--- title: "City of God · De civitate Dei" author: "Augustine" translator: "Marcus Dods" languages: [la, en] shelf: "Church Fathers" section: 7 of 116 url: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/7/ cite: "Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods, City of God · De civitate Dei, section 7. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/7/" --- # City of God · De civitate Dei *Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods* “Two loves have made two cities.” Augustine’s Latin, in Hoffmann’s critical text, beside Dods’s English, chapter by chapter. > Latin: Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. Emanuel Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1899–1900), as encoded by the Open Greek and Latin project, University of Leipzig (stoa0040.stoa003.opp-lat3, CC BY-SA 4.0); apparatus omitted. > English: Marcus Dods, The City of God (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2, 1887). > Chapters are matched one to one except where the two editions divide them differently; within a chapter the Latin sentences are shared out over the English paragraphs by position. ## 7. Of Lucretia, Who Put an End to Her Life Because of the Outrage Done Her. Source: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/7/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/7/#p-N [¶0] Chapter 19.—Of Lucretia, Who Put an End to Her Life Because of the Outrage Done Her. > Latin: Caput XIX. De Lucretia, quae se ob inlatum sibi stuprum peremit. [¶1] This, then, is our position, and it seems sufficiently lucid. We maintain that when a woman is violated while her soul admits no consent to the iniquity, but remains inviolably chaste, the sin is not hers, but his who violates her. But do they against whom we have to defend not only the souls, but the sacred bodies too of these outraged Christian captives,—do they, perhaps, dare to dispute our position? But all know how loudly they extol the purity of Lucretia, that noble matron of ancient Rome. When King Tarquin’s son had violated her body, she made known the wickedness of this young profligate to her husband Collatinus, and to Brutus her kinsman, men of high rank and full of courage, and bound them by an oath to avenge it. Then, heart-sick, and unable to bear the shame, she put an end to her life. What shall we call her? An adulteress, or chaste? There is no question which she was. Not more happily than truly did a declaimer say of this sad occurrence: “Here was a marvel: there were two, and only one committed adultery.” Most forcibly and truly spoken. For this declaimer, seeing in the union of the two bodies the foul lust of the one, and the chaste will of the other, and giving heed not to the contact of the bodily members, but to the wide diversity of their souls, says: “There were two, but the adultery was committed only by one.” > Latin: An forte huic perspicuae rationi, qua dicimus corpore obpresso nequaquam proposito castitatis ulla in malum consensione mutato illius tantum esse flagitium, qui obprimens concubuerit, non illius, quae obpressa concumbenti nulla uoluntate consenserit, contradicere audebunt hi, contra quos feminarum Christianarum in captiuitate obpressarum non tantum mentes, uerum etiam corpora sancta defendimus? Lucretiam certe, matronam nobilem ueteremque Romanam, pudicitiae magnis efferunt laudibus. Huius corpore cum uiolenter obpresso Tarquinii regis filius libidinose potitus esset, illa scelus inprobissimi iuuenis marito Collatino et propinquo Bruto, uiris clarissimis et fortissimis, indicauit eosque ad uindictam constrinxit. Deinde foedi in se commissi aegra adque inpatiens se peremit. Quid dicemus? Adultera haec an casta iudicanda est? Quis in hac controuersia laborandum putauerit? Egregie quidam ex hoc ueraciterque declamans ait: ‘Mirabile dictu, duo fuerunt et adulterium unus admisit.’ Splendide adque uerissime. [¶2] But how is it, that she who was no partner to the crime bears the heavier punishment of the two? For the adulterer was only banished along with his father; she suffered the extreme penalty. If that was not impurity by which she was unwillingly ravished, then this is not justice by which she, being chaste, is punished. To you I appeal, ye laws and judges of Rome. Even after the perpetration of great enormities, you do not suffer the criminal to be slain untried. If, then, one were to bring to your bar this case, and were to prove to you that a woman not only untried, but chaste and innocent, had been killed, would you not visit the murderer with punishment proportionably severe? This crime was committed by Lucretia; that Lucretia so celebrated and lauded slew the innocent, chaste, outraged Lucretia. Pronounce sentence. But if you cannot, because there does not appear any one whom you can punish, why do you extol with such unmeasured laudation her who slew an innocent and chaste woman? Assuredly you will find it impossible to defend her before the judges of the realms below, if they be such as your poets are fond of representing them; for she is among those > Latin: Intuens enim in duorum corporum commixtione unius inquinatissimam cupiditatem, alterius castissimam uoluntatem, et non quid coniunctione membrorum, sed quid animorum diuersitate ageretur adtendens: (Duo., inquit, fuerunt, et adulterium unus admisit.’ Sed quid est hoc, quod in eam grauius uindicatur, quae adulterium non admisit? Nam ille patria cum patre pulsus est. haec summo est mactata supplicio. Si non est illa inpudicitia qua inuita obprimitur, non est haec iustitia qua casta punitur. Vos appello, leges iudicesque Romani. Nempe post perpetrata facinora nec quemquam scelestum indemnatum inpune uoluistis occidi. Si ergo ad uestrum iudicium quisquam deferret hoc crimen uobisque probaretur non solum indemnatam, uerum etiam castam et innocentem interfectam esse mulierem, nonne eum, qui id fecisset, seueritate congrua plecteretis? Hoc fecit illa Lucretia; illa, illa sic praedicata Lucretia innocentem, castam, uim perpessam Lucretiam insuper interemit. Proferte sententiam. [¶3] “Who guiltless sent themselves to doom, > Latin: Quod si propterea non potestis, quia non adstat quam punire possitis, quur interfectricem innocentis et castae tanta praedicatione laudatis? [¶4] And all for loathing of the day, [¶5] In madness threw their lives away.” [¶6] And if she with the others wishes to return, [¶7] “Fate bars the way: around their keep [¶8] The slow unlovely waters creep, [¶9] And bind with ninefold chain.” [¶10] Or perhaps she is not there, because she slew herself conscious of guilt, not of innocence? She herself alone knows her reason; but what if she was betrayed by the pleasure of the act, and gave some consent to Sextus, though so violently abusing her, and then was so affected with remorse, that she thought death alone could expiate her sin? Even though this were the case, she ought still to have held her hand from suicide, if she could with her false gods have accomplished a fruitful repentance. However, if such were the state of the case, and if it were false that there were two, but one only committed adultery; if the truth were that both were involved in it, one by open assault, the other by secret consent, then she did not kill an innocent woman; and therefore her erudite defenders may maintain that she is not among that class of the dwellers below “who guiltless sent themselves to doom.” But this case of Lucretia is in such a dilemma, that if you extenuate the homicide, you confirm the adultery: if you acquit her of adultery, you make the charge of homicide heavier; and there is no way out of the dilemma, when one asks, If she was adulterous, why praise her? if chaste, why slay her? > Latin: Quam certe aput infernos iudices etiam tales, quales poetarum uestrorum carminibus cantitantur, nulla ratione defenditis, constitutam inter illos scilicet,. qui sibi letum Insontes peperere manu lucemque perosi Proiecere animas; cui ad superna redire cupienti Fas obstat, tristisque palus inamabilis undae Adligat. An forte ideo ibi non est, quia non insontem, sed male sibi consciam se peremit? Quid si enim (quod ipsa tantummodo nosse poterat) quamuis iuueni uiolenter inruenti etiam sua libidine inlecta consensit idque in se puniens ita doluit, ut morte putaret expiandum? Quamquam ne sic quidem se occidere debuit, si fructuosam posset aput deos falsos agere paenitentiam. Verum tamen si forte ita est falsumque est illud, quod duo fuerunt et adulterium unus admisit, sed potius ambo adulterium commiserunt, unus manifesta inuasione, altera latente consensione, non se occidit insontem, et ideo potest a litteratis eius defensoribus dici non esse aput inferos inter illos, Latin: Nobis tamen hoc tam nobili feminae huius exemplo ad istos refutandos, qui Christianis feminis in captiuitate conpressis alieni ab omni cogitatione sanctitatis insultant, sufficit quod in praeclaris eius laudibus dictum est: Duo fuerunt et adulterium unus admisit.’ Talis enim ab eis Lucretia magis credita est, quae se nullo adulterino potuerit maculare consensu. Quod ergo se ipsam, quoniam adulterum pertulit, etiam non adultera occidit, non est pudicitiae caritas, sed pudoris infirmitas. Puduit enim eam turpitudinis alienae in se commissae etiamsi non secum, et Romana mulier, laudis auida nimium, uerita est ne putaretur, quod uiolenter est passa cum uiueret, libenter passa si uiueret. Unde ad oculos hominum testem. mentis suae illam poenam adhibendam putauit, quibus conscientiam demonstrare non potuit. Sociam quippe facti se credi erubuit, si, quod alius in ea fecerat turpiter, ferret ipsa patienter. Non hoc fecerunt feminae Christianae, quae passae similia uiuunt tamen nec in se ultae sunt crimen alienum, ne aliorum sceleribus adderent sua, si, quoniam hostes in eis concupiscendo stupra commiserant, illae in se ipsis homicidia erubescendo committerent. Habent quippe intus gloriam castitatis, testimonium conscientiae; habent autem coram oculis Dei sui nec requirunt amplius, ubi quid recte faciant non habent amplius, ne deuient ab auctoritate legis diuinae, cum male deuitant offensionem suspicionis humanae. ### That Christians Have No Authority for Committing Suicide in Any Circumstances Whatever. [¶13] Chapter 20.—That Christians Have No Authority for Committing Suicide in Any Circumstances Whatever. > Latin: Caput XX. Nullam esse auctoritatem, quae Christianis in qualibet causa ius uoluntariae necis tribuat. [¶14] It is not without significance, that in no passage of the holy canonical books there can be found either divine precept or permission to take away our own life, whether for the sake of entering on the enjoyment of immortality, or of shunning, or ridding ourselves of anything whatever. Nay, the law, rightly interpreted, even prohibits suicide, where it says, “Thou shalt not kill.” This is proved especially by the omission of the words “thy neighbor,” which are inserted when false witness is forbidden: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.” Nor yet should any one on this account suppose he has not broken this commandment if he has borne false witness only against himself. For the love of our neighbor is regulated by the love of ourselves, as it is written, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” If, then, he who makes false statements about himself is not less guilty of bearing false witness than if he had made them to the injury of his neighbor; although in the commandment prohibiting false witness only his neighbor is mentioned, and persons taking no pains to understand it might suppose that a man was allowed to be a false witness to his own hurt; how much greater reason have we to understand that a man may not kill himself, since in the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” there is no limitation added nor any exception made in favor of any one, and least of all in favor of him on whom the command is laid! And so some attempt to extend this command even to beasts and cattle, as if it forbade us to take life from any creature. But if so, why not extend it also to the plants, and all that is rooted in and nourished by the earth? For though this class of creatures have no sensation, yet they also are said to live, and consequently they can die; and therefore, if violence be done them, can be killed. So, too, the apostle, when speaking of the seeds of such things as these, says, “That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die;” and in the Psalm it is said, “He killed their vines with hail.” Must we therefore reckon it a breaking of this commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” to pull a flower? Are we thus insanely to countenance the foolish error of the Manichæans? Putting aside, then, these ravings, if, when we say, Thou shalt not kill, we do not understand this of the plants, since they have no sensation, nor of the irrational animals that fly, swim, walk, or creep, since they are dissociated from us by their want of reason, and are therefore by the just appointment of the Creator subjected to us to kill or keep alive for our own uses; if so, then it remains that we understand that commandment simply of man. The commandment is, “Thou shall not kill man;” therefore neither another nor yourself, for he who kills himself still kills nothing else than man. > Latin: Neque enim frustra in sanctis canonicis libris nusquam nobis diuinitus praeceptum permissumue reperiri potest, ut uel ipsius adipiscendae inmortalitatis uel ullius cauendi carendiue mali causa nobismet ipsis necem inferamus. Nam et prohibitos nos esse intellegendum est, ubi lex ait: Non occides, praesertim quia non addidit: ‘proximum tuum’, sicut falsum testimonium cum uetaret: Falsum, inquit, testimonium non dices aduersus proximum tuum. Nec ideo tamen si aduersus se ipsum quisquam falsum testimonium dixerit, ab hoc crimine se putauerit alienum, quoniam regulam diligendi proximum a semet ipso dilector accepit, quando quidem scriptum est: Diliges pro x i mum tuum tamquam te ipsum. Porro si falsi testimonii non minus reus est qui de se ipso falsum fatetur, quam si aduersus proximum hoc faceret, cum in eo praecepto, quo falsum testimonium prohibetur, aduersus proximum prohibeatur possitque non recte intellegentibus uideri non esse prohibitum, ut aduersus se ipsum quisque falsus testis adsistat: quanto magis intellegendum est non licere homini se ipsum occidere, cum in eo, quod scriptum est: Non occides, nihilo deinde addito, nullus, nec ipse utique cui praecipitur, intellegatur exceptus! Unde quidam hoc praeceptum etiam in bestias ac pecora conantur extendere, ut ex hoc nullum etiam illorum liceat occidere. Quur ergo non et herbas et quicquid humo radicitus alitur ac figitur? Nam et hoc genus rerum, quamuis non sentiat, dicitur uiuere ac per hoc potest et mori, proinde etiam, cum uis adhibetur, occidi. Unde et apostolus, cum de huius modi seminibus loqueretur: Tu, inquit, quod seminas non uiuificatur, nisi moriatur; et in psalmo scriptum est: Occidit uites eorum in grandine. Num igitur ob hoc, cum audimus: Non occides, uirgultum uellere nefas ducimus et Manichaeorum errori insanissime adquiescimus? His igitur deliramentis remotis cum legimus: Non occides, si propterea non accipimus hoc dictum de frutectis esse, quia nullus eis sensus est, nec de inrationabilibus animantibus, uolatilibus natatilibus, ambulatilibus reptilibus, quia nulla nobis ratione sociantur, quam non eis datum est nobiscum habere communem (unde iustissima ordinatione creatoris et uita et mors eorum nostris usibus subditur): restat ut de homine intellegamus, quod dictum est: Non occides, nec alterum ergo nec te. Neque enim qui se occidit aliud quam hominem occidit. ### Of the Cases in Which We May Put Men to Death Without Incurring the Guilt of Murder. [¶16] Chapter 21.—Of the Cases in Which We May Put Men to Death Without Incurring the Guilt of Murder. > Latin: Caput XXI. De interfectionibus hominum, quae ab homicidii crimine excipiuntur. [¶17] However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.” Abraham indeed was not merely deemed guiltless of cruelty, but was even applauded for his piety, because he was ready to slay his son in obedience to God, not to his own passion. And it is reasonably enough made a question, whether we are to esteem it to have been in compliance with a command of God that Jephthah killed his daughter, because she met him when he had vowed that he would sacrifice to God whatever first met him as he returned victorious from battle. Samson, too, who drew down the house on himself and his foes together, is justified only on this ground, that the Spirit who wrought wonders by him had given him secret instructions to do this. With the exception, then, of these two classes of cases, which are justified either by a just law that applies generally, or by a special intimation from God Himself, the fountain of all justice, whoever kills a man, either himself or another, is implicated in the guilt of murder. > Latin: Quasdam uero exceptiones eadem ipsa diuina fecit auctoritas, ut non liceat hominem occidi. Sed his exceptis, quos Deus occidi iubet siue data lege siue ad personam pro tempore expressa iussione, (non autem ipse occidit, qui ministerium debet iubenti, sicut adminiculum gladius utenti; et ideo nequa.. quam contra hoc praeceptum fecerunt, quo dictum est: Non occides, qui Deo auctore bella gesserunt aut personam gerentes publicae potestatis secundum eius leges, hoc est iustissimae rationis imperium, sceleratos morte punierunt; et Abraham non solum non est culpatus crudelitatis crimine, uerum etiam laudatus est nomine pietatis, quod uoluit filium nequaquam scelerate, sed oboedienter occidere; et merito quaeritur utrum pro iussu Dei sit habendum, quod Iephte filiam, quae patri occurrit, occidit, cum id se uouisset immolaturum Deo, quod ei redeunti de proelio uictori primitus occurrisset; nec Samson aliter excusatur, quod se ipsum cum hostibus ruina domus obpressit, nisi quia spiritus latenter hoc iusserat, qui per illum miracula faciebat) — his igitur exceptis, quos uel lex iusta generaliter uel ipse fons iustitiae Deus specialiter occidi iubet, quisquis hominem uel se ipsum uel quemlibet occiderit, homicidii crimine innectitur. ### That Suicide Can Never Be Prompted by Magnanimity. [¶19] Chapter 22.—That Suicide Can Never Be Prompted by Magnanimity. > Latin: Caput XXII. An umquam possit mors uoluntaria ad magnitudinem animi pertinere. [¶20] But they who have laid violent hands on themselves are perhaps to be admired for their greatness of soul, though they cannot be applauded for the soundness of their judgment. However, if you look at the matter more closely, you will scarcely call it greatness of soul, which prompts a man to kill himself rather than bear up against some hardships of fortune, or sins in which he is not implicated. Is it not rather proof of a feeble mind, to be unable to bear either the pains of bodily servitude or the foolish opinion of the vulgar? And is not that to be pronounced the greater mind, which rather faces than flees the ills of life, and which, in comparison of the light and purity of conscience, holds in small esteem the judgment of men, and specially of the vulgar, which is frequently involved in a mist of error? And, therefore, if suicide is to be esteemed a magnanimous act, none can take higher rank for magnanimity than that Cleombrotus, who (as the story goes), when he had read Plato’s book in which he treats of the immortality of the soul, threw himself from a wall, and so passed from this life to that which he believed to be better. For he was not hard pressed by calamity, nor by any accusation, false or true, which he could not very well have lived down; there was, in short, no motive but only magnanimity urging him to seek death, and break away from the sweet detention of this life. And yet that this was a magnanimous rather than a justifiable action, Plato himself, whom he had read, would have told him; for he would certainly have been forward to commit, or at least to recommend suicide, had not the same bright intellect which saw that the soul was immortal, discerned also that to seek immortality by suicide was to be prohibited rather than encouraged. > Latin: Et quicumque hoc in se ipsis perpetrauerunt, animi magnitudine fortasse mirandi, non sapientiae sanitate laudandi sunt. Quamquam si rationem diligentius consulas, ne ipsa quidem animi magnitudo recte nominabitur, ubi quisque non ualendo tolerare uel quaeque aspera uel aliena peccata se ipse interemerit. Magis enim mens infirma deprehenditur, quae ferre non potest uel duram sui corporis seruitutem uel stultam uulgi opinionem, maiorque animus merito dicendus est, qui uitam aerumnosam magis potest ferre quam fugere et humanum iudicium maximeque uulgare, quod plerumque caligine erroris inuoluitur, prae conscientiae luce ac puritate contemnere. Quam ob rem si magno animo fieri putandum est, cum sibi homo ingerit mortem, ille potius Theobrotus in hac animi magnitudine reperitur, quem ferunt lecto Platonis libro, ubi de inmortalitate animae disputauit, se praecipitem dedisse de muro adque ita ex hac uita emigrasse ad eam, quam credidit esse meliorem. Nihil enim urguebat aut calamitatis aut criminis seu uerum seu falsum, quod non ualendo ferre se auferret; sed ad capessendam mortem adque huius uitae suauia uincla rumpenda sola adfuit animi magnitudo. Quod tamen magne potius factum esse quam bene testis ei esse potuit Plato ipse quem legerat, qui profecto id praecipue potissimumque fecisset uel etiam praecepisset, nisi ea mente, qua inmortalitatem animae uidit, nequaquam faciendum, quin etiam prohibendum esse iudicasset. [¶21] Again, it is said many have killed themselves to prevent an enemy doing so. But we are not inquiring whether it has been done, but whether it ought to have been done. Sound judgment is to be preferred even to examples, and indeed examples harmonize with the voice of reason; but not all examples, but those only which are distinguished by their piety, and are proportionately worthy of imitation. For suicide we cannot cite the example of patriarchs, prophets, or apostles; though our Lord Jesus Christ, when He admonished them to flee from city to city if they were persecuted, might very well have taken that occasion to advise them to lay violent hands on themselves, and so escape their persecutors. But seeing He did not do this, nor proposed this mode of departing this life, though He were addressing His own friends for whom He had promised to prepare everlasting mansions, it is obvious that such examples as are produced from the “nations that forget God,” give no warrant of imitation to the worshippers of the one true God. > Latin: At enim multi se interemerunt, ne in manus hostium peruenirent. Non modo quaerimus utrum sit factum, sed utrum fuerit faciendum. Sana quippe ratio etiam exemplis anteponenda est, cui quidem et exempla concordant, sed illa, quae tanto digniora sunt imitatione, quanto excellentiora pietate. Non fecerunt patriarchae, non prophetae, non apostoli, quia et ipse Dominus Christus, quando eos, si persecutionem paterentur, fugere admonuit de ciuitate in ciuitatem, potuit admonere ut sibi manus inferrent, ne in manus persequentium peruenirent. Porro si hoc ille non iussit aut monuit, ut eo modo sui ex hac uita emigrarent, quibus migrantibus mansiones aeternas praeparaturum esse se promisit, quaelibet exempla proponant gentes, quae ignorant Deum, manifestum est hoc non licere colentibus unum uerum Deum. ### What We are to Think of the Example of Cato, Who Slew Himself Because Unable to Endure Cæsar’s Victory. [¶23] Chapter 23.—What We are to Think of the Example of Cato, Who Slew Himself Because Unable to Endure Cæsar’s Victory. > Latin: Caput XXIII. Quale exemplum sit Catonis, qui se uictoriam Caesaris non ferens interemit. [¶24] Besides Lucretia, of whom enough has already been said, our advocates of suicide have some difficulty in finding any other prescriptive example, unless it be that of Cato, who killed himself at Utica. His example is appealed to, not because he was the only man who did so, but because he was so esteemed as a learned and excellent man, that it could plausibly be maintained that what he did was and is a good thing to do. But of this action of his, what can I say but that his own friends, enlightened men as he, prudently dissuaded him, and therefore judged his act to be that of a feeble rather than a strong spirit, and dictated not by honorable feeling forestalling shame, but by weakness shrinking from hardships? Indeed, Cato condemns himself by the advice he gave to his dearly loved son. For if it was a disgrace to live under Cæsar’s rule, why did the father urge the son to this disgrace, by encouraging him to trust absolutely to Cæsar’s generosity? Why did he not persuade him to die along with himself? If Torquatus was applauded for putting his son to death, when contrary to orders he had engaged, and engaged successfully, with the enemy, why did conquered Cato spare his conquered son, though he did not spare himself? Was it more disgraceful to be a victor contrary to orders, than to submit to a victor contrary to the received ideas of honor? Cato, then, cannot have deemed it to be shameful to live under Cæsar’s rule; for had he done so, the father’s sword would have delivered his son from this disgrace. The truth is, that his son, whom he both hoped and desired would be spared by Cæsar, was not more loved by him than Cæsar was envied the glory of pardoning him (as indeed Cæsar himself is reported to have said); or if envy is too strong a word, let us say he was ashamed that this glory should be his. > Latin: Sed tamen etiam illi praeter Lucretiam, de qua supra [satis] quod uidebatur diximus, non facile reperiunt de cuius auctoritate praescribant, nisi illum Catonem, qui se Uticae occidit; non quia solus id fecit, sed quia uir doctus et probus habebatur, ut merito putetur etiam recte fieri potuisse uel posse quod fecit. De cuius facto quid potissimum dicam, nisi quod amici eius etiam docti quidam uiri, qui hoc fieri prudentius dissuadebant, inbecillioris quam fortioris animi facinus esse censuerunt, quo demonstraretur non honestas turpia praecauens, sed infirmitas aduersa non sustinens? Hoc et ipse Cato in suo carissimo filio iudicauit. Nam si turpe erat sub uictoria Caesaris uiuere, quur auctor huius turpitudinis filio fuit, quem de Caesaris benignitate omnia sperare praecepit? Quur non et illum secum coegit ad mortem? Nam si eum filium, qui contra imperium in hostem pugnauerat, etiam uictorem laudabiliter Torquatus occidit, quur uictus uicto filio pepercit Cato, qui non pepercit sibi? An turpius erat contra imperium esse uictorem, quam contra decus ferre uictorem? Nullo modo igitur Cato turpe esse iudicauit sub uictore Caesare uiuere; alioquin ab hac turpitudine paterno ferro filium liberaret. Quid [est] ergo, nisi quod filium quantum amauit, cui parci a Caesare et sperauit et uoluit, tantum gloriae ipsius Caesaris, ne ab illo etiam sibi parceretur, ut ipse Caesar dixisse fertur, inuidit — [aut] ut aliquid nos mitius dicamus, erubuit?