---
title: "The African War · Bellum Africum"
author: "Anonymous (Caesarian corpus)"
translator: "A. G. Way"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/
cite: "Anonymous (Caesarian corpus), tr. A. G. Way, The African War · Bellum Africum. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/"
---

# The African War · Bellum Africum

*Anonymous (Caesarian corpus), tr. A. G. Way*

Caesar’s campaign in Africa against the Pompeians and King Juba, to the battle of Thapsus and Cato’s suicide at Utica, by an unknown officer who served in it.

> Latin: ed. A. G. Way, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi0426.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: A. G. Way, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi0426.phi001.perseus-eng1). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Chapters 1–26](https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/1.md)
2. [Chapters 27–50](https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/2.md)
3. [Chapters 51–73](https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/3.md)
4. [Chapters 74–98](https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/4.md)

## 1. Chapters 1–26

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/1/#p-N

[¶0] 1. After completing a series of full day’s marches without pausing for a single day, Caesar arrived at Lilybaeum on December 17, and shewed himself desirous of embarking forthwith, although he had no more than a single legion of recruits and barely six hundred cavalry. He had his tent pitched alongside the actual beach so that the waves all but beat upon it: his purpose in so doing was to prevent anyone from hoping he would enjoy any respite, and to ensure that everyone was in a state of daily and hourly readiness. During this time he was unlucky with the weather, which was unsuitable for sailing; but for all that he still kept his rowers and troops aboard the ships and let slip no opportunity for setting forth, despite, above all, the reports which were coming in from the local provincials about the forces of the enemy—innumerable cavalry, four royal legions, a great quantity of light-armed troops, ten legions under command of Scipio, a hundred-and-twenty elephants and several fleets: vet even so he was not deterred, but remained resolute and optimistic. Meanwhile every day saw an increase in the number of his warships, and numerous transports also assembled there: four legions of recruits, the veteran Fifth legion, and some two thousand cavalry also joined the muster.

> Latin: 1. Caesar itineribus iustis confectis nullo die intermisso a. d. XIIII Kal. Ian. Lilybaeum pervenit statimque ostendit sese navis velle conscendere, cum non amplius legionem tironum haberet unam, equites vix DC. Tabernaculum secundum litus ipsum constituit, ut prope fluctus verberaret. Hoc eo consilio fecit ne quis sibi morae quicquam fore speraret et ut omnes in dies horasque parati essent. Incidit per id tempus ut tempestates ad navigandum idoneas non haberet; nihilo tamen minus in navibus remiges militesque continere et nullam praetermittere occasionem profectionis, cum praesertim ab incolis eius provinciae nuntiarentur adversariorum copiae equitatus hinnitus, legiones regiae IIII, levis armaturae magna vis. Scipionis legiones X, elephanti CXX classesque esse complures; tamen non deterrebatur animoque et spe confidebat. Interim in dies et naves longae adaugeri et onerariae complures eodem concurrere et legiones tironum convenire IIII, veterana legio quinta, equitum ad II milia.

[¶1] 2. Six legions and two thousand cavalry had now been mustered. Each legion, as soon as it arrived, was embarked on the warships, while the cavalry were shipped aboard the transports. Accordingly, he ordered the greater part of the fleet to sail on ahead and make for the island of Aponiana, which is ten miles distant from Lilybaeum: he himself stayed behind there for a few days and sold up the property of a few persons for the profit of the state, and then gave full instructions to the praetor Alienus, who was governor of Sicily, in particular about the prompt embarkation of the rest of the army. Having given these instructions, he himself embarked on December 25 and immediately caught up with the remainder of his fleet. And so, sailing in a fast ship with a steady wind, three days later with a few warships he came into sight of Africa for his transports, which comprised the rest of his fleet, had, with a few exceptions, been scattered by the wind and, losing their course, made for various points along the coast. He sailed on past Clupea with his fleet, and then past Neapolis; and besides these places he passed by quite a number of strongholds and towns not far from the sea.

> Latin: 2. Legionibus collectis VI et equitum II milibus, ut quaeque prima legio venerat in navis longas imponebatur, equites autem in onerarias. Ita maiorem partem navium antecedere iussit et insulam petere Aponianam, quae abest a Lilybaeo milia passuum X: ipse paucos dies ibi commoratus bona paucorum vendit publice, deinde Alieno praetori, qui Siciliam obtinebat, de omnibus rebus praecipit et de reliquo exercitu celeriter imponendo. Datis mandatis ipse navem conscendit a. d. VI. Kal. Ian. et reliquas navis statim est consecutus. Ita vento certo celerique navigio vectus post diem quartum cum longis paucis navibus in conspectum Africae venit; namque onerariae reliquae praeter paucas vento dispersae atque errabundae diversa loca petierunt. Clupeam classe praetervehitur, dein Neapolim; complura praeterea castella et oppida non longe a mari reliquit.

[¶2] 3. When Caesar reached Hadrumetum, where his opponents had a garrison commanded by C. Considius. Cn. Piso made his appearance there with approximately three thousand Moorish troops, approaching Hadrumetum with his cavalry along the sea coast from Clupea whereupon Caesar paused for a little while in front of the port, waiting for the rest of his ships to assemble, and then landed his army, which numbered at present three thousand infantry and a hundred-and-fifty cavalry. He then pitched camp in front of the town and established himself without molesting anyone, looting being universally forbidden. Meanwhile the occupants of the town manned their battlements with armed troops, and massed in front of the gate to defend themselves: their numbers amounted to the equivalent of two legions. Caesar rode round the town carefully observing the lie of the land, and then returned to camp. Some blamed him for lack of foresight because he had not originally briefed his pilots and captains about what points on the coast they were to make for, and had not, as had been his own habitual practice on previous occasions, issued sealed instructions to be read at a specified time, so that they could all make for a given rendezvous together. But this was by no means an oversight on Caesar’s part; in fact, he surmised that there was no port on African soil where his fleet could run ashore and which he could count on as immune from the enemy’s protection; and failing that, he was on the watch for luck to present him with an opportunity to land.

> Latin: 3. Postquam Hadrumetum accessit, ubi praesidium erat adversariorum cui praeerat C. Considius, et a Clupeis secundum oram maritimam cum equitatu Hadrumetum petens Cn. Piso cum Maurorum circiter tribus milibus apparuit, ibi paulisper Caesar ante portum commoratus, dum reliquae naves convenirent, exponit exercitum, cuius numerus in praesentia fuit peditum III milia, equites CL, castrisque ante oppidum positis sine iniuria cuiusquam consedit cohibetque omnis a praeda. Oppidani interim muros armatis complent, ante portam frequentes considunt ad sese defendendum quorum numerus duarum legionum instar erat. Caesar circum oppidum vectus natura loci perspecta rediit in castra. Non nemo culpae eius imprudentiaeque assignabat, quod neque circum loca gubernatoribus praefectisque quid peterent praeceperat neque, ut more ipsius consuetudo superioribus temporibus fuerat, tabellas signatas dediderat, ut in tempore his perlectis locum certum peterent universi. Quod minime Caesarem fefellerat; nam neque ullum portum terrae Africae quo classes decurrerent pro certo tutum ab hostium praesidio fore suspicabatur, sed fortuito oblatam occasionem egressus aucupabatur.

[¶3] 4. Meanwhile one of his lieutenants, L. Phineus, asked Caesar to give him authority to treat with Considius, if by any means he could be brought to see reason. Permission being granted, he accordingly wrote a letter, which he gave to a prisoner to take to Considius in the town. As soon as the prisoner had arrived there, and when he was in the very act of [landing Considius the letter in accordance with his instructions, the latter remarked before accepting it: “Where did you get this?” Whereupon the prisoner replied: “From the commander-in-chief. Caesar.” Then Considius retorted: “There is but one commander-in-chief of the Roman people at the moment, namely Scipio.” He then ordered the prisoner to be executed forthwith in his presence, and gave the letter—still unread and with its seals intact—to a reliable messenger to take to Scipio.

> Latin: 4. L. Plancus interim legatus petit a Caesare uti sibi daret potestatem cum Considio agendi, si posset aliqua ratione perduci ad sanitatem. Itaque data facultate litteras conscribit et eas captivo dat perferendas in oppidum ad Considium. Quo simul atque captivus cum pervenisset litterasque, ut erat mandatum, Considio porrigere coepisset, prius quam acciperet ille, “Unde,” inquit, “istas?” Tum captivus: “Imperatore a Caesare.” Tum Considius, “Unus est,” inquit, “Scipio imperator hoc tempore populi Romani”; deinde in conspectu suo statim captivum interfici iubet litterasque nondum perlectas, sicut erant signatae, dat homini certo ad Scipionem perferendas.

[¶4] 5. A night and a day were spent under the walls of the town without any reply being given by Considius: moreover, the rest of Caesar’s forces failed to arrive to reinforce him; he had no abundance of cavalry and insufficient forces to assault the town, and those he had were mere recruits; he was loath to let his army suffer heavy casualties immediately on its arrival; the defences of the town were remarkably strong, its lofty position rendering it difficult to attack; and reports were coming in that large reinforcements of cavalry were on their way to aid the occupants of the town. For these reasons there seemed no point in staying on for the purpose of attacking the town, lest, while engaged in that task, Caesar might be surrounded in the rear by the enemy cavalry and so find himself in difficulties.

> Latin: 5. Postquam una nocte et die ad oppidum consumpta neque responsum ullum a Considio dabatur, neque ei reliquae copiae succurrebant neque equitatu abundabat et ad oppidum oppugnandum non satis copiarum habebat et eas tironum neque primo adventu convulnerari exercitum volebat, et oppidi egregia munitio et difficilis ad oppugnandum erat ascensus et nuntiabatur auxilia magna equitatus oppidanis suppetias venire, non est visa ratio ad oppugnandum oppidum commorandi, ne, dum in ea re est Caesar occupatus, circumventus a tergo ab equitatu hostium laboraret.

[¶5] 6. Caesar therefore was minded to strike camp and while he was doing so a large body of men suddenly sallied forth from the town, and were reinforced simultaneously, as it chanced, by some cavalry sent by Juba to collect their pay: they seized Caesar’s camp, which he had just quitted to begin his march. and began to pursue his rearguard. On seeing this the legionary troops came to an abrupt halt, while the cavalry, few as they were, nevertheless displayed the utmost gallantry in charging against such vast numbers. An incredible thing took place: less than thirty Gallic cavalry dislodged two thousand Moorish cavalry and drove them to take refuge in the town. After they had been repulsed and hurled back within their fortifications, Caesar made haste to proceed with his projected march. But as the enemy repeated these tactics all too frequently—now following in pursuit, now once again driven back into the town by the cavalry—Caesar posted in the rear of his column a few cohorts of the veteran troops which he had with him, as well as part of his cavalry, and so proceeded to march at a slow pace with the remainder of his force. In this way the further they withdrew from the town, the slower were the Numidians to pursue them. Meanwhile in the course of his march deputations arrived from towns and strongholds with promises of corn and assurances of their readiness to carry out any orders he might give them. And so on that day he pitched camp near the town of Ruspina.

> Latin: 6. Itaque castra cum movere vellet, subito ex oppido erupit multitudo atque equitatus subsidio uno tempore eis casu succurrit, qui erat missus a Iuba ad stipendium accipiendum, castraque, unde Caesar egressus iter facere coeperat, occupant et eius agmen extremum insequi coeperunt. Quae res eum animadversa esset, subito legionarii consistunt et equites, quamquam erant pauci, tamen contra tantam multitudinem audacissime concurrunt. Accidit res incredibilis, ut equites minus XXX Galli Maurorum equitum II milia loco pellerent fugarentque in oppidum. Postquam repulsi et coniecti erant intra munitiones, Caesar iter constitutum ire contendit. Quod cum saepius facerent et modo insequerentur, modo rursus ab equitibus in oppidum repellerentur, cohortibus paucis ex veteranis quas secum habebat in extremo agmine collocatis et parte equitatus iter leniter cum reliquis facere coepit. Ita quanto longius ab oppido discedebatur, tanto tardiores ad insequendum erant Numidae. Interim in itinere ex oppidis et castellis legationes venire, polliceri frumentum paratosque esse quae imperasset facere. Itaque eo die castra posuit ad oppidum Ruspinam.

[¶6] 7. From there he moved camp on January 1st and arrived at the town of Leptis, a free community, immune from taxes. Envoys came from the town to meet him and promised they would readily do whatever he wished. Accordingly, he posted centurions and picquets at the town gates, to prevent any soldier from entering it or molesting any inhabitant, and then made his camp adjoining the shore, not far from the town. And it so chanced that some of his transports and warships arrived at this same place: as for the rest of them, it appeared from the reports which reached him that owing to their uncertain knowledge of the district they were making towards Utica. For the time being Caesar would not leave the sea or strike inland on account of these wayward vessels, and kept all his cavalry aboard ship, his purpose being, I imagine, to prevent their pillaging the countryside: as for water, he ordered it to be carried aboard. Meanwhile Caesar’s troops were taken by surprise when some rowers who had disembarked to fetch water were suddenly set upon by Moorish cavalry, who wounded many with their lances and killed some of them. These Moors in fact lurk in ambush with their horses in the wadis, so as to start up suddenly and not to fight it out hand to hand in the plain.

> Latin: 7. Kal. Ianuariis inde movit et pervenit ad oppidum Leptim, liberam civitatem et immunem. Legati ex oppido obviam veniunt, libenter se omnia facturos quae vellet pollicentur. Itaque centurionibus ad portas oppidi et custodiis impositis, ne quis miles in oppidum introiret aut iniuriam faceret cuipiam incolae, non longe ab oppido secundum litus facit castra. Eodemque naves onerariae et longae non nullae casu advenerunt; reliquae, ut est ei nuntiatum, incertae locorum Uticam versus petere visae sunt. Interim Caesar a mari non digredi neque mediterranea petere propter navium errorem equitatumque in navibus omnem continere, ut arbitror, ne agri vastarentur; aquam in navis iubet comportari. Remiges interim, qui aquatum e navibus exierant, subito equites Mauri neque opinantibus Caesarianis adorti multos iaculis convulnerarunt, non nullos interfecerunt. Latent enim in insidiis cum equis inter convallis ut subito exsistant, non ut in campo comminus depugnent.

[¶7] 8. Meanwhile Caesar sent messengers to Sardinia and the other neighbouring provinces with despatches instructing them to take steps, immediately on reading the despatch, to send him reinforcements, supplies and corn. He also unloaded some of his warships and sent Rabirius Postumius to Sicily to fetch a second convoy. He ordered Vatinius to set out with ten warships to search for the remaining transports which had gone astray, and at the same time to keep the sea safe from enemy raiders. He likewise ordered the praetor C. Sallustius Crispus to proceed with a detachment of ships to the island of Cercina, which was under enemy occupation, as he heard that there was a great quantity of corn there. These orders and instructions he issued to each individual in such terms as to rule out any excuses as to whether or not they could be carried out, and to prevent any shuffling involving delay. Meanwhile he himself learned from deserters and the local inhabitants of the terms entered into by Scipio and his supporters who were engaged in hostilities against him—Scipio was in point of fact maintaining a royal cavalry force at the expense of the province of Africa; and he felt sorry that men could be so mad as to prefer to be the hirelings of a king to being in their own country, in the company of their own citizens, secure in the possession of their own fortunes.

> Latin: 8. Caesar interim in Sardiniam nuntios cum litteris et in reliquas provincias finitimas dimisit, ut sibi auxilia, commeatus, frumentum, simul atque litteras legissent, mittenda curarent, exoneratisque partim navibus longis Rabirium Postumum in Siciliam ad secundum commeatum arcessendum mittit. Vatinium eum X navibus longis ad reliquas navis onerarias conquirendas quae deerrassent et simul mare tuendum ab hostibus iubet proficisci. Item C. Sallustium Crispum praetorem ad Cercinam insulam versus, quam adversarii tenebant, cum parte navium ire iubet, quod ibi magnum numerum frumenti esse audiebat. Haec ita imperabat unicuique, ita praecipiebat uti fieri posset necne locum excusatio nullum haberet nec moram tergiversatio. Ipse interea ex perfugis et incolis cognitis condicionibus Scipionis et qui cum eo bellum contra se gerebant, miserari—regium enim equitatum Scipio ex provincia Africa alebat—tanta homines esse dementia ut malint regis esse vectigales quam cum civibus in patria in suis fortunis esse incolumes.

[¶8] 9. On January 2nd Caesar moved his camp. Leaving behind at Leptis a garrison of six cohorts with Saserna, he himself returned with his remaining forces back to Ruspina, whence he had come the previous day. There the army’s baggage was left, and he himself set out with a force in light order to forage round the farms, issuing instructions to the townsfolk that all their carts and draught animals must go with him; and so, after finding a large quantity of corn, he returned to Ruspina. His object in returning to this town was, I imagine, to avoid leaving the coastal towns behind him unoccupied, but rather, by securing them with garrisons, to fortify them as strongholds for the reception of his fleet.

> Latin: 9. Caesar a. d. IIII Non. Ian. castra movet; Lepti sex cohortium praesidio cum Saserna relicto ipse rursus unde pridie venerat Ruspinam cum reliquis copiis convertit ibique sarcinis exercitus relictis ipse cum expedita manu proficiscitur circum villas frumentatum oppidanisque imperat ut plaustra iumentaque omnia sequantur. Itaque magno numero frumenti invento Ruspinam redit. Huc eum idcirco existimo recepisse, ut maritima oppida post se ne vacua relinqueret praesidioque firmata ad classim receptacula muniret.

[¶9] 10. And so, leaving behind a legion under command of P. Saserna—brother of the man he had left in the nearby town of Leptis—with instructions that as much wood as possible should be conveyed into the town, he left the town of Ruspina and made for its harbour, which is two miles distant. With him he took seven cohorts which were drawn from veteran legions and had seen service aboard the fleet with Sulpicius and Vatinius; and having reached the harbour he went aboard his fleet with this force as evening was approaching. There was not a man in the army who knew the plans of the commander-in-chief, not a man but sought eagerly to know them: and in their ignorance they were all filled with anxiety, grave alarm and depression. For they saw themselves landed in Africa with a tiny force—and that too of recruits, and not all of it disembarked— pitted against large forces including the limitless cavalry of a treacherous race nor could they discern anything to console them in their present plight, no help in the counsels of their comrades—no help at all, save in the expression of their commander himself, and his energy and remarkable cheerfulness for he displayed a high and buoyant spirit. It was in him that his men found peace of mind: his skill and resolution would, they all hoped, make everything run smoothly for them.

> Latin: 10. Itaque ibi relicto P. Saserna, fratre eius quem Lepti in proximo oppido reliquerat, cum legione, iubet comportari ligna in oppidum quam plurima ipse cum cohortibus VII, quae ex veteranis legionibus in classe cum Sulpicio et Vatinio rem gesserant, ex oppido Ruspina egressus proficiscitur ad portum, qui abest ab oppido milia passuum duo, ibique classem sub vesperum cum ea copia conscendit. Omnibus in exercitu insciis et requirentibus imperatoris consilium, magno metu ae tristimonia sollicitabantur. Parva enim cum copia et ea tironum, neque omni exposita, in Africa contra magnas copias et insidiosae nationis equitatum innumerabilem se expositos videbant neque quicquam solati in praesentia neque auxili in suorum consilio animum advertebant, nisi in ipsius imperatoris vultu, vigore mirabilique hilaritate; animum enim altum et erectum prae se gerebat. Huic adquiescebant homines et in eius scientia et consilio omnia sibi proclivia omnes fore sperabant.

[¶10] 11. After spending one night aboard his fleet Caesar was proceeding to set out at the first pale light of dawn, when suddenly the squadron about which he was apprehensive sought haven there from its wanderings. On learning of this, Caesar promptly ordered everyone to disembark and, drawn up under arms on the beach, to await the arrival of the rest of his troops. And so when these ships had been brought without delay into port, with their cargo of infantry and cavalry, Caesar once again returned to the town of Ruspina, drew up his camp there, and then set out himself with thirty cohorts in light order to forage. As a result of this Caesar’s plan now became known: it had been his intention to go with his fleet to the assistance of those transports which had gone astray, but to do so without the enemy’s knowing of it, lest by chance his own ships might run unawares against his opponents’ fleet; nor had he wanted his own troops left behind on guard to know of this plan, lest, on account of their own small numbers and the multitude of the enemy, fear should make them fail in their duty.

> Latin: 11. Caesar una nocte in navibus consumpta iam caelo albente cum proficisci conaretur, subito navium pars de qua timebat ex errore eodem conferebatur. Hac re cognita Caesar celeriter de navibus imperat omnis egredi atque in litore armatos reliquos advenientis milites exspectare. Itaque sine mora navibus eis in portum receptis et advectis militum equitumque copiis rursus ad oppidum Ruspinam redit atque ibi castris constitutis ipse eum cohortibus expeditis XXX frumentatum est profectus. Ex eo est cognitum Caesaris consilium, illum cum classe navibus onerariis quae deerrassent subsidio ire clam hostibus voluisse, ne casu imprudentes suae naves in classem adversariorum inciderent, neque eam rem eos voluisse scire qui in praesidiis relicti sui milites fuissent, ne hi propter suorum paucitatem et hostium multitudinem metu deficerent.

[¶11] 12. Meanwhile, when Caesar had now advanced about three miles from his camp, information obtained by his scouts and mounted patrols reached him that the enemy’s forces had been sighted by them at no great distance. And indeed simultaneously with that information they began to see a great cloud of dust. On learning this, Caesar promptly gave orders for his entire cavalry force—of which arm he had no great abundance available at the moment—-and his small contingent of archers to be summoned from the camp, and for the standards to follow him slowly in their regular order: he himself went on ahead with a small armed party. Now that the enemy could be seen in the distance, he ordered the troops to don their helmets and prepare for battle in the open plain: their total number comprised thirty cohorts, together with four hundred cavalry and one hundred-and-fifty archers.

> Latin: 12. Interim cum iam Caesar progressus esset a castris circiter milia passuum III, per speculatores et antecessores equites nuntiatur ei copias hostium haud longe ab sese visas. Et hercule cum eo nuntio pulvis ingens conspici coeptus est. Hac re cognita Caesar celeriter iubet equitatum universum, cuius copiam habuit in praesentia non magnam, et sagittarios, quorum parvus numerus, ex castris arcessi atque ordinatim signa se leniter consequi ipse antecedere cum paucis armatis. Iamque eum procul hostis conspici posset, milites in campo iubet galeari et ad pugnam parari quorum omnino numerus fuit XXX cohortium cum equitibus CCCC, sagittariis CL.

[¶12] 13. Meanwhile the enemy, led by Labienus and the two Pacidei, deployed a straight line of remarkable length and closely packed, not with infantry, but with cavalry, interspersed with light-armed Numidians and unmounted archers in such close formation that at a distance Caesar’s men supposed them to be infantry: the two wings—to right and left—were reinforced with strong detachments of cavalry. Meanwhile Caesar deployed a single straight line— the most his small numbers allowed; he drew up his archers in front of the line and posted cavalry to cover his right and left wings, with instructions to take care they were not enveloped by the mass of the enemy’s cavalry; for he supposed that he would be engaging infantry troops in the set battle line.

> Latin: 13. Hostes interim, quorum dux erat Labienus et duo Pacidei, aciem derigunt mirabili longitudine non peditum sed equitum confertam, et inter eos levis armaturae Numidas et sagittarios pedites interposuerant et ita condensaverant ut procul Caesariani pedestris copias arbitrarentur; dextrum ae sinistrum cornu magnis equitum copiis firmaverant. Interim Caesar aciem derigit simplicem, ut poterat propter paucitatem; sagittarios ante aciem constituit, equites dextro sinistroque cornu opponit et ita praecipit ut providerent ne multitudine equitatus hostium circumvenirentur: existimabat enim se acie instructa cum pedestribus copiis dimicaturum.

[¶13] 14. There was now on either side a growing feeling of expectancy; but Caesar made no move and saw that the smallness of his own forces called for the use of strategy rather than a trial of strength against the vast numbers of the enemy; when suddenly his opponents’ cavalry began to deploy, extending towards the flanks and enveloping the high ground, causing Caesar’s cavalry to lengthen and weaken their formation, and preparing simultaneously for an encircling movement. Caesar’s cavalry found it difficult to bear up against their vast numbers. Meanwhile as the two centres were proceeding to charge one another, suddenly from out of the closely packed squadrons the light-armed Numidian infantry doubled forward alongside the cavalry and hurled their javelins among the infantry of the legions. Hereupon Caesar’s men launched an attack upon them and their cavalry took to flight; but the infantry stood their ground meantime, until the cavalry should renew their charge and return to succour their own infantry.

> Latin: 14. Cum utrimque exspectatio fieret neque Caesar sese moveret et eum suorum paucitate contra magnam vim hostium artificio magis quam viribus decernendum videret, subito adversariorum equitatus sese extendere et in latitudinem promovere collisque complecti et Caesaris equitatum extenuare simulque ad circumeundum comparare se coeperant. Caesariani equites eorum multitudinem aegre sustinebant. Acies interim mediae eum concurrere conarentur, subito ex condensis turmis pedites Numidae levis armaturae eum equitibus procurrunt et inter legionarios pedites iacula coiciunt. Hic cum Caesariani in eos impetum fecissent, illorum equites refugiebant; pedites interim resistebant, dum equites rursus cursu renovato peditibus suis succurrerent.

[¶14] 15. Caesar was now confronted with novel tactics and observed that his men’s formation was becoming disorganised as they ran forward to attack—the infantry in fact, exposing their flank as they advanced in pursuit of the cavalry too far from the standards, were suffering casualties from the javelins of the nearest Numidians: whereas the enemy cavalry easily eluded by their speed the heavy infantry javelin. Accordingly, he had the order passed down the ranks that no soldier should advance more than four feet from the standards. Meanwhile the cavalry of Labienus, relying on the large numbers on their own side, endeavoured to surround Caesar’s scanty force and the mere handful of Julian cavalry, worn out by the enemy hordes, their horses wounded, gave ground little by little, while the enemy pressed on them more and more. Thus in a moment all the legionaries were surrounded by the enemy cavalry, and Caesar’s forces were compressed into a circle; and so they were all compelled to fight penned behind bars as it were.

> Latin: 15. Caesar novo genere pugnae oblato eum animum adverteret ordines suorum in procurrendo turbari— pedites enim, dum equites longius a signis persequuntur, latere nudato a proximis Numidis iaculis vulnerabantur equites autem hostium pilum militis cursu facile vitabant—edicit per ordines ne quis miles ab signis IIII pedes longius procederet. Equitatus interim Labieni suorum multitudine confisus Caesaris paucitatem circuire conatur: equites Iuliam pauci multitudine hostium defessi equis convulneratis paulatim cedere; hostes magis magisque instare. Ita puncto temporis omnibus legionariis ab hostium equitatu circumventis Caesarisque copiis in orbem compulsis intra cancellos omnes coniecti pugnare cogebantur.

[¶15] 16. Labienus rode bare-headed up and down the front line, encouraging his own men the while and occasionally accosting Caesar’s legionaries in such terms as these: “What are you up to, recruit? Quite the dashing little fellow, aren’t you? Have all of you too been made fools of by that fellow’s words? So help me, it’s a very dangerous situation he has driven you into. I feel sorry for you.” “I’m not a recruit, Labienus,” replied one soldier, “but a veteran of the Tenth legion.” To this Labienus retorted: “I don’t recognise the standards of the Tenth.” Then said the soldier: “You’ll soon see what I’m made of.” As he spoke the words he flung the helmet from his head so that the other could recognise him and, thus uncovered, brandished his heavy javelin with all his force, as he aimed it at Labienus: then plunging it violently full in the horse’s chest he said: “That will teach yon, Labienus, that it’s a soldier of the Tenth who is attacking you.” All the troops, however, were demoralised, particularly the recruits for they kept looking round for Caesar and contented themselves with dodging the enemy javelins.

> Latin: 16. Labienus in equo capite nudo versari in prima acie simul suos cohortari, non numquam legionarios Caesaris ita appellare: “Quid tu,” inquit, “miles tiro? Tam feroculus es? Vos quoque iste verbis infatuavit? In magnum mehercule vos periculum impulit. Misereor vestri.” Tum miles, “Non sum,” inquit, “tiro, Labiene, sed de legione X. veteranus.” Tum Labienus, “Non agnosco,” inquit, “signa decumanorum.” Tum ait miles: “Iam me qui sim intelleges”; simul cassidem de capite deiecit, ut cognosci ab eo posset, atque ita pilum viribus contortum, dum in Labienum mittere contendit, equi graviter adverso pectori adfixit et ait: “Labiene, decumanum militem qui te petit scito esse.” Omnium tamen animi in terrorem coniecti, et maxime tironum: circumspicere enim Caesarem neque amplius facere nisi hostium iacula vitare.

[¶16] 17. Meanwhile Caesar, aware of the enemy’s tactics, gave orders for the line to be extended to its maximum length, and for every other cohort to turn about, so that one was facing to the rear of the standards, while the next one faced to their front. By this means with his right and left wing he split in half the encircling enemy force: and having isolated one half from the other with his cavalry, proceeded to attack it from inside with his infantry, turning it to flight with volleys of missiles: then, after advancing no great distance for fear of ambush, he retired to his own lines. The other half of Caesar’s cavalry and infantry carried out the same tactics. This task accomplished and the enemy being driven far back with heavy casualties, Caesar began to retire to his own defence positions, maintaining battle formation.

> Latin: 17. Caesar interim consilio hostium cognito iubet aciem in longitudinem quam maximam porrigi et alternis conversis cohortibus, ut una post, altera ante signa tenderet, ita coronam hostium dextro sinistroque cornu mediam dividit et unam partem ab altera exclusam equitibus intrinsecus adortus cum peditatu telis coniectis in fugam vertit neque longius progressus veritus insidias se ad suos recipit; idem altera pars equitum peditumque Caesaris fecit. His rebus gestis ac procul hostibus repulsis convulneratisque ad sua praesidia sese, sicut erat instructus, recipere coepit.

[¶17] 18. Meanwhile M. Petreius and Cn. Piso arrived with Numidian troops—sixteen hundred picked cavalry and a fairly considerable force of infantry—and immediately on arrival hastened straight to the aid of their comrades. And so the enemy, putting their fears aside and taking fresh heart and courage, wheeled their cavalry round and began to attack the rear of the retreating legionaries and to hinder their withdrawal to camp. Observing this, Caesar ordered to turn about and renew the battle in the middle of the plain. As the enemy repeated the same manoeuvre, but without any return to hand-to-hand fighting, and as Caesar’s cavalry found that their horses, worn out with the effects of recent seasickness, thirst and the fatigue and wounds sustained in their unequal contest, were now more reluctant to keep doggedly on the move in pursuit of the enemy, and as there was now but a little daylight left, Caesar urged his encircled cohorts and cavalry to make one vigorous thrust and not give up until they had driven the enemy back beyond the furthest high ground and gained possession of the latter. And so, waiting to give the signal until the enemy’s volleys of missiles were half-hearted and inaccurate, he suddenly let loose some cohorts and squadrons of his own troops upon them. In a moment the enemy were driven without trouble off the plain and thrown back behind the high ground, and Caesar’s men had gained the position then, after a brief pause there, they retired slowly in battle formation to their own fortifications. Their opponents likewise, after this warm reception, then at length withdrew to their own positions.

> Latin: 18. Interim M. Petreius et Cn. Piso eum equitibus Numidis MDC electis peditatuque eiusdem generis satis grandi ex itinere recta subsidio suis occurrunt. Atque hostes suis ex terrore firmatis rursusque renovatis animis legionarios conversis equitibus recipientes novissimos adoriri et impedire coeperunt quo minus se in castra reciperent. Hac re animadversa Caesar iubet signa converti et medio campo redintegrari proelium. Cum ab hostibus eodem modo pugnaretur nec comminus ad manus rediretur Caesarisque equites iumenta ex nausea recenti, siti, languore, paucitate, vulneribus defatigata ad insequendum hostem perseverandumque cursum tardiora haberent dicique pars exigua iam reliqua esset, cohortibus equitibusque circumdatis cohortatur ut uno ictu contenderent neque remitterent, donec ultra ultimos collis hostis reppulissent atque eorum essent potiti. Itaque signo dato eum iam hostes languide tela neglegenterque mitterent, subito immittit cohortis turmasque suorum atque puncto temporis hostibus nullo negotio campo pulsis post collemque deiectis nacti locum atque ibi paulisper commorati, ita uti erant instructi leniter se ad suas recipiunt munitiones. Itemque adversarii male accepti tum demum se ad sua praesidia contulerunt.

[¶18] 19. Meanwhile after this engagement had taken place and when the action had been broken off, quite a number of all ranks of the opposing side deserted to Caesar, and in addition not a few of the enemy cavalry and infantry were taken prisoner. From them the enemy’s plan became known. He had come with the intention of trying out new and unfamiliar battle tactics upon Caesar’s legionaries, in order that—raw recruits and few in numbers as they were—they should be demoralised thereby, and be enveloped and crushed by the cavalry, as Curio had been; and Labienus had spoken to this effect to his troops on parade, that he would furnish Caesar’s opponents with so vast a number of auxiliaries that Caesar’s men would be quite exhausted even with killing them, and so would be vanquished in the very hour of victory, and mastered by his forces. In fact, quite apart from the aid of those auxiliaries, he had reason for self-confidence: first because he had heard that at Rome the veteran legions were mutinous and refusing to cross into Africa; next because he had kept his own troops in Africa for three years: they were acclimatised and he had now secured their loyalty to himself; he had, moreover, very large auxiliary forces composed of Numidian cavalry and light-armed troops and, besides these, the German and Gallic cavalry which, after the defeat and rout of Pompeius, he, Labienus, had brought across with him from Buthrotum, as well as those which he had levied later on in Africa from half-castes, freedmen and slaves, and had armed and taught to handle a bridled horse: he had in addition royal auxiliary forces, as well as a hundred and twenty elephants and innumerable cavalry; and finally, legions raised from more than twelve thousand men of every type. On such considerations was based the reckless confidence that fired Labienus, with his sixteen hundred Gallic and German cavalry, his eight thousand Numidians who rode without bridles, reinforced in addition by the cavalry contingent of Petreius, sixteen hundred strong, and with his infantry and light-armed force, four times as big, and with his numerous archers, slingers and mounted archers. These were the forces which on January 4th, five days after Caesar reached Africa, on a perfectly flat and unimpeded plain were engaged in a contest from the fifth hour of the day continuously till sundown. In that battle Petreius was gravely wounded and retired from the field.

> Latin: 19. Interim ea re gesta et proelio dirempto ex adversariis perfugere plures ex omni genere hominum, et praeterea intercepti hostium complures equites peditesque. Ex quibus cognitum est consilium hostium, eos hae mente et conatu venisse ut novo atque inusitato genere proeli tirones legionarii paucique perturbati Curionis exemplo ab equitatu circumventi opprimerentur, et ita Labienum dixisse pro contione, tantam se multitudinem auxiliorum adversariis Caesaris sumministraturum ut etiam caedendo in ipsa victoria defatigati vincerentur atque a suis superarentur, quippe qui sine illorum ope sibi confideret, primum quod audierat Romae legiones veteranas dissentire neque in Africam velle transire; deinde quod triennio in Africa suos milites retentos consuetudine fidelis sibi iam effecisset, maxima autem auxilia haberet Numidarum equitum levisque armaturae, praeterea ex fuga proelioque Pompeiano Labienus quos secum a Buthroto transportaverat equites Germanos Gallosque ibique postea ex hibridis, libertinis servisque conscripserat, armaverat equoque uti frenato condocuerat, praeterea regia auxilia, elephantis CXX equitatuque innumerabili, deinde legiones conscriptas ex cuiusquemodi generis amplius XII milibus. Hac spe atque ea audacia inflammatus Labienus cum equitibus Gallis Germanisque MDC, Numidarum sine frenis VIII milibus, praeterea Petreiano auxilio adhibito equitibus MDC, peditum ac levis armaturae quater tanto, sagittariis ac funditoribus hippotoxotisque compluribus: his copiis pridie Non. Iam, post diem VI. quam Africam Caesar attigit, in campis planissimis purissimisque ab hora diei quinta usque ad solis occasum est decertatum. In eo proelio Petreius graviter ictus ex acie recessit.

[¶19] 20. Meanwhile Caesar fortified his camp with greater care, strengthened its defences by manning them with larger forces, and carried an entrenchment from the town of Ruspina right to the sea, and a second from his camp likewise to the sea: his purpose was to ensure safer communication in both directions and to enable his reinforcements to come up to his support without danger. He brought missiles and artillery from the ships into his camp, and armed some of the Gallic and Rhodian rowers and marines from the fleet and summoned them to camp, in order that, if possible, on the same principle which his opponents had employed, light-armed troops should be interspersed at intervals among his cavalry. From all his ships he brought archers into camp—Ityreans, Syrians and men of divers races—and thronged his forces with numerous drafts of them; for he heard that on the second day after the battle was fought Scipio was approaching and uniting his forces— reported to comprise eight legions and three thousand cavalry—with those of Labienus and Petreius. He also established smithies, took steps to ensure a plentiful supply of arrows and missile-weapons, cast leaden bullets, collected stakes, and sent couriers with despatches to Sicily bidding them build up for his use stocks of hurdles and timber for battering-rams—timber was scarce in Africa—and in addition send him iron and lead. He realised, moreover, that no corn could be available for his use in Africa unless it was imported; for there had been no harvest the previous year on account of the levies held by his opponents and the fact that the farmers, being tributary subjects of Rome, had been called up for military service: moreover, his opponents had collected corn from the whole of Africa and conveyed it into a few well-fortified towns, and every corner of Africa was thus ransacked of corn and apart from those few towns which his opponents were able to defend themselves with their own garrisons, the rest were being destroyed and abandoned: their inhabitants had been compelled to migrate to the shelter of the enemy garrisons, and their lands were now abandoned and laid waste.

> Latin: 20. Caesar interim castra munire diligentius, praesidia firmare copiis maioribus vallumque ab oppido Ruspina usque ad mare ducere et a castris alterum eodem, quo tutius ultro citroque commeare auxiliaque sine periculo sibi succurrere possent, tela tormentaque ex navibus in castra comportare, remigum partem ex classe, Gallorum, Rhodiorum epibatarumque armare et in castra evocare uti, si posset, eadem ratione qua adversarii levis armatura interiecta inter equites suos interponeretur, sagittariisque ex omnibus navibus Ityreis, Syris et cuiusque generis ductis in castra compluribus frequentabat suas copias—audiebat enim Scipionem post diem tertium eius diei quo proelium factum erat appropinquare, copias suas eum Labieno et Petreio coniungere; cuius copiae legionum VIII et equitum III milium esse nuntiabantur—officinas ferrarias instruere, sagittas telaque ut fierent complura curare, glandis fundere, sudis comparare, litteras in Siciliam nuntiosque mittere, ut sibi eratis materiemque congererent ad arietes, cuius inopia in Africa esset, praeterea ferrum, plumbum mitteretur. Etiam animum advertebat frumento se in Africa nisi importaticio uti non posse: priore anno enim propter adversariorum dilectus, quod stipendiarii aratores milites essent facti, messem non esse factam; praeterea ex omni Africa frumentum adversarios in pauca oppida et bene munita comportasse omnemque regionem Africae exinanisse frumento, oppida praeter ea pauca quae ipsi suis praesidiis tueri poterant reliqua dirui ac deseri, et eorum incolas intra sua praesidia coegisse commigrare, agros desertos ac vastatos esse.

[¶20] 21. Under stress of this emergency Caesar had, by soliciting private individuals with touching appeals, amassed a certain amount of corn in his garrisons, and this he was using sparingly. Meanwhile every day he went round the field-works in person, and doubled the number of cohorts on guard duty in view of the large numbers of the enemy. Labienus gave orders that his wounded, who were very numerous, should have their wounds dressed and then be carried in carts to Hadrumetum. Meanwhile some of Caesar’s transports were cruising aimlessly about, badly off their course in their uncertain knowledge of the area and the position of his camp; and one by one they were set upon by a number of enemy pinnaces and set on fire or boarded. When this was reported to Caesar he posted squadrons round the islands and harbours to enable his supplies to be convoyed with greater safety.

> Latin: 21. Hac necessitate Caesar coactus privatos ambiendo et blande appellando aliquantum numerum frumenti in sua praesidia congesserat et eo parce utebatur. Opera interim ipse cotidie circuire et alteras cohortis in statione habere propter hostium multitudinem. Labienus saucios suos, quorum numerus maximus fuit, iubet in plaustris deligatos Hadrumetum deportari. Naves interim Caesaris onerariae errabundae male vagabantur incertae locorum atque castrorum suorum quas singulas scaphae adversariorum complures adortae incendebant atque expugnabant. Hac re nuntiata Caesar classis circum insulas portusque disposuit, quo tutius commeatus supportari posset.

[¶21] 22. Meanwhile M. Cato, who was in command at Utica, never left off assailing Cn. Pompeius, the son, with long and constant speeches of reproof. “When your father was your age,” he said, “he perceived that the state was oppressed by wicked and vicious citizens, and that loyal men had either been put to death or else, punished by exile, were deprived of their country and civic rights. Whereupon, carried away by his ambition and the nobility of his nature, though a mere private citizen and a callow youth. In-mustered the remnants of his father’s army and emancipated Italy and the city of Rome when they were all but utterly overwhelmed and destroyed: and likewise he recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia and Mauretania by force of anus with astonishing speed. By these achievements he won himself that prestige of his which in lustre and in fame is unequalled throughout the world, and, albeit a mere youth and a Roman knight, celebrated a triumph. And in his case his father had not the same imposing record as your father has, nor had he inherited from his ancestors the same position of eminent distinction, nor was he endowed with such influential ties of client-ship or with a famous name, when he entered public life. Whereas in your case not only are you endowed with the fame and prestige of your father, but you yourself arc also adequately endowed on your own account with nobility of nature and with earnestness. Will yon not therefore make an effort and set out in quest of your father’s clients to demand their assistance for yourself, for the state and for every loyal citizen?”

> Latin: 22. M. Cato interim, qui Uticae praeerat, Cn. Pompeium filium multis verbis assidueque obiurgare non desistebat, “Tuus,” inquit, “pater istuc aetatis cum esset et animadvertisset rem publicam ab nefariis sceleratisque civibus oppressam bonosque aut interfectos aut exsilio multatos patria civitateque carere, gloria et animi magnitudine elatus privatus atque adulescentulus paterni exercitus reliquiis collectis paene oppressam funditus et deletam Italiam urbemque Romanam in libertatem vindicavit, idemque Siciliam, Africam, Numidiam, Mauretaniam mirabili celeritate armis recepit. Quibus ex rebus sibi eam dignitatem quae est per gentis clarissima notissimaue conciliavit adulescentulusque atque eques Romanus triumphavit. Atque ille non ita amplis rebus patris gestis neque tam excellenti dignitate maiorum parta neque tantis clientelis nominisque claritate praeditus in rem publicam est ingressus. Tu contra et patris nobilitate et dignitate et per te ipse satis animi magnitudine diligentiaque praeditus nonne eniteris et proficisceris ad paternas clientelas auxilium tibi reique publicae atque optimo cuique efflagitatum?”

[¶22] 23. These words, coming from a man of the greatest authority, spurred on the youth. Taking with him thirty small ships of every type, including a few equipped with beaks, he set out from Utica and invaded Mauretania and the kingdom of Bogud. With an army in light order comprising two thousand slaves and freedmen, some with arms, some without, he proceeded to approach the town of Ascurum, where there was a royal garrison. As Pompeius drew near, the townsfolk allowed him to come closer and closer until he was actually approaching the very gates and the town wall: then suddenly they made a sally and drove the crushed and panic-stricken Pompeians back wholesale to the sea and their ships. After this reverse Cn. Pompeius, the son, withdrew his fleet from there and without touching land again set course with his fleet towards the Balearic Islands.

> Latin: 23. His verbis hominis gravissimi incitatus adulescentulus eum naviculis cuiusquemodi generis XXX, inibi paucis rostratis, profectus ab Utica in Mauretaniam regnumque Bogudis est ingressus expeditoque exercitu servorum, liberorum II milium numero, cuius partem inermem, partem habuerat armatam, ad oppidum Ascurum accedere coepit; in quo oppido praesidium fuit regium. Pompeio adveniente oppidani, usque eo passi propius accedere donec ad ipsas portas ac murum appropinquaret, subito eruptione facta prostratos perterritosque Pompeianos in mare navisque passim compulerunt. Ita re male gesta Cn. Pompeius filius navis inde avertit neque postea litus attigit classemque ad insulas Balearis versus convertit.

[¶23] 24. Meanwhile Scipio set out with the forces we enumerated a little earlier, leaving a considerable garrison behind at Utica, and pitched camp first at Hadrumetum. Then, after staving there a few days, he made a night march and joined up with the forces of Labienus and Petreius; whereupon they established themselves in a single camp three miles distant from Caesar. Meanwhile their cavalry went roving round Caesar’s entrenchments, intercepting all such troops as had advanced beyond the rampart to forage or fetch water; and this had the effect of keeping all their opponents confined within their defences. By these tactics Caesar’s men were afflicted with a severe scarcity of corn, for this reason that supplies had not so far been conveyed to him either from Sicily or Sardinia, and, on account of the season of the year, fleets could not move freely about the seas without risk moreover, they occupied no more than six miles of African soil in any one direction, and were hard put to it for lack of fodder. The urgency of this situation drove the veteran troops—infantry and cavalry—men who had gone through many campaigns by land and sea and had often been afflicted by hazards and similar privation, to collect seaweed from the beach, cleanse it in fresh water, and give it in this state to their famished beasts, thereby prolonging their lives.

> Latin: 24. Scipio interim cum eis copiis quas paulo ante demonstravimus Uticae grandi praesidio relicto profectus primum Hadrumeti castra ponit, deinde ibi paucos dies commoratus noctu itinere facto eum Labieni et Petrei copiis coniungit, atque unis castris factis III milia passuum longe considunt. Equitatus interim eorum circum Caesaris munitiones vagari atque eos qui pabulandi aut aquandi gratia extra vallum progressi essent excipere: ita omnis adversarios intra munitiones continere. Qua re Caesariani gravi annona sunt conflictati, ideo quod nondum neque ab Sicilia neque ab Sardinia commeatus supportatus erat neque per anni tempus in mari classes sine periculo vagari poterant; neque amplius milia passuum VI terrae Africae quoquo versus tenebant pabulique inopia premebantur. Qua necessitate coacti veterani milites equitesque, qui multa terra marique bella confecissent et periculis inopiaque tali saepe essent conflictati, alga e litore collecta et aqua dulci eluta et ita iumentis esurientibus data vitam eorum producebant.

[¶24] 25. While these events were taking place, king Juba, who was aware of Caesar’s difficulties and the small numbers of his forces, thought it advisable not to give him any respite for recruiting his strength or increasing his resources. And so, having got together large forces of cavalry and infantry, he departed from his kingdom and made haste to go to the assistance of his friends. Meanwhile P. Sittius and king Bochus had united their forces and, learning of king Juba’s departure, moved them closer to his kingdom. Sittius then attacked Cirta, the richest town of that kingdom, and after a few days’ fighting captured it, as well as two Gaetulian towns. When he offered them terms, proposing that they should evacuate the town and surrender it unoccupied to him, they refused the terms and were subsequently captured by Sittius and all put to death. Thereupon he advanced, ravaging both countryside and towns without ceasing. Juba got to know of this when he was now not far away from Scipio and his lieutenants, and came to the conclusion that it was better to go to the aid of himself and his own kingdom, rather than that, in the course of setting out to help others, he should himself be driven out of his own kingdom, and perhaps be thwarted in both fields. Accordingly, he marched back again, withdrawing his auxiliary forces too from Scipio, in his alarm on account of himself and his own interests and leaving thirty elephants behind with Scipio, he set forth to the relief of his own territory and towns.

> Latin: 25. Dum haec ita fierent, rex Iuba cognitis Caesaris difficultatibus copiarumque paucitate—non est visum dari spatium convalescendi augendarumque eius opum: itaque comparatis equitum magnis peditumque copiis subsidio suis egressus e regno ire contendit. P. Sittius interim et rex Bochus coniunctis suis copiis cognito regis Iubae egressu propius eius regnum copias suas admovere, Cirtamque, oppidum opulentissimum eius regni, adortus paucis diebus pugnando capit et praeterea duo oppida Gaetulorum. Quibus cum condicionem ferret, ut oppido excederent idque sibi vacuum traderent, condicionemque repudiassent, postea ab eo capti interfectique sunt omnes. Inde progressus agros oppidaque vexare non destitit. Quibus rebus cognitis Iuba cum iam non longe ab Scipione atque eius ducibus abesset, capit consilium satius esse sibi suoque regno subsidio ire quam, dum alios adiuturus proficisceretur, ipse suo regno expulsus forsitan utraque re expelleretur. Itaque rursus recipere atque auxilia etiam ab Scipione abduxit sibi suisque rebus timens elephantisque XXX relictis suis finibus oppidisque suppetias profectus est.

[¶25] 26. Meanwhile as there was some doubt in the province as to Caesar’s arrival, and nobody believed it was Caesar in person that had come to Africa with the forces, but rather some one of his lieutenants, he sent written despatches round the province informing all the communities of his personal arrival. Meanwhile persons of note fled from their towns and sought refuge in Caesar’s camp and proceeded to quote instances of the cruelty and harshness of his opponents. Their tears and complainings had no little effect on Caesar; and though he had previously decided to wait for the beginning of summer to muster all his forces and auxiliaries from their permanent quarters and wage war on his opponents, he now resolved on a winter campaign, promptly drafting a despatch to Alienus and Rabirins Postumus in Sicily, which he sent by a reconnaissance vessel, to the effect that an army must be shipped across to him as quickly as possible: there must be no delay and no excuses on the ground of wintry weather or adverse winds. The province of Africa, he wrote, was in its death throes, in the process of utter destruction at the hands of his foes and unless aid were promptly rendered to their allies, nothing save the very soil of Africa—not even a roof to give them shelter—would be left as the result of their enemies’ treacherous crimes. Caesar himself was in such a ferment of impatient expectancy that on the day after he sent the messenger to Sicily with the despatch he kept saving that the fleet and army were dallying; and day and night he kept his eyes and attention bent and riveted upon the sea. And no wonder; for he perceived that farms were being burned to the ground, fields stripped, herds plundered or butchered, towns and strongholds destroyed and abandoned, and the principal citizens either murdered or held in chains, and their children haled off to slavery on the pretext of being hostages: yet to these folk, who in their misery implored his protection, he could give no assistance because his forces were so few. Meanwhile he kept his troops continuously at work on their training, proceeded with the fortification of his camp, and went on without interruption constructing towers and redoubts and driving moles out into the sea.

> Latin: 26. Caesar interim, cum de suo adventu dubitatio in provincia esset neque quisquam crederet ipsum sed aliquem legatum in Africam cum copiis venisse, conscriptis litteris circum provinciam omnis civitates facit de suo adventu certiores. Interim nobiles homines ex suis oppidis profugere et in castra Caesaris devenire et de adversariorum eius crudelitate acerbitateque commemorare coeperunt. Quorum lacrimis querelisque Caesar commotus, cum antea constituisset e stativis castris aestate inita cunctis copiis auxiliisque accitis bellum cum suis adversariis gerere, hieme gerere instituit, litteris celeriter in Siciliam ad Alienum et Rabirium Postumum conscriptis et per catascopum missis, ut sine mora ae nulla excusatione hiemis ventorumque quam celerrime exercitus sibi transportaretur: Africam provinciam perire funditusque everti ab suis inimicis; quod nisi celeriter sociis foret subventum, praeter ipsam Africam terram nihil, ne tectum quidem quo se reciperent, ab eorum scelere insidiisque reliquum futurum. Atque ipse erat in tanta festinatione et exspectatione ut postero die quam misisset litteras nuntiumque in Siciliam classem exercitumque morari diceret, dies noctesque oculos mentemque ad mare dispositos directosque haberet. Nec mirum: animadvertebat enim villas exuri, agros vastati, pecus diripi, trucidari, oppida castellaque dirui deserique, principes civitatum aut interfici aut in catenis teneri, liberos eorum obsidum nomine in servitutem abripi; eis se miseris suamque fidem imperantibus auxilio propter copiarum paucitatem esse non posse. Milites interim in opere exercere atque castra munire, turris, castella facere molesque iacere in mare non intermittere.

## 2. Chapters 27–50

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/2/#p-N

[¶0] 27. Scipio meanwhile undertook the training of the elephants in the following manner. He drew up two lines of battle: one line of slingers, facing the elephants, to take the place of the enemy and to discharge small stones against the opposing front formed by the elephants; next he arranged the elephants in line, and behind them drew up his own line so that, when the enemy proceeded to sling their stones and the elephants in their consequent panic wheeled round upon their own side, his men should receive them with a volley of stones, and so make them wheel round again away from his own line in the direction of the enemy. This method worked, though it was a difficult and slow process for elephants are uncouth creatures, and it is difficult to get them fully trained even with many years’ training and long practice; and if they are led forth to battle, they are, for all their training, equally dangerous to both sides.

> Latin: 27. Scipio interim elephantos hoc modo condocefacere instituit. Duas instruxit acies, unam funditorum contra elephantos, quae quasi adversariorum locum obtineret et contra eorum frontem adversam lapillos minutos mitteret; deinde in ordinem elephantos constituit, post illos autem suam aciem instruxit ut, cum ab adversariis lapides mitti coepissent et elephanti perterriti se ad suos convertissent, rursus ab sua acie lapidibus missis eos converterent adversus hostem. Quod aegre tardeque fiebat; rudes enim elephanti multorum annorum doctrina usuque vetusto vix edocti tamen communi periculo in aciem producuntur.

[¶1] 28. While these dispositions were being made at Ruspina by the leaders on either side, the ex-praetor C. Vergilius, who was in charge of the coastal town of Thapsus, observed that ships carrying Caesar’s troops were sailing singly on no set course, due to their uncertain knowledge of the locality and of the position of his camp. He therefore seized the opportunity and manned with soldiers and archers a fast boat which he had there, to which he added some ship’s pinnaces, and with these he set about the pursuit of Caesar’s ships one by one. He had attacked several, only to be beaten off, put to flight and forced to quit the area, but even so was still persisting in his hazardous tactics, when chance led him to fall in with a ship which had on board two young Spaniards of the name of Titius—tribunes of the Fifth legion, whose father Caesar had caused to be elected to the Senate—as well as T. Salienus, a centurion of the same legion, who had laid siege to the house of M. Messalla, Caesar’s lieutenant, at Messana, employing in his presence the language of downright mutiny. This man had also been responsible for withholding under guard some money and trappings belonging to Caesar’s triumph, and for these reasons viewed his own prospects with misgiving. His own guilty conscience led him to persuade the young men to put up no resistance, but to surrender to Vergilius. Accordingly they were escorted by Vergilius to Scipio, put under guard, and two days later put to death. As they were being led to execution, the elder Titius, it is said, besought the centurions to put him to death before his brother and was readily granted that request, and they were put to death in that order.

> Latin: 28. Dum haec ad Ruspinam ab utrisque ducibus administrantur, C. Vergilius praetorius, qui Thapsi oppido maritimo praeerat, cum animum advertisset navis singulas cum exercitu Caesaris incertas locorum atque castrorum suorum vagari, occasionem nactus navem quam ibi habuit actuariam complet militibus et sagittariis et eidem scaphas de navibus adiungit ac singulas navis Caesarianas consectari coepit. Et cum pluris adortus esset pulsus fugatusque inde discessisset nec tamen desideret periclitari, forte incidit in navem, in qua erant duo Titii, Hispani adulescentes, tribuni legionis V., quorum patrem Caesar in senatum legerat, et eum his T. Salienus, centurio legionis eiusdem, qui M. Messallam legatum obsederat Messanae seditiosissima oratione apud eum usus idemque pecuniam et ornamenta triumphi Caesaris retinenda et custodienda curarat et ob has causas sibi timebat. Hic propter conscientiam peccatorum suorum persuasit adulescentibus ne repugnarent seseque Vergilio traderent. Itaque deducti a Vergilio ad Scipionem custodibus traditi et post diem tertium sunt interfecti. Qui cum ducerentur ad necem, petisse dicitur maior Titius a centurionibus uti se priorem quam fratrem interficerent, idque ab eis facile impetrasse atque ita esse interfectos.

[¶2] 29. Meanwhile the squadrons of cavalry whose regular duty it was to be on guard in front of tin: rampart were engaging daily in incessant skirmishes with one another; and there were also times when Labienus’ Germans and Gauls and Caesar’s cavalry exchanged pledges of good faith and conversed with one another. Meantime Labienus with part of his cavalry was endeavouring to assault and force his way into the town of Leptis, which was under command of Saserna with six cohorts; but its defenders, thanks to the excellent fortifications of the town and the large number of their engines of war, defended it easily and without danger. But Labienus’ cavalry repeated these tactics fairly frequently and gave them no respite and when it so chanced that a squadron had halted in massed formation in front of the gate, its captain was struck and pinned to his horse by a bolt discharged from a scorpion with unusual Inaccurate aim. This so unnerved the rest that they withdrew in flight to their camp, too much daunted by it to resume their attempt upon the town thereafter.

> Latin: 29. Turmae interim equitum, quae pro vallo in stationibus esse solebant, cotidie minutis proeliis inter se depugnare non intermittunt non numquam etiam Germani Gallique Labieniani eum Caesaris equitibus fide data inter se colloquebantur. Labienus interim cum parte equitatus Leptim oppidum, cui praeerat Saserna eum cohortibus VI, oppugnare ac vi irrumpere conabatur; quod ab defensoribus propter egregiam munitionem oppidi et multitudinem tormentorum facile et sine periculo defendebatur. Quod ubi saepius eius equitatus facere non intermittebat, et eum forte ante portam turma densa adstitisset, scorpione accuratius misso atque eorum deditione percusso et ad equum defixo reliqui perterriti fuga se in castra recipiunt. Quo facto postea sunt deterriti oppidum temptare.

[¶3] 30. Meanwhile practically every day Scipio arrayed his line of battle at no great distance—three hundred paces—from his own camp, and then, when the greater part of the day was now spent, returned back again to camp. As this manoeuvre was carried out quite frequently without anyone’s issuing forth from Caesar’s camp or approaching closer to Scipio’s forces, the latter, holding scorn of the forbearance shewn by Caesar and his army, led forth his entire force, with thirty elephants equipped with towers drawn up in front of his line: then, advancing and simultaneously deploying to the widest possible extent his vast numbers of cavalry and infantry, he halted in the plain not so very far form Caesar’s When he learned of this Caesar gave orders that those troops who had gone forward outside the fortifications, whether to forage or fetch wood or even to work on the fortifications, as well as those who had been collecting stakes and what was needed for that work, should all retire within the fortifications—-gradually and in a disciplined manner, without any fuss or alarm—and take their stand in the field-works.

> Latin: 30. Scipio interim fere cotidie non longe a suis castris passibus CCC instruere aciem ac maiore parte diei consumpta rursus in castra se recipere. Quod eum saepius fieret neque ex Caesaris castris quisquam prodiret neque propius eius copias accederet, despecta Caesaris patientia exercitusque eius, universis copiis productis elephantisque turritis XXX ante aciem instructis, quam latissime potuit porrecta equitum peditumque multitudine uno tempore progressus haud ita longe a Caesaris castris constitit in campo.

[¶4] 31. His instructions to the cavalry on guard were to go on holding the positions in which they had been posted a little earlier, until they should come within range of the enemy’s missiles: if the enemy advanced yet closer, they must then make as honourable a withdrawal as possible within the fortifications. As for the rest of the cavalry, they too had their orders— to be ready at hand, equipped and armed, each man in his proper place. These orders, however, he did not issue personally on the spot, surveying the situation for himself from the rampart; but so remarkable was his skill and knowledge of warfare that, making use of look-outs and orderlies, he issued the instructions necessary for his purpose as he sat in his head-quarters. For he observed that, although his opponents were relying on the great size of their forces, yet they were the very men whom he himself had often routed, beaten back and utterly demoralised, only to spare their lives and forgive their misdemeanours; in which circumstances, considering their own lack of initiative and their guilty conscience, they would never muster sufficient confidence in victory as to venture to attack his camp. Moreover, his own name and prestige had, to a great extent, a sobering effect upon the reckless spirit of their army. Then again the exceptional defences of the camp—the height of the rampart, the depth of the ditches, and the concealed stakes outside the rampart, marvellously well planted—all these, even without defenders, served to deter the enemy’s approach while as for scorpions, catapults and all the other normal weapons of defence, he had a plentiful supply of these. These he had prepared in advance in view of the small size and lack of experience of his army as it then was, and it was not because he was taken aback or dismayed at the enemy’s might that he showed himself—to the enemy’s thinking—long-suffering and timid. The reason why he would not lead his forces on to the field, few and inexperienced though they were, was not that he lacked confidence in his victory, but he considered the important question was—what manner of victory it would prove for he thought it a personal slur if after all his achievements, after all the many brilliant victories he had won over such massive armies, men should look upon this victory as one gained only with much bloodshed over such remnants as his opponents had mustered from their routed forces. And so he had resolved to endure their boastful triumph until his second convoy should join him, including some portion of his veteran legions.

> Latin: 31. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar iubet milites qui extra munitiones processerant pabulandi lignandique aut etiam muniendi gratia quique vallum petierant quaeque ad eam rem opus erant, omnis intra munitiones minutatim modesteque sine tumultu aut terrore se recipere atque in opere consistere. Equitibus autem qui in statione fuerant praecipit ut usque eo locum obtinerent in quo paulo ante constitisset donec ab hoste telum missum ad se perveniet quod si propius accederetur, quam honestissime se intra munitiones reciperent. Alii quoque equitatui edicit uti suo quisque loco paratus armatusque praesto esset. At haec non ipse per se coram, cum de vallo prospecularetur, sed mirabili peritus scientia bellandi in praetorio sedens per speculatores et nuntios imperabat quae fieri volebat. Animadvertebat enim, quamquam magnis essent copiis adversarii freti, tamen saepe a se fugatis, pulsis perterritisque et concessam vitam et ignota peccata; quibus rebus numquam tanta suppeteret ex ipsorum inertia conscientiaque animi victoriae fiducia ut castra sua adoriri auderent. Praeterea ipsius nomen auctoritasque magna ex parte eorum exercitus minuebat audaciam. Tum egregiae munitiones castrorum atque valli fossarumque altitudo et extra vallum stili caeci mirabilem in modum consiti vel sine defensoribus aditum adversariis prohibebant: scorpionum, catapultarum ceterorumque telorum quae ad defendendum solent parari magnam copiam habebat. Atque haec propter exercitus sui praesentis paucitatem et tirocinium praeparaverat, non hostium vi et metu commotus patientem se timidumque hostium opinioni praebebat. Neque idcirco copias, quamquam erant paucae tironumque, non educebat in aciem qui victoriae suae diffideret, sed referre arbitrabatur, cuiusmodi victoria esset futura; turpe enim sibi existimabat tot rebus gestis tantisque exercitibus devictis, tot tam claris victoriis partis, ab reliquis copiis adversariorum suorum ex fuga collectis se cruentam adeptum existimari victoriam. Itaque constituerat gloriam exsultationemque eorum pati, donec sibi veteranarum legionum pars aliqua in secundo commeatu occurrisset.

[¶5] 32. Meanwhile Scipio lingered for a little while, as I mentioned earlier, in that position, to create the impression that he had held Caesar virtually in contempt, and then gradually withdrew his forces to camp. There he paraded his troops and spoke to them of the dread which their own side inspired and the desperate attitude of Caesar’s army; and with such words of encouragement to his men he promised them that he would shortly give them a lasting victory. Caesar ordered his troops to return once more to their duties and, on the pretext of the fortifications, kept his recruits constantly employed to the point of exhaustion. Meanwhile Numidians and Gaetulians were daily deserting from Scipio’s camp: the former betook themselves to Juba’s kingdom, while the latter, because they themselves and their ancestors had been kindly treated by C. Marius and heard that Caesar was a relation of his, swarmed constantly for refuge into Caesar’s camp. From among their number Caesar chose certain more distinguished members, gave them letters for their fellow citizens, and so dismissed them, exhorting them to raise a force for the defence of themselves and their people, and not to submit passively to the dictates of their foes and opponents.

> Latin: 32. Scipio interim paulisper, ut antea dixi, in eo loco commoratus, ut quasi despexisse Caesarem videretur, paulatim reducit suas copias in castra et contione advocata de terrore suo desperationeque exercitus Caesaris facit verba et cohortatus suos victoriam propriam se eis brevi daturum pollicetur. Caesar iubet milites rursus ad opus redire et per causam munitionum tirones in labore defatigare non intermittit. Interim Numidae Gaetulique diffugere cotidie ex castris Scipionis et partim in regnum se conferre, partim, quod ipsi maioresque eorum beneficio C. Mari usi fuissent Caesaremque eius adfinem esse audiebant, in eius castra perfugere catervatim non intermittunt. Quorum ex numero electis hominibus inlustrioribus et litteris ad suos civis datis cohortatus uti manu facta se suosque defenderent, ne suis inimicis adversariisque dicto audientes essent, mittit.

[¶6] 33. While these events were taking place at Ruspina, there came to Caesar envoys from Acylla, an independent state immune from taxes. They assured him that they would readily and gladly do whatever he might bid: they merely prayed and besought him to give them a garrison to enable them to do his bidding with the greater safety and without peril: they would supply its members with corn and with all other adequate supplies for the sake of their common welfare. This request Caesar readily granted and gave them a garrison, ordering C. Messius, who had once held the office of aedile, to set out for Acylla. On learning this, Considius Longus, who was in command at Hadrumetum with two legions and seven hundred cavalry, left part of his garrison force behind and, taking eight cohorts with him, promptly hastened off to Acylla. Messius completed his march more rapidly and was the first to arrive at Acylla with his cohorts. Whereupon Considius approached the city with his forces and observed that Caesar’s garrison was there and not venturing to jeopardies his troops, retired back again to Hadrumetum without having achieved anything to warrant so large a force. Subsequently, when a few days later he had procured a contingent of cavalry from Labienus, he returned, pitched his camp and proceeded to lay siege to Acylla.

> Latin: 33. Dum haec ad Ruspinam fiunt, legati ex Acylla, civitate libera et immuni, ad Caesarem veniunt seque paratos quaecumque imperasset et libenti animo facturos pollicentur: tantum orare et petere ab eo ut sibi praesidium daret, quo tutius id et sine periculo facere possent; se et frumentum et quaecumque res eis suppeteret communis salutis gratia sumministraturos. Quibus rebus facile a Caesare impetratis praesidioque dato. C. Messium, aedilicia functum potestate. Acyllam iubet proficisci. Quibus rebus cognitis Considius Longus, qui Hadrumeti cum duabus legionibus et equitibus DCC praeerat, celeriter ibi parte praesidi relicta cum VIII cohortibus ad Acyllam ire contendit. Messius celerius itinere confecto prior Acyllam cum cohortibus pervenit. Considius interim eum ad urbem cum copiis accessisset et animadvertisset praesidium Caesaris ibi esse, non ausus periculum suorum facere nulla re gesta pro multitudine hominum rursus se Hadrumetum recepit; deinde, paucis post diebus equestribus copiis a Labieno adductis, rursus Acyllitanos castris positis obsidere coepit.

[¶7] 34. It was during this time that C. Sallustius Crispus, who, as we have explained, had been despatched by Caesar with a fleet a few days earlier, arrived at Cercina. On his arrival the ex-quaestor C. Decimius, who was controller of supplies there and was attended by a large escort composed of his own household slaves, went aboard a small boat he had got hold of and took to flight. Meanwhile Sallustius, the praetor, was welcomed by the inhabitants of Cercina; and finding a large quantity of corn he loaded some merchant vessels—there was quite a large number of them there—and sent them to Caesar in his camp. Meanwhile at Lilybaeum the proconsul Alienus embarked in transports the Thirteenth and Fourteenth legions, eight hundred Gallic cavalry and one thousand slingers and archers, and sent to Caesar in Africa his second convoy. With the wind behind them these ships arrived safely three days later at the harbour of Ruspina, the town where Caesar had his camp. This heartened Caesar, who experienced twofold pleasure and delight at thus simultaneously receiving both corn and reinforcements: and now that at last his troops were made cheerful and the corn problem was eased, he laid aside his cares, ordered his legions and cavalry to disembark and get over the effects of their lassitude and seasickness, and drafted them to the various forts and defended positions.

> Latin: 34. Per id tempus C. Sallustius Crispus, quem paucis ante diebus missum a Caesare cum classe demonstravimus, Cercinam pervenit. Cuius adventu C. Decimius quaestorius, qui ibi cum grandi familiae suae praesidio praeerat commeatui, parvulum navigium nactus conscendit ae se fugae commendat. Sallustius interim praetor a Cercinitanis receptus magno numero frumenti invento navis onerarias, quarum ibi satis magna copia fuit, complet atque in castra ad Caesarem mittit. Alienus interim pro consule Lilybaeo in navis onerarias imponit legionem XIII. et XIIII, et equites Gallos DCCC, funditorum sagittariorumque mille ac secundum commeatum in Africam mittit ad Caesarem. Quae naves ventum secundum nactae quarto die in portum ad Ruspinam, ubi Caesar castra habuerat, incolumes pervenerunt. Ita Caesar duplici laetitia ac voluptate uno tempore auctus, frumento auxiliisque, tandem suis hilaritis annonaque levata sollicitudinem deponit, legiones equitesque ex navibus egressos iubet ex languore nauseaque reficere, dimissos in castella munitionesque disponit.

[¶8] 35. All this filled Scipio and his colleagues with wonder and curiosity; and they had a suspicion that some deep purpose must underlie this sudden transformation in the C. Caesar who had habitually taken the offensive hitherto and was always spoiling for a fight. And so, thrown into no little panic as a result of his forbearance, they chose from the Gaetulians two men whom they considered to be the staunchest supporters of their cause; and after offering them large rewards and making them generous promises, sent them in the guise of deserters on a spying mission into Caesar’s camp. No sooner had these men been escorted to Caesar than they sought leave to speak out frankly without danger. That leave being granted, they said: “Many of us Gaetulians, Commander-in-Chief, who are clients of C. Marius, and practically all the Roman citizens who are in the Fourth and Sixth legions have very often wanted to take refuge with you and resort to your protection; but we were prevented from doing so without hazard by the patrols of Numidian cavalry. But now that the chance has been given us we have come to you most eagerly. We were in fact sent by Scipio as spies to observe closely whether any trenches or traps had been made for the elephants in front of the camp and the gates of the rampart; and at the same time to ascertain your tactics against these same beasts and your dispositions for battle, and then report back to them.” Caesar highly commended them, furnished them with pay, and had them taken to join the other deserters. Their statement was speedily verified by actual events; for on the next day quite a number of legionary troops from the legions mentioned by the Gaetulians deserted from Scipio to Caesar’s camp.

> Latin: 35. Quibus rebus Scipio quique eum eo essent comites mirari et requirere: C. Caesarem, qui ultro consuesset bellum inferre ac lacessere proelio, subito commutatum non sine magno consilio suspicabantur. Itaque ex eius patientia in magnum timorem coniecti ex Gaetulis duos quos arbitrabantur suis rebus amicissimos magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque propositis pro perfugis speculandi gratia in castra Caesaris mittunt. Qui simul ad eum sunt deducti, petierunt ut sibi liceret verba sine periculo proloqui. Potestate facta, “Saepenumero,” inquiunt, “imperator, complures Gaetuli, qui sumus clientes C. Mari, et propemodum omnes cives Romani qui sunt in legione IIII. et VI., ad te voluimus in tuaque praesidia confugere sed custodiis equitum Numidarum quo id sine periculo minus faceremus impediebamur. Nunc data facultate ad te cupidissime venimus, pro speculatoribus missi ab Scipione ut perspiceremus num quae fossae aut insidiae elephantis ante castra portasque valli factae essent, simulque consilia vestra contra easdem bestias comparationemque pugnae cognosceremus atque eis renuntiaremus.” Qui collaudati a Caesare stipendioque donati ad reliquos perfugas deducuntur. Quorum orationem celeriter veritas comprobavit: namque postero die ex legionibus eis quas Gaetuli nominarunt milites legionarii complures ab Scipione in castra Caesaris perfugerunt.

[¶9] 36. While this was going on at Ruspina, M. Cato, the commander of Utica, was holding a constant succession of daily levies of freedmen, Africans, slaves even—any man, in fact, no matter of what class, so long as he was of an age to carry arms—and drafting them to Scipio’s camp to be at his disposal. Meanwhile there came to Caesar envoys from the town of Thysdra, in which town three hundred thousand measures of wheat had been collected by Italian merchants and farmers. These envoys now informed Caesar of the large quantity of corn they had and prayed him to send them a garrison whereby both their corn and all their stocks might the more readily be kept safe. For the present Caesar expressed his thanks to them, saying that, as for a garrison, he would send one shortly; he then dismissed them with words of encouragement, bidding them go back to their own countrymen. Meanwhile P. Sittius invaded the territory of Numidia with his forces and forcibly took by storm a stronghold, situated on a well-defended mountain height, in which Juba had collected both corn and all other regular munitions of war, for the sake of prosecuting his campaign.

> Latin: 36. Dum haec ad Ruspinam geruntur, M. Cato, qui Uticae praeerat, dilectus cotidie libertinorum, Afrorum, servorum denique et cuiusquemodi generis hominum, qui modo per aetatem arma ferre poterant, habere atque sub manum Scipioni in castra summitere non intermittit. Legati interim ex oppido Thysdrae, in quod tritici modium milia CCC comportata fuerant a negotiatoribus Italicis aratoribusque, ad Caesarem venire, quantaque copia frumenti apud se sit docent simulque orant ut sibi praesidium mittat quo facilius et frumentum et copiae suae conserventur. Quibus Caesar in praesentia gratias egit praesidiumque brevi tempore se missurum dixit cohortatusque ad suos civis iubet proficisci. P. Sittius interim cum copiis Numidiae finis ingressus castellum in montis loco munito locatum, in quod Iuba belli gerendi gratia et frumentum et res ceteras quae ad bellum usui solent esse comportaverat, vi expugnando est potitus.

[¶10] 37. Now that Caesar had reinforced his troops with two veteran legions, cavalry and light-armed forces from his second convoy, he gave orders that the ships, now unloaded, should set sail forthwith for Lilybaeum to bring across the rest of his army. On January 25, at approximately the first watch, he personally issued orders that all his scouts and aides-decamp should hold themselves at his disposal. Accordingly, without anyone’s knowing or suspecting his plan, at the third watch he ordered all his legions to be led outside the camp and follow him in the direction of the town of Ruspina, where he had a garrison; it was also the first place to have joined his side. He then descended a gentle slope and, keeping to the left side of the plain, led his legions along close to the sea. This plain is remarkably level and extends for twelve miles and the chain of not so very lofty downs which encircles it right from the very sea gives it the appearance of a kind of amphitheatre. This chain includes a few high hills, on each of which were situated some very ancient turrets and watch-towers and in the last of these Scipio had a defencepost and picket.

> Latin: 37. Caesar postquam legionibus veteranis duabus, equitatu levique armatura copias suas ex secundo commeatu auxerat, navis exoneratas statim iubet Lilybaeum ad reliquum exercitum transportandum proficisci; ipse VI. Kal. Febr. circiter vigilia prima imperat speculatores apparitoresque omnes ut sibi praesto essent. Itaque omnibus insciis neque suspicantibus vigilia tertia iubet omnis legiones extra castra educi atque se consequi ad oppidum Ruspinam versus, in quo ipse praesidium habuit et quod primum ad amicitiam eius accessit. Inde parvulam proclivitatem degressus sinistra parte campi propter mare legiones ducit. Hic campus mirabili planitie patet milia passuum XII; quem iugum cingens a mari ortum neque ita praealtum velut theatri efficit speciem. In hoc iugo colles sunt excelsi pauci, in quibus singulae turres speculaeque singulae perveteres erant collocatae, quarum apud ultimam praesidium et statio fuit Scipionis.

[¶11] 38. After Caesar had climbed up to the ridge I have described and visited each individual hill and tower, he proceeded to construct redoubts and these he completed in less than half an hour; and when he was now not so very far away from the last hill and turret, which was nearest the enemy camp and where, as I have explained, there was a defence post and picket of Numidians, he paused for a little while: then, after studying the lie of the land, he posted his cavalry on guard and assigned to his legions their tasks, ordering them to carry a line of fortifications straight along the middle of the chain, from the point he had now reached tight up to the point from where he had started. When Scipio and Labienus observed this, they led their entire cavalry force out of camp and, deploying it in battle line, advanced about a mile from their fortified positions and drew up their infantry forces in a second battle line less than four hundred paces from their camp.

> Latin: 38. Postquam Caesar ad iugum de quo docui ascendit atque in unumquemque collem turremque, castella facere coepit atque ea minus semihora effecit; et postquam non ita longe ab ultimo colle turrique fuit, quae proxima fuit castris adversariorum, in qua docui esse praesidium stationemque Numidarum, Caesar paulisper commoratus perspectaque natura loci equitatu in statione disposito legionibus opus attribuit bracchiumque medio iugo ab eo loco ad quem pervenerat usque ad eum unde egressus erat iubet derigi ac muniri. Quod postquam Scipio Labienusque animadverterant, equitatu omni ex castris educto acieque equestri instructa a suis munitionibus circiter passus mille progrediuntur pedestremque copiam in secunda acie minus passus CCCC a castris suis constituunt.

[¶12] 39. Caesar kept encouraging the troops as they worked, quite unmoved by his opponents’ forces. When he perceived that no more than a mile and a half now separated the enemy ranks from his own fortifications, and realised that the enemy were approaching closer for the purpose of obstructing his troops and forcing them to abandon their task, and as he considered that he must now perforce withdraw his legions from their work of building fortifications, he ordered a squadron of Spaniards to launch a speedy attack upon the adjacent hill, dislodge its enemy defenders, and capture the position and he also instructed a small detachment of light-armed troops to follow them in support to the same objective. Thus despatched they speedily attacked the Numidians, capturing some of them alive and seriously wounding others of their troopers as they sought to escape, and so won the position. As soon as Labienus observed this, he detached practically the entire right wing of the line of cavalry he had deployed, so as the more speedily to render them assistance: and with this force he made haste to proceed to the relief of his retreating troops. But when Caesar saw that Labienus had now withdrawn some distance from his forces, he launched the left wing of his own cavalry, so as to cut the enemy off.

> Latin: 39. Caesar in opere milites adhortari neque adversariorum copiis moveri. Iam cum non amplius passus MD inter hostium agmen suasque munitiones esse animadvertisset intellexissetque ad impediendos milites suos et ab opere depellendos hostem propius accedere necesseque haberet legiones a munitionibus deducere, imperat turmae Hispanorum ut ad proximum collem propere occurrerent praesidiumque inde deturbarent locumque caperent, eodemque iubet levis armaturae paucos consequi subsidio. Qui missi celeriter Numidas adorti partim vivos capiunt, non nullos equites fugientis convulneraverunt locumque sunt potiti. Postquam id Labienus animadvertit, quo celerius eis auxilium ferret, ex acie instructa equitatus sui prope totum dextrum cornu avertit atque suis fugientibus suppetias ire contendit. Quod ubi Caesar conspexit Labienum ab suis copiis longius iam abscessisse, equitatus sui alam sinistram ad intercludendos hostis immisit.

[¶13] 40. Now in the area where this action was going on there was a very large farm building, constructed with four lofty towers and this impeded Labienus’ field of view and prevented his observing that he was being cut off by Caesar’s cavalry. Consequently it was only when he realised that his men were being cut down from the rear that he actually saw the Julian squadrons. As a result, triumph suddenly gave place to panic among the Numidian cavalry, and Labienus made haste to flee straight back to camp. As for the Gauls and Germans, they stood their ground; but hemmed in between the enemy on the higher ground and those in their rear, despite a gallant resistance they were slaughtered to a man. On observing this, Scipio’s legions, which were drawn up in front of his camp, were seized with blind panic and began to flee by every gate into their camp. Now that Scipio and his forces had been swept in disorder from plain and hills and driven wholesale into their camp, Caesar ordered the retreat to be sounded and withdrew all his cavalry inside his own fortifications; and it was then, when the field had been cleared, that his attention was caught by the amazing bodies of the Gauls and Germans: some of whom had followed Labienus from Gaul in deference to his authority; others had been induced to join him by rewards and promises; and there were yet others who, having been made prisoners after Curio’s defeat and their lives being spared, had been anxious to give proof of their unswerving gratitude by maintaining a correspondingly unswerving loyalty. These were the men whose bodies, amazing in their beauty and stature, were lying mutilated and prostrate here and there all over the battle-field.

> Latin: 40. Erat in eo campo ubi ea res gerebatur villa permagna turribus IIII exstructa: quae Labieni prospectum impediebat, ne posset animum advertere ab equitatu Caesaris se intercludi. Itaque non prius vidit turmas Iulianas quam suos caedi a tergo sentit. Ex qua re subito in terrorem converso equitatu Numidarum recta in castra fugere contendit. Galli Germanique, qui restiterant, ex superiore loco et post tergum circumventi fortiterque restantes conciduntur universi. Quod ubi legiones Scipionis, quae pro castris erant instructae, animum adverterunt, metu ae terrore, occaecatae omnibus portis in sua castra fugere coeperunt. Postquam Scipione eiusque copiis campo collibusque exturbatis atque in castra compulsis cum receptui Caesar cani iussisset equitatumque omnem intra suas munitiones recepisset, campo purgato animadvertit mirifica corpora Gallorum Germanorumque qui partim eius auctoritatem erant ex Gallia secuti, partim pretio pollicitationibusque adducti ad eum se contulerant, non nulli, qui ex Curionis proelio capti conservatique parem gratiam in fide pariter tuenda praestare voluerant. Horum corpora mirifica specie amplitudineque caesa toto campo ac prostrata diverse iacebant.

[¶14] 41. On the day following this action Caesar withdrew his cohorts from all his defence posts and drew up all his forces in the plain: whereas Scipio, after the disastrous reception his troops had met with and their resulting heavy casualties in dead and wounded, proceeded to sit tight within his own fortifications. Caesar deployed his battle line along the lowest spurs of the chain of hills, and then slowly approached closer to Scipio’s fortifications. And now the Julian legions were less than a mile away from the town of Uzitta, which Scipio held, when the latter, fearing that he would lose the town, on which his army had been accustomed to rely for its water supply and all other means of support, led out all his forces. These forces were drawn up, according to his custom, in four lines, the first consisting of cavalry deployed in line of squadrons, interspersed with elephants equipped with towers and armour. Thus deployed. Scipio marched to the relief of the town, while Caesar, observing this move and supposing that Scipio was advancing towards him prepared and fully resolved to fight, accordingly halted before the town in the position I described a little earlier. With his own centre covered by the town, Scipio drew up his right and left wings, where his elephants were, in full view of his opponents.

> Latin: 41. His rebus gestis Caesar postero die ex omnibus praesidiis cohortis deduxit atque omnis suas copias in campo instruxit. Scipio suis male acceptis, occisis convulneratisque intra suas continere se munitiones coepit. Caesar instructa acie secundum infimas iugi radices propius munitiones leniter accessit. Iamque minus mille passus ab oppido Uzitta, quod Scipio tenebat, aberant legiones Iulianae, eum Scipio veritus ne oppidum amitteret, unde aquari reliquisque rebus sublevari eius exercitus consuerat, eductis omnibus copiis quadruplici acie instructa ex instituto suo, prima equestri turmatim derecta elephantisque turritis interpositis armatisque, suppetias ire contendit—quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, arbitratus Scipionem ad dimicandum paratum ad se certo animo venire, in eo loco, quo paulo ante commemoravi, ante oppidum constitit—suamque aciem mediam eo oppido texit; dextrum sinistrumque cornu, ubi elephanti erant, in conspectu patenti adversariorum constituit.

[¶15] 42. Caesar had now waited till nearly sunset without observing any signs of Scipio’s leaving the position in which he had halted and advancing towards him and his impression was that Scipio would rather remain on the defensive, utilising his position, if the circumstances demanded it, than venture to come to close grips on the plain. Accordingly, there seemed no sense in approaching closer to the town that day. For he was aware that it contained a large garrison force of Numidians, and he realised that the enemy had used the town to screen his centre, and that he himself was faced with a difficult task in simultaneously attacking the town and at the same time engaging in battle on his right and left wing from a disadvantageous position, the more especially so since his troops had been standing to since early morning without a bite of food, and were quite exhausted. Accordingly, he led his forces back to camp, deciding to wait till the following day and then extend his fortifications nearer the enemy’s line.

> Latin: 42. Cum iam prope solis occasum Caesar exspectavisset neque ex eo loco quo constiterat Scipionem progredi propius se animadvertisset locoque se magis defendere, si res coegisset, quam in campo comminus consistere audere, non est visa ratio propius accedendi eo die ad oppidum, quoniam ibi praesidium grande Numidarum esse cognoverat, hostisque mediam aciem suam oppido texisse et sibi difficile factu esse intellexit simul et oppidum uno tempore oppugnare et in acie in cornu dextro ae sinistro ex iniquiore loco pugnare, praesertim cum milites a mane diei ieiuni sub armis stetissent defatigati. Itaque reductis suis copiis in castra postero die propius eorum aciem instituit exporrigere munitiones.

[¶16] 43. In the meantime Considius with eight cohorts and some Numidian and Gaetulian mercenaries was besieging Acylla, where C. Messius was in command with three cohorts. He had made prolonged and manifold attempts, and had repeatedly approached the walls with siege-works on a large scale but these the townsfolk had set on fire, and he was making no progress. So when the unexpected report of the cavalry engagement arrived, he was much disconcerted and set fire to the large stock of corn in his camp, rendered unusable his wine, oil and all the other victuals with which an army is normally provided, and raised the siege of Acylla. Then he marched through Juba’s kingdom, gave part of his forces to Scipio, and retired to Hadrumetum.

> Latin: 43. Interim Considius, qui Acyllam VIII cohortibus et stipendiariis Numidis Gaetulisque obsidebat, ubi C. Messius cum III cohortibus praeerat, diu multumque expertus magnisque operibus saepe admotis et his ab oppidanis incensis eum proficeret nihil, subito nuntio de equestri proelio allato commotus, frumento cuius in castris copiam habuerat incenso, vino, oleo ceterisque rebus quae ad victum parari solent corruptis, Acyllam, quam obsidebat, deseruit atque itinere per regnum Iubae facto copias eum Scipione partitus Hadrumetum se recepit.

[¶17] 44. Meanwhile from the second convoy, which Alienus had despatched from Sicily,2 one ship having aboard Q. Cominius and a Roman knight named L. Ticida had got astray from the rest of the fleet and had been carried by the wind towards Thapsus; and being intercepted by the pinnaces and light craft of Vergilius was escorted to that port. A second trireme from the same fleet likewise went astray, was carried by a gale towards Aegimurus, and captured by the fleet of Varus and M. Octavius. On board this vessel were some veteran soldiers, with one centurion and a few recruits; and these Varus kept under guard, though without any maltreatment, and had them escorted to Scipio. When they came before him and stood in front of his tribunal, he said: “It is not of your own free will—of that I am quite sure—but under the compulsion and at the behest of that villainous commander of yours, that you are iniquitously persecuting your own citizens and all true patriots. But now that fortune has delivered you into our hands, if you mean to do your duty and range yourselves on the side of all true patriots in the defence of the state, then I am resolved to grant you your lives and reward you with money. Now therefore declare your mind.”

> Latin: 44. Interea ex secundo commeatu, quem a Sicilia miserat Alienus, navis una, in qua fuerat Q. Cominius et L. Ticida, eques Romanus, ab residua classe cum erravisset delataque esset vento ad Thapson, a Vergilio scaphis naviculisque actuariis excepta est et adducta. Item altera navis trieris ex eadem classe errabunda ae tempestate delata ad Aegimurum a classe Vari et M. Octavi est capta, in qua milites veterani eum uno centurione et non nulli tirones fuerunt; quos Varus asservatos sine contumelia deducendos curavit ad Scipionem. Qui postquam ad eum pervenerunt et ante suggestum eius constiterunt, “Non vestra,” inquit, “sponte vos certo scio, sed illius scelerati vestri imperatoris impulsu et imperio coactos civis et optimum quemque nefarie consectari. Quos quoniam fortuna in nostram detulit potestatem, si, id quod facere debetis, rem publicam cum optimo quoque defendetis, certum est vobis vitam et pecuniam donare. Quapropter quid sentiatis proloquimini.”

[¶18] 45. After addressing them to this effect Scipio had little doubt that they would express their gratitude to him for his kindness, and accordingly gave them permission to speak. One of their number, a centurion of the Fourteenth legion, then spoke as follows: “For your great kindness, Scipio—I refrain from calling you commander-in-chief—I thank you, inasmuch as you promise me, by rights a prisoner of war, my life and safety; and maybe I should now avail myself of that kind offer, but for the utterly iniquitous condition attached to it. Am I to range myself in armed opposition against Caesar, my commander-in-chief, under whom I have held my command, and against his army, to sustain the victorious reputation whereof I have been fighting for upwards of thirty-six years? No, I am not likely to do that, and I strongly advise you to give up the attempt. For you now have the chance of appreciating—if you have not previously found it out sufficiently by experience—whose troops they are you are fighting. Choose from your men one cohort, the one you regard as your most reliable, and array it here over against me: I for my part will take no more than ten men from my comrades whom you now hold in your power. Then from our prowess you shall realise what you ought to expect from your own forces.”

> Latin: 45. Hac habita oratione Scipio cum existimasset pro suo beneficio sine dubio ab his gratias sibi actum iri, potestatem eis dicendi fecit. Ex eis centurio legionis XIIII. “Pro tuo,” inquit, “summo beneficio, Scipio, tibi gratias ago—non enim imperatorem te appello— quod mihi vitam incolumitatemque belli iure capto polliceris, et forsan isto uterer beneficio, si non ei summum scelus adiungeretur. Egone contra Caesarem imperatorem meum, apud quem ordinem duxi, eiusque exercitum, pro cuius dignitate victoriaque amplius XXXVI annos depugnavi, adversus armatusque consistam? Neque ego istud facturus sum et te magnopere ut de negotio desistas adhortor. Contra cuius enim copias contendas, si minus antea expertus es, licet nunc cognoscas. Elige ex tuis cohortem unam quam putas esse firmissimam, et constitue contra me; ego autem ex meis commilitonibus quos nunc in tua tenes potestate non amplius X sumam. Tune ex virtute nostra intelleges quid ex tuis copiis sperare debeas.”

[¶19] 46. This forthright and quite unlooked for retort on the part of the centurion infuriated Scipio. Smarting with resentment he signified his wishes to his own centurions by a nod, causing the centurion to be executed in his presence, and issuing instructions for the remaining veterans to be segregated from the recruits. “Away with these fellows,” said he, “tainted as they are with unspeakable iniquities and gorged with the blood of their own citizens.” Accordingly, they were led outside the rampart and tortured to death. As for the recruits, he ordered them to be drafted among the legions, and would not allow Cominius and Ticida to be brought into his presence. This incident disquieted Caesar, who took steps to punish those whom he had instructed to be stationed with warships anchored out at sea on guard off Thapsus, so as to give protection to his transports and men-of-war: in view of their negligence he had them dismissed the service with ignominy, and had a general order published reprimanding them most severely.

> Latin: 46. Postquam haec centurio praesenti animo adversus opinionem eius est locutus, ira percitus Scipio atque animi dolore incensus innuit suis centurionibus quid fieri vellet, atque ante pedes centurionem interfecit reliquosque veteranos a tironibus iubet secerni. “Abducite istos,” inquit, “nefario scelere contaminatos et caede civium saginatos.” Sic extra vallum deducti sunt et cruciabiliter interfecti. Tirones autem iubet inter legiones dispertiri et Cominium cum Ticida in conspectum suum prohibet adduci. Qua ex re Caesar commotus eos quos in stationibus cum longis navibus apud Thapsum custodiae causa in salo esse iusserat ut suis onerariis longisque navibus praesidio essent, ob neglegentiam ignominiae causa dimittendos ab exercitu gravissimumque in eos edictum proponendum curavit.

[¶20] 47. It was round about this time that an incredible and unheard-of experience befell Caesar’s army. Although the constellation of the Pleiades had set, at about the second watch of the night a heavy rainstorm suddenly broke, accompanied by a shower of hail stones. Moreover, to make matters worse, Caesar at the time was not, as was his custom on previous occasions, keeping his army billeted in winter quarters: but every other, or every third day, lie would be advancing, moving up closer to the enemy and fortifying a camp, and in the course of doing this work his troops had no chance to look after themselves. Apart from this, his arrangements for transporting his army from Sicily were such as to allow only the troops themselves and their arms to be embarked, but no baggage, no slaves,1 none of the soldier’s normal comforts. In Africa, moreover, not only had they neither bought nor provided themselves with anything, but in addition the high price of corn had run away with all their savings. In these straitened circumstances very few men indeed were sleeping under proper tents: the rest bivouacked under tents of a sort improvised from clothing or woven with reeds and twigs. And so when the rain came down suddenly and the hail followed it, their tents sagged under the weight, and were undermined and swept away by the violence of the floods: in the dead of night the storm put out their fires: all their victuals were ruined and they wandered aimlessly hither and thither about the camp, covering their heads with their shields. That same night the spear-points of the men of the Fifth legion spontaneously caught fire.

> Latin: 47. Per id tempus fere Caesaris exercitui res accidit incredibilis auditu. Namque vergiliarum signo confecto circiter vigilia secunda noctis nimbus cum saxea grandine subito est exortus ingens. Ad quod autem incommodum accesserat quod Caesar non more superiorum temporum in hibernis exercitum continebat, sed in tertio quartoque die procedendo propiusque hostem accedendo castra communibat opereque faciendo milites se circumspiciendi non habebant facultatem. Praeterea ita ex Sicilia exercitum transportabat ut praeter ipsum militem et arma nec vas nec mancipium neque ullam rem quae usui militi esse consuevit in navis imponi pateretur. In Africa autem non modo sibi quicquam non adquisierant aut paraverant sed etiam propter annonae caritatem ante parta consumpserant. Quibus rebus attenuati oppido perquam pauci sub pellibus adquiescebant: reliqui ex vestimentis tentoriolis laetis atque harundinibus scopisque contextis permanebant. Itaque subito imbre grandineque consecuta gravatis pondere tentoriis aquarumque vi subrutis disiectisque, nocte intempesta ignibus exstinctis, rebus quae ad victum pertinent omnibus corruptis per castra passim vagabantur scutisque capita contegebant. Eadem nocte V. legionis pilorum cacumina sua sponte arserunt.

[¶21] 48. Meanwhile king Juba had been informed of Scipio’s cavalry battle and in response to a written summons from the latter he left behind his general, Saburra, with part of his army, to keep Sittius in cheek, and quitting his kingdom set off to join Scipio. With him he took three legions, eight hundred bridled cavalry, a numerous contingent of Numidians who rode without bridles, and of light-armed infantry troops, and thirty elephants. His purpose in so doing was to add a certain prestige to Scipio’s army by his personal appearance, and the more to intimidate Caesar’s. On reaching Scipio he pitched a separate royal camp with the forces I have mentioned, and took up a position not so far distant from Scipio. Now hitherto there had been considerable apprehension in Caesar’s camp: before Juba’s arrival the feeling of suspense was greater, and it was this which unsettled Caesar’s army as it was waiting for the royal forces but as soon as the king pitched his camp close to theirs, they held his forces in contempt and all their fears were laid aside. And so all the prestige with which his previous absence had endowed the king he forfeited now that he was on the spot. That the king’s arrival in this manner gave Scipio additional courage and confidence was a fact that anyone could readily appreciate: for on the following day he led out his own and the king’s entire forces, including sixty elephants, and set them in battle array with as much pomp and circumstance as possible, and then, after advancing somewhat farther than usual from his fortified positions and pausing there a little while, withdrew to camp.

> Latin: 48. Rex interim Iuba de equestri proelio Scipionis certior factus evocatusque ab eodem litteris praefecto Saburra eum parte exercitus contra Sittium relicto, ut secum ipse aliquid auctoritatis adderet exercitui Scipionis ac terrorem Caesaris, eum tribus legionibus equitibusque frenatis DCCC, Numidis sine frenis peditibusque levis armaturae grandi numero, elephantis XXX egressus e regno ad Scipionem est profectus. Postquam ad eum pervenit, castris regiis seorsum positis cum eis copiis quas commemoravi, haud ita longe ab Scipione consedit.—Erat in castris Caesaris superiore tempore magnus terror, et exspectatione copiarum regiarum exercitus eius magis suspensiore animo ante adventum Iubae commovebatur; postquam vero castra castris contulit, despectis eius copiis omnem timorem deponit. Ita quam antea absens habuerat auctoritatem, eam omnem praesens dimiserat.—Quo facto cuivis facile fuit intellectu Scipioni additum animum fiduciamque regis adventu. Nam postero die universas suas regisque copias cum elephantis LX productas in aciem quam speciosissime potuit instruxit ac paulo longius progressus ab suis munitionibus haud ita diu commoratus se recipit in castra.

[¶22] 49. When Caesar observed that practically all the reinforcements that Scipio had been awaiting had now forgathered and that there was nothing to delay an engagement, he began to advance with his troops along the crest of the ridge, carrying forward his lines of fortification and building strong points. He also made strenuous efforts to seize the high ground closer to Scipio and, by capturing it, to forestall his opponents, lest, relying on their superiority in numbers, they should seize the nearby hill and so deprive him of the opportunity of advancing farther. But Labienus too had made up his mind to seize this hill; and his closer proximity to it had enabled him to achieve the objective more rapidly.

> Latin: 49. Caesar postquam animadvertit Scipioni auxilia fere quae exspectasset omnia convenisse neque moram pugnandi ullam fore, per iugum summum eum copiis progredi coepit et bracchia protinus ducere et castella munire propiusque Scipionem capiendo loca excelsa occupare contendit, ne adversarii magnitudine copiarum confisi proximum collem occuparent atque ita longius sibi progrediendi eriperent facultatem. Eiusdem collis occupandi Labienus consilium ceperat et quo propiore loco fuerat eo celerius occurrerat.

[¶23] 50. There was a ravine, of a fair width and with high, precipitous sides, and honeycombed at many points with cave-like hollows and Caesar had to cross it before he could reach the hill he wished to take. On the far side of this ravine there was an ancient olive grove, dense and thickly planted with trees. It was here that Labienus, perceiving that Caesar must first cross the ravine and olive grove if he wanted to seize that position, and availing himself of his local knowledge, took his stand in ambush with a detachment of cavalry and some light-armed troops. In addition he had posted some cavalry out of sight behind the range of hills, in order that, when he himself unexpectedly launched his attack upon the legionaries, this cavalry might make its appearance from behind the hill; thereby Caesar and his army were to be thrown into utter confusion by this double attack and, denied the opportunity either of retiring or advancing, were to be surrounded and cut to pieces. When Caesar, in ignorance of the ambush, but with a screen of cavalry thrown out in front, came up to this position, the troops of Labienus either misinterpreted or forgot his instructions, or maybe they were afraid of being caught in the trap by Caesar’s cavalry; anyway, they came out from behind the rocks in small groups or singly, and made for the crest of the hill. Caesar’s cavalry pursued them, killing some and capturing others alive, and then forthwith made all haste towards the hill, which they speedily seized after dislodging Labienus’ holding force. Labienus and part of his cavalry barely managed to escape with their lives.

> Latin: 50. Erat convallis satis magna latitudine, altitudine praerupta, crebris locis speluncae in modum subrutis, quae erat transgredienda Caesari, ante quam ad eum collem quem capere volebat perveniretur; ultraque eam convallem olivetum vetus crebris arboribus condensum. Hic cum Labienus animadvertisset Caesarem, si vellet eum locum occupare, prius necesse esse convallem olivetumque transgredi, eorum locorum peritus in insidiis eum parte equitatus levique armatura consedit et praeterea post montem collesque equites in occulto collocaverat ut, eum ipse ex improviso legionarios adortus esset, ex colle se equitatus ostenderet, ut re duplici perturbatus Caesar eiusque exercitus neque retro regrediendi neque ultra procedendi oblata facultate circumventus concideretur. Caesar postquam equitatu ante praemisso inscius insidiarum cum ad cum locum venisset, abusi sive obliti praeceptorum Labieni sive veriti ne in fossa ab equitibus opprimerentur rari ae singuli de rupe prodire et summa petere collis. Quos Caesaris equites consecuti partim interfecerunt, partim vivorum sunt potiti; deinde protinus collem petere contenderunt atque cum decusso Labieni praesidio celeriter occupaverunt. Labienus cum parte equitum vix fuga sibi peperit salutem.

## 3. Chapters 51–73

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/3/#p-N

[¶0] 51. After this action fought by the cavalry Caesar fortified a camp on the hill of which he had gained possession, assigning each legion its share of the work. He then began to carry two fortified lines from his own principal camp across the centre of the plain in the direction of the town of Uzitta—-which town was situated on flat ground between his camp and Scipio’s and was occupied by the latter—-their direction being such as to make them converge upon the tight and left corners of the town. His purpose in constructing this field-work was as follows: when he advanced his forces closer to the town and proceeded to attack it, he should have his flanks covered by these fortifications of his and not he enveloped by the swarms of enemy cavalry and so be deterred from attacking; moreover, it should make it easier to hold conversations with the enemy, and if any of the latter wanted to desert—this had often occurred in the past, but at great risk to the deserters—it should now prove easy and devoid of risk. He was also anxious to discover, when he approached closer to the enemy, whether they intended to fight. Over and above these reasons was the additional fact that this was a low-lying tract, and quite a few wells could be sunk in it: water in fact was in short supply and had to be earned a long distance. While the legionaries were engaged in this work of fortification which I have mentioned above, a detachment of them took post in front of the work in battle formation close to the enemy: for the latter’s foreign cavalry and part of his light-armed force kept skirmishing at close quarters.

> Latin: 51. Hae re per equites gesta Caesar legionibus opera distribuit atque in eo colle quo erat potitus castra munivit. Deinde ab suis maximis castris per medium campum e regione oppidi Uzittae, quod inter sua castra et Scipionis in planitie positum erat tenebaturque a Scipione, duo bracchia instituit ducere et ita dirigere ut ad angulum dextrum sinistrumque eius oppidi convenirent. Id hae ratione opus instruebat ut, eum propius oppidum copias admovisset oppugnareque coepisset, tecta latera suis munitionibus haberet, ne ab equitatus multitudine circumventus ab oppugnatione deterreretur, praeterea quo facilius colloquia fieri possent et, si qui perfugere vellent, id quod antea saepe accidebat magno eum eorum periculo, tum facile et sine periculo fieret. Voluit etiam experiri, cum propius hostem accessisset, haberetne in animo dimicare. Accedebat etiam ad reliquas causas quod is locus depressus erat puteique ibi non nulli fieri poterant: aquatione enim longa et angusta utebatur. Dum haec opera quae ante dixi fiebant a legione, interim pars acie ante opus instructa sub hoste stabat: equites barbari levisque armaturae proeliis minutis comminus dimicabant.

[¶1] 52. It was now nearly dusk, and Caesar was withdrawing his troops from this work to camp, when Juba, Scipio and Labienus launched a violent attack upon his legionaries, employing all their cavalry and light-armed forces. Caesar’s cavalry reeled and gave ground momentarily under the sudden and violent impact of the massed swarms of the enemy. But the latter found that this manoeuvre did not go according to plan: for Caesar halted in his tracks and led his forces back to the assistance of his cavalry. The arrival of the legions put fresh heart into the cavalry, who wheeled round, charged the Numidians in the middle of their eager, but scattered pursuit, and drove them right back into the royal camp, with heavy casualties and many of their number killed. And had not nightfall speedily overtaken this action, and a cloud of dust raised up by the wind hampered everyone’s vision, Juba and Labienus would have been captured and have fallen into Caesar’s hands, and their cavalry and light-armed troops would have been utterly and entirely annihilated. Whereupon an incredible number of Scipio’s troops deserted from the Fourth and Sixth legion—some to Caesar’s camp, others to various places wherever each individual managed to find refuge. The cavalry who were once under Curio’s command likewise lost confidence in Scipio and his forces, and many of them took refuge with the others.

> Latin: 52. Caesar ab eo opere eum iam sub vesperum copias in castra reduceret, magno incursu cum omni equitatu levique armatura Iuba, Scipio, Labienus in legionarios impetum fecerunt. Equites Caesariani vi universae subitaeque hostium multitudinis pulsi parumper cesserunt. Quae res aliter adversariis cecidit: namque Caesar ex medio itinere copiis reductis equitibus suis auxilium tulit; equites autem adventu legionum animo addito conversis equis in Numidas cupide insequentis dispersosque impetum fecerunt atque eos convulneratos usque in castra regia reppulerunt multosque ex eis interfecerunt. Quod nisi in noctem proelium esset coniectum pulvisque vento elatus omnium prospectui offecisset, Iuba cum Labieno capti in potestatem Caesaris venissent, equitatusque eum levi armatura funditus ad internecionem deletus esset. Interim incredibiliter ex legione IIII. et VI. Scipionis milites diffugere partim in castra Caesaris, partim in quas quisque poterat regiones pervenire: itemque equites Curioniani diffisi Scipioni eiusque copiis complures se eodem conferebant.

[¶2] 53. While the leaders on either side were engaged in these operations in the neighbourhood of Uzitta, two legions, the Tenth and the Ninth, which had sailed from Sicily in transports, were now not far from the port of Ruspina. Here they sighted those ships of Caesar’s which were stationed on patrol off Thapsus; and fearing they might be falling unawares upon an enemy flotilla loitering there presumably with treacherous designs, they made off out to sea. Many days later, exhausted by thirst and privation after a long and very storm-tossed voyage, they at length reached Caesar.

> Latin: 53. Dum haec circum Uzittam ab utrisque ducibus administrantur, legiones duae, X. et VIIII., ex Sicilia navibus onerariis profectae, eum iam non longe a portu Ruspinae abessent, conspicati navis Caesarianas quae in statione apud Thapsum stabant, veriti ne in adversariorum ut insidiandi gratia ibi commorantium classem inciderent imprudentes, vela in altum dederunt ac diu multumque iactati tandem multis post diebus siti inopiaque confecti ad Caesarem perveniunt.

[¶3] 54. These legions were then disembarked. Now Caesar had in mind the lack of discipline of old among the troops in Italy and the plundering exploits of certain individuals: and he had now some ground for complaint, though only a trifling one, in the fact that C. Avienus, a military tribune of the Tenth legion, had commandeered a vessel from the convoy and filled it with his own household slaves and beasts of burden, without transporting a single soldier from Sicily. Accordingly, on the following day Caesar paraded the tribunes and centurions of all his legions and thus addressed them from the platform. “I could have wished above all things that people would at some time or other have set bounds to their wanton and highly irresponsible behaviour, and had regard for my own leniency, moderation and forbearance. However, since they set themselves no limit or boundary, I myself will set them a precedent in accordance with military custom, so that the remainder may behave somewhat differently. Inasmuch as you, C. Avienus, in Italy have stirred up soldiers of the Roman people against the state and have committed acts of plunder in various municipal towns; inasmuch as you have proved useless to me and to the state and have embarked, instead of troops, your own household slaves and beasts of burden, so that thanks to you the state is short of troops at a critical time for these reasons I hereby discharge you with ignominy from my army and direct that you leave as soon as possible and be quit of Africa this day. You also, A. Fonteius, I dismiss from my army, for having proved a mutinous military tribune and a disloyal citizen. T. Salienus, M. Tiro and C. Clusinas, you have attained your ranks in my army, not by merit, but by favour; your conduct has been such as to prove you neither brave in war, nor loyal nor competent in peace, and more eager to stir up mutiny among the troops against your commander-in-chief than to preserve respect and discipline: on these counts I deem yon to be unworthy to hold rank in my army, and I hereby discharge you and direct that you be quit of Africa as soon as possible.” Accordingly he handed them over to the centurions, assigned them each no more than a single slave, and had them embarked separately in a ship.

> Latin: 54. Quibus legionibus expositis memor in Italia pristinae licentiae militaris ac rapinarum certorum hominum parvulam modo causulam nactus Caesar, quod C. Avienus, tribunus militum X. legionis, navem ex commeatu familia sua atque iumentis occupavisset neque militem unum ab Sicilia sustulisset, postero die de suggestu convocatis omnium legionum tribunis centurionibusque, “Maxime vellem,” inquit, “homines suae petulantiae nimiaeque libertatis aliquando finem fecissent meaeque lenitatis, modestiae patientiaeque rationem habuissent. Sed quoniam ipsi sibi neque modum neque terminum constituunt, quo ceteri dissimiliter se gerant egomet ipse documentum more militari constituam. C. Aviene, quod in Italia milites populi Romani contra rem publicam instigasti rapinasque per municipia fecisti quodque mihi reique publicae inutilis fuisti et pro militibus tuam familiam iumentaque in navis imposuisti tuaque opera militibus tempore necessario res publica caret, ob eas res ignominiae causa ab exercitu meo removeo hodieque ex Africa abesse et quantum pote proficisci iubeo. Itemque te, A. Fontei, quod tribunus militum seditiosus maiusque civis fuisti, te ab exercitu dimitte T. Saliene, M. Tiro, C. Clusinas, cum ordines in meo exercitu beneficio non virtute consecuti ita vos gesseritis ut neque bello fortes neque pace boni aut utiles fueritis et magis in seditione concitandisque militibus adversum vestrum imperatorem quam pudoris modestiaeque fueritis studiosiores, indignos vos esse arbitror qui in meo exercitu ordines ducatis, missosque facio et quantum pote abesse ex Africa iubeo.” Itaque tradit eos centurionibus et singulis non amplius singulos additos servos in navem imponendos separatim curavit.

[¶4] 55. Meanwhile the Gaetulian deserters who, as we have described above,1 were sent by Caesar with despatches and instructions, arrived back among their own citizens. The authority they held readily induced their countrymen, who were also influenced by Caesar’s reputation, to revolt from king Juba and so they one and all promptly took up arms and did not hesitate to oppose the king. On learning of this situation king Juba, compelled as he now was by necessity to divide his energies between three fronts, detached six cohorts from the force which he had led against Caesar and sent them to his own royal domain to defend it against the Gaetulians.

> Latin: 55. Gaetuli interim perfugae, quos cum litteris mandatisque a Caesare missos supra docuimus, ad suos civis perveniunt. Quorum auctoritate facile adducti Caesarisque nomine persuasi a rege Iuba desciscunt celeriterque cuncti arma capiunt contraque regem facere non dubitant. Quibus rebus cognitis Iuba, distentus triplici bello necessitateque coactus, de suis copiis quas contra Caesarem adduxerat sex cohortis in finis regni sui mittit quae essent praesidio contra Gaetulos.

[¶5] 56. Caesar had now completed his lines of fortification and extended them right up to a point so as to be just out of range of spear-cast from the town. He then fortified a camp, ranging catapults and scorpions at close intervals in front of it and training them upon the town, and harrying without respite the defenders of its walls; he also detached five legions from his former camp and brought them down to the new one. Making use of the opportunity thus offered, certain more distinguished persons and those of the widest acquaintance kept demanding to see their friends and relations, and conversations ensued between them. Caesar was not blind to the expediency of this turn of events; and in fact some of the nobler Gaetulians among the royal cavalry, including captains of horse, whose fathers had previously served with Marius and had, by his good offices, been presented with farms and lands, but later on after Sulla’s victory had been handed over as subjects to king Hiempsal, seized their chance and deserted, when it was night and the lamps were now lit, and came with their horses and grooms—roughly a thousand of them—to Caesar’s camp which was situated in the plain close to Uzitta.

> Latin: 56. Caesar bracchiis perfectis promotisque usque eo quo telum ex oppido adigi non posset castra munit, ballistis scorpionibusque crebris ante frontem castrorum contra oppidum collocatis defensores muri deterrere non intermittit eoque quinque legiones ex superioribus castris deducit. Qua facultate oblata inlustriores notissimique conspectum amicorum propinquorumque efflagitabant atque inter se colloquebantur. Quae res quid utilitatis haberet Caesarem non fallebat: namque Gaetuli ex equitatu regio nobiliores equitumque praefecti, quorum patres cum Mario ante meruerant eiusque beneficio agris fidibusque donati post Sullae victoriam sub Hiempsalis regis erant dati potestatem, occasione capta nocte iam luminibus accensis cum equis calonibusque suis circiter mille perfugium in Caesaris castra quae erant in campo proxime Uzittae locata.

[¶6] 57. It was just about this time, after Scipio and his colleagues had come to learn of this disconcerting setback, that they saw M. Aquinus holding a conversation with C. Saserna. Scipio sent word to Aquinus saying that he had no business to be holding a conversation with the enemy. When none the less the messenger brought back to Scipio the other’s answer, namely that on the contrary it remained for him to complete the rest of his business, Juba also sent him a courier, to say, in the hearing of Saserna: “The king forbids you to hold this conversation.” Alarmed by this message, Aquinus withdrew in deference to the king’s injunction. To think that it had come to this, that a Roman citizen, one, moreover, who had received office at the hands of the Roman people, at a time when his country and all his fortunes stood secure, should rather have obeyed Juba, a foreigner, than deferred to Scipio’s instructions or else, if he preferred, let his own partisans be massacred, while he himself returned home safe and sound! Still more arrogant even was Juba’s behaviour, not towards M. Aquinus, a mere upstart and junior member of the Senate, but towards Scipio, whose family, rank and magistracies were such as to make him an outstanding man. For Scipio had been in the habit of wearing a purple cloak before the king arrived and Juba—so it is said—took the matter up with him, saying that Scipio ought not to wear the same dress as he himself wore. And so it came about that Scipio changed to white dress in deference to Juba—that by-word of arrogance and indolence.

> Latin: 57. Quod postquam Scipio quique cum eo erant cognoverunt, cum commoti ex tali incommodo essent, fere per id tempus M. Aquinum cum C. Saserna colloquentem viderunt. Scipio mittit ad Aquinum, nihil attulere eum cum adversariis colloqui. Cum nihilo minus eius sermonem nuntius ad Scipionem referret sed restare ut reliqua quae sibi vellet perageret, viator praeterea ab Iuba ad eum est missus qui diceret audiente Saserna: “Vetat te rex colloqui.” Quo nuntio perterritus discessit et dicto audiens fuit regi. Usu venisse hoc civi Romano et ei qui ab populo Romano honores accepisset, incolumi patria fortunisque omnibus Iubae barbaro potius oboedientem fuisse quam aut Scipionis obtemperasse nuntio aut caesis eiusdem partis civibus incolumem reverti malle! Atque etiam et superbius Iubae factum non in M. Aquinum, hominem novum parvumque senatorem, sed in Scipionem, hominem illa familia, dignitate, honoribus praestantem. Namque cum Scipio sagulo purpureo ante regis adventum uti solitus esset, dicitur Iuba cum eo egisse non oportere illum eodem vestitu atque ipse uteretur. Itaque factum est ut Scipio ad album sese vestitum transferret et Iubae homini superbissimo inertissimo que obtemperaret.

[¶7] 58. On the next day the enemy led out their entire combined forces from all their camps and, gaining possession of a certain prominent knoll, arrayed their battle line not far from Caesar’s camp, and took up their position there. Caesar likewise led forth his forces, speedily arrayed them and took up a position in front of his fortifications which were in the plain; for he thought, no doubt, that his opponents, seeing they were equipped with such substantial forces and the reinforcements supplied by the king, and had previously been quite prompt to sally forth, would now take the initiative, advance towards him and join battle. After riding round encouraging his legions he gave the signal and awaited the enemy’s advance. For he himself had good reason not to advance too far from his fortifications, since the town of Uzitta, held by Scipio, contained enemy cohorts under arms; moreover, his right-hand wing lay opposite the said town, and he was afraid that, if he advanced beyond it, the enemy might make a sally from the town, attack him in flank, and maul him severely. Apart from this there was another reason too to make him pause, namely that in front of Scipio’s line there was a patch of very broken ground, which he believed would prevent his troops from going over to the offensive.

> Latin: 58. Postero die universas omnium copias de castris omnibus educunt et supercilium quoddam excelsum nacti non longe a Caesaris castris aciem constituunt atque ibi consistunt. Caesar item producit copias celeriterque cis instructis ante suas munitiones quae erant in campo consistit, sine dubio existimans ultro adversarios, cum tam magnis copiis auxiliisque regis essent praediti promptiusque prosiluissent ante, secum concursuros propiusque se accessuros. Equo circumvectus legionesque cohortatus signo dato accessum hostium aucupabatur. Ipse enim a suis munitionibus longius non sine ratione non procedebat, quod in oppido Uzittae, quod Scipio tenebat, hostium erant cohortes armatae; eidem autem oppido ad dextrum latus eius cornu erat oppositum, verebaturque ne, si praetergressi esset, ex oppido eruptione facta ab latere eum adorti conciderent. Praeterea haec quoque eum causa tardavit, quod erat locus quidam perimpeditus ante aciem Scipionis, quem suis impedimento ad ultro occurrendum fore existimabat.

[¶8] 59. I do not think ought to pass over without mention the manner in which the armies of either side were deployed in battle formation. Scipio’s order of battle was as follows. In front he placed his own and Juba’s legions: behind these, in a support line, the Numidians, drawn out in so thin and long a formation as to give the impression at a distance that the centre was a single line composed of legionary troops. His elephants he had placed at regular intervals on his right and left wings, and behind the elephants his light-armed troops and Numidian auxiliaries were stationed in support. On his right wing he had posted his entire force of bridled cavalry for his left wing was covered by the town of Uzitta, and there was no room to deploy cavalry. In addition he had posted some Numidians and a vast multitude of light-armed troops to cover the right flank of his line at a distance of at least a mile or so, pushing them more towards the foothills and so withdrawing them farther away both from the enemy and his own forces. His purpose in doing this was that when the two battle lines charged one another, his cavalry would only have to continue their outflanking movement a little farther in the early stages of the action, and then by sheer weight of numbers they could surprise and envelop Caesar’s army, throw it into disorder, and riddle it with lances. Such was Scipio’s plan of battle that day.

> Latin: 59. Non arbitror esse praetermittendum, quem ad modum exercitus utriusque fuerint in aciem instructi. Scipio hoc modo aciem derexit. Collocabat in fronte suas et Iubae legiones, post eas autem Numidas in subsidiaria acie ita extenuatos et in longitudinem derectos ut procul simplex esse acies media ab legionariis militibus videretur. Elephantos dextro sinistroque cornu collocaverat aequalibus inter eos intervallis interiectis, post autem elephantos armaturas levis Numidasque auxiliaris substituerat. Equitatum fremitum universum in suo dextro cornu disposuerat: sinistrum enim cornu oppido Uzitta claudebatur neque erat spatium equitatus explicandi. Praeterea Numidas Iovisque armaturae infinitam multitudinem ad dextram partem suae aciei opposuerat fere interiecto non minus mille passuum spatio et ad collis radices magis appulerat longiusque ab adversariorum suisque copiis promovebat, id hoc consilio ut, cum acies duae inter se concurrissent, initio certaminis paulo longius eius equitatus circumvectus ex improviso clauderet multitudine sua exercitum Caesaris atque perturbatum iaculis configeret. Haec fuit ratio Scipionis eo die proeliandi.

[¶9] 60. Caesar’s battle line, on the other hand, was disposed as follows, my description beginning with his left wing and working round to his right. On his left wing he had the Tenth and Ninth legions: in the centre the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Twenty-Eighth and Twenty-Sixth. As for the actual right wing, he had posted there some of the cohorts of his veteran legions as well as a few cohorts from the legions of recruits besides. His third line he had concentrated on his left wing, extending it right up to the central legion of his line, and had arranged it in such a formation that his left wing was composed of three lines. His motive for doing this was the fact that, whereas his right flank was supported by his fortifications, he was hard put to it to know how his left Hank could bear up under the hordes of enemy cavalry; and it was on this same left flank that he had concentrated the whole of his own cavalry and, not feeling too confident in it, had detached the Fifth legion to support this cavalry, and drafted light-armed troops at intervals among the horse. As for his archers, he had posted them in various formations at definite points throughout the line, but chiefly on the wings.

> Latin: 60. Caesaris autem acies hoc modo fuit collocata, ut ab sinistro eius cornu ordiar et ad dextrum perveniam. Habuit legionem X. et VIIII, in sinistro cornu, XXV., XXVIIII, XIII., XIV., XXVIII., XXVI. in media acie. Ipso autem dextro cornu veteranarum legionum partem cohortium collocaverat, praeterea ex tironum adiecerat paucas. Tertiam autem aciem in sinistrum suum cornu contulerat et usque ad aciei suae mediam legionem porrexerat et ita collocaverat uti sinistrum suum cornu esset triplex. Id eo consilio fecerat quod suum dextrum latus munitionibus adiuvabatur, sinistrum autem equitatus hostium multitudini uti resistere posset laborabat, eodemque suum omnem equitatum contulerat et, quod ei parum confidebat, praesidio his equitibus legionem V. praemiserat levemque armaturam inter equites interposuerat. Sagittarios varie passimque locis certis maximeque in cornibus collocaverat.

[¶10] 61. Such was the manner in which the armies on either side were drawn up, with a distance of no more than three hundred paces separating them—a situation which had never, perhaps, arisen before without leading to an engagement; and there they remained continuously from early morning right until the tenth hour. And now, while Caesar was beginning to lead his army back within his fortifications, suddenly the entire force of cavalry—the more distant one, comprising Numidians and Gaetulians riding without bridles—began a movement on the right and to advance closer to Caesar’s camp on the high ground, while Labienus’ bridled cavalry maintained their positions and distracted the attention of the legions. Whereupon part of Caesar’s cavalry together with the light-armed troops, acting without orders and without discretion, suddenly advanced too far, crossed a marshy tract and found themselves too far outnumbered to be able to contain the enemy. Abandoning the light-armed troops, the cavalry were driven back and fled to their own lines not without casualties—one horseman missing, many horses wounded and twenty-seven light-armed soldiers killed. It was now night when Scipio, delighted with this successful cavalry engagement, withdrew his forces into camp. But in vouchsafing him this triumph the fortunes of war saw fit to make it but short-lived. On the following day, in fact, a detachment of Caesar’s cavalry which he had sent to Leptis on a foraging mission surprised in the course of their march and attacked about a hundred marauding Numidian and Gaetulian horse, killing some of them and taking the rest alive. Meanwhile Caesar made it his constant and daily practice to lead his legions down into the plain, proceed with his field-works, carry his rampart and trench across the middle of the plain, and thereby hinder his opponents’ sallies. Scipio likewise built counter defences, pushing them forward in haste to prevent Caesar from barring him access to the ridge. Thus the generals on both sides were occupied with field-works, but none the less engaged one another daily in cavalry actions.

> Latin: 61. Sic utrorumque exercitus instructi non plus passuum CCC interiecto spatio, quod forsitan ante id tempus acciderit numquam quin dimicaretur, a mane usque ad horam X. diei perstiterunt. Iamque Caesar dum exercitum intra munitiones suas reducere coepisset, subito universus equitatus ulterior Numidarum Gaetulorumque sine frenis ad dextram partem se movere propiusque Caesaris castra quae erant in colle se conferre coepit, fremitus autem Labieni eques in loco permanere legionesque distinere: cum subito pars equitatus Caesaris cum levi armatura contra Gaetulos iniussu ac temere longius progressi paludemque transgressi multitudinem hostium pauci sustinere non potuerunt levique armatura deserta pulsi convulneratique uno equite amisso, multis equis sauciis, levis armaturae XXVII occisis ad suos refugerunt. Quo secundo equestri proelio facto Scipio laetus in castra nocte copias reduxit. Quod proprium gaudium bellantibus fortuna tribuere non decrevit: namque postero die Caesar cum partem equitatus sui frumentandi gratia Leptim misisset, in itinere praedatores equites Numidas Gaetulosque ex improviso adorti circiter C partim occiderunt, partim vivorum potiti sunt. Caesar interim cotidie legiones in campum deducere atque opus facere vallumque et fossam per medium campum ducere adversariorumque excursionibus ita officere non intermittit. Scipio item munitiones contra facere et, ne iugo a Caesare excluderetur, approperare. Ita duces utrique et in operibus occupati esse et nihilo minus equestribus proeliis inter se cotidie dimicabant.

[¶11] 62. Meanwhile Varus, who had previously beached his flotilla at Utica for the winter, learned that the Seventh and Eighth legions were on the way from Sicily. Thereupon he promptly launched his flotilla, manned it on the spot with Gaetnlian oarsmen and marines and, setting sail from Utica, arrived at Hadrumetum with fifty-five ships with the object of setting a trap for them. Caesar, who was unaware of his arrival, despatched L. Cispius with a squadron of twenty-seven ships to the area of Thapsus to patrol there and give cover to his convoy; and he also sent Q. Aquila with thirteen warships to Hadrumetum for the same purpose. Cispius speedily reached his destination, whereas Aquila, lashed by a storm and unable to double the headland, gained a certain cove which was sheltered from the storm and afforded him and his squadron a fairly inconspicuous retreat. The rest of the fleet stood at anchor out at sea off Leptis; and as the crews had disembarked and were roaming here and there about the beach, some of them having gone off to the town to buy themselves food, the fleet had no one to defend it. Learning of this situation from a deserter. Varus seized his opportunity: at the second watch he came out of the inner harbour of Hadrumetum and arrived off Leptis in the early morning with his entire squadron and there he set fire to the defenceless transports which were anchored out at sea at some distance from the port, and captured two five-banked warships, which offered no resistance.

> Latin: 62. Interim Varus classem, quam antea Uticae hiemis gratia subduxerat, cognito legionis VII et VIII ex Sicilia adventu celeriter deducit ibique Gaetulis remigibus epibatisque complet insidiandique gratia ab Utica progressus Hadrumetum eum L V navibus pervenit. Cuius adventus inscius Caesar L. Cispium cum classe XXVII navium ad Thapsum versus in stationem praesidi gratia commeatus sui mittit itemque Q. Aquilam cum XIII navibus longis Hadrumetum eadem de causa praemittit. Cispius quo erat missus celeriter pervenit; Aquila tempestate iactatus promunturium superare non potuit atque angulum quendam tutum a tempestate nactus cum classe se longius a prospectu removit. Reliqua classis in salo ad Leptim egressis remigibus passimque in litore vagantibus, partim in oppidum victus sui mercandi gratia progressis, vacua a defensoribus stabat. Quibus rebus Varus ex perfuga cognitis occasionem nactus vigilia secunda Hadrumeto ex cothone egressus primo mane Leptim cum universa classe vectus navis onerarias, quae longius a portu in sal o stabant, vacuas a defensoribus incendit et penteres duas nullo repugnante cepit.

[¶12] 63. Meanwhile a message speedily acquainted Caesar with the news as he was touring the defence works in his camp, which was six miles distant from the harbour. Putting everything else on one side and giving his horse its head he speedily reached Leptis, where he insisted that all the ships should follow his lead: he himself then went aboard a small cutter. As he sailed on he came up with Aquila, who was filled with panic and confusion at the large number of the enemy ships, and then set off in pursuit of the enemy squadron. Meanwhile Varus, disconcerted by Caesar’s promptitude and boldness, had turned about with his entire squadron and was now beating a hasty retreat to Hadrumetum. In four miles’ sail Caesar overhauled him, recovered one of his quinqueremes, complete with all its crew, and capturing in addition the enemy prize-crew aboard her, one hundred-and-thirty strong, and then captured the nearest enemy trireme, which in the course of the action had lagged behind the rest, with its full complement of rowers and marines. The rest of the enemy fleet doubled the headland, and one and all sought refuge in the inner harbour of Hadrumetum. But the wind did not hold for Caesar also to be able to double the headland; so after riding out that night at anchor in deep water he approached Hadrumetum at dawn. There he set fire to the transports which were outside the inner harbour and then, as all the others had either been beached by the enemy or massed inside the inner harbour, he waited a little while to see if by chance the enemy were disposed to fight a naval action and then withdrew back to his camp.

> Latin: 63. Caesar interim celeriter per nuntios in castris, cum opera circumiret, certior factus, quae aberant a portu milia passuum VI, equo admisso omissis omnibus rebus celeriter pervenit Leptim ibique hortatur omnes ut se naves consequerentur; ipse parvulum navigiolum conscendit, in cursu Aquilam multitudine navium perterritum atque trepidantem nactus hostium classem sequi coepit. Interim Varus celeritate Caesaris audaciaque commotus cum universa classe conversis navibus Hadrumetum versus fugere contendit. Quem Caesar in milibus passuum IIII consecutus reciperata quinqueremi eum suis omnibus epibatis atque etiam hostium custodibus CXXX in ea nave captis triremem hostium proximam, quae in repugnando erat commorata, onustam remigum epibatarumque cepit. Reliquae naves hostium promunturium superarunt atque Hadrumetum in cothonem se universae contulerunt. Caesar eodem vento promunturium superare non potuit atque in salo in ancoris ea nocte commoratus prima luce Hadrumetum accedit ibique navibus onerariis quae erant extra cothonem incensis omnibusque reliquis ab eis aut subductis aut in cothonem compulsis paulisper commoratus, si forte vellent classe dimicare, rursus se recepit in castra.

[¶13] 64. Among those made prisoner aboard that trireme was P. Vestrius. a Roman knight, and P. Ligarius, once a supporter of Afranius. Caesar had set the latter free in Spain along with the other Afranians, and he had later on joined Pompeius and then, as a fugitive after the battle (of Pharsalus), had come to Varus in Africa. In view of his falseness and treachery Caesar bade him be executed. P. Vestrius, on the other hand, he pardoned; for his brother had paid the stipulated ransom at Rome, and Vestrius himself had satisfied Caesar as to the honesty of his motives, explaining that he had been taken prisoner by the fleet of Nasidius, his life had been saved through the kindness of Varus just as he was being led off to execution, and after that he had been given no opportunity of going over to Caesar’s side.

> Latin: 64. In ea nave captus est P. Vestrius, eques Romanus, et P. Ligarius, Afranianus, quem Caesar in Hispania cum reliquis dimiserat, et postea se ad Pompeium contulerat, inde ex proelio effugerat in Africamque ad Varum venerat; quem ob periuri perfidiam Caesar iussit necari. P. Vestrio autem, quod eius frater Romae pecuniam imperatam numeraverat et quod ipse suam causam probaverat Caesari, se a Nasidi classe captum, cum ad necem duceretur, beneficio Vari esse servatum, postea sibi facultatem nullam datam transeundi, ignovit.

[¶14] 65. There is in Africa a custom among the natives whereby both in the open fields and in practically all their farm buildings they have a secret underground vault for the storage of corn, the main motive for this provision being wars and the sudden appearance of an enemy. When Caesar got to know of this custom through an informer, at the third watch of the night he sent two legions and some cavalry a distance of ten miles from his camp,2 and later saw them return to camp laden with a large quantity of corn. When Labienus learned of this, he advanced seven miles from his camp across the hilly plateau across which Caesar had marched the day before, encamped two legions there and, supposing that Caesar would frequently pass along that same route for foraging purposes, established himself daily at suitable points to lie in wait for him with a large force of cavalry and light-armed troops.

> Latin: 65. Est in Africa consuetudo incolarum ut in agris et in omnibus fere villis sub terra specus frumenti condendi gratia clam habeant atque id propter bella maxime hostiumque subitum adventum praeparent. Qua de re Caesar per indicem certior factus tertia vigilia legiones duas eum equitatu mittit a castris suis milia passuum X atque inde magno numero frumenti onustos recipit in castra. Quibus rebus cognitis Labienus progressus a suis castris milia passuum VII per iugum et collem, per quem Caesar pridie iter fecerat, ibi castra duarum legionum facit atque ipse cotidie existimans Caesarem eadem saepe frumentandi gratia commeaturum eum magno equitatu levique armatura insidiaturus locis idoneis considit.

[¶15] 66. In the meantime information reached Caesar from deserters about Labienus’ trap. He waited in camp there a few days for the constant repetition of the same daily routine to lead the enemy into carelessness and then, early one morning, he suddenly gave the order that three veteran legions and a detachment of cavalry should follow him by way of the rear gate. Then, sending on the cavalry ahead, he suddenly surprised the enemy ambush lurking in the ravines, killing some five hundred of their light-armed troops and throwing the rest into a very unseemly rout. Whereupon Labienus dashed up with his entire cavalry force to the relief of his routed troops and as the odds were now too great for the Caesarian horse to contain their powerful onslaught. Caesar displayed to the enemy forces his legions in battle formation. This action utterly daunted and checked Labienus, and Caesar thereupon withdrew his own cavalry without loss. On the following day Juba crucified those Numidians who had quitted their posts and fled back to their camp.

> Latin: 66. Caesar interim de insidiis Labieni ex perfugis, certior factus paucos dies ibi commoratus, dum hostes cotidiano instituto saepe idem faciendo in neglegentiam adducerentur, subito mane imperat porta decumana legiones se III veteranas cum parte equitatus sequi atque equitibus praemissis neque opinantis insidiatores subito in convallibus latentis ex levi armatura concidit circiter D, reliquos in fugam turpissimam coniecit. Interim Labienus cum universo equitatu fugientibus suis suppetias occurrit. Cuius vim multitudinis cum equites pauci Caesariani iam sustinere non possent. Caesar instructas legiones hostium copiis ostendit. Quo facto perterrito Labieno ac retardato suos equites recepit incolumis. Postero die Iuba Numidas eos qui loco amisso fuga se receperam in castra in cruce omnis suffixit.

[¶16] 67. Caesar meanwhile was embarrassed by lack of corn; for which reason he mustered all his forces in camp and, leaving troops to garrison Leptis, Ruspina and Acylla, and assigning his fleet to Cispius and Aquila to maintain the naval blockade, the one of Hadrumetum and the other of Thapsus, he himself set fire to his camp and at the fourth watch of the night in battle formation with his baggage concentrated on the left wing evacuated that position and came to the town of Aggar. This town had previously been repeatedly attacked by the Gaetulians only to be very stoutly defended by the inhabitants themselves. Here in the plain he pitched a single camp and then set off in person with part of his army on a foraging mission round the farmsteads; and finding a large quantity of barley, oil, wine and figs, and a little wheat, he returned to camp with his army duly refreshed. Meanwhile Scipio, who had got to know of Caesar’s departure, proceeded to follow him across the plateau with his entire forces and established himself six miles away from Caesar’s camp, with his forces divided among three separate camps.

> Latin: 67. Caesar interim, quoniam inopia frumenti premebatur, copias omnis in castra conducit atque praesidio Lepti, Ruspinae, Acyllae relicto, Cispio Aquilaeque classe tradita ut alter Hadrumetum, alter Thapsum mari obsiderent, ipse castris incensis quarta noctis vigilia acie instructa impedimentis in sinistra parte collocatis ex eo loco proficiscitur et pervenit ad oppidum Aggar, quod a Gaetulis saepe antea oppugnatum summaque vi per ipsos oppidanos erat defensum. Ibi in campo castris unis positis ipse frumentatum circum villas cum parte exercitus profectus magno invento hordei, olei, vini, fici numero, pauco tritici, atque recreato exercitu redit in castra. Scipio interim cognito Caesaris discessu cum universis copiis per iugum Caesarem subsequi coepit atque ab eius castris milia passuum VI longe trinis castris dispertitis copiis consedit.

[¶17] 68. There was a town called Zeta, which was ten miles distant from Scipio but situated in the general direction of his camp; whereas it was relatively distant and remote—fourteen miles in fact—from Caesar. To this town Scipio sent two legions to forage. When Caesar learned of this from a deserter he moved his camp from the plain to a safer position on the high ground; and leaving a covering force there, he himself set out at the fourth watch, marched on past the enemy’s camp, and took possession of the town. He then ascertained that Scipio’s legions were foraging farther afield: and he was just proceeding to march in their direction when he observed enemy forces hastening up to support those legions. This circumstance made him loath to attack. And so, taking prisoner C. Minucius Reginus, the commandant of that town, who was a Roman knight and a very intimate friend of Scipio, and P. Atrius, a Roman knight and a member of the corporation of Utica, and leading away twenty-two of the king’s camels, he proceeded to retire to camp, leaving his lieutenant, Oppius, with a garrison in the town.

> Latin: 68. Oppidum erat Zeta, quod aberat a Scipione milia passuum X, ad eius regionem et partem castrorum collocatum, a Caesare autem diversum ac remotum, quod erat ab eo longe milia passuum XIIII. Huc Scipio legiones duas frumentandi gratia misit. Quod postquam Caesar ex perfuga cognovit, castris ex campo in collem ac tutiora loca collatis atque ibi praesidio relicto ipse quarta vigilia egressus praeter hostium castra proficiscitur eum copiis et oppidum potitur. Legiones Scipionis comperit longius in agris frumentari et, cum eo contendere conaretur, animadvertit copias hostium his legionibus occurrere suppetias. Quae res eius impetum retardavit. Itaque capto C. Minucio Regino, equite Romano. Scipionis familiarissimo, qui ei oppido praeerat, et P. Atrio, equite Romano de conventu Uticensi, et camelis XXII regis abductis, praesidio ibi cum Oppio legato relicto ipse se recipere coepit ad castra.

[¶18] 69. When he was now not far away from Scipio’s camp, which of necessity he had to pass, Labienus and Afranius with all their cavalry and light-armed troops sprang up and revealed themselves from behind the nearby hills where they had been lurking in ambush, and flung themselves upon his rearguard. Seeing himself thus attacked. Caesar deployed his cavalry to bear the brunt of the enemy onslaught and ordered his legionaries to pile their packs and promptly deliver a counter-attack. As soon as this was under way the enemy cavalry and light-armed troops were without difficulty driven back and dislodged from the hill directly the legions charged. No sooner had Caesar come to the conclusion that the enemy, beaten back and demoralised as they were, would now stop their harrying, and no sooner had he begun to resume his march, than once again they promptly flung themselves from the cover of the nearby hills and attacked Caesar’s legionaries, employing the same tactics as I described above—Numidians and light-armed troops they were, possessed of a marvellous turn of speed, fighting in the ranks of the cavalry and used to keeping pace with the horsemen and doubling forward or retreating at their side. As they repeated this manoeuvre quite frequently, chasing the Julians as they marched and taking to flight when their opponents turned to attack them, and as they would not approach at all close, but employed peculiar tactics and were content with wounding the horses with their javelins, Caesar realised that what they were trying to do was no less than force him to pitch camp at a spot where there was not a drop of water, so that his famished army, which had tasted nothing at all from the fourth watch of the night right up till the tenth hour of the day, should die of thirst—both men and beasts.

> Latin: 69. Cum iam non longe a castris Scipionis abesset, quae eum necesse erat praetergredi, Labienus Afraniusque eum omni equitatu levique armatura ex insidiis adorti agmini eius extremo se offerunt atque ex collibus proximis exsistunt. Quod postquam Caesar animum advertit, equitibus suis hostium vi oppositis sarcinas legionarios in acervum iubet comportare atque celeriter signa hostibus inferre. Quod postquam coeptum est fieri, primo impetu legionum equitatus et levis armatura hostium nullo negotio loco pulsa et deiecta est de colle. Cum iam Caesar existimasset hostis pulsos deterritosque finem lacessendi facturos et iter coeptum pergere coepisset, iterum celeriter ex proximis collibus erumpunt atque eadem ratione qua ante dixi in Caesaris legionarios impetum faciunt Numidae Iovisque armatura mirabili velocitate praediti, qui inter equites pugnabant et una pariterque eum equitibus accurrere et refugere consueverant. Cum hoc saepius facerent et proficiscentis Iulianos insequerentur, refugerent instantis, propius non accederent et singulari genere pugnae uterentur equosque iaculis convulnerare satis esse existimarent, Caesar intellexit nihil aliud eos conari nisi ut se cogerent castra eo loco ponere ubi omnino aquae nihil esset, ut exercitus ieiunus, qui a quarta vigilia usque ad horam X. diei nihil gustasset, ac iumenta siti perirent.

[¶19] 70. It was now nearly sundown and less than a hundred paces had been covered all told in four hours, when Caesar withdrew his cavalry—in view of the casualties among their horses—from the rearguard, and called on the legions to replace them. By employing the legionary troops in this manner and advancing calmly and at a gentle pace he found it less awkward to contain the enemy’s violent onslaught. Meanwhile detachments of the Numidian cavalry kept charging ahead along the high ground to his right and left and availing themselves of their superior numbers to surround Caesar’s forces with a kind of continuous circle of troops, while others of them pursued his rear-guard. Meanwhile on Caesar’s part it needed no more than three or four of his veterans to wheel round and brandish and hurl amain their heavy javelins at the Numidians who menaced them for more than two thousand of the latter to turn tail to a man and then, wheeling their horses round on all sides, they would regroup once more for battle and resume their pursuit at a set distance, hurling their javelins at the legionaries. In this manner, now advancing, now pausing to fight back, Caesar completed his march, albeit somewhat slowly for it was the first hour of the night when he brought all his men back to camp, with not a single man lost and ten wounded. Labienus retired to his lines with roughly three hundred men missing, many wounded, and all his troops exhausted by their continuous offensive. Meanwhile Scipio, who had deployed his legions, with the elephants posted in battle array in front of his camp in full view of Caesar to inspire terror, now led them back to camp.

> Latin: 70. Cum iam ad solis occasum esset, et non totos C passus in horis IIII esset progressus, equitatu suo propter equorum interitum extremo agmine remoto legiones in vicem ad extremum agmen evocabat. Ita vim hostium placide leniterque procedens per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat. Interim equitum Numidarum copiae dextra sinistraque per collis praecurrere coronaeque in modum cingere multitudine sua Caesaris copias, pars agmen extremum insequi. Caesaris interim non amplius III aut IIII milites veterani si se convenissent et pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duum milium numero ad unum terga vertebant ac rursus ad aciem passim conversis equis se colligebant atque in spatio consequebantur et iacula in legionarios coiciebant. Ita Caesar modo procedendo modo resistendo tardius itinere confecto noctis hora prima omnis suos ad unum in castra incolumis sauciis X factis reduxit. Labienus circiter CCC amissis, multis vulneratis ac defessis instando omnibus ad suos se recepit. Scipio interim legiones productas eum elephantis, quos ante castra in acie terroris gratia in conspectu Caesaris collocaverat, reducit in castra.

[¶20] 71. Faced with an enemy of this kind Caesar proceeded to train his forces, not as a commander trains a veteran army with a magnificent record of victorious achievements, but as a gladiatorial instructor trains his recruits. How many feet they were to retreat from the enemy the manner in which they must wheel round upon their adversary; the restricted space in which they must offer him resistance—now doubling forward, now retiring and making feint attacks; and almost the spot from which, and the manner in which they must discharge their missiles—these were the lessons he taught them. For it was surprising the amount of worry and anxiety the enemy’s light-armed troops were causing our army, what with their making the cavalry chary of engaging for fear of losing their mounts, since the light-armed troops kept killing them with their javelins, and with their wearing the legionaries out by their speediness; for no sooner had a heavy-armed soldier, when pursued by them, halted and then made an attack on them than their speed of movement enabled them easily to avoid the danger.

> Latin: 71. Caesar contra eiusmodi hostium genera copias suas non ut imperator exercitum veteranum victoremque maximis rebus gestis, sed ut lanista tirones gladiatores condocefacere quot pedes se reciperent ab hoste et quem ad modum obversi adversariis et in quantulo spatio resisterent, modo procurrerent modo recederent comminarenturque impetum, ac prope quo loco et quem ad modum tela mitterent, praecipere. Mirifice enim hostium levis armatura anxium exercitum nostrum atque sollicitum habebat, quia et equites deterrebat proelium inire propter equorum interitum, quod eos iaculis interficiebat, et legionarium militem defatigabat propter velocitatem: gravis enim armaturae miles simul atque ab eis insectatus constiterat in eosque impetum fecerat, illi veloci cursu periculum facile vitabant.

[¶21] 72. As a result of this Caesar was seriously perturbed, since as often as an engagement had occurred he had been quite unable to be a match with his own cavalry, unsupported by legionary troops, for the enemy cavalry and their light-armed units. Moreover, there was this other problem which worried him: as yet he had had no experience of the enemy legions; and how, he wondered, could he cope with their cavalry and amazing light-armed troops if they were backed up by their legions too. He had yet another cause for anxiety—the panic with which the size and number of the elephants gripped the minds of his soldiers. Here, however, was one problem to which he had found an answer; for he had ordered elephants to be brought across from Italy to enable our troops not only to become familiar with them, but also to get to know both the appearance and capabilities of the beast, what part of its body was readily vulnerable to a missile and, when an elephant was accoutered and armoured, what part of its body was still left uncovered and unprotected, so that their missiles should be aimed at that spot. He had also this further object in mind, that his horses should learn by familiarity with these beasts not to be alarmed by their scent, trumpeting or appearance. From this experiment he had profited handsomely: for the troops handled the beasts and came to appreciate their sluggishness: the cavalry hurled dummy javelins at them; and the docility of the beasts had brought the horses to feel at home with them.

> Latin: 72. Quibus ex rebus Caesar vehementer commovebatur quod, quotiescunque proelium erat commissum, equitatu suo sine legionario milite hostium equitatui levique armaturae eorum nullo modo par esse poterat. Sollicitabatur autem his rebus, quod nondum legiones hostium cognoverat, et quonam modo sustinere se posset ab eorum equitatu levique armatura, quae erat mirifica, si legiones quoque accessissent. Accedebat etiam haec causa, quod elephantorum magnitudo multitudoque animos militum detinebat in terrore. Cui uni rei tamen invenerat remedium: namque elephantos ex Italia transportari iusserat, quos et miles nosset speciemque et virtutem bestiae cognosceret et cui parti corporis eius telum facile adigi posset, ornatusque ac loricatus cum esset elephas, quae pars corporis eius sine tegmine nuda relinqueretur, ut eo tela coicerentur; praeterea ut iumenta bestiarum odorem, stridorem, speciem consuetudine capta non reformidarent. Quibus ex rebus largiter erat consecutus: nam et milites bestias manibus pertrectabant carumque tarditatem cognoscebant, equitesque in eos pila praepilata coiciebant, atque in consuetudinem equos patientia bestiarum adduxerat.

[¶22] 73. For the reasons above-mentioned Caesar was worried, and his old habitual dashing tactics had now given place to a more sedate and deliberate policy. And no wonder: for the troops he now commanded had been used to fighting in the flat terrain of Gaul against Gauls—men of forthright character with barely a trace of deceit, whose habit it is to rely on valour, not on guile, in their fighting: whereas now he had to perform the arduous task of accustoming his troops to recognise the tricks, traps and stratagems of the enemy, and what tactics could fittingly be adopted, and what avoided. Accordingly, to speed up this training of theirs, he took pains not to keep the legions confined to one area, but to keep them constantly on the move, first to one spot, then to another, ostensibly for foraging purposes, for the very reason that he reckoned the enemy forces would not fail to follow in his tracks. And two days later, when he had led forth his forces duly and carefully deployed, he marched past close to the enemy’s camp and challenged them to battle on level ground but when he saw the enemy reluctant to accept, he led his legions back to camp as evening was approaching.

> Latin: 73. Ob has causas quas supra commemoravi sollicitabatur Caesar tardiorque et consideratior erat factus et ex pristina bellandi consuetudine celeritateque excesserat. Neque mirum: copias enim habebat in Gallia bellare consuetas locis campestribus et contra Gallos, homines apertos minimeque insidiosos, qui per virtutem, non per dolum dimicare consuerunt; tum autem erat ei laborandum ut consuefaceret milites hostium dolos, insidias, artificia cognoscere et quid sequi, quid vitare conveniret. Itaque, quo haec celerius conciperent, dabat operam ut legiones non in uno loco contineret sed per causam frumentandi huc atque illuc rapsaret, ideo quod hostium copias ab se suoque vestigio non discessuras existimabat. Atque post diem tertium productis accuratius suis copiis sicut instruxerat, propter hostium castra praetergressus aequo loco invitat ad dimicandum. Postquam eos abhorrere videt, reducit sub vesperum legiones in castra.

## 4. Chapters 74–98

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/4/#p-N

[¶0] 74. Meanwhile envoys arrived from the town of Vaga, which was near Zeta, the occupation of which by Caesar we have already described. They prayed and besought Caesar to send them a garrison, saying they would assist him by furnishing various supplies useful in war. At this point, by the good will of the gods and their favour towards Caesar, a deserter informed his compatriots that king Juba had speedily hastened to the town with his forces to forestall the arrival there of Caesar’s garrison that at his coming he had surrounded the town with vast forces, won control of it, slaughtered all the inhabitants to a man, and then given it over to his troops to plunder and destroy.

> Latin: 74. Legati interim ex oppido Vaga, quod finitimum fuit Zetae, cuius Caesarem potitum esse demonstravimus, veniunt petunt, obsecrant, ut sibi praesidium mittat: se res compluris quae utiles bello sint sumministraturos. Per id tempus deorum voluntate studioque erga Caesarem transfuga suos civis facit certiores Iubam regem celeriter cum copiis suis, antequam Caesaris praesidium eo perveniret, ad oppidum accucurrisse atque advenientem multitudine circumdata eo potitum omnibusque eius oppidi incolis ad unum interfectis dedisse oppidum diripiendum delendumque militibus.

[¶1] 75. Meanwhile Caesar ceremonially purified his army on March 21st. On the following day he led forth his entire forces, advanced five miles from his own camp, and took his stand in battle array at a distance of some two miles from Scipio’s camp. On perceiving that his opponents, despite this adequate and sustained challenge, declined his offer of battle, he led his forces back: and on the following day he struck camp and took the road to the town of Sarsura, where Scipio had posted a garrison of Numidians and laid in a stock of corn. When Labienus perceived this he proceeded to harry Caesar’s rear-guard with his cavalry and light-armed troops; and having by this means cut off the baggage trains of the sutlers and merchants who were carrying their wares in carts, he was thereby the more encouraged to grow bolder and come closer to the legions, since he supposed that the soldiers were worn out with carrying their heavy packs and so in no condition to fight. But this contingency had not escaped Caesar’s attention: he had in fact given instructions that three hundred men out of each legion should be in light order; and these he accordingly despatched against Labienus’ cavalry to give support to his own squadrons. Whereupon Labienus, dismayed at the sight of the standards, wheeled round his horses and beat a hasty and highly undignified retreat. The legionary troops, having killed many of his men and wounded not a few, retired to their standards and proceeded to resume their march. Labienus still kept up his pursuit at a distance, moving along the crest of the ridge of hills upon the right.

> Latin: 75. Caesar interim lustrato exercitu a. d. XII. Kal. April, postero die productis universis copiis progressus ab suis castris milia passuum V, a Scipionis circiter duum milium interiecto spatio, in acie constitit. Postquam satis diuque adversarios ab se ad dimicandum invitatos supersedere pugnae animadvertit, reducit copias posteroque die castra movet atque iter ad oppidum Sarsuram, ubi Scipio Numidarum habuerat praesidium frumentumque comportaverat, ire contendit. Quod ubi Labienus animadvertit, cum equitatu levique armatura agmen eius extremum carpere coepit atque ita lixarum mercatorumque qui plaustris merces portabant interceptis sarcinis addito animo propius audaciusque accedit ad legiones, quod existimabat milites sub onere ae sub sarcinis defatigatos pugnare non posse. Quae res Caesarem non fefellerat: namque expeditos ex singulis legionibus trecenos milites esse iusserat. Itaque eos in equitatum Labieni immissos turmis suorum suppetias mittit. Tum Labienus conversis equis signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime fugere contendit. Multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis milites legionarii ad sua se recipiunt signa atque iter inceptum ire coeperunt. Labienus per iugum summum collis dextrorsus procul subsequi non destitit.

[¶2] 76. When Caesar came to the town of Sarsura he massacred Scipio’s garrison while his opponents looked on, not daring to assist their friends. Its commander, however, P. Cornelius, a reservist recalled by Scipio, offered a gallant resistance, but was surrounded by overwhelming numbers and killed. Then Caesar gained control of the town, distributed corn to his army on the spot, and arrived next day at the town of Thysdra. Considius was in the town at this time with a considerable garrison force and his own bodyguard of gladiators. Caesar studied the characteristics of the town, and the lack of water discouraged him from attacking it: he then set out forthwith and pitched a camp some four miles away near water, only to quit it at the fourth watch and return once again to the camp he had occupied near Aggar. Scipio followed suit and led his forces back to his old camp.

> Latin: 76. Postquam Caesar ad oppidum Sarsuram venit, inspectantibus adversariis interfecto praesidio Scipionis, cum suis auxilium ferre non auderent, fortiter repugnante P. Cornelio, evocato Scipionis, qui ibi praeerat, atque a multitudine circumvento interfectoque oppido potitur atque ibi frumento exercitui dato postero die ad oppidum Thysdram pervenit; in quo Considius per id tempus fuerat cum grandi praesidio cohorteque sua gladiatorum. Caesar oppidi natura perspecta aquae inopia ab oppugnatione eius deterritus protinus profectus circiter milia passuum Illi ad aquam facit castra atque inde quarta vigilia egressus redit rursus ad ea castra quae ad Aggar habuerat. Idem facit Scipio atque in antiqua castra copias reducit.

[¶3] 77. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Thabena, who dwelt on the coast at the extreme verge of Juba’s kingdom and were his traditional lieges and subjects, had none the less massacred the royal garrison, and now sent envoys to Caesar informing him of their action and earnestly soliciting that the Roman people should give them succour in their present plight, as they had deserved well at their hands. Caesar approved their policy and sent Marcius Crispus with three cohorts and numerous archers and pieces of artillery to Thabena as a garrison force. It was at this same time that Caesar was reinforced by the troops from all his legions who, whether prevented by sickness or because they had been granted leave, had previously been unable to cross to Africa with the colours: these comprised about four thousand infantry, four hundred cavalry and a thousand slingers and archers, and all came in one convoy. And so, leading out all his legions, including these forces, he took up a position in battle array in the plain five miles away from his own camp and two miles distant from Scipio’s.

> Latin: 77. Thabenenses interim, qui sub dicione et potestate Iubae esse consuessent in extrema eius regni regione maritima locati, interfecto regio praesidio legatos ad Caesarem mittunt, rem a se gestam docent, petunt orantque ut suis fortunis populus Romanus, quod bene meriti essent, auxilium ferret. Caesar eorum consilio probato Marcium Crispum tribus cum cohortibus et sagittariis tormentisque compluribus praesidio Thabenam mittit. Eodem tempore ex legionibus omnibus milites qui aut morbo impediti aut commeatu dato cum signis non potuerant ante transire in Africam ad milia IIII, equites CCCC, funditores sagittariique mille uno commeatu Caesari occurrerunt. Itaque cum his copiis et omnibus legionibus eductis, sicut erat instructus, V milibus passuum ab suis castris, ab Scipionis vero II milibus passuum longe constitit in campo.

[¶4] 78. Below Scipio’s camp there was a town called Tegea, where he kept a standing garrison force of cavalry numbering some two thousand men. This cavalry he now deployed in line on the right- and left-hand flanks of the town, while he himself led his legions out of camp and after advancing not much more than about a mile from his defences drew them up arrayed in battle formation on the lower slopes of a ridge. After some little time had elapsed without Scipio’s shifting his position, and as the daylight hours were being frittered away in inaction, Caesar ordered some squadrons of his own horse to make a charge against the enemy cavalry which were posted on guard near the town, and despatched some light-armed units, archers and slingers to the same objective in support. When this manoeuvre was under way and the Julians had delivered their attack at full gallop, Pacideius began to deploy his horsemen on a broader front, to enable them to swarm round the flanks of the Julian cavalry and still fight with the utmost gallantry and spirit. When Caesar observed these tactics he instructed the three hundred men in light order—-it was his normal practice that this number of men in each of his legions should be in light order—from the legion which was posted in the line nearest the scene of this action to hasten to the assistance of the cavalry. Meanwhile Labienus sent cavalry reinforcements to support his own horsemen, furnishing unscathed troopers and those whose strength was relatively unspent to take the place of their wounded or exhausted comrades. Now that the four hundred Julian cavalry were finding it impossible to contain the violent onslaught of an enemy some four thousand strong, and were suffering casualties at the hands of the light-armed Numidians and giving ground very slightly, Caesar despatched a second wing of cavalry to dash speedily to the help of his hard-pressed men. This action raised the spirits of his troops, who delivered a massed charge against the enemy and turned their opponents to flight; and after killing many and wounding not a few and chasing the enemy for three miles and driving them right up to the high ground they retired to their lines. Caesar waited till the tenth hour and then withdrew to his camp in battle order without any losses. In this engagement Pacideius was seriously wounded in the head by a heavy javelin which pierced his helmet; and several of the enemy leaders and all their bravest men were either killed or wounded.

> Latin: 78. Erat oppidum infra castra Scipionis nomine Tegea, ubi praesidium equestre circiter II milium numero habere consuerat. Eo equitatu dextra sinistra derecto ab oppidi lateribus ipse legiones ex castris eductus atque in iugo inferiore instructas non longius fere mille passus ab suis munitionibus progressus in acie constituit. Postquam diutius in uno loco Scipio commorabitur et tempus diei in otio consumebatur. Caesar equitum turmas suorum iubet in hostium equitatum qui ad oppidum in statione erant facere impressionem levemque armaturam, sagittarios funditoresque eodem summittit. Quod ubi coeptum est fieri et equis concitatis Iuliam impetum fecissent, Pacideius suos equites exporrigere coepit in longitudinem, ut haberent facultatem turmas lulianas circumfundi et nihilo minus fortissime acerrimeque pugnare. Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, CCC. quos ex legionibus habere expeditos consuerat, ex legione quae proxima ei proelio in acie constiterat iubet equitatui succurrere. Labienus interim suis equitibus auxilia equestris summittere sauciisque ac defatigatis integros recentioribusque viribus equites sumministrare. Postquam equites Iuliani CCCC vim hostium ad IIII milia numero sustinere non poterant et ab levi armatura Numidarum vulnerabantur minutatimque cedebant, Caesar alteram alam mittit qui satagentibus celeriter occurrerent. Quo facto sui sublati universi in hostis impressione ficta in fugam adversarios dederunt multis occisis, compluribus vulneratis insecuti per III milia passuum usque ad collem hostibus adactis se ad suos recipiunt. Caesar in horam X. commoratus, sicut erat instructus, se ad sua castra recepit omnibus incolumibus. In quo proelio Pacideius graviter pilo per cassidem caput ictus compluresque duces ac fortissimus quisque interfecti vulneratique sunt.

[¶5] 79. Finding it impossible on any terms to induce his opponents to come down to level ground and risk their legions, and realising that it was equally impossible for him to pitch his own camp closer to the enemy owing to the poor supply of water, and perceiving that his opponents, so far from having any confidence in their own valour, were led to hold him in contempt by their reliance on the dearth of water, Caesar left Aggar on April 4th at the third watch. Then, after advancing sixteen miles by-night, he pitched camp near Thapsus, where Vergilius was in command with a considerable garrison. That same day he began to invest the town, seizing and manning several suitable strategic points to prevent the enemy’s being able to infiltrate and approach him, or capture any inner positions. Scipio had in the meantime got to know of Caesar’s plans and being now reduced to the necessity of fighting, if he was to avoid the utter humiliation of losing Vergilius and those most staunch supporters of his cause—the men of Thapsus, he forthwith followed Caesar along the high ground and established himself in two camps at a distance of eight miles from Thapsus.

> Latin: 79. Postquam nulla condicione cogere adversarios poterat ut in aequum locum descenderent legionumque periculum facerent, neque ipse propius hostem castra ponere propter aquae penuriam se posse animadvertebat, adversarios non virtute eorum confidere sed aquarum inopia fretos despicere se intellexit. II. Non. Apr. tertia vigilia egressus ab Aggar XVI milia nocte progressus ad Thapsum, ubi Vergilius cum grandi praesidio praeerat, castra ponit oppidumque eo die circummunire coepit locaque idonea opportunaque complura praesidiis occupare, hostes ne intrare ad se ae loca interiora capere possent. Scipio interim cognitis Caesaris consiliis ad necessitatem adductus dimicandi, ne per summum dedecus fidissimos suis rebus Thapsitanos et Vergilium amitteret, confestim Caesarem per superiora loca consecutus milia passuum VIII a Thapso binis castris consedit.

[¶6] 80. There was a lagoon of salt water, separated from the sea by a certain narrow strip of land not more than a mile and a half wide: and this corridor Scipio now attempted to enter to bring help to the men of Thapsus. The likelihood of such a move had not escaped Caesar’s attention: in fact, the day before he had built a fort at this spot and left behind a force of three cohorts to hold it, while he himself with the rest of his forces established a crescent-shaped camp and invested Thapsus with a ring of siege works. Meanwhile Scipio, foiled in his undertaking, bypassed the lagoon to the north by a march which he completed in the ensuing day and night, and then, at the first pale light of dawn, took up a position not far from the camp and the defence area I mentioned above, and a mile and a half from the sea coast: and there he began to fortify a camp. When this was reported to Caesar, the latter withdrew his troops from their work of fortification, left behind the proconsul Asprenas to guard the camp with two legions, and hurriedly marched to that location with a force in light order. As for his fleet, part of it was left behind off Thapsus, while the remaining ships were ordered to advance as close as possible inshore in rear of the enemy and to watch for a signal from Caesar: on the giving of which signal they were suddenly to raise a shout, surprise the enemy from the rear, and thus demoralise them, so that in their utter confusion and panic they would be obliged to look behind them.

> Latin: 80. Erat stagnum salinarum, inter quod et mare angustiae quaedam non amplius mille et D passus intererant; quas Scipio intrare et Thapsitanis auxilium ferre conabatur. Quod futurum Caesarem non fefellerat. Namque pridie in eo loco castello munito ibique III cohortium praesidio relicto ipse cum reliquis copiis lunatis castris Thapsum operibus circummunivit. Scipio interim exclusus ab incepto, itinere supra stagnum postero die et castra confecto, caelo albente non longe a castris praesidioque quod supra commemoravi MD passibus ad mare versus consedit et castra munire coepit. Quod postquam Caesari nuntiatum est, milite ab opere deducto, castris praesidio Asprenate pro consule eum legionibus duabus relicto ipse eum expedita copia in eum locum citatim contendit, classisque parte ad Thapsum relicta reliquas navis iubet post hostium tergum quam maxime ad litus appelli signumque suum observare, quo signo dato subito clamore facto ex improviso hostibus aversis incuterent terrorem, ut perturbati ae perterriti respicere post terga cogerentur.

[¶7] 81. When Caesar arrived there and observed Scipio’s battle line arrayed in front of the rampart, with the elephants posted on the right and left wings, while none the less part of his troops were busily engaged in fortifying the camp, he himself disposed his army in three lines: the Tenth and Seventh legions he posted on the right wing, the Eighth and Ninth on the left, while five cohorts of the Fifth legion were stationed on each of the actual wings, forming a fourth line to contain the elephants and his archers and slingers were deployed on either wing, and the light-armed units interspersed among the cavalry. Caesar himself hurriedly went the rounds of his troops on foot, reminding the veterans of their gallant bearing in previous combats and raising their morale by flattering appeals. As for tin recruits, seeing they had never so far fought in pitched battle, he urged them to emulate the gallantry of the veterans and to make it their ambition by gaining a victory to enjoy a fame, status and renown equal to theirs.

> Latin: 81. Quo postquam Caesar pervenit et animadvertit aciem pro vallo Scipionis constitutam elephantis dextro sinistroque cornu collocatis, et nihilo minus partem militum castra non ignaviter munire, ipse acie triplici collocata, legione X. VII. que dextro cornu, VIII. et VIIII, sinistro oppositis, quintae legionis in quarta acie ad ipsa cornua quinis cohortibus contra bestias collocatis, sagittariis, funditoribus in utrisque cornibus dispositis levique armatura inter equites interiecta, ipse pedibus circum milites concursans virtutesque veteranorum proeliaque superiora commemorans blandeque appellans animos eorum excitabat. Tirones autem, qui numquam in acie dimicassent, hortabatur ut veteranorum virtutem aemularentur eorumque famam, locum, nomen victoria parta cuperent possidere.

[¶8] 82. Now in the course of making these rounds of his army he observed that the enemy in the neighbourhood of their rampart were excited, rushing hither and thither in alarm, now retiring inside the gates, now trooping out in a spasmodic and undisciplined fashion. Several others were beginning to observe the same symptoms when without more ado his lieutenants and reservists implored Caesar not to hesitate to give the signal, saying that it was decisive victory that the immortal gods were thus foretelling them. Caesar still hesitated, opposing their impetuous eagerness, repeatedly protesting that a precipitate sally was not his approved way of fighting, and again and again holding his battle line in check; when suddenly on the right wing, without orders from Caesar but under coercion of the troops, a trumpeter began to sound the charge. Whereupon even- single cohort began to attack the enemy, despite the resistance of the centurions, who planted themselves in the path of the troops and sought to hold them back by force to prevent their attacking without orders from the commander-in-chief, but all in vain.

> Latin: 82. Itaque in circumeundo exercitu animadvertit hostis circa vallum trepidare atque ultro citroque pavidos concursare et modo se intra portas recipere, modo inconstanter immoderateque prodire. Cum idem a pluribus animadverti coeptum esset, subito legati evocatique obscerare Caesarem ne dubitaret signum dare: victoriam sibi propriam a dis immortalibus portendi. Dubitante Caesare atque eorum studio cupiditatique resistente sibique eruptione pugnari non placere clamitante, etiam atque etiam aciem sustentante, subito dextro cornu iniussu Caesaris tubicen a militibus coactus canere coepit. Quo facto ab universis cohortibus signa in hostem coepere inferri, cum centuriones pectore adverso resisterent vique continerent milites, ne iniussu imperatoris concurrerent, nec quicquam proficerent.

[¶9] 83. When Caesar realised that it was quite out of the question to hold back his troops in their present state of excitement, he signalled “Good Luck” and giving his horse its head rode in hot haste against the enemy front ranks. Meanwhile on the right wing the slingers and archers in crowds launched rapid volleys of missiles against the elephants. Whereupon the beasts, terrified by the whizzing sound of the slings and by the stones and leaden bullets launched against them, speedily wheeled round, trampled under foot the massed and serried ranks of their own supporting troops behind them, and rushed towards the half-completed gates of the rampart. The Moorish cavalry, who were posted on the same wing as the elephants, followed suit and, abandoned by their protective screen, started the rout. Having thus speedily got round the elephants, the legions gained possession of the enemy’s rampart and when the few defenders who offered a spirited resistance had been killed, the remainder precipitately sought refuge in the camp from which they had issued the day before.

> Latin: 83. Quod postquam Caesar intellexit incitatis militum animis resisti nullo modo posse, signo Felicitatis dato equo admisso in hostem contra principes ire contendit. A dextro interim cornu funditores tariique concita tela in elephantos frequentes iniciunt. Quo facto bestiae stridore fundarum, lapidum plumbique iactatu perterritae sese convertere et suos post se frequentis stipatosque proterere et in portas valli semifactas ruere contendunt. Item Mauri equites, qui in eodem cornu elephantis erant, praesidio deserti principes fugiunt. Ita celeriter bestiis circumitis legiones vallo hostium sunt potitae, et paucis acriter repugnantibus interfectisque reliqui concitati in castra unde pridie erant egressi confugiunt.

[¶10] 84. I ought not, I think, to omit to mention the gallantry of a veteran soldier of the Fifth legion. On the left wing an elephant, maddened by the pain of a wound it had received, had attacked an unarmed sutler, pinned him underfoot, and then knelt upon him and now, with its trunk erect and swaying, and trumpeting loudly, it was crushing him to death with its weight. This was more than the soldier could bear he could not but confront the beast, fully armed as he was. When it observed him coming towards it with weapon poised to strike, the elephant abandoned the corpse, encircled the soldier with its trunk, and lifted him up in the air. The soldier, perceiving that a dangerous crisis of this sort demanded resolute action on his part, hewed with his sword again and again at the encircling trunk with all the strength he could muster. The resulting pain caused the elephant to drop the soldier, wheel round, and with shrill trumpetings make all speed to rejoin its fellows.

> Latin: 84. Non videtur esse praetermittendum de virtute militis veterani V. legionis. Nam cum in sinistro cornu elephas vulnere ictus et dolore concitatus in lixam inermem impetum fecisset cumque sub pede subditum dein genu innixus pondere suo proboscide erecta vibrantique stridore maximo premeret atque enecaret, miles hic non potuit pati quin se armatus bestiae offerret. Quem postquam elephas ad se telo infesto venire animadvertit, relicto cadavere militem proboscide circumdat atque in sublime extollit. Armatus, qui in eiusmodi periculo constanter agendum sibi videret, gladio proboscidem qua erat circumdatus caedere quantum viribus poterat non destitit. Quo dolore adductus elephas milite abiecto maximo cum stridore cursuque conversus ad reliquas bestias se recepit.

[¶11] 85. Meanwhile the members of the garrison of Thapsus made a sortie from the town by way of the seaward gate and, whether their object was to hasten to the aid of their fellows, or to abandon the town and secure their own safety by flight, out they came and accordingly, wading waist-high into the sea, made for the land. They were, however, prevented from reaching land by stones and heavy javelins hurled by the slaves and lackeys in the camp; and so they returned back into the town. Meanwhile Scipio’s forces, now thrown into utter confusion, were in wholesale retreat in every sector of the field, and Caesar’s legions promptly pursued them without giving them any respite in which to pull themselves together. When the fugitives reached the camp they were making for, with the object of making a recovery there and defending themselves once more, and of trying to find someone to lead them—someone to look up to, under whose authority and command they could carry on the tight; when they got there and perceived that there was nobody guarding it, they forthwith discarded their armour and beat a hasty retreat to the royal camp. This too on their arrival they saw to be in the hands of the Julians. Abandoning all hope of salvation, they now halted on a hill and gave the military salute by lowering their arms. This gesture, unhappily for them, stood them in but little stead. For Caesar’s veterans were filled with such burning indignation and resentment that, so far from any possibility of inducing them to spare the enemy, they actually wounded or killed several men of culture and distinction among the ranks of their own side, calling them ringleaders. Among these was Tullius Rufus, an ex-quaestor, who was mortally wounded by a soldier who deliberately ran him through with a heavy javelin; and similarly Pompeius Rufus was stabbed in the arm with a sword and would have been done to death, had he not promptly rushed to Caesar’s side. This behaviour caused grave alarm among quite a number of Roman knights and senators, who retired from the battle lest they themselves should also be massacred by the soldiers, who after so resounding a victory had apparently taken it for granted that they were free to perpetrate any excesses, on the assumption that they would go unpunished in view of their magnificent achievements. Accordingly, although all these troops of Scipio implored Caesar’s protection, they were massacred to a man, despite the fact that Caesar himself was looking on and entreating his troops to spare them.

> Latin: 85. Interim Thapso qui erant praesidio ex oppido eruptionem porta maritima faciunt et, sive ut suis subsidio occurrerent, sive ut oppido deserto fuga salutem sibi parerent, egrediuntur atque ita per mare umbilici fine ingressi terram petebant. Qui a servitiis puerisque qui in castris erant lapidibus pilisque prohibiti terram attingere rursus se in oppidum receperunt. Interim Scipionis copiis prostratis passimque toto campo fugientibus confestim Caesaris legiones consequi spatiumque se non dare colligendi. Qui postquam ad ea castra quae petebant perfugerunt, ut refecti castris rursus sese defenderent ducemque aliquem requirerent, quem respicerent, cuius auctoritate imperioque rem gererem:—qui postquam animadverterunt neminem ibi esse praesidio, protinus armis abiectis in regia castra fugere contendunt. Quo postquam pervenerunt, ea quoque ab Iulianis teneri vident. Desperata salute in quodam colle consistunt atque armis demissis salutationem more militari faciunt. Quibus miseris ea res parvo praesidio fuit. Namque milites veterani ira et dolore incensi non modo ut parcerent hosti non poterant adduci sed etiam ex suo exercitu inlustris urbanos, quos auctores appellabant, compluris aut vulnerarunt aut interfecerunt; in quo numero fuit Tullius Rufus quaestorius, qui pilo traiectus consulto a milite interiit; item Pompeius Rufus bracchium gladio percussus, nisi celeriter ad Caesarem accucurrisset, interfectus esset. Quo facto complures equites Romani senatoresque perterriti ex proelio se receperunt, ne a militibus, qui ex tanta victoria licentiam sibi assumpsissent immoderate peccandi impunitatis spe propter maximas res gestas, ipsi quoque interficerentur. Itaque ei omnes Scipionis milites cum fidem Caesaris implorarent, inspectante ipso Caesare et a militibus deprecante eis uti parcerent, ad unum sunt interfecti.

[¶12] 86. Having made himself master of three camps and killed ten thousand of the enemy and routed a large number, Caesar retired to camp with fifty soldiers missing and a few wounded. Immediately on his arrival he established himself in front of the town of Thapsus. He then took sixty-four elephants, equipped, armed and complete with towers and harness, and these he now drew up in array in front of the town: his object in so doing was to see if Vergilius and the others who were being besieged with him could be induced to abandon their obstinate resistance by the evidence of their comrades’ failure. He then addressed a personal appeal to Vergilius inviting him to surrender and reminding him of his own leniency and clemency: but on failing to observe any response he withdrew from the town. On the following day, after offering sacrifice, he held a parade and in full view of the occupants of the town congratulated his troops, rewarding his entire veteran force and bestowing decorations publicly in front of the dais for conspicuous gallantry and meritorious service. Thereupon he immediately withdrew from the town, leaving behind the proconsul Rebilus in front of Thapsus with three legions and Cn. Domitius with two at Thysdra, where Considius was in command, to continue the blockades of these places: and then, sending M. Messalla on ahead to Utica with the cavalry, he himself also proceeded with despatch to the same destination.

> Latin: 86. Caesar trinis castris potitus occisisque hostium X milibus fugatisque compluribus se recepit L militibus amissis, paucis sauciis in castra ae statim ex itinere ante oppidum Thapsum constitit elephantosque LXIIII ornatos armatosque cum turribus ornamentisque capit, captos ante oppidum instructos constituit, id hoc consilio, si posset Vergilius quique cum eo obsidebantur rei male gestae suorum indicio a pertinacia deduci. Deinde ipse Vergilium appellavit invitavitque ad deditionem suamque lenitatem et clementiam commemoravit. Quem postquam animadvertit responsum sibi non dare, ab oppido discessit. Postero die divina re facta contione advocata in conspectu oppidanorum milites collaudat totumque exercitum veteranorum donavit, praemia fortissimo cuique ac bene merenti pro suggestu tribuit, ae statim inde digressus Rebilo pro consule cum III ad Thapsum legionibus et Cn. Domitio cum duabus Thysdrae, ubi Considius praeerat, ad obsidendum relictis, M. Messalla Uticam ante praemisso eum equitatu ipse eodem iter facere contendit.

[¶13] 87. Meanwhile those horsemen of Scipio’s who had escaped from the battle were proceeding in the direction of Utica when they came to the town of Parada. Being refused admittance by the inhabitants—for the tidings of Caesar’s victory had preceded them—they gained possession of the town by force; then, making a pile of faggots in the middle of the market-place and heaping on top all the inhabitants’ possessions, they set fire to it and then flung into the flames, alive and bound, the inhabitants of the town themselves, irrespective of rank or age, thereby meting out to them the most cruel of all punishments. Whereupon they came straight to Utica. Now earlier on M. Cato had come to the conclusion that on account of the benefit they had received from the Julian law the men of Utica were but lukewarm supporters of his cause and so he had expelled the unarmed mob from the town, built a concentration camp in front of the military gate, protected by quite a shallowish trench, and forced them to live there cordoned off by sentries. As for the town’s senate, he kept it under restraint. This concentration camp of theirs Scipio’s horsemen now attacked and began to storm, for the very reason that they knew that its occupants had been adherents of Caesar’s side: and if they massacred them their destruction might serve to avenge their own sense of disappointment. But the people of Utica, emboldened as a result of Caesar’s victory, drove back the horsemen with stones and clubs. And so, finding it impossible to gain possession of the camp, the horsemen hurled themselves upon the town of Utica, where they massacred many of the inhabitants and stormed and looted their houses. As Cato could not persuade them by any means to join him in defending the town or cease from their butchery and pillaging, and as he was aware of their intentions, he distributed a hundred sesterces to each of them by way of appeasing their wanton attitude. Faustus Sulla followed suit and bribed them out of his own pocket; he then left Utica with them and proceeded on his way to Juba’s kingdom.

> Latin: 87. Equites interim Scipionis qui ex proelio fugerant, eum Uticam versus iter facerent, perveniunt ad oppidum Paradae. Ubi eum ab incolis non reciperentur, ideo quod fama de victoria Caesaris praecucurrisset, vi oppido potiti in medio foro lignis coacervatis omnibusque rebus eorum congestis ignem subiciunt atque eius oppidi incolas cuiusque generis aetatisque vivos constrictosque in flammam coiciunt atque ita acerbissimo adficiunt supplicio; deinde protinus Uticam perveniunt. Superiore tempore M. Cato, quod in Uticensibus propter beneficium legis Iuliae parum suis partibus praesidi esse existimaverat, plebem inermem oppido eiecerat et ante portam bellicam castris fossaque parvula dumtaxat muniverat ibique custodiis circumdatis habitare coegerat; senatum autem oppidi custodia tenebat. Eorum castra ei equites adorti expugnare coeperunt, ideo quod eos Caesaris partibus favisse sciebant, ut eis interfectis eorum pernicie dolorem suum ulciscerentur. Uticenses animo addito ex Caesaris victoria lapidibus fustibusque equites reppulerunt. Itaque postea quam castra non potuerant potiri, Uticam se in oppidum coniecerunt atque ibi multos Uticensis interfecerunt domosque eorum expugnaverunt ae diripuerunt. Quibus eum Cato persuadere nulla ratione quiret ut secum oppidum defenderent et caede rapinisque desisterent et quid sibi vellent sciret, sedandae eorum importunitatis gratia singulis C divisit. Idem Sulla Faustus fecit ae de sua pecunia largitus est unaque cum his ab Utica proficiscitur atque in regnum ire intendit.

[¶14] 88. Meanwhile a considerable number of the fugitives reached Utica. All these, together with the Three Hundred,1 who had contributed money to Scipio for the prosecution of the war. Scipio now called together and urged them to set their slaves at liberty and defend the town. On perceiving that, while some of them agreed with him, others were thoroughly scared at heart and had set their minds on flight, he refrained from further mention of the subject and assigned ships to the latter to enable them to leave for the destination of their individual choice. As for himself, having made all arrangements with the greatest care and entrusted his children to L. Caesar, who at the time was acting as his quaestor, he retired to bed without arousing any suspicions, there being nothing unusual either about the way he looked or the way he talked: and then, having secretly smuggled a dagger into his bedroom, he accordingly stabbed himself. He had collapsed but was still breathing when his doctor and some members of his household, suspecting something amiss, forced their way into the bedroom and proceeded to staunch and bind up the wound; but with his own hands he tore it open with utter ruthlessness and resolutely made an end of himself. Despite, their hatred of him on party grounds, yet, on account of his unique integrity, and because he had proved so very different from the other leaders and had fortified Utica with wonderful defences and extended its battlements, the men of Utica accorded him burial. After Cato’s suicide L. Caesar, intending to turn this incident somehow to his personal advantage, delivered a speech to the assembled people in which he urged them all to open their gates, saying that he set great store by C. Caesar’s clemency. Accordingly, the gates were thrown open and he came out from Utica and set forth to meet Caesar, the commander-in-chief. Messalla arrived at Utica in accordance with his instructions and posted guards at all the gates.

> Latin: 88. Complures interim ex fuga Uticam perveniunt. Quos omnis Cato convocatos una cum CCC, qui pecuniam Scipioni ad bellum faciendum contulerant, hortatur uti servitia manumitterent oppidumque defenderent. Quorum eum partem assentire, partem animum mentemque perterritam atque in fugam destinatam habere intellexisset, amplius de ea re agere destitit navisque his attribuit, ut in quas quisque partis vellet proficisceretur. Ipse omnibus rebus diligentissime constitutis, liberis suis L. Caesari, qui tum ei pro quaestore fuerat, commendatis, et sine suspicione, vultu atque sermone quo superiore tempore usus fuerat, cum dormitum isset, ferrum intro clam in cubiculum tulit atque ita se traiecit. Qui dum anima nondum exspirata concidisset, et impetu facto in cubiculum ex suspicione medicus familiaresque continere atque vulnus obligari coepissent, ipse suis manibus vulnus crudelissime divellit atque animo praesenti se interemit. Quem Uticenses quamquam oderant partium gratia, tamen propter eius singularem integritatem, et quod dissimillimus reliquorum ducum fuerat quodque Uticam mirificis operibus muniverat turrisque auxerat, sepultura adficiunt. Quo interfecto L. Caesar ut aliquid sibi ex ea re auxili pararet convocato populo contione habita cohortatur omnis ut portae aperirentur: se in C. Caesaris clementia magnam spem habere. Itaque portis patefactis Utica egressus Caesari imperatori obviam proficiscitur. Messalla, ut erat imperatum, Uticam pervenit omnibusque portis custodias ponit.

[¶15] 89. Caesar meanwhile advanced from Thapsus and arrived at Usseta, where Scipio had kept a large quantity of stores including, amongst other things, corn, arms and weapons: there was also a small garrison force. Of this arsenal he gained possession on his arrival, and then came to Hadrumetum. Entering this town without opposition, he made an inventory of the arms, corn and money in it, and spared the lives of Q. Ligarius and C. Considius, the son, both of whom were present at that time. Then, quitting Hadrumetum the same day and leaving Livineius Regulus behind there with a legion he hastened on to Utica. On the way he was met by L. Caesar, who incontinently threw himself at his feet and prayed him for one boon, for one alone—to spare him his life. Caesar readily granted him this boon—an act which accorded both with his natural temperament and principles and in the same way he followed his normal procedure in sparing the lives of Caecina, C. Ateius, P. Attius, L. Cella (both father and son), M. Eppius, M. Aquinus, as well as Cato’s son and the children of Damasippus. He then arrived at Utica when it was just about dusk and spent that night outside the town.

> Latin: 89. Caesar interim ab Thapso progressus Ussetam pervenit, ubi Scipio magnum frumenti numerum, armorum, telorum ceterarumque rerum cum parvo praesidio habuerat. Id adveniens potitur, deinde Hadrumetum pervenit. Quo cum sine mora introisset, armis, frumento pecuniaque considerata Q. Ligario, C. Considio filio, qui tum ibi fuerant, vitam concessit. Deinde eodem die Hadrumeto egressus Livineio Regulo eum legione ibi relicto Uticam ire contendit. Cui in itinere fit obvius L. Caesar et subito se ad genua proiecit vitamque sibi neque amplius quicquam deprecatur. Cui Caesar facile et pro natura sua et pro instituto concessit, item Caecinae, C. Ateio, P. Atrio, L. Cellae patri et filio, M. Eppio, M. Aquino, Catonis filio Damasippique liberis ex sua consuetudine tribuit circiterque luminibus accensis Uticam pervenit atque extra oppidum ea nocte mansit.

[¶16] 90. Early the following morning he entered the town and summoned an assembly, at which he addressed the citizens of Utica in a stirring speech and thanked them for the zealous support they had given him. As, however, for the Roman citizens who were engaged in trade and those members of the Three Hundred who had contributed sums of money to Varus and Scipio, he brought a very detailed accusation against them and dilated at some length upon their crimes, but finally announced that they could come out into the open without fear: their lives at any rate he would spare: their property indeed he would sell, yet on the following condition, that if any man among them personally bought in his own property, he himself would duly register the sale of the property and enter up the money paid under the heading of a fine, so as to enable the man in question to enjoy full security thereafter. For these men, pale with fear and, considering their deserts, with little hope of saving their lives, here was an unexpected offer of salvation. Gladly and eagerly they accepted the terms and besought Caesar to fix a lump sum of money to be paid by the entire Three Hundred as a whole. Accordingly, he required them to pay to the Roman people the sum of two hundred million sesterces in six instalments spread over three years; and this they accepted gladly and without a single murmur, expressing their gratitude to Caesar and declaring that this day finally marked for them the start of a new life.

> Latin: 90. Postero die mane in oppidum introiit contioneque advocata Uticensis incolas cohortatus gratias pro eorum erga se studio egit, civis autem Romanos negotiatores et eos qui inter CCC pecunias contulerant Varo et Scipioni multis verbis accusat et de eorum sceleribus longiore habita oratione ad extremum ut sine metu prodirent edicit: se eis dumtaxat vitam confossurum bona quidem eorum se venditurum, ita tamen, qui eorum ipse sua bona redemisset, se bonorum venditionem inducturum et pecuniam multae nomine relaturum, ut incolumitatem retinere posset. Quibus metu exsanguibus de vitaque ex suo promerito desperantibus subito oblata salute libentes cupidique condicionem acceperunt petieruntque a Caesare ut universis CCC uno nomine pecuniam imperaret. Itaque bis milies sestertio his imposito, ut per triennium sex pensionibus populo Romano solverent, nullo eorum recusante ae se eo demum die natos praedicantes laeti gratias agunt Caesari.

[¶17] 91. Meanwhile king Juba had fled from the battle and, accompanied by Petreius, by lying up in farms by day and travelling by night, arrived at length in his kingdom and came to the town of Zama. In this town he had his own residence and his wives and children; and it was here he had collected all his money and most precious possessions from all over his kingdom, having fortified the town at the outset of hostilities with very strong defences. But the townsfolk, who had already heard the much-desired tidings of Caesar’s victory, refused him admittance on the following grounds: when he entered upon hostilities with the Roman people he had collected a mass of wooden billets and built a vast pyre in the town of Zama in the middle of the market-place, so that, should it so chance he was beaten in the war, he might pile all his possessions on it, then massacre all his citizens and fling them also on to it, set it alight, and then finally slay himself on top of it, and thus be consumed by fire along with his children, wives, citizens and the entire royal treasure. For a long time Juba earnestly treated with the men of Zama before the gates of the town, employing threats in the first place, as his authority warranted; secondly, realising that he was making but little headway, he besought them with entreaties to let him have access to his own hearth and home; and thirdly, when he observed that they persisted in their determination, and that neither threats nor entreaties on his part had any effect upon them or disposed them the more to admit him, he begged them to hand over to him his wives and children, so that he could carry them away with him. On observing that the townsfolk vouchsafed him no answer at all he left Zama without gaining any satisfaction from them, and then betook himself to a country residence of his, attended by M. Petreius and a few horsemen.

> Latin: 91. Rex interim Iuba, ut ex proelio fugerat, una eum Petreio interdiu in villis latitando tandem nocturnis itineribus confectis in regnum pervenit atque ad oppidum Zamam, ubi ipse domicilium, coniuges liberosque habebat, quo ex cuncto regno omnem pecuniam carissimasque res comportaverat quodque inito bello operibus maximis muniverat, accedit. Quem antea oppidani rumore exoptato de Caesaris victoria audito ob has causas oppido prohibuerunt, quod bello contra populum Romanum suscepto in oppido Zamae lignis congestis maximam in medio foro pyram construxerat ut, si forte bello foret superatus, omnibus rebus eo coacervatis, dein civibus cunctis interfectis eodemque proiectis igne subiecto tum demum se ipse insuper interficeret atque una eum liberis, coniugibus, civibus cunctaque gaza regia cremaretur. Postquam Iuba ante portas diu multumque primo minis pro imperio egisset cum Zamensibus, dein cum se parum proficere intellexisset precibus orasset uti se ad suos deos penates admitterent, ubi eos perstare in sententia animadvertit nec minis nec precibus suis moveri quo magis se reciperent, tertio petit ab eis ut sibi coniuges liberosque redderent ut secum eos asportaret. Postquam sibi nihil omnino oppidanos responsi reddere animadvertit, nulla re ab his impetrata ab Zama discedit atque ad villam suam se eum M. Petreio paucisque equitibus conferti Zamenses interim legatos de his rebus ad Caesarem Uticam mittunt petuntque ab eo uti antequam rex manum colligeret seseque oppugnaret sibi auxilium mitteret: se tamen paratos esse, sibi quoad vita suppeteret, oppidum seque ei reservare.

[¶18] 92. Whereupon the men of Zama sent envoys to Caesar at Utica to discuss this situation, asking him to send them help before the king should collect a force and attack them: at all events, they said, they were prepared to preserve the town and themselves for him so long as the breath of life remained in them. Caesar congratulated the envoys and bade them return home: he would follow them, and they must make known his coming in advance. He himself left Utica the following day with his cavalry and proceeded with despatch into the royal territory. Meanwhile in the course of his march there came to Caesar several leaders of the royal forces, who begged him to forgive them. To these suppliants he granted pardon, and then came to Zama. Meanwhile the tidings of his leniency and clemency had spread abroad, with the result that practically all the horsemen in the kingdom came to Caesar at Zama and there they were set free by him from their fears and the danger winch involved them.

> Latin: 92. Legatos collaudatos Caesar domum iubet antecedere ac suum adventum praenuntiare. Ipse postero die Utica egressus cum equitatu in regnum ire contendit. Interim in itinere ex regiis copiis duces complures ad Caesarem veniunt orantque ut sibi ignoscat. Quibus supplicibus venia data Zamam pervenit. Rumore interim perlato de eius lenitate clementiaque propemodum omnes regni equites Zamam perveniunt ad Caesarem ab eoque sunt metu periculoque liberati.

[¶19] 93. During the course of these proceedings on either side Considius, who was in command at Thysdra and was accompanied by his household slaves, a bodyguard of gladiators and some Gaetulians, learned of the massacre of his comrades; and being seriously perturbed by the arrival of Domitius and his legions, and despairing of saving his life, he abandoned the town, made a secret withdrawal with a handful of his foreign troops and a large sum of money, and beat a hasty retreat to Juba’s kingdom. But while he was on the road the Gaetulians who bore him company cut him down in their impatience to loot his treasure, and then made off, as best they could, in various directions. Meanwhile C. Vergilius, who was cut off alike by land and sea, perceived that he was making no progress: that his comrades were either killed or put to flight: that M. Cato had taken his own life at Utica: that the king was a wanderer at large, abandoned by his subjects and held in universal contempt: that Saburra and his troops had been destroyed by Sittius: that Caesar had been received without opposition at Utica; and that out of all that vast army there was nothing left whatever. For his own part, therefore, he accepted the safeguard for himself and his children offered him by the pro-consul Caninius, who was blockading him, and surrendered himself to the latter with all his effects and the town.

> Latin: 93. Dum haec utrobique geruntur, Considius, qui Thysdrae cum familia sua, gladiatoria manu Gaetulisque praeerat, cognita caede suorum Domitique et legionum adventu perterritus desperata salute oppidum deserit seque clam cum paucis barbaris pecunia onustus subducit atque in regnum fugere contendit. Quem Gaetuli, sui comites, in itinere praedae cupidi concidunt seque in quascumque potuere partis conferunt. C. interim Vergilius, postquam terra marique clausus se nihil proficere intellexit suosque interfectos aut fugatos, M. Catonem Uticae sibi ipsum manus attulisse, regem vagum ab suisque desertum ab omnibus aspernari, Saburram eiusque copias ab Sittio esse deletas, Uticae Caesarem sine mora receptum, de tanto exercitu reliquias esse nullas, ipse sibi suisque liberis a Caninio pro consule, qui eum obsidebat, fide accepta seque et sua omnia et oppidum proconsuli tradit.

[¶20] 94. Meanwhile king Juba, outlawed by all his townships, despaired of saving his life. And so finally, after dining with Petreius, he fought a duel with him with swords, so as to create the impression that both had met a gallant death; and the sword of the stronger man, Juba, easily put an end to Petreius, his weaker adversary. Juba then endeavoured to run himself through the chest with his sword; but not being able to do it, he successfully entreated a slave of his to kill him, and so achieved his purpose.

> Latin: 94. Rex interim ab omnibus civitatibus exclusus, desperata salute, cum iam cenatus esset cum Petreio, ut per virtutem interfecti esse viderentur, ferro inter se depugnant atque firmior imbecilliorem Iuba Petreium facile ferro consumpsit. Deinde ipse sibi eum conaretur gladio traicere pectus nec posset, precibus a servo suo impetravit ut se interficeret idque obtinuit.

[¶21] 95. Meanwhile P. Sittius had routed the army of Saburra, Juba’s lieutenant, killing Saburra himself, and was marching with a small force through Mauretania to join Caesar when he happened to fall in with Faustus and Afranius, who were in command of the party—some thousand strong—with which they had plundered Utica, and were now making tracks for Spain. And so he promptly laid an ambush by night and attacked them at dawn. A few of the cavalry in their vanguard escaped; but all the rest were either killed or else they surrendered, and Sittius captured alive Afranius as well as Faustus with his wife and children. A few days later some disagreement arose in the army and Faustus and Afranius were killed. As for Pompeia and the children of Faustus, Caesar spared their lives and allowed them to retain all their property.

> Latin: 95. P. Sittius interim pulso exercitu Saburrae, praefecti Iubae, ipsoque interfecto eum iter cum paucis per Mauretaniam ad Caesarem faceret, forte incidit in faustum Afraniumque, qui eam manum habebant qua Uticam diripuerant iterque in Hispaniam intendebant et erant numero circiter mille. Itaque celeriter nocturno tempore insidiis dispositis cum prima luce adortus praeter paucos equites, qui ex primo agmine fugerant, reliquos aut interfecit aut in deditionem accepit, Afranium et Faustum cum coniuge et liberis vivos capit. Paucis post diebus dissensione in exercitu orta Faustus et Afranius interficiuntur; Pompeiae eum Fausti liberis Caesar incolumitatem suaque omnia concessit.

[¶22] 96. Meanwhile Scipio, Damasippus, Torquatus and Plaetorius Rustianus were making for Spain aboard some warships; and after a long and very stormy passage they were carried towards Royal Hippo, where P. Sittius had his fleet at that time. Outnumbered as they were by the latter, Scipio’s vessels were surrounded and sunk; and Scipio and those I have just named perished aboard them.

> Latin: 96. Scipio interim eum Damasippo et Torquato et Plaetorio Rustiano navibus longis diu multumque iactati, eum Hispaniam peterent, ad Hipponem regium deferuntur, ubi classis P. Sitti id temporis erat. A qua pauciora ab amplioribus circumventa navigia deprimuntur, ibique Scipio cum illis quos paulo ante nominavi interiit.

[¶23] 97. Meanwhile at Zama Caesar held an auction of the royal property and sold the goods of those who, albeit Roman citizens, had borne arms against the Roman people. He bestowed rewards upon the inhabitants of Zama, who had adopted the policy of barring their gates to the king, farmed out the collection of the royal taxes, and turned the kingdom into a province. Then, leaving C. Sallustius behind there in military command with the powers of proconsul, he himself left Zama and returned to Utica. There he sold the property of those who had held military commands under Juba and Petreius, and exacted the following payments under the title of fines: from the men of Thapsus—two million sesterces from their corporation—three million likewise from the men of Hadrumetum—three million and from their corporation—five million. But he protected their cities and property from all injury and looting. As for the inhabitants of Leptis, whose property had been plundered in former years by Juba but had been restored to them after the Senate had appointed arbitrators on receiving a deputation of theirs lodging a formal complaint, Caesar now required them to pay by way of fine three million pounds weight of oil annually, because at the beginning of the war in the course of disagreements among their leaders they had entered into an alliance with Juba, and had assisted him with arms, troops and money. The men of Thysdra—not a well-to-do community—were fined a certain quantity of corn.

> Latin: 97. Caesar interim Zamae auctione regia facta bonisque eorum venditis qui cives Romani contra populum Romanum arma tulerant praemiisque Zamensibus, qui de rege excludendo consilium ceperant, tributis vectigalibusque regiis locatis ex regnoque provincia facta atque ibi C Sallustio pro consule cum imperio relicto ipse Zama egressus Uticam se recepit. Ibi bonis venditis eorum qui sub Iuba Petreioque ordines duxerant, Thapsitanis HS |X̅X̅, conventui eorum HS |X̅X̅X̅, itemque Hadrumetinis HS |X̅X̅X̅, conventui eorum HS |L̅ multae nomine imponit; civitates bonaque eorum ab omni iniuria rapinisque defendit. Leptitanos, quorum superioribus annis bona Iuba diripuerat, et ad senatum questi per legatos atque arbitris a senatu datis sua receperant, XXX centenis milibus pondo olei in annos singulos multati ideo quod initio per dissensionem principum societatem cum Iuba inierant eumque armis, militibus, pecunia iuverant. Thysdritanos propter humilitatem civitatis certo numero frumenti multati His rebus gestis Idibus Iun.

[¶24] 98. After making these arrangements he went aboard his fleet at Utica on June 13th, and arrived two days later at Caralis in Sardinia. There he fined the men of Sulei one hundred thousand sesterces for having harboured Nasidius and his fleet and assisted him by supplying troops, and directed that they should pay as tax one-eighth of their produce instead of one-tenth. He also sold up the property of a few individuals. Then he embarked on June 27th, and leaving Caralis, sailed along the coast. Twenty-seven days later—for bad weather kept holding him up in the various ports—he arrived at the city of Rome.

> Latin: 98. Uticae classem conscendit et post diem tertium Caralis in Sardiniam pervenit. Ibi Sulcitanos, quod Nasidium eiusque classem receperant copiisque iuverant. HS C multat et pro decumis octavas pendere iubet bonaque paucorum vendit et ante diem IIII Kal. Quint, navis conscendit et a Canalibus secundum terram provectus duodetricesimo die, ideo quod tempestatibus in portibus cohibebatur, ad urbem Romam venit.