---
title: "City of God · De civitate Dei"
author: "Augustine"
translator: "Marcus Dods"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Church Fathers"
section: 61 of 116
url: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/61/
cite: "Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods, City of God · De civitate Dei, section 61. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/61/"
---

# City of God · De civitate Dei

*Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods*

“Two loves have made two cities.” Augustine’s Latin, in Hoffmann’s critical text, beside Dods’s English, chapter by chapter.

> Latin: Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. Emanuel Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1899–1900), as encoded by the Open Greek and Latin project, University of Leipzig (stoa0040.stoa003.opp-lat3, CC BY-SA 4.0); apparatus omitted.

> English: Marcus Dods, The City of God (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2, 1887).

> Chapters are matched one to one except where the two editions divide them differently; within a chapter the Latin sentences are shared out over the English paragraphs by position.

## 61. Of the Death Which the Unbaptized Suffer for the Confession of Christ.

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/61/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/61/#p-N

[¶0] Chapter 7.—Of the Death Which the Unbaptized Suffer for the Confession of Christ.

> Latin: Caput VII. De morte, quam quidam non regenerati pro Christi confessione suscipiunt.

[¶1] For whatever unbaptized persons die confessing Christ, this confession is of the same efficacy for the remission of sins as if they were washed in the sacred font of baptism. For He who said, “Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God,” made also an exception in their favor, in that other sentence where He no less absolutely said, “Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in heaven;” and in another place, “Whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it.” And this explains the verse, “Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His saints.” For what is more precious than a death by which a man’s sins are all forgiven, and his merits increased an hundredfold? For those who have been baptized when they could no longer escape death, and have departed this life with all their sins blotted out have not equal merit with those who did not defer death, though it was in their power to do so, but preferred to end their life by confessing Christ, rather than by denying Him to secure an opportunity of baptism. And even had they denied Him under pressure of the fear of death, this too would have been forgiven them in that baptism, in which was remitted even the enormous wickedness of those who had slain Christ. But how abundant in these men must have been the grace of the Spirit, who breathes where He listeth, seeing that they so dearly loved Christ as to be unable to deny Him even in so sore an emergency, and with so sure a hope of pardon! Precious, therefore, is the death of the saints, to whom the grace of Christ has been applied with such gracious effects, that they do not hesitate to meet death themselves, if so be they might meet Him. And precious is it, also, because it has proved that what was originally ordained for the punishment of the sinner, has been used for the production of a richer harvest of righteousness. But not on this account should we look upon death as a good thing, for it is diverted to such useful purposes, not by any virtue of its own, but by the divine interference. Death was originally proposed as an object of dread, that sin might not be committed; now it must be undergone that sin may not be committed, or, if committed, be remitted, and the award of righteousness bestowed on him whose victory has earned it.

> Latin: Nam quicumque etiam non percepto regenerationis lauacro pro Christi confessione moriuntur, tantum eis ualet ad dimittenda peccata, quantum si abluerentur sacro fonte baptismatis. Qui enim dixit: Si quis non renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non intrabit in regnum caelorum, alia sententia istos fecit exceptos, ubi non minus generaliter ait: Qui me confessus fuerit coram hominibus confitebor [et ego] eum coram Patre meo qui in caelis est; et alio loco: Qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, inueniet eam. Hinc -est quod scriptum est: Pretiosa in conspectu Domini mors sanctorum eius. Quid enim pretiosius quam mors, per quam fit ut et delicta omnia dimittantur et merita cumulatius augeantur? Neque enim tanti sunt meriti, qui, cum mortem differre non possent, baptizati sunt deletisque omnibus peccatis ex hac uita emigrarunt, quanti sunt hi, qui mortem, cum possent, ideo non distulerunt, quia maluerunt Christum confitendo finire uitam quam eum negando ad eius baptismum peruenire. Quod utique si fecissent, etiam hoc eis in illo lauacro dimitteretur, quod timore mortis negauerant Christum, in quo lauacro et illis facinus tam inmane dimissum est, qui occiderant Christum. Sed quando sine abundantia gratiae Spiritus illius, qui ubi uult spirat, tantum Christum amare possent, ut eum in tanto uitae discrimine sub tanta spe ueniae negare non possent? Mors igitur pretiosa sanctorum, quibus cum tanta gratia est praemissa et praerogata mors Christi, ut ad eum adquirendum suam non cunctarentur inpendere, in eos usus redactum esse monstrauit, quod ad poenam peccati antea fuerat constitutum, ut inde iustitiae fructus uberior nasceretur. Mors ergo non ideo bonum uideri debet, quia in tantam utilitatem non ui sua, sed diuina opitulatione conuersa est, ut, quae tunc metuenda proposita est, ne peccatum committeretur, nunc suscipienda proponatur, ut peccatum non committatur commissumque deleatur magnaeque uictoriae debita iustitiae palma reddatur.

### That the Saints, by Suffering the First Death for the Truth’s Sake, are Freed from the Second.

[¶3] Chapter 8.—That the Saints, by Suffering the First Death for the Truth’s Sake, are Freed from the Second.

> Latin: Caput VIII. Quod in sanctis primae mortis pro ueritate susceptio secundae sit mortis abolitio.

[¶4] For if we look at the matter a little more carefully, we shall see that even when a man dies faithfully and laudably for the truth’s sake, it is still death he is avoiding. For he submits to some part of death, for the very purpose of avoiding the whole, and the second and eternal death over and above. He submits to the separation of soul and body, lest the soul be separated both from God and from the body, and so the whole first death be completed, and the second death receive him everlastingly. Wherefore death is indeed, as I said, good to none while it is being actually suffered, and while it is subduing the dying to its power; but it is meritoriously endured for the sake of retaining or winning what is good. And regarding what happens after death, it is no absurdity to say that death is good to the good, and evil to the evil. For the disembodied spirits of the just are at rest; but those of the wicked suffer punishment till their bodies rise again,—those of the just to life everlasting, and of the others to death eternal, which is called the second death.

> Latin: Si enim diligentius consideremus, etiam cum quisque pro ueritate fideliter et laudabiliter moritur, mors cauetur. Ideo quippe aliquid eius suscipitur, ne tota contingat et secunda insuper, quae numquam finiatur, accedat. Suscipitur enim animae a corpore separatio, ne Deo ab anima separato etiam ipsa separetur a corpore, ac sic totius hominis prima morte conpleta secunda excipiat sempiterna. Quocirca mors quidem, ut dixi, cum eam morientes patiuntur cumque in eis ut moriantur facit, nemini bona est, sed laudabiliter toleraretur pro tenendo uel adipiscendo bono; cum uero in ea sunt, qui iam mortui nuncupantur, non absurde dicitur et malis mala et bonis bona. In requie sunt enim animae piorum a corpore separatae, inpiorum autem poenas luunt, donec istarum ad aeternam uitam, illarum uero ad aeternam mortem, quae secunda dicitur, corpora reuiuescant.

### Whether We Should Say that The Moment of Death, in Which Sensation Ceases, Occurs in the Experience of the Dying or in that of the Dead.

[¶6] Chapter 9.—Whether We Should Say that The Moment of Death, in Which Sensation Ceases, Occurs in the Experience of the Dying or in that of the Dead.

> Latin: Caput IX. Tempus mortis, quo uitae sensus aufertur, in morientibus an in mortuis esse dicendum sit.

[¶7] The point of time in which the souls of the good and evil are separated from the body, are we to say it is after death, or in death rather? If it is after death, then it is not death which is good or evil, since death is done with and past, but it is the life which the soul has now entered on. Death was an evil when it was present, that is to say, when it was being suffered by the dying; for to them it brought with it a severe and grievous experience, which the good make a good use of. But when death is past, how can that which no longer is be either good or evil? Still further, if we examine the matter more closely, we shall see that even that sore and grievous pain which the dying experience is not death itself. For so long as they have any sensation, they are certainly still alive; and, if still alive, must rather be said to be in a state previous to death than in death. For when death actually comes, it robs us of all bodily sensation, which, while death is only approaching is painful. And thus it is difficult to explain how we speak of those who are not yet dead, but are agonized in their last and mortal extremity, as being in the article of death. Yet what else can we call them than dying persons? for when death which was imminent shall have actually come, we can no longer call them dying but dead. No one, therefore, is dying unless living; since even he who is in the last extremity of life, and, as we say, giving up the ghost, yet lives. The same person is therefore at once dying and living, but drawing near to death, departing from life; yet in life, because his spirit yet abides in the body; not yet in death, because not yet has his spirit forsaken the body. But if, when it has forsaken it, the man is not even then in death, but after death, who shall say when he is in death? On the one hand, no one can be called dying, if a man cannot be dying and living at the same time; and as long as the soul is in the body, we cannot deny that he is living. On the other hand, if the man who is approaching death be rather called dying, I know not who is living.

> Latin: Sed id tempus, quo animae a corpore separatae aut in bonis sunt aut in malis, utrum post mortem potius an in morte dicendum est? Si enim post mortem est, iam non ipsa mors. quae transacta adque praeterita est, sed post eam uita praesens animae bona seu mala est. Mors autem tunc eis mala erat, quando erat, hoc est quando eam patiebantur, cum morerentur, quoniam grauis et molestus eius inerat sensus; quo malo bene utuntur boni. Peracta autem mors quonam modo uel bona uel mala est, quae iam non est? Porro si adhuc diligentius adtendamus, nec illa mors esse apparebit, cuius grauem ac molestum in morientibus diximus sensum. Quamdiu enim sentiunt, adhuc utique uiuunt, et si adhuc uiuunt, ante mortem quam in morte potius esse dicendi sunt; quia illa, cum uenerit, aufert omnem corporis sensum, qui ea propinquante molestus est. Ac per hoc quo modo morientes dicamus eos, qui nondum mortui sunt, sed inminente morte iam extrema et mortifera adflictione iactantur, explicare difficile est, etiamsi recte isti appellantur morientes, quia, cum mors quae iam inpendet aduenerit, non morientes, sed mortui nuncupantur. Nullus est ergo moriens nisi uiuens, quoniam, cum in tanta est extremitate uitae, in quanta sunt quos agere animam dicimus, profecto qui nondum anima caruit adhuc uiuit. Idem ipse igitur simul et moriens est et uiuens, sed morti accedens, uita cedens; adhuc tamen in uita, quia inest anima corpori; nondum autem in morte, quia nondum abscessit a corpore. Sed si, cum abscesserit, nec tunc in morte, sed post mortem potius erit: quando sit in morte quis dixerit? Nam neque ullus moriens erit, si moriens et uiuens simul esse nullus potest. Quamdiu quippe anima in corpore est, non possumus negare uiuentem. Aut si moriens potius dicendus est, in cuius iam corpore agitur ut moriatur, nec simul quisquam potest esse uiuens et moriens: nescio quando sit uiuens.

### Of the Life of Mortals, Which is Rather to Be Called Death Than Life.

[¶9] Chapter 10.—Of the Life of Mortals, Which is Rather to Be Called Death Than Life.

> Latin: Caput X. An uita mortalium mors potius quam uita dicenda sit.

[¶10] For no sooner do we begin to live in this dying body, than we begin to move ceaselessly towards death. For in the whole course of this life (if life we must call it) its mutability tends towards death. Certainly there is no one who is not nearer it this year than last year, and to-morrow than to-day, and to-day than yesterday, and a short while hence than now, and now than a short while ago. For whatever time we live is deducted from our whole term of life, and that which remains is daily becoming less and less; so that our whole life is nothing but a race towards death, in which no one is allowed to stand still for a little space, or to go somewhat more slowly, but all are driven forwards with an impartial movement, and with equal rapidity. For he whose life is short spends a day no more swiftly than he whose life is longer. But while the equal moments are impartially snatched from both, the one has a nearer and the other a more remote goal to reach with this their equal speed. It is one thing to make a longer journey, and another to walk more slowly. He, therefore, who spends longer time on his way to death does not proceed at a more leisurely pace, but goes over more ground. Further, if every man begins to die, that is, is in death, as soon as death has begun to show itself in him (by taking away life, to wit; for when life is all taken away, the man will be then not in death, but after death), then he begins to die so soon as he begins to live. For what else is going on in all his days, hours, and moments, until this slow-working death is fully consummated? And then comes the time after death, instead of that in which life was being withdrawn, and which we called being in death. Man, then, is never in life from the moment he dwells in this dying rather than living body,—if, at least, he cannot be in life and death at once. Or rather, shall we say, he is in both?—in life, namely, which he lives till all is consumed; but in death also, which he dies as his life is consumed? For if he is not in life, what is it which is consumed till all be gone? And if he is not in death, what is this consumption itself? For when the whole of life has been consumed, the expression “after death” would be meaningless, had that consumption not been death. And if, when it has all been consumed, a man is not in death but after death, when is he in death unless when life is being consumed away?

> Latin: Ex - quo enim quisque in isto corpore morituro esse coeperit, numquam in eo non agitur ut mors ueniat. Hoc enim agit eius mutabilitas toto tempore uitae huius (si tamen uita dicenda est), ut ueniatur in mortem. Nemo quippe est, qui non ei post annum sit, quam ante annum fuit, et cras quam hodie, et hodie quam heri, et paulo post quam nunc, et nunc quam paulo ante propinquior; quoniam, quidquid temporis uiuitur, de spatio uiuendi demitur, et cottidie fit minus minusque quod restat, ut omnino nihil sit aliud tempus uitae huius, quam cursus ad mortem, in quo nemo uel paululum stare uel aliquanto tardius ire permittitur; sed urgentur omnes pari motu nec diuerso inpelluntur accessu. Neque enim, cui uita breuior fuit, celerius diem duxit quam ille, cui longior; sed cum aequaliter et aequalia momenta raperentur ambobus, alter habuit propius, alter remotius, quo non inpari uelocitate ambo currebant. Aliud est autem amplius uiae peregisse, aliud tardius ambulasse. Qui ergo usque ad mortem productiora spatia temporis agit, non lentius pergit, sed plus itineris conficit. Porro si ex illo quisque incipit mori, hoc est esse in morte, ex quo in illo agi coeperit ipsa mors, id est uitae detractio (quia, cum detrahendo finita fuerit, post mortem iam erit, non in morte): profecto, ex quo esse incipit in hoc corpore, in morte est. Quid enim aliud diebus horis momentisque singulis agitur, donec ea consumta mors, quae agebatur, inpleatur, et incipiat iam tempus esse post mortem, quod, cum uita detraheretur, erat in morte? Numquam igitur in uita homo est, ex quo est in isto corpore moriente potius quam uiuente, si et in uita et in morte simul non potest esse. An potius et in uita et in morte simul est; in uita scilicet, in qua uiuit, donec tota detrahatur; in morte autem, quia iam moritur, cum uita detrahitur? Si enim non est in uita, quid est quod detrahitur, donec eius fiat perfecta consumtio? Si autem non est in morte, quid est uitae ipsa detractio? Non enim frustra, cum uita fuerit corpori tota detracta, post mortem iam dicitur, nisi quia mors erat, cum detraheretur. Nam si ea detracta non est homo in morte, sed post mortem: quando, nisi cum detrahitur, erit in morte?

### Whether One Can Both Be Living and Dead at the Same Time.

[¶12] Chapter 11.—Whether One Can Both Be Living and Dead at the Same Time.

> Latin: Caput XI. An quisquam simul et uiuens esse possit et mortuus.

[¶13] But if it is absurd to say that a man is in death before he reaches death (for to what is his course running as he passes through life, if already he is in death?), and if it outrage common usage to speak of a man being at once alive and dead, as much as it does so to speak of him as at once asleep and awake, it remains to be asked when a man is dying? For, before death comes, he is not dying but living; and when death has come, he is not dying but dead. The one is before, the other after death. When, then, is he in death so that we can say he is dying? For as there are three times, before death, in death, after death, so there are three states corresponding, living, dying, dead. And it is very hard to define when a man is in death or dying, when he is neither living, which is before death, nor dead, which is after death, but dying, which is in death. For so long as the soul is in the body, especially if consciousness remain, the man certainly lives; for body and soul constitute the man. And thus, before death, he cannot be said to be in death, but when, on the other hand, the soul has departed, and all bodily sensation is extinct, death is past, and the man is dead. Between these two states the dying condition finds no place; for if a man yet lives, death has not arrived; if he has ceased to live, death is past. Never, then, is he dying, that is, comprehended in the state of death. So also in the passing of time,—you try to lay your finger on the present, and cannot find it, because the present occupies no space, but is only the transition of time from the future to the past. Must we then conclude that there is thus no death of the body at all? For if there is, where is it, since it is in no one, and no one can be in it? Since, indeed, if there is yet life, death is not yet; for this state is before death, not in death: and if life has already ceased, death is not present; for this state is after death, not in death. On the other hand, if there is no death before or after, what do we mean when we say “after death,” or “before death?” This is a foolish way of speaking if there is no death. And would that we had lived so well in Paradise that in very truth there were now no death! But not only does it now exist, but so grievous a thing is it, that no skill is sufficient either to explain or to escape it.

> Latin: Si autem absurdum est, ut hominem, antequam ad mortem perueniat, iam esse dicamus in morte (cui enim propinquat peragendo uitae suae tempora, si iam in illa est?), maxime quia nimis est insolens, ut simul et uiuens esse dicatur et moriens, cum uigilans et dormiens simul esse non possit: quaerendum est quando erit moriens. Etenim antequam mors ueniat, non est moriens, sed uiuens; cum uero mors uenerit, mortuus erit, non moriens. Illud ergo est adhuc ante mortem, hoc iam post mortem. Quando ergo in morte? Tunc enim est moriens, ut, quem ad modum tria sunt cum dicimus ante mortem, in morte, post mortem’, ita tria singulis singula ‘uiuens, moriens mortuusque reddantur. Quando itaque sit moriens, id est in morte, ubi neque sit uiuens, quod est ante mortem, neque mortuus, quod est post mortem, sed moriens, id est in morte, difficillime definitur. Quamdiu quippe est anima in corpore, maxime si etiam sensus adsit, procul dubio uiuit homo, qui constat ex anima et corpore, ac per hoc adhuc ante mortem, non in morte esse dicendus est; cum uero anima abscesserit omnemque abstulerit corporis sensum, iam post mortem mortuusque perhibetur. Perit igitur inter utrumque, quo moriens uel in morte sit; quoniam si adhuc uiuit, ante mortem est; si uiuere destitit, iam post mortem est. Numquam ergo moriens, id est in morte, esse conprehenditur. Ita etiam in transcursu temporum quaeritur praesens, nec inuenitur, quia sine ullo spatio est, per quod transitur ex futuro in praeteritum. Nonne ergo uidendum est, ne ista ratione mors corporis nulla esse dicatur? Si enim est, quando est, quae in ullo et in qua ullus esse non potest? Quando quidem si uiuitur, adhuc non est, quia hoc ante mortem, non in morte; si autem uiuere iam cessatum est, iam non est, quia et hoc post mortem est, non in morte. Sed rursus si nulla mors est ante quid uel post, quid est quod dicitur ante mortem siue post mortem? Nam et hoc inaniter dicitur, si mors nulla est. Adque utinam in paradiso bene uiuendo egissemus, ut re uera nulla mors esset. Nunc autem non solum est, uerum etiam tam molesta est, ut nec ulla explicari locutione possit nec ulla ratione uitari.

[¶14] Let us, then, speak in the customary way,—no man ought to speak otherwise,—and let us call the time before death come, “before death;” as it is written, “Praise no man before his death.” And when it has happened, let us say that “after death” this or that took place. And of the present time let us speak as best we can, as when we say, “He, when dying, made his will, and left this or that to such and such persons,”—though, of course, he could not do so unless he were living, and did this rather before death than in death. And let us use the same phraseology as Scripture uses; for it makes no scruple of saying that the dead are not after but in death. So that verse, “For in death there is no remembrance of thee.” For until the resurrection men are justly said to be in death; as every one is said to be in sleep till he awakes. However, though we can say of persons in sleep that they are sleeping, we cannot speak in this way of the dead, and say they are dying. For, so far as regards the death of the body, of which we are now speaking, one cannot say that those who are already separated from their bodies continue dying. But this, you see, is just what I was saying,—that no words can explain how either the dying are said to live, or how the dead are said, even after death, to be in death. For how can they be after death if they be in death, especially when we do not even call them dying, as we call those in sleep, sleeping; and those in languor, languishing; and those in grief, grieving; and those in life, living? And yet the dead, until they rise again, are said to be in death, but cannot be called dying.

> Latin: Loquamur ergo secundum consuetudinem (non enim aliter debemus) et dicamus (ante mortem’, priusquam mors accidat; sicut scriptum est: Ante mortem ne laudes hominem quemquam. Dicamus etiam cum acciderit: Post mortem illius uel illius factum est illud aut illud. Dicamus et de praesenti tempore ut possumus, uelut cum ita loquimur: Moriens ille testatus est, et: Illis adque illis illud adque illud moriens dereliquit; quamuis hoc nisi uiuens omnino facere non posset et potius hoc ante mortem fecerit, non in morte. Loquamur etiam sicut loquitur scriptura diuina, quae mortuos quoque non post mortem, sed in morte esse non dubitat dicere. Hinc enim est illud: Quoniam non est in morte, qui memor sit tui. Donec enim reuiuescant, recte esse dicuntur in morte, sicut in somno esse quisque, donec euigilet, dicitur; quamuis in somno positos dicamus dormientes, nec tamen eo modo possumus dicere eos, qui iam sunt mortui, morientes. Non enim adhuc moriuntur, qui, quantum adtinet ad corporis mortem, de qua nunc disserimus, iam sunt a corporibus separati. Sed hoc est, quod dixi explicari aliqua locutione non posse. quonam modo uel morientes dicantur uiuere uel iam mortui etiam post mortem adhuc esse dicantur in morte. Quo modo enim post mortem, si adhuc in morte? praesertim cum eos nec morientes dicamus, sicuti eos, qui in somno sunt, dicimus dormientes, et qui in languore, languentes, et qui in dolore, utique dolentes, et qui in uita, uiuentes; at uero mortui, priusquam resurgant, esse dicuntur in morte, nec tamen possunt appellari morientes.

[¶15] And therefore I think it has not unsuitably nor inappropriately come to pass, though not by the intention of man, yet perhaps with divine purpose, that this Latin word moritur cannot be declined by the grammarians according to the rule followed by similar words. For oritur gives the form ortus est for the perfect; and all similar verbs form this tense from their perfect participles. But if we ask the perfect of moritur, we get the regular answer mortuus est, with a double u. For thus mortuus is pronounced, like fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, and similar words, which are not perfect participles but adjectives, and are declined without regard to tense. But mortuus, though in form an adjective, is used as perfect participle, as if that were to be declined which cannot be declined; and thus it has suitably come to pass that, as the thing itself cannot in point of fact be declined, so neither can the word significant of the act be declined. Yet, by the aid of our Redeemer’s grace, we may manage at least to decline the second. For that is more grievous still, and, indeed, of all evils the worst, since it consists not in the separation of soul and body, but in the uniting of both in death eternal. And there, in striking contrast to our present conditions, men will not be before or after death, but always in death; and thus never living, never dead, but endlessly dying. And never can a man be more disastrously in death than when death itself shall be deathless.

> Latin: Unde non inportune neque incongrue arbitror accidisse, etsi non humana industria, iudicio fortasse diuino, ut hoc uerbum, quod est moritur, in Latina lingua nec grammatici declinare potuerint, ea regula qua cetera talia declinantur. Namque ab eo quod est oritur, fit uerbum praeteriti temporis ‘ortus est’; et si qua similia sunt, per temporis praeteriti participia declinantur. Ab eo uero, quod est moritur, si quaeramus praeteriti temporis uerbum, responderi adsolet ‘mortuus est>, u littera geminata. Sic enim dicitur mortuus, quo modo fatuus, arduus, [carduus], conspicuus et si qua similia, quae non sunt praeteriti temporis, sed quoniam nomina sunt, sine tempore declinantur. Illud autem, quasi ut declinetur, quod declinari non potest, pro participio praeteriti temporis ponitur nomen. Conuenienter itaque factum est, ut, quem ad modum id quod significat non potest agendo, ita ipsum uerbum non posset loquendo declinari. Agi tamen potest in adiutorio gratiae Redemtoris nostri, ut saltem secundam mortem declinare possimus. Illa est enim grauior et omnium malorum pessima, quae non fit separatione animae et corporis, sed in aeternam poenam potius utriusque conplexu. Ibi e contrario non erunt homines ante mortem adque post mortem, sed semper in morte; ac per hoc numquam uiuentes, numquam mortui, sed sine fine morientes. Numquam enim erit homini peius in morte, quam ubi erit mors ipsa sine morte.

### What Death God Intended, When He Threatened Our First Parents with Death If They Should Disobey His Commandment.

[¶17] Chapter 12.—What Death God Intended, When He Threatened Our First Parents with Death If They Should Disobey His Commandment.

> Latin: Caput XII. Quam mortem primis hominibus Deus, si mandatum eius transgrederentur, fuerit comminatus.

[¶18] When, therefore, it is asked what death it was with which God threatened our first parents if they should transgress the commandment they had received from Him, and should fail to preserve their obedience,—whether it was the death of soul, or of body, or of the whole man, or that which is called second death,—we must answer, It is all. For the first consists of two; the second is the complete death, which consists of all. For, as the whole earth consists of many lands, and the Church universal of many churches, so death universal consists of all deaths. The first consists of two, one of the body, and another of the soul. So that the first death is a death of the whole man, since the soul without God and without the body suffers punishment for a time; but the second is when the soul, without God but with the body, suffers punishment everlasting. When, therefore, God said to that first man whom he had placed in Paradise, referring to the forbidden fruit, “In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die,” that threatening included not only the first part of the first death, by which the soul is deprived of God; nor only the subsequent part of the first death, by which the body is deprived of the soul; nor only the whole first death itself, by which the soul is punished in separation from God and from the body;—but it includes whatever of death there is, even to that final death which is called second, and to which none is subsequent.

> Latin: Cum ergo requiritur, quam mortem Deus primis hominibus fuerit comminatus, si ab eo mandatum transgrederentur acceptum nec oboedientiam custodirent, utrum animae an corporis an totius hominis an illam quae appellatur secunda: respondendum est: Omnes. Prima enim constat ex duabus, [secunda] ex omnibus tota. Sicut enim uniuersa terra ex multis terris et uniuersa ecclesia ex multis constat ecclesiis: sic uniuersa mors ex omnibus. Quoniam prima constat ex duabus, una animae, altera corporis; ut sit prima totius hominis mors, cum anima sine Deo et sine corpore ad tempus poenas luit; secunda uero, ubi anima sine Deo cum corpore poenas aeternas luit. Quando ergo dixit Deus primo illi homini, quem in paradiso constituerat, de cibo uetito: Quacumque die ederitis ex illo, morte moriemini: non tantum primae mortis partem priorem, ubi anima priuatur Deo, nec tantum posteriorem, ubi corpus priuatur anima, nec solam ipsam totam primam, ubi anima et a Deo et a corpore separata punitur; sed quidquid mortis est usque ad nouissimam, quae secunda dicitur, qua est nulla posterior, comminatio illa conplexa est.

### What Was the First Punishment of the Transgression of Our First Parents.

[¶20] Chapter 13.—What Was the First Punishment of the Transgression of Our First Parents.

> Latin: Caput XIII. Praeuaricatio primorum hominum quam primam senserit poenam.

[¶21] For, as soon as our first parents had transgressed the commandment, divine grace forsook them, and they were confounded at their own wickedness; and therefore they took fig-leaves (which were possibly the first that came to hand in their troubled state of mind), and covered their shame; for though their members remained the same, they had shame now where they had none before. They experienced a new motion of their flesh, which had become disobedient to them, in strict retribution of their own disobedience to God. For the soul, revelling in its own liberty, and scorning to serve God, was itself deprived of the command it had formerly maintained over the body. And because it had willfully deserted its superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior servant; neither could it hold the flesh subject, as it would always have been able to do had it remained itself subject to God. Then began the flesh to lust against the Spirit, in which strife we are born, deriving from the first transgression a seed of death, and bearing in our members, and in our vitiated nature, the contest or even victory of the flesh.

> Latin: Nam postea quam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim gratia deserente diuina de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt. Unde etiam foliis ficulneis, quae forte a perturbatis prima conperta sunt, pudenda texerunt; quae prius eadem membra erant, sed pudenda non erant. Senserunt ergo nouum motum inoboedientis carnis suae, tamquam reciprocam poenam inboedientiae suae. Iam quippe anima libertate in peruersum propria delectata et Deo dedignata seruire pristino corporis seruitio destituebatur, et quia superiorem dominum suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non tenebat, nec omni modo habebat subditam carnem, sicut semper habere potuisset, si Deo subdita ipsa mansisset. Tunc ergo coepit caro concupiscere aduersus spiritum, cum qua controuersia nati sumus, trahentes originem mortis et in membris nostris uitiataque natura contentionem eius siue uictoriam de prima praeuaricatione gestantes.

### In What State Man Was Made by God, and into What Estate He Fell by the Choice of His Own Will.

[¶23] Chapter 14.—In What State Man Was Made by God, and into What Estate He Fell by the Choice of His Own Will.

> Latin: Caput XIV. Qualis homo sit factus a Deo et in quam sortem deciderit suae uoluntatis arbitrio.

[¶24] For God, the author of natures, not of vices, created man upright; but man, being of his own will corrupted, and justly condemned, begot corrupted and condemned children. For we all were in that one man, since we all were that one man, who fell into sin by the woman who was made from him before the sin. For not yet was the particular form created and distributed to us, in which we as individuals were to live, but already the seminal nature was there from which we were to be propagated; and this being vitiated by sin, and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man in any other state. And thus, from the bad use of free will, there originated the whole train of evil, which, with its concatenation of miseries, convoys the human race from its depraved origin, as from a corrupt root, on to the destruction of the second death, which has no end, those only being excepted who are freed by the grace of God.

> Latin: Deus enim creauit hominem rectum, naturarum auctor, non utique uitiorum; sed sponte deprauatus iusteque damnatus deprauatos damnatosque generauit. Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum. Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli uiueremus; sed iam erat natura seminalis, ex qua propagaremur; qua scilicet propter peccatum uitiata et uinculo mortis obstricta iusteque damnata non alterius condicionis homo ex homine nasceretur. Ac per hoc a liberi arbitrii malo usu series calamitatis huius exorta est, quae humanum genus origine deprauata, uelut radice corrupta, usque ad secundae mortis exitium, quae non habet finem, solis eis exceptis qui per Dei gratiam liberantur, miseriarum conexione perducit.