---
title: "The African War · Bellum Africum"
author: "Anonymous (Caesarian corpus)"
translator: "A. G. Way"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 3 of 4
url: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/3/
cite: "Anonymous (Caesarian corpus), tr. A. G. Way, The African War · Bellum Africum, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/3/"
---

# The African War · Bellum Africum

*Anonymous (Caesarian corpus), tr. A. G. Way*

Caesar’s campaign in Africa against the Pompeians and King Juba, to the battle of Thapsus and Cato’s suicide at Utica, by an unknown officer who served in it.

> Latin: ed. A. G. Way, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi0426.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: A. G. Way, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi0426.phi001.perseus-eng1). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 3. Chapters 51–73

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-african-war/3/#p-N

[¶0] 51. After this action fought by the cavalry Caesar fortified a camp on the hill of which he had gained possession, assigning each legion its share of the work. He then began to carry two fortified lines from his own principal camp across the centre of the plain in the direction of the town of Uzitta—-which town was situated on flat ground between his camp and Scipio’s and was occupied by the latter—-their direction being such as to make them converge upon the tight and left corners of the town. His purpose in constructing this field-work was as follows: when he advanced his forces closer to the town and proceeded to attack it, he should have his flanks covered by these fortifications of his and not he enveloped by the swarms of enemy cavalry and so be deterred from attacking; moreover, it should make it easier to hold conversations with the enemy, and if any of the latter wanted to desert—this had often occurred in the past, but at great risk to the deserters—it should now prove easy and devoid of risk. He was also anxious to discover, when he approached closer to the enemy, whether they intended to fight. Over and above these reasons was the additional fact that this was a low-lying tract, and quite a few wells could be sunk in it: water in fact was in short supply and had to be earned a long distance. While the legionaries were engaged in this work of fortification which I have mentioned above, a detachment of them took post in front of the work in battle formation close to the enemy: for the latter’s foreign cavalry and part of his light-armed force kept skirmishing at close quarters.

> Latin: 51. Hae re per equites gesta Caesar legionibus opera distribuit atque in eo colle quo erat potitus castra munivit. Deinde ab suis maximis castris per medium campum e regione oppidi Uzittae, quod inter sua castra et Scipionis in planitie positum erat tenebaturque a Scipione, duo bracchia instituit ducere et ita dirigere ut ad angulum dextrum sinistrumque eius oppidi convenirent. Id hae ratione opus instruebat ut, eum propius oppidum copias admovisset oppugnareque coepisset, tecta latera suis munitionibus haberet, ne ab equitatus multitudine circumventus ab oppugnatione deterreretur, praeterea quo facilius colloquia fieri possent et, si qui perfugere vellent, id quod antea saepe accidebat magno eum eorum periculo, tum facile et sine periculo fieret. Voluit etiam experiri, cum propius hostem accessisset, haberetne in animo dimicare. Accedebat etiam ad reliquas causas quod is locus depressus erat puteique ibi non nulli fieri poterant: aquatione enim longa et angusta utebatur. Dum haec opera quae ante dixi fiebant a legione, interim pars acie ante opus instructa sub hoste stabat: equites barbari levisque armaturae proeliis minutis comminus dimicabant.

[¶1] 52. It was now nearly dusk, and Caesar was withdrawing his troops from this work to camp, when Juba, Scipio and Labienus launched a violent attack upon his legionaries, employing all their cavalry and light-armed forces. Caesar’s cavalry reeled and gave ground momentarily under the sudden and violent impact of the massed swarms of the enemy. But the latter found that this manoeuvre did not go according to plan: for Caesar halted in his tracks and led his forces back to the assistance of his cavalry. The arrival of the legions put fresh heart into the cavalry, who wheeled round, charged the Numidians in the middle of their eager, but scattered pursuit, and drove them right back into the royal camp, with heavy casualties and many of their number killed. And had not nightfall speedily overtaken this action, and a cloud of dust raised up by the wind hampered everyone’s vision, Juba and Labienus would have been captured and have fallen into Caesar’s hands, and their cavalry and light-armed troops would have been utterly and entirely annihilated. Whereupon an incredible number of Scipio’s troops deserted from the Fourth and Sixth legion—some to Caesar’s camp, others to various places wherever each individual managed to find refuge. The cavalry who were once under Curio’s command likewise lost confidence in Scipio and his forces, and many of them took refuge with the others.

> Latin: 52. Caesar ab eo opere eum iam sub vesperum copias in castra reduceret, magno incursu cum omni equitatu levique armatura Iuba, Scipio, Labienus in legionarios impetum fecerunt. Equites Caesariani vi universae subitaeque hostium multitudinis pulsi parumper cesserunt. Quae res aliter adversariis cecidit: namque Caesar ex medio itinere copiis reductis equitibus suis auxilium tulit; equites autem adventu legionum animo addito conversis equis in Numidas cupide insequentis dispersosque impetum fecerunt atque eos convulneratos usque in castra regia reppulerunt multosque ex eis interfecerunt. Quod nisi in noctem proelium esset coniectum pulvisque vento elatus omnium prospectui offecisset, Iuba cum Labieno capti in potestatem Caesaris venissent, equitatusque eum levi armatura funditus ad internecionem deletus esset. Interim incredibiliter ex legione IIII. et VI. Scipionis milites diffugere partim in castra Caesaris, partim in quas quisque poterat regiones pervenire: itemque equites Curioniani diffisi Scipioni eiusque copiis complures se eodem conferebant.

[¶2] 53. While the leaders on either side were engaged in these operations in the neighbourhood of Uzitta, two legions, the Tenth and the Ninth, which had sailed from Sicily in transports, were now not far from the port of Ruspina. Here they sighted those ships of Caesar’s which were stationed on patrol off Thapsus; and fearing they might be falling unawares upon an enemy flotilla loitering there presumably with treacherous designs, they made off out to sea. Many days later, exhausted by thirst and privation after a long and very storm-tossed voyage, they at length reached Caesar.

> Latin: 53. Dum haec circum Uzittam ab utrisque ducibus administrantur, legiones duae, X. et VIIII., ex Sicilia navibus onerariis profectae, eum iam non longe a portu Ruspinae abessent, conspicati navis Caesarianas quae in statione apud Thapsum stabant, veriti ne in adversariorum ut insidiandi gratia ibi commorantium classem inciderent imprudentes, vela in altum dederunt ac diu multumque iactati tandem multis post diebus siti inopiaque confecti ad Caesarem perveniunt.

[¶3] 54. These legions were then disembarked. Now Caesar had in mind the lack of discipline of old among the troops in Italy and the plundering exploits of certain individuals: and he had now some ground for complaint, though only a trifling one, in the fact that C. Avienus, a military tribune of the Tenth legion, had commandeered a vessel from the convoy and filled it with his own household slaves and beasts of burden, without transporting a single soldier from Sicily. Accordingly, on the following day Caesar paraded the tribunes and centurions of all his legions and thus addressed them from the platform. “I could have wished above all things that people would at some time or other have set bounds to their wanton and highly irresponsible behaviour, and had regard for my own leniency, moderation and forbearance. However, since they set themselves no limit or boundary, I myself will set them a precedent in accordance with military custom, so that the remainder may behave somewhat differently. Inasmuch as you, C. Avienus, in Italy have stirred up soldiers of the Roman people against the state and have committed acts of plunder in various municipal towns; inasmuch as you have proved useless to me and to the state and have embarked, instead of troops, your own household slaves and beasts of burden, so that thanks to you the state is short of troops at a critical time for these reasons I hereby discharge you with ignominy from my army and direct that you leave as soon as possible and be quit of Africa this day. You also, A. Fonteius, I dismiss from my army, for having proved a mutinous military tribune and a disloyal citizen. T. Salienus, M. Tiro and C. Clusinas, you have attained your ranks in my army, not by merit, but by favour; your conduct has been such as to prove you neither brave in war, nor loyal nor competent in peace, and more eager to stir up mutiny among the troops against your commander-in-chief than to preserve respect and discipline: on these counts I deem yon to be unworthy to hold rank in my army, and I hereby discharge you and direct that you be quit of Africa as soon as possible.” Accordingly he handed them over to the centurions, assigned them each no more than a single slave, and had them embarked separately in a ship.

> Latin: 54. Quibus legionibus expositis memor in Italia pristinae licentiae militaris ac rapinarum certorum hominum parvulam modo causulam nactus Caesar, quod C. Avienus, tribunus militum X. legionis, navem ex commeatu familia sua atque iumentis occupavisset neque militem unum ab Sicilia sustulisset, postero die de suggestu convocatis omnium legionum tribunis centurionibusque, “Maxime vellem,” inquit, “homines suae petulantiae nimiaeque libertatis aliquando finem fecissent meaeque lenitatis, modestiae patientiaeque rationem habuissent. Sed quoniam ipsi sibi neque modum neque terminum constituunt, quo ceteri dissimiliter se gerant egomet ipse documentum more militari constituam. C. Aviene, quod in Italia milites populi Romani contra rem publicam instigasti rapinasque per municipia fecisti quodque mihi reique publicae inutilis fuisti et pro militibus tuam familiam iumentaque in navis imposuisti tuaque opera militibus tempore necessario res publica caret, ob eas res ignominiae causa ab exercitu meo removeo hodieque ex Africa abesse et quantum pote proficisci iubeo. Itemque te, A. Fontei, quod tribunus militum seditiosus maiusque civis fuisti, te ab exercitu dimitte T. Saliene, M. Tiro, C. Clusinas, cum ordines in meo exercitu beneficio non virtute consecuti ita vos gesseritis ut neque bello fortes neque pace boni aut utiles fueritis et magis in seditione concitandisque militibus adversum vestrum imperatorem quam pudoris modestiaeque fueritis studiosiores, indignos vos esse arbitror qui in meo exercitu ordines ducatis, missosque facio et quantum pote abesse ex Africa iubeo.” Itaque tradit eos centurionibus et singulis non amplius singulos additos servos in navem imponendos separatim curavit.

[¶4] 55. Meanwhile the Gaetulian deserters who, as we have described above,1 were sent by Caesar with despatches and instructions, arrived back among their own citizens. The authority they held readily induced their countrymen, who were also influenced by Caesar’s reputation, to revolt from king Juba and so they one and all promptly took up arms and did not hesitate to oppose the king. On learning of this situation king Juba, compelled as he now was by necessity to divide his energies between three fronts, detached six cohorts from the force which he had led against Caesar and sent them to his own royal domain to defend it against the Gaetulians.

> Latin: 55. Gaetuli interim perfugae, quos cum litteris mandatisque a Caesare missos supra docuimus, ad suos civis perveniunt. Quorum auctoritate facile adducti Caesarisque nomine persuasi a rege Iuba desciscunt celeriterque cuncti arma capiunt contraque regem facere non dubitant. Quibus rebus cognitis Iuba, distentus triplici bello necessitateque coactus, de suis copiis quas contra Caesarem adduxerat sex cohortis in finis regni sui mittit quae essent praesidio contra Gaetulos.

[¶5] 56. Caesar had now completed his lines of fortification and extended them right up to a point so as to be just out of range of spear-cast from the town. He then fortified a camp, ranging catapults and scorpions at close intervals in front of it and training them upon the town, and harrying without respite the defenders of its walls; he also detached five legions from his former camp and brought them down to the new one. Making use of the opportunity thus offered, certain more distinguished persons and those of the widest acquaintance kept demanding to see their friends and relations, and conversations ensued between them. Caesar was not blind to the expediency of this turn of events; and in fact some of the nobler Gaetulians among the royal cavalry, including captains of horse, whose fathers had previously served with Marius and had, by his good offices, been presented with farms and lands, but later on after Sulla’s victory had been handed over as subjects to king Hiempsal, seized their chance and deserted, when it was night and the lamps were now lit, and came with their horses and grooms—roughly a thousand of them—to Caesar’s camp which was situated in the plain close to Uzitta.

> Latin: 56. Caesar bracchiis perfectis promotisque usque eo quo telum ex oppido adigi non posset castra munit, ballistis scorpionibusque crebris ante frontem castrorum contra oppidum collocatis defensores muri deterrere non intermittit eoque quinque legiones ex superioribus castris deducit. Qua facultate oblata inlustriores notissimique conspectum amicorum propinquorumque efflagitabant atque inter se colloquebantur. Quae res quid utilitatis haberet Caesarem non fallebat: namque Gaetuli ex equitatu regio nobiliores equitumque praefecti, quorum patres cum Mario ante meruerant eiusque beneficio agris fidibusque donati post Sullae victoriam sub Hiempsalis regis erant dati potestatem, occasione capta nocte iam luminibus accensis cum equis calonibusque suis circiter mille perfugium in Caesaris castra quae erant in campo proxime Uzittae locata.

[¶6] 57. It was just about this time, after Scipio and his colleagues had come to learn of this disconcerting setback, that they saw M. Aquinus holding a conversation with C. Saserna. Scipio sent word to Aquinus saying that he had no business to be holding a conversation with the enemy. When none the less the messenger brought back to Scipio the other’s answer, namely that on the contrary it remained for him to complete the rest of his business, Juba also sent him a courier, to say, in the hearing of Saserna: “The king forbids you to hold this conversation.” Alarmed by this message, Aquinus withdrew in deference to the king’s injunction. To think that it had come to this, that a Roman citizen, one, moreover, who had received office at the hands of the Roman people, at a time when his country and all his fortunes stood secure, should rather have obeyed Juba, a foreigner, than deferred to Scipio’s instructions or else, if he preferred, let his own partisans be massacred, while he himself returned home safe and sound! Still more arrogant even was Juba’s behaviour, not towards M. Aquinus, a mere upstart and junior member of the Senate, but towards Scipio, whose family, rank and magistracies were such as to make him an outstanding man. For Scipio had been in the habit of wearing a purple cloak before the king arrived and Juba—so it is said—took the matter up with him, saying that Scipio ought not to wear the same dress as he himself wore. And so it came about that Scipio changed to white dress in deference to Juba—that by-word of arrogance and indolence.

> Latin: 57. Quod postquam Scipio quique cum eo erant cognoverunt, cum commoti ex tali incommodo essent, fere per id tempus M. Aquinum cum C. Saserna colloquentem viderunt. Scipio mittit ad Aquinum, nihil attulere eum cum adversariis colloqui. Cum nihilo minus eius sermonem nuntius ad Scipionem referret sed restare ut reliqua quae sibi vellet perageret, viator praeterea ab Iuba ad eum est missus qui diceret audiente Saserna: “Vetat te rex colloqui.” Quo nuntio perterritus discessit et dicto audiens fuit regi. Usu venisse hoc civi Romano et ei qui ab populo Romano honores accepisset, incolumi patria fortunisque omnibus Iubae barbaro potius oboedientem fuisse quam aut Scipionis obtemperasse nuntio aut caesis eiusdem partis civibus incolumem reverti malle! Atque etiam et superbius Iubae factum non in M. Aquinum, hominem novum parvumque senatorem, sed in Scipionem, hominem illa familia, dignitate, honoribus praestantem. Namque cum Scipio sagulo purpureo ante regis adventum uti solitus esset, dicitur Iuba cum eo egisse non oportere illum eodem vestitu atque ipse uteretur. Itaque factum est ut Scipio ad album sese vestitum transferret et Iubae homini superbissimo inertissimo que obtemperaret.

[¶7] 58. On the next day the enemy led out their entire combined forces from all their camps and, gaining possession of a certain prominent knoll, arrayed their battle line not far from Caesar’s camp, and took up their position there. Caesar likewise led forth his forces, speedily arrayed them and took up a position in front of his fortifications which were in the plain; for he thought, no doubt, that his opponents, seeing they were equipped with such substantial forces and the reinforcements supplied by the king, and had previously been quite prompt to sally forth, would now take the initiative, advance towards him and join battle. After riding round encouraging his legions he gave the signal and awaited the enemy’s advance. For he himself had good reason not to advance too far from his fortifications, since the town of Uzitta, held by Scipio, contained enemy cohorts under arms; moreover, his right-hand wing lay opposite the said town, and he was afraid that, if he advanced beyond it, the enemy might make a sally from the town, attack him in flank, and maul him severely. Apart from this there was another reason too to make him pause, namely that in front of Scipio’s line there was a patch of very broken ground, which he believed would prevent his troops from going over to the offensive.

> Latin: 58. Postero die universas omnium copias de castris omnibus educunt et supercilium quoddam excelsum nacti non longe a Caesaris castris aciem constituunt atque ibi consistunt. Caesar item producit copias celeriterque cis instructis ante suas munitiones quae erant in campo consistit, sine dubio existimans ultro adversarios, cum tam magnis copiis auxiliisque regis essent praediti promptiusque prosiluissent ante, secum concursuros propiusque se accessuros. Equo circumvectus legionesque cohortatus signo dato accessum hostium aucupabatur. Ipse enim a suis munitionibus longius non sine ratione non procedebat, quod in oppido Uzittae, quod Scipio tenebat, hostium erant cohortes armatae; eidem autem oppido ad dextrum latus eius cornu erat oppositum, verebaturque ne, si praetergressi esset, ex oppido eruptione facta ab latere eum adorti conciderent. Praeterea haec quoque eum causa tardavit, quod erat locus quidam perimpeditus ante aciem Scipionis, quem suis impedimento ad ultro occurrendum fore existimabat.

[¶8] 59. I do not think ought to pass over without mention the manner in which the armies of either side were deployed in battle formation. Scipio’s order of battle was as follows. In front he placed his own and Juba’s legions: behind these, in a support line, the Numidians, drawn out in so thin and long a formation as to give the impression at a distance that the centre was a single line composed of legionary troops. His elephants he had placed at regular intervals on his right and left wings, and behind the elephants his light-armed troops and Numidian auxiliaries were stationed in support. On his right wing he had posted his entire force of bridled cavalry for his left wing was covered by the town of Uzitta, and there was no room to deploy cavalry. In addition he had posted some Numidians and a vast multitude of light-armed troops to cover the right flank of his line at a distance of at least a mile or so, pushing them more towards the foothills and so withdrawing them farther away both from the enemy and his own forces. His purpose in doing this was that when the two battle lines charged one another, his cavalry would only have to continue their outflanking movement a little farther in the early stages of the action, and then by sheer weight of numbers they could surprise and envelop Caesar’s army, throw it into disorder, and riddle it with lances. Such was Scipio’s plan of battle that day.

> Latin: 59. Non arbitror esse praetermittendum, quem ad modum exercitus utriusque fuerint in aciem instructi. Scipio hoc modo aciem derexit. Collocabat in fronte suas et Iubae legiones, post eas autem Numidas in subsidiaria acie ita extenuatos et in longitudinem derectos ut procul simplex esse acies media ab legionariis militibus videretur. Elephantos dextro sinistroque cornu collocaverat aequalibus inter eos intervallis interiectis, post autem elephantos armaturas levis Numidasque auxiliaris substituerat. Equitatum fremitum universum in suo dextro cornu disposuerat: sinistrum enim cornu oppido Uzitta claudebatur neque erat spatium equitatus explicandi. Praeterea Numidas Iovisque armaturae infinitam multitudinem ad dextram partem suae aciei opposuerat fere interiecto non minus mille passuum spatio et ad collis radices magis appulerat longiusque ab adversariorum suisque copiis promovebat, id hoc consilio ut, cum acies duae inter se concurrissent, initio certaminis paulo longius eius equitatus circumvectus ex improviso clauderet multitudine sua exercitum Caesaris atque perturbatum iaculis configeret. Haec fuit ratio Scipionis eo die proeliandi.

[¶9] 60. Caesar’s battle line, on the other hand, was disposed as follows, my description beginning with his left wing and working round to his right. On his left wing he had the Tenth and Ninth legions: in the centre the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Twenty-Eighth and Twenty-Sixth. As for the actual right wing, he had posted there some of the cohorts of his veteran legions as well as a few cohorts from the legions of recruits besides. His third line he had concentrated on his left wing, extending it right up to the central legion of his line, and had arranged it in such a formation that his left wing was composed of three lines. His motive for doing this was the fact that, whereas his right flank was supported by his fortifications, he was hard put to it to know how his left Hank could bear up under the hordes of enemy cavalry; and it was on this same left flank that he had concentrated the whole of his own cavalry and, not feeling too confident in it, had detached the Fifth legion to support this cavalry, and drafted light-armed troops at intervals among the horse. As for his archers, he had posted them in various formations at definite points throughout the line, but chiefly on the wings.

> Latin: 60. Caesaris autem acies hoc modo fuit collocata, ut ab sinistro eius cornu ordiar et ad dextrum perveniam. Habuit legionem X. et VIIII, in sinistro cornu, XXV., XXVIIII, XIII., XIV., XXVIII., XXVI. in media acie. Ipso autem dextro cornu veteranarum legionum partem cohortium collocaverat, praeterea ex tironum adiecerat paucas. Tertiam autem aciem in sinistrum suum cornu contulerat et usque ad aciei suae mediam legionem porrexerat et ita collocaverat uti sinistrum suum cornu esset triplex. Id eo consilio fecerat quod suum dextrum latus munitionibus adiuvabatur, sinistrum autem equitatus hostium multitudini uti resistere posset laborabat, eodemque suum omnem equitatum contulerat et, quod ei parum confidebat, praesidio his equitibus legionem V. praemiserat levemque armaturam inter equites interposuerat. Sagittarios varie passimque locis certis maximeque in cornibus collocaverat.

[¶10] 61. Such was the manner in which the armies on either side were drawn up, with a distance of no more than three hundred paces separating them—a situation which had never, perhaps, arisen before without leading to an engagement; and there they remained continuously from early morning right until the tenth hour. And now, while Caesar was beginning to lead his army back within his fortifications, suddenly the entire force of cavalry—the more distant one, comprising Numidians and Gaetulians riding without bridles—began a movement on the right and to advance closer to Caesar’s camp on the high ground, while Labienus’ bridled cavalry maintained their positions and distracted the attention of the legions. Whereupon part of Caesar’s cavalry together with the light-armed troops, acting without orders and without discretion, suddenly advanced too far, crossed a marshy tract and found themselves too far outnumbered to be able to contain the enemy. Abandoning the light-armed troops, the cavalry were driven back and fled to their own lines not without casualties—one horseman missing, many horses wounded and twenty-seven light-armed soldiers killed. It was now night when Scipio, delighted with this successful cavalry engagement, withdrew his forces into camp. But in vouchsafing him this triumph the fortunes of war saw fit to make it but short-lived. On the following day, in fact, a detachment of Caesar’s cavalry which he had sent to Leptis on a foraging mission surprised in the course of their march and attacked about a hundred marauding Numidian and Gaetulian horse, killing some of them and taking the rest alive. Meanwhile Caesar made it his constant and daily practice to lead his legions down into the plain, proceed with his field-works, carry his rampart and trench across the middle of the plain, and thereby hinder his opponents’ sallies. Scipio likewise built counter defences, pushing them forward in haste to prevent Caesar from barring him access to the ridge. Thus the generals on both sides were occupied with field-works, but none the less engaged one another daily in cavalry actions.

> Latin: 61. Sic utrorumque exercitus instructi non plus passuum CCC interiecto spatio, quod forsitan ante id tempus acciderit numquam quin dimicaretur, a mane usque ad horam X. diei perstiterunt. Iamque Caesar dum exercitum intra munitiones suas reducere coepisset, subito universus equitatus ulterior Numidarum Gaetulorumque sine frenis ad dextram partem se movere propiusque Caesaris castra quae erant in colle se conferre coepit, fremitus autem Labieni eques in loco permanere legionesque distinere: cum subito pars equitatus Caesaris cum levi armatura contra Gaetulos iniussu ac temere longius progressi paludemque transgressi multitudinem hostium pauci sustinere non potuerunt levique armatura deserta pulsi convulneratique uno equite amisso, multis equis sauciis, levis armaturae XXVII occisis ad suos refugerunt. Quo secundo equestri proelio facto Scipio laetus in castra nocte copias reduxit. Quod proprium gaudium bellantibus fortuna tribuere non decrevit: namque postero die Caesar cum partem equitatus sui frumentandi gratia Leptim misisset, in itinere praedatores equites Numidas Gaetulosque ex improviso adorti circiter C partim occiderunt, partim vivorum potiti sunt. Caesar interim cotidie legiones in campum deducere atque opus facere vallumque et fossam per medium campum ducere adversariorumque excursionibus ita officere non intermittit. Scipio item munitiones contra facere et, ne iugo a Caesare excluderetur, approperare. Ita duces utrique et in operibus occupati esse et nihilo minus equestribus proeliis inter se cotidie dimicabant.

[¶11] 62. Meanwhile Varus, who had previously beached his flotilla at Utica for the winter, learned that the Seventh and Eighth legions were on the way from Sicily. Thereupon he promptly launched his flotilla, manned it on the spot with Gaetnlian oarsmen and marines and, setting sail from Utica, arrived at Hadrumetum with fifty-five ships with the object of setting a trap for them. Caesar, who was unaware of his arrival, despatched L. Cispius with a squadron of twenty-seven ships to the area of Thapsus to patrol there and give cover to his convoy; and he also sent Q. Aquila with thirteen warships to Hadrumetum for the same purpose. Cispius speedily reached his destination, whereas Aquila, lashed by a storm and unable to double the headland, gained a certain cove which was sheltered from the storm and afforded him and his squadron a fairly inconspicuous retreat. The rest of the fleet stood at anchor out at sea off Leptis; and as the crews had disembarked and were roaming here and there about the beach, some of them having gone off to the town to buy themselves food, the fleet had no one to defend it. Learning of this situation from a deserter. Varus seized his opportunity: at the second watch he came out of the inner harbour of Hadrumetum and arrived off Leptis in the early morning with his entire squadron and there he set fire to the defenceless transports which were anchored out at sea at some distance from the port, and captured two five-banked warships, which offered no resistance.

> Latin: 62. Interim Varus classem, quam antea Uticae hiemis gratia subduxerat, cognito legionis VII et VIII ex Sicilia adventu celeriter deducit ibique Gaetulis remigibus epibatisque complet insidiandique gratia ab Utica progressus Hadrumetum eum L V navibus pervenit. Cuius adventus inscius Caesar L. Cispium cum classe XXVII navium ad Thapsum versus in stationem praesidi gratia commeatus sui mittit itemque Q. Aquilam cum XIII navibus longis Hadrumetum eadem de causa praemittit. Cispius quo erat missus celeriter pervenit; Aquila tempestate iactatus promunturium superare non potuit atque angulum quendam tutum a tempestate nactus cum classe se longius a prospectu removit. Reliqua classis in salo ad Leptim egressis remigibus passimque in litore vagantibus, partim in oppidum victus sui mercandi gratia progressis, vacua a defensoribus stabat. Quibus rebus Varus ex perfuga cognitis occasionem nactus vigilia secunda Hadrumeto ex cothone egressus primo mane Leptim cum universa classe vectus navis onerarias, quae longius a portu in sal o stabant, vacuas a defensoribus incendit et penteres duas nullo repugnante cepit.

[¶12] 63. Meanwhile a message speedily acquainted Caesar with the news as he was touring the defence works in his camp, which was six miles distant from the harbour. Putting everything else on one side and giving his horse its head he speedily reached Leptis, where he insisted that all the ships should follow his lead: he himself then went aboard a small cutter. As he sailed on he came up with Aquila, who was filled with panic and confusion at the large number of the enemy ships, and then set off in pursuit of the enemy squadron. Meanwhile Varus, disconcerted by Caesar’s promptitude and boldness, had turned about with his entire squadron and was now beating a hasty retreat to Hadrumetum. In four miles’ sail Caesar overhauled him, recovered one of his quinqueremes, complete with all its crew, and capturing in addition the enemy prize-crew aboard her, one hundred-and-thirty strong, and then captured the nearest enemy trireme, which in the course of the action had lagged behind the rest, with its full complement of rowers and marines. The rest of the enemy fleet doubled the headland, and one and all sought refuge in the inner harbour of Hadrumetum. But the wind did not hold for Caesar also to be able to double the headland; so after riding out that night at anchor in deep water he approached Hadrumetum at dawn. There he set fire to the transports which were outside the inner harbour and then, as all the others had either been beached by the enemy or massed inside the inner harbour, he waited a little while to see if by chance the enemy were disposed to fight a naval action and then withdrew back to his camp.

> Latin: 63. Caesar interim celeriter per nuntios in castris, cum opera circumiret, certior factus, quae aberant a portu milia passuum VI, equo admisso omissis omnibus rebus celeriter pervenit Leptim ibique hortatur omnes ut se naves consequerentur; ipse parvulum navigiolum conscendit, in cursu Aquilam multitudine navium perterritum atque trepidantem nactus hostium classem sequi coepit. Interim Varus celeritate Caesaris audaciaque commotus cum universa classe conversis navibus Hadrumetum versus fugere contendit. Quem Caesar in milibus passuum IIII consecutus reciperata quinqueremi eum suis omnibus epibatis atque etiam hostium custodibus CXXX in ea nave captis triremem hostium proximam, quae in repugnando erat commorata, onustam remigum epibatarumque cepit. Reliquae naves hostium promunturium superarunt atque Hadrumetum in cothonem se universae contulerunt. Caesar eodem vento promunturium superare non potuit atque in salo in ancoris ea nocte commoratus prima luce Hadrumetum accedit ibique navibus onerariis quae erant extra cothonem incensis omnibusque reliquis ab eis aut subductis aut in cothonem compulsis paulisper commoratus, si forte vellent classe dimicare, rursus se recepit in castra.

[¶13] 64. Among those made prisoner aboard that trireme was P. Vestrius. a Roman knight, and P. Ligarius, once a supporter of Afranius. Caesar had set the latter free in Spain along with the other Afranians, and he had later on joined Pompeius and then, as a fugitive after the battle (of Pharsalus), had come to Varus in Africa. In view of his falseness and treachery Caesar bade him be executed. P. Vestrius, on the other hand, he pardoned; for his brother had paid the stipulated ransom at Rome, and Vestrius himself had satisfied Caesar as to the honesty of his motives, explaining that he had been taken prisoner by the fleet of Nasidius, his life had been saved through the kindness of Varus just as he was being led off to execution, and after that he had been given no opportunity of going over to Caesar’s side.

> Latin: 64. In ea nave captus est P. Vestrius, eques Romanus, et P. Ligarius, Afranianus, quem Caesar in Hispania cum reliquis dimiserat, et postea se ad Pompeium contulerat, inde ex proelio effugerat in Africamque ad Varum venerat; quem ob periuri perfidiam Caesar iussit necari. P. Vestrio autem, quod eius frater Romae pecuniam imperatam numeraverat et quod ipse suam causam probaverat Caesari, se a Nasidi classe captum, cum ad necem duceretur, beneficio Vari esse servatum, postea sibi facultatem nullam datam transeundi, ignovit.

[¶14] 65. There is in Africa a custom among the natives whereby both in the open fields and in practically all their farm buildings they have a secret underground vault for the storage of corn, the main motive for this provision being wars and the sudden appearance of an enemy. When Caesar got to know of this custom through an informer, at the third watch of the night he sent two legions and some cavalry a distance of ten miles from his camp,2 and later saw them return to camp laden with a large quantity of corn. When Labienus learned of this, he advanced seven miles from his camp across the hilly plateau across which Caesar had marched the day before, encamped two legions there and, supposing that Caesar would frequently pass along that same route for foraging purposes, established himself daily at suitable points to lie in wait for him with a large force of cavalry and light-armed troops.

> Latin: 65. Est in Africa consuetudo incolarum ut in agris et in omnibus fere villis sub terra specus frumenti condendi gratia clam habeant atque id propter bella maxime hostiumque subitum adventum praeparent. Qua de re Caesar per indicem certior factus tertia vigilia legiones duas eum equitatu mittit a castris suis milia passuum X atque inde magno numero frumenti onustos recipit in castra. Quibus rebus cognitis Labienus progressus a suis castris milia passuum VII per iugum et collem, per quem Caesar pridie iter fecerat, ibi castra duarum legionum facit atque ipse cotidie existimans Caesarem eadem saepe frumentandi gratia commeaturum eum magno equitatu levique armatura insidiaturus locis idoneis considit.

[¶15] 66. In the meantime information reached Caesar from deserters about Labienus’ trap. He waited in camp there a few days for the constant repetition of the same daily routine to lead the enemy into carelessness and then, early one morning, he suddenly gave the order that three veteran legions and a detachment of cavalry should follow him by way of the rear gate. Then, sending on the cavalry ahead, he suddenly surprised the enemy ambush lurking in the ravines, killing some five hundred of their light-armed troops and throwing the rest into a very unseemly rout. Whereupon Labienus dashed up with his entire cavalry force to the relief of his routed troops and as the odds were now too great for the Caesarian horse to contain their powerful onslaught. Caesar displayed to the enemy forces his legions in battle formation. This action utterly daunted and checked Labienus, and Caesar thereupon withdrew his own cavalry without loss. On the following day Juba crucified those Numidians who had quitted their posts and fled back to their camp.

> Latin: 66. Caesar interim de insidiis Labieni ex perfugis, certior factus paucos dies ibi commoratus, dum hostes cotidiano instituto saepe idem faciendo in neglegentiam adducerentur, subito mane imperat porta decumana legiones se III veteranas cum parte equitatus sequi atque equitibus praemissis neque opinantis insidiatores subito in convallibus latentis ex levi armatura concidit circiter D, reliquos in fugam turpissimam coniecit. Interim Labienus cum universo equitatu fugientibus suis suppetias occurrit. Cuius vim multitudinis cum equites pauci Caesariani iam sustinere non possent. Caesar instructas legiones hostium copiis ostendit. Quo facto perterrito Labieno ac retardato suos equites recepit incolumis. Postero die Iuba Numidas eos qui loco amisso fuga se receperam in castra in cruce omnis suffixit.

[¶16] 67. Caesar meanwhile was embarrassed by lack of corn; for which reason he mustered all his forces in camp and, leaving troops to garrison Leptis, Ruspina and Acylla, and assigning his fleet to Cispius and Aquila to maintain the naval blockade, the one of Hadrumetum and the other of Thapsus, he himself set fire to his camp and at the fourth watch of the night in battle formation with his baggage concentrated on the left wing evacuated that position and came to the town of Aggar. This town had previously been repeatedly attacked by the Gaetulians only to be very stoutly defended by the inhabitants themselves. Here in the plain he pitched a single camp and then set off in person with part of his army on a foraging mission round the farmsteads; and finding a large quantity of barley, oil, wine and figs, and a little wheat, he returned to camp with his army duly refreshed. Meanwhile Scipio, who had got to know of Caesar’s departure, proceeded to follow him across the plateau with his entire forces and established himself six miles away from Caesar’s camp, with his forces divided among three separate camps.

> Latin: 67. Caesar interim, quoniam inopia frumenti premebatur, copias omnis in castra conducit atque praesidio Lepti, Ruspinae, Acyllae relicto, Cispio Aquilaeque classe tradita ut alter Hadrumetum, alter Thapsum mari obsiderent, ipse castris incensis quarta noctis vigilia acie instructa impedimentis in sinistra parte collocatis ex eo loco proficiscitur et pervenit ad oppidum Aggar, quod a Gaetulis saepe antea oppugnatum summaque vi per ipsos oppidanos erat defensum. Ibi in campo castris unis positis ipse frumentatum circum villas cum parte exercitus profectus magno invento hordei, olei, vini, fici numero, pauco tritici, atque recreato exercitu redit in castra. Scipio interim cognito Caesaris discessu cum universis copiis per iugum Caesarem subsequi coepit atque ab eius castris milia passuum VI longe trinis castris dispertitis copiis consedit.

[¶17] 68. There was a town called Zeta, which was ten miles distant from Scipio but situated in the general direction of his camp; whereas it was relatively distant and remote—fourteen miles in fact—from Caesar. To this town Scipio sent two legions to forage. When Caesar learned of this from a deserter he moved his camp from the plain to a safer position on the high ground; and leaving a covering force there, he himself set out at the fourth watch, marched on past the enemy’s camp, and took possession of the town. He then ascertained that Scipio’s legions were foraging farther afield: and he was just proceeding to march in their direction when he observed enemy forces hastening up to support those legions. This circumstance made him loath to attack. And so, taking prisoner C. Minucius Reginus, the commandant of that town, who was a Roman knight and a very intimate friend of Scipio, and P. Atrius, a Roman knight and a member of the corporation of Utica, and leading away twenty-two of the king’s camels, he proceeded to retire to camp, leaving his lieutenant, Oppius, with a garrison in the town.

> Latin: 68. Oppidum erat Zeta, quod aberat a Scipione milia passuum X, ad eius regionem et partem castrorum collocatum, a Caesare autem diversum ac remotum, quod erat ab eo longe milia passuum XIIII. Huc Scipio legiones duas frumentandi gratia misit. Quod postquam Caesar ex perfuga cognovit, castris ex campo in collem ac tutiora loca collatis atque ibi praesidio relicto ipse quarta vigilia egressus praeter hostium castra proficiscitur eum copiis et oppidum potitur. Legiones Scipionis comperit longius in agris frumentari et, cum eo contendere conaretur, animadvertit copias hostium his legionibus occurrere suppetias. Quae res eius impetum retardavit. Itaque capto C. Minucio Regino, equite Romano. Scipionis familiarissimo, qui ei oppido praeerat, et P. Atrio, equite Romano de conventu Uticensi, et camelis XXII regis abductis, praesidio ibi cum Oppio legato relicto ipse se recipere coepit ad castra.

[¶18] 69. When he was now not far away from Scipio’s camp, which of necessity he had to pass, Labienus and Afranius with all their cavalry and light-armed troops sprang up and revealed themselves from behind the nearby hills where they had been lurking in ambush, and flung themselves upon his rearguard. Seeing himself thus attacked. Caesar deployed his cavalry to bear the brunt of the enemy onslaught and ordered his legionaries to pile their packs and promptly deliver a counter-attack. As soon as this was under way the enemy cavalry and light-armed troops were without difficulty driven back and dislodged from the hill directly the legions charged. No sooner had Caesar come to the conclusion that the enemy, beaten back and demoralised as they were, would now stop their harrying, and no sooner had he begun to resume his march, than once again they promptly flung themselves from the cover of the nearby hills and attacked Caesar’s legionaries, employing the same tactics as I described above—Numidians and light-armed troops they were, possessed of a marvellous turn of speed, fighting in the ranks of the cavalry and used to keeping pace with the horsemen and doubling forward or retreating at their side. As they repeated this manoeuvre quite frequently, chasing the Julians as they marched and taking to flight when their opponents turned to attack them, and as they would not approach at all close, but employed peculiar tactics and were content with wounding the horses with their javelins, Caesar realised that what they were trying to do was no less than force him to pitch camp at a spot where there was not a drop of water, so that his famished army, which had tasted nothing at all from the fourth watch of the night right up till the tenth hour of the day, should die of thirst—both men and beasts.

> Latin: 69. Cum iam non longe a castris Scipionis abesset, quae eum necesse erat praetergredi, Labienus Afraniusque eum omni equitatu levique armatura ex insidiis adorti agmini eius extremo se offerunt atque ex collibus proximis exsistunt. Quod postquam Caesar animum advertit, equitibus suis hostium vi oppositis sarcinas legionarios in acervum iubet comportare atque celeriter signa hostibus inferre. Quod postquam coeptum est fieri, primo impetu legionum equitatus et levis armatura hostium nullo negotio loco pulsa et deiecta est de colle. Cum iam Caesar existimasset hostis pulsos deterritosque finem lacessendi facturos et iter coeptum pergere coepisset, iterum celeriter ex proximis collibus erumpunt atque eadem ratione qua ante dixi in Caesaris legionarios impetum faciunt Numidae Iovisque armatura mirabili velocitate praediti, qui inter equites pugnabant et una pariterque eum equitibus accurrere et refugere consueverant. Cum hoc saepius facerent et proficiscentis Iulianos insequerentur, refugerent instantis, propius non accederent et singulari genere pugnae uterentur equosque iaculis convulnerare satis esse existimarent, Caesar intellexit nihil aliud eos conari nisi ut se cogerent castra eo loco ponere ubi omnino aquae nihil esset, ut exercitus ieiunus, qui a quarta vigilia usque ad horam X. diei nihil gustasset, ac iumenta siti perirent.

[¶19] 70. It was now nearly sundown and less than a hundred paces had been covered all told in four hours, when Caesar withdrew his cavalry—in view of the casualties among their horses—from the rearguard, and called on the legions to replace them. By employing the legionary troops in this manner and advancing calmly and at a gentle pace he found it less awkward to contain the enemy’s violent onslaught. Meanwhile detachments of the Numidian cavalry kept charging ahead along the high ground to his right and left and availing themselves of their superior numbers to surround Caesar’s forces with a kind of continuous circle of troops, while others of them pursued his rear-guard. Meanwhile on Caesar’s part it needed no more than three or four of his veterans to wheel round and brandish and hurl amain their heavy javelins at the Numidians who menaced them for more than two thousand of the latter to turn tail to a man and then, wheeling their horses round on all sides, they would regroup once more for battle and resume their pursuit at a set distance, hurling their javelins at the legionaries. In this manner, now advancing, now pausing to fight back, Caesar completed his march, albeit somewhat slowly for it was the first hour of the night when he brought all his men back to camp, with not a single man lost and ten wounded. Labienus retired to his lines with roughly three hundred men missing, many wounded, and all his troops exhausted by their continuous offensive. Meanwhile Scipio, who had deployed his legions, with the elephants posted in battle array in front of his camp in full view of Caesar to inspire terror, now led them back to camp.

> Latin: 70. Cum iam ad solis occasum esset, et non totos C passus in horis IIII esset progressus, equitatu suo propter equorum interitum extremo agmine remoto legiones in vicem ad extremum agmen evocabat. Ita vim hostium placide leniterque procedens per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat. Interim equitum Numidarum copiae dextra sinistraque per collis praecurrere coronaeque in modum cingere multitudine sua Caesaris copias, pars agmen extremum insequi. Caesaris interim non amplius III aut IIII milites veterani si se convenissent et pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duum milium numero ad unum terga vertebant ac rursus ad aciem passim conversis equis se colligebant atque in spatio consequebantur et iacula in legionarios coiciebant. Ita Caesar modo procedendo modo resistendo tardius itinere confecto noctis hora prima omnis suos ad unum in castra incolumis sauciis X factis reduxit. Labienus circiter CCC amissis, multis vulneratis ac defessis instando omnibus ad suos se recepit. Scipio interim legiones productas eum elephantis, quos ante castra in acie terroris gratia in conspectu Caesaris collocaverat, reducit in castra.

[¶20] 71. Faced with an enemy of this kind Caesar proceeded to train his forces, not as a commander trains a veteran army with a magnificent record of victorious achievements, but as a gladiatorial instructor trains his recruits. How many feet they were to retreat from the enemy the manner in which they must wheel round upon their adversary; the restricted space in which they must offer him resistance—now doubling forward, now retiring and making feint attacks; and almost the spot from which, and the manner in which they must discharge their missiles—these were the lessons he taught them. For it was surprising the amount of worry and anxiety the enemy’s light-armed troops were causing our army, what with their making the cavalry chary of engaging for fear of losing their mounts, since the light-armed troops kept killing them with their javelins, and with their wearing the legionaries out by their speediness; for no sooner had a heavy-armed soldier, when pursued by them, halted and then made an attack on them than their speed of movement enabled them easily to avoid the danger.

> Latin: 71. Caesar contra eiusmodi hostium genera copias suas non ut imperator exercitum veteranum victoremque maximis rebus gestis, sed ut lanista tirones gladiatores condocefacere quot pedes se reciperent ab hoste et quem ad modum obversi adversariis et in quantulo spatio resisterent, modo procurrerent modo recederent comminarenturque impetum, ac prope quo loco et quem ad modum tela mitterent, praecipere. Mirifice enim hostium levis armatura anxium exercitum nostrum atque sollicitum habebat, quia et equites deterrebat proelium inire propter equorum interitum, quod eos iaculis interficiebat, et legionarium militem defatigabat propter velocitatem: gravis enim armaturae miles simul atque ab eis insectatus constiterat in eosque impetum fecerat, illi veloci cursu periculum facile vitabant.

[¶21] 72. As a result of this Caesar was seriously perturbed, since as often as an engagement had occurred he had been quite unable to be a match with his own cavalry, unsupported by legionary troops, for the enemy cavalry and their light-armed units. Moreover, there was this other problem which worried him: as yet he had had no experience of the enemy legions; and how, he wondered, could he cope with their cavalry and amazing light-armed troops if they were backed up by their legions too. He had yet another cause for anxiety—the panic with which the size and number of the elephants gripped the minds of his soldiers. Here, however, was one problem to which he had found an answer; for he had ordered elephants to be brought across from Italy to enable our troops not only to become familiar with them, but also to get to know both the appearance and capabilities of the beast, what part of its body was readily vulnerable to a missile and, when an elephant was accoutered and armoured, what part of its body was still left uncovered and unprotected, so that their missiles should be aimed at that spot. He had also this further object in mind, that his horses should learn by familiarity with these beasts not to be alarmed by their scent, trumpeting or appearance. From this experiment he had profited handsomely: for the troops handled the beasts and came to appreciate their sluggishness: the cavalry hurled dummy javelins at them; and the docility of the beasts had brought the horses to feel at home with them.

> Latin: 72. Quibus ex rebus Caesar vehementer commovebatur quod, quotiescunque proelium erat commissum, equitatu suo sine legionario milite hostium equitatui levique armaturae eorum nullo modo par esse poterat. Sollicitabatur autem his rebus, quod nondum legiones hostium cognoverat, et quonam modo sustinere se posset ab eorum equitatu levique armatura, quae erat mirifica, si legiones quoque accessissent. Accedebat etiam haec causa, quod elephantorum magnitudo multitudoque animos militum detinebat in terrore. Cui uni rei tamen invenerat remedium: namque elephantos ex Italia transportari iusserat, quos et miles nosset speciemque et virtutem bestiae cognosceret et cui parti corporis eius telum facile adigi posset, ornatusque ac loricatus cum esset elephas, quae pars corporis eius sine tegmine nuda relinqueretur, ut eo tela coicerentur; praeterea ut iumenta bestiarum odorem, stridorem, speciem consuetudine capta non reformidarent. Quibus ex rebus largiter erat consecutus: nam et milites bestias manibus pertrectabant carumque tarditatem cognoscebant, equitesque in eos pila praepilata coiciebant, atque in consuetudinem equos patientia bestiarum adduxerat.

[¶22] 73. For the reasons above-mentioned Caesar was worried, and his old habitual dashing tactics had now given place to a more sedate and deliberate policy. And no wonder: for the troops he now commanded had been used to fighting in the flat terrain of Gaul against Gauls—men of forthright character with barely a trace of deceit, whose habit it is to rely on valour, not on guile, in their fighting: whereas now he had to perform the arduous task of accustoming his troops to recognise the tricks, traps and stratagems of the enemy, and what tactics could fittingly be adopted, and what avoided. Accordingly, to speed up this training of theirs, he took pains not to keep the legions confined to one area, but to keep them constantly on the move, first to one spot, then to another, ostensibly for foraging purposes, for the very reason that he reckoned the enemy forces would not fail to follow in his tracks. And two days later, when he had led forth his forces duly and carefully deployed, he marched past close to the enemy’s camp and challenged them to battle on level ground but when he saw the enemy reluctant to accept, he led his legions back to camp as evening was approaching.

> Latin: 73. Ob has causas quas supra commemoravi sollicitabatur Caesar tardiorque et consideratior erat factus et ex pristina bellandi consuetudine celeritateque excesserat. Neque mirum: copias enim habebat in Gallia bellare consuetas locis campestribus et contra Gallos, homines apertos minimeque insidiosos, qui per virtutem, non per dolum dimicare consuerunt; tum autem erat ei laborandum ut consuefaceret milites hostium dolos, insidias, artificia cognoscere et quid sequi, quid vitare conveniret. Itaque, quo haec celerius conciperent, dabat operam ut legiones non in uno loco contineret sed per causam frumentandi huc atque illuc rapsaret, ideo quod hostium copias ab se suoque vestigio non discessuras existimabat. Atque post diem tertium productis accuratius suis copiis sicut instruxerat, propter hostium castra praetergressus aequo loco invitat ad dimicandum. Postquam eos abhorrere videt, reducit sub vesperum legiones in castra.