Argument—Here begins the second partof this work, which treats of the origin, history, and destinies of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly. In the first place, Augustin shows in this book how the two cities were formed originally, by the separation of the good and bad angels; and takes occasion to treat of the creation of the world, as it is described in Holy Scripture in the beginning of the book of Genesis.
Of This Part of the Work, Wherein We Begin to Explain the Origin and End of the Two Cities.
Chapter 1.—Of This Part of the Work, Wherein We Begin to Explain the Origin and End of the Two Cities.
Caput I. De ea parte operis, qua duarum ciuitatum, id est caelestis adque terrenae, initia et fines incipient demonstrari.
The city of God we speak of is the same to which testimony is borne by that Scripture, which excels all the writings of all nations by its divine authority, and has brought under its influence all kinds of minds, and this not by a casual intellectual movement, but obviously by an express providential arrangement. For there it is written, “Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God.” And in another psalm we read, “Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised in the city of our God, in the mountain of His holiness, increasing the joy of the whole earth.” And, a little after, in the same psalm, “As we have heard, so have we seen in the city of the Lord of hosts, in the city of our God. God has established it for ever.” And in another, “There is a river the streams whereof shall make glad the city of our God, the holy place of the tabernacles of the Most High. God is in the midst of her, she shall not be moved.” From these and similar testimonies, all of which it were tedious to cite, we have learned that there is a city of God, and its Founder has inspired us with a love which makes us covet its citizenship. To this Founder of the holy city the citizens of the earthly city prefer their own gods, not knowing that He is the God of gods, not of false, i.e., of impious and proud gods, who, being deprived of His unchangeable and freely communicated light, and so reduced to a kind of poverty-stricken power, eagerly grasp at their own private privileges, and seek divine honors from their deluded subjects; but of the pious and holy gods, who are better pleased to submit themselves to one, than to subject many to themselves, and who would rather worship God than be worshipped as God. But to the enemies of this city we have replied in the ten preceding books, according to our ability and the help afforded by our Lord and King. Now, recognizing what is expected of me, and not unmindful of my promise, and relying, too, on the same succor, I will endeavor to treat of the origin, and progress, and deserved destinies of the two cities (the earthly and the heavenly, to wit), which, as we said, are in this present world commingled, and as it were entangled together. And, first, I will explain how the foundations of these two cities were originally laid, in the difference that arose among the angels.
Ciuitatem Dei dicimus, cuius ea scriptura testis est, quae non fortuitis motibus animorum, sed plane summae dispositione prouidentiae super omnes omnium gentium litteras omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum diuina excellens auctoritate subiecit. Ibi quippe scriptum est: Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, ciuitas Dei; et in alio psalmo legitur: Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis in ciuitate Dei nostri, in monte sancto eius, dilatans exultationes uniuersae terrae; et paulo post in eodem psalmo: Sicut audiuimus, ita et uidimus, in ciuitate domini uirtutum, in ciuitate Dei nostri; Deus fundauit eam in aeternum; item in alio: Fluminis inpetus laetificat ciuitatem Dei, sanctificauit tabernaculum suum Altissimus; Deus in medio eius non commouebitur. His adque huius modi testimoniis, quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, didicimus esse quandam ciuitatem Dei, cuius ciues esse concupiscimus illo amore, quem nobis illius conditor inspirauit. Huic conditori sanctae ciuitatis ciues terrenae ciuitatis deos suos praeferunt ignorantes eum esse Deum deorum, non deorum falsorum, hoc est inpiorum et superborum, qui eius incommutabili omnibusque communi luce priuati et ob hoc ad quandam egenam potestatem redacti suas quodam modo priuatas potentias consectantur honoresque diuinos a deceptis subditis quaerunt; sed deorum piorum adque sanctorum, qui potius se ipsos uni subdere quam multos sibi, potiusque Deum colere quam pro Deo coli delectantur. Sed huius sanctae ciuitatis inimicis decem superioribus libris, quantum potuimus, domino et rege nostro adiuuante respondimus. Nunc uero quid a me iam expectetur agnoscens meique non inmemor debiti de duarum ciuitatum, terrenae scilicet et caelestis, quas in hoc interim saeculo perplexas quodam modo diximus inuicemque permixtas, exortu et excursu et debitis finibus, quantum ualuero, disputare eius ipsius domini et regis nostri ubique opitulatione fretus adgrediar, primumque dicam, quem ad modum exordia duarum istarum ciuitatum in angelorum diuersitate praecesserint.
Of the Knowledge of God, to Which No Man Can Attain Save Through the Mediator Between God and Men, the Man Christ Jesus.
Chapter 2.—Of the Knowledge of God, to Which No Man Can Attain Save Through the Mediator Between God and Men, the Man Christ Jesus.
Caput II. De cognoscendo Deo, ad cuius notitiam nemo hominum peruenit, nisi per mediatorem Dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum.
It is a great and very rare thing for a man, after he has contemplated the whole creation, corporeal and incorporeal, and has discerned its mutability, to pass beyond it, and, by the continued soaring of his mind, to attain to the unchangeable substance of God, and, in that height of contemplation, to learn from God Himself that none but He has made all that is not of the divine essence. For God speaks with a man not by means of some audible creature dinning in his ears, so that atmospheric vibrations connect Him that makes with him that hears the sound, nor even by means of a spiritual being with the semblance of a body, such as we see in dreams or similar states; for even in this case He speaks as if to the ears of the body, because it is by means of the semblance of a body He speaks, and with the appearance of a real interval of space,—for visions are exact representations of bodily objects. Not by these, then, does God speak, but by the truth itself, if any one is prepared to hear with the mind rather than with the body. For He speaks to that part of man which is better than all else that is in him, and than which God Himself alone is better. For since man is most properly understood (or, if that cannot be, then, at least, believed) to be made in God’s image, no doubt it is that part of him by which he rises above those lower parts he has in common with the beasts, which brings him nearer to the Supreme. But since the mind itself, though naturally capable of reason and intelligence is disabled by besotting and inveterate vices not merely from delighting and abiding in, but even from tolerating His unchangeable light, until it has been gradually healed, and renewed, and made capable of such felicity, it had, in the first place, to be impregnated with faith, and so purified. And that in this faith it might advance the more confidently towards the truth, the truth itself, God, God’s Son, assuming humanity without destroying His divinity, established and founded this faith, that there might be a way for man to man’s God through a God-man. For this is the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. For it is as man that He is the Mediator and the Way. Since, if the way lieth between him who goes, and the place whither he goes, there is hope of his reaching it; but if there be no way, or if he know not where it is, what boots it to know whither he should go? Now the only way that is infallibly secured against all mistakes, is when the very same person is at once God and man, God our end, man our way.
Magnum est et admodum rarum uniuersam creaturam corpoream et incorpoream consideratam conpertamque mutabilem intentione mentis excedere adque ad incommutabilem Dei substantiam peruenire et illic discere ex ipso, quod cunctam naturam, quae non est quod ipse, non fecit nisi ipse. Sic enim Deus cum homine non per aliquam creaturam loquitur corporalem, corporalibus instrepens auribus, ut inter sonantem et audientem aeria spatia uerberentur, neque per eius modi spiritalem, quae corporum similitudinibus figuratur, sicut in somnis uel quo alio tali modo (nam et sic uelut corporis auribus loquitur, quia uelut per corpus loquitur et uelut interposito corporalium locorum interuallo; multum enim similia sunt talia uisa corporibus); sed loquitur ipsa ueritate, si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore. Ad illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine ceteris, quibus homo constat, est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior. Cum enim homo rectissime intellegatur uel, si hoc non potest, saltem credatur factus ad imaginem Dei: profecto ea sui parte est propinquior superiori Deo, qua superat inferiores suas, quas etiam cum pecoribus communes habet. Sed quia ipsa mens, cui ratio et intellegentia naturaliter inest, uitiis quibusdam tenebrosis et ueteribus inualida est, non solum ad inhaerendum fruendo, uerum etiam ad perferendum incommutabile lumen, donec de die in diem renouata adque sanata fiat tantae felicitatis capax, fide primum fuerat inbuenda adque purganda. In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad ueritatem, ipsa ueritas, Deus Dei filius, homine adsumto, non Deo consumto, eandem constituit et fundauit fidem, ut ad hominis Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum. Hic est enim mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. Per hoc enim mediator, per quod homo, per hoc et uia. Quoniam si inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tendit uia media est, spes est perueniendi; si autem desit aut. ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit? Sola est autem aduersus omnes errores uia munitissima, ut idem ipse sit Deus et homo; quo itur Deus, qua itur homo.
Of the Authority of the Canonical Scriptures Composed by the Divine Spirit.
Chapter 3.—Of the Authority of the Canonical Scriptures Composed by the Divine Spirit.
Caput III. De auctoritate canonicae scripturae diuino spiritu conditae.
This Mediator, having spoken what He judged sufficient first by the prophets, then by His own lips, and afterwards by the apostles, has besides produced the Scripture which is called canonical, which has paramount authority, and to which we yield assent in all matters of which we ought not to be ignorant, and yet cannot know of ourselves. For if we attain the knowledge of present objects by the testimony of our own senses, whether internal or external, then, regarding objects remote from our own senses, we need others to bring their testimony, since we cannot know them by our own, and we credit the persons to whom the objects have been or are sensibly present. Accordingly, as in the case of visible objects which we have not seen, we trust those who have, (and likewise with all sensible objects,) so in the case of things which are perceived by the mind and spirit, i.e., which are remote from our own interior sense, it behoves us to trust those who have seen them set in that incorporeal light, or abidingly contemplate them.
Hic prius per prophetas, deinde per se ipsum, postea per apostolos, quantum satis esse iudicauit, locutus etiam scripturam condidit, quae canonica nominatur, eminentissimae auctoritatis, cui fidem habemus de his rebus, quas ignorare non expedit nec per nos ipsos nosse idonei sumus. Nam si ea sciri possunt testibus nobis, quae remota non sunt a sensibus nostris siue interioribus siue etiam exterioribus (unde et praesentia nuncupantur, quod ita ea dicimus esse prae sensibus, sicut prae oculis quae praesto sunt oculis): profecto ea, quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam nostro testimonio scire non possumus, de his alios testes requirimus eisque credimus, a quorum sensibus remota esse uel fuisse non credimus. Sicut ergo de uisibilibus, quae non uidimus, eis credimus, qui uiderunt, adque ita de ceteris, quae ad suum quemque sensum corporis pertinent: ita de his, quae animo ac mente sentiuntur (quia et ipse rectissime dicitur sensus, unde et sententia uocabulum accepit), hoc est de inuisibilibus quae a nostro sensu interiore remota sunt, his nos oportet credere, qui haec in illo incorporeo lumine disposita didicerunt uel manentia contuentur.
That the World is Neither Without Beginning, Nor Yet Created by a New Decree of God, by Which He Afterwards Willed What He Had Not Before Willed.
Chapter 4.—That the World is Neither Without Beginning, Nor Yet Created by a New Decree of God, by Which He Afterwards Willed What He Had Not Before Willed.
Caput IV. De conditione mundi, quae nec intemporalis sit. nec nouo Dei ordinata consilio, quasi postea uoluerit, quod ante noluerat.
Of all visible things, the world is the greatest; of all invisible, the greatest is God. But, that the world is, we see; that God is, we believe. That God made the world, we can believe from no one more safely than from God Himself. But where have we heard Him? Nowhere more distinctly than in the Holy Scriptures, where His prophet said, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” Was the prophet present when God made the heavens and the earth? No; but the wisdom of God, by whom all things were made, was there, and wisdom insinuates itself into holy souls, and makes them the friends of God and His prophets, and noiselessly informs them of His works. They are taught also by the angels of God, who always behold the face of the Father, and announce His will to whom it befits. Of these prophets was he who said and wrote, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” And so fit a witness was he of God, that the same Spirit of God, who revealed these things to him, enabled him also so long before to predict that our faith also would be forthcoming.
Visibilium omnium maximus mundus est, inuisibilium omnium maximus Deus est. Sed mundum esse conspicimus, Deum esse credimus. Quod autem Deus fecerit mundum, nulli tutius credimus quam ipsi Deo. Ubi eum audiuimus? Nusquam interim nos melius quam in scripturis sanctis, ubi dixit propheta eius: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Numquidnam ibi fuit iste propheta, quando fecit Deus caelum et terram? Non; sed ibi fuit sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quae in animas sanctas etiam se transferens amicos Dei et prophetas constituit eisque opera sua sine strepitu intus enarrat. Loquuntur eis quoque angeli Dei, qui semper uident faciem Patris uoluntatemque eius quibus oportet adnuntiant. Ex his unus erat iste propheta, qui dixit et scripsit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Qui tam idoneus testis est, per quem Deo credendum sit, ut eodem spiritu Dei, quo haec sibi reuelata cognouit, etiam ipsam fidem nostram futuram tanto ante praedixerit.
But why did God choose then to create the heavens and earth which up to that time He had not made? If they who put this question wish to make out that the world is eternal and without beginning, and that consequently it has not been made by God, they are strangely deceived, and rave in the incurable madness of impiety. For, though the voices of the prophets were silent, the world itself, by its well-ordered changes and movements, and by the fair appearance of all visible things, bears a testimony of its own, both that it has been created, and also that it could not have been created save by God, whose greatness and beauty are unutterable and invisible. As for those who own, indeed, that it was made by God, and yet ascribe to it not a temporal but only a creational beginning, so that in some scarcely intelligible way the world should always have existed a created world they make an assertion which seems to them to defend God from the charge of arbitrary hastiness, or of suddenly conceiving the idea of creating the world as a quite new idea, or of casually changing His will, though He be unchangeable. But I do not see how this supposition of theirs can stand in other respects, and chiefly in respect of the soul; for if they contend that it is co-eternal with God, they will be quite at a loss to explain whence there has accrued to it new misery, which through a previous eternity had not existed. For if they said that its happiness and misery ceaselessly alternate, they must say, further, that this alternation will continue for ever; whence will result this absurdity, that, though the soul is called blessed, it is not so in this, that it foresees its own misery and disgrace. And yet, if it does not foresee it, and supposes that it will be neither disgraced nor wretched, but always blessed, then it is blessed because it is deceived; and a more foolish statement one cannot make. But if their idea is that the soul’s misery has alternated with its bliss during the ages of the past eternity, but that now, when once the soul has been set free, it will return henceforth no more to misery, they are nevertheless of opinion that it has never been truly blessed before, but begins at last to enjoy a new and uncertain happiness; that is to say, they must acknowledge that some new thing, and that an important and signal thing, happens to the soul which never in a whole past eternity happened it before. And if they deny that God’s eternal purpose included this new experience of the soul, they deny that He is the Author of its blessedness, which is unspeakable impiety. If, on the other hand, they say that the future blessedness of the soul is the result of a new decree of God, how will they show that God is not chargeable with that mutability which displeases them? Further, if they acknowledge that it was created in time, but will never perish in time,—that it has, like number, a beginning but no end,—and that, therefore, having once made trial of misery, and been delivered from it, it will never again return thereto, they will certainly admit that this takes place without any violation of the immutable counsel of God. Let them, then, in like manner believe regarding the world that it too could be made in time, and yet that God, in making it, did not alter His eternal design.
Sed quid placuit aeterno Deo tunc facere caelum et terram, quae antea non fecisset? Qui hoc dicunt, si mundum aeternum sine ullo initio et ideo nec a Deo factum uideri uolunt, nimis auersi sunt a ueritate et letali morbo inpietatis insaniunt. Exceptis enim propheticis uocibus mundus ipse ordinatissima sua mutabilitate et mobilitate et uisibilium omnium pulcherrima specie quodam modo tacitus et factum se esse et non nisi a Deo ineffabiliter adque inuisibiliter magno et ineffabiliter adque inuisibiliter pulchro fieri se potuisse proclamat. Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis uolunt habere sed suae creationis initium, ut modo quodam uix intellegibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, unde sibi Deum uidentur uelut a fortuita temeritate defendere, ne subito illi uenisse credatur in mentem, quod numquam ante uenisset, facere mundum, et accidisse illi nouam uoluntatem, cum in nullo sit omnino mutabilis; sed non uideo quo modo eis possit in ceteris rebus ratio ista subsistere maximeque in anima, quam si Deo coaeternam esse contenderint, unde illi acciderit noua miseria, quae numquam antea per aeternum, nullo modo poterunt explicare. Si enim alternasse semper eius miseriam et beatitudinem dixerint, necesse est dicant etiam semper alternaturam; unde illa eos sequetur absurditas, ut etiam cum beata dicitur in hoc utique non sit beata, si futuram suam miseriam et turpitudinem praeuidet; si autem non praeuidet nec se turpem ac miseram fore, sed beatam semper existimat, falsa opinione sit beata; quo dici stultius nihil potest. Si autem semper quidem per saecula retro infinita cum beatitudine alternasse animae miseriam putant, sed nunc iam de cetero, cum fuerit liberata, ad miseriam non esse redituram, nihilo minus conuincuntur numquam eam fuisse uere beatam, sed deinceps esse incipere noua quadam nec fallaci beatitudine; ac per hoc fatebuntur accidere illi aliquid noui, et hoc magnum adque praeclarum, quod numquam retro per aeternitatem accidisset. Cuius nouitatis causam si Deum negabunt in aeterno habuisse consilio, simul eum negabunt beatitudinis eius auctorem, quod nefandae inpietatis est; si autem dicent etiam ipsum nouo consilio excogitasse, ut de cetero sit anima in aeternum beata, quo modo eum alienum ab ea, quae illis quoque displicet, mutabilitate monstrabunt? Porro si ex tempore creatam, sed nullo ulterius tempore perituram, tamquam numerum, habere initium, sed non habere finem fatentur, et ideo semel expertam miserias, si ab eis fuerit liberata, numquam miseram postea futuram: non utique dubitabunt hoc fieri manente incommutabilitate consilii Dei. Sic ergo credant et mundum ex tempore fieri potuisse, nec tamen ideo Deum in eo faciendo aeternum consilium uoluntatemque mutasse.
That We Ought Not to Seek to Comprehend the Infinite Ages of Time Before the World, Nor the Infinite Realms of Space.
Chapter 5.—That We Ought Not to Seek to Comprehend the Infinite Ages of Time Before the World, Nor the Infinite Realms of Space.
Caput V. Tam non esse cogitandum de infinitis temporum spatiis ante mundum, quam nec de infinitis locorum spatiis extra mundum, quia, sicut nulla ante ipsum sunt tempora, ita nulla extra ipsum sunt loca.
Next, we must see what reply can be made to those who agree that God is the Creator of the world, but have difficulties about the time of its creation, and what reply, also, they can make to difficulties we might raise about the place of its creation. For, as they demand why the world was created then and no sooner, we may ask why it was created just here where it is, and not elsewhere. For if they imagine infinite spaces of time before the world, during which God could not have been idle, in like manner they may conceive outside the world infinite realms of space, in which, if any one says that the Omnipotent cannot hold His hand from working, will it not follow that they must adopt Epicurus’ dream of innumerable worlds? with this difference only, that he asserts that they are formed and destroyed by the fortuitous movements of atoms, while they will hold that they are made by God’s hand, if they maintain that, throughout the boundless immensity of space, stretching interminably in every direction round the world, God cannot rest, and that the worlds which they suppose Him to make cannot be destroyed. For here the question is with those who, with ourselves, believe that God is spiritual, and the Creator of all existences but Himself. As for others, it is a condescension to dispute with them on a religious ques tion, for they have acquired a reputation only among men who pay divine honors to a number of gods, and have become conspicuous among the other philosophers for no other reason than that, though they are still far from the truth, they are near it in comparison with the rest. While these, then, neither confine in any place, nor limit, nor distribute the divine substance, but, as is worthy of God, own it to be wholly though spiritually present everywhere, will they perchance say that this substance is absent from such immense spaces outside the world, and is occupied in one only, (and that a very little one compared with the infinity beyond), the one, namely, in which is the world? I think they will not proceed to this absurdity. Since they maintain that there is but one world, of vast material bulk, indeed, yet finite, and in its own determinate position, and that this was made by the working of God, let them give the same account of God’s resting in the infinite times before the world as they give of His resting in the infinite spaces outside of it. And as it does not follow that God set the world in the very spot it occupies and no other by accident rather than by divine reason, although no human reason can comprehend why it was so set, and though there was no merit in the spot chosen to give it the precedence of infinite others, so neither does it follow that we should suppose that God was guided by chance when He created the world in that and no earlier time, although previous times had been running by during an infinite past, and though there was no difference by which one time could be chosen in preference to another. But if they say that the thoughts of men are idle when they conceive infinite places, since there is no place beside the world, we reply that, by the same showing, it is vain to conceive of the past times of God’s rest, since there is no time before the world.
Deinde uidendum est, isti, qui Deum conditorem mundi esse consentiunt et tamen quaerunt de mundi tempore quid respondeamus, quid ipsi respondeant de mundi loco. Ita enim quaeritur, quur potius tunc et non antea factus sit, quem ad modum quaeri potest, quur hic potius ubi est et non alibi. Nam si infinita spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant, in quibus eis non uidetur Deus ab opere cessare potuisse, similiter. cogitent extra mundum infinita spatia locorum, in quibus si quisquam dicat non potuisse uacare Omnipotentem, nonne consequens erit, ut innumerabiles mundos cum Epicuro somniare cogantur (ea tantum differentia, quod eos ille fortuitis motibus atomorum gigni adserit et resolui, isti autem opere Dei factos dicturi sunt), si eum per interminabilem inmensitatem locorum extra mundum circumquaque patentium uacare noluerint, nec eosdem mundos, quod etiam de isto sentiunt, ulla causa posse dissolui? Cum his enim agimus, qui et Deum incorporeum et omnium naturarum, quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; alios autem nimis indignum est ad istam disputationem religionis admittere, maxime quod aput eos, qui multis dis sacrorum obsequium deferendum putant, isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate adque auctoritate uicerunt, non ob aliud, nisi quia longo quidem interuallo, uerum tamen reliquis propinquiores sunt ueritati. An forte substantiam Dei, quam nec includunt nec determinant nec distendunt loco, sed eam, sicut de Deo sentire dignum est, fatentur incorporea praesentia ubique totam, a tantis locorum extra mundum spatiis absentem esse dicturi sunt, et uno tantum adque in conparationem illius infinitatis tam exiguo loco, in quo mundus est, occupatam? Non opinor eos in haec uaniloquia progressuros. Cum igitur unum mundum ingenti quidem mole corporea, finitum tamen et loco suo determinatum et operante Deo factum esse dicant: quod respondent de infinitis extra mundum locis, quur in eis ab opere Deus cesset, hoc sibi respondeant de infinitis ante mundum temporibus, quur in eis ab opere Deus cessauerit. Et sicut non est consequens, ut fortuito potius quam ratione diuina Deus non alio, sed isto in quo est loco mundum constituerit, cum pariter infinitis ubique patentibus nullo excellentiore merito posset hic eligi, quamuis eandem diuinam rationem, qua id factum est, nulla possit humana conprehendere: ita non est consequens, ut Deo aliquid existimemus accidisse fortuitum, quod illo potius quam anteriore tempore condidit mundum, cum aequaliter anteriora tempora per infinitum retro spatium praeterissent nec fuisset aliqua differentia, unde tempus tempori eligendo praeponeretur. Quod si dicunt inanes esse hominum cogitationes, quibus infinita imaginantur loca, cum locus nullus sit praeter mundum, respondetur eis isto modo: inaniter homines cogitare praeterita tempora uacationis Dei, cum tempus nullum sit ante mundum.
That the World and Time Had Both One Beginning, and the One Did Not Anticipate the Other.
Chapter 6.—That the World and Time Had Both One Beginning, and the One Did Not Anticipate the Other.
Caput VI. Creationis mundi et temporum unum esse principium nec aliud alio praeueniri.
For if eternity and time are rightly distinguished by this, that time does not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had not some creature been made, which by some motion could give birth to change,—the various parts of which motion and change, as they cannot be simultaneous, succeed one another,—and thus, in these shorter or longer intervals of duration, time would begin? Since then, God, in whose eternity is no change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do not see how He can be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be said that prior to the world there was some creature by whose movement time could pass. And if the sacred and infallible Scriptures say that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, in order that it may be understood that He had made nothing previously,—for if He had made anything before the rest, this thing would rather be said to have been made “in the beginning,”—then assuredly the world was made, not in time, but simultaneously with time. For that which is made in time is made both after and before some time,—after that which is past, before that which is future. But none could then be past, for there was no creature by whose movements its duration could be measured. But simultaneously with time the world was made, if in the world’s creation change and motion were created, as seems evident from the order of the first six or seven days. For in these days the morning and evening are counted, until, on the sixth day, all things which God then made were finished, and on the seventh the rest of God was mysteriously and sublimely signalized. What kind of days these were it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible for us to conceive, and how much more to say!
Si enim recte discernuntur aeternitas et tempus, quod tempus sine aliqua mobili mutabilitate non est, in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est: quis non uideat, quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae aliquid aliqua motione mutaret, cuius motionis et mutationis cum aliud adque aliud, quae simul esse non possunt, cedit adque succedit, in breuioribus uel productioribus morarum interuallis tempus sequeretur? Cum igitur Deus, in cuius aeternitate nulla est omnino mutatio, creator sit temporum et ordinator: quo modo dicatur post temporum spatia mundum creasse non uideo, nisi dicatur ante mundum iam aliquam fuisse creaturam, cuius motibus tempora currerent. Porro si litterae sacrae maximeque ueraces ita dicunt, in principio fecisse Deum caelum et terram, ut nihil antea fecisse intellegatur, quia hoc potius in principio fecisse diceretur, si quid fecisset ante cetera cuncta quae fecit: procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore. Quod enim fit in tempore, et post aliquod fit et ante aliquod tempus; post id quod praeteritum est, ante id quod futurum est; nullum autem posset esse praeteritum, quia nulla erat creatura, cuius mutabilibus motibus ageretur. Cum tempore autem factus est mundus, si in eius conditione factus est mutabilis motus, sicut uidetur se habere etiam ordo ille primorum sex uel septem dierum, in quibus et mane et uespera nominantur, donec omnia, quae his diebus Deus fecit, sexto perficiantur die septimoque in magno mysterio Dei uacatio commendetur. Qui dies cuius modi sint, aut perdifficile nobis aut etiam inpossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere.
Of the Nature of the First Days, Which are Said to Have Had Morning and Evening, Before There Was a Sun.
Chapter 7.—Of the Nature of the First Days, Which are Said to Have Had Morning and Evening, Before There Was a Sun.
Caput VII. De qualitate primorum dierum, qui etiam antequam sol fieret uesperam et mane traduntur habuisse.
We see, indeed, that our ordinary days have no evening but by the setting, and no morning but by the rising, of the sun; but the first three days of all were passed without sun, since it is reported to have been made on the fourth day. And first of all, indeed, light was made by the word of God, and God, we read, separated it from the darkness, and called the light Day, and the darkness Night; but what kind of light that was, and by what periodic movement it made evening and morning, is beyond the reach of our senses; neither can we understand how it was, and yet must unhesitatingly believe it. For either it was some material light, whether proceeding from the upper parts of the world, far removed from our sight, or from the spot where the sun was afterwards kindled; or under the name of light the holy city was signified, composed of holy angels and blessed spirits, the city of which the apostle says, “Jerusalem which is above is our eternal mother in heaven;” and in another place, “For ye are all the children of the light, and the children of the day; we are not of the night, nor of darkness.” Yet in some respects we may appropriately speak of a morning and evening of this day also. For the knowledge of the creature is, in comparison of the knowledge of the Creator, but a twilight; and so it dawns and breaks into morning when the creature is drawn to the praise and love of the Creator; and night never falls when the Creator is not forsaken through love of the creature. In fine, Scripture, when it would recount those days in order, never mentions the word night. It never says, “Night was,” but “The evening and the morning were the first day.” So of the second and the rest. And, indeed, the knowledge of created things contemplated by themselves is, so to speak, more colorless than when they are seen in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which they were made. Therefore evening is a more suitable figure than night; and yet, as I said, morning returns when the creature returns to the praise and love of the Creator. When it does so in the knowledge of itself, that is the first day; when in the knowledge of the firmament, which is the name given to the sky between the waters above and those beneath, that is the second day; when in the knowledge of the earth, and the sea, and all things that grow out of the earth, that is the third day; when in the knowledge of the greater and less luminaries, and all the stars, that is the fourth day; when in the knowledge of all animals that swim in the waters and that fly in the air, that is the fifth day; when in the knowledge of all animals that live on the earth, and of man himself, that is the sixth day.
Videmus quippe istos dies notos non habere uesperam nisi de solis occasu nec mane nisi de solis exortu; illorum autem priores tres dies sine sole peracti sunt, qui die quarto factus refertur. Et primitus quidem lux uerbo Dei facta adque inter ipsam et tenebras Deus separasse narratur et eandem lucem uocasse diem, tenebras autem noctem; sed qualis illa sit lux et quo alternante motu qualemque uesperam et mane fecerit, remotum est a sensibus nostris, nec ita ut est intellegi a nobis potest, quod tamen sine ulla haesitatione credendum est. Aut enim aliqua lux corporea ■ est, siue in superioribus mundi partibus longe a conspectibus nostris siue unde sol postmodum accensus est; aut lucis nomine significata est sancta ciuitas in sanctis angelis et spiritibus beatis, de qua dicit apostolus: Quae sursum est Hierusalem, mater nostra aeterna in caelis; ait quippe et alio loco: Omnes enim uos filii lucis estis et filii diei; non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum; si tamen et uesperam diei huius et mane aliquatenus congruenter intellegere ualeamus. Quoniam scientia creaturae in conparationem scientiae Creatoris quodam modo uesperascit, itemque lucescit et mane fit, cum et ipsa refertur ad laudem dilectionemque Creatoris; nec in noctem uergitur, ubi non Creator creaturae dilectione relinquitur. Denique scriptura cum illos dies dinumeraret ex ordine, nusquam interposuit uocabulum noctis. Non enim ait alicubi: Facta est nox; sed: Facta est uespera et factum est mane dies unus. Ita dies secundus et ceteri. Cognitio quippe creaturae in se ipsa decoloratior est, ut ita dicam, quam cum in Dei sapientia cognoscitur, uelut in arte qua facta est. Ideo uespera quam nox congruentius dici potest; quae tamen, ut dixi, cum ad laudandum et ad amandum refertur Creatorem, recurrit in mane. Et hoc cum facit in cognitione sui ipsius, dies unus est; cum in cognitione firmamenti, quod inter aquas inferiores et superiores caelum appellatum est, dies secundus; cum in cognitione terrae ac maris omniumque gignentium, quae radicibus continuata sunt terrae, dies tertius; cum in cognitione luminarium maioris et minoris omniumque siderum, dies quartus; cum in cognitione omnium ex aquis animalium natatilium adque uolatilium, dies quintus; cum in cognitione omnium animalium terrenorum adque ipsius hominis, dies sextus.