---
title: "City of God · De civitate Dei"
author: "Augustine"
translator: "Marcus Dods"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Church Fathers"
section: 60 of 116
url: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/60/
cite: "Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods, City of God · De civitate Dei, section 60. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/60/"
---

# City of God · De civitate Dei

*Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods*

“Two loves have made two cities.” Augustine’s Latin, in Hoffmann’s critical text, beside Dods’s English, chapter by chapter.

> Latin: Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. Emanuel Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1899–1900), as encoded by the Open Greek and Latin project, University of Leipzig (stoa0040.stoa003.opp-lat3, CC BY-SA 4.0); apparatus omitted.

> English: Marcus Dods, The City of God (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2, 1887).

> Chapters are matched one to one except where the two editions divide them differently; within a chapter the Latin sentences are shared out over the English paragraphs by position.

## 60. That the Whole Plenitude of the Human Race Was Embraced in the First Man, and that God There Saw the Portion of It Which Was to Be Honored and Rewarded, and that Which Was to Be Condemned and Punished.

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/60/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/60/#p-N

[¶0] Chapter 27.—That the Whole Plenitude of the Human Race Was Embraced in the First Man, and that God There Saw the Portion of It Which Was to Be Honored and Rewarded, and that Which Was to Be Condemned and Punished.

> Latin: Caput XXVIII. In primo homine exortam fuisse omnem plenitudinem generis humani, in qua praeuiderit Deus, quae pars honoranda esset praemio, quae damnanda supplicio.

[¶1] With good cause, therefore, does the true religion recognize and proclaim that the same God who created the universal cosmos, created also all the animals, souls as well as bodies. Among the terrestrial animals man was made by Him in His own image, and, for the reason I have given, was made one individual, though he was not left solitary. For there is nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as this race. And human nature has nothing more appropriate, either for the prevention of discord, or for the healing of it, where it exists, than the remembrance of that first parent of us all, whom God was pleased to create alone, that all men might be derived from one, and that they might thus be admonished to preserve unity among their whole multitude. But from the fact that the woman was made for him from his side, it was plainly meant that we should learn how dear the bond between man and wife should be. These works of God do certainly seem extraordinary, because they are the first works. They who do not believe them, ought not to believe any prodigies; for these would not be called prodigies did they not happen out of the ordinary course of nature. But, is it possible that anything should happen in vain, however hidden be its cause, in so grand a government of divine providence? One of the sacred Psalmists says, “Come, behold the works of the Lord, what prodigies He hath wrought in the earth.” Why God made woman out of man’s side, and what this first prodigy prefigured, I shall, with God’s help, tell in another place. But at present, since this book must be concluded, let us merely say that in this first man, who was created in the beginning, there was laid the foundation, not indeed evidently, but in God’s foreknowledge, of these two cities or societies, so far as regards the human race. For from that man all men were to be derived—some of them to be associated with the good angels in their reward, others with the wicked in punishment; all being ordered by the secret yet just judgment of God. For since it is written, “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth,” neither can His grace be unjust, nor His justice cruel.

> Latin: Merito igitur uera religio, quem mundi uniuersi, eum animalium quoque uniuersorum, hoc est et animarum et corpo’ rum, conditorem agnoscit et praedicat. In quibus terrenis praecipuus ab illo ad eius imaginem homo propter eam causam, quam dixi, et si qua forte alia maior latet, factus est unus, sed non relictus est solus. Nihil enim est quam hoc genus tam discordiosum uitio, tam sociale natura. Neque commodius contra uitium discordiae uel cauendum ne existeret, uel sanandum cum extitisset, natura loqueretur humana, quam recordationem illius parentis, quem propterea Deus creare uoluit unum, de quo multitudo propagaretur, ut hac admonitione etiam in multis concors unitas seruaretur. Quod uero femina illi ex eius latere facta est, etiam hic satis significatum est quam cara mariti et uxoris debeat esse coniunctio. Haec opera Dei propterea sunt utique inusitata, quia prima. Qui autem ista non credunt, nulla facta prodigia debent credere; neque enim et ipsa, si usitato naturae curriculo gignerentur, prodigia dicerentur. Quid autem sub tanta gubernatione diuinae prouidentiae, quamuis eius causa lateat, frustra gignitur? Ait quidam psalmus sacer: Venite et uidete opera Domini, quae posuit prodigia super terram. Quur ergo ex latere uiri femina facta sit, et hoc primum quodam modo prodigium quid praefigurauerit, dicetur alio loco, quantum me Deus adiuuerit. Nunc quoniam liber iste claudendus est, in hoc [primo] homine, qui primitus factus est, nondum quidem secundum euidentiam, iam tamen secundum Dei praescientiam exortas fuisse existimemus in genere humano societates tamquam ciuitates duas. Ex illo enim futuri erant homines, alii malis angelis in supplicio, alii bonis in praemio sociandi, quamuis occulto Dei iudicio, sed tamen iusto. Cum enim scriptum sit: Uniuersae uiae Domini misericordia et ueritas: nec iniusta eius gratia nec crudelis potest esse iustitia.

### That death is penal, and had its origin in Adam’s sin.

[¶3] Book XIII.

> Latin: Liber XIII

[¶4] Argument—In this book it is taught that death is penal, and had its origin in Adam’s sin.

### Of the Fall of the First Man, Through Which Mortality Has Been Contracted.

[¶6] Chapter 1.—Of the Fall of the First Man, Through Which Mortality Has Been Contracted.

> Latin: Caput I. De lapsu primorum hominum, per quem est contracta mortalitas.

[¶7] Having disposed of the very difficult questions concerning the origin of our world and the beginning of the human race, the natural order requires that we now discuss the fall of the first man (we may say of the first men), and of the origin and propagation of human death. For God had not made man like the angels, in such a condition that, even though they had sinned, they could none the more die. He had so made them, that if they discharged the obligations of obedience, an angelic immortality and a blessed eternity might ensue, without the intervention of death; but if they disobeyed, death should be visited on them with just sentence—which, too, has been spoken to in the preceding book.

> Latin: Expeditis de nostri saeculi exortu et de initio generis humani difficillimis quaestionibus nunc iam de lapsu primi hominis, immo primorum hominum, et de origine ac propagine mortis humanae disputationem a nobis institutam rerum ordo deposcit. Non enim eo modo, quo angelos, condiderat Deus homines, ut etiam si peccassent mori omnino non possent; sed ita ut perfunctos oboedientiae munere sine interuentu mortis angelica inmortalitas et beata aeternitas sequeretur; inoboedientes autem mors plecteret damnatione iustissima; quod etiam in libro superiore iam diximus.

### Of that Death Which Can Affect an Immortal Soul, and of that to Which the Body is Subject.

[¶9] Chapter 2.—Of that Death Which Can Affect an Immortal Soul, and of that to Which the Body is Subject.

> Latin: Caput II. De ea morte, quae animae semper utcumque uicturae accidere potest, et ea, cui corpus obnoxium est.

[¶10] But I see I must speak a little more carefully of the nature of death. For although the human soul is truly affirmed to be immortal, yet it also has a certain death of its own. For it is therefore called immortal, because, in a sense, it does not cease to live and to feel; while the body is called mortal, because it can be forsaken of all life, and cannot by itself live at all. The death, then, of the soul takes place when God forsakes it, as the death of the body when the soul forsakes it. Therefore the death of both—that is, of the whole man—occurs when the soul, forsaken by God, forsakes the body. For, in this case, neither is God the life of the soul, nor the soul the life of the body. And this death of the whole man is followed by that which, on the authority of the divine oracles, we call the second death. This the Saviour referred to when He said, “Fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.” And since this does not happen before the soul is so joined to its body that they cannot be separated at all, it may be matter of wonder how the body can be said to be killed by that death in which it is not forsaken by the soul, but, being animated and rendered sensitive by it, is tormented. For in that penal and everlasting punishment, of which in its own place we are to speak more at large, the soul is justly said to die, because it does not live in connection with God; but how can we say that the body is dead, seeing that it lives by the soul? For it could not otherwise feel the bodily torments which are to follow the resurrection. Is it because life of every kind is good, and pain an evil, that we decline to say that that body lives, in which the soul is the cause, not of life, but of pain? The soul, then, lives by God when it lives well, for it cannot live well unless by God working in it what is good; and the body lives by the soul when the soul lives in the body, whether itself be living by God or no. For the wicked man’s life in the body is a life not of the soul, but of the body, which even dead souls—that is, souls forsaken of God—can confer upon bodies, how little so-ever of their own proper life, by which they are immortal, they retain. But in the last damnation, though man does not cease to feel, yet because this feeling of his is neither sweet with pleasure nor wholesome with repose, but painfully penal, it is not without reason called death rather than life. And it is called the second death because it follows the first, which sunders the two cohering essences, whether these be God and the soul, or the soul and the body. Of the first and bodily death, then, we may say that to the good it is good, and evil to the evil. But, doubtless, the second, as it happens to none of the good, so it can be good for none.

> Latin: Sed de ipso genere mortis uideo mihi paulo diligentius disserendum. Quamuis enim anima humana ueraciter inmortalis perhibeatur, habet tamen quandam etiam ipsa mortem suam. Nam ideo dicitur inmortalis, quia modo quodam quantulocumque non desinit uiuere adque sentire; corpus autem ideo mortale, quoniam deseri omni uita potest nec per se ipsum aliquatenus uiuit. Mors igitur animae fit, cum eam deserit Deus, sicut corporis, cum id deserit anima. Ergo utriusque rei, id est totius hominis, mors est, cum anima Deo deserta deserit corpus. Ita enim nec ex Deo uiuit ipsa nec corpus ex ipsa. Huius modi autem totius hominis mortem illa sequitur, quam secundam mortem diuinorum eloquiorum appellat auctoritas. Hanc Saluator significauit, ubi ait: Eum timete, qui habet potestatem et corpus et animam perdere in gehennam. Quod cum ante non fiat, quam cum anima corpori sic fuerit copulata, ut nulla diremtione separentur: mirum uideri potest quo modo corpus ea morte dicatur occidi, qua non anima deseritur, sed animatum sentiensque cruciatur. Nam in illa ultima poena ac sempiterna, de qua suo loco diligentius disserendum est, recte mors animae dicitur, quia non uiuit ex Deo; mors autem corporis quonam modo, cum uiuat ex anima? Non enim aliter potest ipsa corporalia, quae post resurrectionem futura sunt, sentire tormenta. An quia uita qualiscumque aliquod bonum est, dolor autem malum, ideo nec uiuere corpus dicendum est, in quo anima non uiuendi causa est, sed dolendi? Viuit itaque anima ex Deo, cum uiuit bene; non enim potest bene uiuere nisi Deo in se operante quod bonum est; uiuit autem corpus ex anima, cum anima uiuit in corpore, seu uiuat ipsa seu non uiuat ex Deo. Inpiorum namque in corporibus uita non animarum, sed corporum uita est; quam possunt eis animae etiam mortuae, hoc est Deo deserente, quantulacumque propria uita, ex qua et inmortales sunt, non desistente, conferre. Verum in damnatione nouissima quamuis homo sentire non desinat, tamen, quia sensus ipse nec uoluptate suauis nec quiete salubris, sed dolore poenalis est, non inmerito mors est potius appellata quam uita. Ideo autem secunda, quia post illam primam est, qua fit cohaerentium diremtio naturarum, siue Dei et animae siue animae et corporis. De prima igitur corporis morte dici potest, quod bonis bona sit, malis mala; secunda uero sine dubio sicut nullorum bonorum est, ita nulli bona.

### Whether Death, Which by the Sin of Our First Parents Has Passed Upon All Men, is the Punishment of Sin, Even to the Good.

[¶12] Chapter 3.—Whether Death, Which by the Sin of Our First Parents Has Passed Upon All Men, is the Punishment of Sin, Even to the Good.

> Latin: Caput III. Utrum mors, quae per peccatum primorum hominum in omnes homines pertransiit, etiam in sanctis poena peccati sit.

[¶13] But a question not to be shirked arises: Whether in very truth death, which separates soul and body, is good to the good? For if it be, how has it come to pass that such a thing should be the punishment of sin? For the first men would not have suffered death had they not sinned. How, then, can that be good to the good, which could not have happened except to the evil? Then, again, if it could only happen to the evil, to the good it ought not to be good, but non-existent. For why should there be any punishment where there is nothing to punish? Wherefore we must say that the first men were indeed so created, that if they had not sinned, they would not have experienced any kind of death; but that, having become sinners, they were so punished with death, that whatsoever sprang from their stock should also be punished with the same death. For nothing else could be born of them than that which they themselves had been. Their nature was deteriorated in proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of their sin, so that what existed as punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural consequence in their children. For man is not produced by man, as he was from the dust. For dust was the material out of which man was made: man is the parent by whom man is begotten. Wherefore earth and flesh are not the same thing, though flesh be made of earth. But as man the parent is, such is man the offspring. In the first man, therefore, there existed the whole human nature, which was to be transmitted by the woman to posterity, when that conjugal union received the divine sentence of its own condemnation; and what man was made, not when created, but when he sinned and was punished, this he propagated, so far as the origin of sin and death are concerned. For neither by sin nor its punishment was he himself reduced to that infantine and helpless infirmity of body and mind which we see in children. For God ordained that infants should begin the world as the young of beasts begin it, since their parents had fallen to the level of the beasts in the fashion of their life and of their death; as it is written, “Man when he was in honor understood not; he became like the beasts that have no understanding.” Nay more, infants, we see, are even feebler in the use and movement of their limbs, and more infirm to choose and refuse, than the most tender offspring of other animals; as if the force that dwells in human nature were destined to surpass all other living things so much the more eminently, as its energy has been longer restrained, and the time of its exercise delayed, just as an arrow flies the higher the further back it has been drawn. To this infantine imbecility the first man did not fall by his lawless presumption and just sentence; but human nature was in his person vitiated and altered to such an extent, that he suffered in his members the warring of disobedient lust, and became subject to the necessity of dying. And what he himself had become by sin and punishment, such he generated those whom he begot; that is to say, subject to sin and death. And if infants are delivered from this bondage of sin by the Redeemer’s grace, they can suffer only this death which separates soul and body; but being redeemed from the obligation of sin, they do not pass to that second endless and penal death.

> Latin: Non autem dissimulanda nascitur quaestio, utrum re uera mors, qua separantur anima et corpus, bonis sit bona; quia si ita est, quo modo poterit obtineri, quod etiam ipsa sit poena peccati? Hanc enim primi homines, nisi peccauissent, perpessi utique non fuissent. Quo pacto igitur bona esse possit bonis, quae accidere non posset nisi malis? Et rursus si non nisi malis posset accidere, non deberet bonis bona esse, sed nulla. Quur enim esset ulla poena in quibus non essent ulla punienda? Quapropter fatendum est primos quidem homines ita fuisse institutos, ut, si non peccassent, nullum mortis experirentur genus; sed eosdem primos peccatores ita fuisse morte multatos, ut etiam quidquid de eorum stirpe esset exortum eadem poena teneretur obnoxium. Non enim aliud ex eis, quam quod ipsi fuerant, nasceretur. Pro magnitudine quippe culpae illius naturam damnatio mutauit in peius, ut, quod poenaliter praecessit in peccantibus hominibus primis, etiam naturaliter sequeretur in nascentibus ceteris. Neque enim ita homo ex homine, sicut homo ex puluere. Puluis namque homini faciendo materies fuit, homo. autem homini gignendo parens. Proinde quod est terra, non hoc est caro, quamuis ex terra facta sit caro; quod est autem parens homo, hoc est et proles homo. In primo igitur homine per feminam in progeniem transiturum uniuersum genus humanum fuit. quando illa coniugum copula diuinam sententiam suae damnationis excepit; et quod homo factus est, non cum crearetur, sed cum peccaret et puniretur, hoc genuit, quantum quidem adtinet ad peccati et mortis originem. Non enim ad infantilem hebetudinem et infirmitatem animi et corporis, quam uidemus in paruulis, peccato uel poena ille redactus est (quae Deus uoluit esse tamquam primordia catulorum, quorum parentes in bestialem uitam mortemque deiecerat; sicut enim scriptum est: Homo in honore cum esset, non intellexit; conparatus est pecoribus non intellegentibus et similis factus est illis; nisi quod infantes infirmiores etiam cernimus in usu motuque membrorum et sensu adpetendi adque uitandi, quam sunt aliorum tenerrimi fetus animalium; tamquam se tanto adtollat excellentius supra cetera animantia uis humana, quanto magis inpetum suum, uelut sagitta cum arcus extenditur, retrorsum reducta distulerit); — non ergo ad ista infantilia rudimenta praesumtione inlicita et damnatione iusta prolapsus uel inpulsus est primus homo; sed hactenus in eo natura humana uitiata adque mutata est, ut repugnantem pateretur in membris inoboedientiam concupiscedi et obstringeretur necessitate moriendi, adque ita id, quod uitio poenaque factus est, id eat obnoxios peccato mortique generaret. A quo peccati uinculo si per Mediatoris Christi gratiam soluuntur infantes, hanc solam mortem perpeti possunt, quae animam seiungit a corpore; in secundam uero illam sine fine poenalem liberati a peccati obligatione non transeunt.

### Why Death, the Punishment of Sin, is Not Withheld from Those Who by the Grace of Regeneration are Absolved from Sin.

[¶15] Chapter 4.—Why Death, the Punishment of Sin, is Not Withheld from Those Who by the Grace of Regeneration are Absolved from Sin.

> Latin: Caput IV. Quur ab his, qui per gratiam regenerationis absoluti sunt a peccato, non auferatur mors, id est poena peccati.

[¶16] If, moreover, any one is solicitous about this point, how, if death be the very punishment of sin, they whose guilt is cancelled by grace do yet suffer death, this difficulty has already been handled and solved in our other work which we have written on the baptism of infants. There it was said that the parting of soul and body was left, though its connection with sin was removed, for this reason, that if the immortality of the body followed immediately upon the sacrament of regeneration, faith itself would be thereby enervated. For faith is then only faith when it waits in hope for what is not yet seen in substance. And by the vigor and conflict of faith, at least in times past, was the fear of death overcome. Specially was this conspicuous in the holy martyrs, who could have had no victory, no glory, to whom there could not even have been any conflict, if, after the layer of regeneration, saints could not suffer bodily death. Who would not, then, in company with the infants presented for baptism, run to the grace of Christ, that so he might not be dismissed from the body? And thus faith would not be tested with an unseen reward; and so would not even be faith, seeking and receiving an immediate recompense of its works. But now, by the greater and more admirable grace of the Saviour, the punishment of sin is turned to the service of righteousness. For then it was proclaimed to man, “If thou sinnest, thou shall die;” now it is said to the martyr, “Die, that thou sin not.” Then it was said, “If ye trangress the commandments, ye shall die;” now it is said, “If ye decline death, ye transgress the commandment.” That which was formerly set as an object of terror, that men might not sin, is now to be undergone if we would not sin. Thus, by the unutterable mercy of God, even the very punishment of wickedness has become the armor of virtue, and the penalty of the sinner becomes the reward of the righteous. For then death was incurred by sinning, now righteousness is fulfilled by dying. In the case of the holy martyrs it is so; for to them the persecutor proposes the alternative, apostasy or death. For the righteous prefer by believing to suffer what the first transgressors suffered by not believing. For unless they had sinned, they would not have died; but the martyrs sin if they do not die. The one died because they sinned, the others do not sin because they die. By the guilt of the first, punishment was incurred; by the punishment of the second, guilt is prevented. Not that death, which was before an evil, has become something good, but only that God has granted to faith this grace, that death, which is the admitted opposite to life, should become the instrument by which life is reached.

> Latin: Si quem uero mouet, quur uel ipsam patiantur, si et ipsa peccati poena est, quorum per gratiam reatus aboletur: iam ista quaestio in alio nostro opere, quod scripsimus de baptismo paruulorum, tractata ac soluta est; ubi dictum est ad hoc relinqui animae experimentum separationis a corpore, quamuis ablato iam criminis nexu, quoniam, si regenerationis sacramentum continuo sequeretur inmortalitas corporis, ipsa fides eneruaretur, quae tunc est fides, quando expectatur in spe, quod in re nondum uidetur. Fidei autem robore adque certamine, in maioribus dumtaxat aetatibus, etiam mortis fuerat superandus timor, quod in sanctis martyribus maxime eminuit; cuius profecto certaminis esset nulla uictoria, nulla gloria (quia nec ipsum omnino posset esse certamen), si post lauacrum regenerationis iam sancti non possent mortem perpeti corporalem. Cum paruulis autem baptizandis quis non ad Christi gratiam propterea potius curreret, ne a corpore solueretur? Adque ita non inuisibili praemio probaretur fides, sed iam nec fides esset, confestim sui operis quaerendo et sumendo mercedem. Nunc uero maiore et mirabiliore gratia Saluatoris in usus iustitiae peccati poena conuersa est. Tunc enim dictum est homini: Morieris, si peccaueris: nunc dicitur martyri: Morere, ne pecces. Tunc dictum est: Si mandatum transgressi fueritis, morte moriemini; nunc dicitur: Si mortem recusaueritis, mandatum transgrediemini. Quod tunc timendum fuerat, ut non peccaretur, nunc suscipiendum est, ne peccetur. Sic per ineffabilem Dei misericordiam et ipsa poena uitiorum transit in arma uirtutis, et fit iusti meritum etiam supplicium peccatoris. Tunc enim mors est adquisita peccando, nunc inpletur iustitia moriendo. Verum hoc in sanctis martyribus, quibus alterutrum a persecutore proponitur, ut aut deserant fidem aut sufferant mortem. Iusti enim malunt credendo perpeti, quod sunt primi iniqui non credendo perpessi. Nisi enim peccassent illi, non morerentur; peccabunt autem isti, nisi moriantur. Mortui ergo sunt illi, quia peccauerunt; non peccant isti, quia moriuntur. Factum est per illorum culpam, ut ueniretur in poenam; fit per istorum poenam, ne ueniatur in. culpam; non quia mors bonum aliquod facta est, quae antea malum fuit; sed tantam Deus fidei praestitit gratiam, ut mors, quam uitae constat esse contrariam, instrumentum fieret, per quod transiretur ad uitam.

### As the Wicked Make an Ill Use of the Law, Which is Good, So the Good Make a Good Use of Death, Which is an Ill.

[¶18] Chapter 5.—As the Wicked Make an Ill Use of the Law, Which is Good, So the Good Make a Good Use of Death, Which is an Ill.

> Latin: Caput V. Quod sicut iniqui male utuntur lege, quae bona est, ita iusti bene utantur morte, quae mala est.

[¶19] The apostle, wishing to show how hurtful a thing sin is, when grace does not aid us, has not hesitated to say that the strength of sin is that very law by which sin is prohibited. “The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law.” Most certainly true; for prohibition increases the desire of illicit action, if righteousness is not so loved that the desire of sin is conquered by that love. But unless divine grace aid us, we cannot love nor delight in true righteousness. But lest the law should be thought to be an evil, since it is called the strength of sin, the apostle, when treating a similar question in another place, says, “The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. Was then that which is holy made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful.” Exceeding, he says, because the transgression is more heinous when through the increasing lust of sin the law itself also is despised. Why have we thought it worth while to mention this? For this reason, because, as the law is not an evil when it increases the lust of those who sin, so neither is death a good thing when it increases the glory of those who suffer it, since either the former is abandoned wickedly, and makes transgressors, or the latter is embraced, for the truth’s sake, and makes martyrs. And thus the law is indeed good, because it is prohibition of sin, and death is evil because it is the wages of sin; but as wicked men make an evil use not only of evil, but also of good things, so the righteous make a good use not only of good, but also of evil things. Whence it comes to pass that the wicked make an ill use of the law, though the law is good; and that the good die well, though death is an evil.

> Latin: Apostolus cum uellet ostendere, quantum peccatum gratia non subueniente ad nocendum ualeret, etiam ipsam legem, qua prohibetur peccatum, non dubitauit dicere uirtutem esse peccati. Aculeus, inquit, mortis est peccatum, uirtus autem peccati lex. Verissime omnino. Auget enim prohibitio desiderium operis inliciti, quando iustitia non sic diligitur, ut peccandi cupiditas eius delectatione uincatur. Ut autem diligatur et delectet uera iustitia, non nisi diuina subuenit gratia. Sed ne propterea lex putaretur malum, quoniam uirtus est dicta peccati: ideo ipse alio loco uersans huius modi quaestionem: Itaque, inquit, lex quidem sancta et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum. Quod ergo bonum est, inquit, mihi factum est mors? Absit. Sed peccatum, ut appareat peccatum, per bonum mihi operatum est mortem, ut fiat super modum peccator aut peccatum per mandatum. Super modum dixit, quia etiam praeuaricatio additur, cum peccandi aucta libidine etiam lex ipsa contemnitur. Quur hoc commemorandum putauimus? Quia scilicet, sicut lex non est malum, quando auget peccantium concupiscentiam, ita nec mors bonum est, quando auget patientium gloriam, cum uel illa pro iniquitate deseritur et efficit praeuaricatores, uel ista pro ueritate suscipitur et efficit martyres. Ac per hoc lex quidem bona est, quia prohibitio est peccati; mors autem mala, quia stipendium est peccati; sed quem ad modum iniustitia male utitur non tantum malis, uerum etiam bonis: ita iustitia bene non tantum bonis, sed etiam malis. Hinc fit, ut et mali male lege utantur, quamuis sit lex bonum, et boni bene moriantur, quamuis sit mors malum.

### Of the Evil of Death in General, Considered as the Separation of Soul and Body.

[¶21] Chapter 6.—Of the Evil of Death in General, Considered as the Separation of Soul and Body.

> Latin: Caput VI. De generali mortis malo, quo animae et corporis societas separatur.

[¶22] Wherefore, as regards bodily death, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, it is good unto none while it is being endured by those whom we say are in the article of death. For the very violence with which body and soul are wrenched asunder, which in the living had been conjoined and closely intertwined, brings with it a harsh experience, jarring horridly on nature so long as it continues, till there comes a total loss of sensation, which arose from the very interpenetration of spirit and flesh. And all this anguish is sometimes forestalled by one stroke of the body or sudden flitting of the soul, the swiftness of which prevents it from being felt. But whatever that may be in the dying which with violently painful sensation robs of all sensation, yet, when it is piously and faithfully borne, it increases the merit of patience, but does not make the name of punishment inapplicable. Death, proceeding by ordinary generation from the first man, is the punishment of all who are born of him, yet, if it be endured for righteousness’ sake, it becomes the glory of those who are born again; and though death be the award of sin, it sometimes secures that nothing be awarded to sin.

> Latin: Quapropter quod adtinet ad corporis mortem, id est separationem animae a corpore, cum eam patiuntur, qui morientes appellantur, nulli bona est. Habet enim asperum sensum et contra naturam uis ipsa, qua utrumque diuellitur, quod fuerat in uiuente coniunctum adque consertum, quamdiu moratur, donec omnis adimatur sensus, qui ex ipso inerat animae carnisque conplexu. Quam totam molestiam nonnumquam unus ictus corporis uel animae raptus intercipit nec eam sentiri praeueniente celeritate permittit. Quidquid tamen illud est in morientibus, quod cum graui sensu adimit sensum, pie fideliterque tolerando auget meritum patientiae, non aufert uocabulum poenae. Ita cum ex hominis primi perpetuata propagine procul dubio sit mors poena nascentis. tamen si pro pietate iustitiaque pendatur, fit gloria renascentis; et cum sit mors peccati retributio, aliquando inpetrat, ut nihil retribuatur peccato.