--- title: "Confessions · Confessiones" author: "Augustine" translator: "J. G. Pilkington" languages: [la, en] shelf: "Church Fathers" section: 32 of 44 url: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-confessions/32/ cite: "Augustine, tr. J. G. Pilkington, Confessions · Confessiones, section 32. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-confessions/32/" --- # Confessions · Confessiones *Augustine, tr. J. G. Pilkington* “You have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.” Augustine’s Latin beside Pilkington’s English, paragraph by paragraph. > Latin: Augustine, Confessionum libri tredecim, text from la.wikisource.org (Confessiones), with its book.chapter.paragraph divisions; sentence openings capitalised. > English: J. G. Pilkington, The Confessions of St. Augustin (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 1, 1886). ## 32. Neither Time Past Nor Future, But the Present Only, Really is. Source: https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-confessions/32/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/augustine-confessions/32/#p-N [¶0] Chapter XIV.—Neither Time Past Nor Future, But the Present Only, Really is. > Latin: Caput XIV. [¶1] 17. At no time, therefore, hadst Thou not made anything, because Thou hadst made time itself. And no times are co-eternal with Thee, because Thou remainest for ever; but should these continue, they would not be times. For what is time? Who can easily and briefly explain it? Who even in thought can comprehend it, even to the pronouncing of a word concerning it? But what in speaking do we refer to more familiarly and knowingly than time? And certainly we understand when we speak of it; we understand also when we hear it spoken of by another. What, then, is time? If no one ask of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time; and if nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing were, there would not be present time. Those two times, therefore, past and future, how are they, when even the past now is not; and the future is not as yet? But should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past, time truly it could not be, but eternity. If, then, time present—if it be time—only comes into existence because it passes into time past, how do we say that even this is, whose cause of being is that it shall not be—namely, so that we cannot truly say that time is, unless because it tends not to be? > Latin: 17. Nullo ergo tempore non feceras aliquid, quia ipsum tempus tu feceras. Et nulla tempora tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanes. At illa si permanerent, non essent tempora. Quid est enim tempus? Quis hoc facile breviterque explicaverit? Quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cogitatione comprehenderit? Quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendo commemoramus quam tempus? Et intellegimus utique cum id loquimur, intellegimus etiam cum alio loquente id audimus. Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio. Fidenter tamen dico scire me quod, si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus. Duo ergo illa tempora, praeteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et praeteritum iam non est et futurum nondum est? Praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum transiret, non iam esset tempus, sed aeternitas. Si ergo praesens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit, quia in praeteritum transit, quomodo et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse? ### There is Only a Moment of Present Time. [¶3] Chapter XV.—There is Only a Moment of Present Time. > Latin: Caput XV. [¶4] 18. And yet we say that “time is long and time is short;” nor do we speak of this save of time past and future. A long time past, for example, we call a hundred years ago; in like manner a long time to come, a hundred years hence. But a short time past we call, say, ten days ago: and a short time to come, ten days hence. But in what sense is that long or short which is not? For the past is not now, and the future is not yet. Therefore let us not say, “It is long;” but let us say of the past, “It hath been long,” and of the future, “It will be long.” O my Lord, my light, shall not even here Thy truth deride man? For that past time which was long, was it long when it was already past, or when it was as yet present? For then it might be long when there was that which could be long, but when past it no longer was; wherefore that could not be long which was not at all. Let us not, therefore, say, “Time past hath been long;” for we shall not find what may have been long, seeing that since it was past it is not; but let us say “that present time was long, because when it was present it was long.” For it had not as yet passed away so as not to be, and therefore there was that which could be long. But after it passed, that ceased also to be long which ceased to be. > Latin: 18. Et tamen dicimus longum tempus et breve tempus, neque hoc nisi de praeterito aut futuro dicimus. Praeteritum tempus longum verbi gratia vocamus ante centum annos, futurum itidem longum post centum annos, breve autem praeteritum sic, ut puta dicamus ante decem dies, et breve futurum post decem dies. Sed quo pacto longum est aut breve, quod non est? Praeteritum enim iam non est et futurum nondum est. Non itaque dicamus, 'longum est,' sed dicamus de praeterito, 'longum fuit,' et de futuro, 'longum erit.' Domine meus, lux mea, nonne et hic veritas tua deridebit hominem? Quod enim longum fuit praeteritum tempus, cum iam esset praeteritum longum fuit, an cum adhuc praesens esset? Tunc enim poterat esse longum quando erat, quod esset longum; praeteritum vero iam non erat, unde nec longum esse poterat, quod omnino non erat. Non ergo dicamus, 'longum fuit praeteritum tempus'; neque enim inveniemus quid fuerit longum, quando, ex quo praeteritum est, non est, sed dicamus, 'longum fuit illud praesens tempus,' quia cum praesens esset, longum erat. Nondum enim praeterierat ut non esset, et ideo erat quod longum esse posset; postea vero quam praeteriit, simul et longum esse destitit quod esse destitit. [¶5] 19. Let us therefore see, O human soul, whether present time can be long; for to thee is it given to perceive and to measure periods of time. What wilt thou reply to me? Is a hundred years when present a long time? See, first, whether a hundred years can be present. For if the first year of these is current, that is present, but the other ninety and nine are future, and therefore they are not as yet. But if the second year is current, one is already past, the other present, the rest future. And thus, if we fix on any middle year of this hundred as present, those before it are past, those after it are future; wherefore a hundred years cannot be present. See at least whether that year itself which is current can be present. For if its first month be current, the rest are future; if the second, the first hath already passed, and the remainder are not yet. Therefore neither is the year which is current as a whole present; and if it is not present as a whole, then the year is not present. For twelve months make the year, of which each individual month which is current is itself present, but the rest are either past or future. Although neither is that month which is current present, but one day only: if the first, the rest being to come, if the last, the rest being past; if any of the middle, then between past and future. > Latin: 19. Videamus ergo, anima humana, utrum praesens tempus possit esse longum, datum enim tibi est sentire moras atque metiri. Quid respondebis mihi? An centum anni praesentes longum tempus est? Vide prius utrum possint praesentes esse centum anni. Si enim primus eorum annus agitur, ipse praesens est, nonaginta vero et novem futuri sunt et ideo nondum sunt. Si autem secundus annus agitur, iam unus est praeteritus, alter praesens, ceteri futuri. Atque ita mediorum quemlibet centenarii huius numeri annum praesentem posuerimus. Ante illum praeteriti erunt, post illum futuri. Quocirca centum anni praesentes esse non poterunt. Vide saltem utrum qui agitur unus ipse sit praesens. Et eius enim si primus agitur mensis, futuri sunt ceteri, si secundus, iam et primus praeteriit et reliqui nondum sunt. Ergo nec annus qui agitur totus est praesens, et si non totus est praesens, non annus est praesens. Duodecim enim menses annus est, quorum quilibet unus mensis qui agitur ipse praesens est, ceteri aut praeteriti aut futuri. Quamquam neque mensis qui agitur praesens est, sed unus dies. Si primus, futuris ceteris, si novissimus, praeteritis ceteris, si mediorum quilibet, inter praeteritos et futuros. [¶6] 20. Behold, the present time, which alone we found could be called long, is abridged to the space scarcely of one day. But let us discuss even that, for there is not one day present as a whole. For it is made up of four-and-twenty hours of night and day, whereof the first hath the rest future, the last hath them past, but any one of the intervening hath those before it past, those after it future. And that one hour passeth away in fleeting particles. Whatever of it hath flown away is past, whatever remaineth is future. If any portion of time be conceived which cannot now be divided into even the minutest particles of moments, this only is that which may be called present; which, however, flies so rapidly from future to past, that it cannot be extended by any delay. For if it be extended, it is divided into the past and future; but the present hath no space. Where, therefore, is the time which we may call long? Is it nature? Indeed we do not say, “It is long,” because it is not yet, so as to be long; but we say, “It will be long.” When, then, will it be? For if even then, since as yet it is future, it will not be long, because what may be long is not as yet; but it shall be long, when from the future, which as yet is not, it shall already have begun to be, and will have become present, so that there could be that which may be long; then doth the present time cry out in the words above that it cannot be long. > Latin: 20. Ecce praesens tempus, quod solum inveniebamus longum appellandum, vix ad unius diei spatium contractum est. Sed discutiamus etiam ipsum, quia nec unus dies totus est praesens. Nocturnis enim et diurnis horis omnibus viginti quattuor expletur, quarum prima ceteras futuras habet, novissima praeteritas, aliqua vero interiectarum ante se praeteritas, post se futuras. Et ipsa una hora fugitivis particulis agitur. Quidquid eius avolavit, praeteritum est, quidquid ei restat, futurum. Si quid intellegitur temporis, quod in nullas iam vel minutissimas momentorum partes dividi possit, id solum est quod praesens dicatur; quod tamen ita raptim a futuro in praeteritum transvolat, ut nulla morula extendatur. Nam si extenditur, dividitur in praeteritum et futurum; praesens autem nullum habet spatium. Ubi est ergo tempus quod longum dicamus? An futurum? Non quidem dicimus, 'longum est,' quia nondum est quod longum sit, sed dicimus, 'longum erit.' Quando igitur erit? Si enim et tunc adhuc futurum erit, non erit longum, quia quid sit longum nondum erit. Si autem tunc erit longum, cum ex futuro quod nondum est esse iam coeperit et praesens factum erit, ut possit esse quod longum sit, iam superioribus vocibus clamat praesens tempus longum se esse non posse. ### Time Can Only Be Perceived or Measured While It is Passing. [¶8] Chapter XVI.—Time Can Only Be Perceived or Measured While It is Passing. > Latin: Caput XVI. [¶9] 21. And yet, O Lord, we perceive intervals of times, and we compare them with themselves, and we say some are longer, others shorter. We even measure by how much shorter or longer this time may be than that; and we answer, “That this is double or treble, while that is but once, or only as much as that.” But we measure times passing when we measure them by perceiving them; but past times, which now are not, or future times, which as yet are not, who can measure them? Unless, perchance, any one will dare to say, that that can be measured which is not. When, therefore, time is passing, it can be perceived and measured; but when it has passed, it cannot, since it is not. > Latin: 21. Et tamen, domine, sentimus intervalla temporum et comparamus sibimet et dicimus alia longiora et alia breviora. Metimur etiam quanto sit longius aut brevius illud tempus quam illud, et respondemus duplum esse hoc vel triplum, illud autem simplum aut tantum hoc esse quantum illud. Sed praetereuntia metimur tempora cum sentiendo metimur. Praeterita vero, quae iam non sunt, aut futura, quae nondum sunt, quis metiri potest, nisi forte audebit quis dicere metiri posse quod non est? Cum ergo praeterit tempus, sentiri et metiri potest, cum autem praeterierit, quoniam non est, non potest. ### Nevertheless There is Time Past and Future. [¶11] Chapter XVII.—Nevertheless There is Time Past and Future. > Latin: Caput XVII. [¶12] 22. I ask, Father, I do not affirm. O my God, rule and guide me. “Who is there who can say to me that there are not three times (as we learned when boys, and as we have taught boys), the past, present, and future, but only present, because these two are not? Or are they also; but when from future it becometh present, cometh it forth from some secret place, and when from the present it becometh past, doth it retire into anything secret? For where have they, who have foretold future things, seen these things, if as yet they are not? For that which is not cannot be seen. And they who relate things past could not relate them as true, did they not perceive them in their mind. Which things, if they were not, they could in no wise be discerned. There are therefore things both future and past. > Latin: 22. Quaero, pater, non adfirmo. Deus meus, praeside mihi et rege me. Quisnam est qui dicat mihi non esse tria tempora, sicut pueri didicimus puerosque docuimus, praeteritum, praesens, et futurum, sed tantum praesens, quoniam illa duo non sunt? An et ipsa sunt, sed ex aliquo procedit occulto cum ex futuro fit praesens, et in aliquod recedit occultum cum ex praesenti fit praeteritum? Nam ubi ea viderunt qui futura cecinerunt, si nondum sunt? Neque enim potest videri id quod non est. Et qui narrant praeterita, non utique vera narrarent si animo illa non cernerent. Quae si nulla essent, cerni omnino non possent. Sunt ergo et futura et praeterita. ### Past and Future Times Cannot Be Thought of But as Present. [¶14] Chapter XVIII.—Past and Future Times Cannot Be Thought of But as Present. > Latin: Caput XVIII. [¶15] 23. Suffer me, O Lord, to seek further; O my Hope, let not my purpose be confounded. For if there are times past and future, I desire to know where they are. But if as yet I do not succeed, I still know, wherever they are, that they are not there as future or past, but as present. For if there also they be future, they are not as yet there; if even there they be past, they are no longer there. Wheresoever, therefore, they are, whatsoever they are, they are only so as present. Although past things are related as true, they are drawn out from the memory,—not the things themselves, which have passed, but the words conceived from the images of the things which they have formed in the mind as footprints in their passage through the senses. My childhood, indeed, which no longer is, is in time past, which now is not; but when I call to mind its image, and speak of it, I behold it in the present, because it is as yet in my memory. Whether there be a like cause of foretelling future things, that of things which as yet are not the images may be perceived as already existing, I confess, my God, I know not. This certainly I know, that we generally think before on our future actions, and that this premeditation is present; but that the action whereon we premeditate is not yet, because it is future; which when we shall have entered upon, and have begun to do that which we were premeditating, then shall that action be, because then it is not future, but present. > Latin: 23. Sine me, domine, amplius quaerere, spes mea; non conturbetur intentio mea. Si enim sunt futura et praeterita, volo scire ubi sint. Quod si nondum valeo, scio tamen, ubicumque sunt, non ibi ea futura esse aut praeterita, sed praesentia. Nam si et ibi futura sunt, nondum ibi sunt, si et ibi praeterita sunt, iam non ibi sunt. Ubicumque ergo sunt, quaecumque sunt, non sunt nisi praesentia. Quamquam praeterita cum vera narrantur, ex memoria proferuntur non res ipsae quae praeterierunt, sed verba concepta ex imaginibus earum quae in animo velut vestigia per sensus praetereundo fixerunt. Pueritia quippe mea, quae iam non est, in tempore praeterito est, quod iam non est; imaginem vero eius, cum eam recolo et narro, in praesenti tempore intueor, quia est adhuc in memoria mea. Utrum similis sit causa etiam praedicendorum futurorum, ut rerum, quae nondum sunt, iam existentes praesentiantur imagines, confiteor, deus meus, nescio. Illud sane scio, nos plerumque praemeditari futuras actiones nostras eamque praemeditationem esse praesentem, actionem autem quam praemeditamur nondum esse, quia futura est. Quam cum aggressi fuerimus et quod praemeditabamur agere coeperimus, tunc erit illa actio, quia tunc non futura, sed praesens erit. [¶16] 24. In whatever manner, therefore, this secret preconception of future things may be, nothing can be seen, save what is. But what now is is not future, but present. When, therefore, they say that things future are seen, it is not themselves, which as yet are not (that is, which are future); but their causes or their signs perhaps are seen, the which already are. Therefore, to those already beholding them, they are not future, but present, from which future things conceived in the mind are foretold. Which conceptions again now are, and they who foretell those things behold these conceptions present before them. Let now so multitudinous a variety of things afford me some example. I behold daybreak; I foretell that the sun is about to rise. That which I behold is present; what I foretell is future,—not that the sun is future, which already is; but his rising, which is not yet. Yet even its rising I could not predict unless I had an image of it in my mind, as now I have while I speak. But that dawn which I see in the sky is not the rising of the sun, although it may go before it, nor that imagination in my mind; which two are seen as present, that the other which is future may be foretold. Future things, therefore, are not as yet; and if they are not as yet, they are not. And if they are not, they cannot be seen at all; but they can be foretold from things present which now are, and are seen. > Latin: 24. Quoquo modo se itaque habeat arcana praesensio futurorum, videri nisi quod est non potest. Quod autem iam est, non futurum sed praesens est. Cum ergo videri dicuntur futura, non ipsa quae nondum sunt, id est quae futura sunt, sed eorum causae vel signa forsitan videntur, quae iam sunt. Ideo non futura sed praesentia sunt iam videntibus, ex quibus futura praedicantur animo concepta. Quae rursus conceptiones iam sunt, et eas praesentes apud se intuentur qui illa praedicunt. Loquatur mihi aliquod exemplum tanta rerum numerositas. Intueor auroram, oriturum solem praenuntio. Quod intueor, praesens est, quod praenuntio, futurum. Non sol futurus, qui iam est, sed ortus eius, qui nondum est; tamen etiam ortum ipsum nisi animo imaginarer, sicut modo cum id loquor, non eum possem praedicere. Sed nec illa aurora quam in caelo video solis ortus est, quamvis eum praecedat, nec illa imaginatio in animo meo. Quae duo praesentia cernuntur, ut futurus ille ante dicatur. Futura ergo nondum sunt, et si nondum sunt, non sunt, et si non sunt, videri omnino non possunt; sed praedici possunt ex praesentibus, quae iam sunt et videntur. ### We are Ignorant in What Manner God Teaches Future Things. [¶18] Chapter XIX.—We are Ignorant in What Manner God Teaches Future Things. > Latin: Caput XIX. [¶19] 25. Thou, therefore, Ruler of Thy creatures, what is the method by which Thou teachest souls those things which are future? For Thou hast taught Thy prophets. What is that way by which Thou, to whom nothing is future, dost teach future things; or rather of future things dost teach present? For what is not, of a certainty cannot be taught. Too far is this way from my view; it is too mighty for me, I cannot attain unto it; but by Thee I shall be enabled, when Thou shalt have granted it, sweet light of my hidden eyes. > Latin: 25. Tu itaque, regnator creaturae tuae, quis est modus quo doces animas ea quae futura sunt? Docuisti enim prophetas tuos. Quisnam ille modus est quo doces futura, cui futurum quicquam non est? Vel potius de futuris doces praesentia? Nam quod non est, nec doceri utique potest. Nimis longe est modus iste ab acie mea: invaluit. Ex me non potero ad illum, potero autem ex te, cum dederis tu, dulce lumen occultorum oculorum meorum. ### In What Manner Time May Properly Be Designated. [¶21] Chapter XX.—In What Manner Time May Properly Be Designated. > Latin: Caput XX. [¶22] 26. But what now is manifest and clear is, that neither are there future nor past things. Nor is it fitly said, “There are three times, past, present and future;” but perchance it might be fitly said, “There are three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future.” For these three do somehow exist in the soul, and otherwise I see them not: present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If of these things we are permitted to speak, I see three times, and I grant there are three. It may also be said, “There are three times, past, present and future,” as usage falsely has it. See, I trouble not, nor gainsay, nor reprove; provided always that which is said may be understood, that neither the future, nor that which is past, now is. For there are but few things which we speak properly, many things improperly; but what we may wish to say is understood. > Latin: 26. Quod autem nunc liquet et claret, nec futura sunt nec praeterita, nec proprie dicitur, 'tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens, et futurum,' sed fortasse proprie diceretur, 'tempora sunt tria, praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris.' Sunt enim haec in anima tria quaedam et alibi ea non video, praesens de praeteritis memoria, praesens de praesentibus contuitus, praesens de futuris expectatio. Si haec permittimur dicere, tria tempora video fateorque, tria sunt. Dicatur etiam, 'tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens, et futurum,' sicut abutitur consuetudo; dicatur. Ecce non curo nec resisto nec reprehendo, dum tamen intellegatur quod dicitur, neque id quod futurum est esse iam, neque id quod praeteritum est. Pauca sunt enim quae proprie loquimur, plura non proprie, sed agnoscitur quid velimus.