapter 4.—Examples from Nature Proving that Bodies May Remain Unconsumed and Alive in Fire.

Caput IV. De naturalibus exemplis, quorum consideratio doceat posse inter cruciatus uiuentia corpora permanere.

If, therefore, the salamander lives in fire, as naturalists have recorded, and if certain famous mountains of Sicily have been continually on fire from the remotest antiquity until now, and yet remain entire, these are sufficiently convincing examples that everything which burns is not consumed. As the soul too, is a proof that not everything which can suffer pain can also die, why then do they yet demand that we produce real examples to prove that it is not incredible that the bodies of men condemned to everlasting punishment may retain their soul in the fire, may burn without being consumed, and may suffer without perishing? For suitable properties will be communicated to the substance of the flesh by Him who has endowed the things we see with so marvellous and diverse properties, that their very multitude prevents our wonder. For who but God the Creator of all things has given to the flesh of the peacock its antiseptic property? This property, when I first heard of it, seemed to me incredible; but it happened at Carthage that a bird of this kind was cooked and served up to me, and, taking a suitable slice of flesh from its breast, I ordered it to be kept, and when it had been kept as many days as make any other flesh stinking, it was produced and set before me, and emitted no offensive smell. And after it had been laid by for thirty days and more, it was still in the same state; and a year after, the same still, except that it was a little more shrivelled, and drier. Who gave to chaff such power to freeze that it preserves snow buried under it, and such power to warm that it ripens green fruit?

Quapropter si, ut scripserunt qui naturas animalium curiosius indagarunt, salamandra in ignibus uiuit et quidam notissimi Siciliae montes, qui tanta temporis diuturnitate ac uetustate usque nunc ac deinceps flammis aestuant adque integri perseuerant, satis idonei testes sunt non omne, quod ardet, absumi et anima indicat non omne, quod dolere potest, posse etiam mori: quid adhuc a nobis rerum poscuntur exempla, quibus doceamus non esse incredibile, ut hominum corpora sempiterno supplicio punitorum et in igne animam non amittant et sine detrimento ardeant et sine interitu doleant? Habebit enim tunc istam carnis substantia qualitatem ab illo inditam, qui tam miras et uarias tot rebus indidit, quas uidemus, ut eas, quia multae sunt, non miremur. Quis enim nisi Deus creator omnium dedit carni pauonis mortui ne putesceret? Quod cum auditum incredibile uideretur, euenit ut aput Carthaginem nobis cocta adponeretur haec auis, de cuius pectore pulparum, quantum uisum est, decerptum seruari iussimus; quod post dierum tantum spatium, quanto alia caro quaecumque cocta putesceret, prolatum adque oblatum nihilo nostrum offendit olfactum. Itemque repositum post dies amplius quam triginta idem quod erat inuentum est, idemque post annum, nisi quod aliquantum corpulentiae siccioris et contractioris fuit.

But who can explain the strange properties of fire itself, which blackens everything it burns, though itself bright; and which, though of the most beautiful colors, discolors almost all it touches and feeds upon, and turns blazing fuel into grimy cinders? Still this is not laid down as an absolutely uniform law; for, on the contrary, stones baked in glowing fire themselves also glow, and though the fire be rather of a red hue, and they white, yet white is congruous with light, and black with darkness. Thus, though the fire burns the wood in calcining the stones, these contrary effects do not result from the contrariety of the materials. For though wood and stone differ, they are not contraries, like black and white, the one of which colors is produced in the stones, while the other is produced in the wood by the same action of fire, which imparts its own brightness to the former, while it begrimes the latter, and which could have no effect on the one were it not fed by the other. Then what wonderful properties do we find in charcoal, which is so brittle that a light tap breaks it and a slight pressure pulverizes it, and yet is so strong that no moisture rots it, nor any time causes it to decay. So enduring is it, that it is customary in laying down landmarks to put charcoal underneath them, so that if, after the longest interval, any one raises an action, and pleads that there is no boundary stone, he may be convicted by the charcoal below. What then has enabled it to last so long without rotting, though buried in the damp earth in which [its original] wood rots, except this same fire which consumes all things?

Quis paleae dedit uel tam frigidam uim, ut obrutas niues seruet, uel tam feruidam, ut poma inmatura maturet? De ipso igne mira quis explicet, quo quaeque adusta nigrescunt, cum ipse sit lucidus, et paene omnia, quae ambit et lambit, colore pulcherrimus decolorat adque ex pruna fulgida carbonem taeterrimum reddit? Neque id quasi regulariter definitum est; nam e contrario lapides igne candente percocti et ipsi fiunt candidi, et quamuis magis ille rubeat, illi albicent, congruit tamen luci quod album est, sicut nigrum tenebris. Cum itaque ignis in lignis ardeat, ut lapides coquat, contrarios habet non in contrariis rebus effectus. Etsi enim lapides et ligna diuersa sunt, contraria tamen non sunt, sicut album et nigrum, quorum in lapidibus unum facit, alterum in lignis, clarus illos clarificans, haec obfuscans, cum in illis deficeret, nisi in istis uiueret. Quid, in carbonibus nonne miranda est et tanta infirmitas, ut ictu leuissimo frangantur, pressu facillimo conterantur, et tanta firmitas, ut nullo umore corrumpantur, nulla aetate uincantur, usque adeo ut eos substernere soleant, qui limites figunt, ad conuincendum litigatorem, quisquis post quantalibet tempora exstiterit fixumque lapidem limitem non esse contenderit? Quis eos in terra umida infossos, ubi ligna putescerent, tamdiu durare incorruptibiliter posse nisi rerum ille corruptor ignis effecit?

Again, let us consider the wonders of lime; for besides growing white in fire, which makes other things black, and of which I have already said enough, it has also a mysterious property of conceiving fire within it. Itself cold to the touch, it yet has a hidden store of fire, which is not at once apparent to our senses, but which experience teaches us, lies as it were slumbering within it even while unseen. And it is for this reason called “quick lime,” as if the fire were the invisible soul quickening the visible substance or body. But the marvellous thing is, that this fire is kindled when it is extinguished. For to disengage the hidden fire the lime is moistened or drenched with water, and then, though it be cold before, it becomes hot by that very application which cools what is hot. As if the fire were departing from the lime and breathing its last, it no longer lies hid, but appears; and then the lime lying in the coldness of death cannot be requickened, and what we before called “quick,” we now call “slaked.” What can be stranger than this? Yet there is a greater marvel still. For if you treat the lime, not with water, but with oil, which is as fuel to fire, no amount of oil will heat it. Now if this marvel had been told us of some Indian mineral which we had no opportunity of experimenting upon, we should either have forthwith pronounced it a falsehood, or certainly should have been greatly astonished. But things that daily present themselves to our own observation we despise, not because they are really less marvellous, but because they are common; so that even some products of India itself, remote as it is from ourselves, cease to excite our admiration as soon as we can admire them at our leisure.

Intueamur etiam miraculum calcis. Excepto eo, de quo iam satis diximus, quod igne candicat, quo alia taetra redduntur, etiam occultissime ab igne ignem concipit eumque iam gleba tangentibus frigida tam latenter seruat, ut nulli nostro sensui prorsus appareat, sed conpertus experimento. etiam dum non apparet, sciatur inesse sopitus. Propter quod eam uiuam calcem loquimur, uelut ipse ignis latens anima sit inuisibilis uisibilis corporis. Iam uero quam mirum est, quod, cum exstinguitur, tunc accenditur! Ut enim occulto igne careat, aquae infunditur aquaue perfunditur, et cum ante sit frigida, inde feruescit, unde feruentia cuncta frigescunt. Velut exspirante ergo illa gleba discedens ignis, qui latebat, apparet, ac deinde tamquam morte sic frigida est, ut adiecta unda non sit arsura et quam calcem uocabamus uiuam, uocemus exstinctam. Quid est quod huic miraculo addi posse uideatur? et tamen additur. Nam si non adhibeas aquam, sed oleum, quod magis fomes est ignis, nulla eius perfusione uel infusione feruescit. Hoc miraculum si de aliquo Indico lapide legeremus siue audiremus et in nostrum experimentum uenire non posset, profecto aut mendacium putaremus aut certe granditer miraremur. Quarum uero rerum ante nostros oculos cottidiana documenta uersantur, non genere minus mirabili, sed ipsa adsiduitate uilescunt, ita ut ex ipsa India, quae remota est pars orbis a nobis, desierimus nonnulla mirari, quae ad nos potuerunt miranda perduci.

The diamond is a stone possessed by many among ourselves, especially by jewellers and lapidaries, and the stone is so hard that it can be wrought neither by iron nor fire, nor, they say, by anything at all except goat’s blood. But do you suppose it is as much admired by those who own it and are familiar with its properties as by those to whom it is shown for the first time? Persons who have not seen it perhaps do not believe what is said of it, or if they do, they wonder as at a thing beyond their experience; and if they happen to see it, still they marvel because they are unused to it, but gradually familiar experience [of it] dulls their admiration. We know that the loadstone has a wonderful power of attracting iron. When I first saw it I was thunderstruck, for I saw an iron ring attracted and suspended by the stone; and then, as if it had communicated its own property to the iron it attracted, and had made it a substance like itself, this ring was put near another, and lifted it up; and as the first ring clung to the magnet, so did the second ring to the first. A third and a fourth were similarly added, so that there hung from the stone a kind of chain of rings, with their hoops connected, not interlinking, but attached together by their outer surface. Who would not be amazed at this virtue of the stone, subsisting as it does not only in itself, but transmitted through so many suspended rings, and binding them together by invisible links? Yet far more astonishing is what I heard about this stone from my brother in the episcopate, Severus bishop of Milevis. He told me that Bathanarius, once count of Africa, when the bishop was dining with him, produced a magnet, and held it under a silver plate on which he placed a bit of iron; then as he moved his hand with the magnet underneath the plate, the iron upon the plate moved about accordingly. The intervening silver was not affected at all, but precisely as the magnet was moved backwards and forwards below it, no matter how quickly, so was the iron attracted above. I have related what I myself have witnessed; I have related what I was told by one whom I trust as I trust my own eyes. Let me further say what I have read about this magnet. When a diamond is laid near it, it does not lift iron; or if it has already lifted it, as soon as the diamond approaches, it drops it. These stones come from India. But if we cease to admire them because they are now familiar, how much less must they admire them who procure them very easily and send them to us? Perhaps they are held as cheap as we hold lime, which, because it is common, we think nothing of, though it has the strange property of burning when water, which is wont to quench fire, is poured on it, and of remaining cool when mixed with oil, which ordinarily feeds fire.

Adamantem lapidem multi aput nos habent et maxime aurifices insignitoresque gemmarum, qui lapis nec ferro nec igni nec alia ui ulla perhibetur praeter hircino sanguine uinci. Sed qui eum habent adque nouerunt, numquid ita mirantur ut hi, quibus primum potentia eius ostenditur? Quibus autem non ostenditur, fortasse nec credunt; aut si credunt, inexperta mirantur; et si contigerit experiri, adhuc quidem mirantur insolita, sed adsiduitas experiendi paulatim subtrahit admirationis incitamentum. Magnetem lapidem nouimus mirabilem ferri esse raptorem; quod cum primum uidi, uehementer inhorrui. Quippe cernebam a lapide ferreum anulum raptum adque suspensum; deinde tamquam ferro, quod rapuerat, uim dedisset suam communemque fecisset, idem anulus alteri admotus est eundemque suspendit, adque ut ille prior lapidi, sic alter anulus priori anulo cohaerebat; accessit eodem modo tertius, accessit et quartus; iamque sibi per mutua circulis nexis non inplicatorum intrinsecus, sed extrinsecus adhaerentium quasi catena pependerat anulorum. Quis istam uim lapidis non stuperet, quae illi non solum inerat, uerum etiam per tot suspensa transibat et inuisibilibus ea uinculis subligabat? Sed multo est mirabilius, quod a fratre et coepiscopo meo Seuero Mileuitano de isto lapide comperi. Se ipsum namque uidisse narrauit, quem ad modum Bathanarius quondam comes Africae, cum aput eum conuiuaretur episcopus, eundem protulerit lapidem et tenuerit sub argento ferrumque super argentum posuerit; deinde sicut subter mouebat manum, qua lapidem tenebat, ita ferrum desuper mouebatur, adque argento medio nihilque patiente concitatissimo cursu ac recursu infra lapis ab homine, supra ferrum rapiebatur a lapide. Dixi quod ipse conspexi, dixi quod ab illo audiui, cui tamquam ipse uiderim credidi. Quid etiam de isto magnete legerim dicam. Quando iuxta eum ponitur adamans, non rapit femlID. et si iam rapuerat, ut ei propinquauerit, mox remittit. India mittit hos lapides; sed si eos nos cognitos iam desistimus admirari, quanto magis illi, a quibus ueniunt, si eos facillimos habent, sic forsitan habent, ut nos calcem, quam miro modo aqua feruescentem, qua solet ignis exstingui, et oleo non feruescentem, quo solet ignis accendi, quia in promtu ‘nobis est, non miramur.

Chapter 5.—That There are Many Things Which Reason Cannot Account For, and Which are Nevertheless True.

Caput V. Quanta sint, quorum ratio nequeat agnosci, et tamen eadem uera esse non sit ambiguum.

Nevertheless, when we declare the miracles which God has wrought, or will yet work, and which we cannot bring under the very eyes of men, sceptics keep demanding that we shall explain these marvels to reason. And because we cannot do so, inasmuch as they are above human comprehension, they suppose we are speaking falsely. These persons themselves, therefore, ought to account for all these marvels which we either can or do see. And if they perceive that this is impossible for man to do, they should acknowledge that it cannot be concluded that a thing has not been or shall not be because it cannot be reconciled to reason, since there are things now in existence of which the same is true. I will not, then, detail the multitude of marvels which are related in books, and which refer not to things that happened once and passed away, but that are permanent in certain places, where, if any one has the desire and opportunity, he may ascertain their truth; but a few only I recount. The following are some of the marvels men tell us:—The salt of Agrigentum in Sicily, when thrown into the fire, becomes fluid as if it were in water, but in the water it crackles as if it were in the fire. The Garamantæ have a fountain so cold by day that no one can drink it, so hot by night no one can touch it. In Epirus, too, there is a fountain which, like all others, quenches lighted torches, but, unlike all others, lights quenched torches. There is a stone found in Arcadia, and called asbestos, because once lit it cannot be put out. The wood of a certain kind of Egyptian fig-tree sinks in water, and does not float like other wood; and, stranger still, when it has been sunk to the bottom for some time, it rises again to the surface, though nature requires that when soaked in water it should be heavier than ever. Then there are the apples of Sodom which grow indeed to an appearance of ripeness, but, when you touch them with hand or tooth, the peal cracks, and they crumble into dust and ashes. The Persian stone pyrites burns the hand when it is tightly held in it and so gets its name from fire. In Persia too, there is found another stone called selenite, because its interior brilliancy waxes and wanes with the moon. Then in Cappadocia the mares are impregnated by the wind, and their foals live only three years. Tilon, an Indian island, has this advantage over all other lands, that no tree which grows in it ever loses its foliage.

Verum tamen homines infideles, qui, cum diuina uel praeterita uel futura miracula praedicamus, quae illis experienda non ualemus ostendere, rationem a nobis earum flagitant rerum, quam quoniam non possumus reddere (excedunt enim uires mentis humanae), existimant falsa esse quae dicimus, ipsi de tot mirabilibus rebus, quas uel uidere possumus uel uidemus, debent reddere rationem. Quod si fieri ab homine non posse peruiderint, fatendum est eis non ideo aliquid non fuisse uel non futurum esse, quia ratio inde non potest reddi. quando quidem sunt ista, de quibus similiter non potest. Non itaque pergo per plurima, quae mandata sunt litteris, non gesta adque transacta, sed in locis quibusque manentia; quo si quisquam ire uoluerit et potuerit, utrum uera sint, explorabit; sed pauca commemoro. Agrigentinum Siciliae salem perhibent, cum fuerit admotus igni, uelut in aqua fluescere; cum uero ipsi aquae, uelut in igne crepitare. Aput Garamantas quendam fontem tam frigidum diebus, ut non bibatur, tam feruidum noctibus, ut non tangatur. In Epiro alium fontem, in quo faces, ut in ceteris, exstinguuntur accensae, sed, non ut in ceteris, accenduntur exstinctae. Asbeston Arcadiae lapidem propterea sic uocari, quod accensus semel iam non possit exstingui. Lignum cuiusdam ficus Aegyptiae, non ut ligna cetera in aquis natare, sed mergi; et, quod est mirabilius, cum in imo aliquamdiu fuerit, inde ad aquae superficiem rursus emergere, quando madefactum debuit umoris pondere praegrauari. Poma in terra Sodomorum gigni quidem et ad maturitatis faciem peruenire; sed morsu pressuue tentata in fumum ac fauillam corio fatiscente uanescere. Pyriten lapidem Persicum tenentis manum, si uehementius prematur, adurere, propter quod ab igne nomen accepit. In eadem Perside gigni etiam lapidem seleniten, cuius interiorem candorem cum luna crescere adque deficere. In Cappadocia etiam uento equas concipere, eosdemque fetus non amplius triennio uiuere. Tylon Indiae insulam eo praeferri ceteris terris, quod omnis arbor, quae in ea gignitur, numquam nudatur tegmine foliorum.

These and numberless other marvels recorded in the history, not of past events, but of permanent localities, I have no time to enlarge upon and diverge from my main object; but let those sceptics who refuse to credit the divine writings give me, if they can, a rational account of them. For their only ground of unbelief in the Scriptures is, that they contain incredible things, just such as I have been recounting. For, say they, reason cannot admit that flesh burn and remain unconsumed, suffer without dying. Mighty reasoners, indeed, who are competent to give the reason of all the marvels that exist! Let them then give us the reason of the few things we have cited, and which, if they did not know they existed, and were only assured by us they would at some future time occur, they would believe still less than that which they now refuse to credit on our word. For which of them would believe us if, instead of saying that the living bodies of men hereafter will be such as to endure everlasting pain and fire without ever dying, we were to say that in the world to come there will be salt which becomes liquid in fire as if it were in water, and crackles in water as if it were in fire; or that there will be a fountain whose water in the chill air of night is so hot that it cannot be touched, while in the heat of day it is so cold that it cannot be drunk; or that there will be a stone which by its own heat burns the hand when tightly held, or a stone which cannot be extinguished if it has been lit in any part; or any of those wonders I have cited, while omitting numberless others? If we were to say that these things would be found in the world to come, and our sceptics were to reply, “If you wish us to believe these things, satisfy our reason about each of them,” we should confess that we could not, because the frail comprehension of man cannot master these and such-like wonders of God’s working; and that yet our reason was thoroughly convinced that the Almighty does nothing without reason, though the frail mind of man cannot explain the reason; and that while we are in many instances uncertain what He intends, yet that it is always most certain that nothing which He intends is impossible to Him; and that when He declares His mind, we believe Him whom we cannot believe to be either powerless or false. Nevertheless these cavillers at faith and exactors of reason, how do they dispose of those things of which a reason cannot be given, and which yet exist, though in apparent contrariety to the nature of things? If we had announced that these things were to be, these sceptics would have demanded from us the reason of them, as they do in the case of those things which we are announcing as destined to be. And consequently, as these present marvels are not non-existent, though human reason and discourse are lost in such works of God, so those things we speak of are not impossible because inexplicable; for in this particular they are in the same predicament as the marvels of earth.

De bis adque aliis innumerabilibus mirabilibus, quae historia non factorum et transactorum, sed manentium locorum tenet, mihi autem aliud agenti ea persequi nimis longum est, reddant rationem, si possunt, infideles isti, qui nolunt diuinis litteris credere; quid aliud quam non putantes eas esse diuinas, eo quod res habeant incredibiles, sicuti hoc est unde nunc agimus. Non enim admittit, inquiunt, ulla ratio, ut caro ardeat nec absumatur, doleat neque moriatur; ratiocinatores uidelicet magni, qui de omnibus rebus, quas esse mirabiles constat, possint reddere rationem. lieddant ergo de his, quae pauca posuimus, quae procul dubio si esse nescirent et ea futura esse diceremus, multo minus crederent quam quod nunc dicentibus nobis nolunt credere aliquando uenturum. Quis enim eorum nobis crederet, si, quem ad modum dicimus futura hominum uiua corpora, quae semper arsura adque dolitura nec tamen aliquando moritura sint, ita diceremus in futuro saeculo futurum salem, quem faceret ignis uelut in aqua fluescere, eundemque faceret aqua uelut in igne crepitare; aut futurum fontem, cuius aqua in refrigerio noctis sic ardeat, ut non possit tangi, in aestibus uero diei sic algeat, ut non possit bibi; aut futurum lapidem, uel eum qui suo calore manum constringentis adureret, uel eum qui undecumque accensus exstingui omnino non posset, et cetera quae praetermissis aliis innumeris commemoranda interim duxi? Haec ergo in illo saeculo, quod futurum est, si diceremus futura nobisque increduli responderent: ‘Si uultis ut ea credamus, de singulis reddite rationem’: nos non posse confiteremur, eo quod istis et similibus Dei miris operibus infirma mortalium ratiocinatio uinceretur; fixam tamen aput nos esse rationem, non sine ratione Omnipotentem facere, unde animus humanus infirmus rationem non potest reddere; et in multis quidem rebus incertum nobis esse quid uelit, illud tamen esse certissimum, nihil eorum illi esse inpossibile, quaecumque uoluerit; eique nos credere praedicenti, quem neque inpotentem neque mentientem possumus credere. Hi tamen fidei reprehensores exactoresque rationis quid ad ista respondent, de quibus ratio reddi ab homine non potest, et tamen sunt, et ipsi rationi naturae uidentur esse contraria? Quae si futura esse diceremus, similiter a nobis, sicut eorum quae futura esse dicimus, ab infidelibus ratio posceretur. Ac per hoc, cum in talibus operibus Dei deficiat ratio cordis et sermonis humani, sicut ista non ideo non sunt, sic non ideo etiam illa non erunt, quoniam ratio de utrisque ab homine non potest reddi.