--- title: "City of God · De civitate Dei" author: "Augustine" translator: "Marcus Dods" languages: [la, en] shelf: "Church Fathers" section: 56 of 116 url: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/56/ cite: "Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods, City of God · De civitate Dei, section 56. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/56/" --- # City of God · De civitate Dei *Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods* “Two loves have made two cities.” Augustine’s Latin, in Hoffmann’s critical text, beside Dods’s English, chapter by chapter. > Latin: Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. Emanuel Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1899–1900), as encoded by the Open Greek and Latin project, University of Leipzig (stoa0040.stoa003.opp-lat3, CC BY-SA 4.0); apparatus omitted. > English: Marcus Dods, The City of God (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2, 1887). > Chapters are matched one to one except where the two editions divide them differently; within a chapter the Latin sentences are shared out over the English paragraphs by position. ## 56. Of the Opinion that the Angels Were Created Before the World. Source: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/56/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/56/#p-N [¶0] Chapter 32.—Of the Opinion that the Angels Were Created Before the World. > Latin: Caput XXXII. De opinione eorum, qui angelorum creationem anteriorem uolunt esse quam mundi. [¶1] But if some one oppose our opinion, and say that the holy angels are not referred to when it is said, “Let there be light, and there was light;” if he suppose or teach that some material light, then first created, was meant, and that the angels were created, not only before the firmament dividing the waters and named “the heaven,” but also before the time signified in the words, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;” if he allege that this phrase, “In the beginning,” does not mean that nothing was made before (for the angels were), but that God made all things by His Wisdom or Word, who is named in Scripture “the Beginning,” as He Himself, in the gospel, replied to the Jews when they asked Him who He was, that He was the Beginning;—I will not contest the point, chiefly because it gives me the liveliest satisfaction to find the Trinity celebrated in the very beginning of the book of Genesis. For having said “In the Beginning God created the heaven and the earth,” meaning that the Father made them in the Son (as the psalm testifies where it says, “How manifold are Thy works, O Lord! in Wisdom hast Thou made them all”), a little afterwards mention is fitly made of the Holy Spirit also. For, when it had been told us what kind of earth God created at first, or what the mass or matter was which God, under the name of “heaven and earth,” had provided for the construction of the world, as is told in the additional words, “And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep,” then, for the sake of completing the mention of the Trinity, it is immediately added, “And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.” Let each one, then, take it as he pleases; for it is so profound a passage, that it may well suggest, for the exercise of the reader’s tact, many opinions, and none of them widely departing from the rule of faith. At the same time, let none doubt that the holy angels in their heavenly abodes are, though not, indeed, co-eternal with God, yet secure and certain of eternal and true felicity. To their company the Lord teaches that His little ones belong; and not only says, “They shall be equal to the angels of God,” but shows, too, what blessed contemplation the angels themselves enjoy, saying, “Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones: for I say unto you, that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven.” > Latin: Ne quis autem contendat et dicat non sanctos angelos esse significatos in eo quod scriptum est: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, sed quamlibet lucem tunc primum factam esse corpoream ant opinetur aut doceat; angelos autem prius esse factos non tantum ante firmamentum, quod inter aquas et aquas factum appellatum est caelum, sed ante illud de quo dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; adque illud, quod dictum est: In principio, non ita dictum tamquam primum hoc factum sit, cum ante fecerit angelos, sed quia omnia in sapientia fecit, quod est Verbum eius et ipsum scriptura principium nominauit (sicut ipse in euangelio Iudaeis quaerentibus quis esset respondit se esse principium): non e contrario referam contentionem, maxime quia hoc me delectat plurimum, quod etiam in summo exordio sancti libri geneseos trinitas commendatur. Cum enim ita dicitur: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram, ut Pater fecisse intellegatur in Filio, sicut adtestatur psalmus, ubi legitur: Quam magnificata sunt opera tua Domine! omnia in sapientia fecisti: conuenientissime paulo post commemoratur etiam Spiritus sanctus. Cum enim dictum esset, qualem terram Deus primitus fecerit, uel quam molem materiamue futurae constructionis mundi caeli et terrae nomine nuncupauerit subiciendo et addendo: Terra autem erat inuisibilis et inconposita et tenebrae erant super abyssum: mox ut trinitatis commemoratio conpleretur: Et spiritus, inquit, dei superferebatur super aquam. Proinde ut uolet quisque accipiat, quod ita profundum est, ut ad exercitationem legentium a fidei regula non abhorrentes plures possit generare sententias, dum tamen angelos sanctos in sublimibus sedibus non quidem Deo coaeternos, sed tamen de sua sempiterna et uera felicitate securos et certos esse nemo ambigat. Ad quorum societatem pertinere paruulos suos Dominus docens non solum illud ait: Erunt aequales angelis Dei; uerum ipsi quoque angeli qua contemplatione fruantur ostendit, ubi ait: Videte, ne contemnatis unum ex pusillis istis; dico enim uobis, quia angeli eorum in caelis semper uident faciem Patris mei, qui in caelis est. ### Of the Two Different and Dissimilar Communities of Angels, Which are Not Inappropriately Signified by the Names Light and Darkness. [¶3] Chapter 33.—Of the Two Different and Dissimilar Communities of Angels, Which are Not Inappropriately Signified by the Names Light and Darkness. > Latin: Caput XXXIII. De duabus angelorum societatibus diuersis adque disparibus, quae non incongrue intelleguntur lucis et tenebrarum nominibus nuncupatae. [¶4] That certain angels sinned, and were thrust down to the lowest parts of this world, where they are, as it were, incarcerated till their final damnation in the day of judgment, the Apostle Peter very plainly declares, when he says that “God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness to be reserved into judgment.” Who, then, can doubt that God, either in foreknowledge or in act, separated between these and the rest? And who will dispute that the rest are justly called “light?” For even we who are yet living by faith, hoping only and not yet enjoying equality with them, are already called “light” by the apostle: “For ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord.” But as for these apostate angels, all who understand or believe them to be worse than unbelieving men are well aware that they are called “darkness.” Wherefore, though light and darkness are to be taken in their literal signification in these passages of Genesis in which it is said, “God said, Let there be light, and there was light,” and “God divided the light from the darkness,” yet, for our part, we understand these two societies of angels,—the one enjoying God, the other swelling with pride; the one to whom it is said, “Praise ye Him, all His angels,” the other whose prince says, “All these things will I give Thee if Thou wilt fall down and worship me;” the one blazing with the holy love of God, the other reeking with the unclean lust of self-advancement. And since, as it is written, “God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the humble,” we may say, the one dwelling in the heaven of heavens, the other cast thence, and raging through the lower regions of the air; the one tranquil in the brightness of piety, the other tempest-tossed with beclouding desires; the one, at God’s pleasure, tenderly succoring, justly avenging,—the other, set on by its own pride, boiling with the lust of subduing and hurting; the one the minister of God’s goodness to the utmost of their good pleasure, the other held in by God’s power from doing the harm it would; the former laughing at the latter when it does good unwillingly by its persecutions, the latter envying the former when it gathers in its pilgrims. These two angelic communities, then, dissimilar and contrary to one another, the one both by nature good and by will upright, the other also good by nature but by will depraved, as they are exhibited in other and more explicit passages of holy writ, so I think they are spoken of in this book of Genesis under the names of light and darkness; and even if the author perhaps had a different meaning, yet our discussion of the obscure language has not been wasted time; for, though we have been unable to discover his meaning, yet we have adhered to the rule of faith, which is sufficiently ascertained by the faithful from other passages of equal authority. For, though it is the material works of God which are here spoken of, they have certainly a resemblance to the spiritual, so that Paul can say, “Ye are all the children of light, and the children of the day: we are not of the night, nor of darkness.” If, on the other hand, the author of Genesis saw in the words what we see, then our discussion reaches this more satisfactory conclusion, that the man of God, so eminently and divinely wise, or rather, that the Spirit of God who by him recorded God’s works which were finished on the sixth day, may be supposed not to have omitted all mention of the angels whether he included them in the words “in the beginning,” because He made them first, or, which seems most likely, because He made them in the only-begotten Word. And, under these names heaven and earth, the whole creation is signified, either as divided into spiritual and material, which seems the more likely, or into the two great parts of the world in which all created things are contained, so that, first of all, the creation is presented in sum, and then its parts are enumerated according to the mystic number of the days. > Latin: Peccasse autem quosdam angelos et in huius mundi ima detrusos, qui eis uelut carcer est, usque ad futuram in die iudicii ultimam damnationem apostolus Petrus apertissime ostendit dicens, quod Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercerit. sed carceribus caliginis inferi retrudens tradiderit in iudicio puniendos reseruari. Inter hos ergo et illos Deum uel praescientia uel opere diuisisse quis dubitet? illosque lucem merito appellari quis contradicat? quando quidem nos adhuc in fide uiuentes eorum aequalitatem adhuc sperantes, utique nondum tenentes, iam lux dicti ab apostolo sumus: Fuistis enim, inquit, aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino. Istos uero desertores tenebras aptissime nuncupari profecto aduertunt, qui peiores esse hominibus infidelibus siue intellegunt siue credunt. Quapropter, etsi alia lux in isto huius libri loco intellegenda est, ubi legimus: Dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, et aliae tenebrae significatae sunt in eo quod scriptum est: Diuisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras: nos tamen has duas angelicas societates, unam fruentem Deo, alteram tumentem typho; unam cui dicitur: Adorate eum omnes angeli eius, aliam cuius princeps dicit: Haec omnia tibi dabo, si prostratus adoraueris me: unam Dei sancto amore flagrantem, alteram propriae celsitudinis inmundo amore fumantem; et quoniam, sicut scriptum est, Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam, illam in caelis caelorum habita.item, istam inde deiectam in hoc infimo aerio caelo tumultuantem; illam luminosa pietate tranquillam, istam tenebrosis cupiditatibus turbulentam; illam Dei nutu clementer subuenientem, iuste ulciscentem, istam suo fastu subdendi et nocendi libidine exaestuantem; illam, ut quantum uult consulat, Dei bonitati ministram, istam, ne quantum uult noceat, Dei potestate frenatam; illam huic inludentem ut nolens prosit persecutionibus suis, hanc illi inuidentem, cum peregrinos colligit suos, — nos ergo has duas societates angelicas inter se dispares adque contrarias, unam et natura bonam et uoluntate rectam, aliam uero natura bonam, sed uoluntate peruersam, aliis manifestioribus diuinarum scripturarum testimoniis declaratas, quod etiam in hoc libro, cui nomen est genesis, lucis tenebrarumque uocabulis significatas existimauimus, etiamsi aliud hoc loco sensit forte qui scripsit, non est inutiliter obscuritas huius pertractata sententiae, quia, etsi uoluntatem auctoris libri huius indagare nequiuimus, a regula tamen fidei, quae per alias eiusdem auctoritatis sacras litteras satis fidelibus nota est, non abhorruimus. Etsi enim corporalia hic commemorata sunt opera Dei, habent procul dubio nonnullam similitudinem spiritalium, secundum quam dicit apostolus: Omnes enim uos filii lucis estis et filii diei, non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum. Si autem hoc sensit etiam ille qui scripsit, ad perfectiorem disputationis finem nostra peruenit intentio, ut homo Dei tam eximiae diuinaeque sapientiae, immo per eum Spiritus Dei in commemorandis operibus Dei, quae omnia sexto die dixit esse perfecta, nullo modo angelos praetermisisse credatur siue in principio, quia primo fecit, siue quod conuenientius intellegitur, in principio, quia in Verbo unigenito fecit, scriptum sit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; quibus nominibus uniuersalis est significata creatura, uel spiritalis et corporalis, quod est credibilius, uel magnae duae mundi partes, quibus omnia quae creata sunt continentur, ut primitus eam totam proponeret ac deinde partes eius secundum mysticum dierum numerum exsequeretur. ### Of the Idea that the Angels Were Meant Where the Separation of the Waters by the Firmament is Spoken Of, and of that Other Idea that the Waters Were Not Created. [¶6] Chapter 34.—Of the Idea that the Angels Were Meant Where the Separation of the Waters by the Firmament is Spoken Of, and of that Other Idea that the Waters Were Not Created. > Latin: Caput XXXIV. De eo quod quidam putant in conditione firmamenti aquarum discretarum nomine angelos significatos, et quod quidam aquas existimant non creatas. [¶7] Some, however, have supposed that the angelic hosts are somehow referred to under the name of waters, and that this is what is meant by “Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters:” that the waters above should be understood of the angels, and those below either of the visible waters, or of the multitude of bad angels, or of the nations of men. If this be so, then it does not here appear when the angels were created, but when they were separated. Though there have not been wanting men foolish and wicked enough to deny that the waters were made by God, because it is nowhere written, “God said, Let there be waters.” With equal folly they might say the same of the earth, for nowhere do we read, “God said, Let the earth be.” But, say they, it is written, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” Yes, and there the water is meant, for both are included in one word. For “the sea is His,” as the psalm says, “and He made it; and His hands formed the dry land.” But those who would understand the angels by the waters above the skies have a difficulty about the specific gravity of the elements, and fear that the waters, owing to their fluidity and weight, could not be set in the upper parts of the world. So that, if they were to construct a man upon their own principles, they would not put in his head any moist humors, or “phlegm” as the Greeks call it, and which acts the part of water among the elements of our body. But, in God’s handiwork, the head is the seat of the phlegm, and surely most fitly; and yet, according to their supposition, so absurdly that if we were not aware of the fact, and were informed by this same record that God had put a moist and cold and therefore heavy humor in the uppermost part of man’s body, these world-weighers would refuse belief. And if they were confronted with the authority of Scripture, they would maintain that something else must be meant by the words. But, were we to investigate and discover all the details which are written in this divine book regarding the creation of the world, we should have much to say, and should widely digress from the proposed aim of this work. Since, then, we have now said what seemed needful regarding these two diverse and contrary communities of angels, in which the origin of the two human communities (of which we intend to speak anon) is also found, let us at once bring this book also to a conclusion. > Latin: Quamquam nonnulli putauerint aquarum nomine significatos quodam modo populos angelorum et hoc esse quod dictum est: Fiat firmamentum inter aquam et aquam, ut supra firmamentum angeli intellegantur, infra uero uel aquae istae uisibiles uel malorum angelorum multitudo uel omnium hominum gentes. Quod si ita est, non illic apparet ubi facti sint angeli, sed ubi discreti; quamuis et aquas, quod peruersissimae adque inpiae uanitatis est, negent quidam factas a Deo, quoniam nusquam scriptum est: Dixit Deus: Fiant aquae. Quod possunt simili uanitate etiam de terra dicere; nusquam enim legitur: Dixit Deus: Fiat terra. Sed, inquiunt, scriptum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Illic ergo et aqua intellegenda est; uno enim nomine utrumque conprehensum est. Nam ipsius est mare, sicut in psalmo legitur, et ipse fecit illud, et aridam terram manus eius finxerunt. Sed hi, qui in nomine aquarum, quae super caelos sunt, angelos intellegi uolunt, ponderibus elementorum mouentur et ideo non putant aquarum fluuidam grauemque naturam in superioribus mundi locis potuisse constitui; qui secundum rationes suas, si ipsi hominem facere possent, non ei pituitam, quod Graece ϕλέγμα dicitur et tamquam in elementis corporis nostri aquarum uicem obtinet, in capite ponerent. Ibi enim sedes est phlegmatis, secundum Dei opus utique aptissime, secundum istorum autem coniecturam tam absurde, ut, si hoc nesciremus et in hoc libro similiter scriptum esset, quod Deus umorem fluuidum et frigidum ac per hoc grauem in superiore omnibus ceteris humani corporis parte posuerit, isti trutinatores elementorum nequaquam crederent, et si auctoritati eiusdem scripturae subditi essent, aliquid aliud ex hoc intellegendum esse censerent. Sed quoniam, si diligenter singula scrutemur adque tractemus, quae in illo diuino libro de constitutione mundi scripta sunt, et multa dicenda et a proposito instituti operis longe digrediendum est, iamque de duabus istis diuersis inter se adque contrariis societatibus angelorum, in quibus sunt quaedam exordia duarum etiam in rebus humanis ciuitatum, de quibus deinceps dicere institui, quantum satis esse uisum est, disputauimus: hunc quoque librum aliquando claudamus. ### Of the creation of angels and men, and of the origin of evil. [¶9] Book XII. > Latin: Liber XII [¶10] Argument—Augustin first institutes two inquiries regarding the angels; namely, whence is there in some a good, and in others an evil will? and, what is the reason of the blessedness of the good, and the misery of the evil? Afterwards he treats of the creation of man, and teaches that he is not from eternity, but was created, and by none other than God. ### That the Nature of the Angels, Both Good and Bad, is One and the Same. [¶12] Chapter 1.—That the Nature of the Angels, Both Good and Bad, is One and the Same. > Latin: Caput I. De una bonorum angelorum malorumque natura. [¶13] It has already, in the preceding book, been shown how the two cities originated among the angels. Before I speak of the creation of man, and show how the cities took their rise so far as regards the race of rational mortals I see that I must first, so far as I can, adduce what may demonstrate that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to speak of a society composed of angels and men together; so that there are not four cities or societies,—two, namely, of angels, and as many of men,—but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the other of the wicked, angels or men indifferently. > Latin: Antequam de institutione hominis dicam, ubi duarum ciuitatum, quantum ad rationalium mortalium genus adtinet. apparebit exortus, sicut superiore libro apparuisse in angelis iam uidetur: prius mihi quaedam de ipsis angelis uideo esse dicenda, quibus demonstretur, quantum a nobis potest, quam non inconueniens neque incongrua dicatur esse hominibus angelisque societas, ut non quattuor (duae scilicet angelorum totidemque hominum), sed duae potius ciuitates, hoc est societates, merito esse dicantur, una in bonis, altera in malis non solum angelis, uerum etiam hominibus constitutae. [¶14] That the contrary propensities in good and bad angels have arisen, not from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the good Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from a difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible to doubt. While some steadfastly continued in that which was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and love; others, being enamored rather of their own power, as if they could be their own good, lapsed to this private good of their own, from that higher and beatific good which was common to all, and, bartering the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most assured verity for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for factious partisanship, they became proud, deceived, envious. The cause, therefore, of the blessedness of the good is adherence to God. And so the cause of the others’ misery will be found in the contrary, that is, in their not adhering to God. Wherefore, if when the question is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly answered, because they adhere to God; and when it is asked, why are the latter miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not adhere to God,—then there is no other good for the rational or intellectual creature save God only. Thus, though it is not every creature that can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and things of that kind have not this capacity), yet that creature which has the capacity cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable. He, then, who is blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be miserable, because he cannot lose himself. > Latin: Angelorum bonorum et malo rum inter se contrarios adpetitus non naturis principiisque diuersis, cum Deus omnium substantiarum bonus auctor et conditor utrosque creauerit, sed uoluntatibus et cupiditatibus extitisse dubitare fas non est. dum alii constanter in communi omnibus bono, quod ipse illis Deus est, adque in eius aeternitate ueritate caritate persistunt; alii sua potestate potius delectati, uelut bonum suum sibi ipsi essent, a superiore communi omnium beatifico bono ad propria defluxerunt et habentes elationis fastum pro excelsissima aeternitate, uanitatis astutiam pro certissima ueritate. studia partium pro indiuidua caritate superbi fallaces inuidi effecti sunt. Beatitudinis igitur illorum causa est adhaerere Deo; quocirca istorum miseriae causa ex contrario est intellegenda, quod est non adhaerere Deo. Quam ob rem si, cum quaeritur, quare illi beati sint, recte respondetur: Quia Deo adhaerent; et cum quaeritur, quur isti sint miseri, recte respondetur: Quia non adhaerent Deo: non est creaturae rationalis uel intellectualis bonum, quo beata sit, nisi Deus. Ita quamuis non omnis beata possit esse creatura (neque enim hoc munus adipiscuntur aut capiunt ferae ligna saxa et si quid huius modi est), ea tamen, quae potest, non ex se ipsa potest, quia ex nihilo creata est, sed ex illo, a quo creata est. Hoc enim adepto beata, quo amisso misera est. Ille uero qui non alio, sed se ipso bono beatus est, ideo miser non potest esse, quia non se potest amittere. [¶15] Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one, true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good because from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out of nothing. Although, therefore, they are not the supreme good, for God is a greater good, yet those mutable things which can adhere to the immutable good, and so be blessed, are very good; for so completely is He their good, that without Him they cannot but be wretched. And the other created things in the universe are not better on this account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would say that the other members of the body are superior to the eyes, because they cannot be blind. But as the sentient nature, even when it feels pain, is superior to the stony, which can feel none, so the rational nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than that which lacks reason or feeling, and can therefore experience no misery. And since this is so, then in this nature which has been created so excellent, that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus blessed save in God,—in this nature, I say, not to adhere to God, is manifestly a fault. Now every fault injures the nature, and is consequently contrary to the nature. The creature, therefore, which cleaves to God, differs from those who do not, not by nature, but by fault; and yet by this very fault the nature itself is proved to be very noble and admirable. For that nature is certainly praised, the fault of which is justly blamed. For we justly blame the fault because it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight belongs to the nature of the eyes; and when we say that deafness is a defect of the ears, hearing is thereby proved to belong to their nature;—so, when we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature that it does not cleave to God, we hereby most plainly declare that it pertained to its nature to cleave to God. And who can worthily conceive or express how great a glory that is, to cleave to God, so as to live to Him, to draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy this so great good, without death, error, or grief? And thus, since every vice is an injury of the nature, that very vice of the wicked angels, their departure from God, is sufficient proof that God created their nature so good, that it is an injury to it not to be with God. > Latin: Dicimus itaque incommutabile bonum non esse nisi unum uerum beatum Deum; ea uero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo, uerum tamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de nihilo facta sunt. Quamquam ergo summa non sint, quibus est Deus maius bonum: magna sunt tamen ea mutabilia bona, quae adhaerere possunt, ut beata sint, inmutabili bono, quod usque adeo bonum eorum est, ut sine illo misera esse necesse sit. Nec ideo cetera in hac creaturae uniuersitate meliora sunt, quia misera esse non possunt; neque enim cetera membra corporis nostri ideo dicendum est oculis esse meliora, quia caeca esse non possunt. Sicut autem melior est natura sentiens et cum dolet quam lapis qui dolere nullo modo potest: ita rationalis natura praestantior etiam misera, quam illa quae rationis uel sensus est expers, et ideo in eam non cadit miseria. Quod cum ita sit, huic naturae, quae in tanta excellentia creata est, ut, licet sit ipsa mutabilis, inhaerendo tamen incommutabili bono, id est summo Deo, beatitudinem consequatur, nec expleat indigentiam suam nisi utique beata sit, eique explendae non sufficiat nisi Deus, profecto non illi adhaerere uitium est. Omne autem uitium naturae nocet ac per hoc contra naturam est. Ab illa igitur, quae adhaeret Deo, non natura differt ista, sed uitio; quo tamen etiam uitio ualde magna multumque laudabilis ostenditur ipsa natura. Cuius enim recte uituperatur uitium, procul dubio natura laudatur. Nam recta uitii uituperatio est, quod illo dehonestatur natura laudabilis. Sicut ergo, cum uitium oculorum dicitur caecitas, id ostenditur, quod ad naturam oculorum pertinet uisus; et cum uitium aurium dicitur surditas, ad earum naturam pertinere demonstratur auditus: ita, cum uitium creaturae angelicae dicitur, quo non adhaeret Deo, hinc apertissime declaratur, eius naturae ut Deo adhaereat conuenire. Quam porro magna sit laus adhaerere Deo, ut ei uiuat, inde sapiat, illo gaudeat tantoque bono sine morte sine errore sine molestia perfruatur, quis digne cogitare possit aut eloqui? Quapropter etiam uitio malorum angelorum, quo non adhaerent Deo, quoniam omne uitium naturae nocet, satis manifestatur Deum tam bonam eorum creasse naturam, cui noxium sit non esse cum Deo. ### That There is No Entity Contrary to the Divine, Because Nonentity Seems to Be that Which is Wholly Opposite to Him Who Supremely and Always is. [¶17] Chapter 2.—That There is No Entity Contrary to the Divine, Because Nonentity Seems to Be that Which is Wholly Opposite to Him Who Supremely and Always is. > Latin: Caput II. Nullam essentiam Deo esse contrariam, quia ab eo, qui summe et semper est, hoc in totum uidetur diuersum esse quod non est. [¶18] This may be enough to prevent any one from supposing, when we speak of the apostate angels, that they could have another nature, derived, as it were, from some different origin, and not from God. From the great impiety of this error we shall disentangle ourselves the more readily and easily, the more distinctly we understand that which God spoke by the angel when He sent Moses to the children of Israel: “I am that I am.” For since God is the supreme existence, that is to say, supremely is, and is therefore unchangeable, the things that He made He empowered to be, but not to be supremely like Himself. To some He communicated a more ample, to others a more limited existence, and thus arranged the natures of beings in ranks. For as from sapere comes sapientia, so from esse comes essentia,—a new word indeed, which the old Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized in our day, that our language may not want an equivalent for the Greek οὐσία. For this is expressed word for word by essentia. Consequently, to that nature which supremely is, and which created all else that exists, no nature is contrary save that which does not exist. For nonentity is the contrary of that which is. And thus there is no being contrary to God, the Supreme Being, and Author of all beings whatsoever. > Latin: Haec dicta sint, nec quisquam, cum de angelis apostaticis loquimur, existimet eos aliam uelut ex alio principio habere potuisse naturam, nec eorum naturae auctorem Deum. Cuius erroris inpietate tanto quisque carebit expeditius et facilius, quanto perspicacius intellegere potuerit, quod per angelum Deus dixit, quando Moysen mittebat ad filios Israel: Ego sum, qui sum. Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit: rebus, quas ex nihilo creauit, esse dedit, Sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus, adque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinauit (sicut enim ab eo, quod est sapere, uocatur sapientia, sic ab eo, quod est esse, uocatur essentia, nouo quidem nomine, quo usi ueteres non sunt Latini sermonis auctores, sed iam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant coatav; hoc enim uerbum e uerbo expressum est, ut diceretur essentia); ac per hoc ei naturae, quae summe est, qua faciente sunt quaecumque sunt, contraria natura non est, nisi quae non est. Ei quippe, quod est, non esse contrarium est. Et propterea Deo, id est summae essentiae et auctori omnium qualiumcumque essentiarum, essentia nulla contraria est. ### That the Enemies of God are So, Not by Nature, But by Will, Which, as It Injures Them, Injures a Good Nature; For If Vice Does Not Injure, It is Not Vice. [¶20] Chapter 3.—That the Enemies of God are So, Not by Nature, But by Will, Which, as It Injures Them, Injures a Good Nature; For If Vice Does Not Injure, It is Not Vice. > Latin: Caput III. De inimicis Dei non per naturam, sed per contrariam uoluntatem, quae cum ipsis nocet, bonae utique naturae nocet, quia uitium, si non nocet, non est. [¶21] In Scripture they are called God’s enemies who oppose His rule, not by nature, but by vice; having no power to hurt Him, but only themselves. For they are His enemies, not through their power to hurt, but by their will to oppose Him. For God is unchangeable, and wholly proof against injury. Therefore the vice which makes those who are called His enemies resist Him, is an evil not to God, but to themselves. And to them it is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good of their nature. It is not nature, therefore, but vice, which is contrary to God. For that which is evil is contrary to the good. And who will deny that God is the supreme good? Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good. Further, the nature it vitiates is a good, and therefore to this good also it is contrary. But while it is contrary to God only as evil to good, it is contrary to the nature it vitiates, both as evil and as hurtful. For to God no evils are hurtful; but only to natures mutable and corruptible, though, by the testimony of the vices themselves, originally good. For were they not good, vices could not hurt them. For how do they hurt them but by depriving them of integrity, beauty, welfare, virtue, and, in short, whatever natural good vice is wont to diminish or destroy? But if there be no good to take away, then no injury can be done, and consequently there can be no vice. For it is impossible that there should be a harmless vice. Whence we gather, that though vice cannot injure the unchangeable good, it can injure nothing but good; because it does not exist where it does not injure. This, then, may be thus formulated: Vice cannot be in the highest good, and cannot be but in some good. Things solely good, therefore, can in some circumstances exist; things solely evil, never; for even those natures which are vitiated by an evil will, so far indeed as they are vitiated, are evil, but in so far as they are natures they are good. And when a vitiated nature is punished, besides the good it has in being a nature, it has this also, that it is not unpunished. For this is just, and certainly everything just is a good. For no one is punished for natural, but for voluntary vices. For even the vice which by the force of habit and long continuance has become a second nature, had its origin in the will. For at present we are speaking of the vices of the nature, which has a mental capacity for that enlightenment which discriminates between what is just and what is unjust. > Latin: Dicuntur autem in scripturis inimici Dei, qui non natura, sed uitiis aduersantur eius imperio, nihil ei ualentes nocere, sed sibi. Inimici enim sunt resistendi uoluntate, non potestate laedendi. Deus namque inmutabilis est et omni modo incorruptibilis. Idcirco uitium, quo resistunt Deo qui eius appellantur inimici, non est Deo, sed ipsis malum, neque hoc ob aliud, nisi quia corrumpit in eis naturae bonum. Natura igitur contraria non est Deo sed uitium, quia malum contrarium est bono. Quis autem neget Deum summe bonum? Vitium ergo contrarium est Deo, tamquam malum bono. Porro autem bonum est et natura quam uitiat; unde et huic bono utique contrarium est; sed Deo tantummodo tamquam bono malum, naturae uero, quam uitiat, non tantum malum, sed etiam noxium. Nulla quippe mala Deo noxia sed mutabilibus corruptibilibusque naturis, bonis tamen ipsorum quoque testimonio uitiorum. Si enim bonae non essent, eis uitia nocere non possent. Nam quid eis nocendo faciunt, nisi adimunt integritatem pulchritudinem, salutem uirtutem et quidquid boni naturae per uitium detrahi siue minui consueuit? Quod si omnino desit, nihil boni adimendo non nocet ac per hoc nec uitium est. Nam esse uitium et non nocere non potest. Unde colligitur, quamuis non possit uitium nocere incommutabili bono, non tamen posse nocere nisi bono, quia non inest, nisi ubi nocet. Hoc etiam isto modo dici potest, uitium esse nec in summo posse bono nec nisi in aliquo bono. Sola ergo bona alicubi esse possunt, sola mala nusquam; quoniam naturae etiam illae, quae ex malae uoluntatis initio uitiatae sunt, in quantum uitiosae sunt, malae sunt, in quantum autem naturae sunt, bonae sunt. Et cum in poenis est natura uitiosa, excepto eo, quod natura est, etiam hoc ibi bonum est, quod inpunita non est. Hoc enim est iustum et omne iustum procul dubio bonum. Non enim quisquam de uitiis naturalibus, sed de uoluntariis poenas luit. Nam etiam quod uitium consuetudine nimioue progressu roboratum uelut naturaliter inoleuit, a uoluntate sumsit exordium. De uitiis quippe nunc loquimur eius naturae, cui mens inest capax intellegibilis lucis, qua discernitur iustum ab iniusto. ### Of the Nature of Irrational and Lifeless Creatures, Which in Their Own Kind and Order Do Not Mar the Beauty of the Universe. [¶23] Chapter 4.—Of the Nature of Irrational and Lifeless Creatures, Which in Their Own Kind and Order Do Not Mar the Beauty of the Universe. > Latin: Caput IV. De naturis inrationalium aut uita carentium, quae in suo genere adque ordine ab uniuersitatis decore non discrepant. [¶24] But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts and trees, and other such mortal and mutable things as are void of intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should destroy their corruptible nature; for these creatures received, at their Creator’s will, an existence fitting them, by passing away and giving place to others, to secure that lowest form of beauty, the beauty of seasons, which in its own place is a requisite part of this world. For things earthly were neither to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though inferior, to be quite omitted from the universe. Since, then, in those situations where such things are appropriate, some perish to make way for others that are born in their room, and the less succumb to the greater, and the things that are overcome are transformed into the quality of those that have the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory. Of this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our mortal frailty we are so involved in a part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty. And therefore, where we are not so well able to perceive the wisdom of the Creator, we are very properly enjoined to believe it, lest in the vanity of human rashness we presume to find any fault with the work of so great an Artificer. At the same time, if we attentively consider even these faults of earthly things, which are neither voluntary nor penal, they seem to illustrate the excellence of the natures themselves, which are all originated and created by God; for it is that which pleases us in this nature which we are displeased to see removed by the fault,—unless even the natures themselves displease men, as often happens when they become hurtful to them, and then men estimate them not by their nature, but by their utility; as in the case of those animals whose swarms scourged the pride of the Egyptians. But in this way of estimating, they may find fault with the sun itself; for certain criminals or debtors are sentenced by the judges to be set in the sun. Therefore it is not with respect to our convenience or discomfort, but with respect to their own nature, that the creatures are glorifying to their Artificer. Thus even the nature of the eternal fire, penal though it be to the condemned sinners, is most assuredly worthy of praise. For what is more beautiful than fire flaming, blazing, and shining? What more useful than fire for warming, restoring, cooking, though nothing is more destructive than fire burning and consuming? The same thing, then, when applied in one way, is destructive, but when applied suitably, is most beneficial. For who can find words to tell its uses throughout the whole world? We must not listen, then, to those who praise the light of fire but find fault with its heat, judging it not by its nature, but by their convenience or discomfort. For they wish to see, but not to be burnt. But they forget that this very light which is so pleasant to them, disagrees with and hurts weak eyes; and in that heat which is disagreeable to them, some animals find the most suitable conditions of a healthy life. > Latin: Ceterum uitia pecorum et arborum aliarumque rerum mutabilium adque mortalium uel intellectu uel sensu uel uita omnino carentium, quibus eorum dissolubilis natura corrumpitur, damnabilia putare ridiculum est, cum istae creaturae eum modum nutu Creatoris acceperint, ut cedendo ac succedendo peragant infimam pulchritudinem temporum in genere suo istius mundi partibus congruentem. Neque enim caelestibus fuerant terrena coaequanda, aut ideo uniuersitati deesse ista debuerunt, quoniam sunt illa meliora. Cum ergo in his locis, ubi esse talia conpetebat, aliis alia deficientibus oriuntur et succumbunt minora maioribus adque in qualitates superantium superata uertuntur, rerum est ordo transeuntium. Cuius ordinis decus nos propterea non delectat, quoniam parti eius pro condicione nostrae mortalitatis intexti uniuersum, cui particulae, quae nos offendunt, satis apte decenterque conueniunt, sentire non possumus. Unde nobis, in quibus eam contemplari minus idonei sumus, rectissime credenda praecipitur prouidentia Conditoris, ne tanti artificis opus in aliquo reprehendere uanitate humanae temeritatis audeamus. Quamquam et uitia rerum terrenarum non uoluntaria neque poenalia naturas ipsas, quarum nulla omnino est, cuius non sit auctor et conditor Deus, si prudenter adtendamus, eadem ratione commendant, quia et in eis hoc nobis per uitium tolli displicet, quod in natura placet; nisi quia hominibus etiam ipsae naturae plerumque displicent, cum eis fiunt noxiae. non eas considerantibus, sed utilitatem suam, sicut illa animalia, quorum abundantia Aegyptiorum superbia uapulauit. Sed isto modo possunt et solem uituperare, quoniam quidam peccantes uel debita non reddentes poni a iudicibus iubentur ad solem. Non itaque ex commodo uel incommodo nostro, sed per se ipsam considerata natura dat artifici suo gloriam. Sic est et natura ignis aeterni sine ulla dubitatione laudabilis, quamuis damnatis inpiis futura poenalis. Quid enim est igne flammante uigente lucente pulchrius? quid calfaciente curante coquente utilius? quamuis eo nihil sit urente molestius. Idem igitur ipse aliter adpositus perniciosus, qui conuenienter adhibitus commodissimus inuenitur. Nam eius in uniuerso mundo utilitates uerbis explicare quis sufficit? Nec audiendi sunt, qui laudant in igne lucem, ardorem autem uituperant, uidelicet non ex ui naturae, sed ex suo commodo uel incommodo. Videre enim uolunt, ardere nolunt. Sed parum adtendunt eam ipsam lucem, quae certe et illis placet, oculis infirmis per inconuenientiam nocere, et in illo ardore, qui eis displicet, nonnulla animalia per conuenientiam salubriter uiuere.