Of the Happiness of the Eternal Peace, Which Constitutes the End or True Perfection of the Saints.

Chapter 11.—Of the Happiness of the Eternal Peace, Which Constitutes the End or True Perfection of the Saints.

Caput XI. De beatitudine pacis aeternae, in qua sanctis finis est, id est uera perfectio.

And thus we may say of peace, as we have said of eternal life, that it is the end of our good; and the rather because the Psalmist says of the city of God, the subject of this laborious work, “Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem; praise thy God, O Zion: for He hath strengthened the bars of thy gates; He hath blessed thy children within thee; who hath made thy borders peace.” For when the bars of her gates shall be strengthened, none shall go in or come out from her; consequently we ought to understand the peace of her borders as that final peace we are wishing to declare. For even the mystical name of the city itself, that is, Jerusalem, means, as I have already said, “Vision of Peace.” But as the word peace is employed in connection with things in this world in which certainly life eternal has no place, we have preferred to call the end or supreme good of this city life eternal rather than peace. Of this end the apostle says, “But now, being freed from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end life eternal.” But, on the other hand, as those who are not familiar with Scripture may suppose that the life of the wicked is eternal life, either because of the immortality of the soul, which some of the philosophers even have recognized, or because of the endless punishment of the wicked, which forms a part of our faith, and which seems impossible unless the wicked live for ever, it may therefore be advisable, in order that every one may readily understand what we mean, to say that the end or supreme good of this city is either peace in eternal life, or eternal life in peace. For peace is a good so great, that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying. So that if we dwell for a little longer on this subject, we shall not, in my opinion, be wearisome to our readers, who will attend both for the sake of understanding what is the end of this city of which we speak, and for the sake of the sweetness of peace which is dear to all.

Quapropter possemus dicere fines bonorum nostrorum esse pacem, sicut aeternam diximus uitam, praesertim quia ipsi ciuitati Dei, de qua nobis est ista operosissima disputatio, in sancto dicitur psalmo: Lauda Hierusalem Dominum, conlauda Deum tuum Sion; quoniam confirmauit seras portarum tuarum, benedixit filios tuos in te, qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Quando enim confirmatae fuerint serae portarum eius, iam in illam nullus intrabit nec ab illa ullus exibit. Ac per hoc fines eius eam debemus hic intellegere pacem, quam uolumus demonstrare finalem. Nam et ipsius ciuitatis mysticum nomen, id est Hierusalem, quod et ante iam diximus, uisio pacis interpretatur. Sed quoniam pacis nomen etiam in his rebus mortalibus frequentatur, ubi utique non est uita aeterna, propterea finem ciuitatis huius, ubi erit summum bonum eius, aeternam uitam maluimus commemorare quam pacem. De quo fine apostolus ait: Nunc uero liberati a peccato, serui autem facti Deo, habetis fructum uestrum in sanctificationem, finem uero uitam aeternam. Sed rursus quia uita aeterna ab eis, qui familiaritatem non habent cum scripturis sanctis, potest accipi etiam malorum uita, uel secundum quosdam etiam philosophos propter animae inmortalitatem uel secundum etiam fidem nostram propter poenas interminabiles inpiorum, qui utique in aeternum cruciari non poterunt, nisi etiam uixerint in aeternum: profecto finis ciuitatis huius, in quo summum habebit bonum, uel pax in uita aeterna uel uita aeterna in pace dicendus est, ut facilius ab omnibus possit intellegi. Tantum est enim pacis bonum, ut etiam in rebus terrenis adque mortalibus nihil gratius soleat audiri, nihil desiderabilius concupisci, nihil postremo possit melius inueniri. De quo si aliquanto diutius loqui uoluerimus, non erimus, quantum arbitror, onerosi legentibus, et propter finem ciuitatis huius, de qua nobis sermo est, et propter ipsam dulcedinem pacis, quae omnibus cara est.

Chapter 12.—That Even the Fierceness of War and All the Disquietude of Men Make Towards This One End of Peace, Which Every Nature Desires.

Caput XII. Quod etiam bellantium saeuitia omnesque hominum inquietudines ad pacis finem cupiant peruenire, sine cuius adpetitu nulla natura sit.

Whoever gives even moderate attention to human affairs and to our common nature, will recognize that if there is no man who does not wish to be joyful, neither is there any one who does not wish to have peace. For even they who make war desire nothing but victory,—desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with glory. For what else is victory than the conquest of those who resist us? and when this is done there is peace. It is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by war. For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making peace. For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed into a peace that suits them better. They do not, therefore, wish to have no peace, but only one more to their mind. And in the case of sedition, when men have separated themselves from the community, they yet do not effect what they wish, unless they maintain some kind of peace with their fellow-conspirators. And therefore even robbers take care to maintain peace with their comrades, that they may with greater effect and greater safety invade the peace of other men. And if an individual happen to be of such unrivalled strength, and to be so jealous of partnership, that he trusts himself with no comrades, but makes his own plots, and commits depredations and murders on his own account, yet he maintains some shadow of peace with such persons as he is unable to kill, and from whom he wishes to conceal his deeds. In his own home, too, he makes it his aim to be at peace with his wife and children, and any other members of his household; for unquestionably their prompt obedience to his every look is a source of pleasure to him. And if this be not rendered, he is angry, he chides and punishes; and even by this storm he secures the calm peace of his own home, as occasion demands. For he sees that peace cannot be maintained unless all the members of the same domestic circle be subject to one head, such as he himself is in his own house. And therefore if a city or nation offered to submit itself to him, to serve him in the same style as he had made his household serve him, he would no longer lurk in a brigand’s hiding-places, but lift his head in open day as a king, though the same coveteousness and wicked ness should remain in him. And thus all men desire to have peace with their own circle whom they wish to govern as suits themselves. For even those whom they make war against they wish to make their own, and impose on them the laws of their own peace.

Quod enim mecum quisquis res humanas naturamque communem utcumque intuetur agnoscit, sicut nemo est qui gaudere nolit, ita nemo est qui pacem habere nolit. Quando quidem et ipsi, qui bella uolunt, nihil aliud quam uincere uolunt; ad gloriosam ergo pacem bellando cupiunt peruenire. Nam quid est aliud uictoria nisi subiectio repugnantium ? quod cum factum fuerit, pax erit. Pacis igitur intentione geruntur et bella, ab his etiam, qui uirtutem bellicam student exercere imperando adque pugnando. Unde pacem constat belli esse optabilem finem. Omnis enim homo etiam belligerando pacem requirit; nemo autem bellum pacificando. Nam et illi qui pacem, in qua sunt, perturbari uolunt, non pacem oderunt, sed eam pro arbitrio suo cupiunt commutari. Non ergo ut sit pax nolunt, sed ut ea sit quam uolunt. Denique etsi per seditionem se ab aliis separauerint, cum eis ipsis conspiratis uel coniuratis suis nisi qualemcumque speciem pacis teneant, non efficiunt quod intendunt. Proinde latrones ipsi, ut uehementius et tutius infesti sint paci ceterorum, pacem uolunt habere sociorum. Sed etsi unus sit tam praepollens uiribus et conscios ita cauens, ut nulli socio se committat solusque insidians et praeualens quibus potuerit obpressis et exstinctis praedas agat, cum eis certe, quos occidere non potest et quos uult latere quod facit, qualemcumque umbram pacis tenet. In domo autem sua cum uxore et cum filiis, et si quos. alios illic habet, studet profecto esse pacatus; eis quippe ad nutum obtemperantibus sine dubio delectatur. Nam si non fiat, indignatur corripit uindicat et domus suae pacem, si ita necesse sit, etiam saeuiendo conponit, quam sentit esse non posse, nisi cuidam principio, quod ipse in domo sua est, cetera in eadem domestica societate subiecta sint. Ideoque si offerretur ei seruitus plurium, uel ciuitatis uel gentis, ita ut sic ei seruirent, quem ad modum sibi domi suae seruiri uolebat: non se iam latronem latebris conderet, sed regem conspicuum sublimaret, cum eadem in illo cupiditas et malitia permaneret. Pacem itaque cum suis omnes habere cupiunt, quos ad arbitrium suum uolunt uiuere. Nam et cum quibus bellum gerunt, suos facere, si possint, uolunt eisque subiectis leges suae pacis inponere. Sed faciamus aliquem, qualem canit poetica et fabulosa narratio, quem fortasse propter ipsam insociabilem feritatem semihominem quam hominem dicere maluerunt.

But let us suppose a man such as poetry and mythology speak of,—a man so insociable and savage as to be called rather a semi-man than a man. Although, then, his kingdom was the solitude of a dreary cave, and he himself was so singularly bad-hearted that he was named Κακός, which is the Greek word for bad; though he had no wife to soothe him with endearing talk, no children to play with, no sons to do his bidding, no friend to enliven him with intercourse, not even his father Vulcan (though in one respect he was happier than his father, not having begotten a monster like himself); although he gave to no man, but took as he wished whatever he could, from whomsoever he could, when he could yet in that solitary den, the floor of which, as Virgil says, was always reeking with recent slaughter, there was nothing else than peace sought, a peace in which no one should molest him, or disquiet him with any assault or alarm. With his own body he desired to be at peace, and he was satisfied only in proportion as he had this peace. For he ruled his members, and they obeyed him; and for the sake of pacifying his mortal nature, which rebelled when it needed anything, and of allaying the sedition of hunger which threatened to banish the soul from the body, he made forays, slew, and devoured, but used the ferocity and savageness he displayed in these actions only for the preservation of his own life’s peace. So that, had he been willing to make with other men the same peace which he made with himself in his own cave, he would neither have been called bad, nor a monster, nor a semi-man. Or if the appearance of his body and his vomiting smoky fires frightened men from having any dealings with him, perhaps his fierce ways arose not from a desire to do mischief, but from the necessity of finding a living. But he may have had no existence, or, at least, he was not such as the poets fancifully describe him, for they had to exalt Hercules, and did so at the expense of Cacus. It is better, then, to believe that such a man or semi-man never existed, and that this, in common with many other fancies of the poets, is mere fiction. For the most savage animals (and he is said to have been almost a wild beast) encompass their own species with a ring of protecting peace. They cohabit, beget, produce, suckle, and bring up their young, though very many of them are not gregarious, but solitary,—not like sheep, deer, pigeons, starlings, bees, but such as lions, foxes, eagles, bats. For what tigress does not gently purr over her cubs, and lay aside her ferocity to fondle them? What kite, solitary as he is when circling over his prey, does not seek a mate, build a nest, hatch the eggs, bring up the young birds, and maintain with the mother of his family as peaceful a domestic alliance as he can? How much more powerfully do the laws of man’s nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far as in him lies, since even wicked men wage war to maintain the peace of their own circle, and wish that, if possible, all men belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but one head, and might, either through love or fear, yield themselves to peace with him! It is thus that pride in its perversity apes God. It abhors equality with other men under Him; but, instead of His rule, it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its equals. It abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace; but it cannot help loving peace of one kind or other. For there is no vice so clean contrary to nature that it obliterates even the faintest traces of nature.

Quamuis ergo huius regnum dirae speluncae fuerit solitudo tamque malitia singularis, ut ex hac ei nomen inuentum sit (Graece namque malus xax:m dicitur, quod ille uocabatur), nulla coniux ei blandum ferret referretque sermonem, nullis filiis uel adluderet paruulis uel grandiusculis imperaret, nullo amici conloquio frueretur, nec Vulcani patris, quo uel hinc tantum non parum felicior fuit, quia tale monstrum ipse non genuit; nihil cuiquam daret, sed a quo posset quidquid uellet et quando posset et cum uellet auferret: tamen in ipsa sua spelunca solitaria. cuius, ut describitur, ‘semper recenti caede tepebat humus,’ nihil aliud quam pacem uolebat, in qua nemo illi molestus esset, nec eius quietem uis ullius ten’orne turbaret. Cum corpore denique suo pacem habere cupiebat, et quantum habebat, tantum bene illi erat. Quando quidem membris obtemperantibus imperabat, et ut suam mortalitatem aduersum se ex indigentia rebellantem ac seditionem famis ad dissofciandam adque excludendam de corpore animam concitantem quanta posset festinatione pacaret, rapiebat necabat uorabat et quamuis inmanis ac ferus paci tamen suae uitae ac salutis inmaniter ac ferociter consulebat; ac per hoc si pacem, quam in sua spelunca adque in se ipso habere satis agebat, etiam cum aliis habere uellet, nec malus nec monstrum nec semihomo uocaretur. Aut si eius corporis forma et atrorum ignium uomitus ab eo deterrebat hominum societatem, forte non nocendi cupiditate, sed uiuendi necessitate saeuiebat. Verum iste non fuerit uel, quod magis credendum est, non talis fuerit, qualis poetica uanitate describitur; nisi enim nimis accusaretur Cacus, parum Hercules laudaretur. Talis ergo homo siue semihomo melius, ut dixi, creditur non fuisse, sicut multa figmenta poetarum. Ipsae enim saeuissimae ferae, unde ille partem habuit feritatis (nam et semiferus dictus est), genus proprium quadam pace custodiunt, coeundo gignendo pariendo, fetus fouendo adque nutriendo, cum sint pleraeque insociabiles et soliuagae; non scilicet ut [oues] cerui columbae sturni apes, sed ut leones uulpes aquilae noctuae. Quae enim tigris non filiis suis mitis inmurmurat et pacata feritate blanditur? Quis miluus, quantumlibet solitarius rapinis circumuolet, non coniugium copulat, nidum congerit, oua confouet, pullos alit et quasi cum sua matre familias societatem domesticam quanta potest pace conseruat? Quanto magis homo fertur quodam modo naturae suae legibus ad ineundam societatem pacemque cum hominibus, quantum in ipso est, omnibus obtinendam, cum etiam mali pro suorum pace belligerent omnesque, si possint, suos facere uelint, ut uni cuncti et cuncta deseruiant; quo pacto, nisi in eius pacem uel amando uel timendo consentiant? Sic enim superbia peruerse imitatur Deum. Odit namque cum sociis aequalitatem sub illo. sed inponere uult sociis dominationem suam pro illo. Odit ergo iustam pacem Dei et amat iniquam pacem suam. Non amare tamen qualemcumque pacem nullo modo potest.

He, then, who prefers what is right to what is wrong, and what is well-ordered to what is perverted, sees that the peace of unjust men is not worthy to be called peace in comparison with the peace of the just. And yet even what is perverted must of necessity be in harmony with, and in dependence on, and in some part of the order of things, for otherwise it would have no existence at all. Suppose a man hangs with his head downwards, this is certainly a perverted attitude of body and arrangement of its members; for that which nature requires to be above is beneath, and vice versâ. This perversity disturbs the peace of the body, and is therefore painful. Nevertheless the spirit is at peace with its body, and labors for its preservation, and hence the suffering; but if it is banished from the body by its pains, then, so long as the bodily framework holds together, there is in the remains a kind of peace among the members, and hence the body remains suspended. And inasmuch as the earthly body tends towards the earth, and rests on the bond by which it is suspended, it tends thus to its natural peace, and the voice of its own weight demands a place for it to rest; and though now lifeless and without feeling, it does not fall from the peace that is natural to its place in creation, whether it already has it, or is tending towards it. For if you apply embalming preparations to prevent the bodily frame from mouldering and dissolving, a kind of peace still unites part to part, and keeps the whole body in a suitable place on the earth,—in other words, in a place that is at peace with the body. If, on the other hand, the body receive no such care, but be left to the natural course, it is disturbed by exhalations that do not harmonize with one another, and that offend our senses; for it is this which is perceived in putrefaction until it is assimilated to the elements of the world, and particle by particle enters into peace with them. Yet throughout this process the laws of the most high Creator and Governor are strictly observed, for it is by Him the peace of the universe is administered. For although minute animals are produced from the carcass of a larger animal, all these little atoms, by the law of the same Creator, serve the animals they belong to in peace. And although the flesh of dead animals be eaten by others, no matter where it be carried, nor what it be brought into contact with, nor what it be converted and changed into, it still is ruled by the same laws which pervade all things for the conservation of every mortal race, and which bring things that fit one another into harmony.

Nullius quippe uitium ita contra naturam est, ut naturae deleat etiam extrema uestigia. Itaque pacem iniquorum in pacis conparatione iustorum ille uidet nec pacem esse dicendam, qui nouit praeponere recta prauis et ordinata peruersis. Quod autem peruersum est, etiam hoc necesse est ut in aliqua et ex aliqua et cum aliqua rerum parte pacatum sit, in quibus est uel ex quibus constat; alioquin nihil esset omnino. Velut si quisquam capite deorsum pendeat, peruersus est utique situs corporis et ordo membrorum, quia id, quod desuper esse natura postulat, subter est. et quod illa subter uult esse, desuper factum est; conturbauit carnis pacem ista peruersitas et ideo molesta est: uerum tamen anima corpori suo pacata est et pro eius salute satagit, et ideo est qui doleat: quae si molestiis eius exclusa discesserit, quamdiu conpago membrorum manet, non est sine quadam partium pace quod remanet, et ideo est adhuc qui pendeat. Et quod terrenum corpus in terram nititur et uinculo quo suspensum est renititur, in suae pacis ordinem tendit et locum quo requiescat quodam modo uoce ponderis poscit, iamque exanime ac sine ullo sensu a pace tamen naturali sui ordinis non recedit, uel cum tenet eam, uel cum fertur ad eam. Si enim adhibeantur medicamenta adque curatio, quae formam cadaueris dissolui dilabique non sinat, adhuc pax quaedam partes partibus iungit totamque molem adplicat terreno et conuenienti ac per hoc pacato loco. Si autem nulla adhibeatur cura condendi, sed naturali cursui relinquatur, tamdiu quasi tumultuatur dissidentibus exhalationibus et nostro inconuenientibus sensui (id enim est quod in putore sentitur), donec mundi conueniat elementis et in eorum pacem paulatim particulatimque discedat. Nullo modo tamen inde aliquid legibus summi illius creatoris ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax uniuersitatis administratur; quia, etsi de cadauere maioris animantis animalia minuta nascantur, eadem lege creatoris quaeque corpuscula in salutis pace suis animulis seruiunt; etsi mortuorum carnes ab aliis animalibus deuorentur. easdem leges per cuncta diffusas ad salutem generis cuiusque mortalium congrua congruis pacificantes, quaqua uersum trahantur et rebus quibuscumque iungantur et in res quaslibet conuertantur et commutentur, inueniunt.

Chapter 13.—Of the Universal Peace Which the Law of Nature Preserves Through All Disturbances, and by Which Every One Reaches His Desert in a Way Regulated by the Just Judge.

Caput XIII. De pace uniuersali, quae inter quaslibet perturbationes priuari non potest lege naturae, dum sub iusto iudice ad id quisque peruenit ordinatione, quod meruit uoluntate.

The peace of the body then consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of the appetites, and that of the rational soul the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life and health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place. And hence, though the miserable, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy peace, but are severed from that tranquillity of order in which there is no disturbance, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly miserable, they are by their very misery connected with order. They are not, indeed, conjoined with the blessed, but they are disjoined from them by the law of order. And though they are disquieted, their circumstances are notwithstanding adjusted to them, and consequently they have some tranquillity of order, and therefore some peace. But they are wretched because, although not wholly miserable, they are not in that place where any mixture of misery is impossible. They would, however, be more wretched if they had not that peace which arises from being in harmony with the natural order of things. When they suffer, their peace is in so far disturbed; but their peace continues in so far as they do not suffer, and in so far as their nature continues to exist. As, then, there may be life without pain, while there cannot be pain without some kind of life, so there may be peace without war, but there cannot be war without some kind of peace, because war supposes the existence of some natures to wage it, and these natures cannot exist without peace of one kind or other.

Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae inrationalis ordinata requies adpetitionum, pax animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio, pax corporis et animae ordinata uita et salus animantis, pax hominis mortalis et Dei ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia, pax hominum ordinata concordia, pax domus ordinata imperandi oboediendique concordia cohabitantium, pax ciuitatis ordinata imperandi adque oboediendi concordia ciuium, pax caelestis ciuitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et inuicem in Deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. Proinde miseri, quia, in quantum miseri sunt, utique in pace non sunt, tranquillitate quidem ordinis carent, ubi perturbatio nulla est; uerum tamen quia merito iusteque sunt miseri, in ea quoque ipsa miseria sua I praeter ordinem esse non possunt; non quidem coniuncti beatis, sed ab eis tamen ordinis lege seiuncti. Qui cum sine perturbatione sunt, rebus, in quibus sunt, quantacumque congruentia coaptantur; ac per hoc inest eis ordinis nonnulla tranquillitas, inest ergo nonnulla pax. Verum ideo miseri sunt, quia, etsi in aliqua securitate non dolent, non tamen ibi sunt, ubi securi esse ac dolere non debeant; miseriores autem, si pax eis cum ipsa lege non est, qua naturalis ordo administratur. Cum autem dolent, ex qua parte dolent, pacis perturbatio facta est; in illa uero adhuc pax est, in qua nec dolor urit nec conpago ipsa dissoluitur. Sicut ergo est quaedam uita sine dolore, dolor autem sine aliqua uita esse non potest: sic est quaedam pax sine ullo bello, bellum uero esse sine aliqua pace non potest; non secundum id, quod bellum est, sed secundum id, quod ab eis uel in eis geritur, quae aliquae naturae sunt; quod nullo modo essent, si non qualicumque pace subsisterent.

And therefore there is a nature in which evil does not or even cannot exist; but there cannot be a nature in which there is no good. Hence not even the nature of the devil himself is evil, in so far as it is nature, but it was made evil by being perverted. Thus he did not abide in the truth, but could not escape the judgment of the Truth; he did not abide in the tranquillity of order, but did not therefore escape the power of the Ordainer. The good imparted by God to his nature did not screen him from the justice of God by which order was preserved in his punishment; neither did God punish the good which He had created, but the evil which the devil had committed. God did not take back all He had imparted to his nature, but something He took and something He left, that there might remain enough to be sensible of the loss of what was taken. And this very sensibility to pain is evidence of the good which has been taken away and the good which has been left. For, were nothing good left, there could be no pain on account of the good which had been lost. For he who sins is still worse if he rejoices in his loss of righteousness. But he who is in pain, if he derives no benefit from it, mourns at least the loss of health. And as righteousness and health are both good things, and as the loss of any good thing is matter of grief, not of joy,—if, at least, there is no compensation, as spiritual righteousness may compensate for the loss of bodily health,—certainly it is more suitable for a wicked man to grieve in punishment than to rejoice in his fault. As, then, the joy of a sinner who has abandoned what is good is evidence of a bad will, so his grief for the good he has lost when he is punished is evidence of a good nature. For he who laments the peace his nature has lost is stirred to do so by some relics of peace which make his nature friendly to itself. And it is very just that in the final punishment the wicked and godless should in anguish bewail the loss of the natural advantages they enjoyed, and should perceive that they were most justly taken from them by that God whose benign liberality they had despised. God, then, the most wise Creator and most just Ordainer of all natures, who placed the human race upon earth as its greatest ornament, imparted to men some good things adapted to this life, to wit, temporal peace, such as we can enjoy in this life from health and safety and human fellowship, and all things needful for the preservation and recovery of this peace, such as the objects which are accommodated to our outward senses, light, night, the air, and waters suitable for us, and everything the body requires to sustain, shelter, heal, or beautify it: and all under this most equitable condition, that every man who made a good use of these advantages suited to the peace of this mortal condition, should receive ampler and better blessings, namely, the peace of immortality, accompanied by glory and honor in an endless life made fit for the enjoyment of God and of one another in God; but that he who used the present blessings badly should both lose them and should not receive the others.

Quapropter est natura, in qua nullum malum est uel etiam in qua nullum esse malum potest; esse autem natura, in qua nullum bonum sit, non potest. Proinde nec ipsius diaboli natura, in quantum natura est, malum est; sed peruersitas eam malam facit. Itaque in ueritate non stetit, sed ueritatis iudicium non euasit; in ordinis tranquillitate non mansit, nec ideo tamen a potestate ordinatoris effugit. Bonum Dei, quod illi est in natura, non eum subtrahit iustitiae Dei, qua ordinatur in poena; nec ibi Deus bonum insequitur quod creauit, sed malum quod ille commisit. Neque enim totum aufert quod naturae dedit, sed aliquid adimit, aliquid relinquit, ut sit qui doleat quod ademit. Et ipse dolor testimonium est boni ademti et boni relicti. Nisi enim bonum relictum esset, bonum amissum dolere non posset. Nam qui peccat, peior est, si laetatur in damno aequitatis; qui uero cruciatur, si nihil inde adquirat boni, dolet damnum salutis. Et quoniam aequitas ac salus utrumque bonum est bonique amissione dolendum est potius quam laetandum (si tamen non sit conpensatio melioris; melior est autem animi aequitas quam corporis sanitas): profecto conuenientius iniustus dolet in supplicio, quam laetatus est in delicto. Sicut ergo laetitia deserti boni in peccato testis est uoluntatis malae, ita dolor amissi boni in supplicio testis est naturae bonae. Qui enim dolet amissam naturae suae pacem, ex aliquibus reliquiis pacis id dolet, quibus fit, ut sibi amica natura sit. Hoc autem in extremo supplicio recte fit, ut iniqui et inpii naturalium bonorum damna in cruciatibus defleant, sentientes eorum ablatorem iustissimum Deum, quem contemserunt benignissimum largitorem. Deus ergo naturarum omnium sapientissimus conditor et iustissimus ordinator, qui terrenorum ornamentorum maximum instituit mortale genus humanum, dedit hominibus quaedam bona huic uitae congrua, id est pacem temporalem pro modulo mortalis uitae in ipsa salute et incolumitate ac societate sui generis, et quaeque huic paci uel tuendae uel recuperandae necessaria sunt (sicut ea, quae apte et conuenienter adiacent sensibus, lux uox, aurae spirabiles aquae potabiles, et quidquid ad alendum tegendum curandum ornandumque corpus congruit), eo pacto aequissimo, ut, qui mortalis talibus bonis paci mortalium adcommodatis recte usus fuerit, accipiat ampliora adque meliora, ipsam scilicet inmortalitatis pacem eique conuenientem gloriam et honorem in uita aeterna ad fruendum Deo et proximo in Deo; qui autem perperam, nec illa accipiat et haec amittat.

Chapter 14.—Of the Order and Law Which Obtain in Heaven and Earth, Whereby It Comes to Pass that Human Society Is Served by Those Who Rule It.

Caput XIV. De ordine ac lege siue terrena siue caelesti, per quam societati humanae etiam dominando consulitur, cui et consulendo seruitur.

The whole use, then, of things temporal has a reference to this result of earthly peace in the earthly community, while in the city of God it is connected with eternal peace. And therefore, if we were irrational animals, we should desire nothing beyond the proper arrangement of the parts of the body and the satisfaction of the appetites,—nothing, therefore, but bodily comfort and abundance of pleasures, that the peace of the body might contribute to the peace of the soul. For if bodily peace be awanting, a bar is put to the peace even of the irrational soul, since it cannot obtain the gratification of its appetites. And these two together help out the mutual peace of soul and body, the peace of harmonious life and health. For as animals, by shunning pain, show that they love bodily peace, and, by pursuing pleasure to gratify their appetites, show that they love peace of soul, so their shrinking from death is a sufficient indication of their intense love of that peace which binds soul and body in close alliance. But, as man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has in common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intellect may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which constitutes, as we have said, the peace of the rational soul. And for this purpose he must desire to be neither molested by pain, nor disturbed by desire, nor extinguished by death, that he may arrive at some useful knowledge by which he may regulate his life and manners. But, owing to the liability of the human mind to fall into mistakes, this very pursuit of knowledge may be a snare to him unless he has a divine Master, whom he may obey without misgiving, and who may at the same time give him such help as to preserve his own freedom. And because, so long as he is in this mortal body, he is a stranger to God, he walks by faith, not by sight; and he therefore refers all peace, bodily or spiritual or both, to that peace which mortal man has with the immortal God, so that he exhibits the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. But as this divine Master inculcates two precepts,—the love of God and the love of our neighbor,—and as in these precepts a man finds three things he has to love,—God, himself, and his neighbor,—and that he who loves God loves himself thereby, it follows that he must endeavor to get his neighbor to love God, since he is ordered to love his neighbor as himself. He ought to make this endeavor in behalf of his wife, his children, his household, all within his reach, even as he would wish his neighbor to do the same for him if he needed it; and consequently he will be at peace, or in well-ordered concord, with all men, as far as in him lies. And this is the order of this concord, that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and, in the second, do good to every one he can reach. Primarily, therefore, his own household are his care, for the law of nature and of society gives him readier access to them and greater opportunity of serving them. And hence the apostle says, “Now, if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” This is the origin of domestic peace, or the well-ordered concord of those in the family who rule and those who obey. For they who care for the rest rule,—the husband the wife, the parents the children, the masters the servants; and they who are cared for obey,—the women their husbands, the children their parents, the servants their masters. But in the family of the just man who lives by faith and is as yet a pilgrim journeying on to the celestial city, even those who rule serve those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to others—not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy.

Omnis igitur usus rerum temporalium refertur ad fructum pacis terrenae in terrena ciuitate; in caelesti autem ciuitate refertur ad fructum pacis aeternae. Quapropter si inrationalia essemus animantia, nihil adpeteremus praeter ordinatam temperaturam partium corporis et requiem adpetitionum; nihil ergo praeter quietem carnis et copiam uoluptatum, ut pax corporis prodesset paci animae. Si enim desit pax corporis, inpeditur etiam inrationalis animae pax, quia requiem adpetitionum consequi non potest. Utrumque autem simul ei paci prodest, quam inter se habent anima et corpus, id est ordinatae uitae ac salutis. Sicut enim pacem corporis amare se ostendunt animantia, cum fugiunt dolorem, et pacem aahnae, cum propter explendas indigentias adpetitionum uoluptatem sequuntur: ita mortem fugiendo satis indicant, quantum dili. gant pacem, qua sibi conciliantur anima et corpus. Sed quia homini rationalis anima inest, totum hoc, quod habet commune cum bestiis, subdit paci animae rationalis, ut mente aliquid contempletur et secundum hoc aliquid agat, ut sit ei ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio, quam pacem rationalis animae dixeramus. Ad hoc enim uelle debet nec dolore molestari nec desiderio perturbari nec morte dissolui, ut aliquid utile cognoscat et secundum eam cognitionem uitam moresque conponat. Sed ne ipso studio cognitionis propter humanae mentis infirmitatem in pestem alicuius erroris incurrat, opus habet magisterio diuino, cui certus obtemperet, et adiutorio, ut liber obtemperet. Et quoniam, quamdiu est in isto mortali corpore, peregrinatur a Domino: ambulat per fidem, non per speciem; ac per hoc omnem pacem uel corporis uel animae uel simul corporis et animae refert ad illam pacem, quae homini mortali est cum inmortali Deo, ut ei sit ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia. Iam uero quia duo praecipua praecepta, hoc est dilectionem Dei et dilectionem proximi, docet magister Deus, in quibus tria inuenit homo quae diligat, Deum, se ipsum et proximum, adque ille in se diligendo non errat, qui Deum diligit: consequens est, ut etiam proximo ad diligendum Deum consulat, quem iubetur sicut se ipsum diligere (sic uxori, sic filiis, sic domesticis, sic ceteris quibus potuerit hominibus), et ad hoc sibi a proximo, si forte indiget, consuli uelit; ac per hoc erit pacatus, quantum in ipso est, omni homini pace hominum, id est ordinata concordia, cuius hic ordo est, primum ut nulli noceat, deinde ut etiam prosit cui potuerit. Primitus ergo inest ei suorum cura; ad eos quippe habet opportuniorem facilioremque aditum consulendi, uel naturae ordine uel ipsius societatis humanae. Unde apostolus dicit: Quisquis autem suis et maxime domesticis non prouidet, fidem denegat et est infideli deterior. Hinc itaque etiam pax domestica oritur, id est ordinata imperandi oboediendique concordia cohabitantium. Imperant enim, qui consulunt; sicut uir uxori, parentes filiis, domini seruis. Oboediunt autem quibus consulitur; sicut mulieres maritis, filii parentibus, serui dominis. Sed in domo iusti uiuentis ex fide et adhuc ab illa caelesti ciuitate peregrinantis etiam qui imperant seruiunt eis, quibus uidentur imperare. Neque enim dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi, nec principandi superbia, sed prouidendi misericordia.

Chapter 15.—Of the Liberty Proper to Man’s Nature, and the Servitude Introduced by Sin,—A Servitude in Which the Man Whose Will is Wicked is the Slave of His Own Lust, Though He is Free So Far as Regards Other Men.

Caput XV. De libertate naturali et de seruitute, cuius prima causa peccatum est, quia homo malae uoluntatis, etiamsi non est mancipium alterius hominis, seruus est propriae libidinis.

This is prescribed by the order of nature: it is thus that God has created man. For “let them,” He says, “have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every creeping thing which creepeth on the earth.” He did not intend that His rational creature, who was made in His image, should have dominion over anything but the irrational creation,—not man over man, but man over the beasts. And hence the righteous men in primitive times were made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of men, God intending thus to teach us what the relative position of the creatures is, and what the desert of sin; for it is with justice, we believe, that the condition of slavery is the result of sin. And this is why we do not find the word “slave” in any part of Scripture until righteous Noah branded the sin of his son with this name. It is a name, therefore, introduced by sin and not by nature. The origin of the Latin word for slave is supposed to be found in the circumstance that those who by the law of war were liable to be killed were sometimes preserved by their victors, and were hence called servants. And these circumstances could never have arisen save through sin. For even when we wage a just war, our adversaries must be sinning; and every victory, even though gained by wicked men, is a result of the first judgment of God, who humbles the vanquished either for the sake of removing or of punishing their sins. Witness that man of God, Daniel, who, when he was in captivity, confessed to God his own sins and the sins of his people, and declares with pious grief that these were the cause of the captivity. The prime cause, then, of slavery is sin, which brings man under the dominion of his fellow,—that which does not happen save by the judgment of God, with whom is no unrighteousness, and who knows how to award fit punishments to every variety of offence. But our Master in heaven says, “Every one who doeth sin is the servant of sin.” And thus there are many wicked masters who have religious men as their slaves, and who are yet themselves in bondage; “for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.” And beyond question it is a happier thing to be the slave of a man than of a lust; for even this very lust of ruling, to mention no others, lays waste men’s hearts with the most ruthless dominion. Moreover, when men are subjected to one another in a peaceful order, the lowly position does as much good to the servant as the proud position does harm to the master. But by nature, as God first created us, no one is the slave either of man or of sin. This servitude is, however, penal, and is appointed by that law which enjoins the preservation of the natural order and forbids its disturbance; for if nothing had been done in violation of that law, there would have been nothing to restrain by penal servitude. And therefore the apostle admonishes slaves to be subject to their masters, and to serve them heartily and with good-will, so that, if they cannot be freed by their masters, they may themselves make their slavery in some sort free, by serving not in crafty fear, but in faithful love, until all unrighteousness pass away, and all principality and every human power be brought to nothing, and God be all in all.

Hoc naturalis ordo praescribit, ita Deus hominem condidit. Nam: Dominetur, inquit, piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium repentium, quae repunt super terram. Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit nisi inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini. sed hominem pecori. Inde primi iusti pastores pecorum magis quam reges hominum constituti sunt, ut etiam sic insinuaret Deus, quid postulet ordo creaturarum, quid exigat meritum peccatorum. Condicio quippe seruitutis iure intellegitur inposita peccatori. Proinde nusquam scripturarum legimus seruum, antequam hoc uocabulo Noe iustus peccatum filii uindicaret. Nomen itaque istuc culpa meruit, non natura. Origo autem uocabuli seruorum in Latina lingua inde creditur ducta, quod hi, qui iure belli possent occidi. a uictoribus cum seruabantur serui fiebant, a seruando appellati; quod etiam ipsum sine peccati merito non est. Nam et cum iustum geritur bellum, pro peccato e contrario dimicatur; et omnis uictoria, cum etiam malis prouenit, diuino iudicio uictos humiliat uel emendans peccata uel puniens. Testis est homo Dei Daniel. cum in captiuitate positus peccata sua et peccata populi sui confitetur Deo et hanc esse causam illius captiuitatis pio dolore testatur. Prima ergo seruitutis causa peccatum est. ut homo homini condicionis uinculo subderetur; quod non fit nisi Deo iudicante, aput quem non est iniquitas et nouit diuersas poenas meritis distribuere delinquentium. Sicut autem supernus Dominus dicit: Omnis, qui facit peccatum, seruus est peccati, ac per hoc multi quidem religiosi dominis iniquis, non tamen liberis seruiunt: A quo enim quis deuictus est, huic et seruus addictus est. Et utique felicius seruitur homini, quam libidini, cum saeuissimo dominatu uastet corda mortalium, ut alias omittam, libido ipsa dominandi. Hominibus autem illo pacis ordine, quo aliis alii subiecti sunt, sicut prodest humilitas seruientibus, ita nocet superbia dominantibus. Nullus autem natura, in qua prius Deus hominem condidit, seruus est hominis aut peccati. Verum et poenalis seruitus ea lege ordinatur, quae naturalem ordinem conseruari iubet, perturbari uetat; quia si contra eam legem non esset factum, nihil esset poenali seruitute cohercendum. Ideoque apostolus etiam seruos monet subditos esse dominis suis et ex animo eis cum bona uoluntate serio; ut scilicet, si non possunt a dominis liberi fieri, suam seruitutem ipsi quodam modo liberam faciant, non timore subdolo, sed fideli dilectione seruiendo, donec transeat iniquitas et euacuetur omnis principatus et potestas humana et sit Deus omnia in omnibus.

Chapter 16.—Of Equitable Rule.

Caput XVI. De aequo iure dominandi.

And therefore, although our righteous fathers had slaves, and administered their domestic affairs so as to distinguish between the condition of slaves and the heirship of sons in regard to the blessings of this life, yet in regard to the worship of God, in whom we hope for eternal blessings, they took an equally loving oversight of all the members of their household. And this is so much in accordance with the natural order, that the head of the household was called paterfamilias; and this name has been so generally accepted, that even those whose rule is unrighteous are glad to apply it to themselves. But those who are true fathers of their households desire and endeavor that all the members of their household, equally with their own children, should worship and win God, and should come to that heavenly home in which the duty of ruling men is no longer necessary, because the duty of caring for their everlasting happiness has also ceased; but, until they reach that home, masters ought to feel their position of authority a greater burden than servants their service. And if any member of the family interrupts the domestic peace by disobedience, he is corrected either by word or blow, or some kind of just and legitimate punishment, such as society permits, that he may himself be the better for it, and be readjusted to the family harmony from which he had dislocated himself. For as it is not benevolent to give a man help at the expense of some greater benefit he might receive, so it is not innocent to spare a man at the risk of his falling into graver sin. To be innocent, we must not only do harm to no man, but also restrain him from sin or punish his sin, so that either the man himself who is punished may profit by his experience, or others be warned by his example. Since, then, the house ought to be the beginning or element of the city, and every beginning bears reference to some end of its own kind, and every element to the integrity of the whole of which it is an element, it follows plainly enough that domestic peace has a relation to civic peace,—in other words, that the well-ordered concord of domestic obedience and domestic rule has a relation to the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and civic rule. And therefore it follows, further, that the father of the family ought to frame his domestic rule in accordance with the law of the city, so that the household may be in harmony with the civic order.

Quocirca etiamsi habuerunt seruos iusti patres nostri, sic administrabant domesticam pacem, ut secundum haec temporalia bona filiorum sortem a seruorum condicione distinguerent; ad Deum autem colendum, in quo aeterna bona speranda sunt, omnibus domus suae membris pari dilectione consulerent. Quod naturalis ordo ita praescribit, ut nomen patrum familias hinc exortum sit et tam late uulgatum, ut etiam inique dominantes hoc se gaudeant appellari. Qui autem ueri patres familias sunt, omnibus in familia sua tamquam filiis ad colendum et promerendum Deum consulunt, desiderantes adque optantes uenire ad caelestem domum, ubi necessarium non sit officium imperandi mortalibus, quia necessarium non erit officium consulendi iam in illa inmortalitate felicibus; quo donec ueniatur, magis debent patres quod dominantur, quam serui tolerare quod seruiunt. Si quis autem in domo per inoboedientiam domesticae paci aduersatur, corripitur seu uerbo seu uerbere seu quolibet alio genere poenae iusto adque licito, quantum societas humana concedit, pro eius qui corripitur utilitate, ut paci unde dissiluerat coaptetur. Sicut enim non est beneficentiae adiuuando efficere, ut bonum quod maius est amittatur: ita non est innocentiae parcendo sinere. ut in malum grauius incidatur. Pertinet ergo ad innocentis officium, non solum nemini malum inferre, uerum etiam cohibere a peccato uel punire peccatum, ut aut ipse qui plectitur corrigatur experimento, aut alii terreantur exemplo. Quia igitur hominis domus initium siue particula debet esse ciuitatis, omne autem initium ad aliquem sui generis finem et omnis pars ad uniuersi, cuius pars est, integritatem refertur, satis apparet esse consequens, ut ad pacem ciuicam pax domestica referatur, id est, ut ordinata imperandi oboediendique concordia cohabitantium referatur ad ordinatam imperandi oboediendique concordiam ciuium. Ita fit, ut ex lege ciuitatis praecepta sumere patrem familias oporteat, quibus domum suam sic regat, ut sit paci adcommoda ciuitatis.

Chapter 17.—What Produces Peace, and What Discord, Between the Heavenly and Earthly Cities.

Caput XVII. Unde caelestis societas cum terrena ciuitate pacem habeat et unde discordiam.

But the families which do not live by faith seek their peace in the earthly advantages of this life; while the families which live by faith look for those eternal blessings which are promised, and use as pilgrims such advantages of time and of earth as do not fascinate and divert them from God, but rather aid them to endure with greater ease, and to keep down the number of those burdens of the corruptible body which weigh upon the soul. Thus the things necessary for this mortal life are used by both kinds of men and families alike, but each has its own peculiar and widely different aim in using them. The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men’s wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away. Consequently, so long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city, though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it. But, as the earthly city has had some philosophers whose doctrine is condemned by the divine teaching, and who, being deceived either by their own conjectures or by demons, supposed that many gods must be invited to take an interest in human affairs, and assigned to each a separate function and a separate department,—to one the body, to another the soul; and in the body itself, to one the head, to another the neck, and each of the other members to one of the gods; and in like manner, in the soul, to one god the natural capacity was assigned, to another education, to another anger, to another lust; and so the various affairs of life were assigned,—cattle to one, corn to another, wine to another, oil to another, the woods to another, money to another, navigation to another, wars and victories to another, marriages to another, births and fecundity to another, and other things to other gods: and as the celestial city, on the other hand, knew that one God only was to be worshipped, and that to Him alone was due that service which the Greeks call λατρεία, and which can be given only to a god, it has come to pass that the two cities could not have common laws of religion, and that the heavenly city has been compelled in this matter to dissent, and to become obnoxious to those who think differently, and to stand the brunt of their anger and hatred and persecutions, except in so far as the minds of their enemies have been alarmed by the multitude of the Christians and quelled by the manifest protection of God accorded to them. This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced. Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven; for this alone can be truly called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God. When we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul, but a spiritual body feeling no want, and in all its members subjected to the will. In its pilgrim state the heavenly city possesses this peace by faith; and by this faith it lives righteously when it refers to the attainment of that peace every good action towards God and man; for the life of the city is a social life.

Sed domus hominum, qui non uiuunt ex fide, pacem terrenam ex huius temporalis uitae rebus commodisque sectatur: domus autem hominum ex fide uiuentium exspectat ea, quae in futurum aeterna promissa sunt, terrenisque rebus ac temporalibus tamquam peregrina utitur, non quibus capiatur et auertatur quo tendit in Deum, sed quibus sustentetur ad facilius toleranda minimeque augenda onera corporis COITUPtibilis, quod adgrauat animam. Idcirco rerum uitae huic mortali necessariarum utrisque hominibus et utrique domui communis est usus; sed finis utendi cuique suus proprius multumque diuersus. Ita etiam terrena ciuitas, quae non uiuit ex fide, terrenam pacem adpetit in eoque defigit imperandi oboediendique concordiam ciuium, ut sit eis de rebus ad mortalem uitam pertinentibus humanarum quaedam conpositio uoluntatum. Ciuitas autem caelestis uel potius pars eius, quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur et uiuit ex fide, etiam ista pace necesse est utatur, donec ipsa, cui talis pax necessaria est, mortalitas transeat; ac per hoc, dum aput terrenam ciuitatem uelut captiuam uitam suae peregrinationis agit, iam promissione redemtionis et dono spiritali tamquam pignore accepto legibus terrenae ciuitatis, quibus haec administrantur, quae sustentandae mortali uitae adcommodata sunt, obtemperare non dubitat, ut, quoniam communis est ipsa mortalitas. seruetur in rebus ad eam pertinentibus inter ciuitatem utramque concordia. Verum quia terrena ciuitas habuit quosdam suos sapientes, quos diuina inprobat disciplina, qui uel suspicati uel decepti a daemonibus crederent multos deos conciliandos esse rebus humanis, ad quorum diuersa quodam modo officia diuersa subdita pertinerent, ad alium corpus, ad alium animum, inque ipso corpore ad alium caput, ad alium ceruicem et cetera singula ad singulos; similiter in animo ad alium ingenium, ad alium doctrinam, ad alium iram, ad alium concupiscentiam; inque ipsis rebus uitae adiacentibus ad alium pecus, ad alium triticum, ad alium uinum, ad alium oleum, ad alium siluas, ad alium nummos, ad alium nauigationem, ad alium bella adque uictorias, ad alium coniugia, ad alium partum ac fecunditatem et ad alios alia cetera: caelestis autem ciuitas cum unum Deum solum colendum nosset eique tantum modo seruiendum seruitute illa, quae Graece Xocrpeia dicitur et non nisi Deo debetur, fideli pietate censeret: factum est, ut religionis leges cum terrena ciuitate non posset habere communes proque his ab ea dissentire haberet necesse adque oneri esse diuersa sentientibus eorumque iras et odia et persecutionum inpetus sustinere, nisi cum animos aduersantium aliquando terrore suae multitudinis et semper diuino adiutorio propulsaret. Haec ergo caelestis ciuitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus gentibus ciues euocat adque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem, non curans quidquid in moribus legibus institutisque diuersum est, quibus pax terrena uel conquiritur uel tenetur. nihil eorum rescindens uel destruens, immo etiam seruans ac sequens, quod licet diuersum in diuersis nationibus, ad unum tamen eundemque finem terrenae pacis intenditur, si religionem, qua unus summus et uerus Deus colendus docetur. non inpedit. Utitur ergo etiam caelestis ciuitas in hac sua peregrinatione pace terrena et de rebus ad mortalem hominum naturam pertinentibus humanarum uoluntatum conpositionem. quantum salua pietate ac religione conceditur, tuetur adque adpetit eamque terrenam pacem refert ad caelestem pacem,: quae uere ita pax est, ut rationalis dumtaxat creaturae sola pax habenda adque dicenda sit, ordinatissima scilicet et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et inuicem in Deo; quo cum uentum erit, non erit uita mortalis, sed plane certeque uitalis nec corpus animale, quod, dum corrumpitur, adgrauat animam, sed spiritale sine ulla indigentia ex omni parte subditum uoluntati. Hanc pacem, dum peregrinatur in fide, habet adque ex hac fide iuste uiuit, cum ad illam pacem adipiscendam refert quidquid bonarum actionum gerit erga Deum et proximum, quoniam uita ciuitatis utique socialis est.