--- title: "City of God · De civitate Dei" author: "Augustine" translator: "Marcus Dods" languages: [la, en] shelf: "Church Fathers" section: 97 of 116 url: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/97/ cite: "Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods, City of God · De civitate Dei, section 97. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/97/" --- # City of God · De civitate Dei *Augustine, tr. Marcus Dods* “Two loves have made two cities.” Augustine’s Latin, in Hoffmann’s critical text, beside Dods’s English, chapter by chapter. > Latin: Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. Emanuel Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1899–1900), as encoded by the Open Greek and Latin project, University of Leipzig (stoa0040.stoa003.opp-lat3, CC BY-SA 4.0); apparatus omitted. > English: Marcus Dods, The City of God (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2, 1887). > Chapters are matched one to one except where the two editions divide them differently; within a chapter the Latin sentences are shared out over the English paragraphs by position. ## 97. How Different the Uncertainty of the New Academy is from the Certainty of the Christian Faith. Source: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/97/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-city-of-god/97/#p-N [¶0] Chapter 18.—How Different the Uncertainty of the New Academy is from the Certainty of the Christian Faith. > Latin: Caput XVIII. Quam diuersa sit Academiae nouae ambiguitas a constantia fidei Christianae., [¶1] As regards the uncertainty about everything which Varro alleges to be the differentiating characteristic of the New Academy, the city of God thoroughly detests such doubt as madness. Regarding matters which it apprehends by the mind and reason it has most absolute certainty, although its knowledge is limited because of the corruptible body pressing down the mind, for, as the apostle says, “We know in part.” It believes also the evidence of the senses which the mind uses by aid of the body; for [if one who trusts his senses is sometimes deceived], he is more wretchedly deceived who fancies he should never trust them. It believes also the Holy Scriptures, old and new, which we call canonical, and which are the source of the faith by which the just lives and by which we walk without doubting whilst we are absent from the Lord. So long as this faith remains inviolate and firm, we may without blame entertain doubts regarding some things which we have neither perceived by sense nor by reason, and which have not been revealed to us by the canonical Scriptures, nor come to our knowledge through witnesses whom it is absurd to disbelieve. > Latin: Quod autem adtinet ad illam differentiam, quam de Academicis nouis Varro adhibuit, quibus incerta sunt omnia, omnino ciuitas Dei talem dubitationem tamquam dementiam detestatur, habens de rebus, quas mente adque ratione conprehendit, etiamsi paruam propter corpus corruptibile, quod adgrauat animam (quoniam, sicut dicit apostolus, ex parte scimus), tamen certissimam scientiam, creditque sensibus in rei cuiusque euidentia, quibus per corpus animus utitur, quoniam miserabilius fallitur, qui numquam putat eis esse credendum: credit etiam scripturis sanctis et ueteribus et nouis, quas canonicas appellamus, unde fides ipsa concepta est, ex qua iustus uiuit; per quam sine dubitatione ambulamus, quamdiu peregrinamur a Domino; qua salua adque certa de quibusdam rebus, quas neque sensu neque ratione percepimus neque. nobis per scripturam canonicam claruerunt nec per testes, quibus non credere absurdum est, in nostram notitiam peruenerunt, sine iusta reprehensione dubitamus. ### Of the Dress and Habits of the Christian People. [¶3] Chapter 19.—Of the Dress and Habits of the Christian People. > Latin: Caput XIX. De habitu et moribus populi Christiani. [¶4] It is a matter of no moment in the city of God whether he who adopts the faith that brings men to God adopts it in one dress and manner of life or another, so long only as he lives in conformity with the commandments of God. And hence, when philosophers themselves become Christians, they are compelled, indeed, to abandon their erroneous doctrines, but not their dress and mode of living, which are no obstacle to religion. So that we make no account of that distinction of sects which Varro adduced in connection with the Cynic school, provided always nothing indecent or self-indulgent is retained. As to these three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, although, so long as a man’s faith is preserved, he may choose any of them without detriment to his eternal interests, yet he must never overlook the claims of truth and duty. No man has a right to lead such a life of contemplation as to forget in his own ease the service due to his neighbor; nor has any man a right to be so immersed in active life as to neglect the contemplation of God. The charm of leisure must not be indolent vacancy of mind, but the investigation or discovery of truth, that thus every man may make solid attainments without grudging that others do the same. And, in active life, it is not the honors or power of this life we should covet, since all things under the sun are vanity, but we should aim at using our position and influence, if these have been honorably attained, for the welfare of those who are under us, in the way we have already explained. It is to this the apostle refers when he says, “He that desireth the episcopate desireth a good work.” He wished to show that the episcopate is the title of a work, not of an honor. It is a Greek word, and signifies that he who governs superintends or takes care of those whom he governs: for ἐπί means over, and σκοπεῖν, to see; therefore ἐπισκοπεῖν means “to oversee.” So that he who loves to govern rather than to do good is no bishop. Accordingly no one is prohibited from the search after truth, for in this leisure may most laudably be spent; but it is unseemly to covet the high position requisite for governing the people, even though that position be held and that government be administered in a seemly manner. And therefore holy leisure is longed for by the love of truth; but it is the necessity of love to undertake requisite business. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we are free to sift and contemplate truth; but if it be laid upon us, we are necessitated for love’s sake to undertake it. And yet not even in this case are we obliged wholly to relinquish the sweets of contemplation; for were these to be withdrawn, the burden might prove more than we could bear. > Latin: Nihil sane ad istam pertinet ciuitatem quo habitu uel more uiuendi, si non est contra diuina praecepta, istam fidem, qua peruenitur ad Deum, quisque sectetur; unde ipsos quoque philosophos, quando Christiani fiunt. non habitum uel consuetudinem uictus, quae nihil inpedit religionem, sed falsa dogmata mutare conpellit. Unde illam quam Varro adhibuit ex Cynicis differentiam, si nihil turpiter adque intemperanter agat, omnino non curat. Ex tribus. uero illis uitae generibus. otioso, actuoso et ex utroque conposito, quamuis salua fide quisque possit in quolibet eorum uitam ducere et ad sempiterna praemia peruenire, interest tamen quid amore teneat ueritatis, quid officio caritatis inpendat.fNec sic esse quisque debet otiosus, ut in eodem otio utilitatem non cogitet proximi, nec sic actuosus, ut contemplationem non requirat Dei. In otio non iners uacatio delectare debet, sed aut inquisitio aut inuentio ueritatis, ut in ea quisque proficiat et quod inuenerit ne alteri inuideat. In actione uero non amandus est honor in hac uita siue potentia, quoniam omnia uana sub sole, sed opus ipsum, quod per eundem honorem uel potentiam fit, si recte adque utiliter fit, id est, ut ualeat ad eam salutem subditorum, quae secundum Deum est; unde iam superius disputauimus. Propter quod ait apostolus: Qui episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat. Exponere uoluit quid sit episcopatus, quia nomen est operis, non honoris. Graecum est enim adque inde ductum uocabulum, quod ille qui praeficitur eis quibus praeficitur superintendit, curam scilicet eorum gerens; oxoso? quippe intentio est; ergo cioxojrslv, si uelimus, Latine superintendere possumus dicere, ut intellegat non se esse episcopum, qui praeesse dilexerit, non prodesse. Itaque ab studio cognoscendae ueritatis nemo prohibetur, quod ad laudabile pertinet otium; locus uero superior, sine quo regi populus non potest, etsi ita teneatur adque administretur ut decet, tamen indecenter adpetitur. Quam ob rem otium sanctum quaerit caritas ueri-. tatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus inponit, percipiendae adque intuendae uacandum est ueritati; si autem inponitur, suscipienda est propter caritatis necessitatem: sed nec sic omni modo ueritatis delectatio deserenda est, ne subtrahatur illa suauitas et obprimat ista necessitas. ### That the Saints are in This Life Blessed in Hope. [¶6] Chapter 20.—That the Saints are in This Life Blessed in Hope. > Latin: Caput XX. Quod ciues sanctorum in huius uitae tempore spe beati sint. [¶7] Since, then, the supreme good of the city of God is perfect and eternal peace, not such as mortals pass into and out of by birth and death, but the peace of freedom from all evil, in which the immortals ever abide; who can deny that that future life is most blessed, or that, in comparison with it, this life which now we live is most wretched, be it filled with all blessings of body and soul and external things? And yet, if any man uses this life with a reference to that other which he ardently loves and confidently hopes for, he may well be called even now blessed, though not in reality so much as in hope. But the actual possession of the happiness of this life, without the hope of what is beyond, is but a false happiness and profound misery. For the true blessings of the soul are not now enjoyed; for that is no true wisdom which does not direct all its prudent observations, manly actions, virtuous self-restraint, and just arrangements, to that end in which God shall be all and all in a secure eternity and perfect peace. > Latin: Quam ob rem summum bonum ciuitatis Dei cum sit pax aeterna adque perfecta, non per quam mortales transeant nascendo adque moriendo, sed in qua inmortales maneant nihil aduersi omnino patiendo: quis est qui illam uitam uel beatissimam neget uel in eius comparatione istam, quae hic agitur, quantislibet animi et corporis externarumque rerum bonis plena sit, non miserrimam iudicet? Quam tamen quicumque sic habet, ut eius usum referat ad illius finem, quam diligit ardentissime ac fidelissime sperat, non absurde dici etiam nunc beatus potest, spe illa potius quam re ista. Res ista uero sine spe illa beatitudo falsa et magna miseria est; non enim ueris animi bonis utitur, quoniam non est uera sapientia, quae intentionem suam in his, quae prudenter discernit, gerit fortiter, cohibet temperanter iusteque distribuit, non in illum dirigit finem, ubi erit Deus omnia in omnibus, aeternitate certa et pace perfecta. ### Whether There Ever Was a Roman Republic Answering to the Definitions of Scipio in Cicero’s Dialogue. [¶9] Chapter 21.—Whether There Ever Was a Roman Republic Answering to the Definitions of Scipio in Cicero’s Dialogue. > Latin: Caput XXI. An secundum definitiones Scipionis, quae in dialogo Ciceronis sunt, umquam fuerit Romana res publica. [¶10] This, then, is the place where I should fulfill the promise gave in the second book of this work, and explain, as briefly and clearly as possible, that if we are to accept the definitions laid down by Scipio in Cicero’s De Republica, there never was a Roman republic; for he briefly defines a republic as the weal of the people. And if this definition be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people’s weal was never attained among the Romans. For the people, according to his definition, is an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests. And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right he explains at large, showing that a republic cannot be administered without justice. Where, therefore, there is no true justice there can be no right. For that which is done by right is justly done, and what is unjustly done cannot be done by right. For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights; for even they themselves say that right is that which flows from the fountain of justice, and deny the definition which is commonly given by those who misconceive the matter, that right is that which is useful to the stronger party. Thus, where there is not true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and if no people, then no weal of the people, but only of some promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name of people. Consequently, if the republic is the weal of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is no republic where there is no justice. Further, justice is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then, is the justice of man, when he deserts the true God and yields himself to impure demons? Is this to give every one his due? Or is he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to a man who has no right to it, unjust, while he who keeps back himself from the God who made him, and serves wicked spirits, is just? > Latin: Quapropter nunc est locus, ut quam potero breuiter ac dilucide expediam, quod in secundo huius operis libro me demonstraturum esse promisi, secundum definitiones, quibus aput Ciceronem utitur Scipio in libris de re publica, numquam rem publicam fuisse Romanam. Breuiter enim rem publicam definit esse rem populi. Quae definitio si uera est, numquam fuit Romana res publica, quia numquam fuit res populi, quam definitionem uoluit esse rei publicae. Populum enim esse definiuit coetum multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum. Quid autem dicat iuris consensum, disputando explicat, per hoc ostendens geri sine iustitia non posse rem publicam; ubi ergo iustitia uera non est, nec ius potest esse. Quod enim iure fit, profecto iuste fit; quod autem fit iniuste, nec iure fieri potest Non enim iura dicenda sunt uel putanda iniqua hominum constituta, cum illud etiam ipsi ius esse dicant, quod de iustitiae fonte manauerit, falsumque esse, quod a quibusdam non recte sentientibus dici solet, id esse ius, quod ei, qui plus potest. utile est. Quocirca ubi non est uera iustitia, iuris consensu sociatus coetus hominum non potest esse et ideo nec populus iuxta illam Scipionis uel Ciceronis definitionem; et si non populus, nec res populi. sed qualiscumque multitudinis, quae populi nomine digna non est. Ac per hoc, si res publica res est populi et populus non est, qui consensu non sociatus est iuris, non est autem ius, ubi nulla iustitia est: procul dubio colligitur, ubi iustitia non est, non esse rem publicam. Iustitia porro ea uirtus est, quae sua cuique distribuit. Quae igitur iustitia est hominis, quae ipsum hominem Deo uero tollit et inmundis daemonibus subdit? Hocine est sua cuique distribuere? An qui fundum aufert eius, a quo emtus est, et tradit ei, qui nihil habet in eo iuris, iniustus est; et qui se ipsum aufert dominanti Deo, a quo factus est, et malignis seruit spiritibus, iustus est? [¶11] This same book, De Republica, advocates the cause of justice against injustice with great force and keenness. The pleading for injustice against justice was first heard, and it was asserted that without injustice a republic could neither increase nor even subsist, for it was laid down as an absolutely unassailable position that it is unjust for some men to rule and some to serve; and yet the imperial city to which the republic belongs cannot rule her provinces without having recourse to this injustice. It was replied in behalf of justice, that this ruling of the provinces is just, because servitude may be advantageous to the provincials, and is so when rightly administered,—that is to say, when lawless men are prevented from doing harm. And further, as they became worse and worse so long as they were free, they will improve by subjection. To confirm this reasoning, there is added an eminent example drawn from nature: for “why,” it is asked, “does God rule man, the soul the body, the reason the passions and other vicious parts of the soul?” This example leaves no doubt that, to some, servitude is useful; and, indeed, to serve God is useful to all. And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises a right control over the body; and in the soul itself the reason must be subject to God if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices. Hence, when a man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him, since in this case his soul cannot exercise a just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices? And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in a community composed of such persons. Here, therefore, there is not that common acknowledgment of right which makes an assemblage of men a people whose affairs we call a republic. And why need I speak of the advantageousness, the common participation in which, according to the definition, makes a people? For although, if you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will see that there is nothing advantageous to those who live godlessly, as every one lives who does not serve God but demons, whose wickedness you may measure by their desire to receive the worship of men though they are most impure spirits, yet what I have said of the common acknowledgment of right is enough to demonstrate that, according to the above definition, there can be no people, and therefore no republic, where there is no justice. For if they assert that in their republic the Romans did not serve unclean spirits, but good and holy gods, must we therefore again reply to this evasion, though already we have said enough, and more than enough, to expose it? He must be an uncommonly stupid, or a shamelessly contentious person, who has read through the foregoing books to this point, and can yet question whether the Romans served wicked and impure demons. But, not to speak of their character, it is written in the law of the true God, “He that sacrificeth unto any god save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed.” He, therefore, who uttered so menacing a commandment decreed that no worship should be given either to good or bad gods. > Latin: Disputatur certe acerrime adque fortissime in eisdem ipsis de re publica libris aduersus iniustitiam pro iustitia. Et quoniam, cum prius ageretur pro iniustitiae partibus contra iustitiam et diceretur nisi per iniustitiam rem publicam stare augerique non posse, hoc ueluti ualidissimum positum erat, iniustum esse, ut homines hominibus dominantibus seruiant; quam tamen iniustitiam nisi sequatur imperiosa ciuitas, cuius est magna res publica, non eam posse prouinciis imperare: responsum est a parte iustitiae ideo iustum esse, quod talibus hominibus sit utilis seruitus, et pro utilitate eorum fieri, cum recte fit, id est cum inprobis aufertur iniuriarum licentia, et domiti melius se habebunt, quia indomiti deterius se habuerunt; subditumque est, ut ista ratio firmaretur, ueluti a natura sumtum nobile exemplum adque dictum est: ‘Quur igitur Deus homini, animus imperat corpori, ratio libidini ceterisque uitiosis animi partibus?’ Plane hoc exemplo satis edoctum est quibusdam esse utilem seruitutem, et Deo quidem ut seruiatur utile esse omnibus. Seruiens autem Deo animus recte imperat corpori, inque ipso animo ratio Deo Domino subdita recte imperat libidini uitiisque ceteris. Quapropter ubi homo Deo non seruit, quid in eo putandum est esse iustitiae? quando quidem Deo non seruiens nullo modo potest iuste animus corpori aut humana ratio uitiis imperare. Et si in homine tali non est ulla iustitia. procul dubio nec in hominum coetu, qui ex hominibus talibus constat. Non est hic ergo iuris ille consensus, qui hominum multitudinem populum facit, cuius res dicitur esse res publica. Nam de utilitate quid dicam, cuius etiam communione sociatus coetus hominum, sicut sese habet ista definitio, populus nuncupatur? Quamuis enim, si diligenter adtendas, nec utilitas sit ulla uiuentium, qui uiuunt inpie, sicut uiuit omnis, qui non seruit Deo seruitque daemonibus, tanto magis inpiis, quanto magis sibi, cum sint inmundissimi spiritus, tamquam dis sacrificari uolunt: tamen quod de iuris consensu diximus satis esse arbitror, unde appareat per hanc definitionem non esse populum, cuius res publica esse dicatur, in quo iustitia non est. Si enim dicunt non spiritibus inmundis, sed dis bonis adque sanctis in sua re publica seruisse Romanos: numquid eadem totiens repetenda sunt, quae iam satis, immo ultra quam satis est diximus? Quis enim ad hunc locum per superiores huius operis libros peruenit, qui dubitare adhuc possit malis et inpuris daemonibus seruisse Romanos, nisi uel nimium stolidus uel inpudentissime contentiosus? Sed ut taceam quales sint, quos sacrificiis colebant: in lege ueri Dei scriptum eat: Sacrificans dis eradicabitur nisi Domino tantum. Nec bonis igitur nec malis dis sacrificari uoluit, qui hoc cum tanta comminatione praecepit. ### Whether the God Whom the Christians Serve is the True God to Whom Alone Sacrifice Ought to Be Paid. [¶13] Chapter 22.—Whether the God Whom the Christians Serve is the True God to Whom Alone Sacrifice Ought to Be Paid. > Latin: Caput XXII. An uerus sit Deus, cui Christiani seruiunt, cui soli debeat sacrificari. [¶14] But it may be replied, Who is this God, or what proof is there that He alone is worthy to receive sacrifice from the Romans? One must be very blind to be still asking who this God is. He is the God whose prophets predicted the things we see accomplished. He is the God from whom Abraham received the assurance, “In thy seed shall all nations be blessed.” That this was fulfilled in Christ, who according to the flesh sprang from that seed, is recognized, whether they will or no, even by those who have continued to be the enemies of this name. He is the God whose divine Spirit spake by the men whose predictions I cited in the preceding books, and which are fulfilled in the Church which has extended over all the world. This is the God whom Varro, the most learned of the Romans, supposed to be Jupiter, though he knows not what he says; yet I think it right to note the circumstance that a man of such learning was unable to suppose that this God had no existence or was contemptible, but believed Him to be the same as the supreme God. In fine, He is the God whom Porphyry, the most learned of the philosophers, though the bitterest enemy of the Christians, confesses to be a great God, even according to the oracles of those whom he esteems gods. > Latin: Sed responderi potest: ‘Quis iste Deus est aut unde dignus probatur, cui deberent obtemperare Romani, ut nullum deorum praeter ipsum colerent sacrificiis ?’ Magnae caecitatis est, adhuc quaerere, quis iste sit Deus. Ipse est Deus, cuius prophetae praedixerunt ista quae cernimus. Ipse est Deus, a quo responsum accepit Abraham: In semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes. Quod in Christo fieri, qui secundum carnem de illo semine exortus est, idem ipsi qui remanserunt huius nominis inimici, uelint nolintue, cognoscunt. Ipse est Deus, cuius diuinus Spiritus per eos locutus est, quorum praedicta adque conpleta per ecclesiam, quam uidemus toto orbe diffusam, in libris superioribus posui. Ipse est Deus, quem Varro doctissimus Romanorum Iouem putat, quamuis nesciens quid loquatur; quod tamen ideo commemorandum putaui, quoniam uir tantae scientiae nec nullum istum Deum potuit existimare nec uilem. Hunc enim eum esse credidit, quem summum putauit deum. Postremo ipse est Deus, quem doctissimus philosophorum, quamuis Christianorum acerrimus inimicus, etiam per eorum oracula, quos deos putat, deum magnum Porphyrius confitetur. ### Porphyry’s Account of the Responses Given by the Oracles of the gods Concerning Christ. [¶16] Chapter 23.—Porphyry’s Account of the Responses Given by the Oracles of the gods Concerning Christ. > Latin: Caput XXIII. Quae Porphyrius dicat oraculis deorum responsa esse de Christo. [¶17] For in his book called ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας, in which he collects and comments upon the responses which he pretends were uttered by the gods concerning divine things, he says—I give his own words as they have been translated from the Greek: “To one who inquired what god he should propitiate in order to recall his wife from Christianity, Apollo replied in the following verses.” Then the following words are given as those of Apollo: “You will probably find it easier to write lasting characters on the water, or lightly fly like a bird through the air, than to restore right feeling in your impious wife once she has polluted herself. Let her remain as she pleases in her foolish deception, and sing false laments to her dead God, who was condemned by right-minded judges, and perished ignominiously by a violent death.” Then after these verses of Apollo (which we have given in a Latin version that does not preserve the metrical form), he goes on to say: “In these verses Apollo exposed the incurable corruption of the Christians, saying that the Jews, rather than the Christians, recognized God.” See how he misrepresents Christ, giving the Jews the preference to the Christians in the recognition of God. This was his explanation of Apollo’s verses, in which he says that Christ was put to death by right-minded or just judges,—in other words, that He deserved to die. I leave the responsibility of this oracle regarding Christ on the lying interpreter of Apollo, or on this philosopher who believed it or possibly himself invented it; as to its agreement with Porphyry’s opinions or with other oracles, we shall in a little have something to say. In this passage, however, he says that the Jews, as the interpreters of God, judged justly in pronouncing Christ to be worthy of the most shameful death. He should have listened, then, to this God of the Jews to whom he bears this testimony, when that God says, “He that sacrificeth to any other god save to the Lord alone shall be utterly destroyed.” But let us come to still plainer expressions, and hear how great a God Porphyry thinks the God of the Jews is. Apollo, he says, when asked whether word, i.e., reason, or law is the better thing, replied in the following verses. Then he gives the verses of Apollo, from which I select the following as sufficient: “God, the Generator, and the King prior to all things, before whom heaven and earth, and the sea, and the hidden places of hell tremble, and the deities themselves are afraid, for their law is the Father whom the holy Hebrews honor.” In this oracle of his god Apollo, Porphyry avowed that the God of the Hebrews is so great that the deities themselves are afraid before Him. I am surprised, therefore, that when God said, He that sacrificeth to other gods shall be utterly destroyed, Porphyry himself was not afraid lest he should be destroyed for sacrificing to other gods. > Latin: Nam in libris. quos ex XoTfwv Latin: Denique tamquam mirabile aliquid adque incredibile prolaturus: Traeter opinionem, inquit, profecto quibusdam uideatur esse quod dicturi sumus. Christum enim di piissimum pronuntiauerunt et inmortalem factum et cum bona praedicatione eius meminerunt; Christianos uero pollutos, inquit, et contaminatos et errore inplicatos esse dicunt et multis talibus aduersus eos blasphemiis utuntur.’ Deinde subicit uelut oracula deorum blasphemantium Christianos et post haec: ‘De Christo autem, inquit, interrogantibus si est Deus, ait Hecate: Quoniam quidem inmortalis anima post corpus ut incedit, nosti; a sapientia autem abscisa semper errat. Viri pietate praestantissimi est illa anima; hanc colunt aliena a se ueritate.) Deinde post uerba huius quasi oraculi sua ipse contexens: Tiissimum igitur uirum, inquit, eum dixit et eius animam, sicut et aliorum piorum, post obitum inmortalitate dignatam et hanc colere Christianos ignorantes.) (Interrogantibus autem, inquit: Quur ergo damnatus est? oraculo respondit dea: Corpus quidem debilitantibus tormentis semper obpositum est; anima autem piorum caelesti sedi insidet. Illa uero anima aliis animabus fataliter dedit, quibus fata non adnuerunt deorum dona obtinere neque habere Iouis inmortalis agnitionem, errore inplicari. Propterea ergo dis exosi, quia, quibus fato non fuit nosse Deum nec dona ab dis accipere, his fataliter dedit iste errore inplicari. Ipse uero pius et in caelum, sicut pii, concessit. Itaque hunc quidem non blasphemabis, misereberis autem hominum dementiam, ex eo in eis facile praecepsque periculum.’ ‘ Qui ita stultus est, ut non intellegat aut ab homine callido eoque Christianis inimicissimo haec oracula fuisse conficta aut consilio simili ab inpuris daemonibus ista fuisse responsa, ut scilicet, quoniam laudant Christum, propterea credantur ueraciter uituperare Christianos adque ita, si possint, intercludant uiam salutis aeternae, in qua fit quisque Christianus? [¶19] Who is so foolish as not to see that these oracles were either composed by a clever man with a strong animus against the Christians, or were uttered as responses by impure demons with a similar design,—that is to say, in order that their praise of Christ may win credence for their vituperation of Christians; and that thus they may, if possible, close the way of eternal salvation, which is identical with Christianity? For they believe that they are by no means counter working their own hurtful craft by promoting belief in Christ, so long as their calumniation of Christians is also accepted; for they thus secure that even the man who thinks well of Christ declines to become a Christian, and is therefore not delivered from their own rule by the Christ he praises. Besides, their praise of Christ is so contrived that whosoever believes in Him as thus represented will not be a true Christian but a Photinian heretic, recognizing only the humanity, and not also the divinity of Christ, and will thus be precluded from salvation and from deliverance out of the meshes of these devilish lies. For our part, we are no better pleased with Hecate’s praises of Christ than with Apollo’s calumniation of Him. Apollo says that Christ was put to death by right-minded judges, implying that He was unrighteous. Hecate says that He was a most pious man, but no more. The intention of both is the same, to prevent men from becoming Christians, because if this be secured, men shall never be rescued from their power. But it is incumbent on our philosopher, or rather on those who believe in these pretended oracles against the Christians, first of all, if they can, to bring Apollo and Hecate to the same mind regarding Christ, so that either both may condemn or both praise Him. And even if they succeeded in this, we for our part would notwithstanding repudiate the testimony of demons, whether favorable or adverse to Christ. But when our adversaries find a god and goddess of their own at variance about Christ the one praising, the other vituperating Him, they can certainly give no credence, if they have any judgment, to mere men who blaspheme the Christians. > Latin: Suae quippe nocendi astutiae milleformi sentiunt non esse contrarium, si credatur eis laudantibus Christum, dum tamen credatur etiam uituperantibus Christianos; ut eum, qui utrumque crediderit, talem Christi faciant laudatorem, ne uelit esse Christianus, ac sic quamuis ab illo laudatus ab istorum tamen daemonum dominatu eum non liberet Christus; praesertim quia ita laudant Christum, ut, quisquis in eum talem crediderit, qualis ab eis praedicatur, Christianus nerus non sit, sed Photimanus haereticus, qui tantummodo hominem, non etiam Deum nouerit Christum, et ideo per eum saluus esse non possit nec istorum mendaciloquorum daemonum laqueos uitare uel soluere. Nos autem neque Apollinem uituperantem Christum neque Hecaten possumus adprobare laudantem. Ille quippe tamquam iniquum Christum uult credi, quem iudicibus recta sentientibus dicit occisum; ista hominem piissimum, sed hominem tantum. Una est tamen et illius et huius intentio, ut nolint homines esse Christianos, quia, nisi Christiani erunt, ab eorum erui potestate non poterunt. Iste uero philosophus, uel potius qui talibus aduersus Christianos quasi oraculis credunt, prius faciant, si possunt, ut inter se de ipso Christo Hecate adque Apollo concordent eumque aut ambo condemnent aut ambo conlaudent. Quod si facere potuissent, nihilo minus nos et uituperatores et laudatores Christi fallaces daemones uitaremus. Cum uero eorum deus et dea inter se de Christo, ille uituperando, ista laudando dissentiant: profecto eis blasphemantibus Christianos non credunt homines, si recte ipsi sentiant. Sane Christum laudans uel Porphyrius uel Hecate, cum dicat eum ipsum fataliter dedisse Christianis, ut inplicarentur errore, causas tamen eiusdem, sicut putat, pandit erroris. [¶20] When Porphyry or Hecate praises Christ, and adds that He gave Himself to the Christians as a fatal gift, that they might be involved in error, he exposes, as he thinks, the causes of this error. But before I cite his words to that purpose, I would ask, If Christ did thus give Himself to the Christians to involve them in error, did He do so willingly, or against His will? If willingly, how is He righteous? If against His will, how is He blessed? However, let us hear the causes of this error. “There are,” he says,” in a certain place very small earthly spirits, subject to the power of evil demons. The wise men of the Hebrews, among whom was this Jesus, as you have heard from the oracles of Apollo cited above, turned religious persons from these very wicked demons and minor spirits, and taught them rather to worship the celestial gods, and especially to adore God the Father. This,” he said, “the gods enjoin; and we have already shown how they admonish the soul to turn to God, and command it to worship Him. But the ignorant and the ungodly, who are not destined to receive favors from the gods, nor to know the immortal Jupiter, not listening to the gods and their messages, have turned away from all gods, and have not only refused to hate, but have venerated the prohibited demons. Professing to worship God, they refuse to do those things by which alone God is worshipped. For God, indeed, being the Father of all, is in need of nothing; but for us it is good to adore Him by means of justice, chastity, and other virtues, and thus to make life itself a prayer to Him, by inquiring into and imitating His nature. For inquiry,” says he, “purifies and imitation deifies us, by moving us nearer to Him.” He is right in so far as he proclaims God the Father, and the conduct by which we should worship Him. Of such precepts the prophetic books of the Hebrews are full, when they praise or blame the life of the saints. But in speaking of the Christians he is in error, and caluminates them as much as is desired by the demons whom he takes for gods, as if it were difficult for any man to recollect the disgraceful and shameful actions which used to be done in the theatres and temples to please the gods, and to compare with these things what is heard in our churches, and what is offered to the true God, and from this comparison to conclude where character is edified, and where it is ruined. But who but a diabolical spirit has told or suggested to this man so manifest and vain a lie, as that the Christians reverenced rather than hated the demons, whose worship the Hebrews prohibited? But that God, whom the Hebrew sages worshipped, forbids sacrifice to be offered even to the holy angels of heaven and divine powers, whom we, in this our pilgrimage, venerate and love as our most blessed fellow-citizens. For in the law which God gave to His Hebrew people He utters this menace, as in a voice of thunder: “He that sacrificeth unto any god, save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed.” And that no one might suppose that this prohibition extends only to the very wicked demons and earthly spirits, whom this philosopher calls very small and inferior,—for even these are in the Scripture called gods, not of the Hebrews, but of the nations, as the Septuagint translators have shown in the psalm where it is said, “For all the gods of the nations are demons,”—that no one might suppose, I say, that sacrifice to these demons was prohibited, but that sacrifice might be offered to all or some of the celestials, it was immediately added, “save unto the Lord alone.” The God of the Hebrews, then, to whom this renowned philosopher bears this signal testimony, gave to His Hebrew people a law, composed in the Hebrew language, and not obscure and unknown, but published now in every nation, and in this law it is written, “He that sacrificeth unto any god, save unto the Lord alone, he shall be utterly destroyed.” What need is there to seek further proofs in the law or the prophets of this same thing? Seek, we need not say, for the passages are neither few nor difficult to find; but what need to collect and apply to my argument the proofs which are thickly sown and obvious, and by which it appears clear as day that sacrifice may be paid to none but the supreme and true God? Here is one brief but decided, even menacing, and certainly true utterance of that God whom the wisest of our adversaries so highly extol. Let this be listened to, feared, fulfilled, that there may be no disobedient soul cut off. “He that sacrifices,” He says, not because He needs anything, but because it behoves us to be His possession. Hence the Psalmist in the Hebrew Scriptures sings, “I have said to the Lord, Thou art my God, for Thou needest not my good.” For we ourselves, who are His own city, are His most noble and worthy sacrifice, and it is this mystery we celebrate in our sacrifices, which are well known to the faithful, as we have explained in the preceding books. For through the prophets the oracles of God declared that the sacrifices which the Jews offered as a shadow of that which was to be would cease, and that the nations, from the rising to the setting of the sun, would offer one sacrifice. From these oracles, which we now see accomplished, we have made such selections as seemed suitable to our purpose in this work. And therefore, where there is not this righteousness whereby the one supreme God rules the obedient city according to His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him, and whereby, in all the citizens of this obedient city, the soul consequently rules the body and reason the vices in the rightful order, so that, as the individual just man, so also the community and people of the just, live by faith, which works by love, that love whereby man loves God as He ought to be loved, and his neighbor as himself,—there, I say, there is not an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and by a community of interests. But if there is not this, there is not a people, if our definition be true, and therefore there is no republic; for where there is no people there can be no republic. > Latin: Quas antequam ex uerbis eius exponam, prius quaero, si fataliter dedit Christus Christianis erroris inplicationem, utrum nolens an nolens dederit. Si uolens, quo modo iustus? Si nolens, quo modo beatus? Sed iam causas ipsius audiamus erroris. ‘Sunt, inquit, spiritus terreni minimi loco quodam malorum daemonum potestati subiecti. Ab his sapientes Hebraeorum (quorum unus iste etiam Iesus fuit, sicut audisti diuina Apollinis, quae superius dicta sunt) — ab his ergo Hebraei daemonibus pessimis et minoribus spiritibus uetabant religiosos et ipsis uacare prohibebant; uenerari autem magis caelestes deos, amplius autem uenerari Deum Patrem. Hoc autem, inquit, et di praecipiunt et in superioribus ostendimus, quem ad modum animum aduertere ad Deum monent et illum colere ubique imperant. Verum indocti et inpiae naturae, quibus uere fatum non concessit ab dis dona obtinere neque habere Iouis inmortalis notionem, non audientes et deos et diuinos uiros deos quidem omnes recusauerunt, prohibitos autem daemones et hos non odisse, sed reuereri. Deum autem simulantes colere, ea sola, per quae Deus adoratur, non agunt. Nam Deus quidem, utpote omnium Pater, nullius indiget; sed nobis est bene, cum eum per iustitiam et castitatem aliasque uirtutes adoramus, ipsam uitam precem ad ipsum facientes per’imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purgat, inquit; imitatio deificat adfectionem ad ipsum operando.’ Bene quidem praedicauit Deum Patrem, et quibus sit colendus moribus dixit; quibus praeceptis prophetici libri pleni sunt Hebraeorum, quando sanctorum uita siue imperatur siue laudatur. Sed in Christianis tantum errat aut tantum calumniatur, quantum uolunt daemones, quos opinatur deos; quasi cuiquam difficile sit recolere, quae turpia, quae dedecora erga deorum obsequium in theatris agebantur et templis, et adtendere quae legantur dicantur audiantur in ecclesiis, uel Deo uero quid offeratur, et hinc intellegere ubi aedificium, et ubi ruina sit morum. Quis autem huic dixit uel inspirauit, nisi diabolicus spiritus, tam uanum apertumque mendacium, quod daemones ab Hebraeis coli prohibitos reuereantur potius, quam oderint Christiani? Sed Deus ille. quem coluerunt sapientes Hebraeorum, etiam caelestibus sanctis angelis et uirtutibus Dei, quos beatissimos tamquam ciues in hac nostra peregrinatione mortali ueneramur et amamus, sacrificari uetat intonans in lege sua, quam dedit Hebraeo populo suo, et ualde minaciter dicens: Sacrificans dis eradicabitur. Et ne quisquam putaret daemonibus pessimis terrenisque spiritibus, quos iste dicit minimos uel minores, ne sacrificetur esse praeceptum (quia et ipsi in scripturis sanctis dicti sunt di, non Hebraeorum, sed gentium; quod euidenter in psalmo septuaginta interpretes posuerunt, dicentes: Quoniam [omnes] di gentium daemonia), — ne quis ergo putaret istis quidem daemoniis prohibitum, caelestibus autem uel omnibus uel aliquibus sacrificari esse permissum, mox addidit: Nisi Domino soli, id est nisi Domino tantum; ne forte in eo, quod ait: Domino soli, Dominum solem credat esse quispiam, cui sacrificandum putet; quod non ita esse intellegendum in scripturis Graecis facillime reperitur. Deus igitur Hebraeorum, cui tam magnum tantus etiam iste philosophus perhibet testimonium, legem dedit Hebraeo populo suo, Hebraeo sermone conscriptam, non obscuram et incognitam, sed omnibus iam gentibus diffamatam, in qua lege scriptum est: Sacrificans dis eradicabitur nisi Domino tantum. Quid opus est in hac eius lege eiusque prophetis de hac re multa perquirere; immo non perquirere, non enim abstrusa uel rara sunt, sed aperta et crebra colligere et in hac disputatione mea ponere, quibus luce clarius apparet nulli omnino nisi tantum sibi Deum uerum et summum uoluisse sacrificari? Ecce hoc unum breuiter, immo granditer, minaciter, sed ueraciter dictum ab illo Deo, quem tam excellenter eorum doctissimi praedicant, audiatur timeatur inpleatur, ne inoboedientes eradicatio consequatur. Sacrificans, inquit, dis eradicabitur nisi Domino tantum; non quo rei egeat alicuius, sed quia nobis expedit, ut res eius simus. Huic enim canitur in sacris litteris Hebraeorum: Dixi Domino: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Huius autem praechuissimum adque optimum sacrificium nos ipsi sumus, hoc est ciuitas eius, cuius rei mysterium celebramus oblationibus nostris, quae fidelibus notae sunt, sicut in libris praecedentibus disputauimus. Cessaturas enim uictimas, quas in umbra futuri offerebant Iudaei, et unum sacrificium gentes a solis ortu usque ad occasum, sicut iam fieri cernimus, oblaturas per prophetas Hebraeos oracula increpuere diuina; ex quibus quantum satis uisum est, nonnulla protulimus et huic iam. operi adspersimus. Quapropter ubi non est ista iustitia, ut secundum suam gratiam ciuitati oboedienti Deus imperet unus et summus, ne cuiquam sacrificet nisi tantum sibi, et per hoc in omnibus hominibus ad eandem ciuitatem pertinentibus adque oboedientibus Deo animus etiam corpori adque ratio uitiis ordine legitimo fideliter imperet; ut, quem ad modum iustus unus, ita coetus populusque iustorum uiuat ex fide, quae operatur per dilectionem, qua homo diligit Deum, sicut diligendus est Deus, et proximum sicut semet ipsum, — ubi ergo non est ista iustitia, profecto non est coetus hominum iuris consensu et utilitatis communione. sociatus. Quod si non est, utique populus non est si uera est haec populi definitio. Ergo nec res publica est, quia res populi non est, ubi ipse populus non est. ### The Definition Which Must Be Given of a People and a Republic, in Order to Vindicate the Assumption of These Titles by the Romans and by Other Kingdoms. [¶22] Chapter 24.—The Definition Which Must Be Given of a People and a Republic, in Order to Vindicate the Assumption of These Titles by the Romans and by Other Kingdoms. > Latin: Caput XXIV. Qua definitione constet populi et rei publicae nuncupationem recte sibi non solum Romanos, sed etiam regna alia uindicare. [¶23] But if we discard this definition of a people, and, assuming another, say that a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love, then, in order to discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings and not of beasts, and is bound together by an agreement as to the objects of love, it is reasonably called a people; and it will be a superior people in proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by lower. According to this definition of ours, the Roman people is a people, and its weal is without doubt a commonwealth or republic. But what its tastes were in its early and subsequent days, and how it declined into sanguinary seditions and then to social and civil wars, and so burst asunder or rotted off the bond of concord in which the health of a people consists, history shows, and in the preceding books I have related at large. And yet I would not on this account say either that it was not a people, or that its administration was not a republic, so long as there remains an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of love. But what I say of this people and of this republic I must be understood to think and say of the Athenians or any Greek state, of the Egyptians, of the early Assyrian Babylon, and of every other nation, great or small, which had a public government. For, in general, the city of the ungodly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to Him alone, and which, therefore, could not give to the soul its proper command over the body, nor to the reason its just authority over the vices, is void of true justice. > Latin: Si autem populus non isto, sed alio definiatur modo, uelut si dicatur: Topulus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus’, profecto, ut uideatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda, quae diligit. Quaecumque tamen diligat, si coetus est multitudinis non pecorum, sed rationalium creaturarum et eorum quae diligit concordi communione sociatus est, non absurde populus nuncupatur; tanto utique melior, quanto in melioribus, tantoque deterior, quanto est in deterioribus concors. Secundum istam definitionem nostram Romanus populus populus est et res eius sine dubitatione res publica. Quid autem primis temporibus suis quidue sequentibus populus ille dilexerit et quibus moribus ad cruentissimas seditiones adque inde ad socialia adque ciuilia bella perueniens ipsam concordiam, quae salus est quodam modo populi, ruperit adque corruperit, testatur historia; de qua in praecedentibus libris multa posuimus. Nec ideo tamen uel ipsum non esse populum uel eius rem dixerim non esse rem publicam, quamdiu manet qualiscumque rationalis multitudinis coetus, rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus. Quod autem de isto populo et de ista re publica dixi, hoc de Atheniensium uel quorumcumque Graecorum, hoc de Aegyptiorum, hoc de illa priore Babylone Assyriorum, quando in rebus publicis suis imperia uel parua uel magna tenuerunt, et de alia quacumque aliarum gentium intellegar dixisse adque sensisse. Generaliter quippe ciuitas inpiorum, cui non imperat Deus oboedienti sibi, ut sacrificium non offerat nisi tantummodo sibi, et per hoc in illa et animus corpori ratioque uitiis recte ac fideliter imperet, caret iustitiae ueritate.