Of the Captivity of the Saints, and that Divine Consolation Never Failed Them Therein.

Chapter 14.—Of the Captivity of the Saints, and that Divine Consolation Never Failed Them Therein.

Caput XIV. De captiuitate sanctorum, quibus numquam diuina solacia defuerunt.

But, say they, many Christians were even led away captive. This indeed were a most pitiable fate, if they could be led away to any place where they could not find their God. But for this calamity also sacred Scripture affords great consolation. The three youths were captives; Daniel was a captive; so were other prophets: and God, the comforter, did not fail them. And in like manner He has not failed His own people in the power of a nation which, though barbarous, is yet human,—He who did not abandon the prophet in the belly of a monster. These things, indeed, are turned to ridicule rather than credited by those with whom we are debating; though they believe what they read in their own books, that Arion of Methymna, the famous lyrist, when he was thrown overboard, was received on a dolphin’s back and carried to land. But that story of ours about the prophet Jonah is far more incredible,—more incredible because more marvellous, and more marvellous because a greater exhibition of power.

Sed multi, inquiunt, Christiani etiam captiui ducti sunt. Hoc sane miserrimum est, si aliquo duci potuerunt, ubi Deum suum non inuenerunt. Sunt in scripturis sanctis huius etiam cladis magna solacia. Fuerunt in captiuitate tres pueri, fuit Daniel, fuerunt alii prophetae; nec Deus defuit consolator. Sic ergo non deseruit fideles suos sub dominatione gentis, licet barbarae, tamen humanae, qui prophetam non deseruit nec in uisceribus beluae. Haec quoque illi, cum quibus agimus, malunt inridere quam credere, qui tamen [in] suis litteris credunt Arionem Methymnaeum, nobilissimum citharistam, cum esset deiectus e naui, exceptum delphini dorso et ad terras esse peruectum. Verum illud nostrum de Iona propheta incredibilius est. Plane incredibilius quia mirabilius, et mirabilius quia potentius.

Chapter 15.—Of Regulus, in Whom We Have an Example of the Voluntary Endurance of Captivity for the Sake of Religion; Which Yet Did Not Profit Him, Though He Was a Worshipper of the Gods.

Caput XV. De Regulo, in quo captiuitatis ob religionem etiam sponte tolerandae extat exemplum, quod tamen illi deos colenti prodesse non potuit.

But among their own famous men they have a very noble example of the voluntary endurance of captivity in obedience to a religious scruple. Marcus Attilius Regulus, a Roman general, was a prisoner in the hands of the Carthaginians. But they, being more anxious to exchange their prisoners with the Romans than to keep them, sent Regulus as a special envoy with their own embassadors to negotiate this exchange, but bound him first with an oath, that if he failed to accomplish their wish, he would return to Carthage. He went and persuaded the senate to the opposite course, because he believed it was not for the advantage of the Roman republic to make an exchange of prisoners. After he had thus exerted his influence, the Romans did not compel him to return to the enemy; but what he had sworn he voluntarily performed. But the Carthaginians put him to death with refined, elaborate, and horrible tortures. They shut him up in a narrow box, in which he was compelled to stand, and in which finely sharpened nails were fixed all round about him, so that he could not lean upon any part of it without intense pain; and so they killed him by depriving him of sleep. With justice, indeed, do they applaud the virtue which rose superior to so frightful a fate. However, the gods he swore by were those who are now supposed to avenge the prohibition of their worship, by inflicting these present calamities on the human race. But if these gods, who were worshipped specially in this behalf, that they might confer happiness in this life, either willed or permitted these punishments to be inflicted on one who kept his oath to them, what more cruel punishment could they in their anger have inflicted on a perjured person? But why may I not draw from my reasoning a double inference? Regulus certainly had such reverence for the gods, that for his oath’s sake he would neither remain in his own land nor go elsewhere, but without hesitation returned to his bitterest enemies. If he thought that this course would be advantageous with respect to this present life, he was certainly much deceived, for it brought his life to a frightful termination. By his own example, in fact, he taught that the gods do not secure the temporal happiness of their worshippers; since he himself, who was devoted to their worship, as both conquered in battle and taken prisoner, and then, because he refused to act in violation of the oath he had sworn by them, was tortured and put to death by a new, and hitherto unheard of, and all too horrible kind of punishment. And on the supposition that the worshippers of the gods are rewarded by felicity in the life to come, why, then, do they calumniate the influence of Christianity? why do they assert that this disaster has overtaken the city because it has ceased to worship its gods, since, worship them as assiduously as it may, it may yet be as unfortunate as Regulus was? Or will some one carry so wonderful a blindness to the extent of wildly attempting, in the face of the evident truth, to contend that though one man might be unfortunate, though a worshipper of the gods, yet a whole city could not be so? That is to say, the power of their gods is better adapted to preserve multitudes than individuals,—as if a multitude were not composed of individuals.

Habent tamen isti de captiuitate religionis causa etiam sponte toleranda et in suis praeclaris uiris nobilissimum exemplum. M. Regulus, imperator populi Romani, captiuus aput Carthaginienses fuit. Qui cum sibi mallent a Romanis suos reddi quam eorum tenere captiuos, ad hoc inpetrandum etiam istum praecipue Regulum cum legatis suis Romam miserunt, prius iuratione constrictum, si quod uolebant minime peregisset, rediturum esse Carthaginem. Perrexit ille adque in senatu contraria persuasit, quoniam non arbitrabatur utile esse Romanae rei publicae mutare captiuos. Nec post hanc persuasionem a suis ad hostes redire conpulsus est, sed quia iurauerat, id sponte conpleuit. At illi eum excogitatis adque horrendis cruciatibus necauerunt. Inclusum quippe angusto ligno, ubi stare cogeretur, clauisque acutissimis undique confixo, ut se in nullam eius partem sine poenis atrocissimis inclinaret, etiam uigilando peremerunt. Merito certe laudant uirtutem tam magna infelicitate maiorem. Et per deos ille iurauerat, quorum cultu prohibito has generi humano clades isti opinantur infligi. Qui ergo propterea colebantur, ut istam uitam prosperam redderent, si uerum iuranti has inrogari poenas seu uoluerunt seu permiserunt, quid periuro grauius irati facere potuerunt? Sed quur non ratiocinationem meam potius ad utrumque concludam? Deos certe ille sic coluit, ut propter iuris iurandi fidem nec maneret in patria, nec inde quolibet ire, sed ad suos acerrimos inimicos redire minime dubitaret. Hoc si huic uitae utile existimabat, cuius tam horrendum exitum meruit, procul dubio fallebatur. Suo quippe docuit exemplo nihil deos ad istam temporalem felicitatem suis prodesse cultoribus, quando quidem ille eorum deditus cultui et uictus et captiuus abductus et, quia noluit aliter quam per eos iurauerat facere, nouo ac prius inaudito nimiumque hon’ibili supplicii genere cruciatus extinctus est. Si autem deorum cultus post hanc uitam uelut mercedem reddit felicitatem, quur calumniantur temporibus Christianis, ideo dicentes Urbi accidisse illam calamitatem, quia deos suos colere destitit, cum potuerit etiam illos diligentissime colens tam infelix fieri, quam ille Regulus fuit? Nisi forte contra clarissimam ueritatem tanta quisquam dementia mirae caecitatis obnititur, ut contendere audeat uniuersam ciuitatem deos colentem infelicem esse non posse, unum uero hominem posse, quod uidelicet potentia deorum suorum multos potius sit idonea conseruare quam singulos, cum multitudo constet ex singulis. Si autem dicunt M.

But if they say that M. Regulus, even while a prisoner and enduring these bodily torments, might yet enjoy the blessedness of a virtuous soul, then let them recognize that true virtue by which a city also may be blessed. For the blessedness of a community and of an individual flow from the same source; for a community is nothing else than a harmonious collection of individuals. So that I am not concerned meantime to discuss what kind of virtue Regulus possessed; enough, that by his very noble example they are forced to own that the gods are to be worshipped not for the sake of bodily comforts or external advantages; for he preferred to lose all such things rather than offend the gods by whom he had sworn. But what can we make of men who glory in having such a citizen, but dread having a city like him? If they do not dread this, then let them acknowledge that some such calamity as befell Regulus may also befall a community, though they be worshipping their gods as diligently as he; and let them no longer throw the blame of their misfortunes on Christianity. But as our present concern is with those Christians who were taken prisoners, let those who take occasion from this calamity to revile our most wholesome religion in a fashion not less imprudent than impudent, consider this and hold their peace; for if it was no reproach to their gods that a most punctilious worshipper of theirs should, for the sake of keeping his oath to them, be deprived of his native land without hope of finding another, and fall into the hands of his enemies, and be put to death by a long-drawn and exquisite torture, much less ought the Christian name to be charged with the captivity of those who believe in its power, since they, in confident expectation of a heavenly country, know that they are pilgrims even in their own homes.

Regulum etiam in illa captiuitate illisque cruciatibus corporis animi uirtute beatum esse potuisse, uirtus potius uera quaeratur, qua beata esse possit et ciuitas. Neque enim aliunde beata ciuitas, aliunde homo, cum aliud ciuitas non sit quam concors hominum multitudo. Quam ob rem nondum interim disputo, qualis in Regulo uirtus fuerit: sufficit nunc, quod isto nobilissimo exemplo coguntur fateri non propter corporis bona uel earum rerum, quae extrinsecus homini accidunt, colendos deos, quando quidem ille carere his omnibus maluit quam deos per quos iurauit offendere. Sed quid faciamus hominibus, qui gloriantur se talem habuisse ciuem, qualem timent habere ciuitatem? Quod si non timent, tale ergo aliquid, quale accidit Regulo, etiam ciuitati tam diligenter quam ille deos colenti accidere potuisse fateantur et Christianis temporibus non calumnientur. Verum quia de illis Christianis orta quaestio est, qui etiam captiuati sunt, hoc intueantur et taceant, qui saluberrimae religioni hinc inpudenter adque inprudenter inludunt, quia, si dis eorum probro non fuit, quod adtentissimus cultor illorum, dum eis iuris iurandi fidem seruaret, patria caruit, cum aliam non haberet, captiuusque aput hostes per longam mortem supplicio nouae crudelitatis occisus est, multo minus nomen criminandum est Christianum in captiuitate sacratorum suorum, qui supernam patriam ueraci fide expectantes etiam in suis sedibus peregrinos se esse nouerunt.

Chapter 16.—Of the Violation of the Consecrated and Other Christian Virgins, to Which They Were Subjected in Captivity and to Which Their Own Will Gave No Consent; And Whether This Contaminated Their Souls.

Caput XVI. An stupris, quae etiam sacrarum forte uirginum est passa captiuitas, contaminari potuerit uirtus animi sine uoluntatis adsensu.

But they fancy they bring a conclusive charge against Christianity, when they aggravate the horror of captivity by adding that not only wives and unmarried maidens, but even consecrated virgins, were violated. But truly, with respect to this, it is not Christian faith, nor piety, nor even the virtue of chastity, which is hemmed into any difficulty; the only difficulty is so to treat the subject as to satisfy at once modesty and reason. And in discussing it we shall not be so careful to reply to our accusers as to comfort our friends. Let this, therefore, in the first place, be laid down as an unassailable position, that the virtue which makes the life good has its throne in the soul, and thence rules the members of the body, which becomes holy in virtue of the holiness of the will; and that while the will remains firm and unshaken, nothing that another person does with the body, or upon the body, is any fault of the person who suffers it, so long as he cannot escape it without sin. But as not only pain may be inflicted, but lust gratified on the body of another, whenever anything of this latter kind takes place, shame invades even a thoroughly pure spirit from which modesty has not departed,—shame, lest that act which could not be suffered without some sensual pleasure, should be believed to have been committed also with some assent of the will.

Magnum sane crimen se putant obicere Christianis, cum eorum exaggerantes captiuitatem addunt etiam stupra commissa, non solum in aliena matrimonia uirginesque nupturas, sed etiam in quasdam sanctimoniales. Hic uero non fides, non pietas, non ipsa uirtus, quae castitas dicitur, sed nostra potius disputatio inter pudorem adque rationem quibusdam coartatur angustiis. Nec tantum hic curamus alienis responsionem reddere, quantum ipsis nostris consolationem. Sit igitur in primis positum adque firmatum uirtutem, qua recte uiuitur, ab animi sede membris corporis imperare sanctumque corpus usu fieri sanctae uoluntatis, qua inconcussa ac stabili permanente, quidquid alius de corpore uel in corpore fecerit, quod sine peccato proprio non ualeat euitari, praeter culpam esse patientis. Sed quia non solum quod ad dolorem, uerum etiam quod ad libidinem pertinet, in corpore alieno perpetrari potest: quidquid tale factum fuerit, etsi retentam constantissimo animo pudici. tiam non excutit, tamen pudorem incutit, ne credatur factum cum mentis etiam uoluntate, quod fieri fortasse sine carnis aliqua uoluptate non potuit.

Chapter 17.—Of Suicide Committed Through Fear of Punishment or Dishonor.

Caput XVII. De morte uoluntaria ob metum poenae siue dede cori s.

And consequently, even if some of these virgins killed themselves to avoid such disgrace, who that has any human feeling would refuse to forgive them? And as for those who would not put an end to their lives, lest they might seem to escape the crime of another by a sin of their own, he who lays this to their charge as a great wickedness is himself not guiltless of the fault of folly. For if it is not lawful to take the law into our own hands, and slay even a guilty person, whose death no public sentence has warranted, then certainly he who kills himself is a homicide, and so much the guiltier of his own death, as he was more innocent of that offence for which he doomed himself to die. Do we justly execrate the deed of Judas, and does truth itself pronounce that by hanging himself he rather aggravated than expiated the guilt of that most iniquitous betrayal, since, by despairing of God’s mercy in his sorrow that wrought death, he left to himself no place for a healing penitence? How much more ought he to abstain from laying violent hands on himself who has done nothing worthy of such a punishment! For Judas, when he killed himself, killed a wicked man; but he passed from this life chargeable not only with the death of Christ, but with his own: for though he killed himself on account of his crime, his killing himself was another crime. Why, then, should a man who has done no ill do ill to himself, and by killing himself kill the innocent to escape another’s guilty act, and perpetrate upon himself a sin of his own, that the sin of another may not be perpetrated on him?

Ac per hoc et quae se occiderunt, ne quidquam huius modi paterentur, quis humanus adfectus eis nolit ignosci ( et quae se occidere noluerunt, ne suo facinore alienum flagitium deuitarent, quisquis [eis] hoc crimini dederit, ipse crimen insipientiae non cauebit. Nam utique si non licet priuata potestate hominem occidere uel nocentem, cuius occidendi licentiam lex nulla concedit, profecto etiam qui se ipsum occidit homicida est, et tanto fit nocentior cum se occiderit, quanto innocentior in ea causa fuit, qua se occidendum putauit. Nam si Iudae factum merito detestamur eumque ueritas iudicat, cum se laqueo suspendit, sceleratae illius traditionis auxisse potius quam expiasse commissum, quoniam Dei misericordiam desperando exitiabiliter paenitens nullum sibi salubris paenitentiae locum reliquit: quanto magis a sua nece se abstinere debet, qui tali supplicio quod in se puniat non habet. Iudas enim cum se occidit, sceleratum hominem occidit, et tamen non solum Christi., uerum etiam suae mortis reus finiuit hanc uitam, quia licet propter suum scelus alio suo scelere occisus est. Quur autem homo, qui mali nihil fecit, sibi malefaciat et se ipsum interficiendo hominem interficiat innocentem, ne alium patiatur nocentem, adque in se perpetret peccatum proprium, ne in eo perpetretur alienum?

Chapter 18.—Of the Violence Which May Be Done to the Body by Another’s Lust, While the Mind Remains Inviolate.

Caput XVIII. De aliena uiolentaque libidine, quam in oppresso corpore mens inuita perpetitur.

But is there a fear that even another’s lust may pollute the violated? It will not pollute, if it be another’s: if it pollute, it is not another’s, but is shared also by the polluted. But since purity is a virtue of the soul, and has for its companion virtue, the fortitude which will rather endure all ills than consent to evil; and since no one, however magnanimous and pure, has always the disposal of his own body, but can control only the consent and refusal of his will, what sane man can suppose that, if his body be seized and forcibly made use of to satisfy the lust of another, he thereby loses his purity? For if purity can be thus destroyed, then assuredly purity is no virtue of the soul; nor can it be numbered among those good things by which the life is made good, but among the good things of the body, in the same category as strength, beauty, sound and unbroken health, and, in short, all such good things as may be diminished without at all diminishing the goodness and rectitude of our life. But if purity be nothing better than these, why should the body be perilled that it may be preserved? If, on the other hand, it belongs to the soul, then not even when the body is violated is it lost. Nay more, the virtue of holy continence, when it resists the uncleanness of carnal lust, sanctifies even the body, and therefore when this continence remains unsubdued, even the sanctity of the body is preserved, because the will to use it holily remains, and, so far as lies in the body itself, the power also.

At enim, De uel aliena polluat libido, metuitur. Non polluet, si aliena erit; si autem polluet, aliena non erit. Sed cum pudicitia uirtus sit animi comitemque habeat fortitudinem, qua potius quaelibet mala tolerare quam malo consentire decernit, nullus autem magnanimus et pudicus in potestate habeat, quid de sua carne fiat, sed tantum quid adnuat mente uel renuat: quis eadem sana mente putauerit perdere se pudicitiam, si forte in adprehensa et oppressa carne sua exerceatur et expleatur libido non sua? Si enim hoc modo pudicitia perit, profecto pudicitia uirtus animi non erit, nec pertinebit ad ea bona, quibus bene uiuitur, sed in bonis corporis numerabitur, qualia sunt uires pulchritudo saneualetudo, ac si quid huius modi est; quae bona, etiamsi minuantur, bonam iustamque uitam omnino non minuunt. Quod si tale aliquid est pudicitia, ut quid pro illa, ne amittatur, etiam periculo corporis laboratur? Si autem animi bonum est, etiam obpresso corpore non amittitur. Quin etiam sanctae continentiae bonum cum inmunditiae carnalium concupiscentiarum non cedit, et ipsum corpus sanctificatur, et ideo, cum eis non cedere inconcussa intentione persistit, nec de ipso corpore perit sanctitas, quia eo sancte utendi perseuerat uoluntas et, quantum est in ipso, etiam facultas.

For the sanctity of the body does not consist in the integrity of its members, nor in their exemption from all touch; for they are exposed to various accidents which do violence to and wound them, and the surgeons who administer relief often perform operations that sicken the spectator. A midwife, suppose, has (whether maliciously or accidentally, or through unskillfulness) destroyed the virginity of some girl, while endeavoring to ascertain it: I suppose no one is so foolish as to believe that, by this destruction of the integrity of one organ, the virgin has lost anything even of her bodily sanctity. And thus, so long as the soul keeps this firmness of purpose which sanctifies even the body, the violence done by another’s lust makes no impression on this bodily sanctity, which is preserved intact by one’s own persistent continence. Suppose a virgin violates the oath she has sworn to God, and goes to meet her seducer with the intention of yielding to him, shall we say that as she goes she is possessed even of bodily sanctity, when already she has lost and destroyed that sanctity of soul which sanctifies the body? Far be it from us to so misapply words. Let us rather draw this conclusion, that while the sanctity of the soul remains even when the body is violated, the sanctity of the body is not lost; and that, in like manner, the sanctity of the body is lost when the sanctity of the soul is violated, though the body itself remains intact. And therefore a woman who has been violated by the sin of another, and without any consent of her own, has no cause to put herself to death; much less has she cause to commit suicide in order to avoid such violation, for in that case she commits certain homicide to prevent a crime which is uncertain as yet, and not her own.

Neque enim eo corpus sanctum est, quod eius membra sunt integra, aut eo, quod nullo contrectantur adtactu, cum possint diuersis casibus etiam uulnerata uim perpeti, et medici aliquando saluti opitulantes haec ibi faciant, quae horret aspectus. Obstetrix uirginis cuiusdam integritatem manu uelut explorans siue maleuolentia siue inscitia siue casu, dum inspicit, perdidit. Non opinor quemquam tam stulte sapere, ut huic perisse aliquid existimet etiam de ipsius corporis sanctitate, quamuis membri illius integritate iam perdita. Quocirca proposito animi permanente, per quod etiam corpus sanctificari meruit, nec ipsi corpori aufert sanctitatem uiolentia libidinis alienae, quam seruat perseuerantia continentiae suae. An uero si aliqua femina mente corrupta uiolatoque proposito, quod Deo uouerat, pergat uitianda ad deceptorem suum, ad hoc eam pergentem sanctam uel corpore dicimus, ea sanctitate animi, per quam corpus sanctificabatur, amissa adque destructa? Absit hic error et hinc potius admoneamur ita non amitti corporis sanctitatem manente animi sanctitate etiam corpore obpresso, sicut amittitur et corporis sanctitas uiolata animi sanctitate etiam corpore intacto. Quam ob rem non habet quod in se morte spontanea puniat femina sine ulla sua consensione uiolenter obpressa et alieno conpressa peccato; quanto minus antequam hoc fiat! ne admittatur homicidium certum, cum ipsum flagitium, quamuis alienum, adhuc pendet incertum.