What We are to Believe that Varro Thought Concerning the Gods of the Nations, Whose Various Kinds and Sacred Rites He Has Shown to Be Such that He Would Have Acted More Reverently Towards Them Had He Been Altogether Silent Concerning Them.

Chapter 2.—What We are to Believe that Varro Thought Concerning the Gods of the Nations, Whose Various Kinds and Sacred Rites He Has Shown to Be Such that He Would Have Acted More Reverently Towards Them Had He Been Altogether Silent Concerning Them.

Caput II. Quid Varronem de dis gentium sensisse credendum sit. quorum talia et genera et sacra detexit, ut reuerentius cum eis ageret, si de illis omnino reticeret.

Who has investigated those things more carefully than Marcus Varro? Who has discovered them more learnedly? Who has considered them more attentively? Who has distinguished them more acutely? Who has written about them more diligently and more fully?—who, though he is less pleasing in his eloquence, is nevertheless so full of instruction and wisdom, that in all the erudition which we call secular, but they liberal, he will teach the student of things as much as Cicero delights the student of words. And even Tully himself renders him such testimony, as to say in his Academic books that he had held that disputation which is there carried on with Marcus Varro, “a man,” he adds, “unquestionably the acutest of all men, and, without any doubt, the most learned.” He does not say the most eloquent or the most fluent, for in reality he was very deficient in this faculty, but he says, “of all men the most acute.” And in those books,—that is, the Academic,—where he contends that all things are to be doubted, he adds of him, “without any doubt the most learned.” In truth, he was so certain concerning this thing, that he laid aside that doubt which he is wont to have recourse to in all things, as if, when about to dispute in favor of the doubt of the Academics, he had, with respect to this one thing, forgotten that he was an Academic. But in the first book, when he extols the literary works of the same Varro, he says, “Us straying and wandering in our own city like strangers, thy books, as it were, brought home, that at length we might come to know of who we were and where we were. Thou has opened up to us the age of the country, the distribution of seasons, the laws of sacred things, and of the priests; thou hast opened up to us domestic and public discipline; thou hast pointed out to us the proper places for religious ceremonies, and hast informed us concerning sacred places. Thou hast shown us the names, kinds, offices, causes of all divine and human things.”

Quis Marco Varrone curiosius ista quaesiuit? quis inuenit doctius? quis considerauit adtentius? quis distinxit acutius? quis diligentius pleniusque conscripsit? Qui tametsi minus est suauis eloquio, doctrina tamen adque sententiis ita refertus est, ut in omni eruditione, quam nos saecularem, illi autem liberalem uocant, studiosum rerum tantum iste doceat, quantum studiosum -uerborum Cicero delectat. Denique et ipse [Tullius] huic tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis dicat eam, quae ibi uersatur, disputationem se habuisse cum Marco Varrone, (homine, inquit, omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo). Non ait […] uel (facundissimo), quoniam re uera in hac facultate multum inpar est; sed ‘omnium, inquit, facile acutissimo), et in eis libris. id est Academicis, ubi cuncta dubitanda esse contendit, addidit ‘sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo’. Profecto de hac re sic erat certus, ut auferret dubitationem, quam solet in omnibus adhibere, tamquam de hoc uno etiam pro Academicorum dubitatione disputaturus se Academicum fuisset oblitus. In primo autem libro cum eiusdem Varronis litteraria opera praedicaret: ‘Nos, inquit, in nostra urbe peregrinantes errantesque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum reduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere.

This man, then, of so distinguished and excellent acquirements, and, as Terentian briefly says of him in a most elegant verse,

“Varro, a man universally informed,”

who read so much that we wonder when he had time to write, wrote so much that we can scarcely believe any one could have read it all,—this man, I say, so great in talent, so great in learning, had he been an opposer and destroyer of the so-called divine things of which he wrote, and had he said that they pertained to superstition rather than to religion, might perhaps, even in that case, not have written so many things which are ridiculous, contemptible, detestable. But when he so worshipped these same gods, and so vindicated their worship, as to say, in that same literary work of his, that he was afraid lest they should perish, not by an assault by enemies, but by the negligence of the citizens, and that from this ignominy they are being delivered by him, and are being laid up and preserved in the memory of the good by means of such books, with a zeal far more beneficial than that through which Metellus is declared to have rescued the sacred things of Vesta from the flames, and Æneas to have rescued the Penates from the burning of Troy; and when he nevertheless, gives forth such things to be read by succeeding ages as are deservedly judged by wise and unwise to be unfit to be read, and to be most hostile to the truth of religion; what ought we to think but that a most acute and learned man,—not, however made free by the Holy Spirit,—was overpowered by the custom and laws of his state, and, not being able to be silent about those things by which he was influenced, spoke of them under pretence of commending religion?

Tu aetatem patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura. tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu publicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum nomina genera, officia causas aperuisti.’ Iste igitur uir tam insignis excellentisque peritiae et, quod de illo etiam Terentianus elegantissimo uel’siculo breuiter ait: Vir doctissimus undecumque Varro, qui tam multa legit, ut aliquid ei scribere uacuisse miremur; tam multa scripsit, quam multa uix quemquam legere potuisse credamus: iste, inquam, uir tantus ingenio tantusque doctrina, si rerum uelut diuinarum, de quibus scribit, obpugnator esset adque destructor easque non ad religionem, sed ad superstitionem diceret pertinere, nescio utrum tam multa in eis ridenda contemnenda detestanda conscriberet. Cum uero deos eosdem ita coluerit colendosque censuerit, ut in eo ipso opere litterarum suarum dicat se timere ne pereant, non incursu hostili, sed ciuium neglegentia, de qua illos uelut ruina liberari a se dicit et in memoria bonorum per eius modi libros recondi adque seruari utiliore cura, quam qua Metellus de incendio sacra Vestalia et Aeneas de Troiano excidio penates liberasse praedicatur; et tamen ea legenda saeculis prodit, quae a sapientibus et insipientibus merito abicienda et ueritati religionis inimicissima iudicentur: quid existimare debemus nisi hominem acerrimum ac peritissimum, non tamen sancto Spiritu liberum, obpressum fuisse suae ciuitatis consuetudine ac legibus, et tamen ea quibus mouebatur sub specie commendandae religionis tacere noluisse.

Chapter 3.—Varro’s Distribution of His Book Which He Composed Concerning the Antiquities of Human and Divine Things.

Caput III. Quae sit partitio Varronis librorum suorum, quos de antiquitatibus rerum humanarum diuinarumque conposuit.

He wrote forty-one books of antiquities. These he divided into human and divine things. Twenty-five he devoted to human things, sixteen to divine things; following this plan in that division,—namely, to give six books to each of the four divisions of human things. For he directs his attention to these considerations: who perform, where they perform, when they perform, what they perform. Therefore in the first six books he wrote concerning men; in the second six, concerning places; in the third six, concerning times; in the fourth and last six, concerning things. Four times six, however, make only twenty-four. But he placed at the head of them one separate work, which spoke of all these things conjointly.

Quadraginta et unum libros scripsit antiquitatum; hos in res humanas diuinasque diuisit, rebus humanis uiginti quinque, diuinis sedecim tribuit, istam secutus in ea partitione rationem, ut rerum humanarum libros senos quattuor partibus daret. Intendit enim qui agant, ubi agant, quando agant, quid agant. In sex itaque primis de hominibus scripsit, in secundis sex de locis, sex tertios de temporibus, sex quartos eosdemque postremos de rebus absoluit. Quater autem seni uiginti et quattuor fiunt. Sed unum singularem, qui communiter prius de omnibus loqueretur, in capite posuit.

In divine things, the same order he preserved throughout, as far as concerns those things which are performed to the gods. For sacred things are performed by men in places and times. These four things I have mentioned he embraced in twelve books, allotting three to each. For he wrote the first three concerning men, the following three concerning places, the third three concerning times, and the fourth three concerning sacred rites,—showing who should perform, where they should perform, when they should perform, what they should perform, with most subtle distinction. But because it was necessary to say—and that especially was expected—to whom they should perform sacred rites, he wrote concerning the gods themselves the last three books; and these five times three made fifteen. But they are in all, as we have said, sixteen. For he put also at the beginning of these one distinct book, speaking by way of introduction of all which follows; which being finished, he proceeded to subdivide the first three in that five-fold distribution which pertain to men, making the first concerning high priests, the second concerning augurs, the third concerning the fifteen men presiding over the sacred ceremonies. The second three he made concerning places, speaking in one of them concerning their chapels, in the second concerning their temples, and in the third concerning religious places. The next three which follow these, and pertain to times,—that is, to festival days,—he distributed so as to make one concerning holidays, the other concerning the circus games, and the third concerning scenic plays. Of the fourth three, pertaining to sacred things, he devoted one to consecrations, another to private, the last to public, sacred rites. In the three which remain, the gods themselves follow this pompous train, as it were, for whom all this culture has been expended. In the first book are the certain gods, in the second the uncertain, in the third, and last of all, the chief and select gods.

In diuinis identidem rebus eadem ab illo diuisionis forma seruata est, quantum adtinet ad ea, quae dis exhibenda sunt. Exhibentur enim ab hominibus in locis et temporibus sacra. Haec quattuor, quae dixi, libris conplexus est ternis: nam tres priores de hominibus scripsit, sequentes de locis, tertios de temporibus, quartos de sacris, etiam hic, qui exhibeant, ubi exhibeant, quando exhibeant, quid exhibeant, subtilissima distinctione commendans. Sed quia oportebat dicere et maxime id expectabatur, quibus exhibeant, de ipsis quoque dis tres conscripsit extremos, ut quinquies terni quindecim fierent. Sunt autem omnes, ut diximus, sedecim, quia et istorum exordio unum singularem, qui prius de omnibus loqueretur, adposuit. Quo absoluto consequenter ex illa quinquepertita distributione tres praecedentes, qui ad homines pertinent, ita subdiuisit, ut primus sit de pontificibus, secundus de auguribus, tertius de quindecimuiris sacrorum; secundos tres ad loca pertinentes, ita ut in uno eorum de sacellis, altero de sacris aedibus diceret, tertio de locis religiosis; tres porro, qui istos sequuntur et ad tempora pertinent, id est ad dies festos, ita ut unum eorum faceret de feriis, alterum de ludis circensibus, de scaenicis tertium; quartorum trium ad sacra pertinentium uni dedit consecrationes, alteri sacra priuata, ultimo publica. Hanc uelut pompam obsequiorum in tribus, qui restant, di ipsi sequuntur extremi, quibus iste uniuersus cultus inpensus est: in primo di certi, in secundo incerti, in tertio cunctorum nouissimo di praecipui adque selecti.

Chapter 4.—That from the Disputation of Varro, It Follows that the Worshippers of the Gods Regard Human Things as More Ancient Than Divine Things.

Caput IV. Quod ex disputatione Varronis aput cultores deorum antiquiores res humanae quam diuinae reperiantur.

In this whole series of most beautiful and most subtle distributions and distinctions, it will most easily appear evident from the things we have said already, and from what is to be said hereafter, to any man who is not, in the obstinacy of his heart, an enemy to himself, that it is vain to seek and to hope for, and even most impudent to wish for eternal life. For these institutions are either the work of men or of demons,—not of those whom they call good demons, but, to speak more plainly, of unclean, and, without controversy, malign spirits, who with wonderful slyness and secretness suggest to the thoughts of the impious, and sometimes openly present to their understandings, noxious opinions, by which the human mind grows more and more foolish, and becomes unable to adapt itself to and abide in the immutable and eternal truth, and seek to confirm these opinions by every kind of fallacious attestation in their power. This very same Varro testifies that he wrote first concerning human things, but afterwards concerning divine things, because the states existed first, and afterward these things were instituted by them. But the true religion was not instituted by any earthly state, but plainly it established the celestial city. It, however, is inspired and taught by the true God, the giver of eternal life to His true worshippers.

In hac tota serie pulcherrimae ac subtilissimae distributionis et distinctionis uitam aeternam frustra quaeri et sperari inpudentissime uel optari, ex his, quae iam diximus et quae deinceps dicenda sunt, cuiuis hominum, qui corde obstinato sibi non fuerit inimicus, facillime apparet. Vel hominum enim sunt ista instituta uel daemonum, non quales uocant illi daemones bonos, sed, ut loquar apertius, inmundorum spirituum et sine controuersia malignorum, qui noxias opiniones, quibus anima humana magis magisque uanescat et incommutabili aeternaeque ueritati coaptari adque inhaerere non possit, inuidentia mirabili et occulte inserunt cogitationibus inpiorum et aperte aliquando ingerunt sensibus et qua possunt fallaci adtestatione confirmant. Iste ipse Varro propterea se prius de rebus humanis, de diuinis autem postea scripsisse testatur, quod prius extiterint ciuitates, deinde ab eis haec instituta sint. Vera autem religio non a terrena aliqua ciuitate instituta est, sed plane caelestem ipsa instituit ciuitatem. Eam uero inspirat et docet uerus Deus, dator uitae aeternae, ueris cultoribus suis.

The following is the reason Varro gives when he confesses that he had written first concerning human things, and afterwards of divine things, because these divine things were instituted by men:—“As the painter is before the painted tablet, the mason before the edifice, so states are before those things which are instituted by states.” But he says that he would have written first concerning the gods, afterwards concerning men, if he had been writing concerning the whole nature of the gods,—as if he were really writing concerning some portion of, and not all, the nature of the gods; or as if, indeed, some portion of, though not all, the nature of the gods ought not to be put before that of men. How, then, comes it that in those three last books, when he is diligently explaining the certain, uncertain and select gods, he seems to pass over no portion of the nature of the gods? Why, then, does he say, “If we had been writing on the whole nature of the gods, we would first have finished the divine things before we touched the human?” For he either writes concerning the whole nature of the gods, or concerning some portion of it, or concerning no part of it at all. If concerning it all, it is certainly to be put before human things; if concerning some part of it, why should it not, from the very nature of the case, precede human things? Is not even some part of the gods to be preferred to the whole of humanity? But if it is too much to prefer a part of the divine to all human things, that part is certainly worthy to be preferred to the Romans at least. For he writes the books concerning human things, not with reference to the whole world, but only to Rome; which books he says he had properly placed, in the order of writing, before the books on divine things, like a painter before the painted tablet, or a mason before the building, most openly confessing that, as a picture or a structure, even these divine things were instituted by men. There remains only the third supposition, that he is to be understood to have written concerning no divine nature, but that he did not wish to say this openly, but left it to the intelligent to infer; for when one says “not all,” usage understands that to mean “some,” but it may be understood as meaning none, because that which is none is neither all nor some. In fact, as he himself says, if he had been writing concerning all the nature of the gods, its due place would have been before human things in the order of writing. But, as the truth declares, even though Varro is silent, the divine nature should have taken precedence of Roman things, though it were not all, but only some. But it is properly put after, therefore it is none. His arrangement, therefore, was due, not to a desire to give human things priority to divine things, but to his unwillingness to prefer false things to true. For in what he wrote on human things, he followed the history of affairs; but in what he wrote concerning those things which they call divine, what else did he follow but mere conjectures about vain things? This, doubtless, is what, in a subtle manner, he wished to signify; not only writing concerning divine things after the human, but even giving a reason why he did so; for if he had suppressed this, some, perchance, would have defended his doing so in one way, and some in another. But in that very reason he has rendered, he has left nothing for men to conjecture at will, and has sufficiently proved that he preferred men to the institutions of men, not the nature of men to the nature of the gods. Thus he confessed that, in writing the books concerning divine things, he did not write concerning the truth which belongs to nature, but the falseness which belongs to error; which he has elsewhere expressed more openly (as I have mentioned in the fourth book), saying that, had he been founding a new city himself, he would have written according to the order of nature; but as he had only found an old one, he could not but follow its custom.

Varronis igitur confitentis ideo se prius de rebus humanis scripsisse, postea de diuinis, quia diuinae istae ab hominibus institutae sunt, haec ratio est: ‘Sicut prior est, inquit, pictor quam tabula picta, prior faber quam aedificium: ita priores sunt ciuitates quam ea, quae a ciuitatibus instituta sunt). Dicit autem prius se scripturum fuisse de dis, postea de hominibus, si de omni natura deorum scriberet, quasi hic de aliqua scribat et non de omni, aut uero etiam aliqua, licet non omnis, deorum natura non prior debeat esse quam hominum. Quid, quod in illis tribus nouissimis libris deos certos et incertos et selectos diligenter explicans nullam deorum naturam praetermittere uidetur? Quid est ergo, quod ait: (Si de omni natura deorum et hominum scriberemus, prius diuina absoluissemus, quam humana adtigissemus’? Aut enim de omni natura deorum scribit, aut de aliqua, aut omnino de nulla. Si de omni, praeponenda utique est rebus humanis; si de aliqua, quur non etiam ipsa res praecedat humanas? An indigna est praeferri etiam uniuersae naturae hominum pars aliqua deorum? Quod si multum est, ut aliqua pars diuina praeponatur uniuersis rebus humanis, saltem digna est uel Romanis. Rerum quippe humanarum libros, non quantum ad orbem terrarum, sed quantum ad solam Romam pertinet, scripsit, quos tamen rerum diuinarum libris se dixit scribendi ordine merito praetulisse, sicut pictorem tabulae pictae, sicut fabrum aedificio, apertissime confitens, quod etiam istae res diuinae, sicut pictura, sicut structura, ab hominibus institutae sint. Restat ut de nulla deorum natura scripsisse intellegatur, neque hoc aperte dicere uoluisse, sed intellegentibus reliquisse. Ubi enim dicitur ‘non omnis, usitate quidem intellegitur aliqua; sed potest intellegi et […] quoniam quae nulla est nec omnis nec aliqua est. Nam, ut ipse dicit, si omnis esset natura deorum, de qua scriberet, scribendi ordine rebus humanis praeponenda esset; ut autem et ipso tacente ueritas clamat, praeponenda esset certe rebus Romanis, etiamsi non omnis, sed saltem aliqua esset: recte autem postponitur; ergo nulla est. Non itaque rebus diuinis anteferre uoluit res humanas, sed rebus ueris noluit anteferre res falsas. In his enim, quae scripsit de rebus humanis, secutus est historiam rerum gestarum; quae autem de his, quas diuinas uocat, quid nisi opiniones rerum uanarum? Hoc est nimirum, quod uoluit subtili significatione monstrare, non solum scribens de his posterius quam de illis, sed etiam rationem reddens quur id fecerit. Quam si tacuisset, aliter hoc factum eius ab aliis fortasse defenderetur. In ea uero ipsa ratione, quam reddidit, nec aliis quidquam reliquit pro arbitrio suspicari et satis probauit homines se praeposuisse institutis hominum, non naturam hominum naturae deorum. Ita se libros rerum diuinarum non de ueritate quae pertinet ad naturam, sed de falsitate quae pertinet ad errorem scripsisse confessus est. Quod apertius alibi posuit, sicut in quarto libro commemoraui, ex naturae formula se scripturum fuisse, si nouam ipse conderet ciuitatem; quia uero iam ueterem inuenerat, non se potuisse nisi eius consuetudinem sequi.

Chapter 5.—Concerning the Three Kinds of Theology According to Varro, Namely, One Fabulous, the Other Natural, the Third Civil.

Caput V. De tribus generibus theologiae secundum Varronem, id est uno fabuloso, altero naturali tertioque ciuili.

Now what are we to say of this proposition of his, namely, that there are three kinds of theology, that is, of the account which is given of the gods; and of these, the one is called mythical, the other physical, and the third civil? Did the Latin usage permit, we should call the kind which he has placed first in order fabular, but let us call it fabulous, for mythical is derived from the Greek μῦθος, a fable; but that the second should be called natural, the usage of speech now admits; the third he himself has designated in Latin, call ing it civil. Then he says, “they call that kind mythical which the poets chiefly use; physical, that which the philosophers use; civil, that which the people use. As to the first I have mentioned,” says he, “in it are many fictions, which are contrary to the dignity and nature of the immortals. For we find in it that one god has been born from the head, another from the thigh, another from drops of blood; also, in this we find that gods have stolen, committed adultery, served men; in a word, in this all manner of things are attributed to the gods, such as may befall, not merely any man, but even the most contemptible man.” He certainly, where he could, where he dared, where he thought he could do it with impunity, has manifested, without any of the haziness of ambiguity, how great injury was done to the nature of the gods by lying fables; for he was speaking, not concerning natural theology, not concerning civil, but concerning fabulous theology, which he thought he could freely find fault with.

Deinde illud quale est, quod tria genera theologiae dicit esse, id est rationis quae de dis explicatur, eorumque unum mythicon [appellari], alterum physicon, tertium ciuile? Latine si usus admitteret, genus, quod primum posuit, fabulare appellaremus; sed fabulosum dicamus; a fabulis enim mythicon dictum est, quoniam μυ̃ϑος Graece fabula dicitur. Secundum autem ut naturale dicatur, iam et consuetudo locutionis admittit. Tertium etiam ipse Latine enuntiauit, quod ciuile appellatur. Deinde ait: ‘Mythicon appellant, quo maxime utuntur poetae; physicon, quo philosophi; ciuile, quo populi. Primum, inquit, quod dixi, in eo sunt multa contra dignitatem et naturam inmortalium ficta. In hoc enim est, ut deus alius ei capite, alius ex femore sit, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus: in hoc, ut di furati sint, ut adulterarint, ut seruierint homini; denique in hoc omnia dis adtribuuntur, quae non modo in hominem, sed etiam quae in contemtissimum hominem cadere possunt’. Hic certe ubi potuit, ubi ausus est, ubi inpunitum putauit, quanta mendacissimis fabulis naturae deorum fieret iniuria, sine caligine ullius ambiguitatis expressit. Loquebatur enim non de naturali theologia, non de ciuili, sed de fabulosa, quam libere a se putauit esse culpandam.

Let us see, now, what he says concerning the second kind. “The second kind which I have explained,” he says, “is that concerning which philosophers have left many books, in which they treat such questions as these: what gods there are, where they are, of what kind and character they are, since what time they have existed, or if they have existed from eternity; whether they are of fire, as Heraclitus believes; or of number, as Pythagoras; or of atoms, as Epicurus says; and other such things, which men’s ears can more easily hear inside the walls of a school than outside in the Forum.” He finds fault with nothing in this kind of theology which they call physical, and which belongs to philosophers, except that he has related their controversies among themselves, through which there has arisen a multitude of dissentient sects. Nevertheless he has removed this kind from the Forum, that is, from the populace, but he has shut it up in schools. But that first kind, most false and most base, he has not removed from the citizens. Oh, the religious ears of the people, and among them even those of the Romans, that are not able to bear what the philosophers dispute concerning the gods! But when the poets sing and stage-players act such things as are derogatory to the dignity and the nature of the immortals, such as may befall not a man merely, but the most contemptible man, they not only bear, but willingly listen to. Nor is this all, but they even consider that these things please the gods, and that they are propitiated by them.

Videamus quid de altera dicat. ‘Secundum genus est, inquit, quod demonstraui, de quo multos libros philosophi reliquerunt; in quibus est, di qui sint, ubi, quod genus, quale; a quodam tempore an a sempiterno fuerint di; ex igni sint, ut credit Heraclitus, an ex numeris, ut Pythagoras, an ex atomis, ut ait Epicurus. Sic alia, quae facilius intra parietes in schola quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures). Nihil in hoc genere culpauit, quod physicon uocant et ad philosophos pertinet, tantum quod eorum inter se controuersias commemorauit, per quos facta est dissidentium multitudo sectarum. Remouit tamen hoc genus a foro, id est a populis; scholis uero et parietibus clausit. Illud autem primum mendacissimum adque turpissimum a ciuitatibus non remouit.s o religiosas aures populares adque in his etiam Romanas! Quod de dis inmortalibus philosophi disputant, ferre non possunt; quod uero poetae canunt et histriones agunt, quia contra dignitatem ac naturam inmortalium ficta sunt, quia non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemtissimum hominem cadere possunt, non solum ferunt, sed etiam libenter audiunt. Neque id tantum, sed dis quoque ipsis haec placere et per haec eos placandos esse decernunt.

But some one may say, Let us distinguish these two kinds of theology, the mythical and the physical,—that is, the fabulous and the natural,—from this civil kind about which we are now speaking. Anticipating this, he himself has distinguished them. Let us see now how he explains the civil theology itself. I see, indeed, why it should be distinguished as fabulous, even because it is false, because it is base, because it is unworthy. But to wish to distinguish the natural from the civil, what else is that but to confess that the civil itself is false? For if that be natural, what fault has it that it should be excluded? And if this which is called civil be not natural, what merit has it that it should be admitted? This, in truth, is the cause why he wrote first concerning human things, and afterwards concerning divine things; since in divine things he did not follow nature, but the institution of men. Let us look at this civil theology of his. “The third kind,” says he, “is that which citizens in cities, and especially the priests, ought to know and to administer. From it is to be known what god each one may suitably worship, what sacred rites and sacrifices each one may suitably perform.” Let us still attend to what follows. “The first theology,” he says, “is especially adapted to the theatre, the second to the world, the third to the city.” Who does not see to which he gives the palm? Certainly to the second, which he said above is that of the philosophers. For he testifies that this pertains to the world, than which they think there is nothing better. But those two theologies, the first and the third,—to wit, those of the theatre and of the city,—has he distinguished them or united them? For although we see that the city is in the world, we do not see that it follows that any things belonging to the city pertain to the world. For it is possible that such things may be worshipped and believed in the city, according to false opinions, as have no existence either in the world or out of it. But where is the theatre but in the city? Who instituted the theatre but the state? For what purpose did it constitute it but for scenic plays? And to what class of things do scenic plays belong but to those divine things concerning which these books of Varro’s are written with so much ability?

Dixerit aliquis: Haec duo genera mythicon et physicon, id est fabulosum adque naturale, discernamus ab hoc ciuili, de quo nunc agitur, unde illa et ipse discreuit, iamque ipsum ciuile uideamus qualiter explicet. Video quidem, quur debeat discerni fabulosum: quia falsum, quia turpe, quia indignum est. Naturale autem a ciuili uelle discernere quid est aliud quam etiam ipsum ciuile fateri esse mendosum? Si enim illud naturale est, quid habet reprehensionis, ut excludatur? Si autem hoc quod ciuile dicitur naturale non est, quid habet meriti, ut admittatur? Haec nempe illa causa est, quare prius scripserit de rebus humanis, posterius de diuinis, quoniam in diuinis rebus non naturam, sed hominum instituta secutus est. Intueamur sane et ciuilem theologian. ‘Tertium genus est, inquit, quod in urbibus ciues, maxime sacerdotes, nosse adque administrare debent. In quo est, quos deos publice, ⟨quae⟩ sacra ac sacrificia colere et facere quemque par sit’ Adhuc quod sequitur adtendamus. Trima, inquit, theologia maxime adcommodata est ad theatrum, secunda ad mundum, tertia ad urbem’. Quis non uideat, cui palmam dederit? Utique secundae, quam supra dixit esse philosophorum. Hanc enim pertinere testatur ad mundum, quo isti nihil esse excellentius opinantur in rebus. Duas uero illas theologias, primam et tertiam, theatri scilicet adque urbis, distinxit an iunxit? Videmus enim non continuo, quod est urbis, pertinere posse et ad mundum, quamuis urbes esse uideamus in mundo; fieri enim potest, ut in urbe secundum falsas opiniones ea colantur et ea credantur, quorum in mundo uel extra mundum natura sit nusquam: theatrum uero ubi est nisi in urbe? Quis theatrum instituit nisi ciuitas? Propter quid instituit nisi propter ludos scaenicos? Ubi sunt ludi scaenici nisi in rebus diuinis, de quibus hi libri tanta sollertia conscribuntur?

Chapter 6.—Concerning the Mythic, that Is, the Fabulous, Theology, and the Civil, Against Varro.

Caput VI. De theologia mythica, id est fabulosa, et de ciuili contra Varronem.

O Marcus Varro! thou art the most acute, and without doubt the most learned, but still a man, not God,—now lifted up by the Spirit of God to see and to announce divine things, thou seest, indeed, that divine things are to be separated from human trifles and lies, but thou fearest to offend those most corrupt opinions of the populace, and their customs in public superstitions, which thou thyself, when thou considerest them on all sides, perceivest, and all your literature loudly pronounces to be abhorrent from the nature of the gods, even of such gods as the frailty of the human mind supposes to exist in the elements of this world. What can the most excellent human talent do here? What can human learning, though manifold, avail thee in this perplexity? Thou desirest to worship the natural gods; thou art compelled to worship the civil. Thou hast found some of the gods to be fabulous, on whom thou vomitest forth very freely what thou thinkest, and, whether thou willest or not, thou wettest therewith even the civil gods. Thou sayest, forsooth, that the fabulous are adapted to the theatre, the natural to the world, and the civil to the city; though the world is a divine work, but cities and theatres are the works of men, and though the gods who are laughed at in the theatre are not other than those who are adored in the temples; and ye do not exhibit games in honor of other gods than those to whom ye immolate victims. How much more freely and more subtly wouldst thou have decided these hadst thou said that some gods are natural, others established by men; and concerning those who have been so established, the literature of the poets gives one account, and that of the priests another,—both of which are, nevertheless, so friendly the one to the other, through fellowship in falsehood, that they are both pleasing to the demons, to whom the doctrine of the truth is hostile.

O Marce Varro, cum sis homo omnium acutissimus et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimus, sed tamen homo, non Deus, nec spiritu Dei ad uidenda et adnuntianda diuina in ueritatem libertatemque subuectus, cernis quidem quam sint res diuinae ab humanis nugis adque mendaciis dirimendae; sed uitiosissimas populorum opiniones et consuetudines in superstitionibus publicis uereris offendere, quas ab deorum natura abhorrere uel talium, quales in huius mundi elementis humani animi suspicatur infirmitas, et sentis ipse, cum eas usquequaque consideras, et omnis uestra litteratura circumsonat. Quid hic agit humanum quamuis excellentissimum ingenium? Quid tibi humana licet multiplex ingensque doctrina in his angustiis suffragatur? Naturales deos colere cupis, ciuiles cogeris. Inuenisti alios fabulosos, in quos liberius quod sentis euomas, unde et istos ciuiles uelis nolisue perfundas. Dicis quippe fabulosos adcommodatos esse ad theatrum, naturales ad mundum, ciuiles ad urbem, cum mundus opus sit diuinum, urbes uero et theatra opera sint hominum, nec alii derideantur in theatris, quam qui adorantur in templis, nec aliis ludos exhibeatis, quam quibus uictimas immolatis. Quanto liberius subtiliusque ista diuideres, dicens alios esse deos naturales, alios ab hominibus institutos, sed de institutis aliud habere litteras poetarum, aliud sacerdotum, utrasque tamen ita esse inter se amicas consortio falsitatis, ut gratae sint utraeque daemonibus, quibus doctrina inimica est ueritatis!

That theology, therefore, which they call natural, being put aside for a moment, as it is afterwards to be discussed, we ask if any one is really content to seek a hope for eternal life from poetical, theatrical, scenic gods? Perish the thought! The true God avert so wild and sacrilegious a madness! What, is eternal life to be asked from those gods whom these things pleased, and whom these things propitiate, in which their own crimes are represented? No one, as I think, has arrived at such a pitch of headlong and furious impiety. So then, neither by the fabulous nor by the civil theology does any one obtain eternal life. For the one sows base things concerning the gods by feigning them, the other reaps by cherishing them; the one scatters lies, the other gathers them together; the one pursues divine things with false crimes, the other incorporates among divine things the plays which are made up of these crimes; the one sounds abroad in human songs impious fictions concerning the gods, the other consecrates these for the festivities of the gods themselves; the one sings the misdeeds and crimes of the gods, the other loves them; the one gives forth or feigns, the other either attests the true or delights in the false. Both are base; both are damnable. But the one which is theatrical teaches public abomination, and that one which is of the city adorns itself with that abomination. Shall eternal life be hoped for from these, by which this short and temporal life is polluted? Does the society of wicked men pollute our life if they insinuate themselves into our affections, and win our assent? and does not the society of demons pollute the life, who are worshipped with their own crimes?—if with true crimes, how wicked the demons! if with false, how wicked the worship!

Sequestrata igitur paululum theologia, quam naturalem uocant, de qua postea disserendum est, placetne tandem uitam aeternam peti aut sperari ab dis poeticis theatricis, ludicris scaenicis? Absit; immo auertat Deus uerus tam inmanem sacrilegamque dementiam. Quid? ab eis dis, quibus haec placent et quos haec placant, cum eorum illic crimina frequententur, uita aeterna poscenda est? Nemo, ut arbitror, usque ad tantum praecipitium furiosissimae inpietatis insanit. Nec fabulosa igitur nec ciuili theologia sempiternam quisquam adipiscitur uitam. Illa enim de dis turpia fingendo seminat, haec fauendo metit; illa mendacia spargit, haec colligit; illa res diuinas falsis criminibus insectatur, haec eorum criminum ludos in diuinis rebus amplectitur; illa de. dis nefanda figmenta hominum carminibus personat, haec ea deorum ipsorum festiuitatibus consecrat; facinora et flagitia numinum illa cantat, haec amat; illa prodit aut fingit, haec autem aut adtestatur ueris aut oblectatur et falsis. Ambae turpes ambaeque damnabiles; sed illa, quae theatrica est, publicam turpitudinem profitetur; ista, quae urbana est, illius turpitudine ornatur. Hincine uita aeterna sperabitur, unde ista breuis temporalisque polluitur? An uero uitam polluit consortium nefariorum hominum, si se inserant adfectionibus et adsensionibus nostris, et uitam non polluit societas daemonum, qui coluntur criminibus suis?

When we say these things, it may perchance seem to some one who is very ignorant of these matters that only those things concerning the gods which are sung in the songs of the poets and acted on the stage are unworthy of the divine majesty, and ridiculous, and too detestable to be celebrated, whilst those sacred things which not stage-players but priests perform are pure and free from all unseemliness. Had this been so, never would any one have thought that these theatrical abominations should be celebrated in their honor, never would the gods themselves have ordered them to be performed to them. But men are in nowise ashamed to perform these things in the theatres, because similar things are carried on in the temples. In short, when the fore-mentioned author attempted to distinguish the civil theology from the fabulous and natural, as a sort of third and distinct kind, he wished it to be understood to be rather tempered by both than separated from either. For he says that those things which the poets write are less than the people ought to follow, whilst what the philosophers say is more than it is expedient for the people to pry into. “Which,” says he, “differ in such a way, that nevertheless not a few things from both of them have been taken to the account of the civil theology; wherefore we will indicate what the civil theology has in common with that of the poet, though it ought to be more closely connected with the theology of philosophers.” Civil theology is therefore not quite disconnected from that of the poets. Nevertheless, in another place, concerning the generations of the gods, he says that the people are more inclined toward the poets than toward the physical theologists. For in this place he said what ought to be done; in that other place, what was really done. He said that the latter had written for the sake of utility, but the poets for the sake of amusement. And hence the things from the poets’ writings, which the people ought not to follow, are the crimes of the gods; which, nevertheless, amuse both the people and the gods. For, for amusement’s sake, he says, the poets write, and not for that of utility; nevertheless they write such things as the gods will desire, and the people perform.

Si ueris, quam mali! si falsis, quam male! Haec cum dicimus, uideri fortasse cuipiam nimis harum rerum ignaro potest ea sola de dis talibus maiestati indigna diuinae et ridicula detestabilia, celebrari, quae poeticis cantantur carminibus et ludis scaenicis actitantur; sacra uero illa, quae non histriones, sed sacerdotes agunt, ab omni esse dedecore purgata et aliena. Hoc si ita esset, numquam theatricas turpitudines in eorum honorem quisquam celebrandas esse censeret, numquam eas ipsi di praeciperent sibimet exhiberi. Sed ideo nihil pudet ad obsequium deorum talia gerere in theatris, quia similia geruntur in templis. Denique cum memoratus auctor ciuilem theologian a fabulosa et naturali tertiam quandam sui generis distinguere conaretur, magis eam ex utraque temperatam quam ab utraque separatam intellegi uoluit. Ait enim ea, quae scribunt poetae, minus esse quam ut populi sequi debeant; quae autem philosophi, plus quam ut ea uulgum scrutari expediat. ‘Quae sic abhorrent, inquit, ut tamen ex utroque genere ad ciuiles rationes adsumta sint non pauca. Quare quae erunt communia, una cum propriis ciuilibus scribemus; e quibus maior societas debet esse nobis cum philosophis quam cum poetis. Non ergo ulla cum poetis. Et tamen alio loco dicit de generationibus deorum magis ad poetas quam ad physicos fuisse populos inclinatos. Hic enim dixit quid fieri debeat, ibi quid fiat. Physicos dixit utilitatis causa scripsisse, poetas delectationis. Ac per hoc ea, quae a poetis conscripta populi sequi non debent, crimina sunt deorum, quae tamen delectant et populos et deos. Delectationis enim causa, sicut dicit, scribunt poetae, non utilitatis; ea tamen scribunt, quae di expetant, populi exhibeant.