--- title: "City of God · De civitate Dei" author: "Augustine" translator: "Marcus Dods" languages: [la, en] shelf: "Church Fathers" section: 94 of 116 url: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/94/ cite: "Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods, City of God · De civitate Dei, section 94. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/94/" --- # City of God · De civitate Dei *Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods* “Two loves have made two cities.” Augustine’s Latin, in Hoffmann’s critical text, beside Dods’s English, chapter by chapter. > Latin: Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. Emanuel Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1899–1900), as encoded by the Open Greek and Latin project, University of Leipzig (stoa0040.stoa003.opp-lat3, CC BY-SA 4.0); apparatus omitted. > English: Marcus Dods, The City of God (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2, 1887). > Chapters are matched one to one except where the two editions divide them differently; within a chapter the Latin sentences are shared out over the English paragraphs by position. ## 94. Whether We Should Believe What Some Think, That, as the Ten Persecutions Which are Past Have Been Fulfilled, There Remains No Other Beyond the Eleventh, Which Must Happen in the Very Time of Antichrist. Source: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/94/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/94/#p-N [¶0] Chapter 52.—Whether We Should Believe What Some Think, That, as the Ten Persecutions Which are Past Have Been Fulfilled, There Remains No Other Beyond the Eleventh, Which Must Happen in the Very Time of Antichrist. > Latin: Caput LII. An credendum sit, quod quidam putant, inpletis decem persecutionibus, quae fuerunt, nullam iam superesse praeter undecimam, quae in ipso Antichristi tempore sit futura. [¶1] I do not think, indeed, that what some have thought or may think is rashly said or believed, that until the time of Antichrist the Church of Christ is not to suffer any persecutions besides those she has already suffered,—that is, ten,—and that the eleventh and last shall be inflicted by Antichrist. They reckon as the first that made by Nero, the second by Domitian, the third by Trajan, the fourth by Antoninus, the fifth by Severus, the sixth by Maximin, the seventh by Decius, the eighth by Valerian, the ninth by Aurelian, the tenth by Diocletian and Maximian. For as there were ten plagues in Egypt before the people of God could begin to go out, they think this is to be referred to as showing that the last persecution by Antichrist must be like the eleventh plague, in which the Egyptians, while following the Hebrews with hostility, perished in the Red Sea when the people of God passed through on dry land. Yet I do not think persecutions were prophetically signified by what was done in Egypt, however nicely and ingeniously those who think so may seem to have compared the two in detail, not by the prophetic Spirit, but by the conjecture of the human mind, which sometimes hits the truth, and sometimes is deceived. But what can those who think this say of the persecution in which the Lord Himself was crucified? In which number will they put it? And if they think the reckoning is to be made exclusive of this one, as if those must be counted which pertain to the body, and not that in which the Head Himself was set upon and slain, what can they make of that one which, after Christ ascended into heaven, took place in Jerusalem, when the blessed Stephen was stoned; when James the brother of John was slaughtered with the sword; when the Apostle Peter was imprisoned to be killed, and was set free by the angel; when the brethren were driven away and scattered from Jerusalem; when Saul, who afterward became the Apostle Paul, wasted the Church; and when he himself, publishing the glad tidings of the faith he had persecuted, suffered such things as he had inflicted, either from the Jews or from other nations, where he most fervently preached Christ everywhere? Why, then, do they think fit to start with Nero, when the Church in her growth had reached the times of Nero amid the most cruel persecutions; about which it would be too long to say anything? But if they think that only the persecutions made by kings ought to be reckoned, it was king Herod who also made a most grievous one after the ascension of the Lord. And what account do they give of Julian, whom they do not number in the ten? Did not he persecute the Church, who forbade the Christians to teach or learn liberal letters? Under him the elder Valentinian, who was the third emperor after him, stood forth as a confessor of the Christian faith, and was dismissed from his command in the army. I shall say nothing of what he did at Antioch, except to mention his being struck with wonder at the freedom and cheerfulness of one most faithful and steadfast young man, who, when many were seized to be tortured, was tortured during a whole day, and sang under the instrument of torture, until the emperor feared lest he should succumb under the continued cruelties and put him to shame at last, which made him dread and fear that he would be yet more dishonorably put to the blush by the rest. Lastly, within our own recollection, did not Valens the Arian, brother of the foresaid Valentinian, waste the catholic Church by great persecution throughout the East? But how unreasonable it is not to consider that the Church, which bears fruit and grows through the whole world, may suffer persecution from kings in some nations even when she does not suffer it in others! Perhaps, however, it was not to be reckoned a persecution when the king of the Goths, in Gothia itself, persecuted the Christians with wonderful cruelty, when there were none but catholics there, of whom very many were crowned with martyrdom, as we have heard from certain brethren who had been there at that time as boys, and unhesitatingly called to mind that they had seen these things? And what took place in Persia of late? Was not persecution so hot against the Christians (if even yet it is allayed) that some of the fugitives from it came even to Roman towns? When I think of these and the like things, it does not seem to me that the number of persecutions with which the Church is to be tried can be definitely stated. But, on the other hand, it is no less rash to affirm that there will be some persecutions by kings besides that last one, about which no Christian is in doubt. Therefore we leave this undecided, supporting or refuting neither side of this question, but only restraining men from the audacious presumption of affirming either of them. > Latin: Proinde ne illud quidem temere puto esse dicendum siue credendum, quod nonnullis uisum est uel uidetur, non amplius ecclesiam passuram persecutiones usque ad tempus Antichristi. quam quot iam passa est, id est decem, ut undecima eademque nouissima sit ab Antichristo. Primam quippe conputant a Nerone quae facta est, secundam a Domitiano, a Traiano tertiam, quartam ab Antonino, a Seuero quintam, sextam a Maximino, a Decio septimam, octauam a Valeriano, ab Aureliano nonam, decimam a Diocletiano et Maximiano. Plagas enim Aegyptiorum, quoniam decem fuerunt, antequam exire inde inciperet populus Dei, putant ad hunc intellectum esse referendas, ut nouissima Antichristi persecutio similis uideatur undecimae plagae, qua Aegyptii, dum hostiliter sequerentur Hebraeos, in mari Rubro populo Dei per siccum transeunte perierunt. Sed ego illa re gesta in Aegypto istas persecutiones prophetice significatas esse non arbitror; quamuis ab eis. qui hoc putant, exquisite et ingeniose illa singula his singulis conpai-ata uideantur, non prophetico spiritu, sed coniectura mentis humanae, quae aliquando ad uerum peruenit, aliquando fallitur. Quid enim, qui hoc sentiunt, dicturi sunt de persecutione, qua ipse Dominus crucifixus est? in quo eam numero posituri? Si autem hac excepta existimant conputandum, tamquam illae numerandae sint, quae ad corpus pertinent, non qua ipsum caput est adpetitum et occisum: quid agent de illa. quae, postea quam Christus adscendit in caelum, Hierosolymis facta est, ubi beatus Stephanus lapidatus est, ubi Iacobus frater Iohannis gladio trucidatus, ubi apostolus Petrus ut occideretur inclusus et per angelum liberatus, ubi fugati adque dispersi de Hierosolymis fratres, ubi Saulus, qui postea Paulus apostolus factus est, uastabat ecclesiam, ubi ipse quoque iam fidem, quam persequebatur, euangelizans, qualia faciebat, est passus, siue per Iudaeam siue per alias gentes, quacumque Christum feruentissimus praedicabat? Quur ergo eis a Nerone uidetur ordiendum, cum ad Neronis tempora inter atrocissimas persecutiones, de quibus nimis longum est cuncta dicere, ecclesia crescendo peruenerit? Quod si a regibus factas persecutiones in numero existimant esse debere: rex fuit Herodes, qui etiam post adscensum Domini grauissimam fecit. Deinde quid respondent etiam de Iuliano, quem non numerant in decem? An ipse non est ecclesiam persecutus, qui Christianos liberales litteras docere ac discere uetuit? Sub quo Valentinianus maior, qui post eum tertius imperator fuit, fidei Christianae confessor exstitit militiaque priuatus est; ut omittam quae aput Antiochiam facere coeperat, nisi unius fidelissimi et constantissimi iuuenis, qui multis, ut torquerentur, adprehensis per totum diem primus est tortus, inter ungulas cruciatusque psallentis libertatem adque hilaritatem miratus horruisset et in ceteris deformius erubescere timuisset. Postremo nostra memoria Valens, supradicti Valentiniani frater, Arianus, nonne magna persecutione per Orientis partes catholicam uastauit ecclesiam? Quale est autem, non considerare ecclesiam per totum mundum fructificantem adque crescentem posse in aliquibus gentibus persecutionem pati a regibus, et quando in aliis non patitur? Nisi forte non est persecutio conputanda, quando rex Gothorum in ipsa Gothia persecutus est Christianos crudelitate mirabili, cum ibi non essent nisi catholici, quorum plurimi martyrio coronati sunt, sicut a quibusdam fratribus, qui tunc illic pueri fuerant et se ista uidisse incunctanter recordabantur, audiuimus? Quid modo in Perside? Nonne ita in Christianos ferbuit persecutio (si tamen iam quieuit), ut fugientes inde nonnulli usque ad Romana oppida peruenerint? Haec adque huius modi mihi cogitanti non uidetur esse definiendus numerus persecutionum, quibus exerceri oportet ecclesiam. Sed rursus adfirmare aliquas futuras a regibus praeter illam nouissimam, de qua nullus ambigit Christianus, non minoris est temeritatis. Itaque hoc in medio relinquimus neutram partem quaestionis huius adstruentes siue destruentes, sed tantummodo ab adfirmandi quodlibet horum audaci praesumtione reuocantes. ### Of the Hidden Time of the Final Persecution. [¶3] Chapter 53.—Of the Hidden Time of the Final Persecution. > Latin: Caput LIII. De tempore nouissimae persecutionis nulli hominum reuelato. [¶4] Truly Jesus Himself shall extinguish by His presence that last persecution which is to be made by Antichrist. For so it is written, that “He shall slay him with the breath of His mouth, and empty him with the brightness of His presence.” It is customary to ask, When shall that be? But this is quite unreasonable. For had it been profitable for us to know this, by whom could it better have been told than by God Himself, the Master, when the disciples questioned Him? For they were not silent when with Him, but inquired of Him, saying, “Lord, wilt Thou at this time present the kingdom to Israel, or when?” But He said, “It is not for you to know the times, which the Father hath put in His own power.” When they got that answer, they had not at all questioned Him about the hour, or day, or year, but about the time. In vain, then, do we attempt to compute definitely the years that may remain to this world, when we may hear from the mouth of the Truth that it is not for us to know this. Yet some have said that four hundred, some five hundred, others a thousand years, may be completed from the ascension of the Lord up to His final coming. But to point out how each of them supports his own opinion would take too long, and is not necessary; for indeed they use human conjectures, and bring forward nothing certain from the authority of the canonical Scriptures. But on this subject He puts aside the figures of the calculators, and orders silence, who says, “It is not for you to know the times, which the Father hath put in His own power.” > Latin: Illam sane nouissimam persecutionem, quae ab Antichristo futura est, praesentia sua exstinguet ipse Iesus. Sic enim scriptum est, quod eum interficiet spiritu oris sui et euacuabit inluminatione praesentiae suae. Hic quaeri solet: Quando istud erit? Inportune omnino. Si enim hoc nobis nosse prodesset, a quo melius quam ab ipso Deo magistro interrogantibus discipulis diceretur? Non enim siluerunt inde aput eum, sed a praesente quaesierunt dicentes: Domine, si hoc tempore repraesentabis regnum Israel? At ille: Non est, inquit, uestrum scire tempora, quae Pater posuit in sua potestate. Non utique illi de hora uel die uel anno, sed de tempore interrogauerant, quando istud accepere responsum. Frustra igitur annos, qui remanent huic saeculo, conputare ac definire conamur, cum hoc scire non esse nostrum ex ore Veritatis audiamus; quos tamen alii quadringentos, alii quingentos, alii etiam mille ab adscensione Domini usque ad eius ultimum aduentum conpleri posse dixerunt. Quem ad modum autem quisque eorum adstruat opinionem suam, longum est demonstrare et non necessarium. Coniecturis quippe utuntur humanis, non ab eis aliquid certum de scripturae canonicae auctoritate profertur. Omnium uero de hac re calculantium digitos resoluit et quiescere iubet ille, qui dicit: Non est uestrum scire tempora, quae Pater posuit in sua potestate. [¶5] But because this sentence is in the Gospel, it is no wonder that the worshippers of the many and false gods have been none the less restrained from feigning that by the responses of the demons, whom they worship as gods, it has been fixed how long the Christian religion is to last. For when they saw that it could not be consumed by so many and great persecutions, but rather drew from them wonderful enlargements, they invented I know not what Greek verses, as if poured forth by a divine oracle to some one consulting it, in which, indeed, they make Christ innocent of this, as it were, sacrilegious crime, but add that Peter by enchantments brought it about that the name of Christ should be worshipped for three hundred and sixty-five years, and, after the completion of that number of years, should at once take end. Oh the hearts of learned men! Oh, learned wits, meet to believe such things about Christ as you are not willing to believe in Christ, that His disciple Peter did not learn magic arts from Him, yet that, although He was innocent, His disciple was an enchanter, and chose that His name rather than his own should be worshipped through his magic arts, his great labors and perils, and at last even the shedding of his blood! If Peter the enchanter made the world so love Christ, what did Christ the innocent do to make Peter so love Him? Let them answer themselves then, and, if they can, let them understand that the world, for the sake of eternal life, was made to love Christ by that same supernal grace which made Peter also love Christ for the sake of the eternal life to be received from Him, and that even to the extent of suffering temporal death for Him. And then, what kind of gods are these who are able to predict such things, yet are not able to avert them, succumbing in such a way to a single enchanter and wicked magician (who, as they say, having slain a yearling boy and torn him to pieces, buried him with nefarious rites), that they permitted the sect hostile to themselves to gain strength for so great a time, and to surmount the horrid cruelties of so many great persecutions, not by resisting but by suffering, and to procure the overthrow of their own images, temples, rituals, and oracles? Finally, what god was it—not ours, certainly, but one of their own—who was either enticed or compelled by so great wickedness to perform these things? For those verses say that Peter bound, not any demon, but a god to do these things. Such a god have they who have not Christ. > Latin: Sed haec quia euangelica sententia est, mirum non est non ea repressos fuisse deorum multorum falsorumque cultores, quominus fingerent daemonum responsis, quos tamquam deos colunt, definitum esse quanto tempore mansura esset religio Christiana. Cum enim uiderent nec tot tantisque persecutionibus eam potuisse consumi, sed his potius mira incrementa sumsisse, excogitauerunt nescio quos uersus Graecos tamquam consulenti cuidam diuino oraculo effusos, ubi Christum quidem ab huius tamquam sacrilegii crimine faciunt innocentem. Petrum autem maleficia fecisse subiungunt, ut coleretur Christi nomen per trecentos sexaginta quinque annos, deinde conpleto memorato numero annorum, sine mora sumeret finem.s o hominum corda doctorum!s o ingenia litterata digna credere ista de Christo, quae credere non uultis in Christum, quod eius discipulus Petrus ab eo magicas artes non didicerit, sed, ipso innocente, tamen eius maleficus fuerit nomenque illius quam suum coli maluerit magicis artibus suis, magnis laboribus et periculis suis, postremo etiam effusione sanguinis sui! Si Petrus maleficus fecit, ut Christum sic diligeret mundus, quid fecit innocens Christus, ut eum sic diligeret Petrus? Respondeant igitur ipsi sibi et si possunt intellegant illa superna gratia factum esse, ut propter aeternam uitam Christum diligeret mundus, qua gratia factum est, ut et propter aeternam uitam ab illo accipiendam et usque ad temporariam mortem pro illo patiendam Christum diligeret Petrus. Deinde isti di qui sunt, qui possunt ista praedicere nec possunt auertere, ita succumbentes uni malefico et uni sceleri magico, quo puer, ut dicunt, anniculus occisus et dilaniatus et ritu nefario sepultus est, ut sectam sibi aduersariam tam prolixo tempore conualescere, tot tantarumque persecutionum horrendas crudelitates non resistendo, sed patiendo superare et ad suorum simulacrorum templorum, sacrorum oraculorum euersionem peruenire permitterent? Quis postremo est deus, non noster utique, sed ipsorum, qui uel inlectus tanto scelere uel inpulsus est ista praestare? Non enim alicui daemoni, sed deo dicunt illi uersus haec Petrum arte magica definisse. Talem deum habent, qui Christum non habent. ### Of the Very Foolish Lie of the Pagans, in Feigning that the Christian Religion Was Not to Last Beyond Three Hundred and Sixty-Five Years. [¶7] Chapter 54.—Of the Very Foolish Lie of the Pagans, in Feigning that the Christian Religion Was Not to Last Beyond Three Hundred and Sixty-Five Years. > Latin: Caput LIV. De stultissimo mendacio paganorum, quo Christianam religionem non ultra trecentos sexaginta quinque annos mansuram esse finxerunt. [¶8] I might collect these and many similar arguments, if that year had not already passed by which lying divination has promised, and deceived vanity has believed. But as a few years ago three hundred and sixty-five years were completed since the time when the worship of the name of Christ was established by His presence in the flesh, and by the apostles, what other proof need we seek to refute that falsehood? For, not to place the beginning of this period at the nativity of Christ, because as an infant and boy He had no disciples, yet, when He began to have them, beyond doubt the Christian doctrine and religion then became known through His bodily presence, that is, after He was baptized in the river Jordan by the ministry of John. For on this account that prophecy went before concerning Him: “He shall reign from sea even to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth.” But since, before He suffered and rose from the dead, the faith had not yet been defined to all, but was defined in the resurrection of Christ (for so the Apostle Paul speaks to the Athenians, saying, “But now He announces to men that all everywhere should repent, because He hath appointed a day in which to judge the world in equity, by the Man in whom He hath defined the faith to all men, raising Him from the dead”), it is better that, in settling this question, we should start from that point, especially because the Holy Spirit was then given, just as He behoved to be given after the resurrection of Christ in that city from which the second law, that is, the new testament, ought to begin. For the first, which is called the old testament was given from Mount Sinai through Moses. But concerning this which was to be given by Christ it was predicted, “Out of Sion shall go forth the law and the word of the Lord out of Jerusalem;” whence He Himself said that repentance in His name behoved to be preached among all nations, but yet beginning at Jerusalem. There, therefore, the worship of this name took its rise, that Jesus should be believed in, who died and rose again. There this faith blazed up with such noble beginnings, that several thousand men, being converted to the name of Christ with wonderful alacrity, sold their goods for distribution among the needy, thus, by a holy resolution and most ardent charity, coming to voluntary poverty, and prepared themselves, amid the Jews who raged and thirsted for their blood, to contend for the truth even to death, not with armed power, but with more powerful patience. If this was accomplished by no magic arts, why do they hesitate to believe that the other could be done throughout the whole world by the same divine power by which this was done? But supposing Peter wrought that enchantment so that so great a multitude of men at Jerusalem was thus kindled to worship the name of Christ, who had either seized and fastened Him to the cross, or reviled Him when fastened there, we must still inquire when the three hundred and sixty-five years must be completed, counting from that year. Now Christ died when the Gemini were consuls, on the eighth day before the kalends of April. He rose the third day, as the apostles have proved by the evidence of their own senses. Then forty days after, He ascended into heaven. Ten days after, that is, on the fiftieth after his resurrection, He sent the Holy Spirit; then three thousand men believed when the apostles preached Him. Then, therefore, arose the worship of that name, as we believe, and according to the real truth, by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, but, as impious vanity has feigned or thought, by the magic arts of Peter. A little afterward, too, on a wonderful sign being wrought, when at Peter’s own word a certain beggar, so lame from his mother’s womb that he was carried by others and laid down at the gate of the temple, where he begged alms, was made whole in the name of Jesus Christ, and leaped up, five thousand men believed, and thenceforth the Church grew by sundry accessions of believers. Thus we gather the very day with which that year began, namely, that on which the Holy Spirit was sent, that is, during the ides of May. And, on counting the consuls, the three hundred and sixty-five years are found completed on the same ides in the consulate of Honorius and Eutychianus. Now, in the following year, in the consulate of Mallius Theodorus, when, according to that oracle of the demons or figment of men, there ought already to have been no Christian religion, it was not necessary to inquire, what perchance was done in other parts of the earth. But, as we know, in the most noted and eminent city, Carthage, in Africa, Gaudentius and Jovius, officers of the Emperor Honorius, on the fourteenth day before the kalends of April, overthrew the temples and broke the images of the false gods. And from that time to the present, during almost thirty years, who does not see how much the worship of the name of Christ has increased, especially after many of those became Christians who had been kept back from the faith by thinking that divination true, but saw when that same number of years was completed that it was empty and ridiculous? We, therefore, who are called and are Christians, do not believe in Peter, but in Him whom Peter believed,—being edified by Peter’s sermons about Christ, not poisoned by his incantations; and not deceived by his enchantments, but aided by his good deeds. Christ Himself, who was Peter’s Master in the doctrine which leads to eternal life, is our Master too. > Latin: Haec adque huius modi multa colligerem, si nondum annus ipse transisset, quem diuinatio ficta promisit et decepta uanitas credidit. Cum uero, ex quo nominis Christi cultus per eius in carne praesentiam et per apostolos institutus est, ante aliquot annos anni trecenti sexaginta quinque conpleti sint, quid aliud quaerimus, unde ista falsitas refellatur? Ut enim in Christi natiuitate huius rei non ponamus initium, quia infans et puer discipulos non habebat, tamen quando habere coepit, procul dubio tunc innotuit per eius corporalem praesentiam doctrina et religio Christiana, id est, postea quam in fluuio Iordane ministerio Iohannis est baptizatus. Propter hoc enim de illo prophetia illa praecesserat: Dominabitur a mari usque ad mare et a flumine usque ad terminos orbis terrae. Sed quoniam, priusquam passus esset et resurrexisset a mortuis, nondum fides omnibus fuerat definita (in resurrectione quippe Christi definita est, nam sic apostolus Paulus Atheniensibus loquitur dicens: Iam nunc adnuntiat hominibus omnes ubique agere paenitentiam, eo quod statuit diem iudicare orbem in aequitate in uiro quo definiuit fidem omnibus resuscitans illum a mortuis): melius in hac quaestione soluenda inde initium sumimus; praesertim quia tunc datus est etiam Spiritus sanctus, sicut eum dari post resurrectionem Christi oportebat in ea ciuitate, ex qua debuit incipere lex secunda, hoc est testamentum nouum. Prima enim fuit ex monte Sina per Moysen, quod testamentum uocatur uetus. De hac autem. quae per Christum danda erat, praedictum est: Ex Sion lex prodiet et uerbum Domini ex Hierusalem. Unde et ipse per omnes gentes dixit praedicari oportere in nomine suo paenitentiam, sed tamen incipientibus ab Hierusalem. Ibi ergo exorsus est huius nominis cultus, ut in legum Christum, qui crucifixus fuerat et resurrexerat, crederetur. Ibi haec fides tam insignibus initiis incanduit, ut aliquot hominum milia in Christi nomen mirabili alacritate conuersa uenditis suis rebus, ut egenis distribuerentur, proposito sancto et ardentissima caritate ad paupertatem uoluntariam peruenirent adque inter frementes et sanguinem sitientes Iudaeos se usque ad mortem pro ueritate certare non armata potentia, sed potentiore patientia praepararent. Hoc si nullis magicis artibus factum est, quur credere dubitant eadem uirtute diuina per totum mundum id fieri potuisse, qua hoc factum est? Si autem ut Hierosolymis sic ad cultum nominis Christi accenderetur tanta hominum multitudo, quae illum in cruce uel fixerat prensum uel riserat fixum, iam maleficium illud fecerat Petrus, ex ipso anno quaerendum est, quando trecenti sexaginta quinque conpleti sint. Mortuus est ergo Christus duobus Geminis consulibus octauo Kalendas Aprilis. Resurreiit tertio die, sicut apostoli suis etiam sensibus probauerunt. Deinde post quadraginta dies adscendit in caelum; post decem dies, id est quinquagensimo post suam resurrectionem die, misit Spiritum sanctum. Tunc tria milia hominum apostolis eum praedicantibus crediderunt. Tunc itaque nominis illius cultus exorsus est, sicut nos credimus et ueritas habet, efficacia Spiritus sancti; sicut autem finxit uanitas inpia uel putauit, magicis artibus Petri. Paulo post etiam signo mirabili facto, quando ad uerbum ipsius Petri quidam mendicus ab utero matris ita claudus, ut ab aliis portaretur et ad portam templi, ubi stipem peteret, poneretur, in nomine Iesu Christi saluus exsiliuit, quinque hominum milia crediderunt; ac deinde aliis adque aliis accessibus credentium creuit ecclesia. Ac per hoc colligitur etiam dies, ex quo annus ipse sumsit initium, scilicet quando missus est Spiritus sanctus, id est per Idus Maias. Numeratis proinde consulibus trecenti sexaginta quinque anni reperiuntur inpleti per easdem Idus consulatu Honorii et Eutychiani. Porro sequenti anno, consule Mallio Theodoro, quando iam secundum illud oraculum daemonum aut figmentum hominum nulla esse debuit religio Christiana, quid per alias terrarum partes forsitan factum sit, non fuit necesse perquirere; interim, quod scimus, in ciuitate notissima et eminentissima Carthagine Africae Gaudentius et Iouius comites imperatoris Honorii quarto decimo Kalendas Aprilis falsorum deorum templa euerterunt et simulacra fregerunt. Ex quo usque ad hoc tempus per triginta ferme annos quis non uideat quantum creuerit cultus nominis Christi. praesertim postea quam multi eorum Christiani facti sunt, qui tamquam uera illa diuinatione reuocabantur a fide eamque conpleto eodem numero annorum inanem ridendamque uiderunt? Nos ergo, qui sumus uocamurque Christiani, non in Petrum credimus, sed in quem credidit Petrus; Petri de Christo aedificati sermonibus, non carminibus uenenati; nec decepti maleficiis, sed beneficiis eius adiuti. Ille Petri magister Christus in doctrina, quae ad uitam ducit aeternam, ipse est magister et noster. [¶9] But let us now at last finish this book, after thus far treating of, and showing as far as seemed sufficient, what is the mortal course of the two cities, the heavenly and the earthly, which are mingled together from the beginning down to the end. Of these, the earthly one has made to herself of whom she would, either from any other quarter, or even from among men, false gods whom she might serve by sacrifice; but she which is heavenly and is a pilgrim on the earth does not make false gods, but is herself made by the true God of whom she herself must be the true sacrifice. Yet both alike either enjoy temporal good things, or are afflicted with temporal evils, but with diverse faith, diverse hope, and diverse love, until they must be separated by the last judgment, and each must receive her own end, of which there is no end. About these ends of both we must next treat. > Latin: Sed aliquando iam concludamus hunc librum, huc usque disserentes et quantum satis uisum est demonstrantes, quisnam sit duarum ciuitatum, caelestis adque terrenae, ab initio usque in finem permixtarum mortalis excursus; quarum illa, quae terrena est, fecit sibi quos uoluit uel undecumque uel etiam ex hominibus falsos deos, quibus sacrificando seruiret; illa autem, quae caelestis peregrinatur in terra, falsos deos non facit, sed a uero Deo ipsa fit, cuius uerum sacrificium ipsa sit. Ambae tamen temporalibus uel bonis pariter utuntur uel malis pariter adfliguntur, diuersa fide, diuersa spe, diuerso amore, donec ultimo iudicio separentur, et percipiat unaquaeque suum finem, cuius nullus est finis; de quibus ambarum finibus deinceps disserendum est. ### A review of the philosophical opinions regarding the Supreme Good, and a comparison of these opinions with the Christian belief regarding happiness. [¶11] Book XIX. > Latin: Liber XIX [¶12] Argument—In this book the end of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, is discussed. Augustin reviews the opinions of the philosophers regarding the supreme good, and their vain efforts to make for themselves a happiness in this life; and, while he refutes these, he takes occasion to show what the peace and happiness belonging to the heavenly city, or the people of Christ, are both now and hereafter. ### That Varro Has Made Out that Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Different Sects of Philosophy Might Be Formed by the Various Opinions Regarding the Supreme Good. [¶14] Chapter 1.—That Varro Has Made Out that Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Different Sects of Philosophy Might Be Formed by the Various Opinions Regarding the Supreme Good. > Latin: Caput I. Quod in quaestione, quam de finibus bonorum etmalorum philosophica disputatio uentilauit, ducentas octo- ginta et octo sectas esse posse Varro perspexerit. [¶15] As I see that I have still to discuss the fit destinies of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, I must first explain, so far as the limits of this work allow me, the reasonings by which men have attempted to make for themselves a happiness in this unhappy life, in order that it may be evident, not only from divine authority, but also from such reasons as can be adduced to unbelievers, how the empty dreams of the philosophers differ from the hope which God gives to us, and from the substantial fulfillment of it which He will give us as our blessedness. Philosophers have expressed a great variety of diverse opinions regarding the ends of goods and of evils, and this question they have eagerly canvassed, that they might, if possible, discover what makes a man happy. For the end of our good is that for the sake of which other things are to be desired, while it is to be desired for its own sake; and the end of evil is that on account of which other things are to be shunned, while it is avoided on its own account. Thus, by the end of good, we at present mean, not that by which good is destroyed, so that it no longer exists, but that by which it is finished, so that it becomes complete; and by the end of evil we mean, not that which abolishes it, but that which completes its development. These two ends, therefore, are the supreme good and the supreme evil; and, as I have said, those who have in this vain life professed the study of wisdom have been at great pains to discover these ends, and to obtain the supreme good and avoid the supreme evil in this life. And although they erred in a variety of ways, yet natural insight has prevented them from wandering from the truth so far that they have not placed the supreme good and evil, some in the soul, some in the body, and some in both. From this tripartite distribution of the sects of philosophy, Marcus Varro, in his book De Philosophia, has drawn so large a variety of opinions, that, by a subtle and minute analysis of distinctions, he numbers without difficulty as many as 288 sects,—not that these have actually existed, but sects which are possible. > Latin: Quoniam de ciuitatis utriusque, terrenae scilicet et caelestis, debitis finibus deinceps mihi uideo disputandum: prius exponenda sunt, quantum operis huius terminandi ratio patitur, argumenta mortalium, quibus sibi ipsi beatitudinem facere in huius uitae infelicitate moliti sunt, ut ab eorum rebus uanis spes nostra quid differat, quam Deus nobis dedit, et res ipsa, hoc est uera beatitudo, quam dabit, non tantum auctoritate diuina, sed adhibita etiam ratione, qualem propter infideles possumus adhibere, clarescat. De finibus enim bonorum et malorum multa et multipliciter inter se philosophi disputarunt; quam quaestionem maxima intentione uersantes inuenire conati sunt, quid efficiat hominem beatum. Illud enim est finis boni nostri, propter quod adpetenda sunt cetera, ipsum autem propter se ipsum; et illud finis mali, propter quod uitanda sunt cetera, ipsum autem propter se ipsum. Finem boni ergo nunc dicimus, non quo consumatur, ut non sit, sed quo perficiatur, ut plenum sit; et finem mali, non quo esse desinat, sed quo usque nocendo perducat. Fines itaque isti sunt summum bonum et summum malum. De quibus inueniendis adque in hac uita summo bono adipiscendo, uitando autem summo malo, multum, sicut dixi, laborauerunt, qui studium sapientiae in saeculi huius uanitate professi sunt; nec tamen eos, quamuis diuersis errantes modis, naturae limes in tantum ab itinere ueritatis deuiare permisit, ut non alii in animo, alii in corpore, alii in utroque fines bonorum ponerent et malorum. Ex qua tripertita uelut generalium distributione sectarum Marcus Varro in libro de philosophia tam multam dogmatum uarietatem diligenter et subtiliter scrutatus aduertit, ut ad ducentas octoginta et octo sectas, non quae iam essent, sed quae esse possent, adhibens quasdam differentias facillime perueniret. [¶16] To illustrate briefly what he means, I must begin with his own introductory statement in the above-mentioned book, that there are four things which men desire, as it were by nature without a master, without the help of any instruction, without industry or the art of living which is called virtue, and which is certainly learned: either pleasure, which is an agreeable stirring of the bodily sense; or repose, which excludes every bodily inconvenience; or both these, which Epicurus calls by the one name, pleasure; or the primary objects of nature, which comprehend the things already named and other things, either bodily, such as health, and safety, and integrity of the members, or spiritual, such as the greater and less mental gifts that are found in men. Now these four things—pleasure, repose, the two combined, and the primary objects of nature—exist in us in such sort that we must either desire virtue on their account, or them for the sake of virtue, or both for their own sake; and consequently there arise from this distinction twelve sects, for each is by this consideration tripled. I will illustrate this in one instance, and, having done so, it will not be difficult to understand the others. According, then, as bodily pleasure is subjected, preferred, or united to virtue, there are three sects. It is subjected to virtue when it is chosen as subservient to virtue. Thus it is a duty of virtue to live for one’s country, and for its sake to beget children, neither of which can be done without bodily pleasure. For there is pleasure in eating and drinking, pleasure also in sexual intercourse. But when it is preferred to virtue, it is desired for its own sake, and virtue is chosen only for its sake, and to effect nothing else than the attainment or preservation of bodily pleasure. And this, indeed, is to make life hideous; for where virtue is the slave of pleasure it no longer deserves the name of virtue. Yet even this disgraceful distortion has found some philosophers to patronize and defend it. Then virtue is united to pleasure when neither is desired for the other’s sake, but both for their own. And therefore, as pleasure, according as it is subjected, preferred, or united to virtue, makes three sects, so also do repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the prime natural blessings, make their three sects each. For as men’s opinions vary, and these four things are sometimes subjected, sometimes preferred, and sometimes united to virtue, there are produced twelve sects. But this number again is doubled by the addition of one difference, viz., the social life; for whoever attaches himself to any of these sects does so either for his own sake alone, or for the sake of a companion, for whom he ought to wish what he desires for himself. And thus there will be twelve of those who think some one of these opinions should be held for their own sakes, and other twelve who decide that they ought to follow this or that philosophy not for their own sakes only, but also for the sake of others whose good they desire as their own. These twenty-four sects again are doubled, and become forty-eight by adding a difference taken from the New Academy. For each of these four and twenty sects can hold and defend their opinion as certain, as the Stoics defended the position that the supreme good of man consisted solely in virtue; or they can be held as probable, but not certain, as the New Academics did. There are, therefore, twenty-four who hold their philosophy as certainly true, other twenty-four who hold their opinions as probable, but not certain. Again, as each person who attaches himself to any of these sects may adopt the mode of life either of the Cynics or of the other philosophers, this distinction will double the number, and so make ninety-six sects. Then, lastly, as each of these sects may be adhered to either by men who love a life of ease, as those who have through choice or necessity addicted themselves to study, or by men who love a busy life, as those who, while philosophizing, have been much occupied with state affairs and public business, or by men who choose a mixed life, in imitation of those who have apportioned their time partly to erudite leisure, partly to necessary business: by these differences the number of the sects is tripled, and becomes 288. > Latin: Quod ut breuiter ostendam, inde oportet incipiam, quod ipse aduertit et posuit in libro memorato, quattuor esse quaedam, quae homines sine magistro, sine ullo doctrinae adminiculo, sine industria uel arte uiuendi, quae uirtus dicitur et procul dubio discitur, uelut naturaliter adpetunt, aut uoluptatem, qua delectabiliter mouetur corporis sensus, aut quietem, qua fit ut nullam molestiam corporis quisque patiatur, aut utramque, quam tamen uno nomine uoluptatis Epicurus appellat, aut uniuersaliter prima naturae, in quibus et haec sunt et alia, uel in corpore, ut membrorum integritas et salus adque incolumitas eius, uel in animo, ut sunt ea, quae uel parua uel magna in hominum reperiuntur ingeniis. Haec igitur quattuor, id est uoluptas, quies, utrumque, prima naturae, ita sunt in nobis, ut uel uirtus, quam postea doctrina inserit, propter haec adpetenda sit, aut ista propter uirtutem, aut utraque propter se ipsa; ac per hoc fiunt hinc duodecim sectae; per hanc enim rationem singulae triplicantur; quod cum in una demonstrauero, difficile non erit id in ceteris inuenire. Cum ergo uoluptas corporis animi uirtuti aut subditur aut praefertur aut iungitur, tripertita uariatur diuersitate sectarum. Subditur autem uirtuti, quando in usum uirtutis adsumitur. Pertinet quippe ad uirtutis officium et uiuere patriae et propter patriam filios procreare, quorum neutrum fieri potest sine corporis uoluptate; nam sine illa nec cibus potusque sumitur, ut uiuatur, nec concumbitur, ut generatio propagetur. Cum uero praefertur uirtuti, ipsa adpetitur propter se ipsam, uirtus autem adsumenda creditur propter illam, id est, ut nihil uirtus agat nisi ad consequendam uel conseruandam corporis uoluptatem; quae uita deformis est quidem, quippe ubi uirtus seruit dominae uoluptati, quamuis nullo modo haec dicenda sit uirtus; sed tamen etiam ista horribilis turpitudo habuit quosdam philosophos patronos et defensores suos. Virtuti porro uoluptas iungitur, quando neutra earum propter alteram, sed propter se ipsas ambae adpetuntur. Quapropter sicut uoluptas uel subdita uel praelata uel iuncta uirtuti tres sectas facit, ita quies, ita utrumque, ita prima naturae alias ternas inueniuntur efficere. Pro uarietate quippe humanarum opinionum uirtuti aliquando subduntur, aliquando praeferuntur, aliquando iunguntur, ac sic ad duodenarium sectarum numerum peruenitur. Sed iste quoque numerus duplicatur adhibita una differentia, socialis uidelicet uitae, quoniam, quisquis sectatur aliquam istarum duodecim sectam, profecto aut propter se tantum id agit aut etiam propter socium, cui debet hoc uelle quod sibi. Quocirca duodecim sunt eorum, qui propter se tantum unamquamque tenendam putant, et aliae duodecim eorum, qui non solum propter se sic uel sic philosophandum esse decernunt, sed etiam propter alios, quorum bonum adpetunt sicut suum. Hae autem sectae uiginti quattuor iterum geminantur addita differentia ex Academicis nouis et fiunt quadraginta octo. Illarum quippe uiginti quattuor unamquamque sectarum potest quisque sic tenere ac defendere ut certam, quem ad modum defenderunt Stoici, quod hominis bonum, quo beatus esset, in animi tantummodo uirtute consisteret; potest alius ut incertam, sicut defenderunt Academici noui, quod eis etsi non certum, tamen ueri simile uidebatur. Viginti quattuor ergo fiunt per eos, qui eas uelut certas propter ueritatem, et aliae uiginti quattuor per eos, qui easdem quamuis incertas propter ueri similitudinem sequendas putant. Rursus, quia unamquamque istarum quadraginta octo sectarum potest quisque sequi habitu ceterorum philosophorum, itemque alius potest habitu Cynicorum, ex hac etiam differentia duplicantur et nonaginta sex fiunt. Deinde quia earum singulas quasque ita tueri homines possunt adque sectari, ut aut otiosam diligant uitam, sicut hi, qui tantummodo studiis doctrinae uacare uoluerunt adque ualuerunt, aut negotiosam, sicut hi, qui cum philosopharentur tamen administratione rei publicae regendisque rebus humanis occupatissimi fuerunt,. aut ex utroque genere temperatam, sicut hi, qui partim erudito otio partim necessario negotio alternantia uitae suae tempora tribuerunt: propter has differentias potest etiam triplicari numerus iste sectarum et ad ducentas octoginta octo perduci. [¶17] I have thus, as briefly and lucidly as I could, given in my own words the opinions which Varro expresses in his book. But how he refutes all the rest of these sects, and chooses one, the Old Academy, instituted by Plato, and continuing to Polemo, the fourth teacher of that school of philosophy which held that their system was certain; and how on this ground he distinguishes it from the New Academy, which began with Polemo’s successor Arcesilaus, and held that all things are uncertain; and how he seeks to establish that the Old Academy was as free from error as from doubt,—all this, I say, were too long to enter upon in detail, and yet I must not altogether pass it by in silence. Varro then rejects, as a first step, all those differences which have multiplied the number of sects; and the ground on which he does so is that they are not differences about the supreme good. He maintains that in philosophy a sect is created only by its having an opinion of its own different from other schools on the point of the ends-in-chief. For man has no other reason for philosophizing than that he may be happy; but that which makes him happy is itself the supreme good. In other words, the supreme good is the reason of philosophizing; and therefore that cannot be called a sect of philosophy which pursues no way of its own towards the supreme good. Thus, when it is asked whether a wise man will adopt the social life, and desire and be interested in the supreme good of his friend as in his own, or will, on the contrary, do all that he does merely for his own sake, there is no question here about the supreme good, but only about the propriety of associating or not associating a friend in its participation: whether the wise man will do this not for his own sake, but for the sake of his friend in whose good he delights as in his own. So, too, when it is asked whether all things about which philosophy is concerned are to be considered uncertain, as by the New Academy, or certain, as the other philosophers maintain, the question here is not what end should be pursued, but whether or not we are to believe in the substantial existence of that end; or, to put it more plainly, whether he who pursues the supreme good must maintain that it is a true good, or only that it appears to him to be true, though possibly it may be delusive,—both pursuing one and the same good. The distinction, too, which is founded on the dress and manners of the Cynics, does not touch the question of the chief good, but only the question whether he who pursues that good which seems to himself true should live as do the Cynics. There were, in fact, men who, though they pursued different things as the supreme good, some choosing pleasure, others virtue, yet adopted that mode of life which gave the Cynics their name. Thus, whatever it is which distinguishes the Cynics from other philosophers, this has no bearing on the choice and pursuit of that good which constitutes happiness. For if it had any such bearing, then the same habits of life would necessitate the pursuit of the same chief good, and diverse habits would necessitate the pursuit of different ends. > Latin: Haec de Varronis libro, quantum potui, breuiter ac dilucide posui, sententias eius meis explicans uerbis. Quo modo autem refutatis ceteris unam eligat, quam uult esse Acaderaicorum ueterum (quos a Platone institutos usque ad Polemonem, qui ab illo quartus eius scholam tenuit, quae Academia dicta est, habuisse certa dogmata uult uideri et ob hoc distinguit ab Academicis nonis, quibus incerta sunt omnia, quod philosophiae genus ab Arcesila coepit successore Polemonis), eamque sectam, id est ueterum Academicorum, sicut dubitatione ita omni errore carere arbitretur, longum est per omnia demonstrare; nec tamen omni ex parte res omittenda est. Remouet ergo prius illas omnes differentias, quae numerum multiplicauere sectarum, quas ideo remouendas putat, quia non in eis est finis boni. Neque enim existimat ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distet a ceteris. quod diuersos habeat fines bonorum et malorum. Quando quidem nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit; quod autem beatum facit, ipse est finis boni; nulla est igitur causa philosophandi, nisi finis boni: quam ob rem quae nullum boni finem sectatur, nulla philosophiae secta dicenda est. Cum ergo quaeritur de sociali uita, utrum sit tenenda sapienti, ut summum bonum, quo fit homo beatus, ita uelit et curet amici sui, quem ad modum suum, an suae tantummodo beatitudinis causa faciat quidquid facit: non de ipso summo bono quaestio est, sed de adsumendo uel non adsumendo socio ad huius participationem boni, non propter se ipsum, sed propter eundem socium, ut eius bono ita gaudeat, sicut gaudet suo. Item cum quaeritur de Academicis nouis, quibus incerta sunt omnia, utrum ita sint res habendae, in quibus philosophandum est, an, sicut aliis philosophis placuit, certas eas habere debeamus: non quaeritur quid in boni fine sectandum sit, sed de ipsius boni ueritate, quod sectandum uidetur, utrum sit necne dubitandum; hoc est, ut id planius eloquar, utrum ita sectandum sit, ut, qui sectatur, dicat esse uerum, an ita, ut, qui sectatur, dicat uerum sibi uideri, etiamsi forte sit falsum, tamen uterque sectetur unum adque idem bonum. In illa etiam differentia, quae adhibetur ex habitu et consuetudine Cynicorum, non quaeritur, quisnam sit finis boni, sed utrum in illo habitu et consuetudine sit uiuendum ei, qui uerum sectatur bonum, quodlibet ei uerum uideatur esse adque sectandum. Denique fuerunt, qui cum diuersa sequerentur bona finalia, alii uirtutem, alii uoluptatem, eundem tamen habitum et consuetudinem tenebant, ex qua Cynici appellabantur. Ita illud quidquid est, unde philosophi Cynici discernuntur a ceteris, ad eligendum ac tenendum bonum, quo beati fierent, utique nil ualebat. Nam si aliquid ad hoc interesset, profecto idem habitus eundem finem sequi cogeret, et diuersus habitus eundem sequi finem non sineret. ### How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects, But are Merely Secondary Questions, Reaches Three Definitions of the Chief Good, of Which We Must Choose One. [¶19] Chapter 2.—How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects, But are Merely Secondary Questions, Reaches Three Definitions of the Chief Good, of Which We Must Choose One. > Latin: Caput II. .Quo modo remotis omnibus differentiis, quae non sectae, sed quaestiones sint, ad tripertitam summi boni definitionem Varro perueniat, quarum tamen una sit eligenda. [¶20] The same may be said of those three kinds of life, the life of studious leisure and search after truth, the life of easy engagement in affairs, and the life in which both these are mingled. When it is asked, which of these should be adopted, this involves no controversy about the end of good, but inquires which of these three puts a man in the best position for finding and retaining the supreme good. For this good, as soon as a man finds it, makes him happy; but lettered leisure, or public business, or the alternation of these, do not necessarily constitute happiness. Many, in fact, find it possible to adopt one or other of these modes of life, and yet to miss what makes a man happy. The question, therefore, regarding the supreme good and the supreme evil, and which distinguishes sects of philosophy, is one; and these questions concerning the social life, the doubt of the Academy, the dress and food of the Cynics, the three modes of life—the active, the contemplative, and the mixed—these are different questions, into none of which the question of the chief good enters. And therefore, as Marcus Varro multiplied the sects to the number of 288 (or whatever larger number he chose) by introducing these four differences derived from the social life, the New Academy, the Cynics, and the threefold form of life, so, by removing these differences as having no bearing on the supreme good, and as therefore not constituting what can properly be called sects, he returns to those twelve schools which concern themselves with inquiring what that good is which makes man happy, and he shows that one of these is true, the rest false. In other words, he dismisses the distinction founded on the threefold mode of life, and so decreases the whole number by two-thirds, reducing the sects to ninety-six. Then, putting aside the Cynic peculiarities, the number decreases by a half, to forty-eight. Taking away next the distinction occasioned by the hesitancy of the New Academy, the number is again halved, and reduced to twenty-four. Treating in a similar way the diversity introduced by the consideration of the social life, there are left but twelve, which this difference had doubled to twenty-four. Regarding these twelve, no reason can be assigned why they should not be called sects. For in them the sole inquiry is regarding the supreme good and the ultimate evil,—that is to say, regarding the supreme good, for this being found, the opposite evil is thereby found. Now, to make these twelve sects, he multiplies by three these four things—pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the primary objects of nature which Varro calls primigenia. For as these four things are sometimes subordinated to virtue, so that they seem to be desired not for their own sake, but for virtue’s sake; sometimes preferred to it, so that virtue seems to be necessary not on its own account, but in order to attain these things; sometimes joined with it, so that both they and virtue are desired for their own sakes,—we must multiply the four by three, and thus we get twelve sects. But from those four things Varro eliminates three—pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined—not because he thinks these are not worthy of the place assigned them, but because they are included in the primary objects of nature. And what need is there, at any rate, to make a threefold division out of these two ends, pleasure and repose, taking them first severally and then conjunctly, since both they, and many other things besides, are comprehended in the primary objects of nature? Which of the three remaining sects must be chosen? This is the question that Varro dwells upon. For whether one of these three or some other be chosen, reason forbids that more than one be true. This we shall afterwards see; but meanwhile let us explain as briefly and distinctly as we can how Varro makes his selection from these three, that is, from the sects which severally hold that the primary objects of nature are to be desired for virtue’s sake, that virtue is to be desired for their sake, and that virtue and these objects are to be desired each for their own sake. > Latin: In tribus quoque illis uitae generibus, uno scilicet non segniter, sed in contemplatione uel inquisitione ueritatis otioso, altero in gerendis rebus humanis negotioso, tertio ex utroque genere temperato, cum quaeritur quid horum sit potius eligendum, non finis boni habet controuersiam: sed quid horum trium difficultatem uel facilitatem adferat ad consequendum uel retinendum finem boni, id in ista quaestione uersatur. Finis enim boni, cum ad eum quisque peruenerit, protinus beatum facit; in otio autem litterato, uel in negotio publico, uel quando utrumque uicibus agitur, non continuo quisque beatus est. Multi quippe in quolibet horum trium possunt uiuere, et in adpetendo boni fine, quo fit homo beatus, errare. Alia est igitur quaestio de finibus bonorum et malorum, quae unamquamque philosophorum sectam facit, et aliae sunt quaestiones de sociali uita, de cunctatione Academicorum, de uestitu et uictu Cynicorum, de tribus uitae generibus. otioso. actuoso, ex utroque modificato; quarum nulla est, in qua de bonorum et malorum finibus disputatur. Proinde quoniam Marcus Varro has quattuor adhibens differentias, id est ei uita sociali, ex Academicis nouis, ex Cynicis, ex isto uitae genere tripertito ad sectas ducentas octoginta octo peruenit, et si quae aliae possunt similiter adici: remotis eis omnibus, quoniam de sectando summo bono nullam inferunt quaestionem et ideo sectae nec sunt nec uocandae sunt, ad illas duodecim, in quibus quaeritur, quod sit bonum hominis, quo adsecuto fit beatus, ut ex eis unam ueram, ceteras falsas ostendat esse, reuertitur. Nam remoto illo tripertito genere uitae duae partes huius numeri detrahuntur et sectae nonaginta sex remanent. Remota uero differentia ex Cynicis addita ad dimidium rediguntur et quadraginta octo fiunt. Auferamus etiam quod ex Academicis nouis adhibitum est: rursus dimidia pars remanet, id est uiginti quattuor. De sociali quoque uita quod accesserat similiter auferatur: duodecim sunt reliquae, quas ista differentia, ut uiginti quattuor fierent, duplicauerat. De his ergo duodecim nihil dici potest, quur sectae non sint habendae. Nihil quippe aliud in eis quaeritur quam fines bonorum et malorum. Inuentis autem bonorum finibus profecto e contrario sunt malorum. Hae autem ut fiant duodecim sectae, illa quattuor triplicantur, uoluptas, quies, utrumque et prima naturae, quae primigenia Varro uocat. Haec quippe quattuor dum singillatim uirtuti aliquando subduntur, ut non propter se ipsa, sed propter officium uirtutis adpetenda uideantur, aliquando praeferuntur, ut non propter se ipsa, sed propter haec adipiscenda uel conseruanda necessaria uirtus putetur, aliquando iunguntur, ut propter se ipsa et uirtus et ista adpetenda credantur, quaternarium numerum triplum reddunt et ad duodecim sectas perueniunt. Ex illis autem quattuor rebus Varro tres tollit, uoluptatem scilicet et quietem et utrumque; non quod eas inprobet, sed quod primigenia illa naturae et uoluptatem in se habeant et quietem. Quid ergo opus est ex his duabus tria quaedam facere, duo scilicet, cum singillatim adpetuntur uoluptas aut quies, et tertium cum ambae simul, quando quidem prima naturae et ipsas et praeter ipsas alia multa contineant? De tribus ergo sectis ei placet diligenter esse tractandum, quaenam sit potius eligenda. Non enim ueram plus quam unam uera ratio esse permittit, siue in his tribus sit siue alicubi alibi, quod post uidebimus. Interim de his tribus quo modo unam Varro eligat, quantum breuiter aperteque possumus, disseramus. Istae nempe tres sectae ita fiunt, cum uel prima naturae propter uirtutem, uel uirtus propter prima naturae, uel utraque, id est et uirtus et prima naturae, propter se ipsa sunt expetenda. ### Which of the Three Leading Opinions Regarding the Chief Good Should Be Preferred, According to Varro, Who Follows Antiochus and the Old Academy. [¶22] Chapter 3.—Which of the Three Leading Opinions Regarding the Chief Good Should Be Preferred, According to Varro, Who Follows Antiochus and the Old Academy. > Latin: Caput III. De tribus sectis summum hominis bonum quaerentibus quam eligendam Varro definiat sequens ueteris Academiae Antiocho auctore sententiam. [¶23] Which of these three is true and to be adopted he attempts to show in the following manner. As it is the supreme good, not of a tree, or of a beast, or of a god, but of man that philosophy is in quest of, he thinks that, first of all, we must define man. He is of opinion that there are two parts in human nature, body and soul, and makes no doubt that of these two the soul is the better and by far the more worthy part. But whether the soul alone is the man, so that the body holds the same relation to it as a horse to the horseman, this he thinks has to be ascertained. The horseman is not a horse and a man, but only a man, yet he is called a horseman, because he is in some relation to the horse. Again, is the body alone the man, having a relation to the soul such as the cup has to the drink? For it is not the cup and the drink it contains which are called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because it is made to hold the drink. Or, lastly, is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but both together, which are man, the body and the soul being each a part, but the whole man being both together, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, of which pair the near and the off horse is each a part, but we do not call either of them, no matter how connected with the other, a pair, but only both together? Of these three alternatives, then, Varro chooses the third, that man is neither the body alone, nor the soul alone, but both together. And therefore the highest good, in which lies the happiness of man, is composed of goods of both kinds, both bodily and spiritual. And consequently he thinks that the primary objects of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and that virtue, which is the art of living, and can be communicated by instruction, is the most excellent of spiritual goods. This virtue, then, or art of regulating life, when it has received these primary objects of nature which existed independently of it, and prior to any instruction, seeks them all, and itself also, for its own sake; and it uses them, as it also uses itself, that from them all it may derive profit and enjoyment, greater or less, according as they are themselves greater or less; and while it takes pleasure in all of them, it despises the less that it may obtain or retain the greater when occasion demands. Now, of all goods, spiritual or bodily, there is none at all to compare with virtue. For virtue makes a good use both of itself and of all other goods in which lies man’s happiness; and where it is absent, no matter how many good things a man has, they are not for his good, and consequently should not be called good things while they belong to one who makes them useless by using them badly. The life of man, then, is called happy when it enjoys virtue and these other spiritual and bodily good things without which virtue is impossible. It is called happier if it enjoys some or many other good things which are not essential to virtue; and happiest of all, if it lacks not one of the good things which pertain to the body and the soul. For life is not the same thing as virtue, since not every life, but a wisely regulated life, is virtue; and yet, while there can be life of some kind without virtue, there cannot be virtue without life. This I might apply to memory and reason, and such mental faculties; for these exist prior to instruction, and without them there cannot be any instruction, and consequently no virtue, since virtue is learned. But bodily advantages, such as swiftness of foot, beauty, or strength, are not essential to virtue, neither is virtue essential to them, and yet they are good things; and, according to our philosophers, even these advantages are desired by virtue for its own sake, and are used and enjoyed by it in a becoming manner. > Latin: Quid ergo istorum trium sit uerum adque sectandum, isto modo persuadere conatur. Primum, quia summum bonum in philosophia non arboris, non pecoris, non Dei, sed hominis quaeritur, quid sit ipse homo, quaerendum putat. Sentit quippe in eius natura duo esse quaedam, corpus et animam. 6t horum quidem duorum melius esse animam longeque praestabilius omnino non dubitat, sed utrum anima sola sit homo. ut ita sit ei corpus tamquam equus equiti (eques enim non homo et equus, sed solus homo est; ideo tamen eques dicitur, quod aliquo modo se habeat ad equum), an corpus solum sit homo, aliquo modo se habens ad animam, sicut poculum ad potionem (non enim calix et potio, quam continet calix. simul dicitur poculum, sed calix solus; ideo tamen quod potioni continendae sit adcommodatus), an uero nec anima sola nec solum corpus, sed simul utrumque sit homo, cuius sit pars una siue anima siue corpus, ille autem totus ex utroque constet, ut homo sit (sicut duos equos iunctos bigas uocamus, quorum siue dexter siue sinister pars est bigarum, unum uero eorum, quoquo modo se habeat ad alterum, bigas non dicimus, sed ambo simul). Horum autem trium hoc elegit tertium hominemque nec animam solam nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitratur. Proinde summum bonum hominis, quo fit beatus, ex utriusque rei bonis constare dicit, et animae scilicet et corporis. Ac per hoc prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda ipsamque uirtutem, quam doctrina inserit uelut artem uiuendi, quae in animae bonis est excellentissimum bonum. Quapropter eadem uirtus, id est ars agendae uitae, cum acceperit prima naturae, quae sine illa erant, sed tamen erant etiam quando eis doctrina adhuc deerat, omnia propter se ipsa adpetit simulque etiam se ipsam, omnibusque simul et se ipsa utitur, eo fine, ut omnibus delectetur adque perfruatur, magis minusque, ut quaeque inter se maiora adque minora sunt, tamen omnibus gaudens et quaedam minora, si necessitas postulat, propter maiora uel adipiscenda uel tenenda contemnens. Omnium autem bonorum uel animi uel corporis nihil sibi uirtus omnino praeponit. Haec enim bene utitur et se ipsa et ceteris, quae hominem faciunt beatum, bonis. Ubi uero ipsa non est, quamlibet multa sint bona, non bono eius sunt, cuius sunt, ac per hoc iam nec eius bona dicenda sunt, cui male utenti utilia esse non possunt. Haec ergo uita hominis, quae uirtute et aliis animi et corporis bonis, sine quibus uirtus esse non potest, fruitur, beata esse dicitur; si uero et aliis, sine quibus esse uirtus potest, uel ullis uel pluribus, beatior; si autem prorsus omnibus, ut nullum omnino bonum desit uel animi uel corporis, beatissima. Non enim hoc est uita, quod uirtus, quoniam non omnis uita, sed sapiens uita uirtus est; et tamen qualiscumque uita sine ulla uirtute potest esse; uirtus uero sine ulla uita non potest esse. Hoc et de memoria dixerim adque ratione, et si quid tale aliud est in homine. Sunt enim haec et ante doctrinam, sine his autem non potest esse ulla doctrina, ac per hoc nec uirtus, quae utique discitur. Bene autem currere, pulchrum esse corpore, uiribus ingentibus praeualere et cetera huius modi talia sunt, ut et uirtus sine his esse possit et ipsa sine uirtute; bona sunt tamen, et secundum istos etiam ipsa propter se ipsam diligit uirtus, utiturque illis et fruitur, sicut uirtutem decet. [¶24] They say that this happy life is also social, and loves the advantages of its friends as its own, and for their sake wishes for them what it desires for itself, whether these friends live in the same family, as a wife, children, domestics; or in the locality where one’s home is, as the citizens of the same town; or in the world at large, as the nations bound in common human brotherhood; or in the universe itself, comprehended in the heavens and the earth, as those whom they call gods, and provide as friends for the wise man, and whom we more familiarly call angels. Moreover, they say that, regarding the supreme good and evil, there is no room for doubt, and that they therefore differ from the New Academy in this respect, and they are not concerned whether a philosopher pursues those ends which they think true in the Cynic dress and manner of life or in some other. And, lastly, in regard to the three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, they declare in favor of the third. That these were the opinions and doctrines of the Old Academy, Varro asserts on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero’s master and his own, though Cicero makes him out to have been more frequently in accordance with the Stoics than with the Old Academy. But of what importance is this to us, who ought to judge the matter on its own merits, rather than to understand accurately what different men have thought about it? > Latin: Hanc uitam beatam etiam socialem perhibent esse, quae amicorum bona propter se ipsa diligat sicut sua eisque propter ipsos hoc uelit quod sibi; siue in domo sint, sicut coniux et liberi et quicumque domestici, siue in loco, ubi domus est eius, sicuti est urbs, ut sunt hi qui ciues uocantur, siue in orbe toto, ut sunt gentes quas ei societas humana coniungit, siue in ipso mundo, qui censetur nomine caeli et terrae, sicut esse dicunt deos, quos uolunt amicos esse homini sapienti, quos nos familiarius angelos dicimus. De bonorum autem et e contrario malorum finibus negant ullo modo esse dubitandum et hanc inter se et nouos Academicos adfirmant esse distantiam, nec eorum interest quidquam, siue Cynico siue alio quolibet habitu et uictu in his finibus, quos ueros putant, quisque philosophetur. Ex tribus porro illis uitae generibus, otioso, actuoso et quod ex utroque conpositum est, hoc tertium sibi placere adseuerant. Haec sensisse adque docuisse Academicos ueteres Varro adserit, auctore Antiocho, magistro Ciceronis et suo, quem sane Cicero in pluribus fuisse Stoicum quam ueterem Academicum I unIt uideri. Sed quid ad nos, qui potius de rebus ipsis iudicare debemus, quam pro magno de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire?