SCRIPTURA

Augustine · City of God · 22 of 116

With What Reason They Who Think Felicity and Fortune Goddesses Have Distinguished Them.

Translated by Marcus Dods

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Chapter 18.—With What Reason They Who Think Felicity and Fortune Goddesses Have Distinguished Them.

Caput XVIII. Felicitatem et Fortunam qui deas putant, qua ratione secernunt.

What shall we say, besides, of the idea that Felicity also is a goddess? She has received a temple; she has merited an altar; suitable rites of worship are paid to her. She alone, then, should be worshipped. For where she is present, what good thing can be absent? But what does a man wish, that he thinks Fortune also a goddess and worships her? Is felicity one thing, fortune another? Fortune, indeed, may be bad as well as good; but felicity, if it could be bad, would not be felicity. Certainly we ought to think all the gods of either sex (if they also have sex) are only good. This says Plato; this say other philosophers; this say all estimable rulers of the republic and the nations. How is it, then, that the goddess Fortune is sometimes good, sometimes bad? Is it perhaps the case that when she is bad she is not a goddess, but is suddenly changed into a malignant demon? How many Fortunes are there then? Just as many as there are men who are fortunate, that is, of good fortune. But since there must also be very many others who at the very same time are men of bad fortune, could she, being one and the same Fortune, be at the same time both bad and good—the one to these, the other to those? She who is the goddess, is she always good? Then she herself is felicity. Why, then, are two names given her? Yet this is tolerable; for it is customary that one thing should be called by two names. But why different temples, different altars, different rituals? There is a reason, say they, because Felicity is she whom the good have by previous merit; but fortune, which is termed good without any trial of merit, befalls both good and bad men fortuitously, whence also she is named Fortune. How, therefore, is she good, who without any discernment comes—both to the good and to the bad? Why is she worshipped, who is thus blind, running at random on any one whatever, so that for the most part she passes by her worshippers, and cleaves to those who despise her? Or if her worshippers profit somewhat, so that they are seen by her and loved, then she follows merit, and does not come fortuitously. What, then, becomes of that definition of fortune? What becomes of the opinion that she has received her very name from fortuitous events? For it profits one nothing to worship her if she is truly fortune. But if she distinguishes her worshippers, so that she may benefit them, she is not fortune. Or does, Jupiter send her too, whither he pleases? Then let him alone be worshipped; because Fortune is not able to resist him when he commands her, and sends her where he pleases. Or, at least, let the bad worship her, who do not choose to have merit by which the goddess Felicity might be invited.

Quid, quod et Felicitas dea est? Aedem accepit, aram meruit, sacra congrua persoluta sunt. Ipsa ergo sola coleretur.I Ubi enim ipsa esset, quid boni non esset? Sed quid sibi uult. quod et Fortuna dea putatur et colitur? An aliud est felicitas, aliud fortuna? Quia fortuna potest esse et mala; felicitas autem si mala fuerit, felicitas non erit. Certe omnes deos utriusque sexus (si et sexum habent) non nisi bonos existimare debemus. Hoc Plato dicit, hoc alii philosophi, hoc excellentes rei publicae populorumque rectores. Quo modo ergo dea Fortuna aliquando bona est, aliquando mala? An forte quando mala est, dea non est, sed in malignum daemonem repente conuertitur? Quot sunt ergo deae istae? Profecto quotquot homines fortunati, hoc est bonae fortunae. Nam cum sint et alii plurimi simul, hoc est uno tempore, malae fortunae, numquid, si ipsa esset, simul et bona esset et mala; his aliud, illis aliud? An illa, quae dea est, semper est bona? Ipsa est ergo Felicitas: quur adhibentur diuersa nomina? Sed hoc ferendum est; solet enim et una res duobus nominibus appellari. Quid diuersae aedes, diuersae arae, diuersa sacra? Est causa, inquiunt, quia felicitas illa est, quam boni habent praecedentibus meritis; fortuna uero, quae dicitur bona, sine ullo examine meritorum fortuito accidit hominibus et bonis et malis, unde etiam Fortuna nominatur. Quo modo ergo bona est, quae sine ullo iudicio uenit et ad bonos et ad malos? Ut quid autem colitur, quae ita caeca est passim in quoslibet incurrens, ut suos cultores plerumque praetereat et suis contemtoribus haereat? Aut si aliquid proficiunt cultores eius, ut ab illa uideantur et amentur, iam merita sequitur, non fortuito uenit. Ubi est definitio illa Fortunae? Ubi est quod a fortuitis etiam nomen accepit? Nihil enim prodest eam colere, si fortuna est. Si autem suos cultores discernit, ut prosit, fortuna non est. An et ipsam, quo uoluerit, Iuppiter mittit? Colatur ergo ipse solus; non enim potest ei iubenti et eam quo uoluerit mittenti Fortuna resistere. Aut certe istam mali colant, qui nolunt habere merita, quibus dea possit Felicitas inuitari.

Concerning Fortuna Muliebris.

Chapter 19.—Concerning Fortuna Muliebris.

Caput XIX. De Fortuna muliebri.’

To this supposed deity, whom they call Fortuna, they ascribe so much, indeed, that they have a tradition that the image of her, which was dedicated by the Roman matrons, and called Fortuna Muliebris, has spoken, and has said, once and again, that the matrons pleased her by their homage; which, indeed, if it is true, ought not to excite our wonder. For it is not so difficult for malignant demons to deceive, and they ought the rather to advert to their wits and wiles, because it is that goddess who comes by haphazard who has spoken, and not she who comes to reward merit. For Fortuna was loquacious, and Felicitas mute; and for what other reason but that men might not care to live rightly, having made Fortuna their friend, who could make them fortunate without any good desert? And truly, if Fortuna speaks, she should at least speak, not with a womanly, but with a manly voice; lest they themselves who have dedicated the image should think so great a miracle has been wrought by feminine loquacity.

Tantum sane huic uelut numini tribuunt, quam Fortunam uocant, ut simulacrum eius, quod a matronis dedicatum est et appellata est Fortuna muliebris, etiam locutum esse memoriae memoriae commendauerint adque dixisse non semel, sed iterum, quod eam rite matronae dedicauerint. Quod quidem si uerum, sit, mirari nos non oportet. Non enim malignis daemonibus etiam sic difficile est fallere, quorum artes adque uersutias hinc potius isti aduertere debuerunt, quod illa dea locuta est, quae fortuito accidit, non quae mentis uenit. Fuit enim Fortuna loquax et muta Felicitas, ut quid aliud, nisi ut homines recte uiuere non curarent conciliata sibi Fortuna, quae illos sine ullis bonis meritis faceret fortunatos? Et certe si Fortuna loquitur, non saltem muliebris, sed uirilis potius loqueretur, ut non ipsae, quae simulacrum dedicauerunt, putarentur tantum miraculum muliebri loquacitate finxisse.

Concerning Virtue and Faith, Which the Pagans Have Honored with Temples and Sacred Rites, Passing by Other Good Qualities, Which Ought Likewise to Have Been Worshipped, If Deity Was Rightly Attributed to These.

Chapter 20.—Concerning Virtue and Faith, Which the Pagans Have Honored with Temples and Sacred Rites, Passing by Other Good Qualities, Which Ought Likewise to Have Been Worshipped, If Deity Was Rightly Attributed to These.

Caput XX. De Virtute et Fide, quas pagani templis et sacris honorauerunt praetermittentes alia bona, quae similiter colenda fuerint, si recte aliis diuinitas tribuebatur.

They have made Virtue also a goddess, which, indeed, if it could be a goddess, had been preferable to many. And now, because it is not a goddess, but a gift of God, let it be obtained by prayer from Him, by whom alone it can be given, and the whole crowd of false gods vanishes. But why is Faith believed to be a goddess, and why does she herself receive temple and altar? For whoever prudently acknowledges her makes his own self an abode for her. But how do they know what faith is, of which it is the prime and greatest function that the true God may be believed in? But why had not virtue sufficed? Does it not include faith also? Forasmuch as they have thought proper to distribute virtue into four divisions—prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance—and as each of these divisions has its own virtues, faith is among the parts of justice, and has the chief place with as many of us as know what that saying means, “The just shall live by faith.” But if Faith is a goddess, I wonder why these keen lovers of a multitude of gods have wronged so many other goddesses, by passing them by, when they could have dedicated temples and altars to them likewise. Why has temperance not deserved to be a goddess, when some Roman princes have obtained no small glory on account of her? Why, in fine, is fortitude not a goddess, who aided Mucius when he thrust his right hand into the flames; who aided Curtius, when for the sake of his country he threw himself headlong into the yawning earth; who aided Decius the sire, and Decius the son, when they devoted themselves for the army?—though we might question whether these men had true fortitude, if this concerned our present discussion. Why have prudence and wisdom merited no place among the gods? Is it because they are all worshipped under the general name of Virtue itself? Then they could thus worship the true God also, of whom all the other gods are thought to be parts. But in that one name of virtue is comprehended both faith and chastity, which yet have obtained separate altars in temples of their own.

Virtutem quoque deam fecerunt; quae quidem si dea esset, multis fuerat praeferenda. Et nunc quia dea non est, sed donum Dei est, ipsa ab illo inpetretur, a quo solo dari potest, et omnis falsorum deorum turba uanescet. Sed quur et Fides dea credita est et accepit etiam ipsa templum et altare? Quam quisquis prudenter agnoscit, habitaculum illi se ipsum facit. Unde autem sciunt illi quid sit fides, cuius primum et maximum officium est, ut in uerum credatur Deum? Sed quur non suffecerat et Virtus? Nonne ibi est et Fides? Quando quidem uirtutem in quattuor species distribuendam esse uiderunt, prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam; et quoniam et istae singulae species suas habent, in partibus iustitiae fides est maximumque locum aput nos habet, quicumque scimus quid sit, quod iustus ex fide uiuit. Sed illos miror adpetitores multitudinis deorum, si fides dea est, quare aliis tam multis deabus iniuriam fecerint praetermittendo eas, quibus similiter aedes et aras dedicare potuerunt? Quur temperantia dea esse non meruit, cum eius nomine nonnulli Romani principes non paruam gloriam conpararint? Quur denique fortitudo dea non est, quae adfuit Mucio. cum dexteram porrexit in flammas; quae adfuit Curtio, cum se pro patria in abruptam terram praecipitem dedit; quae adfuit Decio patri et Decio filio, cum pro exercitu se uouerunt? si tamen his omnibus uera inerat fortitudo, unde modo non agitur. Quare prudentia, quare sapientia nulla numinum loca meruerunt? An quia in nomine generali ipsius uirtutis omnes coluntur? Sic ergo posset et unus Deus coli, cuius partes ceteri di putantur. Sed in illa una uirtute et fides est et pudicitia, quae tamen extra, in aedibus propriis altaria meruerunt.

That Although Not Understanding Them to Be the Gifts of God, They Ought at Least to Have Been Content with Virtue and Felicity.

Chapter 21.—That Although Not Understanding Them to Be the Gifts of God, They Ought at Least to Have Been Content with Virtue and Felicity.

Caput XXI. Quod unum non intellegentes Deum Virtute saltem et Felicitate debuerint esse contenti.

These, not verity but vanity has made goddesses. For these are gifts of the true God, not themselves goddesses. However, where virtue and felicity are, what else is sought for? What can suffice the man whom virtue and felicity do not suffice? For surely virtue comprehends all things we need do, felicity all things we need wish for. If Jupiter, then, was worshipped in order that he might give these two things,—because, if extent and duration of empire is something good, it pertains to this same felicity,—why is it not understood that they are not goddesses, but the gifts of God? But if they are judged to be goddesses, then at least that other great crowd of gods should not be sought after. For, having considered all the offices which their fancy has distributed among the various gods and goddesses, let them find out, if they can, anything which could be bestowed by any god whatever on a man possessing virtue, possessing felicity. What instruction could be sought either from Mercury or Minerva, when Virtue already possessed all in herself? Virtue, indeed, is defined by the ancients as itself the art of living well and rightly. Hence, because virtue is called in Greek ἀρετη, it has been thought the Latins have derived from it the term art. But if Virtue cannot come except to the clever, what need was there of the god Father Catius, who should make men cautious, that is, acute, when Felicity could confer this? Because, to be born clever belongs to felicity. Whence, although goddess Felicity could not be worshipped by one not yet born, in order that, being made his friend, she might bestow this on him, yet she might confer this favor on parents who were her worshippers, that clever children should be born to them. What need had women in childbirth to invoke Lucina, when, if Felicity should be present, they would have, not only a good delivery, but good children too? What need was there to commend the children to the goddess Ops when they were being born; to the god Vaticanus in their birth-cry; to the goddess Cunina when lying cradled; to the goddess Rimina when sucking; to the god Statilinus when standing; to the goddess Adeona when coming; to Abeona when going away; to the goddess Mens that they might have a good mind; to the god Volumnus, and the goddess Volumna, that they might wish for good things; to the nuptial gods, that they might make good matches; to the rural gods, and chiefly to the goddess Fructesca herself, that they might receive the most abundant fruits; to Mars and Bellona, that they might carry on war well; to the goddess Victoria, that they might be victorious; to the god Honor, that they might be honored; to the goddess Pecunia, that they might have plenty money; to the god Aesculanus, and his son Argentinus, that they might have brass and silver coin? For they set down Aesculanus as the father of Argentinus for this reason, that brass coin began to be used before silver. But I wonder Argentinus has not begotten Aurinus, since gold coin also has followed. Could they have him for a god, they would prefer Aurinus both to his father Argentinus and his grandfather Aesculanus, just as they set Jove before Saturn. Therefore, what necessity was there on account of these gifts, either of soul, or body, or outward estate, to worship and invoke so great a crowd of gods, all of whom I have not mentioned, nor have they themselves been able to provide for all human benefits, minutely and singly methodized, minute and single gods, when the one goddess Felicity was able, with the greatest ease, compendiously to bestow the whole of them? nor should any other be sought after, either for the bestowing of good things, or for the averting of evil. For why should they invoke the goddess Fessonia for the weary; for driving away enemies, the goddess Pellonia; for the sick, as a physician, either Apollo or Æsculapius, or both together if there should be great danger? Neither should the god Spiniensis be entreated that he might root out the thorns from the fields; nor the goddess Rubigo that the mildew might not come,—Felicitas alone being present and guarding, either no evils would have arisen, or they would have been quite easily driven away. Finally, since we treat of these two goddesses, Virtue and Felicity, if felicity is the reward of virtue, she is not a goddess, but a gift of God. But if she is a goddess, why may she not be said to confer virtue itself, inasmuch as it is a great felicity to attain virtue?

Has deas non ueritas, sed uanitas facit; haec enim ueri Dei munera sunt, non ipsae sunt deae. Verum tamen ubi est uirtus et felicitas, quid aliud quaeritur? Quid ei sufficit, cui uirtus felicitasque non sufficit? Omnia quippe agenda conplectitur uirtus, omnia optanda felicitas. Si Iuppiter, ut haec daret, ideo colebatur, quia, si bonum aliquid est latitudo regni adque diuturnitas, ad eandem pertinet felicitatem: quur non intellectum est dona Dei esse, non deas? Si autem putatae sunt deae, saltem alia tanta deorum turba non quaereretur. Consideratis enim officiis deorum dearumque omnium, quae sicut uoluerunt pro sua opinatione finxerunt, inueniant si possunt aliquid, quod praestari ab aliquo deo possit homini habenti uirtutem, habenti felicitatem. Quid doctrinae uel a Mercurio uel a Minerua petendum esset, cum uirtus omnia secum haberet? Ars quippe ipsa bene recteque uiuendi uirtus a ueteribus definita est. Unde ab eo, quod Graece Aperrj dicitur uirtus, nomen artis Latinos traduxisse putauerunt. Sed si uirtus non nisi ad ingeniosum posset uenire, quid opus erat deo Catio patre, qui catos, id est acutos faceret, cum hoc posset conferre felicitas? Ingeniosum quippe nasci felicitatis est, unde, etiamsi non potuit a nondum nato coli dea Felicitas, ut hoc ei conciliata donaret, conferret hoc parentibus eius cultoribus suis, ut eis ingeniosi filii nascerentur. Quid opus erat parturientibus inuocare Lucinam, cum, si adesset Felicitas, non solum bene parerent, sed etiam bonos? Quid necesse erat Opi deae commendare nascentes, deo Vaticano uagientes, deae Cuninae iacentes, deae Ruminae sugentes, deo Statilino stantes, deae Adeonae adeuntes, Abeonae abeuntes; deae Menti, ut bonam haberent mentem, deo Volumno et deae Volumnae, ut bona uellent; dis nuptialibus, ut bene coniugarentur, dis agrestibus, ut fructus uberrimos caperent, et maxime ipsi diuae Fructeseae; Marti et Bellonae, ut bene belligerarent, deae Victoriae, ut uincerent; deo Honori, ut honorarentur, deae Pecuniae, ut pecuniosi essent, deo Aesculano et filio eius Argentino, ut haberent aeream argenteamque pecuniam? Nam ideo patrem Argentini Aesculanum posuerunt, quia prius aerea pecunia in usu coepit esse, post argentea. Miror autem, quod Argentinus non genuit Aurinum, quia et aurea subsecuta est. Quem deum isti si haberent, sicut Saturno Iouem, ita et patri Argentino et auo Aesculano Aurinum praeponerent. Quid ergo erat necesse propter haec bona uel animi uel corporis uel externa tantam deorum turbam colere et inuocare (quos neque omnes commemoraui, nec ipsi potuerunt omnibus bonis humanis minutatim singillatimque digestis deos minutos et singulos prouidere), cum posset magno facilique conpendio una dea Felicitas cuncta conferre, nec solum ad bona capienda quisquam alius, sed neque ad depellenda mala quaereretur? Quur enim esset inuocanda propter fessos diua Fessona, propter hostes depellendos diua Pellonia, propter aegros medicus uel Apollo uel Aesculapius uel ambo simul, quando esset grande periculum? Nec deus Spiniensis, ut spinas ex agris eradicaret; nec dea Rubigo, ut non accederet, rogaretur: una Felicitate praesente et tuente uel nulla mala exorerentur, uel facillime pellerentur. Postremo quoniam de duabus istis deabus Virtute et Felicitate tractamus: si felicitas uirtutis est praemium, non dea, sed Dei donum est; si autem dea est, quur non dicatur et uirtutem ipsa conferre, quando quidem etiam uirtutem consequi felicitas magna est?

Concerning the Knowledge of the Worship Due to the Gods, Which Varro Glories in Having Himself Conferred on the Romans.

Chapter 22.—Concerning the Knowledge of the Worship Due to the Gods, Which Varro Glories in Having Himself Conferred on the Romans.

Caput XXII. De scientia colendorum deorum, quam a se Varro gloriatur conlatam esse Romanis.

What is it, then, that Varro boasts he has bestowed as a very great benefit on his fellow-citizens, because he not only recounts the gods who ought to be worshipped by the Romans, but also tells what pertains to each of them? “Just as it is of no advantage,” he says, “to know the name and appearance of any man who is a physician, and not know that he is a physician, so,” he says, “it is of no advantage to know well that Æsculapius is a god, if you are not aware that he can bestow the gift of health, and consequently do not know why you ought to supplicate him.” He also affirms this by another comparison, saying, “No one is able, not only to live well, but even to live at all, if he does not know who is a smith, who a baker, who a weaver, from whom he can seek any utensil, whom he may take for a helper, whom for a leader, whom for a teacher;” asserting, “that in this way it can be doubtful to no one, that thus the knowledge of the gods is useful, if one can know what force, and faculty, or power any god may have in any thing. For from this we may be able,” he says, “to know what god we ought to call to, and invoke for any cause; lest we should do as too many are wont to do, and desire water from Liber, and wine from Lymphs.” Very useful, forsooth! Who would not give this man thanks if he could show true things, and if he could teach that the one true God, from whom all good things are, is to be worshipped by men?

Quid est ergo, quod pro ingenti beneficio Varro iactat praestare se ciuibus suis, quia non solum ‘commemorat deos, quos coli oporteat a Romanis, uerum etiam dicit quid ad quemque pertineat? Quoniam nihil prodest, inquit, hominis alicuius medici nomen formamque nosse, et quod sit medicus ignorare: ita dicit nihil prodesse scire deum esse Aesculapium, si nescias eum ualetudini opitulari, adque ita ignores quur ei debeas supplicare. Hoc etiam alia similitudine adfirmat dicens, non modo bene uiuere, sed uiuere omnino neminem posse, si ignoret quisnam sit faber, quis pistor, quis tector, a quo quid utensile petere possit, quem adiutorem adsumere, quem ducem, quem doctorem; eo modo nulli dubium esse adserens ita esse utilem cognitionem deorum, si sciatur quam quisque deus uim et facultatem ac potestatem cuiusque rei habeat. (Ex eo enim poterimus, inquit, scire quem cuiusque causa deum aduocare adque inuocare debeamus, ne faciamus, ut mimi solent, et optemus a Libero aquam, a Lymphis uinum’. Magna sane utilitas. Quis non huic gratias ageret, si uera monstraret, et si unum uerum Deum, a quo essent omnia bona, hominibus colendum doceret?

Concerning Felicity, Whom the Romans, Who Venerate Many Gods, for a Long Time Did Not Worship with Divine Honor, Though She Alone Would Have Sufficed Instead of All.

Chapter 23.—Concerning Felicity, Whom the Romans, Who Venerate Many Gods, for a Long Time Did Not Worship with Divine Honor, Though She Alone Would Have Sufficed Instead of All.

Caput XXIII. De Felicitate, quam Romani, multorum ueneratores deorum, diu non coluerunt honore diuino, cum pro omnibus sola sufficeret.

But how does it happen, if their books and rituals are true, and Felicity is a goddess, that she herself is not appointed as the only one to be worshipped, since she could confer all things, and all at once make men happy? For who wishes anything for any other reason than that he may become happy? Why was it left to Lucullus to dedicate a temple to so great a goddess at so late a date, and after so many Roman rulers? Why did Romulus himself, ambitious as he was of founding a fortunate city, not erect a temple to this goddess before all others? Why did he supplicate the other gods for anything, since he would have lacked nothing had she been with him? For even he himself would neither have been first a king, then afterwards, as they think, a god, if this goddess had not been propitious to him. Why, therefore, did he appoint as gods for the Romans, Janus, Jove, Mars, Picus, Faunus, Tibernus, Hercules, and others, if there were more of them? Why did Titus Tatius add Saturn, Ops, Sun, Moon, Vulcan, Light, and whatever others he added, among whom was even the goddess Cloacina, while Felicity was neglected? Why did Numa appoint so many gods and so many goddesses without this one? Was it perhaps because he could not see her among so great a crowd? Certainly king Hostilius would not have introduced the new gods Fear and Dread to be propitiated, if he could have known or might have worshipped this goddess. For, in presence of Felicity, Fear and Dread would have disappeared,—I do not say propitiated, but put to flight. Next, I ask, how is it that the Roman empire had already immensely increased before any one worshipped Felicity? Was the empire, therefore, more great than happy? For how could true felicity be there, where there was not true piety? For piety is the genuine worship of the true God, and not the worship of as many demons as there are false gods. Yet even afterwards, when Felicity had already been taken into the number of the gods, the great infelicity of the civil wars ensued. Was Felicity perhaps justly indignant, both because she was invited so late, and was invited not to honor, but rather to reproach, because along with her were worshipped Priapus, and Cloacina, and Fear and Dread, and Ague, and others which were not gods to be worshipped, but the crimes of the worshippers? Last of all, if it seemed good to worship so great a goddess along with a most unworthy crowd, why at least was she not worshipped in a more honorable way than the rest? For is it not intolerable that Felicity is placed neither among the gods Consentes, whom they allege to be admitted into the council of Jupiter, nor among the gods whom they term Select? Some temple might be made for her which might be pre-eminent, both in loftiness of site and dignity of style. Why, indeed, not something better than is made for Jupiter himself? For who gave the kingdom even to Jupiter but Felicity? I am supposing that when he reigned he was happy. Felicity, however, is certainly more valuable than a kingdom. For no one doubts that a man might easily be found who may fear to be made a king; but no one is found who is unwilling to be happy. Therefore, if it is thought they can be consulted by augury, or in any other way, the gods themselves should be consulted about this thing, whether they may wish to give place to Felicity. If, perchance, the place should already be occupied by the temples and altars of others, where a greater and more lofty temple might be built to Felicity, even Jupiter himself might give way, so that Felicity might rather obtain the very pinnacle of the Capitoline hill. For there is not any one who would resist Felicity, except, which is impossible, one who might wish to be unhappy. Certainly, if he should be consulted, Jupiter would in no case do what those three gods, Mars, Terminus, and Juventas, did, who positively refused to give place to their superior and king. For, as their books record, when king Tarquin wished to construct the Capitol, and perceived that the place which seemed to him to be the most worthy and suitable was preoccupied by other gods, not daring to do anything contrary to their pleasure, and believing that they would willingly give place to a god who was so great, and was their own master, because there were many of them there when the Capitol was founded, he inquired by augury whether they chose to give place to Jupiter, and they were all willing to remove thence except those whom I have named, Mars, Terminus, and Juventas; and therefore the Capitol was built in such a way that these three also might be within it, yet with such obscure signs that even the most learned men could scarcely know this. Surely, then, Jupiter himself would by no means despise Felicity, as he was himself despised by Terminus, Mars, and Juventas. But even they themselves who had not given place to Jupiter, would certainly give place to Felicity, who had made Jupiter king over them. Or if they should not give place, they would act thus not out of contempt of her, but because they chose rather to be obscure in the house of Felicity, than to be eminent without her in their own places.

Sed (unde nunc agitur) si libri et sacra eorum uera sunt et Felicitas dea est, quur non ipsa una quae coleretur constituta est, quae posset uniuersa conferre et conpendio facere felicem? Quis enim optat aliquid propter aliud quam ut felix fiat? Quur denique tam sero huic tantae deae post tot Romanos principes Lucullus aedem constituit? Quur ipse Romulus felicem cupiens condere ciuitatem non huic templum potissimum struxit nec propter aliquid dis ceteris supplicauit, quando nihil deesset, si haec adesset? Nam et ipse nec prius rex, nec ut putant postea deus fieret, si hanc deam propitiam non haberet. Ut quid ergo constituit Romanis deos Ianum, Iouem, Martem, Picum, Faunum, Tiberinum, Herculem et si quos alios? Ut quid Titus Tatius addidit Saturnum, Opem, Solem, Lunam, Vulcanum, Lucem et quoscumque alios addidit, inter quos etiam deam Cloacinam, Felicitate neglecta? Ut quid Numa tot deos et tot deas sine ista? An eam forte in tanta turba uidere non potuit? Hostilius certe rex deos et ipse nouos Pauorem adque Pallorem propitiandos non introduceret, si deam istam nosset aut coleret. Praesente quippe Felicitate omnis pauor et pallor non propitiatus abscederet, sed pulsus aufugeret. Deinde quid est hoc, quod iam Romanum imperium longe lateque crescebat, et adhuc nemo Felicitatem colebat? An ideo grandius imperium quam felicius fuit? Nam quo modo ibi esset uera felicitas, ubi uera non erat pietas? Pietas est enim uerax ueri Dei cultus, non cultus falsorum tot deorum, quot daemoniorum. Sed et postea iam in deorum numerum Felicitate suscepta magna bellorum ciuilium infelicitas subsecuta est. An forte iuste est indignata Felicitas, quod et tam sero et non ad honorem, sed ad contumeliam potius inuitata est, ut cum ea coleretur Priapus et Cloacina et Pauor et Pallor et Febris et cetera non numina colendorum, sed crimina colentium? Ad extremum si cum turba indignissima tanta dea colenda uisa est, quur non uel inlustrius ceteris colebatur? Quis enim ferat, quod neque inter deos Consentes, quos dicunt in consilium Iouis adhiberi, nec inter deos, quos selectos uocant, Felicitas constituta eat? Templum aliquod ei fieret, quod et loci sublimitate et operis dignitate praemineret. Quur enim non aliquid melius quam ipsi Ioui? Nam quae etiam Ioui regnum nisi Felicitas dedit? si tamen cum regnaret felix fuit. Et potior est felicitas regno. Nemo enim dubitat facile inueniri hominem, qui se timeat fieri regem; nullus autem inuenitur, • qui se nolit esse felicem. Ipsi ergo di si per auguria uel quolibet modo eos posse consuli putant, de hac re consulerentur, utrum uellent Felicitati loco cedere, si forte aliorum aedibus uel altaribus iam fuisset locus occupatus, ubi aedes maior adque sublimior Felicitati construeretur; etiam ipse Iuppiter cederet, ut ipsum uerticem collis Capitolini Felicitas potius obtineret. Non enim quispiam resisteret Felicitati, nisi, quod fieri non potest, qui esse uellet infelix. Nullo modo omnino, si consuleretur, faceret Iuppiter, quod ei fecerunt tres di, Mars, Terminus et Iuuentas, qui maiori et regi ‘suo nullo modo cedere loco uoluerunt. Nam sicut habent eorum litterae, cum rex Tarquinius Capitolium fabricari uellet eumque locum, qui ei dignior aptiorque uidebatur, ab dis aliis cerneret praeoccupatum, non audens aliquid contra eorum facere arbitrium et credens eos tanto numini suoque principi uoluntate cessuros, quia multi erant illic, ubi Capitolium constitutum est. per augurium quaesiuit, utrum concedere locum uellent Ioui; adque ipsi inde cedere omnes uoluerunt praeter illos quos commemoraui, Martem, Terminum, Iuuentatem; adque ideo Capitolium ita constructum est, ut etiam isti tres intus essent tam obscuris signis, ut hoc uix homines doctissimi scirent. Nullo modo igitur Felicitatem Iuppiter ipse contemneret, sicut a Termino, Marte, Iuuentate contemtus est. Sed ipsi etiam, qui non cesserant Ioui, profecto cederent Felicitati, quae illis regem fecerat Iouem. Aut si non cederent, non id contemtu eius facerent, sed quod in domo Felicitatis obscuri esse mallent quam sine illa in locis propriis eminere.

Thus the goddess Felicity being established in the largest and loftiest place, the citizens should learn whence the furtherance of every good desire should be sought. And so, by the persuasion of nature herself, the superfluous multitude of other gods being abandoned, Felicity alone would be worshipped, prayer would be made to her alone, her temple alone would be frequented by the citizens who wished to be happy, which no one of them would not wish; and thus felicity, who was sought for from all the gods, would be sought for only from her own self. For who wishes to receive from any god anything else than felicity, or what he supposes to tend to felicity? Wherefore, if Felicity has it in her power to be with what man she pleases (and she has it if she is a goddess), what folly is it, after all, to seek from any other god her whom you can obtain by request from her own self! Therefore they ought to honor this goddess above other gods, even by dignity of place. For, as we read in their own authors, the ancient Romans paid greater honors to I know not what Summanus, to whom they attributed nocturnal thunderbolts, than to Jupiter, to whom diurnal thunderbolts were held to pertain. But, after a famous and conspicuous temple had been built to Jupiter, owing to the dignity of the building, the multitude resorted to him in so great numbers, that scarce one can be found who remembers even to have read the name of Summanus, which now he cannot once hear named. But if Felicity is not a goddess, because, as is true, it is a gift of God, that god must be sought who has power to give it, and that hurtful multitude of false gods must be abandoned which the vain multitude of foolish men follows after, making gods to itself of the gifts of God, and offending Himself whose gifts they are by the stubbornness of a proud will. For he cannot be free from infelicity who worships Felicity as a goddess, and forsakes God, the giver of felicity; just as he cannot be free from hunger who licks a painted loaf of bread, and does not buy it of the man who has a real one.

Ita dea Felicitate in loco amplissimo et celsissimo constituta discerent ciues, unde omnis boni uoti petendum esset auxilium, ac sic ipsa suadente natura aliorum deorum superflua multitudine derelicta coleretur una Felicitas, uni supplicaretur, unius templum frequentaretur a ciuibus qui felices esse uellent, quorum esset nemo qui nollet, adque ita ipsa a se ipsa peteretur, quae ab omnibus petebatur. Quis enim aliquid ab aliquo deo nisi felicitatem uelit accipere uel quod ad felicitatem existimat pertinere? Proinde si felicitas habet in potestate cum quo homine sit (habet autem, si dea est): quae tandem stultitia est ab aliquo eam deo petere, quam possis a se ipsa inpetrare? Hanc ergo deam super deos ceteros honorare etiam ‘loci dignitate debuerunt. Sicut enim aput ipsos legitur, Romani ueteres nescio quem Summanum, cui nocturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam Iouem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinerent. Sed postquam Ioui templum insigne ac sublime constructum est, propter aedis dignitatem sic ad eum multitudo confluxit, ut uix inueniatur qui Summani nomen, quod audire iam non potest, se saltem legisse meminerit. Si autem felicitas dea non est, quoniam, quod uerum est, munus est Dei: ille Deus quaeratur, qui eam dare possit, et falsorum deorum multitudo noxia relinquatur, quam stultorum hominum multitudo uana sectatur, Dei dona deos sibi faciens et ipsum, cuius ea dona sunt, obstinatione superbae uoluntatis offendens. Sic enim carere non potest infelicitate, qui tamquam deam felicitatem colit et Deum datorem felicitatis relinquit, sicut carere non potest fame, qui panem pictum lingit et ab homine, qui uerum habet, non petit.

The Reasons by Which the Pagans Attempt to Defend Their Worshipping Among the Gods the Divine Gifts Themselves.

Chapter 24.—The Reasons by Which the Pagans Attempt to Defend Their Worshipping Among the Gods the Divine Gifts Themselves.

Caput XXIV. Qua ratione defendant pagani, quod inter deos colant ipsa dona diuina.

We may, however, consider their reasons. Is it to be believed, say they, that our forefathers were besotted even to such a degree as not to know that these things are divine gifts, and not gods? But as they knew that such things are granted to no one, except by some god freely bestowing them, they called the gods whose names they did not find out by the names of those things which they deemed to be given by them; sometimes slightly altering the name for that purpose, as, for example, from war they have named Bellona, not bellum; from cradles, Cunina, not cunæ; from standing corn, Segetia, not seges; from apples, Pomona, not pomum; from oxen, Bubona, not bos. Sometimes, again, with no alteration of the word, just as the things themselves are named, so that the goddess who gives money is called Pecunia, and money is not thought to be itself a goddess: so of Virtus, who gives virtue; Honor, who gives honor; Concordia, who gives concord; Victoria, who gives victory. So, they say, when Felicitas is called a goddess, what is meant is not the thing itself which is given, but that deity by whom felicity is given.

Libet autem eorum considerare rationes. Usque adeone. inquiunt, maiores nostros insipientes fuisse credendum est, ut haec nescirent munera diuina esse, non deos? Sed quoniam sciebant nemini talia nisi aliquo deo largiente concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inueniebant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab eis sentiebant dari, aliqua uocabula inde flectentes, sicut a bello Bellonam nuncupauerunt, non Bellum; sicut a cunis Cuninam, non Cunam; sicut a segetibus Segetiam, non Segetem, a pomis Pomonam, non Pomum: sicut a bubus Bubonam, non Bouem: aut certe nulla uocabuli declinatione sicut res ipsae nominantur, ut Pecunia dicta est dea, quae dat pecuniam, non omnino pecunia dea ipsa putata est; ita Virtus. quae dat uirtutem, Honor, qui honorem, Concordia, quae concordiam, Victoria, quae dat uictoriam. Ita, inquiunt, cum Felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsa quae datur, sed numen illud adtenditur a quo felicitas datur.

Concerning the One God Only to Be Worshipped, Who, Although His Name is Unknown, is Yet Deemed to Be the Giver of Felicity.

Chapter 25.—Concerning the One God Only to Be Worshipped, Who, Although His Name is Unknown, is Yet Deemed to Be the Giver of Felicity.

Caput XXV. De uno tantum colendo Deo, qui licet nomine ignoretur, tamen felicitatis dator esse sentitur.

Having had that reason rendered to us, we shall perhaps much more easily persuade, as we wish, those whose heart has not become too much hardened. For if now human infirmity has perceived that felicity cannot be given except by some god; if this was perceived by those who worshipped so many gods, at whose head they set Jupiter himself; if, in their ignorance of the name of Him by whom felicity was given, they agreed to call Him by the name of that very thing which they believed He gave;—then it follows that they thought that felicity could not be given even by Jupiter himself, whom they already worshipped, but certainly by him whom they thought fit to worship under the name of Felicity itself. I thoroughly affirm the statement that they believed felicity to be given by a certain God whom they knew not: let Him therefore be sought after, let Him be worshipped, and it is enough. Let the train of innumerable demons be repudiated, and let this God suffice every man whom his gift suffices. For him, I say, God the giver of felicity will not be enough to worship, for whom felicity itself is not enough to receive. But let him for whom it suffices (and man has nothing more he ought to wish for) serve the one God, the giver of felicity. This God is not he whom they call Jupiter. For if they acknowledged him to be the giver of felicity, they would not seek, under the name of Felicity itself, for another god or goddess by whom felicity might be given; nor could they tolerate that Jupiter himself should be worshipped with such infamous attributes. For he is said to be the debaucher of the wives of others; he is the shameless lover and ravisher of a beautiful boy.

Ista nobis reddita ratione multo facilius eis, quorum cor non nimis obduruit, persuadebimus fortasse quod uolumus. Si enim iam humana infirmitas sensit non nisi ab aliquo deo dari posse felicitatem, et hoc senserunt homines, qui tam multos colebant deos, in quibus et ipsum eorum regem Iouem: quia nomen eius, a quo daretur felicitas, ignorabant, ideo ipsius rei nomine, quam credebant ab illo dari, eum appellare uoluerunt, satis ergo indicarunt nec ab ipso Ioue dari posse felicitatem, quem iam colebant, sed utique ab illo, quem nomine ipsius felicitatis colendum esse censebant. Confirmo prorsus a quodam deo, quem nesciebant, eos credidisse dari felicitatem: ipse ergo quaeratur, ipse colatur, et sufficit. Repudietur strepitus innumerabilium daemoniorum; illi non sufficiat hic deus, cui non sufficit munus eius. Illi, inquam, non sufficiat ad colendum Deus dator felicitatis, cui non sufficit ad accipiendum ipsa felicitas. Cui autem sufficit (non enim habet homo quid amplius optare debeat), seruiat uni Deo datori felicitatis. Non est ipse, quem nominant Iouem. Nam si eum datorem felicitatis agnoscerent, non utique alium uel aliam, a qua daretur felicitas, nomine ipsius felicitatis inquirerent, neque ipsum Iouem cum tantis iniuriis colendum putarent. Iste alienarum dicitur adulter uxorum, iste pueri pulchri inpudicus amator et raptor.