Concerning the Opinion of Varro, that God is the Soul of the World, Which Nevertheless, in Its Various Parts, Has Many Souls Whose Nature is Divine.

Chapter 6.—Concerning the Opinion of Varro, that God is the Soul of the World, Which Nevertheless, in Its Various Parts, Has Many Souls Whose Nature is Divine.

Caput VI. De opinione Varronis, qua arbitratus est Deum animam esse mundi, qui tamen in partibus suis habeat animas multas, quarum diuina natura sit.

The same Varro, then, still speaking by anticipation, says that he thinks that God is the soul of the world (which the Greeks call κόσμος), and that this world itself is God; but as a wise man, though he consists of body and mind, is nevertheless called wise on account of his mind, so the world is called God on account of mind, although it consists of mind and body. Here he seems, in some fashion at least, to acknowledge one God; but that he may introduce more, he adds that the world is divided into two parts, heaven and earth, which are again divided each into two parts, heaven into ether and air, earth into water and land, of all which the ether is the highest, the air second, the water third, and the earth the lowest. All these four parts, he says, are full of souls; those which are in the ether and air being immortal, and those which are in the water and on the earth mortal. From the highest part of the heavens to the orbit of the moon there are souls, namely, the stars and planets; and these are not only understood to be gods, but are seen to be such. And between the orbit of the moon and the commencement of the region of clouds and winds there are aerial souls; but these are seen with the mind, not with the eyes, and are called Heroes, and Lares, and Genii. This is the natural theology which is briefly set forth in these anticipatory statements, and which satisfied not Varro only, but many philosophers besides. This I must discuss more carefully, when, with the help of God, I shall have completed what I have yet to say concerning the civil theology, as far as it concerns the select gods.

Dicit ergo idem Varro adhuc de naturali theologia praeloquens deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi, quem Graeci uocant xo[i.ov, et hunc ipsum mundum esse deum; sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem, ita mundum deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et corpore. Hic uidetur quoquo modo unum confiteri Deum; sed ut plures etiam introducat, adiungit mundum diuidi in duas partes, caelum et terram; et caelum bifariam, in aethera et aera; terram uero in aquam et humum; e quibus summum esse aethera, secundum aera, tertiam aquam, infimam terram; quas omnes partes quattuor animarum esse plenas, in aethere et aere inmortalium, in aqua et terra mortalium. Ab summo autem circuitu caeli ad circulum lunae aetherias animas esse astra ac stellas; eos caelestes deos non modo intellegi esse, sed etiam uideri; inter lunae uero gyrum et nimborum ac uentorum cacumina aerias esse animas, sed eas animo, non oculis uideri et uocari heroas et lares et genios. Haec est uidelicet breuiter in ista praelocutione proposita theologia naturalis, quae non huic tantum, sed multis philosophis placuit; de qua tunc diligentius disserendum est, cum de ciuili, quantum ad deos selectos adtinet, opitulante Deo uero quod restat inpleuero.

Chapter 7.—Whether It is Reasonable to Separate Janus and Terminus as Two Distinct Deities.

Caput VII. An rationabile fuerit Ianum et Terminum in duo numina _ separari.

Who, then, is Janus, with whom Varro commences? He is the world. Certainly a very brief and unambiguous reply. Why, then, do they say that the beginnings of things pertain to him, but the ends to another whom they call Terminus? For they say that two months have been dedicated to these two gods, with reference to beginnings and ends—January to Janus, and February to Terminus—over and above those ten months which commence with March and end with December. And they say that that is the reason why the Terminalia are celebrated in the month of February, the same month in which the sacred purification is made which they call Februum, and from which the month derives its name. Do the beginnings of things, therefore, pertain to the world, which is Janus, and not also the ends, since another god has been placed over them? Do they not own that all things which they say begin in this world also come to an end in this world? What folly it is, to give him only half power in work, when in his image they give him two faces! Would it not be a far more elegant way of interpreting the two-faced image, to say that Janus and Terminus are the same, and that the one face has reference to beginnings, the other to ends? For one who works ought to have respect to both. For he who in every forthputting of activity does not look back on the beginning, does not look forward to the end. Wherefore it is necessary that prospective intention be connected with retrospective memory. For how shall one find how to finish anything, if he has forgotten what it was which he had begun? But if they thought that the blessed life is begun in this world, and perfected beyond the world, and for that reason attributed to Janus, that is, to the world, only the power of beginnings, they should certainly have preferred Terminus to him, and should not have shut him out from the number of the select gods. Yet even now, when the beginnings and ends of temporal things are represented by these two gods, more honor ought to have been given to Terminus. For the greater joy is that which is felt when anything is finished; but things begun are always cause of much anxiety until they are brought to an end, which end he who begins anything very greatly longs for, fixes his mind on, expects, desires; nor does any one ever rejoice over anything he has begun, unless it be brought to an end.

lanus igitur, a quo sumsit exordium, quaero quisnam sit. Respondetur: Mundus est. Breuis haec plane est adque aperta responsio. Quur ergo ad eum dicuntur rerum initia pertinere, fines uero ad alterum, quem Terminum uocant? Nam propter initia et fines duobus istis dis duos menses perhibent dedicatos praeter illos decem, quibus usque ad Decembrem caput est Martius, Ianuarium lano, Februarium Termino. Ideo Terminalia eodem mense Februario celebrari dicunt, cum fit sacrum purgatorium, quod uocant Februm, unde mensis nomen accepit. Numquid ergo ad mundum, qui lanus est, initia rerum pertinent et fines non pertinent, ut alter illis deus praeficeretur? Nonne omnia, quae in hoc mundo fieri dicunt, in hoc etiam mundo terminari fatentur? Quae est ista uanitas, in opere illi dare potestatem dimidiam, in simulacro faciem duplam? Nonne istum bifrontem multo elegantius interpretarentur, si eundem et Ianum et Terminum dicerent adque initiis unam faciem, finibus alteram darent? quoniam qui operatur utrumque debet intendere; in omni enim motu actionis suae qui non respicit initium non prospicit finem. Unde necesse est a memoria respiciente prospiciens conectatur intentio; nam cui exciderit quod coeperit, quo modo finiat non inueniet. Quod si uitam beatam in hoc mundo inchoari putarent, extra mundum perfici, et ideo Iano, id est mundo, solam initiorum tribuerent potestatem: profecto ei praeponerent Terminum eumque ab dis selectis non alienarent. Quamquam etiam nunc cum in istis duobus dis initia rerum temporalium finesque tractantur, Termino dari debuit plus honoris. Maior enim laetitia est, cum res quaeque perficitur; sollicitudinis autem plena sunt coepta, donec perducantur ad finem, quem qui aliquid incipit maxime adpetit intendit, expectat exoptat, nec de re inchoata, nisi terminetur, exultat.

Chapter 8.—For What Reason the Worshippers of Janus Have Made His Image with Two Faces, When They Would Sometimes Have It Be Seen with Four.

Caput VIII. Ob quam causam cultores Iani bifrontem imaginem ipsius finxerint, quam tamen etiam quadrifrontem uideri uolunt.

But now let the interpretation of the two-faced image be produced. For they say that it has two faces, one before and one behind, because our gaping mouths seem to resemble the world: whence the Greeks call the palate οὐρανός, and some Latin poets, he says, have called the heavens palatum [the palate]; and from the gaping mouth, they say, there is a way out in the direction of the teeth, and a way in in the direction of the gullet. See what the world has been brought to on account of a Greek or a poetical word for our palate! Let this god be worshipped only on account of saliva, which has two open doorways under the heavens of the palate,—one through which part of it may be spitten out, the other through which part of it may be swallowed down. Besides, what is more absurd than not to find in the world itself two doorways opposite to each other, through which it may either receive anything into itself, or cast it out from itself; and to seek of our throat and gullet, to which the world has no resemblance, to make up an image of the world in Janus, because the world is said to resemble the palate, to which Janus bears no likeness? But when they make him four-faced, and call him double Janus, they interpret this as having reference to the four quarters of the world, as though the world looked out on anything, like Janus through his four faces. Again, if Janus is the world, and the world consists of four quarters, then the image of the two-faced Janus is false. Or if it is true, because the whole world is sometimes understood by the expression east and west, will any one call the world double when north and south also are mentioned, as they call Janus double when he has four faces? They have no way at all of interpreting, in relation to the world, four doorways by which to go in and to come out as they did in the case of the two-faced Janus, where they found, at any rate in the human mouth, something which answered to what they said about him; unless perhaps Neptune come to their aid, and hand them a fish, which, besides the mouth and gullet, has also the openings of the gills, one on each side. Nevertheless, with all the doors, no soul escapes this vanity but that one which hears the truth saying, “I am the door.”

Sed iam bifrontis simulacri interpretatio proferatur. Duas eum facies ante et retro habere dicunt, quod hiatus noster, cum os aperimus, mundo similis uideatur; unde et palatum Graeci copavov appellant, et nonnulli, inquit, poetae Latini caelum uocauerunt palatum, a quo hiatu oris et foras esse aditum ad dentes uersus et introrsus ad fauces. Ecce quo perductus est mundus propter palati nostri uocabulum uel Graecum uel poeticum. Quid autem hoc ad animam, quid ad uitam aeternam? Propter solas saliuas colatur hic deus, quibus partim glutiendis partim spuendis sub caelo palati utraque panditur ianua. Quid est porro absurdius, quam in ipso mundo non inuenire duas ianuas ex aduerso sitas, per quas uel ad. mittat ad se aliquid intro uel emittat a se foras, et de nostro ore et gutture, quorum similitudinem mundus non habet, uelle mundi simulacrum conponere in Iano propter solum I palatum, cuius similitudinem Ianus non habet? Cum uero eum faciunt quadrifrontem et Ianum geminum appellant, ad quattuor mundi partes hoc interpretantur, quasi aliquid spectet mundus foras sicut per omnes facies Ianus. Deinde si Ianus est mundus et mundus quattuor partibus constat, falsum est simulacrum Iani bifrontis; aut si propterea uerum est, quia etiam nomine Orientis et Occidentis totus solet mundus intellegi, numquid, cum duas partes alias nominamus Septentrionis et Austri, sicut illum quadrifrontem dicunt geminum Ianum, ita quisquam geminum dicturus est mundum? Non habent omnino unde quattuor ianuas, quae intrantibus et exeuntibus pateant, interpretentur ad mundi similitudinem, sicut de bifronti quod dicerent saltem in ore hominis inuenerunt, nisi Neptunus forte subueniat et porrigat piscem, cui praeter hiatum oris et gutturis etiam dextra et sinistra fauces patent. Et tamen hanc uanitatem per tot ianuas nulla effugit anima, nisi quae audit ueritatem dicentem: Ego sum ianua.

Chapter 9.—Concerning the Power of Jupiter, and a Comparison of Jupiter with Janus.

Caput IX. De Iouis potestate adque eiusdem cum Iano conparatione o nparatione.

But they also show whom they would have Jove (who is also called Jupiter) understood to be. He is the god, say they, who has the power of the causes by which anything comes to be in the world. And how great a thing this is, that most noble verse of Virgil testifies:

Iouem autem, qui etiam Iuppiter dicitur, quem uelint in-; tellegi, exponant. ‘Deus est, inquiunt, habens potestatem can-’, sarum, quibus aliquid fit in mundo.’ Hoc quam magnum sit,I nobilissimus Vergilii uersus ille testatur: Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.

“Happy is he who has learned the causes of things.”

But why is Janus preferred to him? Let that most acute and most learned man answer us this question. “Because,” says he, “Janus has dominion over first things, Jupiter over highest things. Therefore Jupiter is deservedly held to be the king of all things; for highest things are better than first things: for although first things precede in time, highest things excel by dignity.”

Sed quur ei praeponitur Ianus? hoc nobis uir ille acutissimus doctissimusque respondeat. ‘Quoniam penes lacum, inquit, sunt prima, penes louem summa. Merito ergo rex omnium Iuppiter habetur.

Now this would have been rightly said had the first parts of things which are done been distinguished from the highest parts; as, for instance, it is the beginning of a thing done to set out, the highest part to arrive. The commencing to learn is the first part of a thing begun, the acquirement of knowledge is the highest part. And so of all things: the beginnings are first, the ends highest. This matter, however, has been already discussed in connection with Janus and Terminus. But the causes which are attributed to Jupiter are things effecting, not things effected; and it is impossible for them to be prevented in time by things which are made or done, or by the beginnings of such things; for the thing which makes is always prior to the thing which is made. Therefore, though the beginnings of things which are made or done pertain to Janus, they are nevertheless not prior to the efficient causes which they attribute to Jupiter. For as nothing takes place without being preceded by an efficient cause, so without an efficient cause nothing begins to take place. Verily, if the people call this god Jupiter, in whose power are all the causes of all natures which have been made, and of all natural things, and worship him with such insults and infamous criminations, they are guilty of more shocking sacrilege than if they should totally deny the existence of any god. It would therefore be better for them to call some other god by the name of Jupiter—some one worthy of base and criminal honors; substituting instead of Jupiter some vain fiction (as Saturn is said to have had a stone given to him to devour instead of his son,) which they might make the subject of their blasphemies, rather than speak of that god as both thundering and committing adultery,—ruling the whole world, and laying himself out for the commission of so many licentious acts,—having in his power nature and the highest causes of all natural things, but not having his own causes good.

Prima enim uincuntur a summis, quia, licet prima praecedant tempore, summa superant dignitate.’ Sed recte hoc diceretur, si factorum prima discernerentur et summa; sicut initium facti est proficisci, summum peruenire; initium facti inceptio discendi, summum perceptio doctrinae; ac sic in omnibus prima sunt initia summique sunt fines. Sed iam hoc negotium inter Ianum Terminumque discussum est. Causae autem, quae dantur Ioui, efficientia sunt, non effecta; neque ullo modo fieri potest, ut uel tempore praeueniantur a factis initiisue factorum. Semper enim prior est res quae facit, quam illa quae fit. Quapropter si ad Ianum pertinent initia factorum, non ideo priora sunt efficientibus causis, quas Ioui tribuunt. Sicut enim nihil fit, ita nihil inchoatur ut fiat, quod non faciens causa praecesserit. Hunc sane deum, penes quem sunt omnes causae factarum omnium naturarum naturaliumque rerum, si Iouem populi appellant et tantis contumeliis tamque scelestis criminationibus colunt; taetriore sacrilegio sese obstringunt, quam si prorsus nullum putarent deum. Unde satius esset eis alium aliquem Iouis nomine nuncupare, dignum turpibus et flagitiosis honoribus, subposito uano figmento quod potius blasphemarent (sicut Saturno dicitur subpositus lapis, quem pro filio deuoraret), quam istum deum dicere et tonantem et adulterantem, et totum mundum regentem et per tot stupra diffluentem, et naturarum omnium naturalium rerum causas summas habentem et suas causas bonas non habentem. Deinde quaero, quem iam locum inter deos huic Ioui tribuant, si Ianus est mundus.

Next, I ask what place they find any longer for this Jupiter among the gods, if Janus is the world; for Varro defined the true gods to be the soul of the world, and the parts of it. And therefore whatever falls not within this definition, is certainly not a true god, according to them. Will they then say that Jupiter is the soul of the world, and Janus the body —that is, this visible world? If they say this, it will not be possible for them to affirm that Janus is a god. For even, according to them, the body of the world is not a god, but the soul of the world and its parts. Wherefore Varro, seeing this, says that he thinks God is the soul of the world, and that this world itself is God; but that as a wise man though he consists of soul and body, is nevertheless called wise from the soul, so the world is called God from the soul, though it consists of soul and body. Therefore the body of the world alone is not God, but either the soul of it alone, or the soul and the body together, yet so as that it is God not by virtue of the body, but by virtue of the soul. If, therefore, Janus is the world, and Janus is a god, will they say, in order that Jupiter may be a god, that he is some part of Janus? For they are wont rather to attribute universal existence to Jupiter; whence the saying, “All things are full of Jupiter.” Therefore they must think Jupiter also, in order that he may be a god, and especially king of the gods, to be the world, that he may rule over the other gods—according to them, his parts. To this effect, also, the same Varro expounds certain verses of Valerius Soranus in that book which he wrote apart from the others concerning the worship of the gods. These are the verses:

Deos enim ueros animam mundi ac partes eius iste definiuit; ac per hoc, quidquid hoc non est, non est utique secundum istos uerus deus. Num igitur ita dicturi sunt Iouem animam mundi, ut Ianus sit corpus eius, id est iste uisibilis mundus? Hoc si dicunt, non erit quem ad modum Ianum deum dicant, quoniam mundi corpus non est deus uel secundum ipsos, sed anima mundi ac partes eius. Unde apertissime idem dicit deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi et hunc ipsum mundum esse deum; sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex animo et corpore, tamen ei animo dici sapientem, ita mundum deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et corpore. Solum itaque mundi corpus non est deus, sed aut sola anima eius aut simul corpus et animus, ita tamen ut non sit a corpore, sed ab animo deus. Si ergo Ianus est mundus et deus est Ianus, numquid Iouem, ut deus esse possit, aliquam partem Iani esse dicturi sunt? Magis enim Ioui uniuersum solent tribuere; unde est: Iouis omnia plena. Ergo et Iouem, ut deus sit et maxime rex deorum, non alium possunt existimare quam mundum, ut dis ceteris secundum istos suis partibus regnet. In hanc sententiam etiam quosdam uersus Valerii Sorani exponit idem Varro in eo libro, quem seorsum ab istis de cultu deorum scripsit; qui uersus hi sunt: Iuppiter omnipotens regum rerumque deumque Progenitor genetrixquo deum, deus unus et omnes.

“Almighty Jove, progenitor of kings, and things, and gods,

And eke the mother of the gods, god one and all.”

But in the same book he expounds these verses by saying that as the male emits seed, and the female receives it, so Jupiter, whom they believed to be the world, both emits all seeds from himself and receives them into himself. For which reason, he says, Soranus wrote, “Jove, progenitor and mother;” and with no less reason said that one and all were the same. For the world is one, and in that one are all things.

Exponuntur autem in eodem libro ita: cum marem existimarent qui semen emitteret, feminam quae acciperet, Iouemque esse mundum et eum omnia semina ex se emittere et in se recipere, ‘cum causa, inquit, scripsit Soranus: Iuppiter progenitor genetrixque; nec minus cum causa unum et omnia idem esse; mundus enim unus, et in eo uno omnia sunt.’

Chapter 10.—Whether the Distinction Between Janus and Jupiter is a Proper One.

Caput X. An Iani et Iouis recta discretio sit.

Since, therefore, Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world, wherefore are Janus and Jupiter two gods, while the world is but one? Why do they have separate temples, separate altars, different rites, dissimilar images? If it be because the nature of beginnings is one, and the nature of causes another, and the one has received the name of Janus, the other of Jupiter; is it then the case, that if one man has two distinct offices of authority, or two arts, two judges or two artificers are spoken of, because the nature of the offices or the arts is different? So also with respect to one god: if he have the power of beginnings and of causes, must he therefore be thought to be two gods, because beginnings and causes are two things? But if they think that this is right, let them also affirm that Jupiter is as many gods as they have given him surnames, on account of many powers; for the things from which these surnames are applied to him are many and diverse. I shall mention a few of them.

Cum ergo et Ianus mundus sit et Iuppiter mundus sit unusque sit mundus, quare duo di sunt Ianus et Iuppiter? Quare seorsus habent templa seorsus aras, diuersa sacra dissimilia simulacra? Si propterea, quod alia uis est primordiorum, alia causarum, et illa Iani, illa Iouis nomen accepit: numquid si unus homo in diuersis rebus duas habeat potestates aut duas artes, quia singularum diuersa uis est, ideo duo iudices aut duo dicuntur artifices? Sic ergo et unus Deus cum ipse habeat potestatem primordiorum, ipse causarum, num propterea illum duos deos esse necesse est putari, quia primordia causaeque res duae sunt? Quod si hoc iustum putant, etiam ipsum Iouem tot deos esse dicant, quotquot ei cognomina propter multas potestates dederunt, quoniam res omnes, ex quibus illa cognomina sunt adhibita, multae adque diuersae sunt, ex quibus pauca commemoro.