Of the Ranks and Differences of the Creatures, Estimated by Their Utility, or According to the Natural Gradations of Being.

Chapter 16.—Of the Ranks and Differences of the Creatures, Estimated by Their Utility, or According to the Natural Gradations of Being.

Caput XVI. De gradibus et differentiis creaturarum, quas aliter pendit usus utilitatis, aliter ordo rationis.

For, among those beings which exist, and which are not of God the Creator’s essence, those which have life are ranked above those which have none; those that have the power of generation, or even of desiring, above those which want this faculty. And, among things that have life, the sentient are higher than those which have no sensation, as animals are ranked above trees. And, among the sentient, the intelligent are above those that have not intelligence,—men, e.g., above cattle. And, among the intelligent, the immortal such as the angels, above the mortal, such as men. These are the gradations according to the order of nature; but according to the utility each man finds in a thing, there are various standards of value, so that it comes to pass that we prefer some things that have no sensation to some sentient beings. And so strong is this preference, that, had we the power, we would abolish the latter from nature altogether, whether in ignorance of the place they hold in nature, or, though we know it, sacrificing them to our own convenience. Who, e.g., would not rather have bread in his house than mice, gold than fleas? But there is little to wonder at in this, seeing that even when valued by men themselves (whose nature is certainly of the highest dignity), more is often given for a horse than for a slave, for a jewel than for a maid. Thus the reason of one contemplating nature prompts very different judgments from those dictated by the necessity of the needy, or the desire of the voluptuous; for the former considers what value a thing in itself has in the scale of creation, while necessity considers how it meets its need; reason looks for what the mental light will judge to be true, while pleasure looks for what pleasantly titilates the bodily sense. But of such consequence in rational natures is the weight, so to speak, of will and of love, that though in the order of nature angels rank above men, yet, by the scale of justice, good men are of greater value than bad angels.

In his enim, quae quoquo modo sunt et non sunt quod Deus est a quo facta sunt, praeponuntur uiuentia non uiuentibus, sicut ea, quae habent uim gignendi uel etiam adpetendi, his, quae isto motu carent; et in his, quae uiuunt, praeponuntur sentientia non sentientibus, sicut arboribus animalia; et in his, quae sentiunt, praeponuntur intellegentia non intellegentibus, sicut homines pecoribus; et in his, quae intellegunt, praeponuntur inmortalia mortalibus, sicut angeli hominibus. Sed ita praeponuntur naturae ordine; est autem alius adque alius pro suo cuiusque usu aestimationis modus, quo fit, ut quaedam sensu carentia quibusdam sentientibus praeponamus, in tantum, ut si potestas esset ea prorsus de natura rerum auferre uellemus, siue quem in ea locum habeant ignorantes. siue etiamsi sciamus nostris ea commodis postponentes. Quis enim non domi suae panem habere quam mures, nummos quam pulices malit? Sed quid mirum, cum in ipsorum etiam hominum aestimatione, quorum certe natura tantae est dignitatis, plerumque carius conparetur equus quam seruus, gemma quam famula? Ita libertate iudicandi plurimum distat ratio considerantis a necessitate indigentis seu uoluptate cupientis, cum ista quid per se ipsum in rerum gradibus pendat, necessitas autem quid propter quid expetat cogitat, et ista quid uerum luci mentis appareat. uoluptas uero quid iucundum corporis sensibus blandiatur expectat. Sed tantum ualet in naturis rationalibus quoddam ueluti pondus uoluntatis et amoris, ut, cum ordine naturae angeli hominibus, tamen lege iustitiae boni homines malis angelis praeferantur.

Chapter 17.—That the Flaw of Wickedness is Not Nature, But Contrary to Nature, and Has Its Origin, Not in the Creator, But in the Will.

Caput XVII. Vitium malitiae non naturam esse, sed contra naturam, cui ad peccandum non Conditor causa est, sed uoluntas.

It is with reference to the nature, then, and not to the wickedness of the devil, that we are to understand these words, “This is the beginning of God’s handiwork;” for, without doubt, wickedness can be a flaw or vice only where the nature previously was not vitiated. Vice, too, is so contrary to nature, that it cannot but damage it. And therefore departure from God would be no vice, unless in a nature whose property it was to abide with God. So that even the wicked will is a strong proof of the goodness of the nature. But God, as He is the supremely good Creator of good natures, so is He of evil wills the most just Ruler; so that, while they make an ill use of good natures, He makes a good use even of evil wills. Accordingly, He caused the devil (good by God’s creation, wicked by his own will) to be cast down from his high position, and to become the mockery of His angels,—that is, He caused his temptations to benefit those whom he wishes to injure by them. And because God, when He created him, was certainly not ignorant of his future malignity, and foresaw the good which He Himself would bring out of his evil, therefore says the psalm, “This leviathan whom Thou hast made to be a sport therein,” that we may see that, even while God in His goodness created him good, He yet had already foreseen and arranged how He would make use of him when he became wicked.

Propter naturam igitur, non propter malitiam diaboli, dictum recte intellegimus: Hoc est initium figmenti Domini. Quia sine dubio, ubi esset uitium malitiae, natura non uitiata praecessit. Vitium autem ita contra naturam est, ut non possit nisi nocere naturae. Non itaque esset uitium recedere a Deo, nisi naturae, cuius id uitium est, potius conpeteret esse cum Deo. Quapropter etiam uoluntas mala grande testimonium est naturae bonae. Sed Deus sicut naturarum bonarum optimus creator est, ita malarum uoluntatum iustissimus ordinator, ut, cum illae male utuntur naturis bonis, ipse bene utatur etiam uoluntatibus malis. Itaque fecit, ut diabolus institutione illius bonus, uoluntate sua malus, in inferioribus ordinatus inluderetur ab angelis eius, id est, ut prosint tentationes eius sanctis, quibus eas obesse desiderat. Et quoniam Deus, cum eum conderet, futurae malignitatis eius non erat utique ignarus et praeuidebat quae bona de malo eius esset ipse facturus: propterea psalmus ait: Draco hic, quem finxisti ad inludendum ei, ut in eo ipso quod eum finxit, licet per suam bonitatem bonum, iam per suam praescientiam praeparasse intellegatur quo modo illo uteretur et malo.

Chapter 18.—Of the Beauty of the Universe, Which Becomes, by God’s Ordinance, More Brilliant by the Opposition of Contraries.

Caput XVIII. De pulchritudine uniuersitatis, quae per ordinationem Dei etiam ex contrariorum fit obpositione luculentior.

For God would never have created any, I do not say angel, but even man, whose future wickedness He foreknew, unless He had equally known to what uses in behalf of the good He could turn him, thus embellishing, the course of the ages, as it were an exquisite poem set off with antitheses. For what are called antitheses are among the most elegant of the ornaments of speech. They might be called in Latin “oppositions,” or, to speak more accurately, “contrapositions;” but this word is not in common use among us, though the Latin, and indeed the languages of all nations, avail themselves of the same ornaments of style. In the Second Epistle to the Corinthians the Apostle Paul also makes a graceful use of antithesis, in that place where he says, “By the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, by honor and dishonor, by evil report and good report: as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown, and yet well known; as dying, and, behold, we live; as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things.” As, then, these oppositions of contraries lend beauty to the language, so the beauty of the course of this world is achieved by the opposition of contraries, arranged, as it were, by an eloquence not of words, but of things. This is quite plainly stated in the Book of Ecclesiasticus, in this way: “Good is set against evil, and life against death: so is the sinner against the godly. So look upon all the works of the Most High, and these are two and two, one against another.”

Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico angelorum, sed uel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret adque ita ordinem saeculorum tamquam pulcherrimum carmen etiam ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. Antitheta enim quae appellantur in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quae Latine uel appellentur obposita, uel, quod expressius dicitur, contraposita. Non est aput nos huius uocabuli; consuetudo, cum tamen eisdem ornamentis locutionis etiam sermo Latinus utatur, immo linguae omnium gentium. His antithetis et Paulus apostolus in secunda ad Corinthios epistula illum locum suauiter explicat, ubi dicit: Per arma iustitiae dextra et sinistra: per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam; ut seductores et ueraces, ut qui ignoramur et cognoscimur; quasi morientes, et ecce uiuimus, ut coherciti et non mortificati; ut tristes, semper autem gaudentes; sicut egeni, multos autem ditantes; tamquam nihil habentes et omnia possidentes. Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis obposita sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt: ita quadam non uerborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum obpositione saeculi pulchritudo conponitur. Apertissime hoc positum est in libro ecclesiastico isto modo: Contra malum bonum est et contra mortem uita; sic contra pium peccator. Et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi, bina bina, unum contra unum.

Chapter 19.—What, Seemingly, We are to Understand by the Words, “God Divided the Light from the Darkness.”

Caput XIX. Quid sentiendum uideatur de eo quod scriptum est: Diuisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras.

Accordingly, though the obscurity of the divine word has certainly this advantage, that it causes many opinions about the truth to be started and discussed, each reader seeing some fresh meaning in it, yet, whatever is said to be meant by an obscure passage should be either confirmed by the testimony of obvious facts, or should be asserted in other and less ambiguous texts. This obscurity is beneficial, whether the sense of the author is at last reached after the discussion of many other interpretations, or whether, though that sense remain concealed, other truths are brought out by the discussion of the obscurity. To me it does not seem incongruous with the working of God, if we understand that the angels were created when that first light was made, and that a separation was made between the holy and the unclean angels, when, as is said, “God divided the light from the darkness; and God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night.” For He alone could make this discrimination, who was able also before they fell, to foreknow that they would fall, and that, being deprived of the light of truth, they would abide in the darkness of pride. For, so far as regards the day and night, with which we are familiar, He commanded those luminaries of heaven that are obvious to our senses to divide between the light and the darkness. “Let there be,” He says, “lights in the firmament of the heaven, to divide the day from the night;” and shortly after He says, “And God made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night: the stars also. And God set them in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness.” But between that light, which is the holy company of the angels spiritually radiant with the illumination of the truth, and that opposing darkness, which is the noisome foulness of the spiritual condition of those angels who are turned away from the light of righteousness, only He Himself could divide, from whom their wickedness (not of nature, but of will), while yet it was future, could not be hidden or uncertain.

Quamuis itaque diuini sermonis obscuritas etiam ad hoc sit utilis, quod plures sententias ueritatis parit et in lucem notitiae producit, dum alius eum sic, alius sic intellegit (ita tamen ut, quod in obscuro loco intellegitur, uel adtestatione rerum manifestarum uel aliis locis minime dubiis adseratur: siue, cum multa tractantur, ad id quoque perueniatur, quod sensit ille qui scripsit, siue id lateat, sed ex occasione tractandae profundae obscuritatis alia quaedam uera dicantur): non mihi uidetur ab operibus Dei absurda sententia, si, cum lux prima illa facta est, angeli creati intelleguntur, inter sanctos angelos et inmundos fuisse discretum, ubi dictum est: Et diuisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et uocauit Deus lucem diem et tenebras uocauit noctem. Solus quippe ille ista discernere potuit, qui potuit etiam priusquam caderent praescire casuros et priuatos lumine ueritatis in tenebrosa superbia remansuros. Nam inter istum nobis notissimum diem et noctem, id est inter hanc lucem et has tenebras, uulgatissima sensibus nostris luminaria caeli ut diuiderent imperauit: Fiant, inquit, luminaria in firmamento caeli, ut luceant super terram et diuidant inter diem et noctem; et paulo post: Et fecit, inquit, Deus duo luminaria magna, luminare maius in principia diei, et luminare minus in principia noctis, et stellas; et posuit illa Deus in firmamento caeli lucere super terram et praeesse diei et nocti et diuidere inter lucem et tenebras. Inter illam uero lucem, quae sancta societas angelorum est inlustratione ueritatis intellegibiliter fulgens, et ei contrarias tenebras, id est malorum angelorum auersorum a luce iustitiae taeterrimas mentes, ipse diuidere potuit, cui etiam futurum non naturae, sed uoluntatis malum occultum aut incertum esse non potuit.

Chapter 20.—Of the Words Which Follow the Separation of Light and Darkness, “And God Saw the Light that It Was Good.”

Caput XX. De eo, quod post discretionem lucis adque tenebrarum dictum est: Et uidit Deus lucem quia bona est.

Then, we must not pass from this passage of Scripture without noticing that when God said, “Let there be light, and there was light,” it was immediately added, “And God saw the light that it was good.” No such expression followed the statement that He separated the light from the darkness, and called the light Day and the darkness Night, lest the seal of His approval might seem to be set on such darkness, as well as on the light. For when the darkness was not subject of disapprobation, as when it was divided by the heavenly bodies from this light which our eyes discern, the statement that God saw that it was good is inserted, not before, but after the division is recorded. “And God set them,” so runs the passage, “in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness: and God saw that it was good.” For He approved of both, because both were sinless. But where God said, “Let there be light, and there was light; and God saw the light that it was good;” and the narrative goes on, “and God divided the light from the darkness! and God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night,” there was not in this place subjoined the statement, “And God saw that it was good,” lest both should be designated good, while one of them was evil, not by nature, but by its own fault. And therefore, in this case, the light alone received the approbation of the Creator, while the angelic darkness, though it had been ordained, was yet not approved.

Denique nec illud est praetereundum silentio, quod, ubi dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, continuo subiunctum est: Et uidit Deus lucem quia bona est; non postea quam separauit inter lucem et tenebras et uocauit lucem diem et tenebras noctem, ne simul cum luce etiam talibus tenebris testimonium placiti sui perhibuisse uideretur. Nam ubi tenebrae inculpabiles sunt, inter quas et lucem istam his oculis conspicuam luminaria caeli diuidunt, non ante, sed post infertur: Et uidit Deus quia bonum est. Posuit illa, inquit, in firmamento caeli lucere super terram et praeesse diei et nocti et separare inter lucem et tenebras. Et uidit Deus quia bonum est. Utrumque placuit, quia utrumque sine peccato est. Ubi autem dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et uidit Deus lucem quia bona est; et postmodum infertur: Et separauit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et uocauit Deus lucem diem et tenebras uocauit noctem: non hoc loco additum est: Et uidit Deus quia bonum est, ne utrumque appellaretur bonum, cum esset horum alterum malum, uitio proprio, non natura. Et ideo sola ibi lux placuit Conditori; tenebrae autem angelicae, etsi fuerant ordinandae, non tamen fuerant adprobandae.

Chapter 21.—Of God’s Eternal and Unchangeable Knowledge and Will, Whereby All He Has Made Pleased Him in the Eternal Design as Well as in the Actual Result.

Caput XXI. De aeterna et incommutabili scientia Dei ac uoluntate, qua semper illi uniuersa quae fecit sic placuerunt facienda, quem ad modum facta.

For what else is to be understood by that invariable refrain, “And God saw that it was good,” than the approval of the work in its design, which is the wisdom of God? For certainly God did not in the actual achievement of the work first learn that it was good, but, on the contrary, nothing would have been made had it not been first known by Him. While, therefore, He sees that that is good which, had He not seen it before it was made, would never have been made, it is plain that He is not discovering, but teaching that it is good. Plato, indeed, was bold enough to say that, when the universe was completed, God was, as it were, elated with joy. And Plato was not so foolish as to mean by this that God was rendered more blessed by the novelty of His creation; but he wished thus to indicate that the work now completed met with its Maker’s approval, as it had while yet in design. It is not as if the knowledge of God were of various kinds, knowing in different ways things which as yet are not, things which are, and things which have been. For not in our fashion does He look forward to what is future, nor at what is present, nor back upon what is past; but in a manner quite different and far and profoundly remote from our way of thinking. For He does not pass from this to that by transition of thought, but beholds all things with absolute unchangeableness; so that of those things which emerge in time, the future, indeed, are not yet, and the present are now, and the past no longer are; but all of these are by Him comprehended in His stable and eternal presence. Neither does He see in one fashion by the eye, in another by the mind, for He is not composed of mind and body; nor does His present knowledge differ from that which it ever was or shall be, for those variations of time, past, present, and future, though they alter our knowledge, do not affect His, “with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.” Neither is there any growth from thought to thought in the conceptions of Him in whose spiritual vision all things which He knows are at once embraced. For as without any movement that time can measure, He Himself moves all temporal things, so He knows all times with a knowledge that time cannot measure. And therefore He saw that what He had made was good, when He saw that it was good to make it. And when He saw it made, He had not on that account a twofold nor any way increased knowledge of it; as if He had less knowledge before He made what He saw. For certainly He would not be the perfect worker He is, unless His knowledge were so perfect as to receive no addition from His finished works. Wherefore, if the only object had been to inform us who made the light, it had been enough to say, “God made the light;” and if further information regarding the means by which it was made had been intended, it would have sufficed to say, “And God said, Let there be light, and there was light,” that we might know not only that God had made the world, but also that He had made it by the word. But because it was right that three leading truths regarding the creature be intimated to us, viz., who made it, by what means, and why, it is written, “God said, Let there be light, and there was light. And God saw the light that it was good.” If, then, we ask who made it, it was “God.” If, by what means, He said “Let it be,” and it was. If we ask, why He made it, “it was good.” Neither is there any author more excellent than God, nor any skill more efficacious than the word of God, nor any cause better than that good might be created by the good God. This also Plato has assigned as the most sufficient reason for the creation of the world, that good works might be made by a good God; whether he read this passage, or, perhaps, was informed of these things by those who had read them, or, by his quick-sighted genius, penetrated to things spiritual and invisible through the things that are created, or was instructed regarding them by those who had discerned them.

Quid est enim aliud intellegendum in eo, quod per omnia dicitur: Vidit Deus quia bonum est, nisi operis adprobatio secundum artem facti, quae sapientia Dei est? Deus autem usque adeo non, cum factum est, tunc didicit bonum, ut nihil eorum fieret, si ei fuisset incognitum. Dum ergo uidet quia bonum est, quod, nisi uidisset antequam fieret, non utique fieret: docet bonum esse, non discit. Et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet Deum gaudio mundi uniuersitate perfecta. Ubi et ipse non usque adeo desipiebat, ut putaret Deum sui operis nouitate factum beatiorem; sed sic ostendere uoluit artifici suo placuisse iam factum, quod placuerat in arte faciendum; non quod ullo modo Dei scientia uarietur, ut aliud in ea faciant quae nondum sunt, aliud quae iam sunt, aliud quae fuerunt; non enim more nostro ille uel quod futurum est prospicit, uel quod praesens est aspicit, uel quod praeteritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alteque diuerso. Ille quippe non ex hoc in illud cogitatione mutata, sed omnino incommutabiliter uidet; ita ut illa quidem, quae temporaliter fiunt, et futura nondum sint et praesentia iam sint et praeterita iam non sint, ipse uero haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia conprehendat; nec aliter oculis, aliter mente; non enim ex animo constat et corpore; nec aliter nunc et aliter antea et aliter postea; quoniam non sicut nostra, ita eius quoque scientia trium temporum, praesentis uidelicet et praeteriti uel futuri, uarietate mutatur, aput quem non est inmutatio nec momenti obumbratio. Neque enim eius intentio de cogitatione in cogitationem transit, in cuius incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt cuncta quae nouit; quoniam tempora ita nouit nullis suis temporalibus notionibus, quem ad modum temporalia mouet nullis suis temporalibus motibus. Ibi ergo uidit bonum esse quod fecit, ubi bonum esse uidit ut faceret; nec quia factum uidit scientiam duplicauit uel ex aliqua parte auxit, tamquam minoris scientiae fuerit priusquam faceret quod uideret, qui tam perfecte non operaretur, nisi tam perfecta scientia, cui nihil ex eius operibus adderetur. Quapropter. si tantummodo nobis insinuandum esset quis fecerit lucem, sufficeret dicere, fecit Deus lucem; si autem non solum quis fecerit, uerum etiam per quid fecerit, satis esset ita enuntiari: Et dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux; ut non tantum Deum, sed etiam per Verbum lucem fecisse nossemus. Quia uero tria quaedam maxime scienda de creatura nobis oportuit intimari, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit: Dixit Deus, inquit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et uidit Deus lucem quia bona est. Si ergo quaerimus, quis fecerit: Deus est; si per quid fecerit: Dixit: Fiat, et facta est; si quare fecerit: Quia bona est. Nec auctor est excellentior Deo, nec ars efficacior Dei uerbo, nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a [Deo] bono. Hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi iustissimam dicit, ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent; siue ista legerit, siue ab his qui legerant forte cognouerit; siue acerrimo ingenio inuisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspexerit, siue ab his qui ista conspexerant et ipse didicerit.

Chapter 22.—Of Those Who Do Not Approve of Certain Things Which are a Part of This Good Creation of a Good Creator, and Who Think that There is Some Natural Evil.

Caput XXII. De his, quibus in uniuersitate rerum a bono Creatore bene conditarum quaedam displicent, et putant nonnullam malam esse naturam.

This cause, however, of a good creation, namely, the goodness of God,—this cause, I say, so just and fit, which, when piously and carefully weighed, terminates all the controversies of those who inquire into the origin of the world, has not been recognized by some heretics, because there are, forsooth, many things, such as fire, frost, wild beasts, and so forth, which do not suit but injure this thin blooded and frail mortality of our flesh, which is at present under just punishment. They do not consider how admirable these things are in their own places, how excellent in their own natures, how beautifully adjusted to the rest of creation, and how much grace they contribute to the universe by their own contributions as to a commonwealth; and how serviceable they are even to ourselves, if we use them with a knowledge of their fit adaptations,—so that even poisons, which are destructive when used injudiciously, become wholesome and medicinal when used in conformity with their qualities and design; just as, on the other hand, those things which give us pleasure, such as food, drink, and the light of the sun, are found to be hurtful when immoderately or unseasonably used. And thus divine providence admonishes us not foolishly to vituperate things, but to investigate their utility with care; and, where our mental capacity or infirmity is at fault, to believe that there is a utility, though hidden, as we have experienced that there were other things which we all but failed to discover. For this concealment of the use of things is itself either an exercise of our humility or a levelling of our pride; for no nature at all is evil, and this is a name for nothing but the want of good. But from things earthly to things heavenly, from the visible to the invisible, there are some things better than others; and for this purpose are they unequal, in order that they might all exist. Now God is in such sort a great worker in great things, that He is not less in little things,—for these little things are to be measured not by their own greatness (which does not exist), but by the wisdom of their Designer; as, in the visible appearance of a man, if one eyebrow be shaved off, how nearly nothing is taken from the body, but how much from the beauty!—for that is not constituted by bulk, but by the proportion and arrangement of the members. But we do not greatly wonder that persons, who suppose that some evil nature has been generated and propagated by a kind of opposing principle proper to it, refuse to admit that the cause of the creation was this, that the good God produced a good creation. For they believe that He was driven to this enterprise of creation by the urgent necessity of repulsing the evil that warred against Him, and that He mixed His good nature with the evil for the sake of restraining and conquering it; and that this nature of His, being thus shamefully polluted, and most cruelly oppressed and held captive, He labors to cleanse and deliver it, and with all His pains does not wholly succeed; but such part of it as could not be cleansed from that defilement is to serve as a prison and chain of the conquered and incarcerated enemy. The Manichæans would not drivel, or rather, rave in such a style as this, if they believed the nature of God to be, as it is, unchangeable and absolutely incorruptible, and subject to no injury; and if, moreover, they held in Christian sobriety, that the soul which has shown itself capable of being altered for the worse by its own will, and of being corrupted by sin, and so, of being deprived of the light of eternal truth,—that this soul, I say, is not a part of God, nor of the same nature as God, but is created by Him, and is far different from its Creator.

Hanc tamen causam, id est ad bona creanda bonitatem Dei, hanc, inquam, causam tam iustam adque idoneam, quae diligenter considerata et pie cogitata omnes controuersias quaerentium mundi originem terminat, quidam haeretici non uiderunt, quia egenam carnis huius fragilemque mortalitatem iam de iusto supplicio uenientem, dum ei non conueniunt, plurima offendunt, sicut ignis aut frigus aut fera bestia aut quid eius modi; nec adtendunt, quam uel in suis locis naturisque uigeant pulchroque ordine disponantur, quantumque uniuersitati rerum pro sui portione decoris tamquam in communem rem publicam conferant uel nobis ipsis, si eis congruenter adque scienter utamur, commoditatis adtribuant, ita ut uenena ipsa, quae per inconuenientiam perniciosa sunt, conuenienter adhibita in salubria medicamenta uertantur; quamque a contrario etiam haec, quibus delectantur, sicut cibus et potus et ista lux, inmoderato et inopportuno usu noxia sentiantur. Unde nos admonet diuina prouidentia non res insipienter uituperare, sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere, et ubi nostrum ingenium uel infirmitas deficit, ita credere occultam, sicut erant quaedam, quae uix potuimus inuenire; quia et ipsa utilitatis occultatio aut humilitatis exercitatio est aut elationis adtritio; cum omnino natura nulla sit malum nomenque hoc non sit nisi priuationis boni. Sed a terrenis usque ad caelestia et a uisibilibus usque ad inuisibilia sunt aliis alia bona meliora, ad hoc inaequalia, ut essent omnia; Deus autem ita est artifex magnus in magnis, ut minor non sit in paruis; quae parua non sua granditate (nam nulla est), sed artificis sapientia metienda sunt; sicut in specie uisibilis hominis, si unum radatur supercilium, quam propemodum nihil corpori, et quam multum detrahitur pulchritudini, quoniam non mole constat, sed parilitate ac dimensione membrorum! Nec sane multum mirandum est, quod hi, qui nonnullam malam putant esse naturam suo quodam contrario exortam propagatamque principio, nolunt accipere istam causam creationis rerum, ut bonus Deus conderet bona, credentes eum potius ad haec mundana molimina rebellantis aduersum se mali repellendi extrema necessitate perductum suamque naturam bonam malo cohercendo superandoque miscuisse, quam turpissime pollutam et crudelissime captiuatam et obpressam labore magno uix mundet ac liberet; non tamen totam, sed quod eius non potuerit ab illa inquinatione purgari, tegmen ac uinculum futurum hostis uicti et inclusi. Sic autem Manichaei non desiperent uel potius insanirent, si Dei naturam, sicuti est, incommutabilem adque omnino incorruptibilem crederent, cui nocere nulla res possit; animam uero, quae uoluntate mutari in deterius et peccato corrumpi potuit adque ita incommutabilis ueritatis luce priuari, non Dei partem nec eius naturae, quae Dei est, sed ab illo conditam longe inparem Conditori Christiana sanitate sentirent.

Chapter 23.—Of the Error in Which the Doctrine of Origen is Involved.

Caput XXIII. De errore, in quo Origenis doctrina culpatur.

But it is much more surprising that some even of those who, with ourselves, believe that there is one only source of all things, and that no nature which is not divine can exist unless originated by that Creator, have yet refused to accept with a good and simple faith this so good and simple a reason of the world’s creation, that a good God made it good; and that the things created, being different from God, were inferior to Him, and yet were good, being created by none other than He. But they say that souls, though not, indeed, parts of God, but created by Him, sinned by abandoning God; that, in proportion to their various sins, they merited different degrees of debasement from heaven to earth, and diverse bodies as prison-houses; and that this is the world, and this the cause of its creation, not the production of good things, but the restraining of evil. Origen is justly blamed for holding this opinion. For in the books which he entitles περὶ αρχῶν, that is, Of Origins, this is his sentiment, this his utterance. And I can not sufficiently express my astonishment, that a man so erudite and well versed in ecclesiastical literature, should not have observed, in the first place, how opposed this is to the meaning of this authoritative Scripture, which, in recounting all the works of God, regularly adds, “And God saw that it was good;” and, when all were completed, inserts the words, “And God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good.” Was it not obviously meant to be understood that there was no other cause of the world’s creation than that good creatures should be made by a good God? In this creation, had no one sinned, the world would have been filled and beautified with natures good without exception; and though there is sin, all things are not therefore full of sin, for the great majority of the heavenly inhabitants preserve their nature’s integrity. And the sinful will though it violated the order of its own nature, did not on that account escape the laws of God, who justly orders all things for good. For as the beauty of a picture is increased by well-managed shadows, so, to the eye that has skill to discern it, the universe is beautified even by sinners, though, considered by themselves, their deformity is a sad blemish.

Sed multo est mirandum amplius, quod etiam quidam, qui unum nobiscum credunt omnium rerum esse principium, ullamque naturam, quae non est quod Deus est, nisi ab illo conditore esse non posse, noluerunt tamen istam causam fabricandi mundi tam bonam ac simplicem bene ac simpliciter credere, ut Deus bonus conderet bona et essent post Deum quae non essent quod est Deus, bona tamen, quae non faceret nisi bonus Deus; sed animas dicunt, non quidem partes Dei, sed factas a Deo, peccasse a Conditore recedendo et diuersis progressibus pro diuersitate peccatorum a caelis usque ad terras diuersa corpora quasi uincula meruisse, et hunc esse mundum eamque causam mundi fuisse faciendi, non ut conderentur bona, sed ut mala cohiberentur. Hinc Origenes iure culpatur. In libris enim, quos appellat nep2 ἀρχω̄ν, id est de principiis, hoc sensit, hoc scripsit. Ubi plus quam dici potest miror hominem in ecclesiasticis litteris tam doctum et exercitatum non adtendisse, primum quam hoc esset contrarium scripturae huius tantae auctoritatis intentioni, quae per omnia opera Dei subiungens: Et uidit Deus, quia bonum est, conpletisque omnibus inferens: Et uidit Deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona ualde, nullam aliam causam faciendi mundi intellegi uoluit, nisi ut bona fierent a bono Deo. Ubi si nemo peccasset, tantummodo naturis bonis esset mundus ornatus et plenus; et quia peccatum est, non ideo cuncta sunt inpleta peccatis, cum bonorum longe maior numerus in caelestibus suae naturae ordinem seruet; nec mala uoluntas, quia naturae ordinem seruare noluit, ideo iusti Dei leges omnia bene ordinantis effugit; quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro loco suo posito, ita uniuersitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra est, quamuis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet.

In the second place, Origen, and all who think with him, ought to have seen that if it were the true opinion that the world was created in order that souls might, for their sins, be accommodated with bodies in which they should be shut up as in houses of correction, the more venial sinners receiving lighter and more ethereal bodies, while the grosser and graver sinners received bodies more crass and grovelling, then it would follow that the devils, who are deepest in wickedness, ought, rather than even wicked men, to have earthly bodies, since these are the grossest and least ethereal of all. But in point of fact, that we might see that the deserts of souls are not to be estimated by the qualities of bodies, the wickedest devil possesses an ethereal body, while man, wicked, it is true, but with a wickedness small and venial in comparison with his, received even before his sin a body of clay. And what more foolish assertion can be advanced than that God, by this sun of ours, did not design to benefit the material creation, or lend lustre to its loveliness, and therefore created one single sun for this single world, but that it so happened that one soul only had so sinned as to deserve to be enclosed in such a body as it is? On this principle, if it had chanced that not one, but two, yea, or ten, or a hundred had sinned similarly, and with a like degree of guilt, then this world would have one hundred suns. And that such is not the case, is due not to the considerate foresight of the Creator, contriving the safety and beauty of things material, but rather to the fact that so fine a quality of sinning was hit upon by only one soul, so that it alone has merited such a body. Manifestly persons holding such opinions should aim at confining, not souls of which they know not what they say, but themselves, lest they fall, and deservedly, far indeed from the truth. And as to these three answers which I formerly recommended when in the case of any creature the questions are put, Who made it? By what means? Why? that it should be replied, God, By the Word, Because it was good,—as to these three answers, it is very questionable whether the Trinity itself is thus mystically indicated, that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, or whether there is some good reason for this acceptation in this passage of Scripture,—this, I say, is questionable, and one can’t be expected to explain everything in one volume.

Deinde uidere debuit Origenes et quicumque ita sapiunt, si haec opinio uera esset, mundumideo factum, ut animae pro meritis peccatorum suorum tamquam ergastula, quibus poenaliter includerentur, corpora acciperent, superiora et leuiora quae minus, inferiora uero et grauiora quae amplius peccauerunt, daemones, quibus deterius nihil est, terrena corpora, quibus inferius et grauius nihil est, potius quam homines etiam bonos habere debuisse. Nunc uero, ut intellegeremus animarum merita non qualitatibus corporum esse pensanda, aerium pessimus daemon, homo autem, et nunc licet malus longe minoris mitiorisque malitiae, et certe ante peccatum, tamen luteum corpus accepit. Quid autem stultius dici potest, quam isto sole, ut in uno mundo unus esset, non decori pulchritudinis uel etiam saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem Deum, sed hoc potius euenisse, quia una anima sic peccauerat, ut tali corpore mereretur includi? ac per hoc si contigisset, ut non una, sed duae; immo non duae, sed decem uel centum similiter aequaliterque peccassent, centum soles haberet hic mundus? Quod ut non fieret, non opificis prouisione mirabili ad rerum corporalium salutem decoremque consultum est, sed contigit potius tanta unius animae progressione peccantis, ut sola corpus tale mereretur. Non plane animarum, de quibus nesciunt quid loquantur, sed eorum ipsorum, qui talia sapiunt multum longe a ueritate, [et] merito est cohercenda progressio. Haec ergo tria, quae superius commendaui, cum in unaquaque creatura requirantur, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit, ut respondeatur Deus, per Verbum, quia bona est’, utrum altitudine mystica nobis ipsa trinitas intimetur, hoc est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, an aliquid occurrat, quod hoc loco scripturarum id accipiendum esse prohibeat, multi sermonis est quaestio, nec omnia uno uolumine ut explicemus urgendum est.