Concerning the Kingdom of the Jews, Which Was Founded by the One and True God, and Preserved by Him as Long as They Remained in the True Religion.

Chapter 34.—Concerning the Kingdom of the Jews, Which Was Founded by the One and True God, and Preserved by Him as Long as They Remained in the True Religion.

Caput XXXIV. De regno Iudaeorum, quod ab uno et uero Deo institutum adque seruatum est, donec in uera religione manserunt.

Therefore, that it might be known that these earthly good things, after which those pant who cannot imagine better things, remain in the power of the one God Himself, not of the many false gods whom the Romans have formerly believed worthy of worship, He multiplied His people in Egypt from being very few, and delivered them out of it by wonderful signs. Nor did their women invoke Lucina when their offspring was being incredibly multiplied; and that nation having increased incredibly, He Himself delivered, He Himself saved them from the hands of the Egyptians, who persecuted them, and wished to kill all their infants. Without the goddess Rumina they sucked; without Cunina they were cradled, without Educa and Potina they took food and drink; without all those puerile gods they were educated; without the nuptial gods they were married; without the worship of Priapus they had conjugal intercourse; without invocation of Neptune the divided sea opened up a way for them to pass over, and overwhelmed with its returning waves their enemies who pursued them. Neither did they consecrate any goddess Mannia when they received manna from heaven; nor, when the smitten rock poured forth water to them when they thirsted, did they worship Nymphs and Lymphs. Without the mad rites of Mars and Bellona they carried on war; and while, indeed, they did not conquer without victory, yet they did not hold it to be a goddess, but the gift of their God. Without Segetia they had harvests; without Bubona, oxen; honey without Mellona; apples without Pomona: and, in a word, everything for which the Romans thought they must supplicate so great a crowd of false gods, they received much more happily from the one true God. And if they had not sinned against Him with impious curiosity, which seduced them like magic arts, and drew them to strange gods and idols, and at last led them to kill Christ, their kingdom would have remained to them, and would have been, if not more spacious, yet more happy, than that of Rome. And now that they are dispersed through almost all lands and nations, it is through the providence of that one true God; that whereas the images, altars, groves, and temples of the false gods are everywhere overthrown, and their sacrifices prohibited, it may be shown from their books how this has been foretold by their prophets so long before; lest, perhaps, when they should be read in ours, they might seem to be invented by us. But now, reserving what is to follow for the following book, we must here set a bound to the prolixity of this one.

Itaque ut cognosceretur etiam illa terrena bona, quibus solis inhiant qui meliora cogitare non possunt, in ipsius unius Dei esse posita potestate, non in multorum falsorum, quos colendos Romani antea crediderunt, populum suum in Aegypto de paucissimis multiplicauit et inde signis mirabilibus liberauit. Nec Lucinam mulieres illae inuocauerunt, quando earum partus, ut miris modis multiplicarentur et gens illa incredibiliter cresceret, ab Aegyptiorum persequentium et infantes omnes necare uolentium manibus ipse seruauit. Sine dea Rumina suxerunt, sine Cunina in cunis fuerunt, sine Educa et Potina escam potumque sumserunt, sine tot dis puerilibus educati sunt, sine dis coniugalibus coniugati, sine cultu Priapi coniugibus mixti; sine inuocatione Neptuni mare transeuntibus diuisum patuit et sequentes eorum inimicos fluctibus in se redeuntibus obruit. Nec consecrauerunt aliquam deam Manniam, quando de caelo manna sumserunt; nec quando sitientibus aquam percussa petra profudit, Nymphas Lymphasque coluerunt. Sine insanis sacris Martis et Bellonae bella gesserunt, et sine uictoria quidem non uicerunt, non eam tamen deam, sed Dei sui munus habuerunt. Sine Segetia segetes sine Bubona boues, mella sine Mellona poma sine Pomona, et prorsus omnia, pro quibus tantae falsorum deorum turbae Romani supplicandum putarunt, ab uno uero Deo multo felicius acceperunt. Et si non in eum peccassent, inpia curiositate tamquam magicis artibus seducti ad alienos deos et ad idola defluendo, et postremo Christum occidendo: in eodem regno etsi non spatiosiore, tamen feliciore mansissent. Et nunc quod per omnes fere terras gentesque dispersi sunt, illius unius ueri Dei prouidentia est, ut, quod deorum falsorum usquequaque simulacra arae, luci templa euertuntur et sacrificia prohibentur, de codicibus eorum probetur, quem ad modum hoc fuerit tanto ante prophetatum; ne forte, cum legeretur in nostris, a nobis putaretur esse confictum. Iam quod sequitur in uolumine sequenti uidendum est, et hic dandus huius prolixitatis modus.

Book V.

Liber V

Argument—Augustin first discusses the doctrine of fate, for the sake of confuting those who are disposed to refer to fate the power and increase of the Roman empire, which could not be attributed to false gods, as has been shown in the preceding book. After that, he proves that there is no contradiction between God’s prescience and our free will. He then speaks of the manners of the ancient Romans, and shows in what sense it was due to the virtue of the Romans themselves, and in how far to the counsel of God, that he increased their dominion, though they did not worship him. Finally, he explains what is to be accounted the true happiness of the Christian emperors.

Since, then, it is established that the complete attainment of all we desire is that which constitutes felicity, which is no goddess, but a gift of God, and that therefore men can worship no god save Him who is able to make them happy,—and were Felicity herself a goddess, she would with reason be the only object of worship,—since, I say, this is established, let us now go on to consider why God, who is able to give with all other things those good gifts which can be possessed by men who are not good, and consequently not happy, has seen fit to grant such extended and long-continued dominion to the Roman empire; for that this was not effected by that multitude of false gods which they worshipped, we have both already adduced, and shall, as occasion offers, yet adduce considerable proof.

Quoniam constat omnium rerum optandarum plenitudinem esse felicitatem, quae non est dea, sed donum Dei, et ideo nullum deum colendum esse ab hominibus, nisi qui potest eos facere felices (unde si illa dea esset, sola colenda merito diceretur): iam consequenter uideamus, qua causa Deus, qui potest et illa bona dare, quae habere possunt etiam non boni ac per hoc etiam non felices, Romanum imperium tam magnum tamque diuturnum esse uoluerit. Quia enim hoc deorum falsorum illa quam colebant multitudo non fecit, et multa iam diximus, et ubi uisum fuerit opportunum esse dicemus.

Chapter 1.—That the Cause of the Roman Empire, and of All Kingdoms, is Neither Fortuitous Nor Consists in the Position of the Stars.

Caput I. Causam Romani imperii omniumque regnorum nec fortuitam esse nec in stellarum positione consistere.

The cause, then, of the greatness of the Roman empire is neither fortuitous nor fatal, according to the judgment or opinion of those who call those things fortuitous which either have no causes, or such causes as do not proceed from some intelligible order, and those things fatal which happen independently of the will of God and man, by the necessity of a certain order. In a word, human kingdoms are established by divine providence. And if any one attributes their existence to fate, because he calls the will or the power of God itself by the name of fate, let him keep his opinion, but correct his language. For why does he not say at first what he will say afterwards, when some one shall put the question to him, What he means by fate? For when men hear that word, according to the ordinary use of the language, they simply understand by it the virtue of that particular position of the stars which may exist at the time when any one is born or conceived, which some separate altogether from the will of God, whilst others affirm that this also is dependent on that will. But those who are of opinion that, apart from the will of God, the stars determine what we shall do, or what good things we shall possess, or what evils we shall suffer, must be refused a hearing by all, not only by those who hold the true religion, but by those who wish to be the worshippers of any gods whatsoever, even false gods. For what does this opinion really amount to but this, that no god whatever is to be worshipped or prayed to? Against these, however, our present disputation is not intended to be directed, but against those who, in defence of those whom they think to be gods, oppose the Christian religion. They, however, who make the position of the stars depend on the divine will, and in a manner decree what character each man shall have, and what good or evil shall happen to him, if they think that these same stars have that power conferred upon them by the supreme power of God, in order that they may determine these things according to their will, do a great injury to the celestial sphere, in whose most brilliant senate, and most splendid senate-house, as it were, they suppose that wicked deeds are decreed to be done,—such deeds as that, if any terrestrial state should decree them, it would be condemned to overthrow by the decree of the whole human race. What judgment, then, is left to God concerning the deeds of men, who is Lord both of the stars and of men, when to these deeds a celestial necessity is attributed? Or, if they do not say that the stars, though they have indeed received a certain power from God, who is supreme, determine those things according to their own discretion, but simply that His commands are fulfilled by them instrumentally in the application and enforcing of such necessities, are we thus to think concerning God even what it seemed unworthy that we should think concerning the will of the stars? But, if the stars are said rather to signify these things than to effect them, so that that position of the stars is, as it were, a kind of speech predicting, not causing future things,—for this has been the opinion of men of no ordinary learning,—certainly the mathematicians are not wont so to speak saying, for example, Mars in such or such a position signifies a homicide, but makes a homicide. But, nevertheless, though we grant that they do not speak as they ought, and that we ought to accept as the proper form of speech that employed by the philosophers in predicting those things which they think they discover in the position of the stars, how comes it that they have never been able to assign any cause why, in the life of twins, in their actions, in the events which befall them, in their professions, arts, honors, and other things pertaining to human life, also in their very death, there is often so great a difference, that, as far as these things are concerned, many entire strangers are more like them than they are like each other, though separated at birth by the smallest interval of time, but at conception generated by the same act of copulation, and at the same moment?

Causa ergo magnitudinis imperii Romani nec fortuita est nec fatalis secundum eorum sententiam siue opinionem, qui ea dicunt esse fortuita, quae uel nullas causas habent uel non ex aliquo rationabili ordine uenientes, et ea fatalia, quae praeter Dei et hominum uoluntatem cuiusdam ordinis necessitate contingunt. Prorsus diuina prouidentia regna constituuntur humana. Quae si propterea quisquam fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei uoluntatem uel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Quur enim non hoc primum dicit, quod postea dicturus est, cum ab illo quisquam quaesierit quid dixerit fatum? Nam id homines quando audiunt. usitata loquendi consuetudine non intellegunt nisi uim positionis siderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur siue concipitur; quod aliqui alienant a Dei uoluntate, aliqui ex illa etiam hoc pendere confirmant. Sed illi, qui sine Dei uoluntate decernere opinantur sidera quid agamus uel quid bonorum habeamus malorumue patiamur, ab auribus omnium repellendi sunt, non solum eorum qui ueram religionem tenent sed qui deorum qualiumcumque, licet falsorum, uolunt esse cultores. Haec enim opinio quid agit aliud, nisi ut nullus omnino colatur aut rogetur Deus? Contra quos modo nobis disputatio non est instituta, sed contra hos qui pro defensione eorum, quos deos putant, Christianae religioni aduersantur. Illi uero, qui positionem stellarum quodam modo decernentium qualis quisque sit et quid ei proueniat boni quidue mali accidat ex Dei uoluntate suspendunt, si easdem stellas putant habere hanc potestatem traditam sibi a summa illius potestate, ut uolentes ista decernant: magnam caelo faciunt iniuriam, in cuius uelut clarissimo senatu ac splendidissima curia opinantur scelera facienda decerni, qualia si aliqua terrena ciuitas decreuisset, genere humano decernente fuerat euertenda. Quale deinde iudicium de hominum factis Deo relinquitur, quibus caelestis necessitas adhibetur, cum dominus ille sit et siderum et hominum? Aut si non dicunt stellas, accepta quidem potestate a. summo Deo, arbitrio suo ista decernere, sed in talibus necessitatibus ingerendis illius omnino iussa conplere: itane de ipso Deo sentiendum est, quod indignissimum uisum est de stellarum uoluntate sentire? Quod si dicuntur stellae significare potius ista quam facere, ut quasi locutio quaedam sit illa positio praedicens futura, non agens (non enim mediocriter doctorum hominum fuit ista sententia): non quidem ita solent loqui mathematici, ut uerbi gratia dicant: ‘Mara ita positus homicidam significat’, sed: ‘homicidam facit’; uerumtamen ut concedamus non eos ut debent loqui et a philosophis accipere oportere sermonis regulam ad ea praenuntianda, quae in siderum positione reperire se putant: quid fit, quod nihil umquam dicere potuerunt, quur in uita geminorum, in actionibus, in euentis, in professionibus, artibus, honoribus ceterisque rebus ad humanam uitam pertinentibus adque in ipsa morte sit plerumque tanta diuersitas, ut similiores eis sint, quantum ad haec adtinet, multi extranei quam ipsi inter se gemini perexiguo temporis interuallo in nascendo separati, in conceptu autem per unum concubitum uno etiam momento seminati?

Chapter 2.—On the Difference in the Health of Twins.

Caput II. De geminorum simili dissimilique ualetudine.

Cicero says that the famous physician Hippocrates has left in writing that he had suspected that a certain pair of brothers were twins, from the fact that they both took ill at once, and their disease advanced to its crisis and subsided in the same time in each of them. Posidonius the Stoic, who was much given to astrology, used to explain the fact by supposing that they had been born and conceived under the same constellation. In this question the conjecture of the physician is by far more worthy to be accepted, and approaches much nearer to credibility, since, according as the parents were affected in body at the time of copulation, so might the first elements of the fœtuses have been affected, so that all that was necessary for their growth and development up till birth having been supplied from the body of the same mother, they might be born with like constitutions. Thereafter, nourished in the same house, on the same kinds of food, where they would have also the same kinds of air, the same locality, the same quality of water,—which, according to the testimony of medical science, have a very great influence, good or bad, on the condition of bodily health,—and where they would also be accustomed to the same kinds of exercise, they would have bodily constitutions so similar that they would be similarly affected with sickness at the same time and by the same causes. But, to wish to adduce that particular position of the stars which existed at the time when they were born or conceived as the cause of their being simultaneously affected with sickness, manifests the greatest arrogance, when so many beings of most diverse kinds, in the most diverse conditions, and subject to the most diverse events, may have been conceived and born at the same time, and in the same district, lying under the same sky. But we know that twins do not only act differently, and travel to very different places, but that they also suffer from different kinds of sickness; for which Hippocrates would give what is in my opinion the simplest reason, namely, that, through diversity of food and exercise, which arises not from the constitution of the body, but from the inclination of the mind, they may have come to be different from each other in respect of health. Moreover, Posidonius, or any other asserter of the fatal influence of the stars, will have enough to do to find anything to say to this, if he be unwilling to im pose upon the minds of the uninstructed in things of which they are ignorant. But, as to what they attempt to make out from that very small interval of time elapsing between the births of twins, on account of that point in the heavens where the mark of the natal hour is placed, and which they call the “horoscope,” it is either disproportionately small to the diversity which is found in the dispositions, actions, habits, and fortunes of twins, or it is disproportionately great when compared with the estate of twins, whether low or high, which is the same for both of them, the cause for whose greatest difference they place, in every case, in the hour on which one is born; and, for this reason, if the one is born so immediately after the other that there is no change in the horoscope, I demand an entire similarity in all that respects them both, which can never be found in the case of any twins. But if the slowness of the birth of the second give time for a change in the horoscope, I demand different parents, which twins can never have.

Cicero dicit Hippocratem, nobilissimum medicum, scriptum reliquisse, quosdam fratres, cum simul aegrotare coepissent et eorum morbus eodem tempore ingrauesceret, eodem leuaretur, geminos suspicatum; quos Posidonius Stoicus, multum astrologiae deditus, eadem constitutione astrorum natos eademque conceptos solebat adserere. Ita quod medicus pertinere credebat ad simillimam temperiem ualetudinis, hoc philosophus astrologus ad uim constitutionemque siderum, quae fuerat quo tempore concepti natique sunt. In hac causa multo est acceptabilior et de proximo credibilior coniectura medicinalis, quoniam parentes ut erant corpore adfecti, dum concumberent, ita primordia conceptorum adfici potuerunt, ut consecutis ex materno corpore prioribus incrementis paris ualetudinis nascerentur; deinde in una domo eisdem alimentis nutriti, ubi aerem et loci positionem et uim aquarum plurimum ualere ad corpus uel bene uel male accipiendum medicina testatur, eisdem etiam exercitationibus adsuefacti tam simi lia corpora gererent, ut etiam ad aegrotandum uno tempore eisdemque causis similiter mouerentur. Constitutionem uero caeli ac siderum, quae fuit quando concepti siue nati sunt, uelle trahere ad istam aegrotandi parilitatem, cum tam multa diuersissimi generis diuersissimorum effectuum et euentorum eodem tempore in unius regionis terra eidem caelo subdita potuerint concipi et nasci, nescio cuius sit insolentiae. Nos autem nouimus geminos non solum actus et peregrinationes habere diuersas, uerum etiam dispares aegritudines perpeti. De qua re facillimam, quantum mihi uidetur, rationem redderet Hippocrates, diuersis alimentis et exercitationibus, quae non de corporis temperatione, sed de animi uoluntate ueniunt, dissimiles eis accidere potuisse ualetudines. Porro autem Posidonius uel quilibet fatalium siderum adsertor mirum si potest hic inuenire quid dicat, si nolit inperitorum mentibus in eis quas nesciunt rebus inludere. Quod enim conantur efficere de interuallo exiguo temporis, quod inter se gemini dum nascerentur habuerunt, propter caeli particulam, ubi ponitur horae notatio, quem horoscopum uocant: aut non tantum ualet, quanta inuenitur in geminorum uoluntatibus actibus moribus casibusque diuersitas, aut plus etiam ualet, quam est geminorum uel humilitas generis eadem uel nobilitas, cuius maximam diuersitatem non nisi in hora, qua quisque nascitur, ponunt. Ac per hoc si tam celeriter alter post alterum nascitur, ut eadem pars horoscopi maneat, paria cuncta quaero, quae in nullis possunt geminis inueniri; si autem sequentis tarditas horoscopum mutat, parentes diuersos quaero, quos gemini habere non possunt.

Chapter 3.—Concerning the Arguments Which Nigidius the Mathematician Drew from the Potter’s Wheel, in the Question About the Birth of Twins.

Caput III. De argumento, quod ex rota figuli Nigidius mathematicus adsumsit in quaestione geminorum.

It is to no purpose, therefore, that that famous fiction about the potter’s wheel is brought forward, which tells of the answer which Nigidius is said to have given when he was perplexed with this question, and on account of which he was called Figulus. For, having whirled round the potter’s wheel with all his strength he marked it with ink, striking it twice with the utmost rapidity, so that the strokes seemed to fall on the very same part of it. Then, when the rotation had ceased, the marks which he had made were found upon the rim of the wheel at no small distance apart. Thus, said he, considering the great rapidity with which the celestial sphere revolves, even though twins were born with as short an interval between their births as there was between the strokes which I gave this wheel, that brief interval of time is equivalent to a very great distance in the celestial sphere. Hence, said he, come whatever dissimilitudes may be remarked in the habits and fortunes of twins. This argument is more fragile than the vessels which are fashioned by the rotation of that wheel. For if there is so much significance in the heavens which cannot be comprehended by observation of the constellations, that, in the case of twins, an inheritance may fall to the one and not to the other, why, in the case of others who are not twins, do they dare, having examined their constellations, to declare such things as pertain to that secret which no one can comprehend, and to attribute them to the precise moment of the birth of each individual? Now, if such predictions in connection with the natal hours of others who are not twins are to be vindicated on the ground that they are founded on the observation of more extended spaces in the heavens, whilst those very small moments of time which separated the births of twins, and correspond to minute portions of celestial space, are to be connected with trifling things about which the mathematicians are not wont to be consulted,—for who would consult them as to when he is to sit, when to walk abroad, when and on what he is to dine? —how can we be justified in so speaking, when we can point out such manifold diversity both in the habits, doings, and destinies of twins?

Frustra itaque adfertur nobile illud commentum de figuli rota, quod respondisse ferunt Nigidium hac quaestione turbatum, unde et Figulus appellatus est. Dum enim rotam figuli ui quanta potuit intor?isset, currente illa bis numero de atramento tamquam uno eius loco summa celeritate percussit; deinde inuenta sunt signa, quae fixerat, desistente motu, non paruo interuallo in rotae illius extremitate distantia. <Sic, inquit, in tanta rapacitate caeli, etiamsi alter post alterum tanta celeritate nascatur, quanta rotam bis ipse percussi, in caeli spatio plurimum est: hinc sunt, inquit, quaecumque dissimillima perhibentur in moribus casibusque geminorum.’ Hoc figmentum fragilius est quam uasa, quae illa rotatione finguntur. Nam si tam multum in caelo interest, quod constellationibus conprehendi non potest, ut alteri geminorum hereditas obueniat, alteri non obueniat: quur audent ceteris, qui gemini non sunt, cum inspexerint eorum constellationes, talia pronuntiare, quae ad illud secretum pertinent, quod nemo potest conprehendere et momentis adnotare nascentium? Si autem propterea talia dicunt in aliorum genituris, quia haec ad productiora spatia temporum pertinent; momenta uero illa partium minutarum, quae inter se gemini possunt habere nascentes, rebus minimis tribuuntur, de qualibus mathematici non solent consuli (quis enim consulat quando sedeat, quando deambulet, quando uel quid prandeat?): numquid ista dicimus, quando in moribus operibus casibusque geminorum plurima plurimumque diuersa monstramus?

Chapter 4.—Concerning the Twins Esau and Jacob, Who Were Very Unlike Each Other Both in Their Character and Actions.

Caput IV. De Esau et Jacob geminis multum inter se morum et actionum qualitate disparibus.

In the time of the ancient fathers, to speak concerning illustrious persons, there were born two twin brothers, the one so immediately after the other, that the first took hold of the heel of the second. So great a difference existed in their lives and manners, so great a dissimilarity in their actions, so great a difference in their parents’ love for them respectively, that the very contrast between them produced even a mutual hostile antipathy. Do we mean, when we say that they were so unlike each other, that when the one was walking the other was sitting, when the one was sleeping the other was waking,—which differences are such as are attributed to those minute portions of space which cannot be appreciated by those who note down the position of the stars which exists at the moment of one’s birth, in order that the mathematicians may be consulted concerning it? One of these twins was for a long time a hired servant; the other never served. One of them was beloved by his mother; the other was not so. One of them lost that honor which was so much valued among their people; the other obtained it. And what shall we say of their wives, their children, and their possessions? How different they were in respect to all these! If, therefore, such things as these are connected with those minute intervals of time which elapse between the births of twins, and are not to be attributed to the constellations, wherefore are they predicted in the case of others from the examination of their constellations? And if, on the other hand, these things are said to be predicted, because they are connected, not with minute and inappreciable moments, but with intervals of time which can be observed and noted down, what purpose is that potter’s wheel to serve in this matter, except it be to whirl round men who have hearts of clay, in order that they may be prevented from detecting the emptiness of the talk of the mathematicians?

Nati sunt duo gemini antiqua patrum memoria ut de insignibus loquar) sic alter post alterum, ut posterior plantam prioris teneret. Tanta in eorum uita fuerunt moribusque diuersa, tanta in actibus disparilitas, tanta in parentum amore dissimilitudo, ut etiam inimicos eos inter se faceret ipsa distantia. Numquid hoc dicitur, quia uno ambulante alius sedebat, et alio dormiente alius uigilabat, et alio loquente tacebat alius; quae pertinent ad illas minutias, quae non possunt ab eis conprehendi, qui constitutionem siderum, qua quisque nascitur, scribunt, unde mathematici consulantur? Unus duxit mercennariam seruitutem, alius non seruiuit; unus a matre diligebatur, alius non diligebatur; unus honorem, qui magnus aput eos habebatur, amisit, indeptus est alter. Quid de uxoribus, quid de filiis, quid de rebus, quanta diuersitas! Si ergo haec ad illas pertinent minutias temporum, quae inter se habent gemini, et constellationibus non adscribuntur: quare aliorum constellationibus inspectis ista dicuntur? Si autem ideo dicuntur, quia non ad minuta inconprehensibilia, sed ad temporum spatia pertinent, quae obseruari notarique possunt: quid hic agit rota illa figuli, nisi ut homines luteum cor habentes in gyrum mittantur, ne mathematicorum uaniloquia conuincantur?

Chapter 5.—In What Manner the Mathematicians are Convicted of Professing a Vain Science.

Caput V. Quibus modis conuincantur mathematici uanam scientiam profiteri.

Do not those very persons whom the medical sagacity of Hippocrates led him to suspect to be twins, because their disease was observed by him to develop to its crisis and to subside again in the same time in each of them,—do not these, I say, serve as a sufficient refutation of those who wish to attribute to the influence of the stars that which was owing to a similarity of bodily constitution? For wherefore were they both sick of the same disease, and at the same time, and not the one after the other in the order of their birth? (for certainly they could not both be born at the same time.) Or, if the fact of their having been born at different times by no means necessarily implies that they must be sick at different times, why do they contend that the difference in the time of their births was the cause of their difference in other things? Why could they travel in foreign parts at different times, marry at different times, beget children at different times, and do many other things at different times, by reason of their having been born at different times, and yet could not, for the same reason, also be sick at different times? For if a difference in the moment of birth changed the horoscope, and occasioned dissimilarity in all other things, why has that simultaneousness which belonged to their conception remained in their attacks of sickness? Or, if the destinies of health are involved in the time of conception, but those of other things be said to be attached to the time of birth, they ought not to predict anything concerning health from examination of the constellations of birth, when the hour of conception is not also given, that its constellations may be inspected. But if they say that they predict attacks of sickness without examining the horoscope of conception, because these are indicated by the moments of birth, how could they inform either of these twins when he would be sick, from the horoscope of his birth, when the other also, who had not the same horoscope of birth, must of necessity fall sick at the same time? Again, I ask, if the distance of time between the births of twins is so great as to occasion a difference of their constellations on account of the difference of their horoscopes, and therefore of all the cardinal points to which so much influence is attributed, that even from such change there comes a difference of destiny, how is it possible that this should be so, since they cannot have been conceived at different times? Or, if two conceived at the same moment of time could have different destinies with respect to their births, why may not also two born at the same moment of time have different destinies for life and for death? For if the one moment in which both were conceived did not hinder that the one should be born before the other, why, if two are born at the same moment, should anything hinder them from dying at the same moment? If a simultaneous conception allows of twins being differently affected in the womb, why should not simultaneousness of birth allow of any two individuals having different fortunes in the world? and thus would all the fictions of this art, or rather delusion, be swept away. What strange circumstance is this, that two children conceived at the same time, nay, at the same moment, under the same position of the stars, have different fates which bring them to different hours of birth, whilst two children, born of two different mothers, at the same moment of time, under one and the same position of the stars, cannot have different fates which shall conduct them by necessity to diverse manners of life and of death? Are they at conception as yet without destinies, because they can only have them if they be born? What, therefore, do they mean when they say that, if the hour of the conception be found, many things can be predicted by these astrologers? from which also arose that story which is reiterated by some, that a certain sage chose an hour in which to lie with his wife, in order to secure his begetting an illustrious son. From this opinion also came that answer of Posidonius, the great astrologer and also philosopher, concerning those twins who were attacked with sickness at the same time, namely, “That this had happened to them because they were conceived at the same time, and born at the same time.” For certainly he added “conception,” lest it should be said to him that they could not both be born at the same time, knowing that at any rate they must both have been conceived at the same time; wishing thus to show that he did not attribute the fact of their being similarly and simultaneously affected with sickness to the similarity of their bodily constitutions as its proximate cause, but that he held that even in respect of the similarity of their health, they were bound together by a sidereal connection. If, therefore, the time of conception has so much to do with the similarity of destinies, these same destinies ought not to be changed by the circumstances of birth; or, if the destinies of twins be said to be changed because they are born at different times, why should we not rather understand that they had been already changed in order that they might be born at different times? Does not, then, the will of men living in the world change the destinies of birth, when the order of birth can change the destinies they had at conception?

Quid idem ipsi, quorum morbum, quod eodem tempore grauior leuiorque apparebat amborum, medicinaliter inspiciens Hippocrates geminos suspicatus est, nonne satis istos redarguunt, qui uolunt sideribus dare, quod de corporum simili temperatione ueniebat? Quur enim similiter eodemque tempore, non alter prior, alter posterior aegrotabant, sicut nati fuerant, quia utique simul nasci ambo non poterant? Aut si nihil momenti adtulit, ut diuersis temporibus aegrotarent, quod diuersis temporibus nati sunt: quare tempus in nascendo diuersum ad aliarum rerum diuersitates ualere contendunt? Quur potuerunt diuersis temporibus peregrinari, diuersis temporibus ducere uxores, diuersis temporibus filios procreare et multa alia, propterea quia diuersis temporibus nati sunt, et non potuerunt eadem causa diuersis etiam temporibus aegrotare? Si enim dispar nascendi mora mutauit horoscopum et disparilitatem intulit ceteris rebus: quur illud in aegritudinibus mansit, quod habebat in temporis aequalitate conceptus? Aut si fata ualetudinis in conceptu sunt, aliarum uero rerum in ortu esse dicuntur, non deberent inspectis natalium constellationibus de ualetudine aliquid dicere, quando eis inspicienda conceptionalis hora non datur. Si autem ideo praenuntiant aegritudines non inspecto conceptionis horoscopo, quia indicant eas momenta nascentium: quo modo dicerent cuilibet eorum geminorum ex natiuitatis hora, quando aegrotaturus esset, cum et alter, qui non habebat eandem horam natiuitatis, necesse haberet pariter aegrotare? Deinde quaero: si tanta distantia est temporis in natiuitate geminorum, ut per hanc oporteat eis constellationes fieri diuersas propter diuersum horoscopum et ob hoc diuersos omnes cardines, ubi tanta uis ponitur, ut hinc etiam diuersa sint fata: unde hoc accidere potuit, cum eorum conceptus diuersum tempus habere non possit? Aut si duorum uno momento temporis conceptorum potuerunt esse ad nascendum fata disparia, quur non et duorum uno momento temporis natorum possint esse ad uiuendum adque moriendum fata disparia? Nam si unum momentum, quo ambo concepti sunt, non inpediuit, ut alter prior, alter posterior nasceretur: quur, uno momento si duo nascantur, inpedit aliquid, ut alter prior, alter posterior moriatur? Si conceptio momenti unius diuersos casus in utero geminos habere permittit, quur natiuitas momenti unius non etiam quoslibet duos in terra diuersos casus habere permittat, ac sic omnis huius artis uel potius uanitatis commenta tollantur? Quid est hoc, quur uno tempore, momento uno. sub una eademque caeli positione concepti diuersa habent fata, quae illos perducant ad diuersarum horarum natiuitatem, et uno momento temporis sub una eademque caeli positione de duabus matribus duo pariter nati diuersa fata habere non possint, quae illos perducant ad diuersam uiuendi uel moriendi necessitatem? An concepti nondum habent fata, quae nisi nascantur habere non poterunt? Quid est ergo quod dicunt, si hora conceptionalis inueniatur, multa ab istis dici posse diuinius? Unde etiam illud a nonnullis praedicatur, quod quidam sapiens horam elegit, qua cum uxore concumberet, unde filium mirabilem gigneret. Unde postremo et hoc est, quod de illis pariter aegrotantibus geminis Posidonius, magnus astrologus idemque philosophus, respondebat, ideo fieri, quod eodem tempore fuissent nati eodemque concepti. Nam utique propter hoc addebat conceptionem, ne diceretur ei non ad liquidum eodem tempore potuisse nasci, quos constabat omnino eodem tempore fuisse conceptos, ut hoc, quod similiter simulque aegrotabant, non daret de proximo pari corporis temperamento, sed eandem quoque ualetudinis parilitatem sidereis nexibus adligaret. Si igitur in conceptu tanta uis est ad aequalitatem fatorum, non debuerunt nascendo eadem fata mutari. Aut si propterea mutantur fata geminorum, quia temporibus diuersis nascuntur, quur non potius intellegamus iam fuisse mutata, ut diuersis temporibus nascerentur? Itane non mutat fata natiuitatis uoluntas uiuentium, cum mutet fata conceptionis ordo nascentium?

Chapter 6.—Concerning Twins of Different Sexes.

Caput VI. De geminis disparis sexus.

But even in the very conception of twins, which certainly occurs at the same moment in the case of both, it often happens that the one is conceived a male, and the other a female. I know two of different sexes who are twins. Both of them are alive, and in the flower of their age; and though they resemble each other in body, as far as difference of sex will permit, still they are very different in the whole scope and purpose of their lives (consideration being had of those differences which necessarily exist between the lives of males and females),—the one holding the office of a count, and being almost constantly away from home with the army in foreign service, the other never leaving her country’s soil, or her native district. Still more,—and this is more incredible, if the destinies of the stars are to be believed in, though it is not wonderful if we consider the wills of men, and the free gifts of God,—he is married; she is a sacred virgin: he has begotten a numerous offspring; she has never even married. But is not the virtue of the horoscope very great? I think I have said enough to show the absurdity of that. But, say those astrologers, whatever be the virtue of the horoscope in other respects, it is certainly of significance with respect to birth. But why not also with respect to conception, which takes place undoubtedly with one act of copulation? And, indeed, so great is the force of nature, that after a woman has once conceived, she ceases to be liable to conception. Or were they, perhaps, changed at birth, either he into a male, or she into a female, because of the difference in their horoscopes? But, whilst it is not altogether absurd to say that certain sidereal influences have some power to cause differences in bodies alone,—as, for instance, we see that the seasons of the year come round by the approaching and receding of the sun, and that certain kinds of things are increased in size or diminished by the waxings and wanings of the moon, such as sea-urchins, oysters, and the wonderful tides of the ocean,—it does not follow that the wills of men are to be made subject to the position of the stars. The astrologers, however, when they wish to bind our actions also to the constellations, only set us on investigating whether, even in these bodies, the changes may not be attributable to some other than a sidereal cause. For what is there which more intimately concerns a body than its sex? And yet, under the same position of the stars, twins of different sexes may be conceived. Wherefore, what greater absurdity can be affirmed or believed than that the position of the stars, which was the same for both of them at the time of conception, could not cause that the one child should not have been of a different sex from her brother, with whom she had a common constellation, whilst the position of the stars which existed at the hour of their birth could cause that she should be separated from him by the great distance between marriage and holy virginity?

Quamquam et in ipsis geminorum conceptibus, ubi certe amborum eadem momenta sunt temporum, unde fit ut sub eadem constellatione fatali alter concipiatur masculus, altera femina? Nouimus geminos diuersi sexus, ambo adhuc uiuunt, ambo aetate adhuc uigent; quorum cum sint inter se similes corporum species, quantum in diuerso sexu potest, instituto tamen et proposito uitae ita sunt dispares, ut praeter actus, quos necesse est a uirilibus distare femineos (quod ille in officio comitis militat et a sua domo paene semper peregrinatur, illa de solo patrio et de rure proprio non recedit), insuper (quod est incredibilius, si astralia fata credantur; non autem mirum, si uoluntates hominum et Dei munera cogitentur) ille coniugatus, illa uirgo sacra est; ille numerosam prolem genuit, illa nec nupsit. At enim plurimum uis horoscopi ualet. Hoc quam nihil sit, iam satis disserui. Sed qualecumque sit, in ortu ualere dicunt; numquid et in conceptu? ubi et unum concubitum esse manifestum est, et tanta naturae uis est, ut, cum conceperit femina, deinde alterum concipere omnino non possit; unde necesse est eadem esse in geminis momenta conceptus. An forte quia diuerso horoscopo nati sunt, aut ille in masculum, dum nascerentur, aut illa in feminam commutata est? Cum igitur non usquequaque absurde dici posset ad solas corporum differentias adflatus quosdam ualere sidereos, sicut in solaribus accessibus et decessibus uidemus etiam ipsius anni tempora uariari et lunaribus incrementis adque detrimentis augeri et minui quaedam genera rerum, sicut echinos et conchas et mirabiles aestus oceani; non autem et animi uoluntates positionibus siderum subdi: nunc isti, cum etiam nostros actus inde religare conantur, admonent ut quaeramus, unde ne in ipsis quidem corporibus eis possit ratio ista constare. Quid enim tam ad corpus pertinens quam corporis sexus? et tamen sub eadem positione siderum diuersi sexus gemini concipi potuerunt. Unde quid insipientius dici aut credi potest, quam siderum positionem, quae ad horam conceptionis eadem ambobus fuit, facere non potuisse, ut, cum quo habebat eandem constellationem, sexum diuersum a fratre non haberet; et positionem siderum, quae fuit ad horam nascentium, facere potuisse, ut ab eo tam multum uirginali sanctitate distaret?