---
title: "The Consolation of Philosophy · De consolatione philosophiae"
author: "Boethius"
translator: "H. F. Stewart"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Mystics"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/
cite: "Boethius, tr. H. F. Stewart, The Consolation of Philosophy · De consolatione philosophiae. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/"
---

# The Consolation of Philosophy · De consolatione philosophiae

*Boethius, tr. H. F. Stewart*

Awaiting execution, Boethius is visited by Lady Philosophy: fortune’s wheel, true happiness and the providence of God, in Latin prose and verse beside English.

> Latin: ed. H. F. Stewart, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, stoa0058.stoa001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: H. F. Stewart, from the Perseus Digital Library (stoa0058.stoa001.perseus-eng1). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Book I · section 1 · 1](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/1.md)
2. [Book I · section 1 · 1](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/2.md)
3. [Book II · section 2 · 2](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/3.md)
4. [Book II · section 2 · 2](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/4.md)
5. [Book III · section 3 · 3](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/5.md)
6. [Book III · section 3 · 3](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/6.md)
7. [Book IV · section 4 · 4](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/7.md)
8. [Book IV · section 4 · 4](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/8.md)
9. [Book V · section 5 · 5](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/9.md)
10. [Book V · section 5 · 5](https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/10.md)

## 1. Book I · section 1 · 1

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/1/#p-N

[¶0] I THAT with youthful heat did verses write, Must now my woes in doleful tunes indite. My work is framed by Muses torn and rude, And my sad cheeks are with true tears bedewed: For these alone no terror could affray from being partners of my weary way. The art that was my young life's joy and glory Becomes my solace now i m old and sorry; Sorrow has filched my youth from me, the thief! My days are numbered not by time but Grief. a Untimely hoary hairs cover my head, And my loose skin quakes on my flesh half dead. o happy death, that spareth sweetest years, And comes in sorrow often called with tears. Alas, how deaf is he to wretch's cries; And loath he is to close up weeping eyes; While trustless chance me with vain favours crowned, that saddest hour my life had almost drowned Now she hath clouded her deceitful face, My spiteful days prolong their weary race. My friends, why did you count me fortunate? He that is fallen, ne'er stood in settled state. While I ruminated these things with myself, and determined to set forth my woful complaint in writing, methought I saw a woman stand above my head, having a grave countenance, glistening clear eye, and of quicker sight than commonly Nature doth afford;

> Latin: Carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi,
Flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos.
Ecce mihi lacerae dictant scribenda Camenae
Et ueris elegi fletibus ora rigant
Has saltem nullus potuit peruincere terror,
Ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter.
Gloria felicis olim uiridisque iuuentae
Solantur maesti nunc mea fata senis.
Venit enim properata malis inopina senectus
Et dolor aetatem iussit inesse suam.
Intempestiui funduntur uertice cani
Et tremit effeto corpore laxa cutis.
Mors hominum felix quae se nec dulcibus annis
Inserit et maestis saepe uocata uenit.
Eheu quam surda miseros auertitur aure
Et flentes oculos claudere saeua negat.
Dum leuibus male fida bonis fortuna falleret,
Paene caput tristis merserat hora meum.
Nunc quia fallacem mutauit nubila uultum,
Protrahit ingratas impia uita moras.
Quid me felicem totiens iactastis amici?
Qui cecidit, stabili non erat ille gradu.

[¶1] her colour fresh and bespeaking unabated vigour, and yet discovering so many years, that she could not at all be thought to belong to our times; her stature uncertain and doubtful, for sometime she exceeded not the common height of men, and sometime she seemed to touch the heavens with her head, and if she lifted it up to the highest, she pierced the very heavens, so that she could not be seen by the beholders; her garments were made of most fine threads with cunning workmanship into an ever-during stuff, which (as I knew afterward by her own report) she had woven with her own hands. A certain duskishness caused by negligence and time had darkened their colour, as it is wont to happen when pictures stand in a smoky room. In the lower part of them was placed the Greek letter Π, and in the upper θ, a and betwixt the two letters, in the manner of stairs, there were certain degrees made, by which there was a passage from the lower to the higher letter: this her garment had been cut by the violence of some, who had taken away such pieces as they could get. In her right hand she had certain books, and in her left hand she held a sceptre. This woman, seeing the poetical Muses standing about my bed, and suggesting words to my tears, being moved for a little space, and inflamed with angry looks: “Who,” saith she, “hath permitted these tragical harlots to have access to this sick man, which will not only not comfort his grief with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them with sugared poison?

> Latin: Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili officio signarem, adstitisse milli supra uerticem uisa est mulier reuerendi admodum uultus, oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum ualentiam perspicacibus colore umido atque inexhausti uigoris, quamuis ita aeui plena foret ut nullo modo nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis ambiguae. Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese hominum mensuram cohibebat, nunc uero pulsare caelum summi uerticis cacumine uidebatur; quae cum altius caput extulisset, ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum frustrabatur intuitum. Vestes erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio, indissolubili materia perfectae quas, uti post eadem prodente cognoui, suis manibus ipsa texuerat. Quarum speciem, ueluti fumosas imagines solet, caligo quaedam neglectae uetustatis obduxerat. Harum in extrema margine Π Graecum, in supremo uero θ, legebatur intextum. Atque inter utrasque litteras in scalarum modum gradus quidam insigniti uidebantur quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus. Eandem tamen uestem uiolentorum quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas quisque potuit abstulerant. Et dextera quidem eius libellos, sceptrum uero sinistra gestabat.

[¶2] For these be they which with the fruitless thorns of affections do kill the fruitful crop of reason, and do accustom men s minds to sickness, instead of curing them. But if your flattery did deprive us of some profane fellow, a as commonly it happeneth, I should think that it were not so grievously to be taken, for in him our labours should receive no harm. But now have you laid hold of him who hath been brought up in Eleatical and Academical studies? b Rather get you gone, you Sirens pleasant even to destruction, and leave him to my Muses to be cured and healed.” That company being thus checked, overcome with grief, casting their eyes upon the ground, and bewraying their bashfulness with blushing, went sadly away.

> Latin: Quae ubi poeticas Musas uidit nostro adsistentes toro fletibusque meis uerba dictantes, commota paulisper ac toruis inflammata luminibus: “Quis,” inquit, “has scenicas meretriculas ad hunc aegrum permisit accedere quae dolores eius non modo nullis remediis fouerent, uerum dulcibus insuper alerent uenenis? Hae sunt enim quae infructuosis affectuum spinis uberem fructibus rationis segetem necant hominumque mentes assuefaciunt morbo, non liberant. At si quem profanum, uti uulgo solitum uobis, blanditiae uestrae detraherent, minus moleste ferendum putarem, nihil quippe in eo nostrae operae laederentur. Hunc uero Eleaticis atque Academicis studiis innutritum? Sed abite potius Sirenes usque in exitium dulces meisque eum Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite.”

[¶3] But I, whose sight was dimmed with tears, so that I could not discern what this woman might be, so imperious, and of such authority, was astonished, and, fixing my countenance upon the earth, began to expect with silence what she would do afterward. Then she coming nigher, sat down at my bed's feet, and beholding my countenance sad with mourning, and cast upon the ground with grief, complained of the perturbation of my mind with these verses. “Alas, how thy dull mind is headlong cast In depths of woe, where, all her light once lost, She doth to walk in utter darkness haste, While cares grow great with earthly tempests tost. He that through the opened heavens did freely run, And used to travel the celestial ways. Marking the rosy splendour of the sun, And noting Cynthia's cold and watery rays; He that did bravely comprehend in verse The different spheres and wandering course of stars, He that was wont the causes to rehearse Why sounding winds do with the seas make wars, What spirit moves the world s well-settled frame, And why the sun, whom forth the east doth bring, In western waves doth hide his falling flame, Searching what power tempers the pleasing Spring Which makes the earth her rosy flowers to bear, Whose gift it is that Autumn s fruitful season Should with full grapes flow in a plenteous year, Telling of secret Nature every reason, Now having lost the beauty of his mind Lies with his neck compassed in ponderous chains; His countenance with heavy weight declined, Him to behold the sullen earth constrains.” “But it is rather time,” saith she, “to apply remedies, than to make complaints.” And then looking wistfully upon me: “Art thou he,” saith she, “which, being long since nursed with our milk, and brought up with our nourishments, wert come to man's estate?

> Latin: His ille chorus increpitus deiecit humi maestior uultum confessusque rubore uerecundiam limen tristis excessit. At ego cuius acies lacrimis mersa caligaret nec dinoscere possem, quaenam haec esset mulier tam imperiosae auctoritatis, obstipui uisuque in terram defixo quidnam deinceps esset actura, exspectare tacitus coepi. Tum illa propius accedens in extrema lectuli mei parte consedit meumque intuens uultum luctu grauem atque in humum maerore deiectum his uersibus de nostrae mentis perturbatione conquesta est.
Heu quam praecipiti mersa profundo
Mens hebet et propria luce relicta
Tendit in externas ire tenebras,
Terrenis quotiens flatibus aucta
Crescit in inmensum noxia cura.
Hic quondam caelo liber aperto
Suetus in Aetherios ire meatus
Cernebat rosei lumina solis,
Visebat gelidae sidera lunae
Et quaecumque uagos stella recursus
Exercet uarios flexa per orbes,
Comprensam numeris uictor habebat.
Quin etiam causas unde sonora
Flamina sollicitent aequora ponti,
Quis uoluat stabilem spiritus orbem
Vel cur hesperias sidus in undas
Casurum rutilo surgat ab ortu,
Quid ueris placidas temperet horas,
Vt terram roseis floribus ornet,
Quis dedit ut pleno fertilis anno
Autumnus grauidis influat uuis
Rimari solitus atque latentis
Naturae uarias reddere causas.
Nunc iacet effeto lumine mentis
Et pressus grauibus colla catenis
Decliuemque gerens pondere uultum
Cogitur, heu, stolidam cernere terram.

[¶4] Hut we had given thee such weapons as, if thou hadst not east them away, would have made thee invincible. Dost thou not know me? Why dost thou not speak? Is it shame-fastness or insensibleness that makes thee silent? I had rather it were shamefastness, but I perceive thou art become insensible.” And seeing me not only silent but altogether mute and dumb, fair and easily she laid her hand upon my breast saying: “There is no danger; he is in a lethargy, the common disease of deceived minds; he hath a little forgot himself, but he will easily remember himself again, if he be brought to know us first. To which end, let us a little wipe his eyes, dimmed with the cloud of mortal things. And having thus said, with a corner of her garment she dried my eyes which were wet with tears.” “Then fled the night and darkness did me leave, Mine eyes their wonted strength receive, As when swift Corus spreads the stars with clouds And the clear sky a veil of tempest shrouds The sun doth lurk, the earth receiveth night, Lacking the boon of starry light, But if fierce Boreas, sent from I brace, make way For the restoring of the day, Phoebus with fresh and sudden beams doth rise, Striking with light our wondering eyes.” In like manner, the mists of sadness dissolved, I came to myself and recovered my judgment, so that I knew my Physician's face; wherefore casting mine eyes upon her somewhat stedfastly, I beheld my nurse Philosophy, in whose house I had remained from my youth, and I said: “O Mistress of all virtues, for what cause art thou come from heaven into this our solitary banishment?

> Latin: Sed medicinae, “inquit, ‘tempus est quam querelae’ Tum uero totis in me intenta luminibus: ‘Tune ille es,’ ait, ‘qui nostro quondam lacte nutritus nostris educatus alimentis in uirilis animi robur euaseras? Atqui talia contuleramus arma quae nisi prior abiecisses, inuicta te firmitate tuerentur. Agnoscisne me? Quid taces? Pudore an stupore siluisti? Mallem pudore, sed te, ut uideo, stupor oppressit.’ Cumque me non modo tacitum sed elinguem prorsus mutumque uidisset, admouit pectori meo leniter manum et: ‘Nihil,’ inquit, pericli est; lethargum patitur communem inlusarum mentium morbum. Sui paulisper oblitus est; recordabitur facile, si quidem nos ante cognouerit. Quod ut possit, paulisper lumina eius mortalium rerum nube caligantia tergamus.” Haec dixit oculosque meos fletibus undantes contracta in rugam ueste siceauit.
Tunc me discussa liquerunt nocte tenebrae
Luminibusque prior rediit uigor,
Vt, cum praecipiti glomerantur sidera Coro
Nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus.
Sol latet ac nondum caelo uenientibus astris,
Desuper in terram nox funditur;
Hanc si Threicio Boreas emissus ab antro
Verberet et clausam reseret diem,
Emicat ac subito uibratus lumine Phoebus
Mirantes oculos radiis ferit.

[¶5] Art thou come to bear me company in being falsely accused?” “Should I,” saith she, “forsake thee, my disciple, and not divide the burden, which thou bearest through hatred of my name, by partaking of thy labour? But Philosophy never thought it lawful to forsake the innocent in his trouble. Should I fear any accusations, as though this were any new matter? For dost thou think that this is the first time that Wisdom hath been exposed to danger by wicked men?

> Latin: Haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis hausi caelum et ad cognoscendam medicantis faciem mentem recepi. Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam cuius ab adulescentia laribus obuersatus fueram Philosophiam. “Et quid,” inquam, “tu in has exilii nostri solitudines o omnium magistra uirtutum supero cardine delapsa uenisti? An ut tu quoque mecum rea falsis criminationibus agiteris?”

[¶6] Have we not in ancient times before our Plato s age had oftentimes great conflicts with the rashness of folly? And while he lived, had not his master Socrates the victory of an unjust death in my presence, whose inheritance, when afterward the mob of Epicures, Stoics, and others (every one for his own sect) endeavoured to usurp, and as it were in part of their prey, sought to draw me to them, exclaiming and striving against them; they tore the garment which I had woven with my own hands, and having gotten some little pieces of it, thinking me to be wholly in their possession, departed. Some of whom, because certain signs of my apparel appeared upon them, were rashly supposed to be my familiar friends, and condemned accordingly through the error of the profane multitude. But if thou hast not heard of the flight of Anaxagoras, the poison of Soerates, nor the torments of Zeno, because they are foreign examples; yet thou mayst have heard of Canius, of Seneca, of Soranus, a whose memory is both fresh and famous, whom nothing else brought to their overthrow but that they had been instructed in our school and were altogether disliking to the humours of wicked men; wherefore thou hast no cause to marvel, if in the sea of this life we be tossed with boisterous storms, whose chiefest purpose is to displease the wicked; of which though there be an huge army, yet it is to be despised, because it is not governed by any captain, but is carried up and down by fantastical error without any order at all. And if at any time they assail us with great force, our captain retireth her band into a castle, b leaving them occupied in sacking unprofitable baggage. And from above we laugh them to scorn for seeking so greedily after most vile things, being safe from all their furious assault, and fortified with that defence which aspiring folly cannot prevail against.” “Who mildly can his age dispose, And at his feet proud destiny throws: Who stoutly doth each chance behold, Keeping his countenance uncontrolled; Not him the ocean s rage and threat, Stirring the waves with angry heat, Nor hot Vesuvius when he casts From broken hills enflamèd blasts, Nor fiery thunder can dismay, Which takes the tops of towers away. Why do fierce tyrants us affright, Whose rage is far beyond their might? For nothing hope, nor fear thou harm, So their weak wrath thou shalt disarm. But he whom hope or terror takes, Being a slave, his shield forsakes, And leaves his place, and doth provide A chain wherewith his hands are tied.” Understandest thou these things, saith she, “and do they make impression in thy mind? Art thou c like the ass, deaf to the lyre? Why weepest thou? Why sheddest thou so many tears? Speak out; hide not thy thoughts. a If thou expectest to be cured, thou must discover thy wound.” Then I, collecting the forces of my mind together, made her answer in these words: “ Doth the cruelty of fortune s rage need further declaration, or doth it not sufficiently appear of itself? Doth not the very countenance of this place move thee? Is this the library which thou thyself hadst chosen to sit in at my house, in which thou hast oftentimes discoursed with me of the knowledge of divine and human things?

> Latin: “An,” inquit illa, “te alumne desererem nec sarcinam quam mei nominis inuidia sustulisti, communicato tecum labore partirer? Atqui Philosophiae fas non erat incomitatum relinquere iter innocentis; meam scilicet criminationem uererer et quasi nouum aliquid acciderit, perhorrescerem? Nunc enim primum censes apud inprobos mores lacessitam periculis esse sapientiam? Nonne apud ueteres quoque ante nostri Platonis aetatem magnum saepe certamen cum stultitiae temeritate certauimus eodemque superstite praeceptor eius Socrates iniustae uictoriam mortis me adstante promeruit? Cuius hereditatem cum deinceps Epicureum uulgus ac Stoicum ceterique pro sua quisque parte raptum ire molirentur meque reclamantem renitentemque uelut in partem praedae traherent, uestem quam meis texueram manibus, disciderunt abreptisque ab ea panniculis totam me sibi cessisse credentes abiere. In quibus quoniam quaedam nostri habitus uestigia uidebantur, meos esse familiares inprudentia rata nonnullos eorum profanae multitudinis errore peruertit. Quod si nec Anaxagorae fugam nec Socratis uenenum nec Zenonis tormenta quoniam sunt peregrina nouisti, at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos quorum nec peruetusta nec incelebris memoria est, scire potuisti. Quos nihil aliud in cladem detraxit nisi quod nostris moribus instituti studiis improborum dissimillimi uidebantur. Itaque nihil est quod admirere, si in hoc uitae salo circumflantibus agitemur procellis, quibus hoc maxime propositum est pessimis displicere. Quorum quidem tametsi est numerosus exercitus, spernendus tamen est, quoniam nullo duce regitur, sed errore tantum temere ac passim lymphante raptatur. Qui si quando contra nos aciem struens ualentior incubuerit, nostra quidem dux copias suas in arcem contrahit, illi uero circa diripiendam inutiles sarcinulas occupantur. At nos desuper inridemus uilissima rerum quaeque rapientes securi totius furiosi tumultus eoque uallo muniti quo grassanti stultitiae adspirare fas non sit.”
Quisquis composito serenus aeuo
Fatum sub pedibus egit 1 superbum
Fortunamque tuens utramque rectus
Inuictum potuit tenere uultum,
Non illum rabies minaequc ponti
Versum funditus exagitantis aestum
Nec ruptis quotiens uagus caminis
Torquet fumificos Vesaeuus ignes
Aut celsas soliti ferire turres
Ardentis uia fulminis mouebit.
Quid tantum miseri saeuos tyrannos
Mirantur sine uiribus furentes?
Nec speres aliquid nec extimescas,
Exarmaueris impotentis iram.
At quisquis trepidus pauet uel optat,
Quod non sit stabilis suique iuris,
Abiecit clipeum locoque motus
Nectit qua ualeat trahi catenam.

[¶7] Had I this attire or countenance when I searched the secrets of nature with thee, when thou describedst unto me the course of the stars with thy geometrical rod, when thou didst frame my conversation and the manner of my whole life according to the pattern of the celestial order?

> Latin: “Sentisne,” inquit, “haec atque animo inlabuntur tuo, an ὄνοσ λύρασ? Quid fles, quid lacrimis manas? ἐξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε νόῳ. Si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet uulnus detegas.”
Tum ego collecto in uires animo: “

[¶8] Are these the rewards which thy obedient servants have? But thou didst decree that sentence by the mouth of Plato: That commonwealths should be happy, if either the students of wisdom did govern them, or those which were appointed to govern them would give themselves to the study of wisdom. a Thou by the same philosopher didst admonish us that it is a sufficient cause for wise men to take upon themselves the government of the commonwealth, lest, if the rule of cities were left in the hands of lewd and wicked citizens, they should work the subversion and overthrow of the good. Wherefore, following this authority, I desired to practise that by public administration which I had learnt of thee in private conference. Thou and God Himself who had inserted thee in the minds of the wise, are my witnesses that nothing but the common desire of all good men brought me to be a magistrate. This hath been the cause of my grievous and irreconcilable disagreements with wicked men, and that which freedom of conscience carrieth with it, of ever contemning the indignation of potentates for the defence of justice.

> Latin: Anne adhuc eget admonitione nec per se satis eminet fortunae in nos saeuientis asperitas? Nihilne te ipsa loci facies mouet? Haecine est bibliotheca, quam certissimam tibi sedem nostris in laribus ipsa delegeras? In qua mecum saepe residens de humanarum diuinarumque rerum scientia disserebas? Talis habitus talisque uultus erat, cum tecum naturae secreta rimarer, cum mihi siderum uias radio de-scriberes, cum mores nostros totiusque uitae rationem ad caelestis ordinis exempla formares? Haecine praemia referimus tibi obsequentes? Atqui tu hanc sententiam Platonis ore sanxisti: beatas fore res publicas, si eas uel studiosi sapientiae regerent uel earum rectores studere sapientiae, contigisset. Tu eiusdem uiri ore hanc sapientibus capessendae rei publicae necessariam causam esse monuisti, ne improbis flagitiosisque ciuibus urbium relicta gubernacula pestem bonis ac perniciem ferrent.

[¶9] How often have I encountered with Conigastus, violently possessing himself with poor men's goods? How often have I put back Triguilla, Provost of the King's house, from injuries which he had begun, yea, and finished also? How often have I protected, by putting my authority in danger, such poor wretches as the unpunished covetousness of the barbarous did vex with infinite reproaches?

> Latin: Hanc igitur auctoritatem secutus quod a te inter secreta otia didiceram transferre in actum publicae administrationis optaui. Tu mihi et qui te sapientium mentibus inseruit deus conscii nullum me ad magistratum nisi commune bonorum omnium studium detulisse. Inde cum inprobis graues inexorabilesque discordiae et quod conscientiae libertas habet, pro tuendo iure spreta potentiorum semper offensio.

[¶10] Never did any man draw me from right to wrong. It grieved me no less than them which suffered it, to see the wealth of our subjects wasted, partly by private pillage, and partly by public tributes. contend with the chief Praetor himself, and the matter was discussed before the King, and I prevailed so far that it went not forward. I drew Paulinus, who had been Consul, out of the very mouth of the gaping courtiers, who like ravenous curs had already in hope and ambition devoured his riches. That Albinus who had likewise been Consul might not be punished upon presumptuous a and false accusation, I exposed myself to the hatred of Cyprian his accuser.

> Latin: Quotiens ego Conigastum in inbecilli cuiusque fortunas impetum facientem obuius excepi, quotiens Triguillam regiae praepositum domus ab incepta, perpetrata iam prorsus iniuria deieci, quotiens miseros quos infinitis calumniis inpunita barbarorum semper auaritia uexabat, obiecta periculis auctoritate protexi! Numquam me ab iure ad iniuriam quisquam detraxit. Prouincialium fortunas tum priuatis rapinis tum publicis uectigalibus pessumdari non aliter quam qui patiebantur indolui.

[¶11] May I seem to have provoked enmity enough against myself? But others should so much the more have procured my safety, since that for the love I bear to justice I left myself no way by the means of courtiers to be safe. But by whose accusations did I receive this blow? By theirs who, long since having put Basil out of the King's service, compelled him now to accuse me, by the necessity which he was driven to by debt. Opilio likewise and Gaudentius being banished by the King's decree, for the injuries and manifold deceits which they had committed, because they would not obey, defended themselves by taking sanctuary, of which the King hearing, gave sentence, that unless they departed out of the city of Ravenna within certain days, they should be branded in the foreheads, and put out by force. What could be added to this severity? And yet that very day their accusations against me went for current. What might be the reason of this? Did my dealing deserve it? Or did the condemnation, which went before, make them just accusers? Was not fortune ashamed, if not that innocency was accused, yet at least that it had so vile and base accusers? But what crime was laid to my charge? Wilt thou have it in one word? I am said to have desired the Senate's safety. Wilt thou know the manner how? I am blamed for having hindered their accuser to bring forth evidence by which he should prove the Senate guilty of treason. What thinkest thou, O Mistress? Shall I deny this charge, that I may not shame thee? But it is true, I desired it, neither will I ever cease from having that desire. Shall I confess it? But I have already left hindering their accuser. Shall I call it an offence to have wished the safety of that order? Indeed the Senate with their decrees concerning me had made it an offence. But folly, always deceiving herself, cannot change the deserts of things, nor, according to the decree of Soerates, a do I think it is lawful either to conceal the truth or grant a lie.

> Latin: Cum acerbae famis tempore grauis atque inexplicabilis indicta coemptio profligatum inopia Campaniam prouinciam uideretur, certamen aduersum praefectum praetorii communis commodi ratione suscepi, rege cognoscente contendi et ne coemptio exigeretur, euici. Paulinum consularem uirum cuius opes Palatinae canes iam spe atque ambitione deuorassent, ab ipsis hiantium faucibus traxi. Ne Albinum consularem uirum praeiudicatae accusationis poena corriperet, odiis me Cypriani delatoris opposui. Satisne in me magnas uideor exaceruasse discordias? Sed esse apud ceteros tutior debui qui mihi amore iustitiae nihil apud aulicos quo magis essem tutior reseruaui. Quibus autem deferentibus perculsi sumus? Quorum Basilius olim regio ministerio depulsus in delationem nostri nominis alieni aeris necessitate compulsus est. Opilionem uero atque Gaudentium cum ob innumeras multiplicesque fraudes ire in exilium regia censura decreuisset cumque illi parere nolentes sacrarum sese aedium defensione tuerentur compertumque id regi foret, edixit: uti ni intra praescriptum diem Rauenna urbe decederent, notas insigniti frontibus pellerentur. Quid huic seueritati posse astrui uidetur? Atqui in eo die deferentibus eisdem nominis nostri delatio suscepta est. Quid igitur? Nostraene artes ita me-ruerunt? An illos accusatores iustos fecit praeniissa damnatio? Itane nihil fortunam puduit si minus accusatae innocentiae, at accusantium uilitatis? 1 At cuius criminis arguimur summam quaeris? Senatum dicimur saluum esse uoluisse. Modum desideras? Delatorem ne documenta deferret quibus senatum maiestatis reum faceret impedisse criminamur.

[¶12] But how this may be, I leave to thine and Wisdom's censure. And that posterity may not be ignorant of the course and truth of the matter, I have put it down in writing. For why should I speak of those feigned letters, in which I am charged to have hoped for Roman liberty? The deceit of which would manifestly have appeared, if it might have been lawful for me to have used the confession of my very accusers, which in all business is of greatest force. For what liberty remaineth there to be hoped for? I would to God there were any! I would have answered as Canius did, who being charged by Gaius Caesar, son to Germanicus, that he was privy to the conspiracy made against him, answered: ' If I had been made acquainted with it, thou shouldest never have known of it.'

> Latin: Quid igitur o magistra censes? Infitiabimur crimen, ne tibi pudor simus? At uolui nec umquam uelle desistam. Fatebimur? Sed impediendi delatoris opera cessauit. An optasse illius ordinis salutem nefas uocabo? Ille quidem suis de me decretis, uti hoc nefas esset, effecerat. Sed sibi semper mentiens inprudentia rerum merita non potest inmutare nec mihi Socratico decreto fas esse arbitror uel occuluisse ueritatem uel concessisse mendacium. Verum id quoquo modo sit, tuo sapientiumque iudicio aestimandum relinquo. Cuius rei seriem atque ueritatem, ne latere posteros queat, stilo etiam memoriaeque mandaui.

## 2. Book I · section 1 · 1

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/2/#p-N

[¶0] b Neither hath sorrow so dulled my wits in this matter that I complain of the wicked endeavours of sinful men against virtue, but I exceedingly marvel to see that they have brought to pass the things they hoped to do. For the desire of doing evil may be attributed to our weakness, but that in the sight of Cod the wicked should be able to compass whatsoever they contrive against the innocent, is altogether monstrous. Whence not without cause one of thy familiar friends a demanded: ' If,' saith he, ' there be a God, from whence proceed so many evils? And if there be no God, from whence cometh any good? ' But let that pass that wicked men, which seek the blood of all good men, and of the whole Senate, would also have overthrown me, whom they saw to stand in defence of good men and of the Senate. But did I deserve the same of the Senators themselves? I suppose thou rememberest how thou being present didst alway direct me when I went about to say or do anything. Thou rememberest, I say, when at Verona the King, being desirous of a common overthrow, endeavoured to lay the treason, whereof only Albinus was accused, upon the whole order of the Senate, with how great security of my own danger I defended the innocency of the whole Senate. Thou knowest that these things which I say are true, and that I was never delighted in my own praise, for the secret of a good conscience is in some sort diminished when by declaring what he hath done a man recciveth the reward of fame..But thou seest to what pass my innocency is come; instead of the rewards of true virtue, I undergo the punishment of wickedness, wherewith I am falsely charged. Was it ever yet seen that the manifest confession of any crime made the judges so at one in severity, that either the error of man's judgment or the condition of fortune, which is certain to none, did not incline some of them to favour? If I had been accused that I would have burnt the churches, or wickedly have killed the priests, or have sought the death of all good men, yet sentence should have been pronounced against me present, having confessed, and being convicted. Now being conveyed five hundred miles off, dumb and defenceless, I am condemned to death and proscription for bearing the Senate too much good will. O Senate, which deserves that never any may be convicted of the like crime! The dignity of which accusation even the very accusers themselves saw, which that they might obscure by adding some sort of fault, they belied me that I defiled m v conscience with sacrilege, for an ambitious desire of preferment. But thou, which hadst seated thyself in me, didst repel from the seat of my mind all desire of mortal things, and within thy sight there was no place for sacrilege to harbour for thou didst instil into my ears and thoughts daily that saying of Pythagoras, ' Follow God. a Neither was it fitting for me to use the aid of most vile spirits when thou wast shaping me into that excellency to make me like to God. Besides the innocency which appeared in the most retired rooms of my house, the assembly of my most honourable friends, my holy father-in-law Symmachus, who is as worthy of reverence as thou thyself art, do clear me from all suspicion of this crime. But O detestable wickedness! they the rather credit thee with so great a crime, and think me the nigher to such mischievous dealing, because I am endued with thy knowledge, and adorned with thy virtues, so that it is not enough that I reap no commodity for thy respect, unless thou beest also dishonoured for the hatred conceived against me. And that my miseries may increase the more, the greatest part do not so much respect the value of tilings as the event of fortune, and they esteem only that to be providently done which the happy success commends. By which means it cometh to pass that the first loss which miserable men have is their estimation and the good opinion which was had of them. What rumours go now among the people, what dissonant and diverse opinions! I cannot abide to think of them; only this will I say, the last burden of adversity is that when they which are in misery are accused of any crime, they are thought to deserve whatsoever they suffer. And I, spoiled of all my goods, bereaved of my dignities, blemished in my good name, for benefits receive punishments. And methinks I see the cursed crews of the wicked abounding with joy and gladness, and every lost companion devising with himself how to accuse others falsely, good men lie prostrate with the terror of my danger, and every lewd fellow is provoked by impunity to attempt any wickedness, and by rewards to bring it to effect;

> Latin: Nam de compositis falso litteris quibus libertatem arguor sperasse Romanam quid attinet dicere? Quarum fraus aperta patuisset, si nobis ipsorum confessione delatorum, quod in omnibus negotiis maximas uires habet, uti licuisset. Nam quae sperari leliqua libertas potest? Atque utinam posset ulla! Respondissem Canii uerbo, qui cum a Gaio Caesare Germanici filio conscius contra se factae coniurationis fuisse diceretur: ' Si ego,' inquit, ' scissem, tu nescisses. Qua in re non ita sensus nostros maeror hebetauit ut impios scelerata contra uirtutem querar molitos, sed quae sperauerint effecisse uehementer admiror. Nam deteriora uelle nostri fuerit fortasse defectus, posse contra innocentiam, quae sceleratus quisque conceperit inspectante deo, monstri simile est. Vnde haud iniuria tuorum quidam familiarium quaesiuit: 'Si quidem deus, inquit, 'est, unde mala? Bona uero unde, si non est?' Sed fas fuerit nefarios homines qui bonorum omnium totiusque senatus sanguinem petunt, nos etiam quos propugnare bonis senatuique uiderant, perditum ire uoluisse. Sed num idem de patribus quoque merebamur? Meministi, ut opinor, quoniam me dicturum quid facturumue praesens semper ipsa dirigebas, meministi, inquam, Veronae cum rex auidus exitii communis maiestatis crimen in Albinum delatae ad cunctum senatus ordinem transferre moi iretur, uniuersi innocentiam senatus quanta mei periculi securitate defenderim. Scis me haec et uera proferre et in nulla umquam mei laude iactasse. Minuit enim quodam modo se probantis conscientiae secretum, quotiens ostentando quis factum recipit famae pretium. Sed innocentiam nostram quis exceperit euentus uides; pro uerae uirtutis praemiis falsi sceleris poenas subimus. Et cuius umquam facinoris manifesta confessio ita iudices habuit in seueritate concordes ut non aliquos uel ipse ingenii error humani uel fortunae condicio cunctis mortalibus incerta submitteret? Si inflammare sacras aedes uoluisse, si sacerdotes impio iugulare gladio, si bonis omnibus necem struxisse dicerentur, piaesentem tamen sententia, confessum tamen conuictumue punisset. Nunc quingentis fere passuum milibus procul muti atque indefensi ob studium propensius in senatum morti proscriptionique damnamur. O meritos de simili crimine neminem posse conuinci! Cuius dignitatem reatus ipsi etiam qui detulere uiderunt, quam uti alicuius sceleris admixtione fuscarent, ob ambitum dignitatis sacrilegio me conscientiam polluisse mentiti sunt. Atqui et tu insita nobis omnem rerum mortalium cupidinem de nostri animi sede pellebas et sub tuis oculis sacrilegio locum esse fas non erat. Instillabas enim auribus cogitationibusque cotidie meis Pythagoricum illud ἕπου θεῷ. 1 Nec conueniebat uilissimorum me spirituum praesidia captare quem tu in hanc excellentiam componebas ut consimilem deo faceres. Praeterea penetral innocens domus, honestissimorum coetus amicorum, socer etiam sanctus et aeque ac tu ipsa 2 reuerendus ab omni nos huius criminis suspitione defendunt. Sed, o nefas, illi uero de te tanti criminis fidem capiunt atque hoc ipso uidebimur affines fuisse maleficio, quod tuis inbuti disciplinis, tuis instituti moribus sumus. Ita non est satis nihil mihi tuam profuisse reuerentiam, nisi ultro tu mea potius offensione lacereris. At uero hic etiam nostris malis cumulus accedit, quod existimatio plurimorum non rerum merita sed fortunae spectat euentum eaque tantum iudicat esse prouisa quae felicitas commendauerit. Quo fit ut existimatio bona prima omnium deserat infelices. Qui nunc populi rumores, quam dissonae multiplicesque sententiae, piget reminisci. Hoc tantum dixerim ultimam esse aduersae fortunae sarcinam, quod dum miseris aliquod crimen affingitur, quae perferant meruisse creduntur. Et ego quidem bonis omnibus pulsus, dignitatibus exutus, existimatione foedatus ob beneficium supplicium tuli.

[¶1] hut, the innocent are not only deprived of all security, but also of any manner of defence. Wherefore I may well exclaim:” “Creator of the Sky, Who sittest on I nine eternal throne on high, Who dost quick motions cause In all the heavens, and givest stars their laws, That the pale Queen of Night, Sometimes receiving all her brother's light, Should shine in her full pride. And with her beams the lesser stars should hide; Sometimes she wants her grace, When the sun's rays are in less distant place; And Hesperus that flies, Driving the cold, before the night doth rise, And oft with sudden change Before the sun as Lucifer doth range. a Thou short the days dost make, When Winter from the trees the leaves doth take; Thou, when the fiery sun Doth Summer cause, makest the nights swiftly run. Thy might doth rule the year, As northern winds the leaves away do bear, So Zephyrus from west The plants in all their freshness doth revest; And Syrius burns that corn With which Arcturus did the earth adorn. None from Thy laws are free, Nor can forsake their place ordained by Thee, Thou to that certain end Governest all things; deniest Thou to intend The acts of men alone, Directing them in measure from Thy throne? For why should slippery chance Rule all things with such doubtful governance? Or why should punishments, Due to the guilty, light on innocents? But now the highest place Giveth to naughty manners greatest grace, And wicked people vex Good men, and tread unjustly on their necks; Virtue in darkness lurks. And righteous souls are charged with impious works. Deceits nor perjuries Disgrace not those who colour them with lies, For, when it doth them please To show their force, they to their will with ease The hearts of kings can steer, To whom so many crouch with trembling fear. O Thou that joinest with love All worldly things, look from Thy seat above On the earth s wretched state; We men, not the least work thou didst create, With fortune s blasts do shake; Thou careful ruler, these fierce tempests slake, And for the earth provide Those laws by which Thou heaven in peace dost guide.”

> Latin: Videre autem uidcor nefarias sceleratorum officinas gaudio laetitiaque fluitantes, perditissimum quemque nouis delationum fraudibus imminentem, iacere bonos nostri discriminis terrore prostratos, flagitiosum quemque ad audendum quidem facinus impunitate, ad efficiendum uero praemiis incitari, insontes autem non modo securitate, uerum ipsa etiam defensione priuatos. Itaque libet exclamare:”
O stelliferi conditor orbis
Qui perpetuo nixus solio
Rapido caelum turbine uersas
Legemque pati sidera cogis,
Vt nunc pleno lucida cornu
Totis fratris obuia flammis
Condat stellas luna minores,
Nunc obscuro pallida cornu
Phoebo propior lumina perdat,
Et qui primae tempore noctis
Agit algentes Hesperos ortus,
Solitas iterum mutet habenas
Phoebi pallens Lucifer ortu.
Tu frondifluae frigore brumae
Stringis lucem breuiore mora:
Tu, cum feruida uenerit aestas,
Agiles nocti diuidis horas.
Tua uis uarium temperat annum
Vt quas Boreae spiritus aufert
Reuehat mites Zephyrus frondes
Quaeque Arcturus semina uidit
Sirius altas urat segetes.
Nihil antiqua lege solutum
Linquit propriae stationis opus,
Omnia certo fine gubernans
Hominum solos respuis actus
Merito rector cohibere modo.
Nam cur tantas lubrica uersat
Fortuna uices? Premit insontes
Debita sceleri noxia poena,
At peruersi resident celso
Mores solio sanctaque calcant
Iniusta uice colla nocentes.
Latet obscuris condita uirtus
Clara tenebris iustusque tulit
Crimen iniqui.
Nil periuria, nil nocet ipsis
Fraus mendaci compta colore.
Sed cum libuit uiribus uti,
Quos innumeri metuunt populi
Summos gaudent subdere reges,
O iam miseras respice terras
Quisquis rerum foedera nectis.
Operis tanti pars non ullis
Homines quatimur fortunae salo.
Rapidos rector comprime fluctus
Et quo caelum regis immensum
Firma stabiles foedere terras.

[¶2] When I had uttered these speeches with continued grief, she, with an amiable countenance and nothing moved with my complaints, said: “When I first saw thee sad and weeping, I forthwith knew thee to be in misery and banishment. But I had not known how far off thou wert banished, if thy speech had not bewrayed it. O how far art thou gone from thy country, not being driven away, but wandering of thine own accord! Or if thou hadst rather be thought to have been driven out, it hath been only by thyself; for never could any other but thyself have done it; for it thou rememberest of what country thou art, it is not governed as Athens was wont to be, by the multitude, but 'one is its rider, one its king,'a who desires to have abundance of citizens, and not to have them driven away. To be governed by whose authority, and to be subject to her laws, is the greatest freedom that can be. Art thou ignorant of that most ancient law of thy city, by which it is decreed that he may not be banished that hath made choice of it for his dwelling-place; a for lie that is within her fort or hold need not fear lest he deserve to be banished? But whosoever ceaseth to desire to dwell in it, ceaseth likewise to deserve so great a benefit. Wherefore the countenance of this place moveth me not so much as thy countenance doth. Neither do I much require thy library adorned with ivory adornments, and its crystal walls, as the seat of thy mind, in which I have not placed books, but that which makes books to be esteemed of, I mean the sentences of my books, which were written long since. And that which thou hast said of thy deserts to the common good, is true indeed, but little in respect of the many things which thou hast done. That which thou hast reported, either of the honesty or of the falseness of those things which are objected against thee, is known to all men. Thou didst well to touch but briefly the wickedness and deceit of thy accusers, for that the common people to whose notice they are come do more fitly and largely speak of them. Thou hast also sharply rebuked the unjust Senate's deed. Thou hast also grieved at our accusation, and hast bewailed the loss or diminishing of our good name; and lastly, thy sorrow raged against fortune, and thou complainedst that deserts were not equally rewarded. In the end of thy bitter verse, thou desiredst that the earth might be governed by that peace which heaven enjoyeth. But because thou art turmoiled with the multitude of affections, grief and anger drawing thee to divers parts, in the plight thou art now, the more forcible remedies cannot be applied unto thee; wherefore, for a while, we will use the more easy, that thy affections, which are, as it were, hardened and swollen with perturbations, may by gentle handling be mollified and disposed to receive the force of sharper medicines.” “When hot with Phoebus' beams The Crab casts fiery gleams, He that doth then with seed Th' unwilling furrows feed, Deceivéd of his bread Must be with acorns fed. Seek not the flowery woods For violets sweet buds. When fields are overcast With the fierce northern blast. Nor hope thou home to bring Vine-clusters in the Spring If thou in grapes delight; In autumn Bacchus' might With them doth deck our clime. God every several time With proper grace hath crowned Nor will those laws confound Which He once settled hath. He that with headlong path This certain order leaves, An hapless end receives.”

> Latin: Haec ubi continuato dolore delatraui, illa uultu placido nihilque meis questibus mota: “Cum te,” inquit, “maestum lacrimantemque uidissem, ilico miserum exsulemque cognoui. Sed quam id longinquum esset exilium, nisi tua prodidisset oratio, nesciebam. Sed tu quam procul a patria non quidem pulsus es sed aberrasti; ac si te pulsum existimari mauis, te potius ipse pepulisti. Nam id quidem de te numquam cuiquam fas fuisset. Si enim cuius oriundo sis patriae reminiscare, non uti Atheniensium quondam multitudinis imperio regitur, sed εἶς κοίρανός ἐστιν, εἶς βασιλεύς qui frequentia ciuium non depulsione laetetur; cuius agi frenis atque obtemperare iustitiae summa libertas est. An ignoras illam tuae ciuitatis antiquissimam legem, qua. sanctum est ei ius exulare non esse quisquis in ea sedem fundare maluerit? Nam qui uallo eius ac munimine continetur, nullus metus est ne exul esse mereatur. At quisquis eam inhabitare uelle desierit, pariter desinit etiam mereri. Itaque non tam me loci huius quam tua facies mouet nec bibliothecae potius comptos ebore ac nitro parietes quam tuae mentis sedem requiro, in qua non libros sed id quod libris pretium facit, librorum quondam meorum sententias, collocaui. Et tu quidem de tuis in commune bonum meritis uera quidem, sed pro multitudine gestorum tibi pauca dixisti. De obiectorum tibi uel honestate uel falsitate cunctis nota memorasti. De sceleribus fraudibusque delatorum recte tu quidem strictim attingendum putasti, quod ea melius uberiusque recognoscentis omnia uulgi ore celebrentur. Increpuisti etiam uehementer iniusti factum senatus. De nostra etiam criminatione doluisti, laesae quoque opinionis damna fleuisti. Postremus aduersum fortunam dolor incanduit conquestusque non aequa meritis praemia pensari. In extremo Musae saeuientis, uti quae caelum terras quoque pax regeret, uota posuisti. Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus incubuit diuersumque te dolor, ira, maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es, nondum te ualidiora remedia contingunt. Itaque lenioribus paulisper utemur, ut quae in tumorem perturbationibus influentibus in- duruerunt, ad acrioris uim medicaminis recipiendum tactu blandiore mollescant.”
Cum Phoebi radiis graue
Cancri sidus inaestuat,
Tum qui larga negantibus
Sulcis semina credidit, Elusus Cereris fide
Quernas pergat ad arbores.
Numquam purpureum nemus
Lecturus uiolas petas
Cum saeuis aquilonibus
Stridens campus inhorruit.
Nec quaeras auida manu
Vernos stringere palmites,
Vuis si libeat frui;
Autumno potius sua
Bacchus munera contulit.
Signat tempora propriis
Aptans officiis deus
Nec quas ipse coercuit
Misceri patitur uices.
Sic quod praecipiti uia
Certum deserit ordinem
Laetos non habet exitus.

[¶3] “First, therefore, wilt thou let me touch and try the state of thy mind by asking thee a few questions, that I may understand how thou art to be cured?” To which I answered: “Ask me what questions thou wilt, and I will answer thee.” And then she said: “Thinkest thou that this world is governed by haphazard and chance? Or rather dost thou believe that it is ruled By reason?” “I can,” quoth I, “in no manner imagine that such certain motions are caused by rash chance. And I know that God the Creator doth govern His work, nor shall the day ever come to draw me from the truth of that judgment.”

> Latin: Primum igitur paterisne me pauculis rogationibus statum tuae mentis attingere atque temptare, ut qui modus sit tuae curationis intellegam? “Tu uero arbitratu,” inquam, “tuo quae uoles ut responsurum rogato.” Tum illa: “Huncine,” inquit, “mundum temerariis agi fortuitisque casibus putas, an ullum credis ei regimen inesse rationis?” “Atqui,” inquam, “nullo existimauerim modo ut fortuita temeritate tam certa moueantur, uerum operi suo conditorem praesidere deum scio nec umquam fuerit dies qui me ab hac sententiae ueritate depellat.” “Ita est,” inquit. “

[¶4] “It is so,” saith she, “tor so thou saidst in thy verse a little before, and bewailedst that only men were void of God s care; for as for the rest, thou didst not doubt but that they were governed by reason. And surely I cannot choose but exceedingly admire how thou canst be ill affected, holding so wholesome an opinion. But let us search further; I guess thou wantest something, but I know not what.

> Latin: Nam id etiam paulo ante cecinisti, hominesque tantum diuinae exortes curae esse deplorasti. Nam de ceteris quin ratione regerentur, nihil mouebare. Papae autem! Vehementer admiror cur in tam salubri sententia Iocatus aegrotes. Verum altius perscrutemur; nescio quid abesse coniecto.

[¶5] Tell me, since thou doubtest not that the world is governed by God, canst thou tell me also by what means it is governed?” “I do scarcely,” quoth I, “understand what thou askest, and much less am I able to make thee a sufficient answer,” “Was I,” quoth she, “deceived in thinking that thou wantedst something by which, as by the breach of a fortress, the sickness of perturbations hath entered into thy mind? But tell me, dost thou remember what is the end of things? Or to what the whole intention of nature tendeth?” “I have heard it,” quoth I, “but grief hath dulled my memory.” “But knowest thou from whence all things had their beginning?”

> Latin: Sed dic mihi, quoniam deo mundum regi non ambigis, quibus etiam gubernaculis regatur aduertis?” “Vix,” inquam, “rogationis tuae sententiam nosco, nedum ad inquisita respondere queam.” “Num me,” inquit, “fefellit abesse aliquid, per quod, uelut hiante ualli robore, in animum tuum perturbationum morbus inrepserit? Sed dic mihi, meministine, quis sit rerum finis, quoue totius naturae tendat intentio?” “Audieram,” inquam, “sed memoriam maeror hebetauit.” “Atqui scis unde cuncta processerint?” “Noui,” inquam, deumque esse respondi. “

[¶6] “I know,” quoth I, and answered, that from God. “And how can it be that, knowing the beginning, thou canst be ignorant of the end? But this is the condition and force of perturbations, that they may alter a man, but wholly destroy, and as it were root him out of himself, they cannot But I would have thee answer me to this also;

> Latin: Et qui fieri potest, ut principio cognito quis sit rerum finis ignores? Verum hi perturbationum mores, ea ualentia est, ut mouere quidem loco hominem possint, conuellere autem sibique totum exstirpare non possint.

[¶7] dost thou remember that thou art a man?” “Why should I not remember it?” quoth I. “Well then, canst thou explicate what man is?” “Dost thou ask me if I know that I am a reasonable and mortal living creature? I know and confess myself to be so.” To which she replied: “Dost thou not know thyself to be anything else?” “Not anything.” “Now I know,” quoth she, “another, and that perhaps the greatest, cause of thy sickness: thou hast forgotten what thou art. Wherefore I have fully found out both the manner of thy disease and the means of thy recovery; for the confusion which thou art in, by the forgetfulness of thyself, is the cause why thou art so much grieved at thy exile and the loss of thy goods. And because thou. art ignorant what is the end of things, thou thinkest that lewd and wicked men be powerful and happy; likewise, because thou hast forgotten by what means the world is governed, thou imaginest that these alternations of fortune do fall out without any guide; sufficient causes not only of sickness, but also of death itself. But thanks be to the author of thy health, that Nature hath not altogether forsaken thee. We have the greatest nourisher of thy health, the true opinion of the government of the world, in that thou believest that it is not subject to the events of chance, but to divine reason. Wherefore fear nothing; out of this little sparkle will be enkindled thy vital heat. But because it is not yet time to use more solid remedies, and it is manifest that the nature of minds is such that as often as they cast away true opinions they are possessed with false, out of which the darkness of perturbations arising doth make them that they cannot discern things aright, I will endeavour to dissolve this cloud with gentle and moderate fomentations; that having removed the obscurity of deceitful affections, thou mayest behold the splendour of true light.” “When stars are shrouded With dusky night, They yield no light Being so clouded. When the wind moveth And churneth the sea, The flood, clear as day, Foul and dark proveth. And rivers creeping Down a high hill Stand often still, Rocks them back keeping, If thou wouldst brightly See Truth's clear rays, Or walk those ways Which lead most rightly. All joy forsaking Fear must thou fly, And hopes defy, No sorrow taking For where these terrors Reign in the mind, They it do bind In cloudy errors.”

> Latin: Sed hoc quoque respondeas uelim, hominemne te esse meministi?” “Quidni,” inquam, “meminerim?” “Quid igitur homo sit, poterisne proferre?” “Hocine interrogas an esse me sciam rationale animal atque mortale? Scio et id me esse confiteor.” Et illa: “Nihilne aliud te esse nouisti?” “Nihil.” “Iam scio.” inquit. “morbi tui aliam uel maximam causam; quid ipse sis, nosse desisti. Quare plenissime uel aegritudinis tuae rationem uel aditum reconciliandae sospitatis inueni. Nam quoniam tui obliuione confunderis, et exsulem te et exspoliatum piopriis bonis esse doluisti. Quoniam uero quis sit rerum fanis ignoras, nequam homines atque nefarios potentes felicesque arbitraris. Quoniam uero quibus gubernaculis mundus regatur oblitus es, has fortunarum uices aestimas sine rectore fluitare—magnae non ad morbum modo uerum ad interitum quoque causae. Sed sospitatis auctori grates, quod te nondum totum natura destituit. Habemus maximum tuae fomitem salutis ueram de mundi gubernatione sententiam, quod eam non casuum temeritati sed diuinae rationi subditam credis. Nihil igitur pertimescas; iam tibi ex hac minima scintillula uitalis calor inluxerit. Sed quoniam firmioribus remediis nondum tempus est et eam ruentium constat esse naturam, ut quotiens abiecerint ueras falsis opinionibus induantur ex quibus orta perturbationum caligo uerum illum confundit intuitum, hanc paulisper lenibus mediocribusque fomentis at-tenuare temptabo, ut dimotis fallacium affectionum tenebris splendorem uerae lucis possis agnoscere.”
Nubibus atris
Condita nullum
Fundere possunt
Sidera lumen.
Si mare uoluens
Turbidus Auster
Misceat aestum,
Vitrea dudum
Parque serenis
Vnda diebus
Mox resoluto
Sordida caeno
Visibus obstat.
Quique uagatur
Montibus altis
Defluus amnis,
Saepe resistit
Rupe soluti
Obice saxi.
Tu quoque si uis
Lumine claro
Cernere uerum,
Tramite recto
Carpere callem,
Gaudia pelle,
Pelle timorem
Spemque fugato
Nec dolor adsit.
Nubila mens est
Vinctaque frenis,
Haec ubi regnant.

## 3. Book II · section 2 · 2

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/3/#p-N

[¶0] After this she remained silent for a while; and, having by that her modesty made me attentive, began in this wise: “

[¶1] If I be rightly informed of the causes and condition of thy disease, thou languishest with the affection of thy former fortune, and the change of that alone, as thou imaginest, hath overthrown so much of thy mind, I know the manifold illusions of that monster, exercising most alluring familiarity with them whom she meaneth to deceive, to the end she may confound them with intolerable grief, by forsaking them upon the sudden, whose nature, customs, and desert, if thou rememberest, thou shalt know that thou neither didst possess nor hast lost anything of estimation in it; and, as I hope, I shall not need to labour much to bring these things to thy remembrance, for thou wert wont, when she was present, and flattered thee most, to assail her with manful words, and pursue her with sentences taken forth of our most hidden knowledge. But every sudden change of things happeneth not without a certain wavering and disquietness of mind. And this is the cause that thou also for a while hast lost thy former tranquillity and peace. But it is time tor thee to take and taste some gentle and pleasant thing which being received may prepare thee tor stronger potions. Wherefore let us use the sweetness of Rhetoric s persuasions, which then only is well employed when it forsaketh not our ordinances, and with this, let Music, a little slave belonging to our house, chant sometime lighter and sometime sadder notes.

> Latin: Post haec paulisper obticuit atque ubi attentionem meam modesta taciturnitate collegit, sic exorsa est: “ Si penitus aegritudinis tuae causas habitumque cognovi, fortunae prioris affectu desiderioque tabescis. Ea tantum animi tui sicuti tu tibi fingis mutata peruertit. Intellego multiformes illius prodigii fucos et eo usque cum his quos eludere nititur blandissimam familiaritatem, dum intolerabili dolore confundat quos insperata reliquerit. Cuius si naturam mores ac meritum reminiscare, nec habuisse te in ea pulchrum aliquid nec amisisse cognosces, sed ut arbitror haud multum tibi haec in memoriam reuocare laborauerim. Solebas enim praesentem quoque blandientemque uirilibus incessere uerbis eamque de nostro adyto prolatis insectabare sententiis. Verum omnis subita mutatio rerum non sine quodam quasi fluctu contingit animorum; sic factum est ut tu quoque paulisper a tua tranquillitate descisceres. Sed tempus est haurire te aliquid ac degustare molle atque iucundum quod ad interiora transmissum ualidioribus haustibus uiam fecerit. Adsit igitur Rhetoricae suadela dulcedinis quae tum tantum recto calle procedit, cum nostra instituta non deserit cumque hac Musica laris nostri uernacula nunc leuiores nunc grauiores modos succinat.

[¶2] Wherefore, O man, what is it that hath cast thee into sorrow and grief? Thou hast, methinks, seen something new and unwonted. If thou thinkest that fortune hath altered her manner of proceeding tow aid thee, thou art in an error. This was alway her fashion; tins is her nature. She hath kept that constancy in thy affairs which is proper to her, in being mutable; such was her condition when she fawned upon thee and allured thee with enticements of feigned happiness. Thou hast discovered the doubtful looks of this blind goddess. She, which concealeth herself from others, is wholly known to thee. If thou likest her, frame thyself to her conditions, and make no complaint. If thou detestest I her treachery, despise and cast her off, with her! pernicious flattery. For that which hath caused thee so much sorrow should have brought thee to great tranquillity. For she hath forsaken thee, of whom no man can be secure. Dost thou esteem that happiness precious which thou art to lose? And is the present fortune dear unto thee, of whose stay thou art not sure, and whose departure will breed thy grief? And if she can neither be kept at our will, and maketh them miserable whom she at last leaveth, what else is fickle fortune but a token of future calamity? For it is not sufficient to behold that which we have before our eyes; wisdom pondereth the event of things, and this mutability on both sides maketh the threats of fortune not to be feared, nor her flatterings to be desired. Finally, thou must take in good part whatsoever happeneth unto thee within the reach of fortune, when once thou hast submitted thy neck to her yoke. And if to her whom, of thine own accord, thou hast chosen for thy mistress, thou wouldest prescribe a law how long she were to stay, and when to depart, shouldst thou not do her mighty wrong, and with thy impatience make thy estate more intolerable, which thou canst not better? If thou settest up thy sails to the wind, thou shalt be carried not whither thy will desirest, but whither the gale driveth. If thou so west thy seed, thou consider es t that there are as well barren as fertile years. Thou hast yielded thyself to fortune s sway; thou must be content with the conditions of thy mistress, Endeacovrest thou to stay the force of the turning wheel? But thou foohshest man that ever was, if it beginneth to stay, it ceaseth to be fortune.”

> Latin: Quid est igitur o homo quod te in maestitiam luctumque deiecit? Nouum, credo, aliquid inusitatumque uidisti. Tu fortunam putas erga te esse mutatam; erras. Hi semper eius mores sunt ista natura. Seruauit circa te propriam potius in ipsa sui mutabilitate constantiam. Talis erat cum blandiebatur, cum tibi falsae inlecebris felicitatis alluderet. Deprehendisti caeci numinis ambiguos uultus. Quae sese adhuc uelat aliis, tota tibi prorsus innotuit. Si probas, utere moribus; ne queraris. Si perfidiam perhorrescis, sperne atque abice perniciosa ludentem. Nam quae nunc tibi est tanti causa maeroris, haec eadem tranquillitas esse debuisset. Reliquit enim te quam non relicturam nemo umquam poterit esse securus. An uero tu pretiosam aestimas abituram felicitatem? Et cara tibi est fortuna praesens nec manendi fida et cum discesserit adlatura maerorem. Quod si nec ex arbitrio retineri potest et calamitosos fugiens facit, quid est aliud fugax quam futurae quoddam calamitatis indicium? Neque enim quod ante oculos situm est, suffecerit intueri; rerum exitus prudentia metitur eademque in alterutro mutabilitas nec formidandas fortunae minas nec exoptandas facit esse blanditias. Postremo aequo animo toleres oportet quidquid intra fortunae aream geritur, cum semel iugo eius colla submiseris. Quod si manendi abeundique scribere legem uelis ei quam tu tibi dominam sponte legisti, nonne iniurius fueris et inpatientia sortem exacerbes quam permutare non possis? Si uentis uela committeres, non quo uoluntas peteret sed quo flatus impellerent, promoueres; si aruis semina crederes, feraces inter se annos sterilesque pensares. Fortunae te regendum dedisti; dominae moribus oportet obtemperes. Tu uero uoluentis rotae impetum retinere conaris?.At, omnium mortalium stolidissime, si manere incipit, fors esse desistit.”
Haec cum superba uerterit uices dextra
Et aestuantis more fertur Euripi,
Dudum tremendos saeua proterit reges
Humilemque uicti subleuat fallax uultum.

[¶3] “The pride of fickle fortune spareth none, And, like the floods of swift Euripus borne, a Oft casteth mighty princes from their throne, And oft the abject captive doth adorn. She cares not for the wretch s tears and moan, And the sad groans, which she hath caused, doth scorn. Thus doth she play, to make her power more known, Showing her slaves a marvel, when man's state Is in one hour both downcast and fortunate.”

> Latin: Non illa miseros audit aut curat fletus
Vltroque gemitus dura quos fecit ridet.
Sic illa ludit, sic suas probat uires
Magnumque suis demonstrat 1 ostentum, si quis
Visatur una stratus ac felix hora. Vellem autem pauca tecum fortunae ipsius uerbis agitare. Tu igitur an ius postulet, animaduerte. 'Quid tu homo ream me cotidianis agis querelis?

[¶4] But I would urge thee a little with Fortune's own speeches. Wherefore consider thou if she asketh not reason. 'For what cause, O man, ehargest thou me with daily complaints? What injury have I done thee? What goods of thine have I taken from thee? Contend with me before any judge about the possession of riches and dignities; and if thou canst show that the propriety of any of these things belong to any mortal wight, I will forthwith willingly grant that those things which thou demandest were thine. When Nature produced thee out of thy mother's womb, I received thee naked and poor in all respects, cherished thee with my wealth, and (which maketh thee now to fall out with me) being forward to favour thee, I had most tender care for thy education, and adorned thee with the abundance and splendour of all things which are in my power. Now it pleaseth me to withdraw my hand, yield thanks, as one that hath had the use of that which was not his own. Thou hast no just cause to complain, as though thou hadst lost that which was fully thine own. Wherefore lamentest thou? I have offered thee no violence. Riches, honours, and the rest of that sort belong to me. They acknowledge me for their mistress, and themselves for my servants, they come with me, and when I go away they likewise depart. I may boldly affirm, if those things which thou complainest to be taken from thee had been thine own, thou shouldst never have lost them. Must I only be forbidden to use my light. It is lawful for the heaven to bring forth fair days, and to hide them again in darksome nights. It is lawful for the year sometime to compass the face of the earth with flowers and fruits and sometime to cover it with clouds and cold, The sea hath right sometime to fawn with calms, and sometime to frown with storms and waves. And shall I the insatiable desire of men tie me to constancy so contrary to my custom? This is my force, this is the sport which I continually use. I turn about my wheel with speed, and take a pleasure to turn lings upside down. Ascend, if thou wilt, but with this condition, that thou thinkest it not an injury to descend when the course of my sport so requireth. Didst thou not know my fashion? Wert thou ignorant how Croesus, King of the Lydians, not long before a terror to Cyrus, within a while after came to such misery that he should have been burnt had he not been saved by a shower sent from heaven? a Hast thou forgotten how Paul piously bewailed the calamities of King Perses his prisoner? b What other thing doth the outcry of tragedies lament, but that fortune, having no respect, overturneth happy states? Didst thou not learn in thy youth that there lay two barrels, the one of good things and the other of bad, a at Jupiter s threshold t But what if thou hast tasted more abundantly of the good? What if I be not wholly gone from thee? What if this mutability of be a just cause for thee to hope for better?

> Latin: Quam tibi fecimus iniuriam? Quae tua tibi detraximus bona? Quouis iudice de opum dignitatumque mecum possessione contende. Et si cuiusquam mortalium proprium quid horum esse monstraueris, ego iam tua fuisse quae repetis, sponte concedam. Cum te matris utero natura produxit, nudum rebus omnibus inopemque suscepi, meis opibus foui et quod te nunc inpatientem nostri facit, fauore prona indulgentia educaui, omnium quae mei iuris sunt affluentia et splendore circumdedi. Nunc milli retrahere manum libet. Habes gratiam uelut usus alienis, non habes ius querelae tamquam prorsus tua perdideris. Quid igitur ingemiscis? Nulla tibi a nobis est allata uiolentia. Opes honores ceteraque talium mei sunt iuris. Dominam famulae cognoscunt j mecum ueniunt, me abeunte discedunt. Audacter adfirmem, si tua forent quae amissa conquerens nullo modo perdidisses. An ego sola meum ius exercere prohibebor? Licet caelo proferre lucidos dies eosdemque tenebrosis noctibus condere. Licet anno terrae uultum nunc floribus frugibusque redimire, nunc nimbis frigoribusque confundere. Ius est mari nunc strato aequore blandiri, nunc procellis ac fluctibus iuborrescere. Nos ad constantiam nostris moribus alienam inexpleta hominum cupiditas alligabit? Haec nostra uis est, hunc continuum ludum ludimus; rotam uolubili orbe uersamus, infima summis summa infimis mutare gaudemus. Ascende si placet, sed ea lege ne utique 1 cum Iudicia mei ratio poscet, descendere iniuriam putes. An tu mores ignorabas meos? Nesciebas Croesum regem Lydorum Cyro paulo ante formidabilem mox deinde miserandum rogi flammis traditum misso caelitus imbre defensum? Num te praeterit Paulum Persi regis a se capti calamitatibus pias inpendisse lacrimas? Quid tragoediarum clamor aliud deflet nisi indiscreto ictu fortunam felicia regna uertentem? Nonne adulescentulus δοιοὺσ πίθουσ τὸν μὲν ἕνα κακῶν τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἐάων in Iouis limine iacere didicisti? Quid si liberius de bonorum parte sumpsisti? Quid si a te non tota discessi? Quid si haec ipsa mei mutabilitas iusta tibi causa est sperandi meliora? tamen ne animo contabescas et intra commune omnibus regnum Iocatus proprio uiuere iure desideres.
Si quantas rapidis flatibus incitus
Pontus uersat barenas
Aut quot stelliferis edita noctibus
Caelo sidera fulgent
Tantas fundat opes nec retrahat manum
Pleno copia cornu.
Humanum miseras haud ideo genus
Cesset flere querellas.

[¶5] Notwithstanding, lose not thy courage, and, living in a kingdom which is common to all men, desire not to be governed by peculiar laws proper only to thyself.

> Latin: Quamuis uota libens excipiat deus
Multi prodigus auri
Et claris auidos ornet honoribus,
Nil iam parta uidentur,
Sed quaesita uorans saeua rapacitas
Altos 1 pandit hiatus.

[¶6] “back her hand, As the swift winds in troubled seas do toss up heaps of sand, Or as the stars in light some nights shine forth on heaven s face, Yet wretched men would still accuse their miserable case. Should God too liberal of His gold, their greedy wishes bear, And with bright honour them adorn; yet all that nothing were, Since ravenous minds, devouring all, for more are ready still. What bridle can contain in bounds this their contentless will, When filled with riches they retain the thirst of having more? He is not rich that fears and grieves, and counts himself but poor.' ”

> Latin: Quae iam praecipitem frena cupidinem
Certo fine retentent,
Largis cum potius muneribus fluens
Sitis ardescit habendi?
Numquam diues agit qui trepidus gemens
Sese credit egentem. “His igitur si pro se tecum fortuna loqueretur, quid profecto contra hisceres non haberes, aut si quid est quo querelam tuam iure tuearis, proferas oportet. Dabimus dicendi locum.” Tum ego: “Speciosa quidem ista sunt, inquam, oblitaque Rhetoricae ac Musicae melle dulcedinis;

[¶7] Wherefore if fortune should plead with thee thus in her own defence, doubtless thou wouldst not have a word to answer her. But if there be anything which thou canst allege in thy own defence, thou must utter it. We will give thee full liberty to speak. Then I said: “These things make a fair show and, being set out with pleasant rhetoric and music, delight only so long as they arc heard. But those which are miserable have a deeper feeling of their miseries, therefore, when the sound of these things is past, hidden sorrow oppresseth the mind.” “It is so indeed,” quoth she, “

> Latin: tum tantum, cum audiuntur, oblectant. Sed miseris malorum altior sensus est. Itaque cum haec auribus insonare desierint, insitus animum maeror praegrauat.” Et illa: “Ita est,” inquit. “ Haec enim nondum morbi tui remedia sed adhuc contumacis aduersum curationem doloris fomenta quaedam sunt. Nam quae in profundum sese penetrant, cum tempestiuum fuerit admouebo. Verumtamen ne te existimari miserum uelis, an numerum modumque tuae felicitatis oblitus es?

[¶8] for these be not the remedies of thy disease, but certain fomentations to assuage thy grief, which as yet resisteth all cure. But when it shall be time, I will apply that which shall pierce to the quick. And yet there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself miserable. Hast thou forgotten how many ways, and in what degree thou art happy?

> Latin: Taceo quod desolatum parente summorum te uirorum cura suscepit delectusque in affiniatem principum ciuitatis, quod pretiosissimum propinquitatis genus est, prius carus quam proximus esse coepisti. Quis non te felicissimum cum tanto splendore socerorum, cum coniugis pudore, cum masculae quoque prolis opportunitate praedicauit?

[¶9] I pass over with silence that, having lost thy father, thou wert provided for by men of the best sort, and, being chosen to have affinity with the chiefest of the city, thou begannest sooner to be dear unto them than to be akin, which is the most excellent kind of kindred. Who esteemed thee not most happy, having so noble a father-in-law, so chaste a wife, and so noble sons? I say nothing (for I will not speak of ordinary matters) of the dignities denied to others in their age, and granted to thee m thy youth. I desire to come to the singular top of thy felicity. If any fruit of mortal things hath any weight of happiness, can the remembrance of that light be destroyed with any cloud of miseries that can overcast thee? When thou sawst thy two sons being both Consuls together carried from their house, the Senators accompanying them, and the people rejoicing with them; when, they sitting in the Senate in their chairs of state, thou making an oration in the King's praise deservedst the glory of wit and eloquence. When in public assembly, thou, standing betwixt thy two sons, didst satisfy with thy triumphant liberality the expectation of the multitudes gathered together, I suppose thou flatteredst fortune, while she fawned thus upon thee, as her dearest friend. Thou obtainedst more at her hands than ever private man had before thee. Wilt thou then reckon with fortune? This is the first time that ever she frowned upon thee. If thou considerest the number and measure of thy joyful and sad accidents, thou canst not choose but think thyself fortunate hitherto; and if thou esteemest not thyself fortunate because those things which seemed joyful are past, there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself miserable, since those things which thou now takest to be sorrowful do pass. Comest thou now first as a pilgrim and stranger into the theatre of this life? Supposest thou to find any constancy in human affairs, since that man himself is soon gone? For although things subject to fortune seldom keep touch in staying, yet the end of life is a certain death, even of that fortune which remaineth. Wherefore, what matter is it whether thou by dying leavest it, or it forsaketh thee by flying?”

> Latin: Praetereo, libet enim praeterire communia, sumptas in adulescentia negatas senibus dignitates; ad singularem felicitate tuae cumulum uenire delectat. Si quis rerum mortalium fructus ullum beatitudinis pondus habet, poteritne illius memoria lucis quantalibet ingruentium malorum mole deleri, cum duos pariter consules liberos tuos domo prouehi sub frequentia patrum, sub plebis alacritate uidisti, cum eisdem in curia curules in-sidentibus tu regiae laudis orator ingenii gloriam facundiaeque meruisti, cum in circo duorum medius consulum circumfusae multitudinis expectationem triumphali largitione satiasti? Dedisti ut opinor uerba fortunae, dum te illa demulcet, dum te ut delicias suas fouet. Munus quod nulli umquam priuato commodauerat abstulisti. Visne igitur cum fortuna calculum ponere? Nunc te primum liuenti oculo praestrinxit. Si numerum modumque laetorum tristiumue consideres, adhuc te felicem negare non possis. Quod si idcirco te fortunatum esse non aestimas, quoniam quae tunc laeta uidebantur abierunt, non est quod te miserum putes, quoniam quae nunc creduntur maesta praetereunt. An tu in hanc uitae scaenam nunc primum subitus hospesque uenisti? VI Iamne humanis rebus inesse constantiam reris, cum ipsum saepe hominem uelox hora dissoluat? Nam etsi rara est fortuitis manendi fides, ultimus tamen uitae dies mors quaedam fortunae est etiam manentis. Quid igitur referre putas, tune illam moriendo deseras an te illa fugiendo?”
Cum polo Phoebus roseis quadrigis
Lucem spargere coeperit,
Pallet albentes hebetata uultus
Flammis stella prementibus.
Cum nemus flatu Zephyri tepentis
Vernis inrubuit rosis,
Spiret insanum nebulosus Auster
Iam spinis abeat decus.
Saepe tranquillo radiat sereno
Immotis mare fluctibus,
Saepe feruentes Aquilo procella?

[¶10] “When Phoebus with his rosy team Showeth his lightsome beam, The dull and darkened stars retire Yielding to greater fire. When Zephyrus his warmth doth bring, Sweet roses deck the spring; Let noisome Auster blow apace, Plants soon will lose their grace. The sea hath often quiet stood With an unmoved flood, And often is turmoiled with waves, When boisterous Boreas raves. If thus the world never long tarry The same, but often vary, On fading fortunes then rely, Trust to those goods that fly. An everlasting law is made, That all things born shall fade.”

> Latin: Verso concitat aequore.
Rara si constat sua forma mundo,
Si tantas uariat uices,
Crede fortunis hominum caducis,
Bonis crede fugacibus.
Constat aeterna positumque lege est
Vt constet genitum nihil. Tum ego: “Vera,” inquam, “commemoras, o uirtutum omnium nutrix, nec infitiari possum prosperitatis meae uelocissimum cursum. Sed hoc est quod recolentem uehementius coquit.

[¶11] To which I answered: “The things which thou reportest are true, O nurse of all virtues, and I cannot deny the most speedy course of my prosperity. But this is that which vexeth me most, when I remember it. For in all adversity of fortune it is the most unhappy kind of misfortune to have been happy.” “But,” quoth she, “

> Latin: Nam in omni aduersitate fortunae infelicissimum est genus infortunii fuisse felicem,” “Sed quod tu,” inquit, “falsae opinionis supplicium luas, id rebus iure imputare non possis. Nam si te hoc inane nomen fortuitae felicitatis mouet, quam pluribus maximisque abundes mecum reputes licet.

[¶12] thou canst not justly impute to the things themselves that thou art punished for thy false opinion. for if this vain name of casual felicity moveth thee, let us make accompt with how many and how great things thou aboundest. Wherefore, if that which in all thy revenues of fortune thou esteemest most precious doth still by God s providence remain safe and untouched, canst thou, retaining the best, justly complain of misfortune?

> Latin: Igitur si quod in omni fortunae tuae censu pretiosissimum possidebas, id tibi diuinitus iulaesum adhuc inuiolatumque seruatur, poterisne meliora quaeque retinens de infortunio iure causari? Atqui uiget incolumis illud pretiosissimum generis humani decus Symmachus socer et quod uitae pretio non segnis emeres, uir totus ex sapientia uirtutibusque factus suarum securus tuis ingemiscit iniuriis.

[¶13] But thy father-in-law, Symmachus (that most excellent ornament of mankind) liveth in safety, and for the obtaining of which thou wouldst willingly spend thy life, that man wholly framed to wisdom and virtues, being secure of his own, mourneth for thy injuries. Thy wife liveth, modest in disposition, eminent in chastity, and, to rehearse briefly all her excellent gifts, like her father. She liveth, I say, and weary of her life reserveth her breath only for thee. In which alone even I must grant that thy felicity is diminished, she consumeth herself with tears and grief for thy sake. What should I speak of thy children, which have been Consuls, in whom already, as in children of that age, their father's or grandfathers good disposition appeareth? Wherefore, since the greatest care that mortal men have is to save their lives, O happy man that thou art, if thou knowest thine own wealth, who still hast remaining those things which no man doubteth to be dearer than life itself? And therefore cease weeping. Fortune hath not hitherto showed her hatred against you all, neither art thou assailed with too boisterous a storm, since those anchors hold fast which permit neither the comfort of the time present nor the hope of the time to come to be wanting.” “And I pray God,” quoth I, “that they may hold fast, for so long as they remain, howsoever the world goeth we shall escape drowning. But thou seest how great a part of our ornaments is lost.” “ We have gotten a little ground,” quoth she, “

> Latin: Viuit uxor ingenio modesta, pudicitia pudore praecellens et, ut omnes eius dotes breuiter includam, patri similis. Viuit inquam tibique tantum uitae huius exosa spiritum seruat quoque uno felicitatem minui tuam uel ipsa concesserim, tui desiderio lacrimis ac dolore tabescit. Quid dicam liberos consulares quorum iam, ut in id aetatis pueris, uel paterni uel auiti specimen elucet ingenii? Cum igitur praecipua sit mortalibus uitae cura retinendae, o te si tua bona cognoscas felicem, cui suppetunt etiam nunc quae uita nemo dubitat esse carior! Quare sicca iam lacrimas. Nondum est ad unum omnes exosa fortuna nec tibi nimium ualida tempestas incubuit, quando tenaces haerent ancorae quae nec praesentis solamen nec futuri spem temporis abesse patiantur.” “Et haereant,” inquam, “precor; illis namque manentibus, utcumque se res habeant, enatabimus. Sed quantum ornamentis nostris decesserit, uides.” Et illa. “Promouimus,” inquit, “ aliquantum, si te nondum totius tuae sortis piget. Sed delicias tuas ferre non possum qui abesse aliquid tuae beatitudini tam luctuosus atque anxius conqueraris. Quis est enim tam conpositae felicitatis ut non aliqua ex parte cum status sui qualitate rixetur?

[¶14] if thy whole estate be not irksome unto thee. But I cannot suffer thy daintiness, who with such lamentation and anxiety complaineth that something is wanting to thy happiness. For who hath so entire happiness that he is not in some part offended with the condition of his estate? The nature of human felicity is doubtful and uncertain, and is neither ever wholly obtained, or never lasteth always. One man hath great revenues, but is contemned for bis base lineage. Another's nobility maketh him known, but, oppressed with penury, had rather be unknown. Some, abounding with both, bewail their life without marriage. Some other, well married but wanting children, provideth riches for strangers to inherit. Others, finally, having children, mournfully bewail the vices which their sons or daughters are given to. So that scarce any man is pleased with the condition of his fortune. For there is something in every estate, which without experience is not known, and being experienced doth molest and trouble. Besides that, those which are most happy are most sensible, a and unless all things fall out to their liking, impatient of all adversity, every little cross overthrows them, so small are the occasions which take from the most fortunate the height of their happiness. How many are there, thinkest thou, which would think themselves almost in Heaven if they had but the least part of the remains of thy fortune? This very place, which thou callest banishment, is to the inhabitants thereof their native land. So true it is that nothing is miserable but what is thought so, and contrariwise, every estate is happy if lie that bears it be content. Who is so happy that if he yieldeth to discontent, desireth not to change his estate? How much bitterness is mingled with the sweetness of man s felicity, which, though it seemeth so pleasant while it is enjoyed, yet can it not be retained from going away when it will. And by this it appeareth how miserable is the blessedness of mortal things, which neither endureth alway with the contented, nor wholly delighteth the pensive.

> Latin: Anxia enim res est humanorum condicio bonorum et quae uel numquam tota proueniat uel numquam perpetua subsistat. Huic census exuberat, sed est pudori degener sanguis; hunc nobilitas notum facit, sed angustia rei familiaris inclusus esse mallet ignotus. Ille utroque circumfluus uitam caelibem deflet; ille nuptiis felix orbus liberis alieno censum nutrit heredi. Alius prole laetatus filii filiaeue delictis maestus inlacrimat. Idcirco nemo facile cum fortunae suae condicione concordat j inest enim singulis quod inexpertus ignoret, expertus exhorreat. Adde quod felicissimi cuiusque delicatissimus sensus est et nisi ad nutum cuncta suppetant, omnis aduersitatis insolens minimis quibusque prosternite; adeo perexigua sunt quae fortunatissimis beatitudinis summam detrahunt. Quam multos esse coniectas qui sese caelo proximos arbitrentur, si de fortunae tuae reliquiis pars eis minima contingat? Hic ipse locus quem tu exilium uocas, incolentibus patria est; adeo nihil est miserum nisi cum putes contraque beata sors omnis est aequanimitate tolerantis. Quis est ille tam felix qui cum dederit inpatientiae manus, statum suum mutare non optet? Quam multis amaritudinibus humanae felicitatis dulcedo respersa est! Quae si etiam fruenti iucunda esse uideatur, tamen quo minus cum uelit abeat retineri non possit. Liquet igitur quam sit mortalium rerum misera beatitudo quae nec apud aequanimos perpetua perdurat necanxios tota delectat. Quid igitur o mortales extra petitis intra uos positam felicitatem? Error uos inscitiaque confundit. Ostendam breuiter tibi summae cardinem felicitatis. Estne aliquid tibi te ipso pretiosius? Nihil inquies. Igitur si tui compos fueris, possidebis quod nec tu amittere umquam uelis nec fortuna possit auferre.

[¶15] Wherefore, O mortal men, why seek you for your felicity abroad, which is placed within yourselves? Error and ignorance do confound you. I will briefly show thee the centre of thy chiefest happiness. Is there anything more precious to thee than thyself? I am sure thou wilt say, nothing. Wherefore, if thou enjoyest thyself, thou shalt possess that which neither thou wilt ever wish to lose nor fortune can take away. And that thou mayst acknowledge that blessedness cannot consist in t lies c casual thin its, gather it thus. If blessedness be the chiefest good of nature endued with reason, and that is not the chiefest good which may by any means be taken away, because that which cannot be taken away is better, it is manifest that the instability of fortune cannot aspire to the obtaining of blessedness. Moreover, he that now enjoyeth this brittle felicity, either knoweth it to be mutable or no. If not, what estate can be blessed by ignorant blindness? And if he knoweth it, he must needs fear lest he lose that which he doubteth not may be lost, wherefore continual fear permitteth him not to be happy. Or though he should lose it, doth he think that a thing of no moment? But so it were a very small good which he would be content to lose. And because thou art one whom I know to be fully persuaded and convinced by innumerable demonstrations that the souls of men are in no wise mortal, and since it is clear that casual felicity is ended by the body's death, there is no doubt, if this can cause blessedness, but that all mankind fall et h into misery by death. But if we know many who have sought to reap the fruit of blessedness, not only by death, but also by affliction and torments, how can present happiness make men happy, the loss of which causeth not misery?”

> Latin: Atque ut agnoscas in his fortuitis rebus beatitudinem constare non possessio collige. Si beatitudo est summum naturae bonum ratione degentis nec est summum bonum quod eripi ullo modo potest, quoniam praecellit id quod nequeat auferri, manifestum est quoniam 1 ad beatitudinem percipiendam fortunae instabilitas adspirare non possit. Ad haec quem caduca ista felicitas uenit uel scit eam uel nescit esse mutabilem. Si nescit, quaenam beata sors esse potest ignorantiae caecitate? Si scit, metuat necesse est, ne amittat quod amitti posse non dubitat; quare continuus timor non sinit esse felicem. An uel si amiserit, neglegendum putat? Sic quoque perexile bonum est quod aequo animo feratur amissum. Et quoniam tu idem es cui persuasum atque insitum permultis demonstrationibus scio mentes hominum nullo modo esse mortales cumque clarum sit fortuitam felicitatem corporis morte finiri, dubitari nequit, si haec afferre beatitudinem potest, quin omne mortalium genus in miseriam mortis fine labatur. Quod si multos scimus beatitudinis fructum non morte solum uerum etiam doloribus suppliciisque quaesisse, quonam modo praesens facere beatos potest quae miseros transacta non efficit?”
Quisquis uolet perennem
Cautus ponere sedem
Stabilisque nec sonori
Sterni flatibus Euri
Et fluctibus minantem
Curat spernere pontum,
Montis cacumen alti,
Bibulas uitet harenas.
Illud proteruus Auster
Totis uiribus urget,
Hae pendulum solutae
Pondus ferre recusant.

[¶16] “Who with an heedful care Will an eternal seat prepare, Which cannot be down cast By force of windy blast, And will the floods despise, When threatening billows do arise, He not on hills must stand, Nor on the dangerous sinking sand. For there the winds will threat, And him with furious tempests beat, And here the ground too weak Will with the heavy burden break. a Fly then the dangerous case Of an untried delightful place, And thy poor house bestow In stony places firm and low. For though the winds do sound, And waves of troubled seas confound i Yet thou to rest disposed In thy safe lowly vale inclosed, Mayst live a quiet age, Scorning the air's distempered rage.”

> Latin: Fugiens periculosam
Sortem sedis amoenae
Humili domum memento
Certus figere saxo.
Quamuis tonet ruinis
Miscens aequora uentus,
Tu conditus quieti
Felix robore ualli
Duces serenus aeuum
Ridens aetheris iras. Sed quoniam rationum iam in te mearum fomenta descendunt, paulo ualidioribus utendum puto. Age enim si iam caduca et momentaria fortunae dona non essent, quid in eis est quod aut uestrum umquam fieri queat aut non perspectum consideratumque uilescat? Diuitiaene uel uestra uel sui natura pretiosae sunt? Quid earum potius, aurumne an uis congesta pecuniae?

[¶17] But since the soothing of my reasons begins to sink into thee, I will use those which are somewhat more forcible. Go to then, if the gifts of fortune were not brittle and momentary, what is there in them which can either ever be made your own, or, well weighed and considered, seemeth not vile and of no accompt? Are riches precious in virtue either of their own nature or of yours? What part of them can be so esteemed of? The gold or the heaps of money? But these make a fairer show when they are spent than when they are kept. For covetousness alway maketh men odious, as liberality famous. And if a man cannot have that which is given to another, then money is precious when, bestowed upon others, by the use of liberality it is not possessed any longer. But if.ill the money in the whole world were gathered into one man s custody, all other men should he poor. The voice at the same time wholly filleth the ears of many, but your riches cannot pass to many, except they be diminished, which being done, they must needs make them poor whom they leave. O scant and poor riches, which neither can be wholly possessed of many, and come to none without the impoverishment of others! Doth the glittering of jewels draw thy eyes after them? But if there be any great matter in this show, not men but the jewels shine, which I exceedingly marvel that men admire, for what is there wanting life and members that may justly seem beautiful to a nature not only endued with life but also with reason? Which, though by their maker's workmanship and their own variety they have some part of basest beauty, yet it is so far inferior to your excellency that it did in no sort deserve your admiration. Doth the pleasant prospect of the fields delight you? Why not? for it is a fair portion of a most fair work. So we are delighted with a calm sea, so we admire the sky, the stars, the sun, and the moon. Do any of these belong to thee? Darest thou boast of the beauty which any of them have? Art thou thyself adorned with May flowers? Or doth thy fertility teem with the fruits of summer? Why rejoieest thou vainly? Why embraeest thou outward goods as if they were thine own? Fortune will never make those things thine which by the appointment of Nature belong not to thee. The fruits of the earth are doubtless appointed for the sustenance of living creatures. But if thou wilt only satisfy want, which sufficeth Nature, there is no cause to require the superfluities of fortune. For Nature is contented with little and with the smallest things, and, if, being satisfied, thou wilt overlay it with more than needs, that which thou addest will either become unpleasant or hurtful. But perhaps thou thinkest it a fine thing to go deeked in gay apparel, which, if they make a fair show, I will admire either the goodness of the stuff or the invention of the workman. Or doth the multitude of servants make thee happy? Who, if they be vicious, they are a pernicious burden to thy house, and exceedingly troublesome to their master; and if they be honest, how shall other men's honesty be counted amongst thy treasures? By all which is manifestly proved that none of these goods which thou accountest thine, are thine indeed. And if there is nothing in these worthy to be desired, why art thou either glad when thou hast them or sorry when thou losest them? Or what is it to thee, if they be precious by nature? For in this respect they would have pleased thee, though they had belonged to others, for they are not precious because they are come to be thine, but because they seemed precious thou wert desirous to have them. Now, what desire you with such loud praise of fortune? Perhaps you seek to drive away penury with plenty. But this falleth out quite contrary, for you stand in need of many supplies, to protect all this variety of precious ornaments. And it is true that they which have much, need much; and contrariwise, that they need little which measure not their wealth by the superfluity of ambition, but by the necessity of nature. Have you no proper and inward good, that you seek your goods in those things which are outward and separated from you? Is the condition of things so changed that a living creature, deservedly accounted divine for the gift of reason, seemeth to have no other excellency than the possession of a little household stuff without life? All other creatures are content with that they have of their own; and you, who in your mind carry the likeness of God, are content to take the ornaments of your excellent nature from the most base and vile things, neither understand you what injury you do your Creator. He would have mankind to excel all earthly things; you debase your dignity under every meanest creature. For if it be manifest that the good of everything is more precious than that whose good it is, since you judge the vilest things that can be to be your goods, you deject yourselves under them in your own estimation, which questionless cometh not undeservedly to pass; for this is the condition of man s nature, that then only it surpasseth other things when it knoweth itself, and it is worse than beasts when it is without that knowledge. For in other living creatures the ignorance of themselves is nature, but in men it is vice. And how far doth this error of yours extend, who think that any can be adorned with the ornaments of another? Which can in no wise be. for if any adjoined thing seem precious, it is that which is praised, but that which is covered and enwrapped in it remaineth, notwithstanding, with the foul baseness which it hath of itself. Moreover, I deny that to be good which hurteth the possessor. Am I deceived in this? I am sure thou wilt say no. But riches have often hurt their possessors, since every lewdest companion, who are consequently most desirous of that which is not their own, think themselves most worthy to possess alone all the gold and jewels in the world. Wherefore thou, who with much perturbation fearest now to be assailed and slain, if thou hadst entered the path of this hie like a poor passenger, needest not be afraid, but mightest rejoice and sing even in the sight of most ravenous thieves. a O excellent happiness of mortal riches, which, when thou hast gotten, thou hast lost thy safety!

> Latin: Atqui haec effundendo magis quam coaceruando melius nitent, si quidem auaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. Quod si manere apud quemque non potest quod transfertur in alterum, tunc est pretiosa pecunia cum translata in alios largiendi usu desinit possideri. At eadem si apud unum quanta est ubique gentium congeratur, ceteros sui inopes fecerit. Et uox quidem tota pariter multorum replet auditum j uestrae uero diuitiae nisi comminutae in plures transire non possunt. Quod cum factum est, pauperes necesse est faciant quos relinquunt. O igitur angustas inopesque diuitias quas nec habere totas pluribus licet et ad quemlibet sine ceterorum paupertate non ueniunt! An gemmarum fulgor oculos trahit? Sed si quid est in hoc splendore praecipui, gemmarum est lux illa non hominum, quas quidem mirari homines uehementer admiror. Quid est enim carens animae motu atque compage quod animatae rationabilique naturae pulchrum esse iure uideatur? Quae tametsi conditoris opera suique distinctione postremae aliquid pulchritudinis trahunt, infra uestram tamen excellentiam conlocatae admirationem uestram nullo modo merebantur. An uos agrorum pulchritudo delectat? Quidni? Est enim pulcherrimi operis pulchra portio. Sic quondam sereni maris facie gaudemus; sic caelum sidera lunam solemque miramur. Num te horum aliquid attingit? Num audes alicuius talium splendore gloriari? An uernis floribus ipse distmgueris aut tua in aestiuos fructus intumescit ubertas? Quid inanibus gaudiis raperis? Quid externa bona pro tuis amplexaris? Numquam tua faciet esse fortuna quae a te natura rerum fecit aliena. Terrarum quidem fructus animantium procul dubio debentur alimentis. Sed si, quod naturae satis est, replere indigentiam uelis, nihil est quod fortunae affluentiam petas. Paucis enim minimisque natura contenta est, cuius satietatem si superfluis urgere uelis, aut iniucnndum quod infuderis fiet aut noxium. Iam uero pulchrum uariis fulgere uestibus putas, quarum si grata intuitu species est, aut materiae naturam aut ingenium mirabor artificis. An uero te longus ordo famulorum facit esse felicem? Qui si uitiosi moribus sint, perniciosa domus sarcina et ipsi domino uehementer inimica; sin uero probi, quonam modo in tuis opibus aliena probitas numerabitur? Ex quibus omnibus nihil horum quae tu in tuis conputas bonis tuum esse bonum liquido monstratur. Quibus si nihil inest appetendae pulchritudinis, quid est quod uel amissis doleas uel laeteris retentis? Quod si natura pulchra sunt, quid id tua refert? Nam haec per se a tuis quoque opibus sequestrata placuissent. Neque enim idcirco sunt pretiosa quod in tuas uenere diuitias, sed quoniam pretiosa uidebantur, tuis ea diuitiis adnumerare maluisti. Quid autem tanto fortunae strepitu desideratis? Fugare credo indigentiam copia quaeritis. Atqui hoc uobis in contrarium cedit. Pluribus quippe adminiculis opus est ad tuendam pretiosae supellectilis uarietatem, uerumque illud est permultis eos indigere qui permulta possideant contraque minimum qui abundantiam suam naturae necessitate non ambitus superfluitate metiantur. Itane autem nullum est proprium uobis atque insitum bonum ut in externis ac sepositis rebus bona uestra quaeratis? Sic rerum uersa condicio est ut diuinum merito rationis animal non aliter sibi splendere nisi inanimatae supellectilis possessione uideatur? Et alia quidem suis contenta sunt; uos autem deo mente consimiles ab rebus infimis excellente naturae ornamenta captatis nec intellegitis quantam conditori uestro faciatis iniuriam. Ille genus humanum terrenis omnibus praestare uoluit; uos dignitatem uestram infra infima quaeque detruditis. Nam si omne cuiusque bonum eo cuius est constat esse pretiosius, cum uilissima rerum uestra bona esse iudicatis, eisdem uosmet ipsos uestra existimatione submittitis, quod quidem haud inmerito cadit. Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est ut tum tantum ceteris rebus cum se cognoscit excellat, eadem tamen infra bestias redigatur, si se nosse desierit. Nam ceteris animantibus sese ignorare naturae est; hominibus uitio uenit. Quam uero late patet uester hic error qui ornari posse aliquid ornamentis existimatis alienis? At id fieri nequit. Nam si quid ex appositis luceat, ipsa quidem quae sunt apposita laudantur; illud uero his tectum atque uelatum in sua nihilo minus foeditate perdurat. Ego uero nego ullum esse bonum quod noceat habenti. Num id mentior? ' Minime,' inquis. Atqui diuitiae possidentibus persaepe nocuerunt, cum pessimus quisque eoque alieni magis auidus quidquid usquam auri gemmarumque est se solum qui habeat dignissimum putat. Tu igitur qui nunc contum gladiumque sollicitus pertimescis, si uitae huius callem uacuus uiator intrasses, coram latrone cantares. O praeclara opum mortalium beatitudo quam cum adeptus fueris securus esse desistis!
Felix nimium prior aetas
Contenta fidelibus aruis
Nec inerti perdita luxu,
Facili quae sera solebat
Ieiunia soluere glande.
Non Bacchica munera norant
Liquido confundere melle
Nec lucida uellera
Serum Tyrio miscere ueneno.
Somnos dabat herba salubres,
Potum quoque lubricus amnis,
Vmbras altissima pinus.

## 4. Book II · section 2 · 2

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/4/#p-N

[¶0] “Too much the former age was blest. When fields their pleaséd owners failéd not, Who, with no slothful lust opprest, Broke their long fasts with acorns eas'ly got. No wine with honey mixéd was, Nor did they silk in purple colours steep; They slept upon the wholesome grass And their cool drink did fetch from rivers deep. The pines did hide them with their shade, No merchants through the dangerous billows went, Nor with desire of gainful trade Their traffic into foreign countries sent. Then no shrill trumpets did amate The minds of soldiers with their daunting sounds, Nor weapons were with deadly hate Dyed with the dreadful blood of gaping wounds. For how could any fury draw The mind of man to stir up war m vain, When nothing but fierce wounds he saw, And for his blood no recompense should gain? O that the ancient manners would In these our latter hapless times return! Now the desire of having gold Doth like the flaming fires of Aetna burn. Ah, who was he that first did show The heaps of treasure which the earth did hide, And jewels which lay close below, By which he costly dangers did provide?”

> Latin: Nondum maris alta secabat
Nec mercibus undique lectis
Noua litora uiderat hospes.
Tunc classica saeua tacebant,
Odiis neque fusus acerbis
Cruor horrida tinxerat arua.
Quid enim furor hosticus ulla
Vellet prior arma mouere,
Cum uulnera saeua uiderent
Nec praemia sanguinis ulla?
Vtinam modo nostra redirent
In mores tempora priscos!
Sed saeuior ignibus Aetnae
Feruens amor ardet habendi.
Heu primus quis fuit ille
Auri qui pondera tecti
Geminasque latere uolentes
Pretiosa pericula fodit? Quid autem de dignitatibus potentiaque disseram quae uos uerae dignitatis ac potestatis inscii caelo exaequatis? Quae si in improbissimum quemque ceciderunt, quae flammis Aetnae eructuantibus, quod diluuium tantas strages dederint? Certe, uti meminisse te arbitror, consulare imperium, quod libertatis principium fuerat, ob superbiam consulum uestri ueteres abolere cupiuerunt, qui ob eandem superbiam prius regium de ciuitate nomen abstulerant.

[¶1] Now, why should I discourse of dignities and power which you, not knowing what true dignity and power meaneth, exalt to the skies? And if they light upon wicked men, what Aetnas, belching names, or what deluge can cause so great harms? I suppose thou rememberest how your ancestors, by reason of the consuls arrogancy, desired to abolish that government which had been the beginning of their freedom, who before, for the same cause, had removed the government of kings from their city. And if sometime, which is very seldom, good men be preferred to honours, a what other thing can give contentment in them but the honesty of those which have them? So that virtues are not honoured by dignities, but dignities by virtue. But what is this excellent power which you esteemed so desirable? Consider you not, O earthly wights, whom you seem to excel? For if among mice thou shouldst see one claim jurisdiction and power to himself over the rest, to what a laughter it would move thee! And what, if thou respectest the body, canst thou find more weak than man, whom even the biting of little flies or the entering of creeping worms doth often kill? Now, how can any man exercise jurisdiction upon anybody except upon their bodies, and that which is inferior to their bodies, I mean their fortunes? Canst thou ever imperiously impose anything upon a free mind? Canst thou remove a soul settled in firm reason from the quiet state which it possesseth? When a tyrant thought to compel a certain free man by torments to bewray his confederates of a conspiracy attempted against him, he bit off his tongue, and spit it out upon the cruel tyrant's face, a by that means wisely making those tortures, which the tyrant thought matter of cruelty, to be to him occasion of virtue. Now, what is there, that any can enforce upon another which he may not himself be enforced to sustain by another? We read that Busiris, wont to kill his guests, was himself slain by his guest Hercules. b Regulus had laid fetters upon many Africans taken in war, but ere long he found his own hands environed with his conqueror s chains. c Wherefore thinkest thou the power of that man to be anything worth, who cannot hinder another from doing that to him which he can do to another? Moreover, if dignities and power had any natural and proper good in them, they would never be bestowed upon the worst men, for one opposite useth not to accompany another; nature refuseth to have contraries joined. So that, since there is no doubt but that men of the worst sort often enjoy dignities, it is also manifest that they are not naturally good which may follow most naughty men. Which may more worthily be thought of all fortune's gifts which are more plentifully bestowed upon every lewd companion. Concerning which, I take that also to be worthy consideration, that no man doubteth him to be a valiant man in whom he seeth valour, and it is manifest that he which hath swiftness is swift. So, likewise, music maketh musicians, physic physicians, and rhetoric rhetoricians. For the nature of everything doth that which is proper unto it, and is not mixed with contrary effects but repelleth all opposites. But neither can riches extinguish unsatiable avarice, nor power make him master of himself whom vicious lusts keep chained in strongest fetters. And dignity bestowed upon wicked men doth not only not make them worthy but rather bewrayeth and discovereth their unworthiness. How come th th is to pass? Because m miscalling things that are otherwise, you take a pleasure which is easily refuted by the effect of the things themselves. Wherefore. by right, these things are not to be called riches, this is not to be called power, that is not to be called dignity. Lastly, we may conclude the same of all fortunes in which it is manifest there is nothing to be desired, nothing naturally good, which neither are always bestowed upon good men, nor do make them good whom they are bestowed upon.

> Latin: At si quando, quod perrarum est, probis deferantur, quid in eis aliud quam probitas utentium placet? Ita fit ut non uirtutibus ex dignitate sed ex uirtute dignitatibus honor accedat. Quae uero est ista uestra expetibilis ac praeclara potentia? Nonne, o terrena animalia, consideratis quibus qui praesidere uideamini? Nunc si inter mures uideres unum aliquem ius sibi ac potestatem prae ceteris uindicantem, quanto mouereris cachinno! Quid uero, si corpus spectes, inbecillius homine reperire queas quos saepe muscularum quoque uel morsus uel in secreta quaeque reptantium necat introitus? Quo uero quisquam ius aliquod in quempiam nisi in solum corpus et quod infra corpus est, fortunam loquor, possit exserere? Num quidquam libero imperabis animo? Num mentem firma sibi ratione cohaerentem de statu propriae quietis amouebis? Cum liberum quendam uirum suppliciis se tyrannus adacturum Putaret, ut aduersum se factae coniurationis conscios proderet, linguam ille momordit atque abscidit et in os tyranni saeuientis abiecit; ita cruciatus, quos putabat tyrannus materiam crudelitatis, uir sapiens fecit esse uirtutis. Quid autem est quod in alium facere quisquam 1 possit, quod sustinere ab alio ipse non possit? Busiridem accipimus necare hospites solitum ab Hercule hospite fuisse mactatum. Regulus plures Poenorum bello captos in uincla coniecerat, sed mox ipse uictorum catenis manus praebuit. Vllamne igitur eius hominis potentiam putas, qui quod ipse in alio potest, ne id in se alter ualeat efficere non possit? Ad haec si ipsis dignitates ac potestatibus inesset aliquid naturalis ac proprii boni, numquam pessimis prouenirent. Neque enim sibi solent aduersa sociari; natura respuit ut contraria quaeque iungantur. Ita cum pessimos plerumque dignitatibus fungi dubium non sit, illud etiam liquet natura sui bona non esse quae se pessimis haerere patiantur. Quod quidem de cunctis fortunae muneribus dignius existimari potest, quae ad improbissimum quemque uberiora perueniunt. De quibus illud etiam considerandum puto, quod nemo dubitat esse fortem, cui fortitudinem inesse conspexerit, et cuicumque uelocitas adest manifestum est esse uelocem. Sic musica quidem musicos medicina medicos rhetorice rhetores facit. Agit enim cuiusque rei natura quod proprium est nec contrariarum rerum miscetur effectibus et ultro quae sunt auersa depellit. Atqui nec opes inexpletam restinguere auaritiam queunt nec potestas sui compotem fecerit quem uitiosae libidines insolubilibus adstrictum retinent catenis, et collata improbis dignitas non modo non efficit dignos, sed prodit potius et ostentat indignos. Cur ita prouenit? Gaudetis enim res sese aliter habentes falsis compellare nominibus quae facile ipsarum rerum redarguuntur effectu; itaque nec illae diuitiae nec illa potentia nec haec dignitas iure appellari potest. Postremo idem de tota concludere fortuna licet in qua nihil expetendum, nihil natiuae bonitatis inesse manifestum est, quae nec se bonis semper adiungit et bonos quibus fuerit adiuncta non efficit.
Nouimus quantas dederit ruinas
Vrbe flammata patribusque caesis
Fratre qui quondam ferus interempto
Matris effuso maduit cruore
Corpus et uisu gelidum pererrans
Ora non tinxit lacrimis, sed esse
Censor extincti potuit decoris.

[¶2] “We know what stirs he made Who did the Senate slay and Rome with fire invade, Who did his brother kill, And with his mother's blood his moistened hand did fill; Who looked on that cold face Tearless, and nicely marked her members' several grace. a Yet his dread power controlled Those people whom the sun doth in the east behold, And those who do remain In western lands or dwell under Boötes wain And those whose skins are tanned With southern winds, which roast and burn the parched sand. What? Could this glorious might Restrain the furious rage of wicked Nero s spite? But oh! mishap most bad, Which doth the wicked sword to cruel poison add!”

> Latin: Hic tamen sceptro populos regebat
Quos uidet condens radios sub undas
Phoebus extremo ueniens ab ortu,
Quos premunt septem gelidi triones,
Quos Notus sicco uiolentus aestu
Torret ardentes recoquens harenas.
Celsa num tandem ualuit potestas
Vertere praui rabiem Neronis?
Heu grauem sortem, quotiens iniquus
Additur saeuo gladius ueneno! Tum ego: “Scis,” inquam, “ipsa minimum nobis ambitionem mortalium rerum fuisse dominatam. Sed materiam gerendis rebus optauimus quo ne uirtus tacita consenesceret.”

[¶3] Then I said: “Thou thyself knowest that the ambition of mortal things hath borne as little sway with me as with any, but I desired matter of action, lest old age should come upon me ere I had done anything.” To which she answered; “

> Latin: Et illa: “Atqui hoc unum est quod praestantes quidem natura mentes sed nondum ad extremam manum uirtutum perfectione perductas allicere possit, gloriae scilicet cupido et optimorum in rem publicam fama meritorum;

[¶4] This is the only thing which is able to entice such minds as, being well qualified by nature, are not yet fully brought to full excellence by the perfecting of virtues, I mean desire of glory, and fame of best deserts towards their commonwealth, which how slender it is, and void of all weight, consider this: thou hast learnt by astronomical demonstrations that the compass of the whole earth compared to the scope of heaven is no bigger than a pin's point, which is as much as to say that, if it be conferred with the greatness of the celestial sphere, it hath no bigness at all. And of this so small a region in the world only the fourth part is known to be inhabited by living creatures known to us, as Ptolemy a proveth. From which fourth part, if thou takest away in imagination the seas, the marsh grounds, and all other desert places, there will scarcely be left any room at all for men to inhabit. Wherefore, enclosed and shut up in this smallest point of that other point, do you think of extending your fame and enlarging your name? But what great or heroical matter can that glory have, which is pent up in so small and narrow bounds? Besides that the little compass of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, different in language, fashions, and conversation, to which by reason of the difficulties in travelling, the diversity of speech, and the scarcity of traffic, not only the fame of particular men but even of cities can hardly come. Finally, in the age of Marcus Tullius, as he himself writeth, a the fame of the Roman Commonwealth had not passed the mountain Caucasus, and vet it was then in the most flourishing estate, fearful even to the Parthians and to the rest of the nations about. Seest thou therefore how strait and narrow that glory is which you labour to enlarge and increase? W here the fame of the Roman name could not pass, can the glory of a Roman man penetrate? Moreover, the customs and laws of diverse nations do so much differ the one from the other, that the same thing which some commend as laudable, others condemn as deserving punishment. So that if a man be delighted with the praise of fame, it is no way convenient for him to be named in many countries. Wherefore, every man must be content with that glory which he may have at home, and that noble immortality of fame must be comprehended within the compass of one nation.

> Latin: quae quam sit exilis et totius uacua ponderis, sic considera. Omnem terrae ambitum, sicuti astrologicis demonstrationibus accepisti, ad caeli spatium puncti constat obtinere rationem, id est ut, si ad caelestis globi magnitudinem conferatur, nihil spatii prorsus habere iudicetur. Huius igitur tam exiguae in mundo regionis quarta fere portio est, sicut Ptolomaeo probante didicisti, quae nobis cognitis animantibus incolatur Huic quartae, si quantum maria paludesque premunt quantumque siti uasta regio distenditur cogitatione subtraxeris, uix angustissima inhabitandi hominibus area relinquetur. In hoc igitur minimo puncti quodam puncto circumsaepti atque conclusi de peruulganda fama, de proferendo nomine cogitatis? Aut quid habeat amplum magnificumque gloria tam angustis exiguisque limitibus artata? Adde quod hoc ipsum breuis habitaculi saeptum plures incolunt nationes lingua, moribus, totius uitae ratione distantes, ad quas tum difficultate itinerum tum loquendi diuersitate tum commercii insolentia non modo fama hominum singulorum sed ne urbium quidem peruenire queat. Aetate denique Marci Tullii, sicut ipse quodam loco significat, nondum Caucasum montem Romanae rei publicae fama transcenderat, et erat tunc adulta Parthis etiam ceterisque id locorum gentibus formidolosa. Videsne igitur quam sit angusta, quam compressa gloria quam dilatare ac propagare laboratis? An ubi Romani nominis transire fama nequit, Romani hominis gloria progredietur? Quid quod diuersarum gentium mores inter se atque instituta discordant, ut quod apud alios laude apud alios supplicio dignum iudicetur. Quo fit ut si quem famae praedicatio delectat, huic in plurimos populos nomen proferre nullo modo conducat. Erit igitur peruagata inter suos gloria quisque contentus et intra unius gentis terminos praeclara illa famae inmortalitas coartabitur. Sed quam multos clarissimos suis temporibus uiros scriptorum inops deleuit obliuio!

[¶5] Now, how many, most famous while they lived, are altogether forgotten for want of writers! Though what do writings themselves avail which perish, as well as their authors, by continuance and obscurity of time? But you imagine that you make yourselves immortal when you cast your eyes upon future fame. Whereas, if thou weighest attentively the infinite spaces of eternity, what cause hast thou to rejoice at the prolonging of thy name? For if we compare the stay of one moment with ten thousand years, since both be limited, they have some proportion, though it be but very small. But this number of years, how oft so ever it be multiplied, is no way comparable to endless eternity. For limited things may in some sort be compared among themselves, but that which is infinite admitteth no comparison at all with the limited. So that the fame of never so long time, if it be compared with everlasting eternity, seemeth not little but none at all. But without popular blasts and vain rumours you know not how to do well, and, rejecting the excellency of a good conscience and of virtue, you choose to be rewarded with others' tattling. Hear how pleasantly one jested at this vain and contemptible arrogancy. For having assaulted with reproachful speeches a certain fellow who had falsely taken upon him the name of a philosopher, not for the use of virtue but for vainglory, and having added that, now he would know whether he were a philosopher or no by his gentle and patient bearing of injuries, the other took all patiently for a while, and having borne his contumely, as it were, triumphing, said: ' Host thou now at length think me a philosopher?' To which he bitingly replied: ' I would have thought thee one if thou hadst holden thy peace.' But what have excellent men (for of these I speak) who seek for glory by virtue, what have we, I say, to expect for these by fame after final death hath dissolved the body? For if, contrary to our belief, men wholly perish, there is no glory at all, since he to whom it is said to belong is nowhere extant. But if a guiltless mind freed from earthly imprisonment goeth forthwith to heaven, will she not despise all earthly traffic who, enjoying heaven, rejoiceth to see herself exempted from earthly affairs?”

> Latin: Quamquam quid ipsa scripta proficiant, quae cum suis auctoribus premit longior atque obscura uetustas? Vos uero inmortalitatem uobis propagare uidemini, cum futuri famam temporis cogitatis. Quod si aeternitatis infinita spatia pertractes, quid habes quod de nominis tui diuturnitate laeteris? Vnius etenim mora momenti, si decem milibus conferatur annis, quoniam utrumque spatium definitum est, minimam, licet, habet tamen aliquam portionem. At hic ipse numerus annorum eiusque quamlibet multiplex ad interminabilem diuturnitatem ne comparari quidem potest. Etenim finitis ad se inuicem fuerit quaedam, infiniti uero atque finiti nulla umquam poterit esse collatio. Ita fit ut quamlibet prolixi temporis fama, si cum inexhausta aeternitate cogitetur, non parua sed plane nulla esse uideatur. Vos autem nisi ad populares auras inanesque rumores recte facere nescitis et relicta conscientiae uirtutisque praestantia de alienis praemia sermunculis postulatis. Accipe in huiusmodi arrogantiae leuitate quam festiue aliquis inluserit. Nam cum quidam adortus esset hominem contumeliis, qui non ad uerae uirtutis usum sed ad superbam gloriam falsum sibi philosophi nomen induerat, adiecissetque iam se sciturum, an ille philosophus esset, si quidem illatas iniurias leniter patienterque tolerasset, ille patientiam paulisper adsumpsit acceptaque contumelia uelut insultans: 'Iam tandem,' inquit, 'intellegis me esse philosophum?' Tum ille nimium mordaciter: 'Intellexeram,' inquit, ' si tacuisses.' Quid autem est quod ad praecipuos uiros, de his enim sermo est, qui uirtute gloriam petunt, quid, inquam, est quod ad hos de fama post resolutum morte suprema corpus attineat? Nam si, quod nostrae rationes credi uetant, toti moriuntur homines, nulla est omnino gloria, eum is cuius ea esse dicitur non exstet omnino.

[¶6] “He that to honour only seeks to mount And that his chiefest end doth count Let him behold the largeness of the skies And on the strait earth east his eyes; He will despise the glory of his name, Which cannot fill so small a frame. Why do proud men scorn that their necks should bear That yoke which every man must wear? Though fame through many nations fly along And should be blazed by every tongue, Ana houses shine with our forefathers' stories Yet Death contemns these stately glories And, summoning both rich and poor to die, Makes the low equal with the high. Who knows where faithful Fabrice' bones are pressed, Where Brutus and strict Cato rest? a A slender fame consigns their titles vain In some few letters to remain. Because their famous names in books we read, Come we by them to know the dead? You dying, then, remembered are by none, Nor any fame can make yon known. But if you think that life outstrippeth death Your names borne up with mortal breath, When length of time takes this away likewise, A second death shall you surprise.”

> Latin: Sin uero bene sibi mens conscia terreno carcere resoluta caelum libera petit, nonne omne terrenum negotium spernat quae se caelo fruens terrenis gaudet exemptam?”
Quicumque solam mente praecipiti petit
Summumque credit gloriam,
Late patentes aetheris cernat plagas
Artumque terrarum situm.
Breuem replere non ualentis ambitum
Pudebit aucti nominis.
Quid o superbi colla mortali iugo
Frustra, leuare gestiunt?
Licet remotos fama per populos means
Diffusa linguas explicet
Et magna titulis fulgeat claris domus,
Mors spernit altam gloriam,
Inuoluit humile pariter et celsum caput
Aequatque summis infima.
Vbi nunc fidelis ossa Fabricii manent,
Quid Brutus aut rigidus Cato?
Signat superstes fama tenuis pauculis
Inane nomen litteris.
Sed quod decora nouimus uocabula,
Num scire consumptos datur?
Iacetis ergo prorsus ignorabiles
Nec fama notos efficit.

[¶7] Hut lest thou shouldst think that I am at implacable war with fortune, there is a time when this thy goddess ceasing to deceive deserveth of men, to wit, when she declareth herself, when she discovereth her face and showeth herself in lier own colours. Perhaps thou understandest not yet what I say. I would utter a wonderful thing, insomuch as I can scarcely explicate my mind in words. For I think that Fortune, when she is opposite, is more profitable to men than when she is favourable. For in prosperity, by a show of happiness and seeming to caress, she is ever false, but in adversity when she showeth herself inconstant by changing, she is ever true. In that she deeciveth, in this she instructeth; in that she imprisoneth the minds of men with falsely seeming goods, which they enjoy, in this she setteth them at liberty by discovering the uncertainty of them. Wherefore, in that thou shalt alway see her puffed up, and wavering, and blinded with a self-conceit of herself, in this thou shalt find her sober, settled, and, with the very exercise of adversity, wise. Finally, prosperity with her flatterings withdraweth men from true goodness, adversity recalleth and reclaimeth them many times by force a to true happiness. Dost thou esteem it a small benefit that this rough and harsh Fortune hath made known unto thee the minds of thy faithful friends? She hath severed thy assured from thy doubtful friends; prosperity at her departure took away with her those which were hers, and left thee thine. How dearly wouldst thou have bought this before thy fall, and when thou seemedst to thyself fortunate! Now thou dost even lament thy lost riches; thou hast found friends, the most precious treasure in the world.

> Latin: Quod si putatis longius uitam trahi
Mortalis aura nominis,
Cum sera uobis rapiet hoc etiam dies,
Iam uos secunda mors manet. Sed ne me inexorabile contra fortunam gerere bellum putes, est aliquando eum de hominibus illa, fallax illa nihil, bene mereatur, tum scilicet cum se aperit, cum frontem detegit moresque profitetur Nondum forte quid loquar intellegis. Mirum est quod dicere gestio, coque sententiam uerbis explicare uix queo. Etenim plus hominibus reor aduersam quam prosperam prodesse fortunam. Illa enim semper specie felicitatis cum uidetur blanda, mentitur; haec semper uera est, cum se instabilem mutatione demonstrat. Illa fallit, haec instruit, illa mendacium specie bonorum mentes fruentium ligat, haec cognitione fragilis felicitatis absoluit. Itaque illam uideas uentosam, fluentem suique semper ignaram, hanc sobriam succinctamque et ipsius aduersitatis exercitatione prudentem. Postremo felix a uero bono deuios blanditiis trahit, aduersa plerumque ad uera bona reduces unco retrahit. An hoc inter minima aestimandum putas quod amicorum tibi fidelium mentes haec aspera, haec horribilis fortuna detexit, haec tibi certos sodalium uultus ambiguosque secreuit, discedens suos abstulit, tuos reliquit? Quanti hoc integer, ut uidebaris tibi fortunatus, emisses! Nunc et amissas opes querere; quod pretiosissimum diuitiarum genus est amicos inuenisti.

[¶8] “That this fair world in settled course her several forms should vary, That a perpetual law should tame the fighting seeds of things, That Phoebus should the rosy day in his bright chariot carry. That Phoebe should govern the nights which Hesperus forth brings, That to the floods of greedy seas are certain bounds assigned, Which them, lest they usurp too much upon the earth, debar, Love ruling heaven, and earth, and seas, them in this course doth bind. And if it once let loose their reins, their friendship turns to war, Tearing the world whose ordered form their quiet motions bear. By it all holy laws are made and marriage rites are tied, By it is faithful friendship joined. How happy mortals were, If that pure love did guide their minds, which heavenly spheres doth guide!”

> Latin: Quod mundus stabili fide
Concordes uariat uices,
Quod pugnantia semina
Foedus perpetuum tenent,
Quod Phoebus roseum diem
Curru prouehit aureo,
Vt quas duxerit Hesperos
Phoebe noctibus imperet,
Vt fluctus auidum mare
Certo fine coerceat,
Ne terris liceat uagis
Latos tendere terminos.
Hanc rerum seriem ligat
Terras ac pelagus regens
Et caelo imperitans amor.
Hic si frena remiserit,
Quidquid nunc amat inuicem
Bellum continuo geret
Et quam nunc socia fide
Pulchris motibus incitant,
Certent soluere machinam.
Hic sancto populos quoque
Iunctos foedere continet,
Hic et coniugii sacrum
Castis nectit amoribus,
Hic fidis etiam sua
Dictat iura sodalibus.
O felix hominum genus,
Si uestros animos amor
Quo caelum regitur regat.

## 5. Book III · section 3 · 3

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/5/#p-N

[¶0] Though she had ended her verse, yet the sweetness of it made me remain astonished, attentive, and desirous to hear her longer. Wherefore, after a while, I said: “O most effectual refreshment of wearied minds, how have I been comforted with thy weighty sentences and pleasing music! Insomuch that I begin to think myself not unable to encounter the assaults of fortune. Wherefore, I am not now afraid, but rather earnestly desire to know those remedies, which before thou toldest me were too sharp.” To which she answered: “I perceived as much as thou sayest, when I saw thee hearken to my speeches with so great silence and attention, and I expected this disposition of thy mind, or rather more truly caused it myself. For the remedies which remain are of that sort that they are bitter to the taste, but being inwardly received wax sweet. And whereas thou sayest that thou art desirous to hear; how much would this desire increase if thou knewest whither we go about to bring thee!” “Whither?” quoth I. “To true felicity,” quoth she, “which thy mind also dreameth of, but thy sight is so dimmed with phantasies that thou canst not behold it as it is.” Then I beseeched her to explicate without delay wherein true happiness consisteth. To which she answered: “I will willingly do so for thy sake, but first I will endeavour to declare in words and to give shape to that which is better known unto thee, that, having thoroughly understood it, by reflecting of the contrary thou mayest discover the type of perfect blessedness.”

> Latin: IAM cantum illa finiuerat, cum me audiendi auidum stupentemque arrectis adnue auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat. Itaque paulo post: “O” inquam, “summum lassorum solamen animorum quam tu me uel sententiarum pondere uel canendi etiam iucunditate refouisti! Adeo ut iam me post haec inparem fortunae ictibus esse non arbitrer. Itaque remedia quae paulo acriora esse dicebas, non modo non per-horresco, sed audiendi auidus uehementer efflagito.” Tum illa “Sensi,” inquit, “cum uerba nostra tacitus attentusque rapiebas, eumque tuae mentis habitum uel exspectaui uel, quod est uerius, ipsa perfeci. Talia sunt quippe quae restant, ut degustata quidem mordeant, interius autem recepta dulcescant. Sed quod tu te audiendi cupidum dicis, quanto ardore flagrares, si quonam te ducere aggrediamur agnosceres!” Quonam? inquam. “Ad ueram”, inquit, “felicitatem, quam tuus quoque somniat animus, sed occupato ad imagines uisu ipsam illam non potest intueri.” Tum ego: “Fac obsecro et quae illa uera sit, sine cunctatione demonstra.” “Faciam,” inquit illa, “tui causa libenter. Sed quae tibi causa notior est, eam prius designare uerbis atque informare conabor ut ea perspecta cum in contrariam partem flexeris oculos, uerae beatitudinis speciem possis agnoscere.”

[¶1] “He that a fruitful field will sow. Doth first the ground from bushes free. All fern and briars likewise mow, That he his harvest great may see. Honey seems sweeter to our taste, If cloyed with noisome food it be. Stars clearer shine when Notus' blast Hath ceased the rainy storms to breed. When Lucifer hath night defaced, The day's bright horses then succeed. So thou, 'whom seeming goods do feed. First shake off yokes which so thee press That Truth may then thy mind possess.”

> Latin: Qui serere ingenuum uolet agrum,
Liberat arua prius fruticibus,
Falce rubos filicemque resecat,
Vt noua fruge grauis Ceres eat.
Dulcior est apium mage labor,
Si malus ora prius sapor edat.
Gratius astra nitent ubi Notus
Desinit imbriferos dare sonos.
Lucifer ut tenebras pepulerit
Pulchra dies roseos agit equos.
Tu quoque falsa tuens bona prius
Incipe colla iugo retrahere.
Vera dehinc animum subierint.

[¶2] Then, for a while looking steadfastly upon the ground, and, as it were, retiring herself to the most secret seat of her soul, she began in this manner: “

> Latin: Tum defixo paululum uisu et uelut in augustam suae mentis sedem recepta sic coepit: “ Omnis mortalium cura quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet, diuerso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur peruenire.

[¶3] All men's thoughts, which are turmoiled with manifold cares, take indeed divers courses, but yet endeavour to attain the same end of happiness, which is that good which, being once obtained, nothing can be further desired. Which is the chiefest of all goods, and containeth in itself whatsoever is good, and if it wanted anything it could not be the chiefest, because there would something remain besides it which might be wished for. Wherefore, it is manifest that blessedness is an estate replenished with all that is good. This, as we said, all men endeavour to obtain by divers ways, For there is naturally ingrafted in men's minds an earnest desire of that which is truly good; but deceitful error withdraweth it to that which falsely seemeth such. So that some, esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all means to abound with riches; others, deeming that to be good which is most deserving of honour, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their fellow-citizens. Others think it the greatest felicity to have great power and authority, and these will either reign themselves or at least procure to be great with princes. But they who think fame better than all these, make all speed possible to spread their names far and near, by achieving some worthy enterprise either in war or peace. Many measure good by joy and mirth, and their chiefest care is how they may abound with pleasure. Some interchange the ends and means of these things one with the other, wanting now riches for the sake of power and pleasure, now power for the sake of wealth and fame. At these and such other do men's actions and desires aim, as nobility and popularity, which make men esteemed; wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. But friendship, that most sacred thing, is rather to be attributed to virtue than to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for power or pleasure. And it is an easy matter to reduce all corporal goods to the former heads. For strength and greatness give ability, beauty and swiftness, fame; and health yieldeth pleasure. By all which we manifestly seek for nothing else but happiness, for that which every man seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all one with happiness. Wherefore he esteemeth that estate happy which he preferreth before all other.

> Latin: Id autem est bonum quo quis adepto nihil ulterius desiderare queat. Quod quidem est omnium summum bonorum cunctaque intra se bona continens, cui si quid aforet summum esse non posset, quoniam relinqueretur extrinsecus quod posset optari. Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem statum bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum. Hunc, uti diximus, diuerso tramite mortales omnes conantur adipisci. Est enim mentibus hominum ueri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas, sed ad falsa deuius error abducit. Quorum quidem alii summum bonum esse nihilo indigere credentes ut diuitiis affluant elaborant; alii uero bonum quod sit dignissimum ueneratione iudicantes adeptis honoribus reuerendi ciuibus suis esse nituntur. Sunt qui summum bonum in summa potentia esse constituat; hi uel regnare ipsi uolunt uel regnantibus adhaerere conantur. At quibus optimum quiddam claritas uidetur, hi uel belli uel pacis artibus gloriosum nomen propagare festinant. Plurimi uero boni fructum gaudio laetitiaque metiuntur; zahi felicissimum putant uoluptate diffluere. Sunt etiam qui horum fines causasque alterutro permutent, ut qui diuitias ob potentiam uoluptatesque desiderant uel qui potentiam seu pecuniae causa seu proferendi nominis appetunt. In his igitur ceterisque talibus humanorum actuum uotorumque uersatur intentio, ueluti nobilitas fauorque popularis quae uidentur quandam claritudinem comparare, uxor ac liberi quae iucunditatis gratia petuntur; amicorum uero quod sanctissimum quidem genus est, non in fortuna sed in uirtute numeratur, reliquum uero uel potentiae causa uel delectationis assumitur. Iam uero corporis bona promptum est ut ad superiora referantur. Robur enim magnitudoque uidetur praestare ualentiam, pulchritudo atque uelocitas celebritatem, salubritas uoluptatem; quibus omnibus solam beatitudinem desiderari liquet. Nam quod quisque prae ceteris petit, id summum esse iudicat bonum. Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse definiuimus; quare beatum esse iudicat statum quem prae ceteris quisque desiderat.

[¶4] And thus thou hast in a manner seen the form of human felicity riches, honour, power, glory, pleasure. Which Epicurus only considering, consequently took pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest seemed to delight the mind. But I return to the careful thoughts of men, whose minds, though obscured, yet seek after the greatest good, but like a drunken man know not the way home, for seem they to err who endeavour to want nothing? But nothing can cause happiness so much as the plentiful possession of all that is good, needing the help of none, but is sufficient of itself. Or do they err who take that which is best to be likewise most worthy of respect? No. For it is no vile or contemptible thing which almost all men labour to obtain. Or is not power to be esteemed good? Why, then, is that to be accounted feeble and of no force, which manifestly surpasses all other things? Or is fame to be contemned? But it cannot be ignored that the most excellent is also most famous, for to what purpose should I say that happiness is not sad or melancholy, or subject to grief and trouble, when even in smallest matters we desire that which we delight to have and enjoy? And these be the things which men desire to obtain, and to this end procure riches, dignities, kingdoms, glory, and pleasures, because by them they think to have sufficiency, respect, power, fame, delight, and joy. Wherefore, that is good which men seek after by divers desires, in which the force of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different, opinions, yet they agree in choosing for their end that which is good.”

> Latin: Habes igitur ante oculos propositam fere formam felicitatis humanae—opes, honores, potentiam, gloriam, uoluptates. Quae quidem sola considerans Epicurus consequenter sibi summum bonum uoluptatem esse constituit, quod cetera omnia iucunditatem animo uideantur afferre. Sed ad hominum studia reuertor, quorum animus etsi caligante memoria tamen bonum suum repetit, sed uelut ebrius domum quo tramite reuertatur ignorat. Num enim uidentur errare hi qui nihilo indigere nituntur? Atqui non est aliud quod aeque perficere beatitudinem possit quam copiosus bonorum omnium status nec alieni egens sed sibi ipse sufficiens. Num uero labuntur hi qui quod sit optimum, id etiam reuerentiae cultu dignissimum putent? Minime. Neque enim uile quiddam contemnendumque est quod adipisci omnium fere mortalium laborat intentio. An in bonis non est numeranda potentia? Quid igitur? Num imbecillum ac sine uiribus aestimandum est, quod omnibus rebus constat esse praestantius? An claritudo nihili pendenda est? Sed sequestrari nequit quin omne quod excellentissimum sit id etiam uideatur esse clarissimum. Nam non esse anxiam tristemque beatitudinem nec doloribus molestiisque subiectam quid attinet dicere, quando in minimis quoque rebus id appetitur quod habere fruique delectet?

[¶5] “How the first reins of all things guided are By powerful Nature as the chiefest cause, And how she keeps, with a foreseeing care, The spacious world in order by her laws, And to sure knots which nothing can untie, By her strong hand all earthly motions draws— To show all this we purpose now to try Our pliant string, our musick's thrilling sound. Although the Libyan lions often lie Gentle and tame in splendid fetters bound, a And fearing their incensed master's wrath, With patient looks endure each blow and wound, Yet if their jaws they once in blood do bathe, They, gaming courage, b with fierce noise awake The force which Nature in them seated hath, And from their necks the broken chains do shake; Then he that tamed them first doth feel their rage, And torn in pieces doth their fury slake. The bird shut up in an unpleasing cage, Which on the lofty trees did lately sing, Though men, her want of freedom to assuage, Should unto her with careful labour brine The sweetest meats which they can best devise, Yet when within her prison fluttering The pleasing shadows of the groves she spies, Her hated food she scatters with her feet, In yearning spirit to the woods she flies, The woods delights do tune her accents sweet. When some strong hand doth tender plant constrain With his debased top the ground to meet, If it let go, the crooked twig again Up toward Heaven itself it straight doth raise. Phoebus doth fall into the western main, Yet doth he back return by secret ways, And to the earth doth guide his chariot's race. Each thing a certain course and laws obeys, Striving to turn back to Ins proper place; Nor any settled order can be found, But that which doth within itself embrace The births and ends of all things in a round.”

> Latin: Atqui haec sunt quae adipisci homines uolunt eaque de causa diuitias, dignitates, regna, gloriam uoluptatesque desiderant quod per haec sibi sufficientiam, reuerentiam, potentiam, celebritatem, laetitiam credunt esse uenturam. Bonum est igitur quod tam diuersis studiis homines petunt; in quo quanta sit naturae uis facile monstratur, cum licet uariae dissidentesque sententiae tamen in diligendo boni fine consentiunt.”
Quantas rerum flectat habenas
Natura potens, quibus inmensum
Legibus orbem prouida seruet
Stringatque ligans inresoluto
Singula nexu, placet arguto
Fidibus lentis promere cantu.
Quamuis Poeni pulchra leones
Vincula gestent manibusque datas
Cantent escas metuantque trucem
Soliti uerbera, ferre magistrum.
Si cruor horrida tinxerit ora,
Resides olim redeunt animi
Fremituque graui meminere sui;
Laxant nodis colla solutis
Primusque lacer dente cruento
Domitor rabidas imbuit iras.
Quae canit altis garrula ramis
Ales caueae clauditur antro;
Huic licet inlita pocula melle
Largasque dapes dulci studio
Ludens hominum cura ministret,
Si tamen arto saliens texto
Nemorum gratas uiderit umbras,
Sparsas pedibus proterit escas,
Siluas tantum maesta requirit,
Siluas dulci uoce susurrat.
Validis quondam uiribus acta
Pronum flectit uirga cacumen;
Hanc si curuans dextra remisit,
Recto spectat uertice caelum.
Cadit Hesperias Phoebus in undas,
Sed secreto tramite rursus
Currum solitos uertit ad ortus.
Repetunt proprios quaeque recursus
Redituque suo singula gaudent
Nec manet ulli traditus ordo
Nisi quod fini iunxerit ortum
Stabilemque sui fecerit orbem.

[¶6] “You also, O earthly creatures, though slightly and as it were in a dream acknowledge your beginning, and though not perspicuously yet in some sort behold that true end of happiness, so that the intention of nature leadeth you to the true good, and manifold error withdraweth you from it. For consider whether those things, by which men think to obtain happiness, can bring them to their desired end. For if either money, or honour, or any of the rest be of that quality that they want nothing which is good, we will also confess that they are able to make men happy. But if they neither be able to perform that they promise, and want many things which are good, are they not manifestly discovered to have a false appearance of happiness? First then, I ask thee thyself, who not long since didst abound with wealth; in that plenty of riches, was thy mind never troubled with any injuries?” “I cannot remember,” quoth I, “that ever my mind was so free from trouble but that something or other still vexed me.” “Was it not because thou either ' wantedst something which thou wouldst have had, or else hadst something which thou wouldst have wanted?” “It is true,” quoth I. “Then thou desiredst the presence of that, and the absence of this?” “I confess I did,” quoth I. “And doth not a man want that,” quoth she, “which he desireth?” “He doth,” quoth I. “But be that wanteth anything is not altogether sufficient of himself?” “He is not,” quoth I. “So that thou feltest this insufficiency, even the height of thy wealth?” “Why not?” quoth I. “Then riches cannot make a man wanting nothing nor sufficient of himself, and this was that they seemed to promise. But this is most of all to be considered, that money hath nothing of itself which can keep it from being taken from them which possess it, against their will.” “I grant it,” quoth I. “Why shouldst thou not grant it, since that every day those which arc more potent take it from others perforce? For from whence proceed so many complaints in law, but that money gotten either by violence or deceit is sought to be recovered by that means?” “It is so indeed,” quoth I. “So that every man needeth some other help to defend his money?” “Who denies that?” quoth I. “But he should not need that help, unless he had money which he might lose?” “There is no doubt of that,” quoth I. “Now then the matter is fallen out quite contrary; for riches, which are thought to suffice of themselves, rather make men stand in need of other helps. And after what manner do riches expel penury? For are not rich men hungry? Are they not thirsty? Or doth much money make the owners senseless of cold in winter? But thou wilt say, wealthy men have wherewithal to satisfy their hunger, slake their thirst, and defend themselves from cold. But in this sort, though want may be somewhat relieved by wealth, yet it cannot altogether be taken away. For if ever gaping and craving it be satiated by riches, there must needs always remain something to be satiated. I omit, that to nature very little, to covetousness nothing is sufficient. Wherefore it riches can neither remove wants, and cause some themselves, why imagine you that they can cause sufficiency.”

> Latin: “Vos quoque, o terrena animalia, tenui licet imagine uestrum tamen principium somniatis uerumque illum beatitudinis finem licet minime perspicaci qualicumque tamen cogitatione prospicitis eoque uos et ad uerum bonum naturalis ducit intentio et ab eodem multiplex error abducit. Considera namque an per ea quibus se homines adepturos beatitudinem putant ad destinatum finem ualeant peruenire. Si enim uel pecuniae uel honores ceteraque tale quid afferunt cui nihil honorum abesse uideatur, nos quoque fateamur fieri aliquos horum adeptione felices. Quod si neque id ualent efficere quod promittunt bonisque pluribus carent, nonne liquido falsa in eis beatitudinis species deprehenditur? Primum igitur te ipsum qui paulo ante diuitiis affluebas, interrogo: Inter illas abundantissimas opes numquamne animum tuum concepta ex qualibet iniuria confudit anxietas?” Atqui, inquam, “libero me fuisse animo quin aliquid semper augerer reminisci non queo.” “Nonne quia uel aberat quod abesse non uelles uel aderat quod adesse noluisses?” “Ita est,” inquam. “Illius igitur praesentiam huius absentiam desiderabis?” “Confiteor,” inquam. “Eget uero,” inquit, “eo quod quisque desiderat?” “Eget,” inquam. “Qui uero eget aliquo, non est usquequaque sibi ipse sufficiens?” “Minime,” inquam. “Tu itaque hanc insufficientiam plenus,” inquit, “opibus sustinebas?” “Quidni?” inquam. “Opes igitur nihilo indigentem sufficientemque sibi facere nequeunt et hoc erat quod promittere uidebantur. Atqui hoc quoque maxime considerandum puto quod nihil habeat suapte natura pecunia ut his a quibus possidetur inuitis nequeat auferri.” “Fateor,” inquam. “Quidni fateare, cum eam cotidie ualentior aliquis eripiat inuito? Vnde enim forenses querimoniae nisi quod uel ui uel fraude nolentibus pecuniae repetuntur ereptae?” “Ita est,” inquam. “Egebit igitur,” inquit, “extrinsecus petito praesidio quo suam pecuniam quisque tueatur?” “Quis id,” inquam, “neget?” “Atqui non egeret eo, nisi possideret pecuniam quam posset amittere?” “Dubitari,” inquam, “nequit.” “In contrarium igitur relapsa res est; nam quae sufficientes sibi facere putabantur opes, alieno potius praesidio faciunt indigentes. Quis autem modus est quo pellatur diuitiis indigentia? Num enim diuites esurire nequeunt? Num sitire non possunt? Num frigus hibernum pecuniosorum membra non sentiunt? Sed adest, inquies, opulentis quo famem satient, quo sitim frigusque depellant. Sed hoc modo consolari quidem diuitiis indigentia potest, auferri penitus non potest. Nam si haec hians semper atque aliquid poscens opibus expietur, maneat necesse est quae possit expleri. Taceo quod naturae minimum, quod auantiae nihil satis est. Quare si opes nec submouere possunt indigentiam et ipsae suam faciunt, quid est quod eas sufficientiam praestare credatis?”

[¶7] “Although the rich man from his mines of gold Dig treasure which his mind can never fill, And lofty neck with precious pearls enfold, And his hit fields with many oxen till. Yet biting cares will never leave his head. Nor will his wealth attend him being dead.”

> Latin: Quamuis fluente diues auri gurgite
Non expleturas cogat auarus opes
Oneretque bacis colla rubri litoris
Ruraque centeno scindat opima boue,
Nec cura mordax deseret superstitem,
Defunctumque leues non comitantur opes.

[¶8] But dignities make him honourable and reverend on whom they light. Have offices that force to plant virtues and expel vices in the minds of those who have them? But they are not wont to banish, but rather to make wickedness splendid. So that we many times complain because most wicked men obtain them. Whereupon Catullus called Nonius a scab or impostume though he sat in his chair of estate. a Seest thou what great ignominy dignities heap upon evil men? For their unworthiness would less appear if they were never advanced to any honours.

> Latin: Sed dignitates honorabilem reuerendumque cui prouenerint reddunt. Num uis ea est magistratibus ut utentium mentibus uirtutes inserant uitia de- pellant? Atqui non fugare sed illustrare potius nequitiam solent; quo fit ut indignemur eas saepe nequissimis hominibus contigisse, unde Catullus licet in curuli Nonium sedentem strumam tamen appellat. Videsne quantum malis dedecus adiciant dignitates? Atqui minus eorum patebit indignitas, si nullis honoribus inclarescant.

[¶9] Could so many dangers ever make thee think to bear office with Decoratus, b having discovered him to be a very varlet and spy? For we cannot for their honours account them worthy of respect whom we judge unworthy of the honours themselves. But it thou seest any man endued with wisdom, canst thou esteem him unworthy of that respect or wisdom which he hath? No, truly. For virtue hath a proper dignity of her own, which she presently endueth her possessors withal. Which since popular preferments cannot do, it is manifest that they have not the beauty which is proper to true dignity.

> Latin: Tu quoque num tandem tot periculis adduci potuisti ut cum Decorato gerere magistratum putares, cum in eo mentem nequissimi scurrae delatorisque respiceres? Non enim possumus ob honores reuerentia dignos iudicare quos ipsis honoribus iudicamus indignos. At si quem sapientia praeditum uideres, num posses eum uel reuerentia uel ea qua est praeditus sapientia non dignum putare? Minime. Inest enim dignitas propria uirtuti, quam protinus in eos quibus fuerit adiuncta transfundit.

[¶10] In which we are farther to consider that, if to be contemned of many make men abject, dignities make the wicked to be despised the more by laying them open to the view of the world. But the dignities go not scot-free, for wicked men do as much for them, defiling them with their own infection. And that thou mayst plainly see that true respect cannot be gotten by these painted dignities, let one that hath been often Consul go among barbarous nations; will that honour make those barbarous people respect him? And yet, if this were natural to dignities, they would never forsake their function in any nation whatsoever; as fire, wheresoever it be, always remaineth hot. But because not their own nature, but the deceitful opinion of men attributeth that to them, they forthwith come to nothing, being brought to them who esteem them not to be dignities And this tor foreign nations But do they always last among them where they had their beginning?

> Latin: Quod quia populares facere nequeunt honores, liquet eos propriam dignitatis pulchritudinem non habere. In quo illud est animaduertendum magis. Nam si eo abiectior est quo magis a pluribus quisque contemnitur, cum reuerendos facere nequeat quos pluribus ostentat, despectiores potius improbos dignitas facit. Verum non impune; reddunt namque improbi parem dignitatibus uicem quas sua contagione commaculant. Atque ut agnoscas ueram illam reuerentiam per has umbratiles dignitates non posse confingere, si qui multiplici consulatu functus in barbaras nationes forte deuenerit, uenerandumne barbaris honor faciet? Atqui si hoc naturale munus dignitatibus foret, ab officio suo quoquo gentium nullo modo cessarent, sicut ignis ubique terrarum numquam tamen calere desistit, sed quoniam id eis non propria uis sed hominum fallax adnectit opinio, uanescunt ilico, cum ad eos uenerint qui dignitates -eas esse non aestimant.

[¶11] The Praetorship, a great dignity in time past, is now an idle name, and an heavy burden of the Senate's fortune. If heretofore one had care of' the people's provision, he was accounted a great man; now what is more abject than that office? For as we said before, that which hath no proper dignity belonging unto it sometime receiveth and sometime loseth bis value at the users discretion. Wherefore if dignities cannot make us respected, if they be easily defiled with the infection of the wicked, if their worth decays by change of times, if diversities of nations ma e them contemptible, what beauty have they in themselves, or can they afford to others, worth the desiring?

> Latin: Sed hoc apud exteras nationes. Inter eos uero apud quos ortae sunt 3 num perpetuo perdurant? Atqui praetura magna olim potestas nunc inane nomen et senatorii census grauis sarcina; si quis populi quondam curasset annonam, magnus habebatur, nunc ea praefectura quid abiectius? Vt enim paulo ante diximus, quod nihil habet proprii decoris, opinione utentium nunc splendorem accipit nunc amittit.

[¶12] “Though fierce and lustful Nero did adorn Himself with purple robes, which pearls did grace, He did but gain a general hate and scorn. Yet wickedly he officers most base Over the reverend Senators did place. Who would esteem of fading honours then Which may be given thus by the wickedest men?”

> Latin: Si igitur reuerendos facere nequeunt dignitates, si ultro improborum contagione sordescunt, si mutatione temporum splendere desinunt, si gentium aestimatione uilescunt, quid est quod in se expetendae pulchritudinis habeant, nedum aliis praestent?
Quamuis se Tyrio superbus ostro
Comeret et niueis lapillis,
Inuisus tamen omnibus uigebat
Luxuriae Nero saeuientis.

[¶13] But can kingdoms and the familiarity of kings make a man mighty? Why not, when their felicity lasteth always? But both former and present times are full of examples that many kings have changed their happiness with misery. O excellent power, winch is not sufficient to uphold itself! And if this strength of kingdoms be the author of blessedness, doth it not diminish happiness and bring misery, when it is m any way defective? Put though some empires extend themselves far, there will still remain many nations out of their dominions. Now, where the power endeth which maketh them happy, there entereth the contrary which maketh them miserable, so that all kings must needs have less happiness than misery. That Tyrant, knowing by experience the dangers of his estate, signified the fears incident to a kingdom, by the hanging of a drawn sword over a man s head. a What power is this, then, which cannot expel nor avoid biting cares and pricking fears? They would willingly have lived securely, but could not, and yet they brag of their power. Thinkest thou him mighty whom thou seest desire that which he cannot do? Thinkest thou him mighty who dareth not go without his guard; who feareth others more than they fear him; who cannot seem mighty, except his servants please? For what should I speak of kings followers, since I show that kingdoms themselves are so full of weakness? Whom the power of kings often standing, but many times falling, doth overthrow. Nero compelled Seneca, his familiar friend and master, to make choice of his own death. b Antoninus called Papinianus, who had been long a gallant courtier, to be cut in pieces with his soldiers swords. c Yet they would both have renounced their power, yea Seneca endeavoured to deliver up his riches also to Nero, and to give himself to a contemplative life. But their very greatness drawing them to their destruction, neither of them could compass that which they desired. Wherefore what power is this that the possessors fear, which when thou wilt have, thou art not secure, and when thou wilt leave, thou canst not avoid? Are we the better for those friends which love us not for our virtue but for our prosperity? But whom prosperity maketh our friend, adversity will make our enemy. And what plague is able to hurt us more than a familiar enemy?

> Latin: Sed quondam dabat improbus uerendis
Patribus indecores curules.
Quis illos igitur putet beatos
Quos miseri tribuunt honores? An uero regna regumque familiaritas efficere potentem ualet? Quidni, quando eorum felicitas perpetuo perdurat? Atqui plena est exemplorum uetustas, plena etiam praesens aetas, qui reges felicitatem calamitate mutaueruit. O praeclara potentia quae ne ad conseruationem quidem sui satis efficax inuenitur! Quod si haec regnorum potestas beatitudinis auctor est, nonne si qua parte defuerit, felicitatem minuat, miseriam inportet? Sed quamuis late humana tendantur imperia, plures necesse est gentes relinqui quibus regum quisque non imperet. Qua uero parte beatos faciens desinit potestas, hac inpotentia subintrat quae miseros facit; hoc igitur modo maiorem regibus inesse necesse est miseriae portionem. Expertus sortis suae periculorum tyrannus regni metus pendentis supra uerticem gladii terrore simulauit. Quae est igitur haec potestas quae sollicitudinum morsus expellere, quae formidinum aculeos uitare nequit? Atqui uellent ipsi uixisse securi, sed nequeunt; dehinc de potestate gloriantur. An tu potentem censes quem uideas uelle quod non possit efficere? Potentem censes qui satellite latus ambit, qui quos terret ipse plus metuit, qui ut potens esse uideatur, in seruientium manu situm est? Nam quid ego de regum familiaribus disseram, cum regna ipsa tantae inbecillitatis plena demonstrem? Quos quidem regia potestas saepe incolumis saepe autem lapsa prosternit. Nero Senecam familiarem praeceptoremque suum ad eligendae mortis coegit arbitrium. Papinianum diu inter aulicos potentem militum gladiis Antoninus obiecit. Atqui uterque potentiae suae renuntiare uoluerunt, quorum Seneca opes etiam suas tradere Neroni seque in otium conferre conatus est; sed dum ruituros moles ipsa trahit, neuter quod uoluit effecit. Quae est igitur ista potentia quam pertimescunt habentes, quam nec cum habere uelis tutus sis et cum deponere cupias uitare non possis.

[¶14] “Who would be powerful, must His own affections cheek, Nor let foul reins of lust Subdue his conquered neck. For though the Indian land Should tremble at thy beck, And though thy dread command Far Thule's isle obey. Unless thou canst withstand And boldly drive away Black care and wretched moan, Thy might is small or none.”

> Latin: An praesidio sunt amici quos non uirtus sed fortuna conciliat? Sed quem felicitas amicum iecit, intortunium faciet inimicum. Quae uero pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris inimicus.
Qui se uolet esse potentem
Animos domet ille feroces
Nec uicta libidine colla
Foedis submittat habenis.

[¶15] As for glory, how deceitful it is oftentimes, and dishonest! For which cause the tragical poet deservedly exclaimeth: “O glory, glory, thou hast raised to honour and dignity myriads of worthless mortals!” a For many have often been much spoken of through the false opinions of the common people. Than which what can be imagined more vile? For those who are falsely commended must needs blush at their own praises. Which glory though it be gotten by deserts, yet what adds it to a wise man s conscience who measureth his own good, not by popular rumours, but by his own certain knowledge? And if it seemeth a fair thing to have dilated our fame, consequently we must judge it a foul thing not to have it extended. But since, as I showed a little before, there must needs be many nations to which the fame of one man cannot arrive, it cometh to pass that he whom thou esteemeth glorious, in the greater part of the world seemeth to have no glory at all. And here now I think popular glory not worth the speaking of, which neither proceeded, from judgment, nor ever hath any firmness. Likewise, who seeth not what a vain and idle thing it is to be called noble? Which insofar as it concerneth fame, is not our own. For nobility seemeth to be a certain praise proceeding from our parents deserts. But if praising cause th fame, they must necessarily be famous who are praised. Wherefore the fame of others, if thou hast none of thine own, maketh not thee renowned. But if there be anything good in nobility, I judge it only to be this, that it imposeth a necessity upon those which are noble, not to suffer their nobility to degenerate from the virtue of their ancestors.

> Latin: Etenim licet Indica longe
Tellus tua iura tremescat
Et seruiat ultima Thyle,
Tamen atras pellere curas
Miserasque fugare querelas
Non nosse potentia non est. Gloria uero quam fallax saepe, quam turpis est! Vnde non iniuria tragicus exclamat: ὦ δόξα δόξα μυρίοισι δὴ βροτῶν οὐδὲν γεγῶσι βίοτον ὤγκωσας μέγαν. Plures enim magnum saepe nomen falsis uulgi opinionibus abstulerunt; quo quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur, suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant. Quae si etiam meritis conquisita sit, quid tamen sapientis adiecerit conscientiae qui bonum suum non populari rumore, sed conscientiae ueritate metitur? Quod si hoc ipsum propagasse nomen pulchrum uidetur, consequens est ut foedum non extendisse iudicetur. Sed cum, uti paulo ante disserui, plures gentes esse necesse sit ad quas unius fama hominis nequeat peruenire, fit ut quem tu aestimas esse gloriosum, pro maxima parte terrarum uideatur inglorius. Inter haec uero popularem gratiam ne commemoratione quidem dignam puto, quae nec iudicio prouenit nec umquam firma perdurat. Iam uero quam sit inane quam futtile nobilitatis nomen, quis non nideat? Quae si ad claritudinem refertur, aliena est. Videtur namque esse nobilitas quaedam de meritis ueniens laus parentum. Quod si claritudinem praedicatio facit, illi sint clari necesse est qui praedicantur. Quare splendidum te, si tuam non habes, aliena claritudo non efficit.

[¶16] The general race of men from a like birth is born. All things one Father have, Who doth them all adorn, Who gave the sun his rays, and the pale moon her horn, “The lofty heaven for stars, low earth tor mortals chose; He souls fetched down from high in bodies did enclose; And thus from noble seed all men did first compose. Why brag you of your stock? Since none is counted base, If you consider God the author of your race, But he that with foul vice doth his own birth deface.”

> Latin: Quod si quid est in nobilitate bonum, id esse arbitror solum, ut inposita nobilibus necessitudo uideatur ne a maiorum uirtute degeneret.
Omne hominum genus in terris simili surgit ab ortu
Vnus enim rerum pater est, unus cuncta ministrat.
Ille dedit Phoebo radios dedit et cornua lunae,
Ille homines etiam terris dedit ut sidera caelo,
Hic clausit membris animos celsa sede petitos.
Mortales igitur cunctos edit nobile germen.

[¶17] Now what should I speak of bodily pleasures, the desire of which is full of anxiety, and the enjoying of them breeds repentance? How many diseases, how intolerable griefs bring they forth in the bodies of their possessors, as it were the fruits of their own wickedness! I know not what sweetness their beginnings have, but whosoever will remember his lusts shall understand that the cud of pleasure is sadness, Which if it be able to cause happiness, there is no reason why beasts should not be thought blessed, whose whole intention is bent to supply their corporal wants. That pleasure which proceedeth from wife and children should be most honest; but it was too naturally spoken, that some tormentor invented children, whose condition, whatsoever it be, how biting it is, I need not tell thee, who hast had experience heretofore, and art not now free from care. In which I approve the opinion of Euripides, who said that they which had no children are happy by being unfortunate. a

> Latin: Quid genus et proauos strepitis? Si primordia uestra
Auctoremque deum spectes, nullus degener exstat,
Ni uitiis peiora fouens proprium deserat ortum. Quid autem de corporis uoluptatibus loquar, quarum appetentia quidem plena est anxietatis, satietas uero poenitentiae? Quantos illae morbos, quam intolerabiles dolores quasi quendam fructum nequitiae fruentium solent referre corporibus! Quarum motus quid habeat iucunditatis, ignoro. Tristes uero esse uoluptatum exitus, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum uolet, intelleget. Quae si beatos explicare possunt, nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur quarum omnis ad explendam corporalem lacunam festinat intentio. Honestissima quidem coniugis foret liberorumque iucunditas, sed nimis e natura dictum est nescio quem filios inuenisse tortorem;

[¶18] “All pleasure hath.this property, She woundeth those who have her most. And, like unto the angry bee Who hath her pleasant honey lost, She flies away with nimble wing And in our hearts doth leave her sting.”

> Latin: quorum quam sit mordax quaecumque condicio, neque alias expertum te neque nunc anxium necesse est admonere. In quo Euripidis mei sententiam probo, qui carentem liberis infortunio dixit esse felicem.

[¶19] Wherefore there is no doubt but that these ways to happiness are only certain by-paths, which can never bring any man thither whither they promise to lead him. And with how great evils they are beset, I will briefly show. For what? Wilt thou endeavour to gather money? But thou shalt take it away from him who hath it. Wilt thou excel in dignities? Thou shalt crouch to the giver, and thou who desirest to surpass others in honour shalt become vile by thy baseness in begging. Wishest thou for power? ', non shalt be in danger of thy subjects treacheries. Seekest Ilion for glory? But, drawn into many dangers, thou shalt lose thy safety. Wilt thou live a voluptuous life? But who would not despise and neglect the service of so vile and frail a thing as his body? Now they who boast of the liabilities of their body, upon how unsteadfast a possession do they ground themselves! For can you be bigger than elephants, or stronger than bulls? Or swifter than tigers? Look upon the spice, firmness, and speed v motion of the heavens, and cease at length to have in admiration these base things. Which heavens are not more to be admired for these qualities than for the manner of their government. As for the glittering of beauty, how soon and swiftly doth it vanish away! As suddenly decaying and changing as the frail flowers in the spring. And if, as Aristotle saith, men had Lynceus's eyes, that they could see through stone walls, would not they judge that body of Alcibiades, seeming outwardly most fair, to be most foul and ugly by discovering his entrails? Wherefore not thy nature but the weakness of the beholders' eyes maketh thee seem fair. But esteem the goods of the body as much as you will, so that yon acknowledge this, that whatsoever you admire may be dissolved with the burning of an ague of three days. Out of which we may briefly collect this sum; that these goods, which can neither perform that they promise, nor are perfect by having all that is good, do neither, as so many paths, lead men to happiness, nor make men happy of themselves.

> Latin: Habet hoc uoluptas omnis,
Stimulis agit fruentes
Apiumque par uolantum
Vbi grata mella fudit,
Fugit et nimis tenaci
Ferit icta corda morsu. Nihil igitur dubium est quin hae ad beatitudinem uiae deuia quaedam sint nec perducere quemquam eo ualeant ad quod se perducturas esse promittunt. Quantis uero implicitae malis sint, breuissime monstrabo. Quid enim? Pecuniamne congregare conaberis? Sed eripies habenti. Dignitatibus fulgere uelis? Danti supplicabis et qui praeire ceteros honore cupis, poscendi humilitate uilesces. Potentiamne desideras? Subiectorum insidiis obnoxius periculis subiacebis. Gloriam petas? Sed per aspera quaeque distractus securus esse desistis. Voluptariam uitam degas? Sed quis non spernat atque abiciat uilissimae fragilissimaeque rei corporis seruum? Iam uero qui bona prae se corporis ferunt, quam exigua, quam fragili possessione nituntur! Num enim elephantos mole, tauros robore superare potentis, num tigres uelocitate praeibitis? Respicite caeli spatium, firmitudinem, celeritatem et aliquando desinite uilia mirari. Quod quidem caelum non his potius est quam sua qua regitur ratione mirandum. Formae uero nitor ut rapidus est, ut uelox et uernalium florum mutabilitate fugacior! Quod si? ut Aristoteles 1 ait, Lynceis oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum uisus obstantia penetraret, nonne introspectis uisceribus illud Alcibiadis superficie pulcherrimum corpus turpissimum uideretur? Igitur te pulchrum uideri non tua natura sed oculorum spectantium reddit infirmitas. Sed aestimat e quam uultis nimio corporis bona, dum sciatis hoc quodcumque miramini triduanae febris igniculo posse dissolui!

[¶20] “Alas, bow ignorance makes wretches stray Out of the way! You from green trees expect no golden mines Nor pearls from vines, Nor use you on mountains to lay your net Fishes to get, Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please, Run you to seas. Men will be skilful in the hidden eaves Of the ocean waves, And in what coasts the orient pearls are bred, Or purple red, Also, what different sorts of fishes store Each several shore, But when they come their chiefest good to find, Then are they blind, And search for that under the earth, which lies Above the skies. How should I curse these fools? Let thirst them hold Of fame and gold, That, having got false goods with pain, they learn True to discern.”

> Latin: Ex quibus omnibus illud redigere in summam licet, quod haec quae nec praestare quae polluentur bona possunt nec omnium bonorum congregatione perfecta sunt, ea nec ad beatitudinem quasi quidam calles ferunt nec beatos ipsa perficiunt
Eheu quae miseros tramite deuios
Abducit ignorantia!
Non aurum in uiridi quaeritis arbore
Nec uite gemmas carpitis,
Non altis laqueos montibus abditis
Vt pisce ditetis dapes
Nec uobis capreas si libeat sequi,
Tyrrhena captatis uada.
Ipsos quin etiam fluctibus abditos
Norunt recessus aequoris,
Quae gemmis niueis unda feracior
Vel quae rubentis purpurae
Nec non quae tenero pisce uel asperis
Praestent echinis litora.
Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum,
Nescire caeci sustinent,
Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum,
Tellure demersi petunt.

[¶21] “Let it suffice that we have hitherto discovered the form of false felicity, which if thou hast plainly seen, order now requireth that we show thee in what true happiness consisteth.” “I see,” quoth I, “that neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdoms, nor respect by dignities, nor renown by glory, nor joy can be gotten by pleasures.” “Hast thou also understood the causes why it is so?” “Methink I have a little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldst declare them more plainly.” “The reason is manifest, for that which is simple and undivided of itself, is divided by men's error, and is translated from true and perfect to false and imperfect. Thinkest thou that which needeth nothing, to stand in need of power?” “No,” quoth I. “Thou sayest well, for if any power in any respect be weak, in this it must necessarily stand in need of the help of others.” “It is true,” quoth I. “Wherefore sufficiency and power have one and the same nature.” “So it seemeth.” “Now thinkest thou, that which is of this sort ought to be despised, or rather that it is worthy to be respected above all other things?” “There can be no doubt of this,” quoth I. “Let us add respect then to sufficiency and power, so that we judge these three to be one.” “We must add it if we confess the truth.” “What now,” quoth she, “thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether that which thou hast granted to want nothing, to be most potent, and most worthy of honour, may seem to want fame, which it cannot yield itself, and for that cause be in some respect more abject.” “I must needs confess,” quoth I, “that, being what it is, this is also most famous.” “Consequently then we must acknowledge that fame differeth nothing from the former three.” “We must so,” quoth I. “Wherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can perform all things by its own power, which is famous and respected, is it not manifest that it is also most pleasant.?” To which I answered: “How such a man should fall into any grief, I can by no means imagine. Wherefore if that which we have said hitherto be true, we must needs confess that he is most joyful and content.” “And by the same reason it followeth that sufficiency, power, fame, respect, pleasure have indeed divers names, but differ not in substance.” “It followeth indeed,” quoth I. “This then, which is one and simple by nature, man's wickedness divideth, and while he endeavoureth to obtain part of that which hath no parts, he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he seeketh not after.” “How is this?” quoth I. “He who seeketh after riches,” quoth she, “to avoid w ant, taketh no thought for power, he had rather be base and obscure, he depriveth himself even of many natural pleasures that he may not lose the money which he hath gotten. But by this means he attaineth not to sufficiency, whom power forsaketh, whom trouble moleste th, whom baseness maketh abject, whom obscurity overwhelmeth. Again, he. that only desireth power, consumeth wealth, despiseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and being not able to rid himself, ceaseth to be powerful, which was the only thing he aimed at. The like discourse may be made of honours, glory, pleasures. For since every one of these things is the same with the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth not that which he desneth.” “What then?” quoth I. “If one should desire to have them all together, he should wish for the sum of happiness, but shall he find it in these things which we have showed cannot perform what they promise?” “No,” quoth I. “Wherefore we must by no means seek for happiness in these things which arc thought to afford the several portions of that which is to be desired.” “I confess it,” quoth I, “and nothing can be more true than this.” “Now then,” quoth she, “thou hast both the form and causes of false felicity; cast but the eyes of thy mind on the contrary, and thou shalt presently espy true happiness, which we promised to show thee.” “This,” quoth I, “is evident, even to him that is blind, and thou showedst it a little before, while thou endeavouredst to lay open the causes of the false. For, if I be not deceived, that is true and perfect happiness which maketh a man sufficient, potent, respected, famous, joyful.. And that thou mayest know that I understood thee aright, that which can truly perform any one of these because they are all one, I acknowledge to be full and perfect happiness.” “O my scholar, I think thee happy by having this opinion, if thou addest this also.” “What?” quoth I. “Dost thou imagine that there is any mortal or frail thing which can cause this happy estate?” “I do not,” quoth I, “and that hath been so proved by thee, that more cannot be desired.” “Wherefore these things seem to afford men the images of the true good, or certain unperfeet goods, but they cannot give them the true and perfect good itself.” “I am of the same mind,” quoth I. “Now then, since thou knowest wherein true happiness consisteth, and what have only a false show of it, it remaineth that thou shouldst learn where thou mayest seek for this which is true.” “This is that,” quoth I, “which I have long earnestly expected.” “But since, as Plato teacheth (in Timaeus), a we must implore Cod s assistance even in our least affairs, what, thinkest thou, must we do now, that we may deserve to find the seat of that sovereign good?” “We must,” quoth I, “invocate the Father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good foundation.” “Thou sayest rightly, quoth she, and withal sung in this sort.”

> Latin: Quid dignum stolidis mentibus inprecer?
Opes honores ambiant;
Et cum falsa graui mole parauerint,
Tum uera cognoscant bona. “Hactenus mendacis formam felicitatis ostendisse suffecerit, quam si perspicaciter intueris, ordo est deinceps quae sit uera monstrare.” “Atqui uideo,” inquam, “nec opibus sufficicntiam nec regnis potentiam nec reuerentiam dignitatibus nec celebritatem gloria nec laetitiam uoluntatibus posse contingere.” “An etiam causas, cur id ita sit, deprehendisti?” “Tenui quidem ueluti rimula mihi uideor intueri, sed ex te apertius cognoscere malim.” “Atqui promptissima ratio est. Quod enim simplex est indiuisumque natura, id error humanus separat et a uero atque perfecto ad falsum imperfectumque traducit. An tu arbitraris quod nihilo indigeat egere potentia?” “Minime,” inquam. “Recte tu quidem. Nam si quid est quod in ulla re inbecillioris ualentiae sit, in hac praesidio necesse est egeat alieno.” “Ita est,” inquam. “Igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque una est eademque natura.” “Sic uidetur.” “Quod uero huiusmodi sit, spernendumne esse censes an contra rerum omnium ueneratione dignissimum?” “At hoc,” inquam, “ne dubitari quidem potest.” “Addamus igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque reuerentiam, ut haec tria unum esse iudicemus.” “Addamus, si quidem uera nolumus confiteri.” “Quid uero,” inquit, “obscurumne hoc atque ignobile censes esse an omni celebritate clarissimum? Considera uero, ne quod nihilo indigere, quod potentissimum, quod honore dignissimum esse concessum est, egere claritudine quam sibi praestare non possit atque ob id aliqua ex parte uideatur abiectius.” “Non possum,” inquam, “quin hoc uti est ita etiam celeberrimum esse confitear.” “Consequens igitur est ut claritudinem superioribus tribus nihil differre fateamur.” “Consequitur,” inquam. “Quod igitur nullius egeat alieni, quod suis cuncta uiribus possit, quod sit clarum atque reuerendum, nonne hoc etiam constat esse laetissimum?” Sed unde huic, inquam, “tali maeror ullus obrepat ne cogitare quidem possum; quare plenum esse laetitiae, si quidem superiora manebunt, necesse est confiteri.” “Atqui illud quoque per eadem necessarium est sufficientiae, potentiae, claritudinis, reuerentiae, iucunditatis nomina quidem esse diuersa, nullo modo uero discrepare substantiam.” “Necesse est,” inquam. “Hoc igitur quod est unum simplexque natura, prauitas humana dispertit et dum rei quae partibus caret partem conatur adipisci, nec portionem quae nulla est nec ipsam quam minime affectat adsequitur.” “Quonam,” inquam, “modo?” “Qui diuitiae, inquit, petit penuriae fuga, de potentia nihil laborat, uilis obscurusque esse mauult, multas etiam sibi naturales quoque subtrahit uolup- tates, ne pecuniam quam parauit amittat. Sed hoc modo ne sufficientia quidem contingit ei quem ualentia deserit, quem molestia pungit, quem uilitas abicit, quem recondit obscuritas. Qui uero solum posse desiderat, profligat opes, despicit uoluptates honoremque potentia carentem gloriam quoque nihili pendit. Sed hunc quoque quam multa deficiant uides. Fit enim ut aliquando necessariis egeat, ut anxietatibus mordeatur cumque haec depellere nequeat, etiam id quod maxime petebat potens esse desistat. Similiter ratiocinari de honoribus, gloria, uoluptatibus licet. Nam cum unumquodque horum idem quod cetera sit, quisquis horum aliquid sine ceteris petit, ne illud quidem quod desiderat apprehendit.” “Quid igitur?” inquam. “Si qui cuncta simul cupiat adipisci, summam quidem ille beatitudinis uelit. Sed num in his eam reperiet, quae demonstrauimus id quod polluentur non posse conferre?” “Minime,” inquam. “In his igitur quae singula quaedam expetendorum praestare ei eduntur, beatitudo nullo modo uestiganda est.” “Fateor,” inquam, “et hoc nihil dici uerius potest.” “Habes igitur,” inquit, “et formam falsae felicitatis et causas. Deflecte nunc in aduersum mentis intuitum; ibi enim ueram quam promisimus statim uidebis.” Atqui haec, inquam, “uel caeco perspicua est eamque tu paulo ante monstrasti, dum falsae causas aperire conaris. Nam nisi fallor ea uera est et perfecta felicitas quae sufficientem, potentem, reuerendum, celebrem laetumque perficiat. Atque ut me interius animaduertisse cognoscas, quae unum horum, quoniam idem cuncta sunt, ueraciter praestare potest hanc esse plenam beatitudinem sine ambiguitate cognosco.” “O te alumne hac opinione felicem, si quidem hoc,” inquit, “adieceris....” “Quidnam?” inquam. “Essene aliquid in his mortalibus caducisque rebus putas quod huiusmodi statum possit afferre?” “Minime,” inquam, “puto idque a te, nihil ut amplius desideretur, ostensum est.” “Haec igitur uel imagines ueri boni uel inperfecta quaedam bona dare mortalibus uidentur, uerum autem atque perfectum bonum conferre non possunt.” “Assentior” inquam. “Quoniam igitur agnouisti quae uera illa sit, quae autem beatitudinem mentiantur, nunc superest ut unde ueram hanc petere possis agnoscas.” “Id quidem,” inquam, “iam dudum uehementer exspecto.”

## 6. Book III · section 3 · 3

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/6/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/6/#p-N

[¶0] b “O Thou, that dost the world in lasting order guide, Father of heaven and earth, Who makest time swiftly slide, And, standing still Thyself, yet tram st all moving laws, Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause: But by a sweet desire, where envy hath no place, Thy goodness moving Thee to give each thing his grace, Thou dost all creatures' forms from highest patterns take. From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make. Thus Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame. Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixed with flame And dry things join with moist, lest fire away should fly, Or earth, opprest with weight, buried too low should lie. Thou in consenting parts fitly disposed hast Th' all-moving soul in midst of threefold nature placed, Which, cut in several parts that run a different race Into itself returns, and circling doth embrace The highest mind, and heaven with like proportion drives. Thou with like cause dost make the souls and lesser lives, Fix them in chariots swift, and widely scatterest O'er heaven and earth; then at Thy fatherly behest They stream, like fire returning, back to Thee, their God. Dear Father, let my mind Thy hallowed seat ascend, Let me behold the spring of grace and find Thy light, That I on Thee may fix my soul's well cleared sight. Cast off the earthly weight wherewith I am opprest, Shine as Thou art most bright, Thou only calm and rest To pious men whose end is to behold Thy ray, Who their beginning art, their guide, their bound, and way. a ”

> Latin: “Sed cum, ut in Timaeo 1 Platoni,” inquit, “nostro placet, in minimis quoque rebus diuinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur?” “Inuocandum,” inquam, “rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite fundatur exordium.” “Recte,” inquit, “ac simul ita modulata est.”
O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas
Terrarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo
Ire iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moueri,
Quem non externae pepulerunt fingere causae
Materiae fluitantis opus, uerum insita summi
Forma boni liuore carens, tu cuncta superno
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens similique in imagine formans
Perfectasque iubens perfectum absoluere partes.
Tu numeris elementa ligas ut frigora flammis
Arida conueniant liquidis, ne purior ignis
Euolet aut mersas deducant pondera terras.
Tu triplicis mediam naturae cuncta mouentem
Conectens animam per consona membra resoluis.
Quae cum secta duos motum glomerauit in orbes,
In semet reditura meat mentemque profundam
Circuit et simili conuertit imagine caelum.
Tu causis animas paribus uitasque minores
Prouehis et leuibus sublimes curribus aptans
In caelum terramque seris quas lege benigna
Ad te conuersas reduci facis igne reuerti.

[¶1] “Wherefore since thou hast seen what is the form of perfect and imperfect good, now I think we must show in what this perfection of happiness is placed. And inquire first whether there can be any such good extant in the world, as thou hast defined; lest, contrary to truth, we be deceived with an empty show of thought. But it cannot be denied that there is some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness. For all that is said to he imperfect is so termed for the want it hath of perfection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something imperfect, there must needs he something perfect also in the same kind. For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that which is defective and not complete, but, proceeding from entire and absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and enfeebled. But as we showed before, there be a certain imperfect felicity of frail goods, it cannot be doubted but that there is some solid and perfect happiness also.” “Thou hast,” quoth I, “concluded most firmly and most truly.” “Now where this good dwelleth,” quoth she, “consider this. The common conceit of men s minds proveth that God the Prince of all tilings is good. For, since nothing can be imagined better than God, who doubteth but that is good than which is nothing better? And reason doth in such sort demonstrate God to be good that it convinceth Him to be perfectly good. For unless He were so, He could not be the chief of all things. for there would be something better than He, having perfect goodness, which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than He. for it is already manifest that perfect things were before the imperfect. Wherefore, lest our reasoning should have no end, we must confess that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign and perfect goodness. But we have concluded that perfect goodness is true happiness, wherefore true blessedness must necessarily be placed in the most high God.” “I agree,” I, “neither can this be any way contradicted.” “But I pray thee,” quoth she, “see how boldly and inviolably thou approvest that which we said, that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign goodness.” “How?” quoth I. “That thou presumest not that this Father of all things hath either received from others that sovereign good with which He is said to be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort that thou shouldst think that the substance of the blessedness which is had, and of God who hath it, were diverse, for if thou thinkest that lie had it from others, thou mayest also infer that he who gave it was better than the receiver. But we most worthily confess that He is the most excellent of all things. And if He hath it by nature, but as a diverse thing, since we speak of God the Prince of all things, let him that can, invent who united these diverse things. Finally, that which is different from anything, is not that from which it is understood to differ. Wherefore that which is naturally different from the sovereign good, is not the sovereign good itself. Which it were impious to think of God, than whom, we know certainly, nothing is better. For doubtless the nature of nothing can be better than the beginning of it Wherefore I may most truly conclude that which is the beginning of all things to be also in His own substance the chiefest good.” “Most rightly,” quoth I. “But it is granted that the chiefest good is blessedness?” “It is,” quoth I.

> Latin: Da pater augustam menti conscendere sedem,
Da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta
In te conspicuos animi defigere uisus.
Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis
Atque tuo splendore mica! Tu namque serenum,
Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,
Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem. “Quoniam igitur quae sit imperfecti, quae etiam perfecti boni forma uidisti, nunc demonstrandum reor quonam haec felicitatis perfectio constituta sit. In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum quale paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei subiectae ueritatem cassa cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin exsistat sitque hoc ueluti quidam omnium fons bonorum negari nequit. Omne enim quod inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere inperfectum quid esse uideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod inperfectum perhibetur exstiterit ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effeta dilabitur. Quod si, uti paulo ante monstrauimus, est quaedam boni fragilis inperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari.” “Firmissime,” inquam, “uerissimeque conclusum est.” “Quo uero,” inquit, “habitet, ita considera. Deum rerum omnium principem bonum esse communis humanorum con- ceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet? Ita uero bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit. Erit enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora esse claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est summum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Sed perfectum bonum ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus; ueram igitur beatitudinem in summo deo sitam esse necesse est.” “.Accipio,” inquam, “nec est quod contradici ullo modo queat.” “Sed quaeso,” inquit, “te uide quam id sancte atque inuiolabiliter probes quod boni summi summum deum diximus esse plenissimum.” “Quonam,” inquam, “modo?” “Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem illud summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur uel extrinsecus accepisse uel ita naturaliter habere praesumas, quasi habentis dei habitaeque beatitudinis diuersam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes, praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis. Sed hunc esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur. Quod si natura quidem inest, sed est ratione diuersum, cum de rerum principe loquamur deo, fingat qui potest: quis haec diuersa coniunxerit? Postremo quod a qualibet re diuersum est, id non est illud a quo intellegitur esse diuersum. Quare quod a.

[¶2] “Wherefore,” quoth she, “we must needs confess that blessedness itself is God.” “I can neither contradict,” quoth I, “thy former propositions, and I sec this illation followeth from them.” “Consider,” saith she, “if the same be not more firmly proved hence, because there cannot be two chief goods, the one different from the other, for it is manifest that of those goods which differ, the one is not the other, wherefore neither of them can be perfect, wanting the other. But manifestly that which is not perfect, is not the chiefest, wherefore the chief goods cannot be diverse. Now we have proved that both blessedness and God are the chiefest good, wherefore that must needs be the highest blessedness which is the highest divinity.” “There can be nothing,” quoth I, “concluded more truly than this, nor more firmly in arguing, nor more worthy God himself.” “Upon this then,” quoth she, “

> Latin: summo bono diuersum est sui natura., id summum bonum non est—quod nefas est de eo cogitare quo nihil constat esse praestantius. Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit exsistere, quare quod omnium principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonum uerissima ratione concluserim.” “Rectissime,” inquam. “Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse concessum est.” “Ita est,” inquam. “Igitur,” inquit, “deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri.” “Nec propositis,” inquam, “prioribus refragari queo et illis hoc inlatum consequens esse perspicio.” “Respice,” inquit, “an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa bona quae a se diuersa sint esse non possunt. Etenim quae discrepant bona, non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet; quare neutrum poterit esse perfectum, cum alterutri alterum deest.

[¶3] as the geometricians a are wont, out of their propositions which they have demonstrated, to infer something which they call porismata (deductions) so will I give thee as it were a corollarium.

> Latin: Sed quod perfectum non sit, id summum non esse manifestum est; nullo modo igitur quae summa sunt bona ea possunt esse diuersa.

[¶4] For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining of blessedness, and blessedness is nothing else but divinity, it is manifest that men are made blessed by the obtaining of divinity. And as men are made just by the obtaining of justice, and wise by the obtaining of wisdom, so they who obtain divinity must needs in like manner become gods. Wherefore everyone that is blessed is a god, but by nature there is only one God: but there may be many by participation.” “This is,” quoth I, “an excellent and precious porisma or corollarium.” “But there is nothing more excellent than that which reason persuadeth us to add.” “What?” quoth I.

> Latin: Atqui et beatitudinem et deum summum bonum esse collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinem quae sit summa diuinitas.” “Nihil,” inquam, “nee reapse uerius 1 nec ratiocinatione firmius nee deo dignius concludi potest.” “Super haec,” inquit, “igitur ueluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae porismata ipsi uocant, ita ego quoque tibi ueluti corollarium dabo. Nam quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beatitudo uero est ipsa diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione beatos fieri manifestum est: sed uti iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatem adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est.

[¶5] “Since,” quoth she, “blessedness seemeth to contain many things, whether do they all concur as divers parts to the composition of one entire body of blessedness, or doth some one of them form the substance of blessedness to which the rest are to be referred?” “I desire,” quoth I, “that thou wouldst declare this point, by the enumeration of the particulars.” “Do we not think,” quoth she, “that blessedness is good?” “Yea, the chiefest good,” quoth I. “Thou mayest,” quoth she, “add this to them all. For blessedness is accounted the chiefest sufficiency, the chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? Are all these sufficiency, power, and the rest—the good, in the sense that they are members of it, or rather are they referred to good as to the head?” “I understand,” quoth I, “what thou proposest, but I desire to hear what thou concludest.” “This is the decision of this matter. If all these were members of blessedness, they should differ one from another. For this is the nature of parts, that being divers they compose one body. But we have proved that all these are one and the same thing. Wherefore they are no members, otherwise blessedness should be compacted of one member, which cannot be.” “There is no doubt of this,” quoth I, “but I expect that which is behind.” “It is manifest that the rest are to be referred to goodness; for sufficiency is desired, because it is esteemed good, and likewise power, because that likewise is thought to be good. And we may conjecture the same of respect, fame, and pleasure. Wherefore goodness is the sum and cause of all that is desired. For that which is neither good indeed, nor beareth any show of goodness, can by no means be sought after. And contrariwise those thing's which are not good of their own nature, yet, if they seem such are desired as if they were truly good. So that the sum, origin, and cause of all that is sought after is rightly thought to be goodness. And that on account of which a thing is sought, seemeth to be the chief object of desire. As if one would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore, since all things are desired in respect of goodness, they are not so much wished for as goodness itself. But we granted that to be blessedness for which other things are desired, wherefore in like manner only blessedness is sought after; by which it plainly appeareth, that goodness and blessedness have one and the self-same substance.” “I see not how any man can dissent.” “But we have showed that God and true blessedness are one and the self-same thing.” “It is so,” quoth I. “We may then securely conclude that the substance of God consisteth in nothing else but in goodness.”

> Latin: Omnis igitur beatus deus, sed natura quidem unus; participatione uero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos.” “Et pulchrum,” inquam, “hoc atque pretiosum, siue porisma siue corollarium uocari mauis.” “Atqui hoc quoque pulchrius nihil est, quod his annectendum. esse ratio persuadet.” “Quid?” inquam, “Cum multa,” inquit, “beatitudo continere uideatur, utrumne haec omnia unum ueluti corpus beatitudinis quadam partium uarietate coniungant an sit eorum aliquid quod beatitudinis substantiam compleat, ad hoc uero cetera referantur?” “Vellem,” inquam, “id ipsarum rerum commemoratione patefaceres.” “Nonne,” inquit, “beatitudinem bonum esse censemus?” “Ac summum quidem,” inquam. “Addas,” inquit, “hoc omnibus licet. Nam eadem sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reuerentia quoque, claritas ac uoluptas beatitudo esse iudicatur. Quid igitur? Haecine omnia bonum—sufficientia potentia ceteraque—ueluti quaedam beatitudinis membra sunt an ad bonum ueluti ad uerticem cuncta referuntur?” “Intellego,” inquam, “quid inuestigandum proponas, sed quid constituas audire desidero.” “Cuius discretionem rei sic accipe. Si haec omnia beatitudinis membra forent, a se quoque inuicem discreparent. Haec est enim partium natura ut unum corpus diuersa coinponant. Atqui haec omnia idem esse monstrata sunt; minime igitur membra sunt. Alioquin ex uno membro beatitudo uidebitur esse coniuncta—quod fieri nequit.” “Id quidem,” inquam, “dubium non est, sed id quod restat exspecto.” “Ad bonum uero cetera referri palam est. Idcirco enim sufficientia petitur quoniam bonum esse iudicatur, idcirco potentia quoniam id quoque esse creditur bonum; idem de reuerentia, claritudine, iucunditate coniectare licet. Omnium igitur expetendorum summa atque causa bonum est. Quod enim neque re neque similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum, id expeti nullo modo potest. Contraque etiam quae natura bona non sunt, tamen si esse uideantur, quasi uere bona sint appetuntur. Quo fit uti summa, cardo atque causa expetendorum omnium bonitas esse iure credatur. Cuius uero causa quid expetitur, id maxime uidetur optari, ueluti si sal ut is causa quispiam uelit equitare, non tam equitandi motum desiderat quam salutis effectum. Cum igitur omnia boni gratia petantur, non illa potius quam bonum ipsum desideratur ab omnibus.

[¶6] a “Come hither, all you that are bound, Whose base and earthly minds are drowned By lust which doth them tie in cruel chains: Here is a seat for men opprest, Here is a port of pleasant rest; Here may a wretch have refuge from his pains. No gold, which Tagus' sands bestow, Nor which on Hermus' banks doth flow, Nor precious stones which scorchéd Indians get, a Can clear the sharpness of the mind, But rather make it far more blind, And in the farther depth of darkness set, For this that sets our souls on work. Buried in caves of earth doth lurk. But heaven is guided by another light, Which causeth us to shun the dark, b And who this light doth truly mark, Must needs deny that Phoebus beams are bright.”

> Latin: Sed propter quod cetera optantur, beatitudinem esse concessimus; quare sic quoque sola quaeritur beatitudo. Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni et beatitudinis unam atque eandem esse substantiam.” “Nihil uideo cur dissentire quispiam possit.” “Sed deum ueramque beatitudinem unum atque idem esse monstrauimus.” “Ita,” inquam. “Securo igitur concludere licet dei quoque in ipso bono nec usquam alio sitam esse substantiam.”
Huc omnes pariter uenite capti
Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis
Terrenus habitans libido mentes,
Haec erit-uobis requies laborum,
Hic portus placida manens quiete,
Hoc patens unum miseris asylum.

[¶7] “I consent,” quoth I, “for all is grounded upon most firm reasons” “But what account wilt thou make,” quoth she, “to know what goodness itself is?” “I will esteem it infinitely,” quoth I, “because by this means I shall come to know God also, who is nothing else but goodness.” “I will conclude this,” quoth she, “most certainly, if those things be not denied which I have already proved.” “They shall not,” quoth I. “Have we not proved,” quoth she, “that those things which are desired of many, are not true and perfect goods, because they differ one from another and, being separated, cannot cause complete and absolute goodness, which is only found when they are united as it were into one form and causality, that the same may he sufficiency, power, respect, fame, and pleasure? And except they be all one and the same thing, that they have nothing worth the desiring?” “It hath been proved,” quoth I, “neither can it be any way doubted of.” “Those things, then, which, when they differ, are not good and when they are one, become good, are they not made good by obtaining unity?” “So me think,” quoth I. “But dost thou grant that all that is good is good by partaking goodness?” “It is so.” “Thou must grant then likewise that unity and goodness are the same. For those things have the same substance, which naturally have not diverse effects.” “I cannot deny it,” quoth I. “Knowest thou then,” quoth she, “that everything that is doth so long remain and subsist as it is one, and perish e th and is dissolved so soon as it ceaseth to be one?” “How?” “As in living creatures,” quoth she, “so long as the body and soul remain united, the living creature remaineth. But when this unity is dissolved by their separation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is no longer a living creature The body also itself, so long as it remaineth in one form by the conjunction of the parts, appeareth the likeness of a man. But if the members of the body, being separated and sundered, have lost their unity, it is no longer the same. And in like maimer it will be manifest to him that will descend, to other particulars, that everything continueth so long as it is one, and perisheth when it loseth unity.” “Considering more particulars, I find it to be no otherwise.” “Is there anything,” quoth she, “that in the course of nature, leaving the desire of being, seeketh to come to destruction and corruption?” “If,” quoth I, “I consider living creatures which have any nature to will and nill, I find nothing that without extern compulsion forsake the intention to remain, and of their own accord hasten to destruction, For every living creature laboureth to preserve his health, and eseheweth death and detriment. But what I should think of herbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am altogether doubtful.” “

> Latin: Non quidquid Tagus aureis harenis
Donat aut Hermus rutilante ripa
Aut Indus calido propinquus orbi
Candidis miscens uirides lapillos,
Inlustrent aciem magisque caecos
In suas condunt animos tenebras.
Hoc quidquid placet excitatque mentes,
Infimis tellus aluit cauernis;
Splendor quo legitur uigetque caelum,
Vitat obscuras animae ruinas.
Hanc quisquis poterit notare lucem,
Candidos Phoebi radios negabit. “Adsentior,” inquam, “cuncta enim firmissimis nexa rationibus constant.” Tum illa, “Quanti,” inquit, “aestimabis, si bonum ipsum quid sit agnoueris?” “Infinita,” inquam, “si quidem mihi pariter deum quoque qui bonum est continget agnoscere.” “Atqui hoc uerissima,” inquit, “ratione patefaciam, maneant modo quae paulo ante conclusa sunt.” “Manebunt.” “Nonne,” inquit, “monstrauimus ea quae appetuntur pluribus idcirco uera perfectaque bona non esse quoniam a se inuicem discreparent cumque alteri abesset alterum, plenum absolutumque bonum afferre non posse? Tum autem uerum bonum fieri cum in unam ueluti formam atque efficientiam colliguntur, ut quae sufficientia est, eadem sit potentia, reuerentia, claritas atque iucunditas, nisi uero unum atque idem omnia sint, nihil habere quo inter expetenda numerentur?” “Demonstratum,” inquam “nec dubitari ullo modo potest.” “Quae igitur cum discrepant minime bona sunt, cum uero unum esse coeperint, bona fiunt; nonne haec ut bona sint, unitatis fieri adeptione contingit?” “Ita,” inquam, “uidetur.” “Sed omne quod bonum est boni participatione bonum esse concedis an minime?” “Ita est.” “Oportet igitur idem esse unum atque bonum simili ratione concedas; eadem namque substantia est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diuersus effectus.” “Negare,” inquam, “nequeo.” “Nostine igitur,” inquit, “omne quod est tam diu manere atque subsistere quam diu sit unum, sed interire atque dissolui pariter atque unum destiterit?” “Quonam modo?” “Vt in animalibus,” inquit, “cum in unum coeunt ac permanent anima corpusque, id animal uocatur; cum uero haec unitas utriusque separatione dissoluitur, interire nec iam esse animal liquet. Ipsum quoque corpus cum in una forma membrorum coniunctione permanet, humana uisitur species; at si distributae segregataeque partes corporis distraxerint unitatem, desinit esse quod fuerat. Eoque modo percurrenti cetera procul dubio patebit subsistere unumquodque, dum unum est, cum uero unum esse desinit, interire.”

[¶8] But there is no cause why thou shouldst doubt of this, if thou considerest first that herbs and trees glow in places agreeable to their nature, where, so much as their constitution permitteth, they cannot soon wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other upon lulls some in fenny, other in stony places, and the barren sands are fertile for some, which if thou wouldst transplant into other places they die. But nature giveth every one that which is fitting, and striveth to keep them from decaying so long as they can remain. What should I fell thee, if all of them, thrusting as it were their lips into the ground, draw nourishment by their roots, and convey substance and bark by the inward pith? What, that always the softest, as the pith, is placed within, and is covered without by the strength of the wood, and last of all the bark is exposed to the weather, as being best able to bear it off? And how great is the diligence of nature that all things may continue by the multiplication of seed; all which who knoweth not to be, as it were, certain engines, not only to remain for a time, but successively in a manner to endure for ever? Those things also which are thought to be without all life, doth not every one in like manner desire that which appertained! to their own good: For why doth levity lift up flames, or heaviness weigh down the earth, but because these places and motions are convenient for then.? And that which is agreeable to everything conserveth it, as that which is opposite causeth corruption. Likewise those things which are hard, as stones, stick most firmly to their parts, and make great resistance to any dissolution.

> Latin: “Consideranti,” inquam, “mihi plura minime aliud uidetur.” “Estne igitur,” inquit, “quod in quantum naturaliter agat relicta subsistendi appetentia uenire ad intentum corruptionemque desideret?” “Si animalia,” inquam, “considerem quae habent aliquam uolendi nolendique naturam, nihil inuenio quod nullis extra cogentibus abiciant manendi intentionem et ad interitum sponte festinent. Omne namque animal tueri salutem laborat, mortem uero perniciemque deuitat. Sed quid de herbis arboribusque, quid de inanimatis omnino consentiam rebus prorsus dubito.” “Atqui non est quod de hoc quoque possis ambigere, cum herbas atque arbores intuearis primum sibi conuenientibus innasci locis, ubi quantum earum natura queat cito exarescere atque interire non possint. Nam aliae quidem campis aliae montibus oriuntur, alias ferunt paludes, aliae saxis haerent, aliarum fecundae sunt steriles harenae, quas si in alia quispiam loca transferre conetur, arescant. Sed dat cuique natura quod conuenit et ne, dum manere possunt, intereant, elaborat. Quid quod omnes uelut in terras ore demerso trahunt alimenta radicibus ac per medullas robur corticemque diffundunt? Quid quod mollissimum quidque, sicuti medulla est, interiore semper sede reconditur, extra uero quadam ligni firmitate, ultimus autem cortex aduersum caeli intemperiem quasi mali patiens defensor opponitur? Iam uero quanta est naturae diligentia, ut cuncta semine multiplicat propagentur!

[¶9] And liquid things, as air and water, are indeed easily divided, but do easily also join again. And fire flieth all division. Neither do we now treat of the voluntary motions of the understanding soul, but only of natural operations. Of which sort is, to digest that which we have eaten, without thinking of it, to breathe in our sleep not thinking what we do. for even m living creatures the love of life proecedeth not from the will of the soul, but from the principles of nature. For the will many times emoraceth death upon urgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though nature doth always desire it. So true it is that this self-love proecedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from natural intention. For providence gave to her creatures this as the greatest cause of continuance, that they naturally desire to continue so long as they may, wherefore there is no cause why thou shouldst any way doubt that all things which are desire naturally stability of remaining, and eschew corruption.” “I confess,” quoth I, “that I now see undoubtedly that which before seemed very doubtful.” “Now that,” quoth she, “which desireth to continue and remain seeketh to have unity. For if this be taken away, being itself cannot remain.” “It is true,” quoth I, “All tilings then,” quoth she, “desire unity.” I granted it to be so. “But we have showed that unity is the same as goodness.” “You have indeed.” “All things then desire goodness, winch thou mayest define thus: Goodness is that which is desired of all things.” “There can be nothing imagined more true, for either all things have reference to no one principle and, being destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusion without any ruler: or if there be anything to which all things hasten, that must be the chiefest of all goods.” “I rejoice greatly O scholar,” quoth she, “for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very mark of verity. But in this thou hast discovered that which a little before thou saidest thou wert ignorant of.” “What is that?” quoth I. “What the end of all things is,” quoth she. “For certainly it is that which is desired of all things, which since we have concluded to be goodness, we must also confess that goodness is the end of all things.”

> Latin: Quae omnia non modo ad tempus manendi uerum generatim quoque quasi in perpetuum permanendi ueluti quasdam machinas esse quis nesciat? Ea etiam quae inanimata esse creduntur nonne quod suum est quaeque simili ratione desiderant? Cur enim flammas quidem sursum leuitas uenit, terras uero deorsum pondus deprimit, nisi quod haec singulis loca motionesque conueniunt? Porro autem quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque conseruat, sicuti ea quae sunt inimica corrumpunt. Iam uero quae dura sunt ut lapides, adhaerent tenacissime partibus suis et ne facile dissoluantur resistunt. Quae uero liquentia ut aer atque aqua, facile quidem diuidentibus cedunt, sed cito in ea rursus a quibus sunt abscisa relabuntur, ignis uero omnem refugit sectionem. Neque nunc nos de uoluntariis animae cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione tractamus, sicuti est quod acceptas escas sine cogitatione transigimus, quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes; nam ne in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animae uoluntatibus, uerum ex naturae principiis uenit. Nam saepe mortem cogentibus causis quam natura re-formidat uoluntas amplectitur, contraque illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas gignendi opus, quod natura semper appetit, interdum coercet uoluntas. Adeo haec sui caritas non ex animali motione sed ex naturali intentione procedit. Dedit enim prouidentia creatis a se rebus hanc uel maximam manendi causam ut quoad possunt naturaliter manere desiderent; quare nihil est quod ullo modo queas dubitare cuncta quae sunt appetere naturaliter constantiam permanendi, deuitare perniciem.” “Confiteor,” inquam, “nunc me indubitato cernere quae dudum incerta uidebantur.” “Quod autem,” inquit, “subsistere ac permanere petit, id unum esse desiderat; hoc enim sublato ne esse quidem cuiquam permanebit.” “Verum est,” inquam. “Omnia igitur,” inquit, “unum desiderant.” Consensi. “Sed unum id ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum.” “Ita quidem.”

[¶10] “He that would seek the truth with thoughts profound And would not stray in ways that are not right, He to himself must turn his inward sight, And guide his motions in a circled round, Teaching his mind that ever she design Herself in her own treasures to possess: So that which late lay hidden in cloudiness More bright and clear than Phoebus' beams shall shine. Flesh hath not quenched all the spirit's light, Though this oblivion's lump holds her opprest. Some seed of truth remaineth in our breast. Which skilful learning eas'ly doth excite. For being askt how can we answer true Unless that grace within our hearts did dwell? If Plato's heavenly muse the truth us tell, We learning things remember them anew. a ”

> Latin: “Cuncta igitur bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas licet i ipsum bonum esse quod desideretur ab omnibus.” “Nihil,” inquam, “uerius excogitari potest. Nam uel ad nihil unum cuncta referuntur et uno ueluti uertice destituta sine rectore fluitabunt, aut si quid est ad quod uniuersa festinent, id erit omnium summum bonorum.” Et illa: “Nimium,” inquit, “o alumne laetor, ipsam enim mediae ueritatis notam mente fixisti. Sed in hoc patuit tibi quod ignorare te paulo ante dicebas.” “Quid?” inquam. “Quis esset,” inquit, “rerum omnium finis. Is est enim profecto, quod desideratur ab omnibus, quod quia bonum esse collegimus, oportet rerum omnium finem bonum esse fateamur.”

[¶11] Then I said that I did very well like of Plato? doctrine, for thou dost bring these things to my remembrance now the second time, first, because I lost their memory by the contagion of my body, and after when I was oppressed with the burden of grief. “If,” quoth she, “thou reflectest upon that which heretofore hath been granted, thou wilt not be far from remembering that which in the beginning thou confessedst thyself to be ignorant of.” “What?” quoth I. “By what government,” quoth she, “the world is ruled,” “I remember,” quoth I, “that I did confess my ignorance, but though I foresee what thou wilt say, yet I desire to hear it more plainly from thyself.” “Thou thoughtest a little before that it was not to be doubted that this world is governed by God,” “Neither do I think now,” quoth I, “neither will I ever think, that it is to be doubted of, and I will briefly explicate the reasons which move me to think so. this world could never have been compacted of so many divers and contrary parts, unless there were One that doth.unite these so different things; and this disagreeing diversity of natures being united would separate and divide this concord, unless there were One that holdeth together that which He united. Neither would the course of nature continue so certain, nor would the different parts hold so well-ordered motions in due places, times, causality, spaces and qualities, unless there were One who, Himself remaining quiet. disposeth and ordereth this variety of motions. This, whatsoever it he, by which things created coutinue and arc moved, I call God, a name which all men use.” a “Since,” quoth she, “thou art of this mind, I think with little labour thou mayest be capable of felicity, and return to thy country in safety. But let us consider what we proposed. Have we not placed sufficiency in happiness, and granted that God is blessedness itself?” “Yes truly” “Wherefore,” quoth she, “He will need no outward helps to govern the world, otherwise, if He needed anything, e had not full sufficiency” “That,” quoth I, “must necessarily be so.” “Wherefore He disposeth all things by Himself.” “No doubt He doth,” quoth I. “But it hath been proved that God is goodness itself.” “I remember it very well,” quoth I. “Then He disposeth all things by goodness: since He governeth all things by Himself, whom we have granted to be goodness. And this is as it were the helm and rudder by which the frame of the world is kept steadfast and uncorrupted.” “I most willingly agree,” quoth I, “and I foresaw a little before, though only with a slender guess, that thou wouldst conclude this.” “I believe thee,” quoth she, “for now I suppose thou lookest more watchfully about thee to discern the truth. But that which I shall say is no less manifest.” “What?” quoth I, “Since that God is deservedly thought to govern all things with the helm of goodness, and all these things likewise, as I have showed, hasten to goodness with their natural contention, can there be any doubt made but that they are governed willingly, and that they frame themselves of their own accord to their disposer's heck, as agreeable and conformable to their ruler?” “It must needs be so,” quoth I, “neither would it seem an happy government, if it were an imposed yoke, not a desired health.” “There is nothing then which, following nature, endeavoureth to resist God.” “Nothing,” quoth I. “What if anything doth endeavour,” quoth she, “can anything prevail against Him, whom we have granted to be most powerful by reason of His blessedness?” “No doubt,” quoth I, “nothing could prevail.” “Wherefore there is nothing which either will or can resist this sovereign goodness.” “I think not,” quoth I. “It is then the sovereign goodness which governeth all things strongly, and disposeth them sweetly.” “How much,” quoth I, “doth not only the reason which thou allegest, but much more the very words which thou usest, delight me, that folly which so much vexed me may at length be ashamed of herself.” “Thou hast heard in the poets' fables,” quoth she, “how the giants provoked heaven, but this benign fortitude put them also down, as they deserved. But wilt thou have our arguments contend together r Perhaps by this clash there will fly out some beautiful spark of truth.” “As it pleaseth thee,” quoth I. “No man can doubt,” quoth she, “but that God is almighty.” “No man,” quoth I, “that is well in bis wits.” “But,” quoth she, “there is nothing that He who is almighty cannot do.” “Nothing,” quoth I. “Can God do evil?” “No,” quoth I. “Wherefore,” quoth she, “evil is nothing, since He cannot do it who can do anything.” “Dost thou mock me,” quoth I, “making with thy reasons an inextricable labyrinth, because thou dost now go in where thou meanest to go out again, and after go out, where thou earnest in, or dost thou frame a wonderful circle of the simplicity of God? For a little before taking thy beginning from blessedness, thou affirmedst that to be the chiefest good which thou saidst was placed in God, and likewise thou provedst, that God Himself is the chiefest good and full happiness, out of which thou madest me a present of that inference, that no man shall be happy unless he be also a God. Again thou toldest me that the form of goodness is the substance of God and of blessedness, and that unity is the same with goodness, because it is desired by the nature of all things; thou didst also dispute that God governeth the whole world with the helm of goodness, and that all things obey willingly, and that there is no nature of evil, and thou didst explicate all these things with no foreign or far-fetched proofs, but with those which were proper and drawn from inward principles, the one confirming the other.” “We neither play nor mock,” quoth she, “and we have finished the greatest matter that can be by the assistance of God, whose aid we implored in the beginning. For such is the form of the Divine substance that it is neither divided into Outward things, nor receiveth any such into itself, but as Parmenides saith of it: In body like a sphere well-rounded on all sides, a it doth roll about the moving orb of things, while it keepeth itself immovable. And if we have used no far-fetched reasons, but such as were placed within the compass of the matter we handled, thou hast no cause to marvel, since thou hast learned in Plato s school that our speeches must be like and as it were akin to the things we speak of.”

> Latin: Quisquis profunda mente uestigat uerum
Cupitque nullis ille deuiis falli,
In se reuoluat intimi lucem uisus
Longosque in orbem cogat inflectens motus
Animumque doceat quidquid extra molitur
Suis retrusum possidere thesauris.
Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes
Lucebit ipso perspieacius Phoebo.
Non omne namque mente depulit lumen
Obliuiosam corpus inuehens. molem.
Haeret profecto semen introrsum ueri
Quod excitatur uentilante doctrina.
Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
Ni mersus alto uiueret fomes corde?
Quod si Platonis Musa personat uerum,
Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur. Tum ego: “Platoni,” inquam, “uehementer assentior, nam me horum iam secundo commemoras, primum quod memoriam corporea contagione, dehinc cum maeroris mole pressus amisi.” Tum illa: “Si priora,” inquit, “concessa respicias, ne illud quidem longius aberit quin recorderis quod te dudum nescire confessus es.” “Quid?” inquam. “Quibus,” ait illa, “gubernaculis mundus regatur.” “Memini,” inquam, “me inscitiam meam fuisse confessum, sed quid afferas, licet iam prospiciam, planius tamen ex te audire desidero.” “Mundum,” inquit, “hunc deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas.” “Ne nunc quidem arbitror,” inquam, “nec umquam dubitandum putabo quibusque in hoc rationibus accedam breuiter exponam. Mundus hic ex tam diuersis contrariisque partibus in unam formam minime conuenisset, nisi unus esset qui tam diuersa coniungeret. Coniuncta uero naturarum ipsa diuersitas inuicem discors dissociaret atque diuelleret, nisi unus esset qui quod nexuit contineret. Non tam uero certus naturae ordo procederet nec tam dispositos motus locis, temporibus, efficientia, spatiis, qualitatibus explicarent, nisi unus esset qui has mutationum uarietates manens ipse disponeret. Hoc quidquid est quo condita manent atque agitantur, usitato cunctis uocabulo deum nomino.” Tum illa: “Cum haec,” inquit, “ita sentias, paruam mihi restare operam puto ut felicitatis compos patriam sospes reuisas. Sed quae proposuimus intueamur. Nonne in beatitudine sufficientiam numerauimus deumque beatitudinem ipsam esse consensimus?” “Ita quidem.” “Et ad mundum igitur” inquit, “regendum nullis extrinsecus adminiculis indigebit; alioquin si quo egeat, plenam sufficientiam non habebit.” “Id,” inquam, “ita est necessarium.” “Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit.” “Negari,” inquam, “nequit.” “Atqui deus ipsum bonum esse monstratus est.” “Memini,” inquam. “Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit, si quidem per se regit omnia quem bonum esse consensimus et hic est ueluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum quo mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur.” “Vehementer assentior,” inquam, “et id te paulo ante dicturam tenui licet suspicione prospexi.” “Credo;” inquit, “iam enim ut arbitror uigilantius ad cernenda uera oculos deducis. Sed quod dicam non minus ad contuendum patet.” “Quid?” inquam. “Cum deus,” inquit, “omnia bonitatis clauo gubernare iure credatur eademque omnia sicuti docui ad bonum naturali intentione festinent, num dubitari potest quin uoluntaria regantur seque ad disponentis nutum ueluti conuenientia contemperataque rectori sponte conuertant?” “Ita,” inquam, “necesse est; nec beatum regimen esse uideretur, si quidem detrectantium iugum foret, non obtemperantium salus.” “Nihil est igitur quod naturam seruans deo contrahe conetur.” “Nihil,” inquam. “Quod si conetur,” ait, “num tandem proficiet quidquam, aduersus eum quem iure beatitudinis potentissimum esse concessimus?” “Prorsus,” inquam, “nihil ualeret.” “Non est igitur aliquid quod summo huic bono uel uelit uel possit obsistere.” “Non,” inquam, “arbitror.” “Est igitur summum, inquit, bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter suauiterque disponit.” Tum ego: “Quam,” inquam, “me non modo ea quae conclusa est summa rationum, uerum multo magis haec ipsa quibus uteris uerba delectant, ut tandem aliquando stultitiam magna lacerantem sui pudeat.” “Accepisti, inquit, ‘in fabulis lacessentes caelum Gigantas; sed illos quoque, uti condignum fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit. Sed uisne rationes ipsas inuicem collidamus? Forsitan ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulchra quaedam ueritatis scintilla dissiliat.’ ‘Tuo,’ inquam, ‘arbitratu.’ ‘Deum,’ inquit, ‘esse omnium potentem nemo dubitauerit.’ ‘Qui quidem, inquam, “mente consistat, nullus prorsus ambigat.” “Qui uero est,” inquit, “omnium potens, nihil est quod ille non possit.” “Nihil,” inquam. “Num igitur deus facere malum potest?” “Minime,” inquam.’ Malum igitur,” inquit, “nihil est, cum id facere ille non possit, qui nihil non potest.” “Ludisne,” inquam, “me inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens, quae nunc quidem qua egrediaris introeas, nunc uero quo introieris egrediare, an mirabilem quendam diuinae simplicitatis orbem complicas? Etenim paulo ante beatitudine incipiens eam summum bonum esse dicebas quam in summo deo sitam loquebare. Ipsum quoque deum summum esse bonum plenamque beatitudinem disserebas; ex quo neminem beatum fore nisi qui pariter deus esset quasi munusculum dabas. Rursus ipsam boni formam dei ac beatitudinis loquebaris esse substantiam ipsumque unum id ipsum esse bonum docebas quod ab omni rerum natura peteretur. Deum quoque bonitatis gubernaculis uniuersitatem regere disputabas uolentiaque cuncta parere nec ullam mali esse naturam. Atque haec nullis extrinsecus sumptis sed ex altero altero fidem trahente insitis domesticisque probationibus explicabas.” Tum illa: “Minime,” inquit, “ludimus remque omnium maximam dei munere quem dudum deprecabantur exegimus.

[¶12] “Happy is be that can behold The well-spring whence all good doth rise, Happy is he that can unfold The bands with which the earth him ties. The Thracian poet whose sweet song Performed his wife s sad obsequies, And forced the woods to run along When he his mournful tunes did play, Whose powerful music was so strong That it could make the rivers stay; The fearful binds not daunted were, But with the lions took their way, Nor did the hare behold with fear The dog whom these sweet notes appease. When force of grief drew yet more near, And on his heart did burning seize, Nor tunes which all in quiet bound Could any jot their master ease, The gods above too hard he found, And Pluto's palace visiting. He mixed sweet verses with the sound Of bis loud harp's delightful string, All that he drank with thirsty draught From his high mother s chiefest spring, All that his restless grief him taught, And love which gives grief double aid, With this even hell itself was caught, Whither he went, and pardon prayed for his dear spouse (unheard request). The three-head porter was dismayed, Ravished with his unwonted guest, The Furies, which in tortures keep The guilty souls with pains opprest, Moved with his song began to weep. Ixion's wheel now standing still Turns not his head with motions steep. Though Tantalus might drink at will, To quench his thirst lie would forbear, The vulture full with music shrill Doth not poor Tityus' liver tear. 'We by his verses conquered are,' Saith the great King whom spirits fear. 'Let us not then from him debar His wife whom he with songs doth gain, Yet lest our gift should stretch too far, We will it with this law restrain, That when from hell he takes his flight, He shall from looking back refrain.' Who can for lovers laws indite? Love hath no law but her own will. Orpheus, seeing on the verge of night Eurydice, doth lose and kill Her and himself with foolish love. But you this feigned tale fulfil, Who think unto the day above To bring with speed your darksome mind. For if, your eye conquered, you move Backward to Pluto left behind, All the rich prey which thence you took, You lose while back to hell you look.”

> Latin: Ea est enim diuinae forma substantiae ut neque in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut de ea Parmenides ait: πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ rerum orbem mobilem rotat, dum se immobilem ipsa conseruat. Quod si rationes quoque non extra petitas sed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitum collocatas agitauimus, nihil est quod admirere, cum Pia tone sanciente didiceris cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones.”
Felix qui potuit boni
Fontem uisere lucidum,
Felix qui potuit grauis
Terrae soluere uincula.
Quondam funera coniugis
Vates Threicius gemens
Postquam flebilibus modis
Siluas currere mobiles.
Amnes stare coegerat,
Iunxitque intrepidum latus
Saeuis cerua leonibus,
Nec uisum timuit lepus
Iam cantu placidum canem,
Cum flagrantior intima
Feruor pectoris ureret,
Nec qui cuncta subegerant
Mulcerent dominum modi,
Inmites superos querens
Infernas adiit domos.
Illic blanda sonantibus
Chordis carmina temperans
Quidquid praecipuis deae
Matris fontibus hauserat,
Quod luctus dabat impotens,
Quod luctum geminans amor,
Deflet Taenara commouens
Et dulci ueniam prece
Vmbrarum dominos rogat.
Stupet tergeminus nouo
Captus carmine ianitor,
Quae sontes agitant metu
Ultrices scelerum deae
Iam maestae lacrimis madent.
Non Ixionium caput
Velox praecipitat rota
Et longa site perditus
Spernit numina Tantalus.
Vultur dum satur est modis,
Non traxit Tityi iecur.
Tandem, 'Vincimur,' arbiter
Vmbrarum miserans ait, '
Donamus comitem uiro
Emptam carmine coniugem,
Sed lex dona coerceat,
Ne, dum Tartara liquerit,
Fas sit lumina flectere.
Quis legem det amantibus?
Maior lex amor est sibi.
Heu, noctis prope terminos
Orpheus Eurydicen suam
Vidit, perdidit, occidit.
Vos haec fabula respicit
Quicumque in superum diem
Mentem ducere quaeritis.
Nam qui Tartareum in specus
Victus lumina flexerit,
Quidquid praecipuum trahit
Perdit, dum uidet inferos.

## 7. Book IV · section 4 · 4

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/7/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/7/#p-N

[¶0] When Philosophy had sung these verses with s soil and sweet voice, observing due dignity and gravity in her countenance and gesture, I, not having altogether forgotten my inward grief, interrupted her speech which she was about to continue, and said: “O thou who bringest us to see true light, those things which hitherto thou hast treated of have manifestly appeared both to be divine when contemplated apart, and invincible when supported by thy reasons, and what thou hast uttered, though the force of grief had made me forget it of late, yet heretofore I was not altogether ignorant of it. But this is the chiefest cause of my sorrow, that since the governor of all things is so good, there can either be any evil at all, or that it pass unpunished. Which alone I beseech thee consider, how much admiration it deserveth. But there is another greater than this; for wickedness bearing rule and sway, virtue is not only without reward, but lieth also trodden under the wicked's feet, and is punished instead of vice. That which things should be done in the kingdom of God, who knoweth all things, can do all things, but will do only that which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor complain.” To which she answered: “It were indeed infinitely strange, and surpassing all monsters, if, as thou conecivest, in the best-ordered house of so great an householder the vilest vessels were made account of and the precious neglected; but it is not so. For if those things which were a little before concluded be kept unviolated, thou shalt by His help, of whose kingdom we speak, know that the good are always powerful, and the evil always abject and weak, and that vices are never without punishment, nor virtue without reward, and that the good are always prosperous, and the evil unfortunate, and many things of that sort, which will take away all cause of complaint, and give thee firm and solid strength. And since by my means thou hast already seen the form of true blessedness, and known where it is placed, running over all those things which I think necessary to rehearse, 1 will show thee the way which will carry thee home. And I will also fasten wings upon thy mind, with which she may rouse herself, that, all perturbation being driven away, thou mayest return safely into thy country by my direction, by my path, and with my wings.”

> Latin: HAEC cum Philosophia dignitate uultus et oris grauitate seruata leniter similiterque cecinisset, tum ego nondum penitus insiti maeroris oblitus intentionem dicere adhuc aliquid parantis abrupi. Et: “O,” inquam, “ueri praeuia luminis quae usque adhuc tua fudit oratio, cum sui speculatione diuina tum tuis rationibus inuicta patuerunt, eaque mihi etsi ob iniuriae dolorem nuper oblita non tamen antehac prorsus ignorata dixisti. Sed ea ipsa est uel maxima nostri causa maeroris, quod, cum rerum bonus rector exsistat, uel esse omnino mala possint uel impunita praetereant; quod solum quanta dignum sit admiratione profecto consideras. At huic aliud maius adiungitur. Nam imperante florenteque nequitia uirtus non solum praemiis caret, uerum etiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur et in locum facinorum supplicia luit. Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis omnia sed bona tantummodo uolentis dei nemo satis potest nec admirari nec conqueri.” Tum illa: “Et esset,” inquit, “infinita stuporis omnibusque horribilius monstris, si, uti tu aestimas, in tanti uelut patrisfamilias dispositissima domo uilia uasa colerentur, pretiosa sordescerent. Sed non ita est. Nam si ea quae paulo ante conclusa sunt inconuulsa seruantur, ipso de cuius nunc regno loquimur auctore cognosces semper quidem potentes esse bonos, malos uero abiectos semper atque inbecillos nec sine poena umquam esse uitia nec sine praemio uirtutes, bonis felicia, malis semper infortunata confingere multaque id genus quae sopitis querelis firma te soliditate corroborent. Et quoniam uerae formam beatitudinis me dudum monstrante uidisti, quo etiam sita sit agnouisti, decursis omnibus quae praemittere necessarium puto, uiam tibi quae te domum reuehat ostendam. Pennas etiam tuae menti quibus se in altum tollere possit adfigam, ut perturbatione depulsa sospes in patriam meo ductu, mea semita, meis etiam uehiculis reuertaris.”

[¶1] “For I have swift and nimble wings which will ascend the lofty skies, With which when thy quick mind is clad, it will the loathéd earth despise, And go beyond the airy globe, and watery clouds behind thee leave, Passing the tire which scorching heat doth from the heavens swift course receive, Until it reach the starry house, and get to tread bright Phoebus' ways, Following the chilly sire's path, a companion of his flashing, lays, And trace the circle of the stars which in the night to us appeal, And having staged there long enough go on beyond the farthest sphere, Sitting upon the highest orb partaker of the glorious light, Where the great King his sceptre holds, and the world's reins doth guide aright, And, firm in his swift chariot, doth everything in order set. Unto this seat when thou art brought, thy country, which thou didst forget, Thou then wilt challenge to thyself, saying: 'This is the glorious land Where I was born, and in this soil my feet for evermore shall stand. Whence if thou pleasest to behold the earthly night which thou hast left, Those tyrants which the people fear will seem of their true home bereft.' ”

> Latin: Sunt etenim pennae uolucres mihi
Quae celsa conscendant poli.
Quas sibi cum uelox mens induit,
Terras perosa despicit,
Aeris inmensi superat globum,
Nubesque postergum uidet,
Quique agili motu calet aetheris,
Transcendit ignis uerticem,
Donec in astriferas surgat domos
Phoeboque coniungat uias
Aut comitetur iter gelidi senis
Miles corusci sideris,
Vel quocumque micans nox pingitur,
Recurrat astri circulum
Atque ubi iam exhausti fuerit satis,
Polum relinquat extimum
Dorsaque uelocis premat aetheris
Compos uerendi luminis.
Hic regum sceptrum dominus tenet
Orbisque habenas temperat
Et uolucrem currum stabilis regit
Rerum coruscus arbiter.
Huc te si reducem referat uia,
Quam nunc requiris immemor:
' Haec,' dices, ' memini, patria est mihi,
Hinc ortus, hic sistam gradum.'
Quod si terrarum placeat tibi
Noctem relictam uisere,
Quos miseri toruos populi timent
Cernes tyrannos exules. Tum ego: “Papae,” inquam, “ut magna promittis! Nec dubito quin possis efficere;

[¶2] a “Oh!” quoth I. “How great things dost thou promise! And I doubt not but thou canst perform them, wherefore stay me not now that thou hast stirred up my desires.” “First then,” quoth she, “

> Latin: tu modo quem excitaueris ne moreris.” “Primum igitur,” inquit, “ bonis semper adesse potentiam, malos cunctis uiribus esse desertos agnoscas licebit, quorum quidem alterum demonstratur ex altero.

[¶3] that good men are always powerful, and evil men of no strength, thou mayest easily know, the one is proved by the other. For since that good and evil are contraries, if it be convinced that goodness is potent, the weakness or evil will be also manifest; and contrariwise if we discern the frailty of evil, we must needs acknowledge the firmness of goodness. But that our opinions may be more certainly embraced, I will take both ways, confirming my propositions, sometime from one part, sometime from another.

> Latin: Nam cum bonum malumque contraria sint, si bonum potens esse constiterit, liquet inbecillitas mali; at si fragilitas clarescat mali, boni firmitas nota est. Sed uti nostrae sententiae fides abundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam nunc hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans. Duo sunt quibus omnis humanorum actuum constat effectus, uoluntas scilicet ac potestas, quorum si alterutrum desit, nihil est quod explicari queat.

[¶4] There be two things by which all human actions are effected, will and power, of which ii either lie wanting, there can nothing be performed. For if there want will, no man taketh anything in hand against his will, and if there be not power, the will is in vain So that if thou seest any willing to obtain that winch he doth not obtain, thou canst not doubt but. that he wanted power to obtain what he would.” “It is manifest,” quoth I, “and can by no means be denied.” “And wilt thou doubt that he could, whom thou seest bring to pass what he desired?” “No.” “But every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that which he cannot do.” “I confess it,” quoth I. “Dost thou remember then,” quoth she, “that it was inferred by our former discourses that all the intentions of man's will doth hasten to happiness, though their courses be divers?” “I remember.” quoth I. “that that also was proved.” “Dost thou also call to mind that blessedness is goodness itself, and consequently when blessedness is sought after, goodness must of course be desired?” “I call it not to mind, for I have it already fixed in my memory.” “Wherefore all men both good and bad without difference of intentions endeavour to obtain goodness.” “It followeth,” quoth I. “But it is certain that men are made good by the obtaining of goodness.” “It is so.” “Wherefore good men obtain what they desire.” “So it seemeth.” “And if evil men did obtain the goodness they desire, they could not be evil.” “It is true.” “Wherefore since they both desire goodness, but the one obtaineth it and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men arc powerful, and the evil weak.” “Whosoever doubteth of this,” quoth I, “he neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy reasons.” “Again,” quoth she, “if there be two to whom the same thing is proposed according to nature, and the one of them bringeth it perfectly to pass with his natural function, but the other cannot exercise that natural function but after another manner than is agreeable to nature, and doth not perform that which he had proposed, but imitateth the other who performeth it: which of these two wilt thou judge to be more powerful?” “Though I conjecture.” quoth I, “at thy meaning, yet I desire to hear it more plainly.” “Wilt thou deny,” quoth she, “that the motion of walking is agreeable to the nature of men?” “No,” quoth I. “And makest thou any doubt that the function of it doth naturally belong to the feet?” “There is no doubt of this neither,” quoth I. “Wherefore if one that can go upon his feet doth walk, and another who hath not this natural function of his feet endeavoureth to walk by creeping upon his hands, which of these two is deservedly to be esteemed the stronger?” “Infer the rest,” quoth I, “for no man doubteth but that lie which can use that natural function is stronger than lie which cannot.” “But,” quoth she, “the good seek to obtain the chiefest good, which is equally proposed to bad and good, by the natural function of virtues, but the evil endeavour to obtain the same by divers concupiscences, which are not the natural function of obtaining goodness. Thinkest thou otherwise?” “No,” quoth I, “for it is manifest what followeth. For by the force of that which I have already granted, it is necessary that good men are powerful and evil man weak.” “Thou runnest before rightly,” quoth she, “

> Latin: Deficiente etenim uoluntate ne aggreditur quidem quisque quod non uult; at si potestas absit, uoluntas frustra sit. Quo fit ut si quem uideas adipisci uelle quod minime adipiscatur, huic obtinendi quod uoluerit defuisse ualentiam dubitare non possis.” “Perspicuum est,” inquam, “nec ullo modo negari potest.” “Quem uero effecisse quod uoluerit uideas, num etiam potuisse dubitabis?” “Minime.” “Quod uero quisque potest, in eo ualidus, quod uero non potest, in hoc imbecillis esse censendus est.” “Fateor,” inquam. “Meministine igitur,” inquit, “superioribus rationibus esse collectum intentionem omnem uoluntatis humanae quae diuersis studiis agitur ad beatitudinem festinare?” “Memini,” inquam, “illud quoque esse demonstratum.” “Num recordaris beatitudinem ipsum esse bonum eoque modo, cum beatitudo petitur, ab omnibus desiderari bonum?” “Minime,” inquam, “recordor, quoniam id memoriae fixum teneo.” “Omnes igitur homines boni pariter ac mali indiscreta intentione ad bonum peruenire nituntur?” “Ita,” inquam, “consequens est.” “Sed certum est adeptione boni bonos fieri.” “Certum.” “Adipiscuntur igitur boni quod appetunt?” “Sic uidetur.” “Mali uero si adipiscerentur quod appetunt bonum, mali esse non possent.” “Ita est.” “Cum igitur utrique bonum petant, sed hi quidem adipiscantur, illi uero minime, num dubium est bonos quidem potentes esse, qui uero mali sunt imbecillos?” “Quisquis,” inquam, “dubitat, nec rerum naturam nec consequentiam potest considerare rationum.” “Rursus,” inquit, “si duo sint quibus idem secundum naturam propositum sit eorumque unus naturali officio id ipsum agat atque perficiat, alter uero naturale illud officium minime administrare queat, alio uero modo quam naturae conuenit non quidem impleat propositum suum sed imitetur implentem, quemnam horum ualentiorem esse decernis?” “Etsi coniecto,” inquam, “quid uelis, planius tamen audire desidero.” “Ambulandi,” inquit, “motum secundum naturam esse hominibus num negabis?” “Minime,” inquam. “Eiusque rei pedum officium esse naturale num dubitas?” “Ne hoc quidem,” inquam. “Si quis igitur pedibus incedere ualens ambulet aliusque cui hoc naturale pedum desit officium, manibus nitens ambulare conetur, quis horum iure ualentior existimari potest?” “Contexe,” inquam, “cetera; nam quin naturalis officii potens eo qui idem nequeat ualentior sit, nullus ambigat.” “Sed summum bonum, quod aeque malis bonisque propositum, boni quidem naturali officio uirtutum petunt, mali uero uariam per cupiditatem, quod adipiscendi boni naturale officium non est, idem ipsum conantur adipisci. An tu aliter existimas?” “Minime,” inquam, “nam etiam quod est consequens patet. Ex his enim quae concesserim, bonos quidem potentes, malos uero esse necesse est imbecillos.”

[¶5] and it is (as physicians are wont to hope) a token of an erected and resisting nature. Wherefore, since I see thee most apt and willing to comprehend, I will therefore heap up many reasons together. For consider the great weakness of vicious men, who cannot come so far as their natural intention leadeth and almost compelleth them. And what if they were destitute of this so great and almost invincible help of the direction of nature? Ponder likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or trifling rewards a which they desire, and cannot obtain: but they fail in the very sum and top of things: neither can the poor wretches compass that which they only labour for nights and days: in which thing the forces of the good eminently appear. For as thou wouldst judge him to be most able to walk who going on foot could come as far as there were any place to go in: so must thou of force judge him most powerful who obtaineth the end of all that can be desired, beyond which there is nothing. Hence that which is opposite also followeth, that the same men are wicked and destitute of all forces. For why do they follow vices, forsaking virtues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more devoid of strength than blind ignorance? Or do they know what they should embrace, but passion driveth them headlong the. contrary way? So also intemperance makes them trail, since they cannot strive against vice. Or do they wittingly and willingly forsake goodness, and decline to vices? But in this sort they leave not only to be powerful, but even to be at all. For they which leave the common end of all things which are, leave also being. Which may perhaps seem strange to some, that we should say that evil men are not at all, who are the greatest part of men: but yet it is so. for I deny not that evil men are evil, but withal I say that purely and simply they are not.

> Latin: “Recte,” inquit, “ praecurris idque, uti medici sperare solent, indicium est erectae iam resistentisque naturae. Sed quoniam te ad intellegendum promptissimum esse conspicio, crebras coaceruabo rationes. Vide enim quanta uitiosorum hominum pateat infirmitas qui ne ad hoc quidem peruenire queunt ad quod eos naturalis ducit ac paene compelli intentio. Et quid si hoc tam magno ac paene inuicto praeeuntis naturae desererentur auxilio? Considera uero quanta sceleratos homines habeat impotentia. Neque enim leuia aut ludicra praemia petunt, quae consequi atque obtinere non possunt, sed circa ipsam rerum summam uerticemque deficiunt nec in eo miseris contingit effectus quod solum dies noctesque moliuntur; in qua re bonorum uires eminent. Sicut enim eum qui pedibus incedens ad eum locum usque peruenire potuisset, quo nihil ulterius peruium iaceret incessui, ambulandi poten- tissimum esse censeres, ita eum qui expetendorum finem quo nihil ultra est apprehendit, potentissimum necesse est iudices. Ex quo fit quod huic obiacet, ut idem scelesti, idem uiribus omnibus uideantur esse deserti. Cur enim relicta uirtute uitia sectantur? Inscitiane bonorum? Sed quid eneruatius ignorantiae caecitate? An sectanda nouerunt? Sed transuersos eos libido praecipitat. Sic quoque intemperantia fragiles qui obluctari uitio nequeunt. An scientes uolentesque bonum deserunt, ad uitia deflectunt? Sed hoc modo non solum potentes esse sed omnino esse desinunt. Nam qui communem omnium quae sunt finem relinquunt, pariter quoque esse desistunt.

[¶6] For as thou mayest call a carcase a dead man, but not simply a man, so I confess that the vicious are evil, but I cannot grant that they are absolutely, for that is which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but that which faileth from this leaveth also to be that which is in his own nature. Put thou wilt say that evil men can do many things, neither will 1 deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces but from weakness. For they can do evil, which they could not do if they could have remained in the performance of that which is good. Which possibility declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if, as we concluded a little before, evil is nothing, since they can only do evil, if is manifest that the wicked can do nothing.” “It is most manifest.” “And that thou mayest understand what the force of this power is; we determined a little before that there is nothing more powerful than the Sovereign Goodness.” “It is true:,” quoth I. “But He cannot do evil.” “No.” “Is there any then,” quoth she, “that think that men can do all things?” “No man, except he be mad, thinketh so.” “But yet men can do evil.” “I would to God they could not,” quoth I. “Since therefore he that can only do good, can do all things, and they who can do evil, cannot do all things, it is manifest that they which can do evil are less potent. Moreover, we have proved that all power is to be accounted among those things which are to be wished for, and that all such things have reference to goodness, as to the very height of their nature. Hut the possibility of committing wickedness cannot have reference to goodness. Wherefore it is not to be wished for. Yet all power is to be wished for; and consequently it is manifest, possibility of evil is no power. By all which the power of the good and the undoubted infirmity of evil appeareth. And it is manifest that the sentence of Plato is true: that only wise men can do that which they desire, and that the wicked men practise indeed what they list, but cannot perform what they would. For they do what they list, thinking to obtain the good which they desire by those things which cause them delight; but they obtain it not, because shameful action cannot arrive to happiness.” a

> Latin: Quod quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominum sunt, eosdem non esse dicamus; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mali sunt eos malos esse non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque simpliciter nego. Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, simpliciter uero hominem appellare non possis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim, sed esse absolute nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet seruatque naturam; quod uero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sua natura situm est derelinquit. 'Sed possunt,' inquies, 'mali.' Ne ego quidem negauerim, sed haec eorum potentia non a uiribus sed ab imbecillitate descendit. Possunt enim mala quae minime ualerent, si in bonorum efficientia manere potuissent. Quae possibilitas eos euidentius nihil posse demonstrat. Nam si, uti paulo ante collegimus, malum nihil est, cum mala tantummodo possint, nihil posse improbos liquet.” “Perspicuum est.” “Atque ut intellegas quaenam sit huius potentiae uis, summo bono nihil potentius esse paulo ante definiuimus.” “Ita est,” inquam. “Sed idem,” inquit, “facere malum nequit.” “Minime.” “Est igitur,” inquit, “aliquis qui omnia posse homines putet?” “Nisi quis insaniat, nemo.” “Atqui idem possunt mala.” “Vtinam quidem,” inquam, “non possent.” “Cum igitur bonorum tantummodo potens possit omnia, non uero queant omnia potentes etiam malorum, eosdem qui mala possunt minus posse manifestum est. Huc accedit quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam omniaque expetenda referri ad bonum uelut ad quoddam naturae suae cacumen ostendimus. Sed patrandi sceleris possibilitas referri ad bonum non potest; expetenda igitur non est. Atqui omnis potentia expetenda est; liquet igitur malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet infirmitas ueramque illam Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod desiderent facere posse sapientes, improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desiderent explere non posse.

[¶7] “The kings whom we behold In highest glory placed And with rich purple graced, Compassed with soldiers bold; Whose countenance shows fierce threats, Who with rash fury chide, If any strip the pride From their vainglorious feats; He'll see them close oppressed Within by galling chains. For filthy lust there reigns And poisoneth their breast, Wrath often them perplexeth Raising their minds like waves, Sorrow their power enslaves And sliding hope them vexeth. So many tyrants still Dwelling in one pool heart, Except they first depart She cannot have her will.”

> Latin: Faciunt enim quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id bonum quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt.”
Quos uides sedere celsos solii culmine reges
Purpura claros nitente saeptos tristibus armis
Ore toruo comminantes rabie cordis anhelos,
Detrahat si quis superbis uani tegmina cultus,
Iam uidebit intus artas dominos ferre catenas.

[¶8] Seest thou then in what mire wickedness wallows, and how clearly honesty shineth? By which it is manifest that the good are never without rewards, nor the evil without punishments. For in all things that are done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he runneth is proposed as a reward. But we have showed that blessedness is the selfsame goodness for which all things are done. Wherefore this goodness is proposed as a common reward for all human actions, and this cannot be separated from those who are good. For lie shall not rightly be any longer called good, who wanteth goodness; wherefore virtuous manners are not left without their due rewards. And how much so ever the evil do rage, yet the wise man s crown will not fade nor wither. For others wickedness depriveth not virtuous minds of their proper glory. But if he should rejoice at anything which he hath from others, either he who gave it, or any other might take it away. But because every man s virtue is the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward when he leaveth to be virtuous. Lastly, since every reward is therefore desired because it is thought to be good, who can judge him to be devoid of reward, which hath goodness for his possession? But what reward hath he? The most beautiful and the greatest that can be. For remember that corollarium a which I presented thee with a little before, as with a rare and precious jewel, and infer thus: Since that goodness itself is happiness, it is manifest that all good men even by being good are made happy. But we agreed that happy men are gods. Wherefore the reward of good men, which no time can waste, no man's power diminish, no man's wickedness obscure, is to become gods. Which things being so, no wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punishment of the evil. For since goodness and evil, punishment and reward, are opposite the one to the other, those things which we see fall out in the reward of goodness must needs be answerable in a contrary manner in the punishment of evil. Wherefore as to honest men honesty itself is a reward, so to the wicked their very wickedness is a punishment. And he that is punished doubteth not but that he is afflicted with the evil. Wherefore if they would truly consider their own estate, can they think themselves free from punishment, whom wickedness, the worst of all evils, doth not only touch but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment which accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the virtuous. For thou learnedst not long before that whatsoever is at all is one, and that unity is goodness, by which it followeth that whatsoever is must alsobe good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth from goodness ceaseth to be, by which it followeth that e vii men leave to be that which they were, but the shape of men, which they still retain, showeth them to have been men: wherefore by embracing wickedness they have lost the nature of men. But since virtue alone can exalt us above men, wickedness must needs east those under the desert of men, which it hath bereaved of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extorter of other men s goods carried away with his covetous desire? Thou mayest liken him to a wolf. Is the angry and unquiet man always contending and brawling? Thou mayest compare him to a dog. Doth the treacherous fellow rejoice that he hath deceived others with his hidden frauds? Let him be accounted no better than a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let him be thought to have a lion s mind. Is the fearful and timorous afraid without cause? Let him be esteemed like to hares and deer. Is the slow and stupid always idle? He liveth an ass's life. Doth the light and unconstant change his courses? He is nothing different from the birds. Is he drowned in filthy and unclean lusts? He is entangled in the pleasure of a stinking sow. So that he who, leaving virtue, ceaseth to be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the divine condition, is turned into a beast.

> Latin: Hinc enim libido uersat auidis corda uenenis.
Hinc flagellat ira mentem fluctus turbida tollens
Maeror aut captos fatigat aut spes lubrica torquet
Ergo cum caput tot unum cernas ferre tyrannos,
Non facit quod optat ipse dominis pressus iniquis. Videsne igitur quanto in caeno probra uoluantur, qua probitas luce resplendeat? In quo perspicuum est numquam bonis praemia numquam sua sceleribus deesse supplicia. Rerum etenim quae geruntur illud propter quod unaquaeque res geritur, eiusdem rei praemium esse non iniuria uideri potest, uti currendi in stadio propter quam curritur iacet praemium corona. Sed beatitudinem esse idem ipsum bonum propter quod omnia geruntur ostendimus. Est igitur humanis actibus ipsum bonum ueluti praemium commune propositum. Atqui hoc a bonis non potest separari neque enim bonus ultra iure uocabitur qui careat bono; quare probos mores sua praemia non relinquunt. Quantumlibet igitur saeuiant mali, sapienti tamen corona non decidet, non arescet. Neque enim probis animis proprium decus aliena decerpit improbitas. Quod si extrinsecus accepto laetaretur, poterat hoc uel alius quispiam uel ipse etiam qui contulisset auferre; sed quoniam id sua cuique probitas confert, tum suo praemio carebit, cum probus esse desierit. Postremo cum omne praemium idcirco appetatur quoniam bonum esse creditur, quis boni compotem praemii iudicet expertem? At cuius praemii? Omnium pulcherrimi maximique. Memento etenim corollarii illius quod paulo ante praecipuum dedi ac sic collige: cum ipsum bonum beatitudo sit, bonos omnes eo ipso quod boni sint fieri beatos liquet. Sed qui beati sint deos esse conuenit. Est igitur praemium bonorum quod nullus deferat dies, nullius minuat potestas, nullius fuscet improbitas, deos fieri. Quae cum ita sint, de malorum quoque inseparabili poena dubitare sapiens nequeat. Nam cum bonum malumque item poenae atque praemium aduersa fronte dissideant, quae in boni praemio uidemus accedere eadem necesse est in mali poena contraria parte respondeant. Sicut igitur probis probitas ipsa fit praemium, ita improbis nequitia ipsa supplicium est. Iam uero quisquis afficitur poena, malo se affectum esse non dubitat. Si igitur sese ipsi aestimare uelint, possuntne sibi supplicii expertes uideri quos omnium malorum extrema nequitia non affecit modo uerum etiam uehementer infecit? Vide autem ex aduersa parte bonorum, quae improbos poena comitetur. Omne namque quod sit unum esse ipsumque unum bonum esse paulo ante didicisti, cui consequens est ut omne quod sit id etiam bonum esse uideatur. Hoc igitur modo quidquid a bono deficit esse desistit; quo fit ut mali desinant esse quod fuerant, sed fuisse homines adhuc ipsa humani corporis reliqua species ostentat. Quare uersi in malitiam humanam quoque amisere naturam. Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere sola probitas possit, necesse est ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit, infra hominis meritum detrudat improbitas. Euenit igitur, ut quem transformatum uitiis uideas hominem aestimare non possis. Auaritia feruet alienarum opum uiolentus ereptor? Lupi similem dixeris. Ferox atque inquies lingnam litigiis exercet? Cani comparabis. Insidiator occultus subripuisse fraudibus gaudet? Vulpeculis exaequetur. Irae in-temperans fremit? Leonis animum gestare credatur. Pauidus ac fugax non metuenda formidat? Cernis similis habeatur. Segnis ac stupidus torpit? Asinum uiuit.

[¶9] “The sails which wise Ulysses bore, And ships which in the seas long lime did stray The eastern wind drave to that shore Where the fair Goddess Lady Circe lay, Daughter by birth to Phoebus bright, Who with enchanted cups and charms did stay Her guests, deceived with their delight And into sundry figures them did change, Being most skilful in the might And secret force of herbs and simples strange; Some like to savage boars, and some Like lions fierce, which daily use to range Through Libya, a in tooth and claw become. Others are changed to the shape and guise Of ravenous wolves, and waxing dumb Use howling in the stead of manly cries. Others like to the tiger rove b Which in the scorched Indian desert lies. And though the winged son of Jove c From these bewitched cups' delightful taste To keep the famous captain strove, Yet them the greedy mariners embraced With much desire, till turned to swine Instead of bread they fed on oaken mast. Ruined in voice and form, no sign Remains to them of any human grace; Only their minds unchanged repine To see their bodices in such ugly case. O feeble hand and idle art Which, though it could the outward limbs deface, Yet had no force to change the heart. For all the force of men given by God's arm Lies hidden in their inmost part. The poisons therefore which within them swarm More deeply pierce, and with more might, For to the body though they do no harm, Yet on the soul they work their spite.”

> Latin: Leuis atque inconstans studia permutat? Nihil auibus differt. Foedis inmundisque libidinibus immergitur? Sordidae suis uoluptate detinetur. Ita fit ut qui probitate deserta homo esse desierit, eum in diuinam condicionem transire non possit, uertatur in beluam.
Vela Neritii ducis
Et uagas pelago rates
Eurus appulit insulae,
Pulchra qua residens dea
Solis edita semine
Miscet hospitibus nouis
Tacta carmine pocula.
Quos ut in uarios modos
Vertit herbipotens manus,
Hunc apri facies tegit,
Ille Marmaricus leo
Dente crescit et unguibus.
Hic lupis nuper additus,
Flere dum parat, ululat.
Ille tigris ut Indica
lecta mitis obambulat.
Sed licet uariis malis
Numen Arcadis alitis
Obsitum miserans ducem
Peste soluerit hospitis,
Iam tamen mala remiges
Ore pocula traxerant,
Iam sues Cerealia
Glande pabula uerterant
Et nihil manet integrum
Voce corpore perditis.
Sola mens stabilis super
Monstra quae patitur gemit.
O leuem nimium manum
Nec potentia gramina.
Membra quae ualeant licet.
Corda uertere non ualent!
Intus est hominum uigor
Arce conditus abdita.
Haec uenena potentius
Detrahunt hominem sibi
Dira quae penitus ineant
Nec nocentia corpori
Mentis uulnere saeuiunt.

[¶10] Then said I, “I confess and perceive that thou affirmest not without cause that the vicious, though they keep the outward shape of men, are in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the good, restrained from executing their malice.” “They are restrained,” quoth she, “as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible) evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pass their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could not have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness, whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness.” “I grant it,” quoth I, “but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this misery, haying lost the power to perform their malice.” “They will lose it,” quoth she, “

> Latin: Tum ego: “Fateor,” inquam, “nec iniuria dici uideo uitiosos, tametsi humani corporis speciem seruent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari; sed quorum atrox scelerataque mens bonorum pernicie saeuit, id ipsum eis licere noluissem.” “Nec licet,” inquit, “uti conuenienti monstrabitur loco. Sed tamen si id ipsum quod eis licere creditur auferatur, magna ex parte sceleratorum hominum poena releuetur. Etenim quod incredibile cuiquam forte uideatur, infeliciores esse necesse est malos, cum cupita perfecerint, quam si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint. Nam si miserum est uoluisse praua, potuisse miserius est, sine quo uoluntatis miserae langueret effectus. Itaque cum sua singulis miseria sit, triplici infortunio necesse est urgeantur quos uideas scelus uelle, posse, perficere.” “Accedo,” inquam, “sed uti hoc infortunio cito careant patrandi sceleris possibilitate deserti uehementer exopto.” “Carebunt,” inquit, “ocius quam uel tu forsitan uelis uel illi sese aes timent esse carituros.

[¶11] sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they themselves suppose. For in the short compass of this life there is nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should think it long m coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.

> Latin: Neque enim est aliquid in tam breuibus uitae metis ita serum quod exspectare longum immortalis praesertim animus putet: quorum magna spes et excelsa facinorum machina repentino atque insperato saepe fine destruitur, quod quidem illis miseriae modum statuit. Nam si nequitia miseros facit, miserior sit necesse est diuturnior nequam;

[¶12] For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more miserable he must needs be; and 1 should judge them the most unhappy men that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite.” “A strange illation,” quoth I, “and hard to be granted; but I see that those things which were granted before agree very well with these.” “Thou thinkest aright,” quoth she, “but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of those things winch are already assumed.” “What?” quoth I. “That wicked men,” quoth she, “are more happy being punished than it they escaped the hands of justice. Neither do I now go about to show that which may come into every man's mind, that evil customs are corrected by chastisement, and are reduced to virtue by the terror of punishment, and that others may take example to avoid evil, but in another manner also I think vicious men that go unpunished to be more miserable, although we take no account of correction and pay no regard to example.” “And what other manner shall this be,” quoth I, “besides these?” “Have we not granted,” quoth she, “that the good are happy, and the evil miserable?” “We have,” quoth I. “If then,” quoth she, “something that is good be added to one s misery, is he not happier than another whose misery is desolate and solitary, without any participation of goodness?” “So it seemeth,” quoth I. “What if there be some other evil annexed to this miserable man who is deprived of all goodness, besides those which make him miserable, is he not to be accounted much more unhappy than he whose misery is lightened by partaking of goodness?” “Why not?” quoth I. “But it is manifest that it is just that the wicked be punished, and unjust that they should go unpunished,” “Who can deny that?” “But neither will any man deny this,” quoth she, “that whatsoever is just, is good, and contrariwise, that whatsoever is unjust, is evil.” “Certainly,” I answered. “Then the wicked have some good annexed when they are punished, to wit. the punishment itself, which by reason of justice is good, and when they are not punished, they have a further evil, the very impunity which thou hast deservedly granted to be an evil because of its injustice.” “I cannot deny it.” “Wherefore the vicious arc far more unhappy by escaping punishment unjustly, than by being justly punished.” “This followeth,” quoth I, “ out of that which hath been concluded betore.

> Latin: quos infelicissimos esse iudicarem, si non eorum malitiam saltem mors extrema finiret..Etenim si de prauitatis infortunio uera conclusimus, infinitam liquet esse miseriam quam esse constat aeternam.” Tum ego: “Mira quidem,” inquam, “et concessu difficilis inlatio, sed his eam quae prius concessa sunt nimium conuenire cognosco.” “Recte,” inquit, “aestimas. Sed qui conclusioni accedere durum putat, aequum est uel falsum aliquid praecessisse demonstrat uel collocationem propositionum non esse efficacem necessariae conclusionis ostendat; alioquin concessis praecedentibus nihil prorsus est quod de inlatione causetur. Nam hoc quoque quod dicam non minus mirum uideatur, sed ex his quae sumpta sunt aeque est necessarium.” “Quidnam?” inquam. “Feliciores,” inquit, “esse improbos supplicia luentes quam si eos nulla iustitiae poena coerceat. Neque id nunc molior quod cuiuis ueniat in mentem, corrigi ultione prauos mores et ad rectum supplicii terrore deduci, ceteris quoque exemplum esse culpanda fugiendi, sed alio quodam modo infeliciores esse improbos arbitror impunitos, tametsi nulla ratio correctionis, nullus respectus habeatur exempli.” “Et quis erit,” inquam, “praeter hos alius modus?” Et illa: “Bonos,” inquit, “esse felices, malos uero miseros nonne concessimus?” “Ita est,” inquam. “Si igitur,” inquit, “miseriae cuiuspiam bonum aliquid addatur, nonne felicior est eo cuius pura ac solitaria sine cuiusquam boni ad-mixtione miseria est?” “Sic,” inquam, “uidetur.” “Quid si eidem misero qui cunctis careat bonis, praeter ea quibus miser est malum aliud fuerit adnexum, nonne multo infelicior eo censendus est cuius infortunium boni participatione releuatur?” “Quidni?” inquam. “Sed puniri improbos iustum, impunitos uero elabi iniquum esse manifestum est.” “Quis id neget?” “Sed ne illud quidem,” ait, “quisquam negabit bonum esse omne quod iustum est contraque quod iniustum est malum.” Liquere, respondi. 1 “Habent igitur improbi, cum puniuntur, quidem boni aliquid adnexum poenam ipsam scilicet quae ratione iustitiae bona est, idemque cum supplicio carent, inest eis aliquid ulterius mali ipsa impunitas quam iniquitatis merito malum esse confessus es.” “Negare non possum.” “Multo igitur infeliciores improbi sunt iniusta impunitate donati quam iusta ultione puniti.” Tum ego: “Ista quidem consequentia sunt eis quae paulo ante conclusa sunt.

[¶13] But I pray thee, leavest thou no punishments for the souls after the death of the body?” “And those great too,” quoth she. “Some of which I think to be executed as sharp punishments, and others as merciful purgations. a But I purpose not now to treat of those. But we have hitherto laboured that thou shouldest perceive the power of the wicked, which to thee seemed intolerable, to be none at all, and that thou shouldest see, that those whom thou complainedst went unpunished, do never escape without punishment for their wickedness. And that thou shouldest learn that the licence which thou wishedst might soon end, is not long, and yet the longer the more miserable, and most unhappy if it were everlasting. Besides, that the wicked are, more wretched being permitted to escape with unjust impunity, than being punished with just severity. Out of which it followeth that they are then more grievously punished, when they are thought to go scot-free.” “When I consider thy reasons,” quoth I, “I think nothing can be said more truly. But if I return to the judgments of men, who is there that will think them worthy to be believed or so much as beard.?” “It is title,” quoth she, “for they cannot lift up their eyes accustomed to darkness, to behold the light of manifest truth, and they are like those birds whose sight is quickened by the night, and dimmed by the day. For while they look upon, not the order of things, but their own affections, they think that licence and impunity to sin is happy. Put see what the eternal law establisheth. It thou apply thy mind to the better, thou needest no judge to reward thee: thou hast joined thyself to the more excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, never expect any other to punish thee: thou hast put thyself in a miserable estate; as if by turns thou lookest down to the miry ground, and up to heaven, setting aside all outward causes, by the very law of sight thou seemest sometime to be in the dirt, and sometime present to the stars. Put the common sort considereth not these things. What then? Shall we join ourselves to them whom we have proved to be like beasts? What if one having altogether lost his sight should likewise forget that he ever had any, and should think that he wanted nothing which belongeth to human perfection: should we likewise think them blind, that see as well as they saw before? For they will not grant that neither, which may be proved by as forcible reasons, that they are more unhappy that do injury than they which suffer it.” “I would,” quoth I, “hear these reasons.” “Deniest thou,” quoth she, “that every wicked man deserveth punishment?” “No.” “And it is many ways clear that the vicious are miserable?” “Yes,” quoth I. “Then you do not doubt that those who deserve punishment are wretched?” “It is true,” quoth I. “If then,” quoth she, “thou wert to examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that did or that suffered wrong?” “I doubt not,” quoth I, “but that I would satisfy him that suffered with the sorrow of him that did it.” “The offerer of the injury then would seem to thee more miserable than the receiver?” “It followeth,” quoth I. “Hence therefore, and for other causes grounded upon that principle that dishonesty of itself maketh men miserable, it appeareth that the injury which is offered any man is not the receiver' s but the doer s misery.” “But now-a-days,” quoth she, “orators take the contrary course. For they endeavour to draw the judges to commiseration of them who have suffered any grievous afflictions; whereas pity is more justly due to the causers thereof, who should be brought, not by angry, but rather by favourable and compassionate accusers to judgment, as it were sick men to a physician, that their diseases and faults might be taken away by punishments; by which means the defenders labour would either wholly cease, or if they had rather do their clients some good, they would change their defence into accusations. And the wicked themselves, if they could behold virtue abandoned by them, through some little rift, and perceive that they might be delivered from the filth of sin by the affliction of punishments, obtaining virtue in exchange, they would not esteem of torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly resign themselves to their accusers and judges. By which means it cometh to pass, that in wise men there is no place for hatred. For who but a very fool would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against reason. For as faintness is a disease of the body, so is vice a sickness of the mind. Wherefore, since we judge those that have corporal infirmities to be rather worthy of compassion than of hatred, much more are they to be pitied, and not abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with wickedness, the greatest malady that may be.”

> Latin: Sed quaeso,” inquam, “te, nullane animarum supplicia post defunctum morte corpus relinquis?” “Et magna quidem, inquit,” quorum alia poenali acerbitate, alia uero purgatoria clementia exerceri puto. Sed nunc de his disserere consilium non est, Id uero hactenus egimus, ut quae indignissima tibi uidebatur malorum potestas eam nullam esse cognosceres quosque impunitos querebare, uideres numquam improbitatis suae carere suppliciis, licentiam quam cito finiri precabaris nec longam esse disceres intelicioremque fore, si diuturnior, infelicissimam uero, si esset aeterna; post haec miseriores esse improbos iniusta impunitate dimissos quam iusta ultione punitos. Cui sententiae consequens est ut tum demum grauioribus suppliciis urgeantur, cum impuniti esse creduntur. Tum ego: “Cum tuas,” inquam, “rationes considero, nihil dici uerius puto. At si ad hominum iudicia reuertar, quis ille est cui haec non credenda modo sed saltem audienda uideantur?” “Ita est,” inquit illa. “Nequeunt enim oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae ueritatis attollere, similesque auibus sunt quarum intuitum nox inluminat dies caecat. Dum enim non rerum ordinem, sed suos intuentur affectus, uel licentiam uel impunitatem scelerum putant esse felicem. Vide autem quid aeterna lex sauciat. Melioribus animum conformaueris, nihil opus est iudice praemium deferente tu te ipse excellentioribus addidisti. Studium ad peiora deflexeris, extra ne quaesieris ultorem. Tu te ipse in deteriora trusisti, ueluti si uicibus sordidam humum caelumque respicias, cunctis extra cessantibus ipsa cernendi ratione nunc caeno nunc sideribus interesse uidearis. At uulgus ista non respicit Quid igitur? Hisne accedamus quos beluis similes esse monstrauimus? Quid si quis amisso penitus uisu ipsum etiam se habuisse obliuisceretur intuitum nihilque sibi ad humanam perfectionem deesse arbitraretur, num uidentes eadem caecos putaremus? Nam ne illud quidem adquiescent quod aeque ualidis rationum nititur firmamentis: infeliciores eos esse qui faciant quam qui patiantur iniuriam.” “Vellem,” inquam, “has ipsas audire rationes.” “Omnem,” inquit, “improbum num supplicio dignum negas?” “Minime.” “Infelices uero esse qui sint improbi multipliciter liquet.” “Ita,” inquam. “Qui igituir supplicio digni sunt miseros esse non dubitas?” “Conuenit,” inquam. “Si igitur cognitor,” ait, “resideres, cui supplicium inferendum putares, eine qui fecisset an qui pertulisset iniuriam?” “Nec ambigo,” inquam, “quin perpesso satisfacerem dolore facientis.” “Miserior igitur tibi iniuriae in lator quam acceptor esse uideretur.” “Consequitur,” inquam. “Hinc igitur aliis de causis ea radice nitentibus, quod turpitudo suapte natura miseros faciat, apparet inlatam cuilibet iniuriam non accipientis sed inferentis esse miseriam.” “Atqui nunc,” ait, “contra faciunt oratores. Pro his enim qui graue quid acerbumque perpessi sunt miserationem iudicum excitare conantur, cum magis admittentibus iustior miseratio debeatur; quos non ab iratis sed a propitiis potius miserantibusque accusatoribus ad iudicium ueluti aegros ad medicum duci oportebat, ut culpae morbos supplicio resecarent. Quo pacto defensorum opera uel tota frigeret, uel si prodesse hominibus mallet, in accusationis habitum uerteretur. Ipsi quoque improbi, si eis aliqua rimula uirtutem relictam fas esset aspicere uitiorumque sordes poenarum cruciatibus se deposituros uiderent compensatione adipiscendae probitatis, nec hos cruciatus esse ducerent defensorumque operam repudiarent ac se totos accusatoribus iudicibusque permitterent. Quo fit ut apud sapientes nullus prorsus odio locus relinquatur. Nam bonos quis nisi stultissimus oderit? Malos uero odisse ratione caret. Nam si, uti corporum languor, ita uitiositas quidam est quasi morbus animorum, cum aegros corpore minime dignos odio sed potius miseratione iudicemus, multo magis non insequendi sed miserandi sunt quorum mentes omni languore atrocior urget improbitas.”
Quod tantos iuuat excitare motus
Et propria fatum sollicitare manu?

## 8. Book IV · section 4 · 4

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/8/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/8/#p-N

[¶0] “Why should we strive to die so many ways, And slay ourselves with our own hands? If we seek death, she ready stands, She willing comes, her chariot never stays. Those against whom the wild beasts arméd be, Against themselves with weapons rage. a Do they such wars unjustly wage, Because their lives and manners disagree, And so themselves with mutual weapons kill? Alas, but this revenge is small. wouldst thou give due desert to all? Love then the good, and pity thou the ill.”

> Latin: Si mortem petitis, propinquat ipsa
Sponte sua uolucres nec remoratur equos.
Quos serpens leo tigris ursus aper
Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt.
An distant quia dissidentque mores,
Iniustas acies et fera bella mouent
Alternisque uolunt perire telis?
Non est iusta satis saeuitiae ratio.
Vis aptam meritis uicem referre?
Dilige iure bonos et miseresce malis.

[¶1] “I see,” quoth I, “what felicity or misery is placed in the deserts of honest and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good or evil even in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather live in banishment, poverty, and ignominy, than prosper in his own country, being rich, respected, and powerful. For in this manner Is the office of wisdom performed with more credit and renown, when the governors happiness is participated by the people about them; so chiefly because prisons, death, and other torments of legal punishments are rather due to pernicious subjects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I much marvel why these things arc thus turned upside down, and the punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while evil men obtain the rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee what may seem to be the reason of so unjust confusion. For I would marvel less it I thought that all things were disordered by casual events. Now God being the Governor, my astonishment is increased. For since that He distributeth often ti mes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is distasteful to the bad, and contrariwise adversity to the good, and prosperity to the evil, unless we find out the cause hereof, what difference may th ere seem to be betwixt this and accidental chances?” “It is no marvel,” quoth she, “if anything be thought temerarious and confused, when we know not the order it hath. Hut although thou beest ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because the world hath a governor, doubt not but all things are well done.”

> Latin: Hic ego: “Video,” inquam, “quae sit uel felicitas uel miseria in ipsis proborum atque improborum meritis constituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna populari non nihil boni maline inesse perpendo. Neque enim sapientum quisquam exul inops ignominiosusque esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus, honore reuerendus, potentia ualidus, in sua permanens urbe florere. Sic enim clarius testatiusque sapientiae tractatur officium, cum in contingentes populos i egentium quodam modo beatitudo transfunditur, cum praesertim carcer, nex 1 ceteraque legalium tormenta poenarum perniciosis potius ciuibus propter quos etiam constituta sunt debeantur. Cur haec igitur uersa uice mutentur scelerumque supplicia bonos premant, praemia uir- tutum mali rapiant, uehementer admiror, quaeque tu in iniustae confusionis ratio uideatur ex te scire desidero. M in us etenim mirarer, si misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector exaggerat. Qui cum saepe bonis iucunda, malis aspera contraque bonis dura tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehenditur, quid est quod a fortuitis casibus differre uideatur?” “Nec mirum,” inquit, “si quid ordinis ignorata ratione temerarium confusumque credatur. Sed tu quamuis causam tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat, recte fieri cuncta ne dubites.”

[¶2] “Who knows not bow the stars near to the poles do slide, And how Boötes his slow wain doth guide, And why he sets so late, and doth so early rise, May wonder at the courses of the skies. If when the moon is full her horns seem pale to sight, Infested with the darkness of the night, And stars from which all grace she with her brightness took, Now show themselves, while she doth dimly look, A public error straight through vulgar minds doth pass, And they with many strokes beat upon brass. a None wonders why the winds upon the waters blow. Nor why hot Phoebus beams dissolve the snow. These easy are to know, the other hidden lie, And therefore more our hearts they terrify. All strange events which time to light more seldom brings, And the vain people count as sudden things, If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free, No longer would by us admired be.”

> Latin: Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit
Propinqua summo cardine labi,
Cur legat tardus plaustra Bootes
Mergatque seras aequore flammas,
Cum nimis celeres explicet ortus,
Legem stupebit aetheris alti.
Palleant plenae cornua lunae
Infecta metis noctis opacae
Quaeque fulgenti texerat ore
Confusa Phoebe detegat astra,
Commouet gentes publicus error
Lassantque crebris pulsibus aera.
Nemo miratur flamina Cori
Litus frementi fundere fluctu
Nec niuis duram frigore molem
Feruente Phoebi soluier aestu.
Hic enim causas cernere promptum est,
Illic latentes pectora turbant.
Cuncta quae rara prouehit aetas
Stupetque subitis mobile uulgus,
Cedat inscitiae nubilus error,
Cessent profecto mira uideri. “Ita est,” inquam;

[¶3] “It is true,” quoth I, “but since it is thy profession to explicate the causes of hidden things, and to unfold the reasons which are covered with darkness, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare what conclusion thou drawest from these things, for this miracle troubleth me above all others.” Then she smiling a little said. “Thou invitest me to a matter which is most hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently declared; for it is such that, one doubt being taken away, innumerable others, like the heads of Hydra, succeed, neither will they have any end unless a man repress them with the most lively fire of his mind, for in this matter are wont to be handled these questions: of the simplicity, of Providence; of the course of Fate; of sudden chances; of God's knowledge. and predestination. and of free will; which how weighty they are, thou thyself discerneth. But because it is part of thy cure to know these things also, though the time be short, yet we will endeavour to touch them briefly. But if the sweetness of verse delight thee, thou must forbear this pleasure for a while, until I propose unto thee some few arguments.” “As it pleaseth thee,” quoth I. Then taking as it were a new beginning, she discoursed in this manner: “

> Latin: “sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas euoluere uelatasque caligine explicare rationes, quaeso uti quae hinc decernas, quoniam hoc me miraculum maxime perturbat, edisseras.” Tum illa paulisper arridens; “Ad rem me,” inquit, “omnium quaesiti, maximam uocas, cui uix exhausti quicquam satis sit. Talis namque materia est ut una dubitatione succisa innumerabiles aliae uelut hydrae capita succrescant, nec ullus fuerit modus, nisi quis eas uiuacissimo mentis igne coerceat. In hac enim de prouidentiae simplicitate, de fati serie, de repentinis casibus, de cognitione ac praedestinatione diuina, de arbitrii libertate quaeri solet, quae quanti oneris sint ipse perpendis. Sed quoniam haec quoque te nosse quaedam medicinae tuae portio est, quamquam angusto limite temporis saepti tamen aliquid delibare 1 conabimur. Quod si te musici carminis oblectamenta delectant, hanc oportet paulisper differas uoluptatem, dum nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes.”

[¶4] The generation of all things, and all the proceedings of mutable natures, and whatsoever is moved in any sort, take their causes, order, and forms from the stability of the Divine mind. This, placed in the castle of its own simplicity, hath determined manifold ways for doing things; which ways being considered in the purity of God's understanding, are named Providence, but being referred to those things which He moveth disposeth, they are by the ancients called Fate. The diversity of which will easily appear if we weigh the force of both. For Providence is the very Divine reason itself, seated in the highest Prince, which disposeth all things. But Fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things, by which Providence connecteth all things. in their due order. For Providence embraceth all things together, though diverse, though infinite; but Fate putteth every particular thing into motion being distributed by places, forms, and time; so that this unfolding of temporal order being united into the foresight of God s mind is Providence, and the same uniting, being digested and unfolded in time, is called fate. Which although they be diverse yet the one dependeth on the other, for fatal order proceedeth from the simplicity of Providence. For as a workman conceiving the form of anything in his mind taketh his work in hand, and exceuteth by order of time that which he had simply and in a moment foreseen, so God by His Providence disposeth whatsoever is to be done with simplicity and stability, and by hate effecteth by manifold ways and in the order of time those very things which He disposeth. Wherefore, whether Fate be exercised by the subordination of certain -Divine spirits to Providence, or this fatal web be woven by a soul or by the service of all nature, or by the heavenly motions of the stars, by angelical virtue, or by diabolical industry, or by some or all of these, that certainly is manifest that Providence is an immovcable and simple form of those things which are to be done, and Fate a moveable connexion and temporal order of those things which the Divine simplicity hath disposed to be done. So that all that is under Fate is also subject to Providence, to which also, Fate itself obeyeth. But some things which are placed under Providence are above the course of Fate. And they are those things which nigh to the first Divinity, being stable and fixed, exceed the order of fatal mobility. For as of orbs which turn about the same centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the midst, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without it, about which they are turned, and the outmost, wheeled with a greater compass, by how much it departeth from the middle indivisibility of the centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces, but that which is joined and coupled to that middle approacheth to simplicity, and ceaseth to spread and flow abroad, m like manner that which departeth farthest from the first mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of fate, and everything is so much the freer from fate, by how much it draweth nigh to the hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the stability of the Sovereign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also the necessity of Fate. Wherefore in what sort discourse of reason is compared to pure understanding, that which is produced to that which is, time to eternity, a circle to the centre, such is the course of moveable hate to the stable simplicity of Providence. That course moveth the heaven and stars, tempereth the elements one with another, and transformeth them by mutual changing. The same reneweth all rising and dying things by like proceeding of fruits and seeds. This comprehendeth also the actions and fortunes or men by an unloosable connexion of causes, which since it proceeds from the principles of unmovable Providence, the causes also must needs be immutable. For in this manner things are best governed, if the simplicity which remaineth in the Divine mind produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order restraineth with its own immutability things otherwise mutable, and which would have a confused course. Whereof it ensueth that though all things seem confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider this order, notwithstanding all things are disposed by their own proper measure directing them to good. For there is nothing which is done for the love of evil, even by the wicked themselves: whom, as hath been abundantly proved, lewd error carrieth away while they are seeking after that which is good, so far is it that order proceeding from the hinge of the Sovereign Goodness should avert any from his first beginning.

> Latin: “Vt libet,” inquam, Tunc uelut ab alio orsa principio ita disseruit: “ Omnium generatio rerum cunctisque mutabilium naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo mouetur modo, causas, ordinem, formas ex diuinae mentis stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis arce compositamultiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit. Qui modus cum in ipsa diuinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur; cum uero ad ea quae mouet atque disponit refertur, fatum a ueteribus appellatum est. Quae diuersa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusque uim mente conspexerit. Nam prouidentia est ipsa illa diuina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta quae cuncta disponit; fatum uero inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio per quam prouidentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Prouidentia namque cuncta pariter quamuis diuersa quamuis infinita complectitur; fatum uero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in diuinae mentis adunata prospectum prouidentia sit, eadem uero adunatio digesta atque explicata temporibus fatum uocetur. Quae licet diuersa sint, alterum tamen pendet ex altero. Ordo namque fatalis ex prouidentiae simplicitate procedit. Sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens mouet operis effectum, et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat, per temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa quae disposuit multipliciter ac temporaliter administrat. Siue igitur famulantibus quibusdam proui- dentiae diuinis spiritibus fatum exercetur seu anima seu tota inseruiente natura seu caelestibus siderum motibus seu angelica uirtute seu daemonum uaria sollertia seu aliquibus horum seu omnibus fatalis series texitur, illud certe manifestum est immobilem simplicemque gerendam formam rerum esse prouidentiam, fatum uero eorum quae diuina simplicitas gerenda disposuit nobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem. Quo fit ut omnia quae fato subsunt prouidentiae quoque subiecta sint cui ipsum etiam subiacet fatum, quaedam uero quae sub prouidentia locata sunt fati seriem superent. Ea uero sunt quae primae propinqua diuinitati stabiliter fixa fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Nam ut orbium circa eundem cardinem sese uertentium qui est intimus ad simplicitatem medietatis accedit ceterorumque extra locatorum ueluti cardo quidam circa quem uersentur exsistit, extimus uero maiore ambitu rotatus quanto a puncti media indiuiduitate discedit tanto amplioribus spatiis explicatur, si quid nero illi se medio conectat et societ, in simplicitatem cogitur diffundique ac diffluere cessat, simili ratione quod longius a prima mente discedit maioribus fati nexibus implicatur ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est quanto illum rerum cardinem uicinius petit. Quod si supernae mentis haeserit firmitati, motu carens fati quoque supergreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus, ita est fati series mobilis ad proui- dentiae stabilem simplicitatem. Ea series caelum ac sidera mouet, elementa in se inuicem temperat et alterna commutatione transformat; eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes fetuum seminumque renouat progressus. Haec actus etiam fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum conexione constringit, quae cum ab immobilis prouidentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsas quoque immutabiles esse necesse est. Ita enim res optime reguntur, si manens in diuina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum ordinem premat. Hic uero ordo res mutabiles et alioquin temere fluituras propria incommutabilitate coerceat. Quo fit ut tametsi uobis hunc ordinem minime considerare ualentibus confusa omnia perturbataque uideantur, nihilo minus tamen suus modus ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat. Nihil est enim quod mali causa ne ab ipsis quidem improbis fiat;

[¶5] But, thou wilt say, what more unjust confusion can there be than that both adversity and prosperity should happen to the good, and in like manner both desired and hateful things to the wicked? But are men so completely wise that whomsoever they judge wicked or honest must needs be so? Mow then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to divers the same men seem worthy of reward and punishment! But let us grant that some are able to discern the good from the evil. Can they therefore behold, as is wont to be said of bodies, that inward complexion of souls? For he that knoweth not the cause may marvel in like manner why some sound bodies agree better with sweet things and other with tart; and why some sick men are healed with gentle and some with sharper physic. But to a physician who knoweth the manner and temper both of health and sickness this is nothing strange Now, what is the health of souls but virtue? What sickness have they but vices? And who either conserveth goodness or expelleth evils, but God the Ruler and Governor of men's minds? Who beholding from His high turret of providence seeth what is fitting for everyone, and applieth that which He knoweth to be most convenient. Here ariseth that strange wonder of fatal order, to wit that He that knoweth what is best, doth that which the ignorant admire. For to touch briefly some few things of the divine depth, which human reason is able to attain he whom thou thinketh most just and most observant of equity, seemeth otherwise in the eyes of Providence which knoweth all. And our disciple Lucan noteth that the cause of conquerers pleased the gods, and that of the conquered, Cato. a Wherefore whatsoever thou seest done here against thy expectation is right order in the things themselves, but a perverse confusion in thy opinion. But let there be one so well conditioned that God and men approve and praise him; yet perhaps he is so weak a minded man, that if he falleth into adversity, he will forsake his innocency, which was not able to keep him in prosperity. Wherefore God's wise dispensation spareth him that adversity might make worse, lest he should suffer to whom difficulties are dangerous. There is another complete in all virtues, a saint and nigh to God; Providence judgeth it a sacrilege to lay affliction on him, insomuch that she permitteth him not to be troubled so much as with corporal sickness. For as one that excelleth me saith ' the body of an holy man is builded of pure ether.' a It happeneth often also that the chief command is given to good men, that wickedness,, which otherwise would overflow all, may be kept down. She mixeth for others sour and sweet according to the disposition of their souls; she troubles some lest they should fall to dissolution by long prosperity, others are vexed with hardships, that they may confirm the forces of their mind with the use and exercise of patience. Some are too much afraid of that which they are able to bear. Others make less account than there is cause of that which they cannot endure. All these she affrayeth with afflictions that they make trial of themselves. Many have bought the renown of this world with a glorious death. Some, overcoming all torments, have showed by their example that virtues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good upon whom they are seen to fall, there can be no doubt. For that sometime grievous, sometime pleasant things befall in like manner the wicked, proceedeth from the same causes. And as for adversity no man marvelleth because all think they deserve ill. Whose punishments do both terrify others from the like courses, and move them to amend themselves. And their prosperity is a great argument to the good, what they ought to judge of this happiness which they see oftentimes bestowed upon the wicked. In which thing also is to be considered that peradventure some have so headlong and untoward a disposition, that poverty would rather make him worse; whose disease is cured by Providence, with giving him store of money. Another, knowing his own guilty conscience, and comparing his character with his own estate, is afraid lest the loss of that should be grievous unto him, the use of which is pleasant. Wherefore he resolveth to change his customs, and whiles he feareth to lose his prosperity, he forsaketh wickedness. The increase of honour undeservedly obtained hath thrown some headlong into their deserved destruction. Others are permitted to have authority to punish others, that they may exercise the good and punish the bad. For as there is no league between virtuous and wicked men, so neither can the wicked agree among themselves. Why not? Since they disagree within themselves by reason of their vices which tear their conscience, so that they many times do that which afterwards they wish undone. From whence that highest Providence often worketh that wonderful miracle, that evil men make those which are evil good. For some, considering the injustice done them by most wicked men, inflamed with hatred of evildoers have returned to the practice of virtue, procuring to be contrary to them whom they hate. For it is only a divine strength to which even evil things are good, m lien, by using them in due sort, it draweth some good effect out of them. For a certain order embraceth all things, so that even that which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falleth into another, yet that is order also, lest confused rashness should bear any sway in the kingdom of Providence. 'But it is hard for me to rehearse all this as if I were a God.' a For it is impossible for any man either to comprehend by his wit or to explicate in speech all the frame of God's work. Be it sufficient that we have seen thus much, that God, the author of all natures, directeth and disposeth all things to goodness, and while He endeavoureth to retain in His own likeness those things which He hath produced, He banisheth all evil from the bounds of His commonwealth, by the course of fatal necessity. So that if thou considerest the disposition of Providence, thou wilt perceive that evil, which is thought so to abound upon earth, hath no place left for it at all. But I see that long since burdened with so weighty a question, and wearied with my long discourse, thou expectest the delight of verses; wherefore take a draught, that, being refreshed, Thou mayest be able to go forward.”

> Latin: quos, ut uberrime demonstratum est, bonum quaerentes prauus error auertit, nedum ordo de summi boni cardine proficiscens a suo quoquam deflectat exordio. Quae uero, inquies, potest ulla iniquior esse confusio, quam ut bonis tum aduersa tum prospera, malis etiam tum optata tum odiosa contingant? Num igitur ea mentis integritate homines degunt, ut quos probos improbosue censuerunt eos quoque uti existimant esse necesse sit? Atqui in hoc hominum iudicia depugnant, et quos alii praemio alii supplicio dignos arbitrantur. Sed concedamus ut aliquis possit bonos malosque discernere; num igitur poterit intueri illam intimam temperiem, uelut in corporibus diei solet, animorum? Non enim dissimile est miraculum nescienti cur sanis corporibus his quidem dulcia illis uero amara conueniant, cur aegri etiam quidam lenibus quidam uero acribus adiuuentur? At hoc medicus, qui salutatis ipsius atque aegritudinis modum temperamentumque dinoscit, minime miratur. Quid uero aliud animorum salus uidetur esse quam probitas? Quid aegritudo quam uitia? Quis autem alius uel seruator bonorum uel malorum depulsor quam rector ae medicator mentium deus? Qui eum ex alta prouidentiae specula respexit, quid unicuique conueniat agnoscit et quod conuenire nouit accommodat. Hic iam fit illud fatalis ordinis insigne miraculum, eum ab sciente geritur quod stupeant ignorantes. Nam ut pauca quae ratio ualet humana de diuina profunditate perstringam, de hoc quem tu iustissimum et aequi seruantissimum putas omnia scienti prouidentiae diuersum uidetur; et uictricem quidem causam dis, uictam uero Catoni placuisse familiaris noster Lucanus admonuit. Hie igitur quidquid citra spem uideas geri, rebus quidem rectus ordo est, opinioni uero tuae peruersa confusio. Sed sit aliquis ita bene moratus ut de eo diuinum iudicium pariter et humanum consentiat, sed est animi uiribus infirmus; cui si quid eueniat aduersi, desinet colere forsitan innocentiam per quam non potuit retinere fortunam. Parcit itaque sapiens dispensatio ei quem deteriorem facere possit aduersitas, ne cui non con- uenit laborare patiatur. Est alius cunctis uirtutibus absolutus sanctusque ac deo proximus; hunc contingi quibuslibet aduersis nefas prouidentia iudicat adeo ut ne corporeis quidem morbis agitari sinat. Nam ut quidam me quoque excellentior: ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἱεροῦ δέμας αἰθέρες ᾠκοδόμησαν Fit autem saepe, uti bonis summa rerum regenda deferatur, ut exuberans retundatur improbitas. Aliis mixta quaedam pro animorum qualitate distribuit; quosdam remordet ne longa felicitate luxurient, alios duris 1 agitari ut uirtutes animi patientiae usu atque exercitatione confirment. Alii plus aequo metuunt quod ferre possunt, alii plus aequo despiciunt quod ferre non possunt; hos in experimentum sui tristibus ducit. Nonnulli uenerandum saeculi nomen gloriosae pretio mortis emerunt: quidam suppliciis inexpugnabiles exemplum ceteris praetulerunt inuictam malis esse uirtutem. Quae quam recte atque disposite et ex eorum bono quibus accedere uidentur fiant, nulla dubitatio est. Nam illud quoque, quod improbis nunc tristia nunc optata proueniunt, ex eisdem ducitur causis; ac de tristibus quidem nemo miratur, quod eos male meritos omnes existimant. Quorum quidem supplicia tum ceteros ab sceleribus deterrent, tum ipsos quibus inuehuntur emendant; laeta uero magnum bonis argumentum loquuntur, quid de huiusmodi felicitate debeant iudicare quam famulari saepe improbis cernant. In qua re illud etiam dispensari credo, quod est forsitan alicuius tam praeceps atque inportuna natura ut eum in scelera potius exacerbare possit rei familiaris inopia j huius morbo prouidentia collatae pecuniae remedio medetur. Hic foedatam probris conscientiam exspectans et se cum fortuna sua comparatis, forsitan pertimescit ne cuius ei iucundus usus est, sit tristis amissio. Mutabit igitur mores ac dum fortunam metuit amittere, nequitiam derelinquit. Alios in cladem meritam praecipitauit indigne acta felicitas; quibusdam permissum puniendi ius, ut exercitii bonis et malis esset causa supplicii. Nam ut probis atque improbis nullum foedus est, ita ipsi inter se improbi nequeunt conuenire. Quidni, cum a semet ipsis discerpentibus conscientiam uitiis quisque dissentiat faciantque saepe, quae cum gesserint non fuisse gerenda decernant? Ex quo saepe summa illa prouidentia protulit insigne miraculum, ut malos mali bonos facerent. Nam dum iniqua sibi a pessimis quidam perpeti uidentur, noxiorum odio flagrantes ad uirtutis frugem rediere, dum se eis dissimiles student esse quos oderant. Sola. est enim diuina uis cui mala quoque bona sint, cum eis competenter utendo alicuius boni elicit effectum. Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur, ut quod adsignata ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno prouidentiae liceat temeritati. ἀργαλέον δέ με ταῦτα θεὸν ὥς πάντ᾽ ἀγορεύειν Neque enim fas est homini cunctas diuinae operae machinas uel ingenio conprehendere uel explicare sermone. Hoc tantum perspexisse sufficiat, quod naturarum omnium proditor deus idem ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat, dumque ea quae protulit in sui similitudinem retinere festinat, malum omne de reipublicae suae terminis per fatalis seriem necessitatis eliminet. Quo fit ut quae in terris abundare creduntur, si disponentem prouidentiam spectes, nihil usquam mali esse perpendas.

[¶6] “If thou would st see God's laws with purest mind, Thy sight on heaven must fixed be, Whose settled course the stars in peace doth bind. The sun's bright fire Stops not his sisters team, Nor doth the northern bear desire Within the ocean s wave to hide her beam. Though she behold The other stars there couching, Yet she uncessantly is rolled About high heaven, the ocean never touching. The evening light With certain course doth show The coming of the shady night, And Lucifer before the day doth go. This mutual love Courses eternal makes, And from the starry spheres above All cause of war and dangerous discord takes. This sweet consent In equal bands doth tie The nature of each element, So that the moist things yield unto the dry, The piercing cold With flames doth friendship keep, The trembling fire the highest place doth hold, And the gross earth sinks down into the deep. The flowery year Breathes odours in the spring The scorching summer corn doth bear, The autumn fruit from laden trees doth bring. The falling rain Doth winter s moisture give. These rules thus nourish and maintain All creatures which we see on earth to live. And when they die, These bring them to their end, While their Creator sits on high, Whose hand the reins of the whole world doth bend. He as their King Rules them with lordly might. From Him they rise, flourish, and spring, He as their law and judge decides their right. Those things whose course Most swiftly glides away His might doth often backward force, And suddenly their wandering motion stay. Unless His strength Their violence should bound, And them which else would run at length, Should bring within the compass of a round, That firm decree Which now doth all adorn Would soon destroyed and broken be, Things being far from their beginning borne. This powerful love Is common unto all, Which for desire of good do move Back to the springs from whence they first did fall. No worldly thing Can a continuance have Unless love back again it bring Unto the cause which first the essence gave.”

> Latin: Sed uideo te iam dudum et pondere quaestionis oneratum et rationis prolixitate fatigatum aliquam carminis exspectare dulcedinem. Accipe igitur haustum quo refectus firmior in ulteriora, contendas.”
Si uis celsi iura tonantis
Pura sollers cernere mente,
Aspice summi culmina caeli.
Illic iusto foedere rerum
Veterem seruant sidera pacem.
Non sol rutilo concitus igne
Gelidum Phoebes impedit axem
Nec quae summo uertice mundi
Flectit rapidos Vrsa meatus.
Numquam occiduo lota profundo
Cetera cernens sidera mergi
Cupit oceano tingere flammas.
Semper uicibus temporis aequis
Vesper seras nuntiat umbras
Reuehitque diem Lucifer almum.
Sic aeternos reficit cursus
Alternus amor, sic astrigeris
Bellum discors exulat oris.
Haec concordia temperat aequis
Elementa modis, ut pugnantia
Vicibus cedant umida siccis
Iungantque fidem frigora flammis
Pendulus ignis surgat in altum
Terraeque graues pondere sidant.
Isdem causis uere tepenti
Spirat florifer annus odores,
Aestas Cererem feruida siccat,
Remeat pomis grauis autumnus,
Hiemem defluus inrigat imber
Haec temperies alit ac profert
Quidquid uitam spirat in orbe.
Eadem rapiens condit et aufert
Obitu mergens orta supremo.
Sedet interea conditor altus
Rerumque regens flectit habenas
Rex et dominus fons et origo
Lex et sapiens arbiter aequi
Et quae motu concitat ire.
Sistit retrahens ac uaga firmat.
Nam nisi rectos reuocans itus
Flexos iterum cogat in orbes,
Quae nunc stabilis continet ordo
Dissaepta suo fonte fatiscant.
Hic est cunctis communis amor
Repetuntque boni fine teneri,
Quia non aliter durare queant,
Nisi conuerso rursus amore
Refluant causae quae dedit esse. “Iamne igitur uides quid haec omnia quae diximus consequatur?” “Quidnam.?” inquam. “Omnem,” inquit, “bonam prorsus esse fortunam.”

[¶7] “Perceivest thou now what followeth of all that we have hitherto said?” “What?” quoth I. “That,” quoth she, “all manner of fortune is good.” “How can that be?” quoth I. “Be attentive,” quoth she; “since that all fortune, be it pleasing or unpleasing, is directed to the reward or exercise of the good, and to the punishment and direction of the wicked, it is manifest it is all good, since all is just or profitable.” “Thy reason is very true,” quoth I, “and if I consider Providence and Fate, which thou didst explicate a little before, thy opinion is well grounded. But if thou pleasest let us account it among those which thou not long since supposest incredible.” “Why?” quoth she. “Because men commonly use to say and repeat that some have ill fortune.” “Shall we,” quoth she, “frame our speech to the vulgar phrase, lest we seem to have as it were forsaken the use of human conversation?” “As it pleaseth thee,” quoth I. “Dost thou not think then that that is good which is profitable?” “Yes,” quoth I. “But that fortune which either exerciseth or correcteth is profitable?” “It is true,” quoth I It is good then? “Why not?” “But this is the estate of them who being either virtuous strive with adversity, or forsaking vices betake themselves to the way of virtue.” “I cannot deny it,” quoth I. “Now, what sayest thou to that pleasing fortune which is given in reward to the good, doth the common people account it bad?” “No, but judgeth it exceeding good, as it is indeed.” “.And what of the other which, being unpleasing, restraineth the evil with just punishment, doth not the people think it good?” “Nay,” quoth I, “they think it the most miserable that can be.” “Look then,” quoth she, “how, following the people's opinion, we have concluded a very incredible matter.” “What?” quoth I. “For it followeth,” quoth she, “out of that which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoever it be, who are either in the possession or increase or entrance of virtue, is good: and theirs, which remain in vices, the worst that may be,” “This,” quoth I, “is true, though none dare say so.” “Wherefore,” quoth she, “a wise man must be no more troubled when he is assaulted with adversity, than a valiant captain dismayed at the sound of an alarum. For difficulties are the matter by which the one must extend his glory, and the other increase his wisdom. For which cause virtue is so called, because it hath sufficient strength to overcome adversity. a For you, that are proficients in virtue, arc not come hither to be dissolute with dainties or to languish in pleasures, You skirmish fiercely with any fortune, lest either affliction oppress you or prosperity corrupt you. Stay yourselves strongly in the mean! For whatsoever cometh either short or goeth beyond, may well contemn felicity, but will never obtain any rewrad of labour. For it is placed in your power to frame to yourselves what fortune you please. For all that seemeth unsavoury either exerciseth or correcteth or punisheth.”

> Latin: “Et qui id,” inquam, “fieri potest?” “Attende,” inquit. “Cum omnis fortuna uel iucunda uel aspera tum remunerandi exercendiue bonos tum puniendi corrigendiue improbos causa deferatur, omnis bona quam uel iustam constat esse uel utilem.” “Nimis quidem,” inquam, “uera ratioet si quam paulo ante docuisti prouidentiam fatumue considerent, firmis uiribus nixa sententia. Sed eam si placet inter eas quas inopinabiles paulo ante posuisti numeremus.” “Qui?” inquit. “Quia id hominum sermo communis usurpat et quidem crebro quorundam malam esse fortunam.” “Visne igitur,” inquit, “paulisper uulgi sermonibus acce- damus, ne nimium uelut ab humanitatis usu recessisse uideamur?” “Vt placet,” inquam. “Nonne igitur bonum censes esse Quod prodest?” “Ita est,” inquam, “Quae uero aut exercet aut corrigit, prodest?” “Fateor,” inquam. “Bona igitur?” “Quidni?” “Sed haec eorum est qui uel in uirtute positi contra aspera bellum gerunt, uel a uitiis declinantes uirtutis iter arripiunt.” “Negare,” inquam, “nequeo.” “Quid uero iucunda, quae in praemium tribuitur bonis, num uulgus malam esse decernit?” “Nequaquam; uerum uti est ita quoque esse optimam censet.” “Quid reliqua, quae cum sit aspera, iusto supplicio malos coercet, num bonam populus putat?” “Immo omnium,” inquam, “quae excogitari possunt, iudicat esse miserrimam.” “Vide igitur ne opinionem populi sequentes quiddam ualde inopinabile confecerimus.” “Quid?” inquam. “Ex his enim,” ait, “quae concessa sunt, euenit eorum quidem qui uel sunt uel in possessione uel in prouectu uel in adeptione uirtutis, omnem quaecumque sit bonam, in improbitate uero manentibus omnem pessimam esse fortunam.” “Hoc,” inquam, “uerum est, tametsi nemo audeat confiteri.” “Quare,” inquit, “ita uir sapiens moleste ferre non debet, quotiens in fortunae certamen adducitur, ut uirum fortem non decet indignari, quotiens increpuit bellicus tumultus; utrique enim, huic quidem gloriae propagandae illi uero conformandae sapientiae, difficultas ipsa materia est. Ex quo etiam uirtus uocatur quod suis uiribus nitens non superetur aduersis. Neque enim uos in prouectu positi uirtutis diffluere deliciis et emarcescere uoluptate uenistis. Proelium cum omni fortuna nimis 1 acre conseritis, ne uos aut tristis opprimat aut iucunda corrumpat. Firmis medium uiribus occupate! Quidquid aut infra subsiste aut ultra progreditur, habet contemptum felicitatis, non habet praemium laboris. In uestra enim situm manu qualem uobis fortunam formare malitis;

[¶8] “Revengeful Atreus son did ten whole years employ In wars, till he his brother's loss repaid with ransacked Troy. He setting forth the fleet of Greece upon the seas, And knowing well that only blood the angry winds would please, Forgot a father's part, and with his cruel knife Unto the gods did sacrifice his dearest daughter's life. Ulysses wailed the loss of his most faithful men, Whom Polyphemus did devour enclosed in his den But when his hands by sleight had made the Cyclops blind, Most pleasant joy instead of former tears possessed his mind. Hercules famous is for his laborious toil, Who tamed the Centaurs and did take the dreadful lion's spoil. He the Stymphalian birds with piercing arrows strook, And from the watchful dragon's care the golden apples took. a He in a threefold chain the hellish porter led, And with their cruel masters flesh the savage horses fed. He did th' increasing bends of poisonous Hydra burn, And breaking Achelous' horns, did make him back return. a He on the Libyan sands did proud Antaeus kill, And with the mighty Cacus' blood Euander's wrath That world-uplifting back the boar's white foam did fleck. To hold on high the sphere of heaven with never bending neck Of all his many toils the last was, and most hard, And for this last and greatest toil the heaven was his reward. You gallant men pursue this way of high renown, Why yield you? Overcome the earth, and you the stars shall crown.”

> Latin: omnis enim quae uidetur aspera nisi aut exercet aut corrigit punit.”
Bella bis quinis operatus annis
Vltor Atrides Phrygiae ruinis
Fratris amissos thalamos piauit;
Ille dum Graiae dare uela classi
Optat et uentos redimit cruore,
Exuit patrem miserumque tristis
Foederat natae iugulum sacerdos,
Fleuit amissos Ithacus sodales
Quos ferus uasto recubans in antro
Mersit inmani Polyphemus aluo;
Sed tamen caeco furibundus ore
Gaudium maestis lacrimis rependit.
Herculem duri celebrant labores.
Ille Centauros domuit superbos,
Abstulit saeuo spolium leoni
Fixit et certis uolucres sagittis.
Poma cernenti rapuit draconi
Aureo laeuam grauior metallo,
Cerberum traxit triplici catena.
Victor immitem posuisse fertur
Pabulum saeuis dominum quadrigis.
Hydra combusto periit ueneno,
Fronte turpatus Achelous amnis
Ora demersit pudibunda ripis.
Strauit Antaeum Libycis harenis,
Cacus Euandri satiauit iras
Quosque pressurus foret altus orbis
Saetiger spumis umeros notauit.
Vltimus caelum 1 labor inreflexo
Sustulit collo pretiumque rursus
Vltimi caelum meruit laboris.
Ite nunc fortes ubi celsa magni
Ducit exempli uia! Cur inertes
Terga nudatis? Superata tellus
Sidera donat.

## 9. Book V · section 5 · 5

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/9/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/9/#p-N

[¶0] Having said thus, she began to turn her speech to treat and explicate certain other questions, when I interrupted her, saying: “Thy exhortation is very good, and well-seeming thy authority..But I find it true by experience, as thou affirmedst, that the question of Providence is entangled with many other. For I desire to know whether thou thinkest chance to be anything at all, and what it is.” “I make haste,” quoth she, “to perform my promise, and to show thee the way by which thou mayest return to thy country. But these other questions, though they be very profitable, yet they are somewhat from our purpose, and it is to be feared lest being wearied with digressions thou beest not able to finish thy direct journey.” “There is no fear of that,” quoth I, “for it will be a great ease to me to understand those things in which I take great delight, and withal, when thy disputation is fenced in on every side with sure conviction, there can be no doubt made of anything thou shalt infer,” “I will,” quoth she, “do as thou wouldst me have,” and withal began in this manner. “If any shall define chance to be an event produced by a confused motion, and without connexion of causes, I affirm that there is no such thing, and that chance is only an empty voice that hath beneath it no real signification. For what place can confusion have, since God disposeth all things in due order? For it is a true sentence that of nothing cometh nothing, which none of the ancients denied, though they held not that principle of the efficient cause, but of the material subject, laying it down as in a manner the ground of all their reasonings concerning nature. But if anything proecedeth from no causes, that will seem to have come from nothing, which if it cannot be, neither is it possible there should be any such chance as is defined a little before.” “What then,” quoth I, “is there nothing that can rightly be called chance or fortune? Or is there something, though unknown to the common sort, to which these names agree?” “My Aristotle,” quoth she, “in his Books of Nature a declared this point briefly and very near the truth.” “How?” quoth I. “When,” quoth she, “

> Latin: DIXERAT orationisque cursum ad alia quaedam tractanda atque expedienda uertebat. Tum ego: “Recta quidem,” inquam, “exhortatio tuaque prorsus auctoritate dignissima, sed quod tu dudum de prouidentia quaestionem pluribus aliis implicitam esse dixisti, re experior. Quaero enim an esse aliquid omnino et quidnam esse casum arbitrere.” Tum illa “Festino,” inquit, “debitum promissionis absoluere uiamque tibi qua patriam reueharis aperire. Haec autem etsi perutilia cognitu tamen a propositi nostri tramite paulisper auersa sunt, uerendumque est ne deuiis fatigatus ad emetiendum rectum iter sufficere non possis.” “Ne id,” inquam, “prorsus uereare. Nam quietis mihi loco fuerit ea quibus maxime delector agnoscere, simul cum omne disputatione tuae latus indubitata fide constiterit, nihil de sequentibus ambigatur.” Tum illa. “Morem,” inquit, “geram tibi,” simulque sic orsa est: “Si quidem,” inquit, “aliquis euentum temerario motu nullaque causarum conexione productum casum esse definiat, nihil omnino casum esse confirmo et praeter subiectae rei significationem inanem prorsus uocem esse decerno. Quis enim coercente in ordinem cuncta deo locus esse ullus temeritati reliquus potest? Nam nihil ex nihilo exsistere uera. sententia, est cui nemo umquam ueterum refragatus est, quamquam id illi non de operante principio, sed de materiali subiecto hoc omnium de natura rationum quasi quoddam iecerint fundamentum. At si nullis ex causis aliquid oriatur, id de nihilo ortum esse uidebitur. Quod si hoc fieri nequit, ne casum quidem huiusmodi esse possibile est qualem paulo ante definiuimus.” “Quid igitur,” inquam, “nihilne est quod uel casus uel fortuitum iure appellari queat? An est aliquid, tametsi uulgus lateat, cui uocabula ista conueniant?” “Aristoteles meus id,” inquit, “in Physicis et breui et ueri propinqua ratione definiuit.”

[¶1] anything is done for some certain cause, and some other thing happeneth for other reasons than that which was intended, this is called chance; as if one digging his ground with intention to till it, findeth an hidden treasure. This is thought to have fallen thus out by fortune, but it is not of nothing, for it hath peculiar causes whose unexpected and not foreseen concourse seemeth to have brought forth a chance. For unless the husbandman had digged up his ground, and unless the other had hidden his money in that place, the treasure had not been found. These are therefore the causes of this fortunate accident, which proceedeth from the meeting and concourse of causes, and not from the intention of the doer. For neither he that hid the gold nor he that tilled his ground had any intention that the money should be found, but, as I said, it followed and concurred that this man should dig up in the place where the other hid.

> Latin: “Quonam,” inquam “modo?” “Quotiens,” ait, “aliquid cuiuspiam rei gratia geritur aliudque quibusdam de causis quam quod intendebatur obtingit, casus uocatur, ut si quis colendi agri causa fodiens humum defossi auri pondus inueniat. Hoc igitur fortuito quidem creditur accidisse, uerum non de nihilo est; nam proprias causas habet quarum inprouisus inopinatusque concursus casum uidetur operatus. Nam nisi cultor agri humum foderet, nisi eo loci pecuniam suam depositor obruisset, aurum non esset inuentum. Haec sunt igitur fortuiti causa compendii, quod ex obuiis sibi et confluentibus causis, non ex gerentis intentione prouenit. Neque enim uel qui aurum obruit uel qui agrum exercuit ut ea pecunia reperiretur intendit; sed uti dixi, quo ille obruit hunc fodisse conuenit atque concurrit.

[¶2] Wherefore, we may define chance thus: That it is an unexpected event of concurring causes in those things which are done to some end and purpose. Now the cause why causes so concur and meet so together, is that order proceeding with inevitable connexion, which, descending from the fountain of Providence, disposeth all things in their places and times.”

> Latin: Licet igitur definire casum esse inopinatum ex confluentibus causis in his quae ob aliquid geruntur euentum; concurrere uero atque confluere causas facit ordo ille ineuitabili conexione procedens, qui de prouidentiae fonte descendens cuncta suis locis temporibusque disponit.”

[¶3] “In the Achaemenian rocks, where Parthians with their darts In their dissembled flight do wound their enemies, Tigris from the same head doth with Euphrates rise, And forthwith they themselves divide in several parts, But if they join again, and them one channel bound, Bringing together all that both their waves do bear; The ships and trees, whose roots they from the bank do tear, Will meet, and they their floods will mingle and confound, Yet run tins wandering course in places which are low, And in these sliding streams a settled law remains. a So fortune, though it seems to run with careless reins, Yet hath it certain rule, and doth in order flow.”

> Latin: Rupis Achaemeniae scopulis ubi uersa sequentum
Pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax,
Tigris et Euphrates uno se fonte resoluunt
Et mox abiunctis dissociantur aquis.
Si coeant cursumque iterum reuocentur in unum,
Confluat alterni quod trahit unda uadi;
Conuenient puppes et uulsi flumine trunci
Mixtaque fortuitos implicet unda modos,
Quos tamen ipsa uagos terrae decliuia casus
Gurgitis et lapsi defluus ordo regit.
Sic quae permissis fluitare uidetur habenis
Fors patitur frenos ipsaque lege meat. “Anmiaduerto,” inquam, “idque, uti tu dicis, ita esse consentio.

[¶4] “I observe it,” quoth. I, “and I acknowledge it to be as thou sayest. But in this rank of coherent causes, have we any free-will, or doth the fatal chain fasten also the motions of men's minds?” “We have,” quoth she, “for there can be no reasonable nature, unless it be endued with free-will. For that which naturally hath the use of reason hath also judgment by which it can discern of everything by itself, wherefore of itself it. distinguisheth betwixt those things which are to be avoided, and those which are to be desired. Now every one seeketh for that which he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his judgment is to be avoided. Wherefore, they which have reason in themselves have freedom to will and nill. But yet I consider not this equal in all. For the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgment and an uncorrupted will, and an effectual power to obtain.their desires. But the minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves in the contemplation of God, and less when they come to their bodies, and yet less when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their greatest bondage is when, giving themselves to vices, they lose possession of their own reason. For, having east their eyes from the light of the.sovereign truth to inferior obscurities, forthwith they are blinded with the cloud of ignorunce, molested with hurtful affections, by yielding and consenting to which they increase the bondage which they laid upon themselves, and are, after a certain manner, captives by their own freedom. Which notwithstanding that foresight of Providences which beholdeth all things from eternity foreseeth any by predestination disposeth of everything by their merits.”

> Latin: Sed in hac haerentium sibi serie causarum, estne ulla nostri arbitrii libertas an ipsos quoque humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena constringit?” “Est,” inquit, “neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit arbitrii. Nam quod ratione uti naturaliter potest id habet iudicium quo quidque discernat; per se igitur fugienda optandaue dinoscit. Quod uero quis optandum esse iudicat petit; refugit uero quod aestimat esse fugiendum. Quare quibus in ipsis inest ratio, inest etiam uolendi nolendique libertas. Sed hanc non in omnibus aequam esse constituo. Nam supernis diuinisque substantiis et perspicax iudicium et incorrupta uoluntas et efficax optatorum praesto est potestas. Humanas uero animas liberiores quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis diuinae speculatione conseruant, minus uero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam, cum terrenis artubus colligantur. Extrema uero est seruitus, cum uitiis deditae rationis propriae possessione ceciderunt. Nam ubi oculos a summae luce ueritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa deiecerint, mox inscitiae nube caligant, perniciosis turbantur affectibus quibus accedendo consentiendoque quam inuexere sibi adiuuant seruitutem et sunt quodam modo propria libertate captiuae. Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens prouidentiae cernit intuitus et suis quaeque meritis praedestinata disponit.”
πάντ᾽ ἐφορᾶν καὶ πάντ᾽ ἐπακούειν
Puro clarum lumine Phoebum
Melliflui canit oris Homerus:
Qui tamen intima uiscera terrae
Non ualet aut pelagi radiorum
Infirma perrumpere luce.

[¶5] “Sweet Homer a sings the praise Of Phoebus clear and bright. And yet his strongest rays Cannot with feeble, light Cast through the secret ways Of earth and seas his sight, Though 'all lies open to his eyes.' b But He who did this world devise- The earth's vast depths unseen From his sight are not free, No clouds can stand between, He at one time doth see What are, and what have been, And what shall after be. Whom, since he only vieweth all, You rightly the true Sim may call.”

> Latin: Haud sic magni conditor orbis;
Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti
Nulla terrae mole resistunt,
Non nox atris nubibus obstat.
Quae sint, quae fuerint ueniantque
Vno mentis cernit in ictu;
Quem, quia respicit omnia solus,
Verum possis dicere solem. Tum ego: “En,” inquam, “difficilior rursus ambiguitate confundor.” “Quaenam,” inquit, “ista est?

[¶6] Then I complained that I was now in a greater confusion and more doubtful difficulty than before. “What is that?” quoth she, “for I already con- jecture what it is that troubleth thee.” “It seemeth,” quoth I, “

> Latin: Iam enim quibus perturbere coniecto.” “Nimium,” inquam, “aduersari ae repugnare uidetur praenoscere uniuersa deum et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium.

[¶7] to be altogether impossible and repugnant that God foreseeth all things, and that there should be any free-will. For if God beholdeth all things and cannot be deceived, that must of necessity follow which His providence foreseeth to be to come. Wherefore, it from eternity he doth not only foreknow the deeds of men, but also their counsels and wills, there can be no free-will; for there is not any other deed or will, but those which the divine providence, that cannot he deceived, hath foreseen, tor if things can be drawn aside to any other end than was foreknown, there will not be any firm knowledge of that which is to come, but rather an uncertain opinion, which in my opinion were impious to believe of God. Neither do I allow of that reason with which some suppose that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question. For they t say that nothing is therefore to come to pass because Providence did foresee it, but rather contrariwise, because it shall be, it could not be unknown to Providence, and in this manner the necessity passes over to the other side, for it is not necessary, they argue, that those things should happen which are foreseen, but it is necessary that those things should be foreseen that are to come—as though our problem were this, which of them is the cause of a thing, the foreknowledge of the necessity of things to come, or the necessity of the foreknowledge of things to come, and we were not trying to prove that, howsoever these causes be ordered, the event of the things which are foreknown is necessary, even though the foreknowledge seemeth not to confer necessity of being upon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth the opinion which thinketh so must needs be true, and again on the other side, if the opinion that one sitteth be true, he must needs sit. Wherefore, there is necessity m both, m the one of sitting and in the other of truth. Put one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but lather this is true because one hath taken his seat. So that though the cause of truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both.

> Latin: Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque falli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod prouidentia futurum esse praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia uoluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas; neque enim uel factum aliud ullum uel quaelibet exsistere poterit uoluntas nisi quam nescia falli prouidentia diuina praesenserit. Nam si aliorsum quam prousisae sunt detorqueri ualent, non iam erit futuri firma praescientia. sed opinio potius incerta, quod de deo credere nefas iudico. Neque enim illam probo rationem qua se quidam credunt hunc quaestionis nodum posse dissoluere. Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse euenturum, quoniam id prouidentia futurum esse prospexerit, sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid futurum est, id diuinam prouidentiam latere non posse eoque modo necessarium hoc in contrariam relabi partem, neque enim necesse esse contingere quae prouidentur, sed necesse esse quae futura sunt prouideri—quasi uero quae euius rei causa sit praeseientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum necessitas prouidentiae laboretur, ae non illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo modo sese habeat ordo causarum, necessarium esse euentum praescitarum rerum, etiam si praescientia futuris rebus eueniendi necessitatem non uideatur inferre. Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere coniectat ueram esse necesse est; atque e conuerso rursus, si de quopiam uera sit opinio quoniam sedet, eum sedere necesse est. In utroque igitur necessitas inest, in hoc quidem sedendi, at uero in altero ueritatis. Sed non idcirco quisque sedet quoniam uera est opinio, sed haec potius uera est quoniam quempiam sedere praecessit. Ita cum causa ueritatis ex altera parte procedat, inest tamen communis in utraque necessitas Similia de prouidentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet.

[¶8] And the like is to be inferred of Providence and future things. For even though they be foreseen because they shall be, yet they do not conic to pass because they are foreseen, notwithstanding it is necessary that either things to come be foreseen by Cod, or that things foreseen do fall out, which alone is sufficient to overthrow free-will. Put see how preposterous it is that the event of temporal things should be said to be the cause of the everlasting foreknowledge! And what else is it to think that God doth therefore foresee future things because they are to happen, than to affirm that those things which happened long since, are the cause of that sovereign providence? Furthermore, as when I know anything to be, it must needs be; so when I know that anything shall be, it must needs be to come. And so it followeth that the event of a thing foreknown cannot be avoided. Finally, if any man thinketh otherwise than the thing is, that is not only no knowledge, but it is a deceitful opinion far from the truth of knowledge; wherefore, if anything is to be in such sort that the event of it is not certain or necessary, how can that he foreknown that it shah happen? For as knowledge is without mixture of falsity, so that which is conceived by it cannot be otherwise than it is conceived. For this is the cause why knowledge is without deceit, because everything must needs be so as the knowledge apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth God foreknow that these uncertain things shall be.? For it He judgeth that those things shall happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, He is deceived, which is not only impious to t link but also to speak. But if lie supposeth that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that knoweth that they may equally be done and not he done, what foreknowledge is this which comprehendeth no certain or stable thing? Or in what is this better than that ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias ‘Whatsoever I say shall either be or not be’ a? or in what shall the divine providence exceed human opinion, if, as men, God judgeth those things to be uncertain the event of which is doubtful? But if nothing can be uncertain to that most certain fountain of all things the occurrence of those things is certain, which He doth certainly know shall be. Wherefore there is no freedom in human counsels and actions, which the divine mind foreseeing all things without error or falsehood, tieth and bindeth to one; event. Which once admitted, it is evident what ruin of human affairs will ensue. For in vain are rewards and punishments proposed to good and evil, which no free and voluntary motion of their minds hath deserved. And that will seem most unjust which is now judged most just, that either the wicked should be punished or the good rewarded, since their own will leadeth them to neither, but they are compelled by the certain necessity of that which is to come. By which means virtues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will follow a mixed confusion of all deserts. And—than which there can be nothing invented more impious—since that all order of things proceedeth from Providence, and human counsels can do nothing, it followeth that our vices also shall be referred to the author of goodness. Wherefore there is no means left to hope or pray for anything, since an unflexible course connecteth all things that can be desired! Wherefore that only traffic betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall he taken away: if indeed by the price of just humility we deserve the unestimable benefit of God's grace; for this is the only manner by which it seemeth that men may talk with God, and by the very manner of supplication be joined to that inaccessible light before they obtain anything; which if by the admitting the necessity of future things, they be thought to have no force, by what shall we be united and cleave to that Sovereign Prince of all things? Wherefore mankind must needs (as thou saidest in thy verse a little before), being separated and severed from its source, fail and fall away.”

> Latin: Nam etiam si idcirco quoniam futura sunt, prouidentur, non uero ideo quoniam prouidentur eueniunt, nihilo minus tamen ab deo uel uentura prouideri uel prouisa necesse est euenire,1 quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum satis est. Iam uero quam praeposterum est ut aeternae praescientiae temporalium rerum euentus causa esse dicatur! Quid est autem aliud arbitrari ideo deum futura quoniam sunt euentura prouidere, quam putare quae olim acciderunt causam summae illius esse prouidentiae? Ad haec sicuti cum quid esse scio, id ipsum esse necesse est, ita cum quid futurum noui, id ipsum futurum esse necesse est. Sic fit igitur ut euentus praescitae rei nequeat euitari. Postremo si quid aliquis aliorsum atque sese res habet existimet, id non modo scientia non est, sed est opinio fallax ab scientiae ueritate longe diuersa. Quare si quid ita futurum est ut eius certus ac necessarius non sit euentus, id euenturum esse praesciri qui poterit? Sicut enim scientia ipsa impermixta est falsitati, ita id quod ab ea concipitur esse aliter atque concipitur nequit. Ea namque causa est cur mendacio scientia careat, quod se ita rem quamque habere necesse est uti eam sese habere scientia comprehendit. Quid igitur? Quonam modo deus haec incerta futura praenoscit? Nam si incuitabiliter euentura censet quae etiam non euenire possibile est, fallitur; quod non sentire modo nefas est, sed etiam uoce proferre, At si ita uti sunt, ita ea futura esse decernit, ut aeque uel fieri ea uel non fieri posse cognoscat, quae est haec praescientia quae nihil certum nihil stabile comprehendit? Aut quid hoc refert uaticinio illo ridiculo Tiresiae? Quidquid dicam, aut erit aut non. Quid etiam diuina prouidentia humana opinione praestiteris si uti homines incerta iudicat quorum est incertus euentus? Quod si apud illum rerum omnium certissimum fontem nihil incerti esse potest, certus eorum est euentus quae futura firmi ter ille praescierit. Quare nulla est humanis consiliis actionibusque libertas quas diuina mens sine falsitatis errore cuncta prospiciens ad unum alligat et constringit euentum. Quo semel recepto quantus occasus humanarum rerum consequatur liquet. Frustra enim bonis malisque praemia poenaeue proponuntur quae nullus meruit liber ac uoluntarius motus animorum. Idque omnium uidebitur iniquissimum quod nunc aequissimum iudicatur uel puniri improbos uel remunerari probos quos ad alterutrum non propria mittit uoluntas, sed futuri cogit certa necessitas. Nec uitia igitur nec uirtutes quidquam fuerint, sed omnium meritorum potius mixta atque indisereta confusio. Quoque nihil sceleratus excogitari potest, cum ex prouidentia rerum omnis ordo ducatur nihilque consiliis liceat humanis, fit ut uitia quoque nostra ad honorum omnium referantur auctorem. Igitur nec sperandi aliquid nec deprecandi ulla ratio est. Quid enim uel speret quisque uel etiam deprecetur, quando optanda omnia series indeflexa conectit? Auferetur igitur unicum illud inter homines deumque commercium sperandi scilicet ac deprecandi. Si quidem iustae humilitatis pretio inaestimabilem uicem diuinae gratiae promeremur, qui solus modus est quo cum deo colloqui homines posse uideantur illique inaccessae luci prius quoque quam impetrent ipsa supplicandi ratione coniungi. Quae si recepta futurorum necessitate nihil uirium habere credantur, quid erit quo summo illi rerum principi conecti atque adhaerere possimus?

[¶9] “What cause of discord breaks the bands of love? What God between two truths such wars doth move? That things which severally well settled be Yet joined in one will never friendly prove? Or in true things can we no discord see, Because all certainties do still agree? But our dull soul, covered with members blind, Knows not the secret laws which things do bind, By the drowned light of her oppressed fire. Why then, the hidden notes of things to find, Doth she with such a love of truth desire? If she knows that which she doth so require, Why wisheth she known things to know again? If she knows not, why strives she with blind pain? Who after things unknown will strive to go? Or will such ignorant pursuit maintain? How shall she find them out? Or having so, How shall she then their forms and natures know? Because this soul the highest mind did view, Must we needs say that it all nature knew? Now she, though clouds of flesh do her debar, Forgets not all that was her ancient due, But in her mind some general motions are, Though not the skill of things particular. He that seeks truth in neither course doth fall; Not knowing all, nor ignorant of all, He marketh general things which he retains, And matters seen on high doth back recall, And things forgotten to his mind regains, And joins them to that part which there remains.” “This,” quoth she, “

> Latin: Quare necesse erit humanum genus, uti paulo ante cantabas, dissaeptum atque disiunctum suo fonte fatiscere.”
Quaenam discors foedera rerum
Causa resoluit? Quis tanta deus
Veris statuit bella duobus,
Vt quae carptim singula constent
Eadem nolint mixta iugari?
An nulla est discordia ueris
Semperque sibi certa cohaerent?
Sed mens caecis obruta membris
Nequit oppressi luminis igne
Rerum tenues noscere nexus.
Sed cur tanto flagrat amore
Veri tectas reperire notas?
Scitne quod appetit anxia nosse?
Sed quis nota scire laborat?
At si nescit, quid caeca petit?
Quis enim quidquam nescius optet
Aut quis ualeat nescita sequi?
Quoue inueniat, quisque repertam
Queat ignarus noscere formam?
An cum mentem cerneret altam.
Pariter summam et singula norat?
Nunc membrorum condita nube
Non in totum est oblita sui
Summamque tenet singula perdens.
Igitur quisquis uera requirit,
Neutro est habitu; nam neque nouit
Nec penitus tamen omnia nescit,
Sed quam retinens meminit summam
Consulit alte uisa retractans,
Vt seruatis queat oblitas
Addere partes. Tum illa: “Vetus,” inquit, “haec est de prouidentia querela Marcoque Tullio, cum diuinationem distribuit, uehementer agitata tibique ipsi res diu prorsus multumque quaesita, sed haud quaquam ab ullo uestrum hactenus satis diligenter ac firmi ter expedita.

[¶10] is an ancient complaint of providence, vehemently pursued by Marcus Tullius in his Distribution of Divination, a and a thing which thou thyself hast made great and long search after. But hitherto none of you have used sufficient diligence and vigour in the explication thereof. The cause of which obscurity is for that the motion of human discourse cannot attain to the simplicity of the divine knowledge, which if by any means we could conceive, there would not remain any doubt at all; which I will endeavour to make manifest and plain when I have first explicated that which moveth thee. For I demand why thou thinkest their solution unsufficient, who think that free-will is not hindered by foreknowledge, because they suppose that foreknowledge is not the cause of any necessity in tilings to conic. For fetchest thou any proof for the necessity of future things from any other principle, but only from this, that those things which are foreknown cannot choose but happen Wherefore if foreknowledge imposeth no necessity upon future events, which thou didst grant not long before, why should voluntary actions be tied to any certain success? For example s sake, that thou mayest see what will follow, let us suppose that there were no providence or foresight at all. Would those things which proceed from free-will be compelled to any necessity by this means?” “No.” “

> Latin: Cuius caliginis causa est, quod humanae ratiocinationis motus ad diuinae praescientiae simplicitatem non potest admoueri, quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil prorsus relinquetur ambigui. Quod ita demum patefacere atque expedire temptabo, si prius ea quibus moueris expendero. Quaero enim, cur illam soluentium rationem minus efficacem putes, quae quia praescientiam non esse futuris rebus causam necessitatis existimat, nihil impediri praescientia arbitrii libertatem putat. Num enim tu aliunde argumentum futurorum necessitatis trahis, nisi quod ea quae praesciuntur non euenire non possunt? Si igitur praeuotio nullam futuris rebus adicit necessitatem, quod tu etiam paulo ante fatebare, quid est quod uoluntarii exitus rerum ad certum cogantur euentum? Etenim positionis gratia, ut quid consequatur aduertas, statuamus nullam esse praescientiam. Num igitur quantum ad hoc attinet, quae ex arbitrio eueniunt ad necessitatem cogantur?” “Minime.” “ Statuamus iterum esse, sed nihil rebus necessitatis iniungere; manebit ut opinor eadem uoluntatis integra atque absoluta libertas.

[¶11] Again, let us grant it to be, but that it imposeth no necessity upon anything; no doubt the same freedom of will will remain whole and absolute.

> Latin: Sed praescientia, inquies, tametsi futuris eueniendi necessitas non est, signum tamen est necessario ea esse uentura.

[¶12] But thou wilt say, even though foreknowledge be not a necessity tor things to happen, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily come to pass. Wherefore now, even it there had been no foreknowledge, the events of future things would have been necessary. For all signs only show what is, but cause not that which they design. And consequently it must first be proved that all things fall out by necessity, that it may appear that foreknowledge is a sign of this necessity. for otherwise, if there be no necessity, neither can foreknowledge be the sign of that which is not. Besides it is manifest that every firm proof must be drawn from intrinsical and necessary causes and not from signs and other far-fetched arguments. But how is it possible those things should not happen which are foreseen to be to come? As though we did believe that those things will not be which providence hath foreknown and do not rather judge that although they happen, yet by their own nature they had no necessity of being, which thou mayest easily gather hence. For we see many things with our eyes while they are in doing, as those things which the coachmen do while they drive and turn their coaches and in like manner other things. Now doth necessity compel any of these things to be done in this sort?” “No. For in vain should art labour if all things were moved by compulsion.” “

> Latin: Hoc igitur modo, etiam si praecognitio non fuisset, necessarios futurorum exitus esse constaret. Omne etenim signum tantum quid sit ostendit, non uero efficit quod designat. Quare demonstrandum prius est nihil non ex necessitate contingere, ut praenotionem signum esse huius necessitatis appareat. Alioquin si haec nulla est, ne illa quidem eius rei signum poterit esse quae non est. Iam uero probationem firma ratione subnixam constat non ex signis neque petitis extrinsecus argumentis sed ex conuenientibus necessariisque causis esse ducendam. Sed qui fieri potest ut ea non proueniant quae futura esse prouidentur? Quasi uero nos ea quae prouidentia futura esse praenoscit non esse euentum credamus ac non illud potius arbitremur, licet eueniant, nihil tamen ut euenirent sui natura necessitatis habuisse; quod hinc facile perpendas licebit. Plura etenim dum fiunt subiecta oculis intuemur, ut ea quae in quadrigis moderandis atque flectendis facere spectantur aurigae atque ad hunc modum cetera. Num igitur quidquam illorum ita fieri necessitas ulla compellit?” “Minime. Frustra enim esset artis effectus, si omnia coacta mouerentur.”

[¶13] Wherefore, as these things are without necessity when they are in doing, so likewise they are to come without necessity before they be done. And consequently there are some things to come whose event is tree from all necessity.

> Latin: “ Quae igitur cum fiunt carent exsistendi necessitate, eadem prius quam fiant sine necessitate futura sunt. Quare sunt quaedam euentura quorum exitus ab omni necessitate sit absolutus.

[¶14] For I suppose no man will say that those tilings which are done now were not to come before they were done. Wherefore these things even being foreseen come freely to effect. For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledge in things to come. But thou wilt say: This is the question, whether there can be any foreknowledge of those things whose events are not necessary. For these things seem opposite, and thou thinkest that, if future things be foreseen, there followeth necessity, if there be no necessity, that they that are not foreknown, and that nothing can be perfectly known unless it be certain. Hut if uncertain events be foreseen as certain, it is manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be far from the integrity knowledge to judge otherwise than the thing is The cause of which error is because thou thinnest that all that is known is known only by the force and nature of the things themselves, which is al- together otherwise. for all that is known is not comprehended according to the force which it hath in itself, but rather according to the faculty of them which know it. for to explicate it with a brief example: the sight and the feeling do diversely discern the same roundness of a die The sight standing aloof beholdeth it altogether by his beams; but the feeling united and joined to the orb, being moved about the compass of it, comprehendeth the roundness by parts. Likewise sense, imagination, reason and understanding do diversely behold a man. For sense looketh upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject, the imagination discerneth it alone without matter, reason passeth beyond this also and considereth universally the species or kind which is in particulars. The eye of the understanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compass of the whole world it beholdeth with the clear eye of the mind that simple form in itself.

> Latin: Nam illud quidem nullum arbitror esse dicturum, quod quae nunc fiunt, prius quam fierent, euentura non fuerint. Haec igitur etiam praecognita liberos habent euentus. Nam sicut scientia praesentium rerum nihil his quae fiunt, ita praescientia futurorum nihil his quae uentura sunt necessitatis importat. Sed hoc, inquis, ipsum dubitatur, an earum rerum quae necessarios exitus non habent ulla possit esse praenotio. Dissonare etenim uidentur putasque si praeuideantur consequi necessitatem, si necessitas desit minime praesciri nihilque scientia comprehendi posse nisi certum; quod si quae incerti sunt exitus ea quasi certa prouidentur, opinionis id esse caliginem non scientiae ueritatem. Aliter enim ac sese res habeat arbitrari ab integritate scientiae credis esse diuersum. Cuius erroris causa est, quod omnia quae quisque nouit ex ipsorum tantum ui atque natura cognosci aestimat quae sciuntur; quod totum contra est Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. Nam ut hoc breui liqueat exemplo, eandem corporis rotunditatem aliter uisus aliter tactus agnoscit. Ille eminus manens totum simul iactis radiis intuetur, hic uero cohaerens orbi atque coniunctus circa ipsum motus ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur. Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio uero solam sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio uero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam quae singularibus inest uniuersali consideratione perpendit. Intellegentiae uero celsior oculus exsistit;

## 10. Book V · section 5 · 5

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/10/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/boethius-consolation-latin/10/#p-N

[¶0] In which that is chiefly to be considered, that the superior force of comprehending embraceth the inferior; but the inferior can by no means attain to the superior: for the sense bath no force out of matter, neither doth the imagination convene universal species, nor is reason capable of the simple form, but the understanding, as it were looking downward, having conceived that form, discerneth of all things which are under it, but in that sort in which it apprehendeth that form which can be known by none of the other. For it knoweth the universality of reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense, neither using reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were formally beholding all things with that one twinkling of the mind. Likewise reason, when it considereth any universality, comprehendeth both imagination and sensible things without the use of either imagination or senses. For she defineth the universality of her conceit thus: Man is a reasonable, two-looted, living creature, which being an universal knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable conceiving and not by imagination or sense. Imagination also, although it began by the senses of seeing and forming figures, yet when sense is absent it beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but alter an imaginary manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how all these in knowing do rather use their own force and faculty than the force of those things which are known r Nor undeservedly; for since all judgment is the act of him who judgeth, it is necessary that every one should perfect Ins operation by his own power and not by the force of any other.”

> Latin: supergressa namque uniuersitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur. In quo illud maxime considerandum est: nam superior comprehendendi uis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit. Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam ualet uel uniuersales species imaginatio contuetur uel ratio capit simplicem formam, sed intellegentia quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat, sed eo modo quo formam ipsam, quae nulli alii nota esse poterat, comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuersum et imaginationis figuram et materiale sensibile cognoscit nec ratione utens nec imaginatione nec sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens. Ratio quoque cum quid uniuersale respicit, nec imaginatione nee sensibus utens imaginabilia uel sensibilia comprehendit. Haec est enim quae conceptionis suae uniuersale ita definiuit: homo est animal bipes rationale. Quae cum uniuersalis notio sit, tum imaginabilem sensibilemque esse rem nullus ignorat, quod illa non imaginatione uel sensu sed in rationali conceptione considerat. Imaginatio quoque tametsi ex sensibus uisendi formandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente sensibilia quaeque conlustrat non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione iudicandi. Videsne igitur ut in cognoscendo cuncta sua potius facultate quam eorum quae cognoscuntur utantur? Neque id iniuria;

[¶1] “Cloudy old prophets of the Porch a once taught. That sense and shape presented to the thought From outward objects their impression take, As when upon a paper smooth and plain On which as yet no marks of ink have lain We with a nimble pen do letters make. But if our minds to nothing can apply Their proper motions, but do patient lie Subject to forms which do from bodies flow, As a glass renders empty a shapes of things, Who then can show from whence that motion springs By force of which the mind all things doth know? Or by what skill are several things espied? And being known what power doth them divide. And thus divided doth again unite, And with a various journey oft aspires To highest things, and oft again retires To basest, nothing being out of sight, And when she buck unto herself doth move, Doth all the falsehoods by the truth reprove? This vigour needs must be an active cause, And with more powerful forces must be deekt, Than that which from those forms, that do reflect From outward matter, all her virtue draws. And yet in living bodies passion s might Doth go before, whose office is to incite, And the first motions in the mind to make. As when the light unto our eves appears, Or some loud voice is sounded in our ears, Then doth the strength of the dull mind awake Those phantasies which she retains within, She stirreth up such notions to begin, Whose objects with their natures best agree, And thus applying them to outward things, She joins the external shapes winch thence she brings With forms which in herself included be.”

> Latin: nam cum omne iudicium iudicantis actus exsistat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non ex aliena sed ex propria potestate perficiat.”
Quondam porticus attulit
Obscuros nimium senes
Qui sensus et imagines
E corporibus extimis
Credant mentibus imprimi,
Vt quondam celeri stilo
Mos est aequore paginae.
Quae nullas habeat notas,
Pressas figere litteras.
Sed mens si propriis ingens
Nihil motibus explicat,
Sed tantum patiens iacet
Notis subdita corporum
Cassasque in speculi uicem
Rerum reddit imagines,
Vnde haec sic animis uiget
Cernens omnia notio?
Quae uis singula perspicit
Aut quae cognita diuidit?
Quae diuisa recolligit
Alternumque legens iter
Nunc summis caput inserit,
Nunc decedit in infima,
Tum sese referens sibi
Veris falsa redarguit?
Haec est efficiens magis
Longe causa potentior
Quam quae materiae modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Praecedit tamen excitans
Ac uires animi mouens
Viuo in corpore passio.
Cum uel lux oculos ferit
Vel uox auribus instrepit,
Tum mentis uigor excitus
Quas intus species tenet
Ad motus similes uocaus
Notis applicat ex teris
Introrsumque reconditis
Formis miscet imagines. Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamuis afficiant instrumenta sensuum forinsecus obiectae qualitates animique agentis uigorem passio corporis antecedat quae in se actum mentis prouocet excitetque interim quiescentes intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non passione insignitur, sed ex sua ui subiectam corpori iudicat passionem, quanto magis ea quae cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt, in discernendo non obiecta extrinsecus sequuntur, sed actum suae mentis expediunt?

[¶2] And if in sentient bodies, although the qualities of outward objects do move the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the vigour of the active mind, provoking her action to itself and exciting the inward forms which before lay quiet; it, I say, in perceiving these corporal the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by her own force judgeth of the passion itself, which is objected to the body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their mind and not only follow the outward objects in their judgment, which are free; from all affections of the body. Wherefore in this sort have diverse and different substances knowledges of many kinds. For only sense destitute of all other means of knowledge is m those living creatures which are immovable, as some shell-fish and other which stick to stones and so are nourished; and imagination in movable beasts who seem to have some power to covet and fly. Hut reason belongeth only to mankind, as understanding to things divine. So that that knowledge is most excellent which of itself doth not only Know her own object, but also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination repugn to discourse and reason, affirming that universality to be nothing which reason thinketh herself to see? For that cannot be universal, they argue, which is either. sensible or imaginable; wherefore either the judgment of reason must be true and nothing at all sensible, or because they know that many tilings are subject to the senses and imagination, the conceit of reason is vain, which considereth that which is sensible and singular as if it wore universal. More over if reason should answer that she beholdeth m her universality all that which is sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of universality, because their knowledge cannot sin pass corporal figures and shapes, and that we must give more credit to the firmer and more perfect judgment about the knowledge of things, in this contention should not we, who have the power of discoursing as well as of imagination and sense, rather take reason s part? The very like happeneth when human reason doth not think that the divine understanding doth behold future things otherwise than she herself doth. For thus thou arguest: If any things seem not to have certain and necessary events, they cannot be certainly foreknown to be to come. Wherefore there is no foreknowledge of these things, and if we think that there is any, there shall be nothing which happeneth not of necessity. If, therefore, as we are endued with reason, we could likewise have the judgment proper to the divine mind, as we have judged that imagination and sense must yield to reason, so likewise we would think it most reasonable and just that human reason should submit herself to the divine mind. Wherefore let us be lifted up as much as we can to that height of the highest mind; for there reason shall see that which she cannot behold in herself. And that is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even those things which have no certain issue, and that this is no opinion, hut rather the simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed within no bounds.

> Latin: Hac itaque ratione multiplices cognitiones diuersis ac differentibus cessere substantiis. Sensus enim solus cunctis aliis cognitionibus destitutus immobilibus animantibus cessit quales sunt conchae maris quaeque alia saxis haerentia nutriuntur, imaginatio uero mobilibus beluis quibus iam inesse fugiendi appetendiue aliquis uidetur affectus, ratio uero humani tantum generis est sicut intellegentia sola diuini. Quo fit ut ea notitia ceteris praestet quae suapte natura non modo proprium sed ceterarum quoque notitiarum subiecta cognoscit. Quid igitur, si ratiocinationi sensus imaginatioque refragentur, nihil esse illud uniuersale dicentes quod sese intueri ratio putet? Quod enim sensibile uel imaginabile est, id uniuersum esse non posse; aut igitur rationis uerum esse iudicium nec quidquam esse sensibile, aut quoniam sibi notum sit plura sensibus et imaginationi esse subiecta, inanem conceptionem esse rationis quae quod sensibile sit ac singulare quasi quiddam uniuersale consideret. Ad haec, si ratio contra respondeat se quidem et quod sensibile et quod imaginabile sit in uniuersitatis ratione conspicere, illa uero ad uniuersitatis cognitionem adspirare non posse, quoniam eorum notio corporales figuras non possit excedere, de rerum uero cognitione firmiori potius perfectumque iudicio esse credendum, in huiusmodi igitur lite nos quibus tam ratiocinandi quam imaginandi etiam sentiendique uis inest nonne rationis potius causam probaremus? Simile est quod humana ratio diuinam intellegentiam futura, nisi ut ipsa cognoscit, non putat intueri. Nam ita disseris: Si qua certos ac necessarios habere non uideantur euentus, ea certo euentura praesciri nequeunt. Harum igitur rerum nulla est praescientia, quam si etiam in his esse credamus, nihil erit quod non ex necessitate pro-ueniat. Si igitur uti rationis participes sumus, ita diuinae iudicium mentis habere possemus, sicut imaginationem sensumque lationi cedere oportere iudicauimus, sic diuinae sese menti humanam submittere rationem iustissimum censeremus. Quare in illius summae intellegentiae cacumen, si possumus, erigamur; illic enim ratio uidebit quod in se non potest intueri, id autem est, quonam modo etiam quae certos exitus non habent, certa tamen uideat ac definita praenotio neque id sit opinio sed summae potius scientiae nullis terminis inclusa simplicitas.
Quam uariis terras animalia permeant figuris!

[¶3] “What several figures things that live upon the earth do keep! Some have their bodies stretched in length by which the dust they sweep And do continual furrows make while on their creep. breasts they creep. Some lightly soaring Up on high with wings the wind do smite And through the longest airy space pass with an easy flight. Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight, Which through the pleasant fields do pass or to the woods do go, Whose several forms though to our eyes they do a difference show, Yet by their looks east down on earth their senses heavy grow. Men only with more stately shape to higher objects rise, Who with erected bodies stand and do th e earth despise. These figures warn (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eyes) That thou who with an upright face dost look upon the sky, Shouldst also raise thy mind aloft, lest while thou bearest high Thine earthly head, thy soul opprest beneath thy body lie.”

> Latin: Namque alia extento sunt corpore puiueremque uerrunt
Continuumque trahunt ui pectoris incitata sulcum,
Sunt quibus alarum leuitas uaga uerberetque uentos
Et liquido longi spatia aetheris enatet uolatu,
Haec pressisse solo uestigia gressibusque gaudent
Vel uirides campos transmittere uel subire siluas.
Quae uariis uideas licet omnia discrepare formis,
Prona tamen facies hebetes ualet ingrauare sensus.
Vnica gens hominum celsum leuat altius cacumen
Atque leuis recto stat corpore despicitque terras.
Haec nisi terrenus male desipis, admonet figura,
Qui recto caelum uultu petis exserisque frontem,
In sublime feras animum quoque, ne grauata pessum
Inferior sidat mens corpore celsius leuato. “Quoniam igitur, uti paulo ante monstratum est, omne quod scitur non ex sua sed ex conprehendentimn natura cognoscitur, iutueamur nunc quantum fas est, quis sit diuinae substantiae status, ut quaenam etiam scientia eius sit, possimus agnoscere.

[¶4] “Seeing, therefore, as bath been showed, all that is known is not comprehended by its own nature but by the power of him which comprehendeth if, let us see now, as much as we may, what is the state of the divine substance that we may also know what His knowledge is. Wherefore it is the com m on judgment of fill that live by reason that God is everlasting, and th ere fore let us consider what eternity is. for this declareth unto us both the divine nature and knowledge. Eternity therefore is a perfect possession altogether of an endless life, which is more manifest by the comparison of temporal things, for whatsoever liveth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past to times to come, and there is nothing' placed in time which can embrace all the space of its life at once. But it hath not vet attained to-morrow and hath lost yesterday. And you live no more in this day's life than in That movable and transitory moment. Wherefore, whatsoever suffereth the condition of time, although, as Aristotle thought of the world, it never began nor were ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time, yet it is nut such that it ought to be called everlasting. For it doth not comprehend and embrace all the space of its life together, though that life be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fulness of an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is absent, nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be accounted everlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in itself, it may always be present to itself, and have an infinity of movable time present to it. Wherefore they are deceived who, hearing that Plato thought that this world had neither beginning of time nor should ever have any end, think that by this means the created world should be coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be carried through an endless life, which Plato attributed to the world, another thing to embrace the whole presence of an endless life together, which is manifestly proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to seem more ancient than the things created, by the quantity of time, but rather by the simplicity of His divine nature, tor that infinite motion of temporal things imitateth the present state of the immovable life, and since it cannot express nor equal it, it falleth from immobility to motion, and from the. simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an infinite quantity of future and past, and since it cannot possess together all the fulness of its life, by never leaving to be in some sort, it seemeth to emulate in part that which it cannot fully obtain and express, tying itself to this small presence of this short and swift moment, which because it carrieth a certain image of that abiding presence, whosoever hath it, seemeth to be. Put because it could not stay it undertook an infinite journey of time, and so it came to pass that if. continued that life by going whose plenitude it could not comprehend by staying. Wherefore, if we will give things their right names, following Plato, let us say that God is everlasting and the world perpetual. Wherefore, since every judgment comprehendeth those things which are subject unto it, according to its own nature, and God hath always an everlasting and present state, His knowledge also surpassing all motions of time, remaineth in the simplicity of His presence, and comprehending the.infinite spaces of that which is past and to come, considereth all things in His simple knowledge as though they were now in doing. So that, if thou wilt weigh His foreknowledge with which He discerneth all things, thou wilt more rightly esteem it to be the knowledge of a never fading instant than a foreknowledge as of a thing to come. For which cause it is not called praevidence or foresight, but rather providence. because, placed far from inferior things, it overlooketh all things, as it were, from the highest top of things. Why, therefore, wilt thou have those things necessary which are illustrated by the divine light, since that not even men make not those things necessary which they see? For doth thy sight impose any necessity upon those things which thou seest present?” “No.” “

> Latin: Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur aeterni tus consideremus; haec enim nobis naturam pariter diuinam scientiamque patefacit. Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis uitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid uiuit in tempore id praesens a praeteritis in futura procedit nihilque est in tempore constitutum quod totum uitae suae spatium pariter possit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem nondum adprehendit, hesternum uero iam perdidit; in hodierna quoque uita non amplius uiuitis quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod igitur temporis patitur condicionem, licet illud, sicuti de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec coeperit umquam esse nec desinat uitaque eius cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est ut aeternum esse iure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinitae licet uitae spatium comprehendit atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta iam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis uitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit nec praeteriti fluxerit, id aeternum esse iure perhibetur, idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper adsistere et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem. Vnde non recte quidam, qui cum audiunt uisum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci uitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis uitae totam pariter complexum esse praesentiam, quod diuinae mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque deus conditis rebus antiquior uideri debet temporis quantitate sed simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Hunc enim uitae immobilis praesentarium statum infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur cumque eum effingere atque aequare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum, ex simplicitate praesentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ae praeteriti quantitatem; et cum totam pariter uitae suae plenitudinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso quod aliquo modo numquam esse desinit, illud quod implete atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus uidetur aemulari alligans se ad qualemcumque praesentiam huius exigui uolucrisque momenti, quae, quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque contigerit id praestat ut esse uideantur. Quoniam uero manere non potuit, infinitum temporis iter arripuit eoque modo factum est ut continuaret eundo uitam cuius plenitudinem complecti non ualuit permanendo. Itaque si digna rebus nomina uelimus imponere, Platonem sequentes deum quidem aeternum, mundum uero dicamus esse perpetuum. Quoniam igitur omne iudicium seeundum sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est autem deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status; scientia quoque eius omnem temporis supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praescntiae infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spatia complectens omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praesentiam pensare uelis qua cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis j unde non praeuidentia sed prouidentia potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituta quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat. Quid igitur postulas ut necessaria fiant quae diuino lumine lustrentur, cum ne homines quidem necessaria faciant esse quae uideant? Num enim quae praesentia cernis, aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus?” “Minime.”

[¶5] But the present instant of men may well be compared to that of God in this: that as you see some things in your temporal instant, so He beholdeth all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge doth not change the nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in His presence as they will after come to be, neither doth He confound the judgment of tilings, and with one sight of His mind He discerneth as well those things which shall happen necessarily as otherwise. As you, when at one time you see a man walking upon the earth and the sun rising in heaven, although they be both seen at once, yet you discern and judge that the one is voluntary, and the other necessary, so likewise the divine sight beholding all things disturbeth not the quality of things which to Him are present, but in respect of time are yet to come. And so this is not an opinion but rather a knowledge grounded upon truth when He knoweth that such a thing shall be, which likewise He is not ignorant that it hath no necessity of being. Here if thou sayest that cannot choose but happen which God seeth shall happen, and that which cannot choose but happen, must be of necessity, and so tiest me to this name of necessity. I will grant that it is a most solid truth, but whereof scarce any but a contemplator of divinity is capable. For I will answer that the same thing is necessary when it is referred to toe Divine knowledge; hut when it is weighed in its own nature that it seemeth altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities: the one simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortal. the other conditional, as if thou knowest that any man walketh, he must needs walk. For what a man knoweth cannot be otherwise than it is known. But this conditional draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity. For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding a condition. For no necessity maketh him to go that goeth of his own accord, although it be necessary that he goeth while he goeth. In like manner, if providence seeth anything present, that must needs be. although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future things, which proceed from free-will, present. These things, therefore, being referred to the divine sight are necessary by the condition of the divine knowledge, and, considered by themselves, they lose not absolute freedom of their own nature. Wherefore doubtless all, those things come to pass which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceed, from free-will, which though they come to pass, yet do not, by coming into being. lose, since before they came to pass, they might also not have happened. But what importeth it that they are not necessary, since that by reason of the condition of the divine knowledge they come to pass in all respects as if they were necessary? It hath the same import as those things which I proposed a little before—the sun rising and the man going. While they are in doing, they cannot choose but be in doing; yet one of them was necessarily to be before it was, and the other not. Likewise those things which God hath present, will have doubtless a being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things, other from, the power of the doers. And therefore we said not without cause that these, if they be referred to God's knowledge, are necessary; and if they be considered by themselves, they are free from the bonds of necessity. As whatsoever is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to reason, is universal; if thou considerest the things themselves, it is singular or particular. But thou wilt say, 'If it is in my power to change my purpose, shall I frustrate providence if I chance to alter those things which she foreknoweth?' I answer that thou mayest indeed change thy purpose, but because the truth of providence, being present, seeth that thou canst do so, and whether thou wilt do so or no, and what thou purposest anew, thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge, even as thou canst not avoid the sight of an eye which is present, although thou turnest thyself to divers actions by thy free-will.

> Latin: “Atqui si est diuini humanique praesentis digna collatio, uti uos uestro hoc temporario praesenti quaedam uidetis, ita ille omnia suo cernit aeterno. Quare haec diuina praenotio naturam rerum proprietatemque non mutat taliaque apud se praesentia spectat qualia in tempore olim futura prouenient. Nec rerum iudicia confundit unoque suae mentis intuitu tam necessarie quam non necessarie uentura dinoscit; sicuti uos cum pariter ambulare in terra hominem et oriri in caelo solem uidetis, quamquam simul utrumque conspectum tamen discernitis et hoc uoluntarium illud esse necessarium iudicatis, ita igitur cuncta despiciens diuinus intuitus qualitatem rerum minime perturbat apud se quidem praesentium, ad condicionem uero temporis futurarum. Quo fit ut hoc non sit opinio sed ueritate potius nixa cognitio, cum exstaturum quid esse cognoscit quod idem exsistendi necessitate carere non nesciat. Hic si dicas quod euenturum deus uidet id non euenire non posse, quod autem non potest non euenire id ex necessitate contingere, meque ad hoc nomen necessitatis adstringas, fatebor rem quidem solidissimae ueritatis sed cui uix aliquis nisi diuini speculator accesserit. Respondebo namque idem futurum, cum ad diuinam notionem refertur, necessarium, cum uero in sua natura perpenditur, liberum prorsus atque absolutum uideri. Duae sunt etenim necessitates, simplex una, ueluti quod necesse est omnes homines esse mortales, altera condicionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare necesse est; quod enim quisque uouit, id esse aliter ac notum est nequit, sed haec condicio minime secum illam simplicem trahit. Hanc enim necessitatem non propria facit natura sed condicionis adiectio; nulla enim necessitas cogit incedere uoluntate gradientem, quamuis eum tum cum graditur incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo, si quid prouidentia praesens uidet, id esse necesse est, tametsi nullam naturae habeat necessitatem. Atqui deus ea futura quae ex arbitrii libertate proueniunt praesentia contuetur. Haec igitur ad intuitum relata di uinum necessaria fiant per condicionem diuinae notionis; per se uero considerat?! ab absoluta naturae suae libertate non desinunt. Fient igitur procul dubio cuncta quae futura deus esse praenoscit, sed eorum quaedam de libero proficiscuntur arbitrio, quae quamuis eueniant, exsistendo tamen naturam propriam non amittunt, qua priusquam fierent etiam non euenire potuissent. Quid igitur refert non esse necessaria, cum propter diuinae scientiae condicionem modis omnibus necessitatis instar eueniet? Hoc scilicet quod ea quae paulo ante proposui, sol oriens et gradiens homo. Quae dum fiunt, non fieri non possunt; eorum tamen unum prius quoque quam fieret, necesse erat exsistere, alterum uero minime. Ita etiam quae praesentia deus habet, dubio procul exsistent, sed eorum hoc quidem de rerum necessitate descendit, illud uero de potestate facientium. Haud igitur iniuria diximus haec si ad diuinam notitiam referantur necessaria, si per se considerentur necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta; sicuti omne quod sensibus patet, si ad rationem referas, uniuersale est, si ad se ipsa respicias, singulare. ' Sed si in mea,' inquies,' potestate situm est mutare propositum, euacuabo prouidentiam, cum quae illa praenoscit forte mutauero.' Respondebo: propositum te quidem tuum posse deflectere, sed quoniam et id te posse et an facias quoue conuertas praesens prouidentiae ueritas intuetur, diuinam te praescientiam non posse uitare, sicuti praesentis oculi effugere non possis intuitum, quamuis te in uarias actiones libera uoluntate conuerteris.

[¶6] But yet thou wilt inquire whether God's knowledge shall be changed by thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another, it should also seem to have divers knowledges. No. For God's sight preventeth all that is to come and recalleth and draweth it to the presence of His own knowledge; neither doth He vary, as thou imaginest, now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving preventeth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of comprehending and seeing all things, God hath not by the event of future things but by His own simplicity. By which that doubt is also resolved which thou didst put a little before, that it is an unworthy thing that our future actions should be said to cause the knowledge of God. For this force of the divine knowledge comprehending all things with a present notion appointeth to everything its measure and receiveth nothing i mm ensuing accidents. All which being so, tile tree-will of mortal men remaineth unviolated, neither are the laws unjust which propose punishments and rewards to our wills, which are free from all necessity. There remaineth also a beholder of all things which is God, who foreseeth all things, and the eternity of His vision, which is always present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions, distributing rewards to the good and punishments to the evil. Neither do we in vain put our hope in God or pray to Him; for if we do this well and as we ought, we shall not lose our labour or be without effect. Wherefore fly vices, embrace virtues, possess your minds with worthy hopes, offer up humble prayers to your highest Prince. There is, if yon will not dissemble, a great necessity of doing we imposed upon you. since yon live in the sight of your Judge, who beholdeth all things.”

> Latin: Quid igitur inquies? Ex meane dispositione scientia diuina mutabitur, ut cum ego nunc hoc nunc aliud uelim, illa quoque noscendi uices alternare uideatur? Minime. Omne namque futurum diuinus praecurrit intuitus et ad praesentiam propriae cognitionis retorquet ac reuocat nec alternat, ut aestimas, nunc hoc nunc illud praenoscendi uice, sed uno ictu mutationes tuas manens praeuenit atque complectitur. Quam comprehendendi omnia uisendique praesentiam non ex futurarum prouentu rerum, sed ex propria deus simplicitate sortitus est. Ex quo illud quoque re- soluitur quod paulo ante posuisti indignum esse, si scientiae dei causam futura nostra praestare dicantur. Haec enim scientiae uis praesentaria notione cuncta complectens rebus modum omnibus ipsa constituit, nihil uero posterioribus debet. Quae cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus arbitrii libertas nec iniquae leges solutis omni necessitate uoluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. Manet etiam spectator desuper cunctorum praescius deus uisionisque eius praesens semper aeternitas cum nostrorum actuum futura qualitate concurrit bonis praemia malis supplicia dispensans. Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque; quae cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt. Auersamini igitur uitia, colite uirtutes, ad rectas spes animum subleuate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigite. Magna uobis est, si dissimulare non uultis, necessitas indicta probitatis, cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis.”