21. So long as by words of encouragement Caesar was able to keep his men at the bridge and its emplacements, he too was involved in the same danger; but when he perceived that they were all retreating, he withdrew to his own vessel. As a large number of men followed him and kept forcing their way aboard it, and as no opportunity was afforded either of navigating it or easing it off shore, anticipating what actually happened he dived from the vessel and swam to those ships which were hove to farther off. From them he sent pinnaces to the help of his men who were in difficulties, and saved not a few. His vessel was in fact capsized by the large number of troops, and foundered with the men on board. In this battle the losses among the legionary troops amounted to approximately 400, with a slightly larger number of seamen and rowers. The Alexandrians reinforced the redoubt there with strong entrenchments and many pieces of artillery and removed the stones from the sea, subsequently making free use of the opening to despatch their vessels.
21. Caesar quoad potuit cohortando suos ad pontem ac munitiones continere, eodem in periculo versatus est; postquam universos cedere animadvertit, in suum navigium se recepit. Quo multitudo hominum insecuta cum irrumperet neque administrandi neque repellendi a terra facultas daretur, fore quod accidit suspicatus sese ex navigio eiecit atque ad eas quae longius constiterant navis adnatavit. Hinc suis laborantibus subsidio scaphas mittens non nullos conservavit. Navigium quidem eius multitudine depressum militum una cum hominibus interiit. Hoc proelio desiderati sunt ex numero legionariorum militum circiter CCCC et paulo ultra eum numerum classiarii et remiges. Alexandrini eo loco castellum magnis munitionibus multisque tormentis confirmarunt atque egestis ex mari lapidibus libere sunt usi postea ad mittenda navigia.
22. This reverse, so far from dismaying our troops, fired and stimulated them to carry out large-scale sallies in the course of storming the enemy’s defence-works. Every day encounters took place, and whenever a chance, offered itself and the Alexandrians burst out in a frontal sally and gave Caesar an opportunity of engaging battle, he achieved considerable success, thanks to the excellent morale and ardent enthusiasm of his troops; nor could his widespread words of encouragement keep pace with the legions’ exertions or their eagerness for fighting, so that they had to be deterred and held back from the most hazardous encounters rather than be spurred on to fight.
22. Hoc detrimento milites nostri tantum afuerunt ut perturbarentur, ut incensi atque incitati magnas accessiones fecerint in operibus hostium expugnandis. In proeliis cotidianis, quandocumque fors obtulerat, procurrentibus et erumpentibus Alexandrinis, manum conserendi potestate facta multum proficiebat Caesar voluntate optima et ardentibus studiis militum; nec divulgata Caesaris hortatio subsequi legionum aut laborem aut pugnandi poterat cupiditatem, ut magis deterrendi et continendi a periculosissimis essent dimicationibus quam incitandi ad pugnandum.
23. The Alexandrians saw that the Romans were heartened by successes and stimulated by reverses, nor were they aware of any third vicissitude of war which could make them yet more steadfast. And so, whether it was they were warned by the king’s friends who were in Caesar’s camp, or whether they were acting on some previous plan of their own made known to the king by secret despatches and approved by him, —we can only guess at their motive—they sent envoys to Caesar requesting him to release the king and allow him to go over to his own side. “The whole population”, they said, “being tired and wearied of the girl, of the delegation of the kingship, and of the utterly remorseless tyranny of Ganymedes, were ready to do the king’s bidding and if, at his instance, they were to enter into a loyal friendship with Caesar, then no danger would intimidate or prevent the population from submitting.”
23. Alexandrini eum Romanos et secundis rebus confirmari et adversis incitari viderent neque ullum belli tertium casum nossent quo possent esse firmiores, ut coniectura consequi possumus, aut admoniti a regis amicis qui in Caesaris erant praesidiis, aut suo priore consilio per occultos nuntios regi probato legatos ad Caesarem miserunt, ut dimitteret regem transireque ad suos pateretur: paratam enim omnem multitudinem esse, confectam taedio puellae, fiduciario regno, dominatione crudelissima Ganymedis, facere id quod rex imperasset; quo si auctore in Caesaris fidem amicitiamque venturi essent, nullius periculi timorem multitudini fore impedimento quo minus se dederent.
24. Though Caesar was well aware that they were a deceitful race, always pretending something different from their real intentions, yet he decided that it was expedient to satisfy their plea for clemency, since, if their demands in any way reflected their feelings, then he believed the king would remain loyal when released but if, on the other hand, they wanted to have the king to lead them with a view to waging the war—and that was more in keeping with their character—then he thought there would be greater honour and distinction for him in waging war against a king than against a motley collection of refugees. Accordingly, he urged the king to take thought for the kingdom of his fathers, to have pity on his most illustrious country, shamefully scarred as it was by fire and desolation, to recall his citizens to sanity first and then to preserve them therein, and to prove his loyalty to the Roman people and to Caesar, inasmuch as Caesar himself had such faith in him that he was sending him to join an enemy under arms. Then, grasping his right hand in his own, Caesar made to take leave of the boy—already grown to manhood. But the royal mind, schooled in all the lessons of utter deceit, was loth to fall short of the customary standards of his race and so with tears he proceeded to beseech Caesar to the opposite effect not to send him away: his very kingdom, he declared, was not more pleasing to him than the sight of Caesar. Checking the lad’s tears, albeit not unmoved himself, Caesar declared that, if that was the way he felt, they would speedily be reunited, and so sent him back to his people. Like a horse released from the starting-gate and given his head, the king proceeded to wage war against Caesar so energetically that the tears he had shed at their conference seemed to have been tears of joy. Not a few of Caesar’s officers and friends and many of the centurions and soldiers were delighted at this turn of events, inasmuch as Caesar’s over-generosity had, they felt, been made fun of by the deceitful tricks of a boy. As if indeed it was merely generosity and not the most far-sighted strategy which had led him to do it!
24. Caesar etsi fallacem gentem semperque alia cogitantem, alia simulantem bene cognitam habebat, tamen petentibus dare veniam utile esse statuit, quod, si quo pacto sentirent ea quae postularent, mansurum in fide dimissum regem credebat, sin, id quod magis illorum naturae conveniebat, ducem ad bellum gerendum regem habere vellent, splendidius atque honestius se contra regem quam contra convenarum ac fugitivorum manum bellum esse gesturum. Itaque regem cohortatus ut consuleret regno paterno, parceret praeclarissimae patriae, quae turpibus incendiis et ruinis esset deformata, civis suos primum ad sanitatem revocaret, deinde conservaret, fidem populo Romano sibique praestaret, cum ipse tantum ei crederet ut ad hostis armatos eum mitteret, dextra dextram tenens dimittere coepit adulta iam aetate puerum. At regius animus disciplinis fallacissimis eruditus, ne a gentis suae moribus degeneraret, flens orare contra Caesarem coepit ne se dimitteret: non enim sibi regnum ipsum conspectu Caesaris esse iucundius. Compressis pueri lacrimis Caesar ipse commotus celeriter, si illa sentiret, fore eum secum adfirmans ad suos dimisit. Ille, ut ex carceribus in liberum cursum emissus, adeo contra Caesarem acriter bellum gerere coepit ut lacrimas quas in colloquio proiecerat gaudio videretur profudisse. Accidisse hoc complures Caesaris legati, amici, centuriones militesque laetabantur, quod nimia bonitas eius fallaciis pueri elusa esset. Quasi vero id Caesar bonitate tantum adductus ae non prudentissimo consilio fecisset.
25. Having got themselves a leader, the Alexandrians observed no greater degree of resolution in themselves or of listlessness in the Romans: in addition, the fun which the soldiers made of the king’s youthfulness and irresolution caused great resentment, and they saw they were making no headway. As, moreover, rumours were current that large reinforcements for Caesar were on their way overland from Syria and Cilicia—intelligence which had not yet come to Caesar’s ears—they decided to intercept a convoy of supplies which was being conveyed to our troops by sea. Accordingly they stationed some lightly armed vessels on guard at suitable points near Canopus, and lay in wait for our ships and supplies. When Caesar was informed of this he ordered his entire fleet to be got ready and equipped, putting Tiberius Nero in command. Included in this fleet when it set out were the Rhodian ships, and aboard them Euphranor, without whom no naval action had ever been fought, and none even that was not a resounding victory. Fortune, however, very often reserves for a harsher fate those upon whom she has showered her most prolific blessings; and so too the fortune that now attended Euphranor was different from that of former times. For when they reached Canopus and each side had drawn up its fleet and entered the conflict, Euphranor, following his normal custom, was the first to join battle but when he had holed and sunk one enemy quadrireme, he pursued the next one too far; and as the other ships were not quick enough in following his lead, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. No one brought him assistance, either because they thought that, considering his courage and his good luck, he was quite able to take care of himself, or because they were afraid for their own sakes. And so the one and only man who was successful in that battle perished alone along with his victorious quadrireme.
25. Cum duce assumpto Alexandrini nihilo se firmiores factos aut languidiores Romanos animadverterent cedentibusque militibus regis aetatem atque infirmitatem magnum dolorem acciperent neque se quicquam proficere viderent, rumoresque exsisterent magna Caesari praesidia terrestri itinere ex Syria Ciliciaque adduci, quod nondum auditum Caesari erat, commeatum, qui mari nostris supportabatur, intercipere statuerunt. Itaque expeditis navigiis locis idoneis ad Canopum in statione dispositis navibus insidiabantur nostris commeatuque. Quod ubi Caesari nuntiatum est, universam classem iubet expediri atque instrui. Praeficit huic Tiberium Neronem. Proficiscuntur in ea classe Rhodiae naves atque in his Euphranor, sine quo nulla umquam dimicatio maritima, nulla etiam parum feliciter confecta erat. At fortuna, quae plerumque eos quos plurimis beneficiis ornavit ad duriorem casum reservat, superiorum temporum dissimilis Euphranorem prosequebatur. Nam eum ad Canopum ventum esset instructaque utrimque classis conflixisset et sua consuetudine Euphranor primus proelium commisisset et quadriremem hostium perforasset ac demersisset, proximam longius insecutus parum celeriter insequentibus reliquis circumventus est ab Alexandrinis. Cui subsidium nemo tulit, sive quod in ipso satis praesidi pro virtute ac felicitate eius putarent esse, sive quod ipsi sibi timebant. Ita, qui unus ex omnibus eo proelio bene rem gessit, solus cum sua quadriremi victrice perit.
26. Round about the same time Mithridates of Pergamum approached Pelusium. A man of high standing in his own country and of great experience and valour in war, as well as a very loyal and valued friend of Caesar, he had been sent into Syria and Cilicia at the outbreak of the Alexandrian war to fetch reinforcements; and now, accompanied by large forces which he had speedily raised, thanks both to the very helpful attitude adopted by the states and to his own conscientious efforts, he arrived at Pelusium by the overland route which links Egypt with Syria. This town had been occupied by a strong garrison of Achillas on account of the tactical importance of the place for Pharos and Pelusium are regarded as the keys, as it were, to the defence of the whole of Egypt, Pelusium guarding the overland approach, as Pharos defends the seaward one. Mithridates now suddenly surrounded it with large forces and, despite the obstinate defence put up by its numerous garrison, thanks both to the large number of fresh troops which he kept throwing in to replace the wounded and exhausted and to the stubborn and unremitting nature of his assault, he reduced it to submission on the same day he started to attack it, and then posted a garrison of his own in it. Whereupon, having achieved this success, he marched to join Caesar in Alexandria, peacefully subduing, meanwhile, and winning over to friendship with Caesar, by that authority which normally belongs to the victor, all those districts along his line of march.
26. Sub idem tempus Mithridates Pergamenus, magnae nobilitatis domi scientiaeque in bello et virtutis, fidei dignitatisque in amicitia Caesaris, missus in Syriam Ciliciamque initio belli Alexandrini ad auxilia arcessenda, eum magnis copiis, quas celeriter et propensissima civitatium voluntate et sua diligentia confecerat, itinere pedestri, quo coniungitur Aegyptus Syriae, Pelusium adducit: idque oppidum firmo praesidio occupatum Achillae propter opportunitatem loci—namque tota Aegyptus maritimo accessu Pharo, pedestri Pelusio velut claustris munita existimatur—, repente magnis circumdatum copiis multiplici praesidio pertinaciter propugnantibus et copiarum magnitudine, quas integras vulneratis defessisque subiciebat, et perseverantia constantiaque oppugnandi quo die est aggressus in suam redegit potestatem praesidiumque ibi suum collocavit. Inde re bene gesta Alexandream ad Caesarem contendit omnisque eas regiones per quas iter faciebat auctoritate ea quae plerumque adest victori pacarat atque in amicitiam Caesaris redegerat.
27. Not so very far from Alexandria lies what is perhaps the best known spot in those parts. It is called Delta, and took its name from its resemblance to the letter; for a certain section of the river Nile splits up into two channels which diverge gradually but are separated by a very wide interval at the coast, where the river joins the sea. When the king learned that Mithridates was approaching this spot, and knew that he must cross the river, he despatched large forces against him, by which he believed Mithridates could either be beaten and destroyed, or else undoubtedly held in check. However, desirous as he was for his defeat, he was quite as content to cut him off from Caesar and hold him in check. The first of his forces to succeed in crossing the river from Delta and meeting Mithridates joined battle in eager haste to forestall those following up behind, and so rob them of the chance to participate in victory. Mithridates contained their attack with great discretion, fortifying his camp after our regular fashion; but when he saw them coming up to the entrenchments with a contemptuous recklessness, he made a general sally and killed a large number of them. And had not the remainder employed their knowledge of the district to find cover for themselves, and some retired to the ships in which they had crossed the river, they would have been completely wiped out. When they had recovered a little from the resulting panic, they joined forces with their comrades following up behind, and proceeded to a new attack on Mithridates.
27. Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non ita longe ab Alexandrea, qui nominatur Delta; quod nomen a similitudine litterae cepit: nam pars quaedam fluminis Nili derivata duobus itineribus paulatim medium inter se spatium relinquens diversissimo ad litus intervallo mari coniungitur. Cui loco cum appropinquare Mithridaten rex cognovisset, et transeundum ei flumen sciret, magnas adversus eum copias misit, quibus vel superari delerique Mithridaten vel sine dubio retineri posse credebat. Quem ad modum autem optabat eum vinci, sic satis habebat interclusum a Caesare a se retineri. Quae primae copiae flumen a Delta transire et Mithridati occurrere potuerunt, proelium commiserunt festinantes praeripere subsequentibus victoriae societatem. Quorum impetum Mithridates magna cum prudentia consuetudine nostra castris vallatis sustinuit; eum vero incaute atque insolenter succedere cos munitionibus videret, eruptione undique facta magnum numerum eorum interfecit. Quod nisi locorum notitia reliqui se texissent partimque in navis quibus flumen transierant recepissent, funditus deleti essent. Qui ut paulum ab illo timore se recrearunt, adiuncti eis qui subsequebantur rursus oppugnare Mithridaten coeperunt.
28. A messenger was despatched by Mithridates to Caesar to bring him tidings of the action. The king learned of these same events from his own people. Accordingly at practically the same time the king set forth to crush Mithridates, and Caesar to relieve him. The king had recourse to the quicker method of transport, namely sailing up the river Nile, in which he had a large fleet in readiness. Caesar was unwilling to use the same route, so as not to fight a naval action in the river. Instead, he sailed round by that sea which is said to belong to part of Africa, as I have explained earlier. Yet in spite of this he came up with the king’s forces before the latter could attack Mithridates, and so rescued the victorious Mithridates with his army intact. The king had encamped with his forces in a naturally strong position, since in itself the position was higher than the plateau which lay beneath it on all sides; moreover, on three sides it was covered by defences of diverse types: one side abutted the river Nile; a second ran along very high ground and formed one face of his camp; while the third was encircled by a marsh.
28. Mittitur a Mithridate nuntius Caesari qui rem gestam perferret. Cognoscit ex suis eadem haec accidisse rex. Ita paene sub idem tempus et rex ad opprimendum Mithridaten proficiscitur et Caesar ad recipiendum. Celeriore fluminis Nili navigatione rex est usus, in quo magnam et paratam classem habebat. Caesar eodem itinere uti noluit, ne navibus in flumine dimicaret, sed circumvectus est eo mari, quod Africae partis esse dicitur, sicuti supra demonstravimus; prius tamen regis copiis occurrit, quam is Mithridaten aggredi posset, eumque ad se victorem incolumi exercitu recepit. Consederat eum copiis rex loco natura munito, quod erat ipse excelsior planitie ex omnibus partibus subiecta; tribus autem ex lateribus variis genere munitionibus tegebatur: unum latus erat adiectum flumini Nilo, alterum editissimo loco ductum, ut partem castrorum obtineret, tertium palude cingebatur.
29. Between the camp and Caesar’s line of march ran a narrow river with very high banks, which flowed into the Nile and was some seven miles distant from the king’s camp. When the king learned that Caesar was coming by this route, he despatched all his cavalry and a picked force of light-armed infantry to this river to prevent Caesar from crossing it and to engage at long range from its banks—an unfair engagement, for the spot could neither afford scope for valour nor involve cowardice in any risk. These tactics filled our infantry and cavalry with burning resentment at the thought that for so long their struggle with the Alexandrians should prove a drawn battle. And so, at the same time as scattered groups of German cavalry, looking for places to ford the river, swam across it at some points where the banks were lower, simultaneously the legionary troops, having felled lofty trees tall enough to reach from bank to bank, hurled them forward and crossed the river on a causeway hastily thrown on top. So terrified were the enemy by their attack, that they pinned their hopes of deliverance to flight: in vain, however: for few survived that rout to take refuge with the king, and practically all the remainder were killed.
29. Inter castra et Caesaris iter flumen intercedebat angustum altissimis ripis, quod in Nilum influebat, aberat autem ab regis castris milia passuum circiter VII. Rex cum hoc itinere venire Caesarem comperisset, equitatum omnem expeditosque delectos pedites ad id flumen misit qui transitu Caesarem prohiberent et eminus ex ripis proelium impar inirent: nullum enim processum virtus habebat aut periculum ignavia subibat. Quae res incendit dolore milites equitesque nostros, quod tam diu pari proelio cum Alexandrinis certaretur. Itaque eodem tempore equites Germani dispersi vada fluminis quaerentes partim demissioribus ripis flumen tranarunt, et legionarii magnis arboribus excisis, quae longitudine utramque ripam contingerent, proiectis eis repentinoque aggere iniecto flumen transierunt. Quorum impetum adeo pertimuerunt hostes ut in fuga spem salutis collocarent: sed id frustra: namque ex ea fuga pauci ad regem refugerunt paene omni reliqua multitudine interfecta.
30. After this most notable success Caesar forthwith pushed forward triumphantly to the king’s camp, holding the view that his sudden approach would strike great terror into the hearts of the Alexandrians. But when he observed that this camp was strongly entrenched as well as protected by its natural position, and saw the serried mass of armed men posted at the rampart, he was unwilling to let his soldiers, weary as they were with marching and fighting, advance to attack the camp. Accordingly he pitched camp at no great distance from the enemy. In a nearby hamlet, not far distant from the king’s camp, there was a fort which the king had built and linked with bastions to the main defences of his camp so as to hold the hamlet. This fort Caesar attacked and took by storm on the following day with all his forces; not that he thought it would be difficult to gain that objective by using a smaller number of soldiers, but in order that, with the Alexandrians thoroughly unnerved as a result, he might go straight on from that victory to attack the king’s camp. And so, having chased the retreating Alexandrians from the fort into their camp, our troops carried on their charge right up to the fortifications, where they proceeded to fight at long range very briskly. On two sides our men were afforded an opening for assault: the first was the one which, as I have explained, allowed unimpeded approach; the second comprised the moderate-sized space between the camp and the river Nile. The largest and most carefully picked contingent of the Alexandrians was defending that side which afforded the easiest approach; but the defenders in the area of the river Nile were the most successful in repelling and wounding our men: for the latter were being hit by missiles coming from opposite directions—from the rampart of the camp ahead of them, and from the river behind them, where many ships manned with slingers and archers were engaging our men.
30. Caesar re praeclarissime gesta, cum subitum adventum suum iudicaret magnum terrorem Alexandrinis iniecturum, protinus victor ad castra regis pertendit. Haec cum et opere magno vallata et loci natura munita animadverteret confertamque armatorum multitudinem collocatam in vallo videret, laesos itinere ac proeliando milites ad oppugnanda castra succedere noluit. Itaque non magno intervallo relicto ab hoste castra posuit. Postero die castellum, quod rex in proximo vico non longe a suis castris munierat bracchiisque cum opere castrorum coniunxerat vici obtinendi causa, Caesar aggressus omnibus copiis expugnat, non quo id minore numero militum consequi difficile factu putaret, sed ut ab ea victoria perterritis Alexandrum protinus castra regis oppugnaret. Itaque eo cursu, quo refugientis Alexandrinos ex castello in castra sunt milites insecuti, munitionibus successerunt acerrimeque eminus proeliari coeperunt. Duabus ex partibus aditus oppugnationis nostris dabatur: una, quam liberum accessum habere demonstravi, altera, quae mediocre intervallum inter castra et flumen Nilum habebat. Maxima et electissima multitudo Alexandrinorum defendebat eam partem, quae facillimum aditum habebat; plurimum proficiebam in repellendis vulnerandisque nostris, qui regione fluminis Nili propugnabant: diversis enim telis nostri figebantur, adversi ex vallo castrorum, aversi ex flumine, in quo multae naves instructae funditoribus et sagittairis nostros impugnabant.
31. Now Caesar saw that, while it was impossible for his soldiers to fight with any greater gallantry, yet little headway was being made on account of the difficulty of the ground; he also noted that the highest sector of their camp had been abandoned by the Alexandrians, not only because of its natural strength, but also because, in their eagerness in some cases to fight, in others to look on, its defenders had rushed down to the sector where the fighting was going on consequently he ordered some cohorts to proceed thither, skirting the camp, and storm the height, putting in command of them Carfulenus, a man of exceptional personality and experience in the field. When they arrived there our men fought with the greatest gallantry against those few of the enemy who were defending the entrenchment; whereupon the Alexandrians, panic-stricken by the shouting and fighting on both sides of them, began to rush about in confusion hither and thither throughout the camp. This utter bewilderment of theirs fired the spirits of our troops to such a pitch that they captured the camp almost simultaneously in all sectors, though its highest point was the first to capitulate and from that point our men rushed down and killed a vast multitude of the enemy in the camp. In their efforts to escape this danger most of the Alexandrians hurled themselves en masse from the rampart into the area adjoining the river; the first of these were crushed by their heavy fall in the actual trench of the fortification, but the rest found it easier to escape. It is established that the king himself fled from the camp and then, after being taken aboard a ship along with a large number of his men who were swimming to the nearest ships, perished when as a result of the numbers the vessel capsized.
31. Caesar cum videret milites acrius proeliari non posse nec tamen multum profici propter locorum difficultatem, cumque animum adverteret excelsissimum locum castrorum relictum esse ab Alexandrinis, quod et per se munitus esset et studio partim pugnandi partim spectandi decucurrissent in eum locum in quo pugnabatur, cohortis illo circumire castra et summum locum aggredi iussit eisque Carfulenum praefecit, et animi magnitudine et rei militaris scientia virum praestantem. Quo ut ventum est, paucis defendentibus munitionem, nostris contra militibus acerrime pugnantibus, diverso clamore et proelio perterriti Alexandrini trepidantes in omnis partis castrorum discurrere coeperunt. Quorum perturbatione nostrorum animi adeo sunt incitati ut paene eodem tempore ex omnibus partibus, primi tamen editissimum castrorum locum caperent; ex quo decurrentes magnam multitudinem hostium in castris interfecerunt. Quod periculum plerique Alexandrini fugientes acervatim se de vallo praecipitarunt in eam partem quae flumini erat adiuncta. Horum primis in ipsa fossa munitionis magna ruina oppressis ceteri faciliorem fugam habuerunt. Constat fugisse ex castris regem ipsum receptumque in navem multitudine corum qui ad proximas navis adnatabant demerso navigio perisse.
32. This signal victory, the outcome of a most speedy and successful action, filled Caesar with such confidence that he hastened with his cavalry to Alexandria by the nearest overland route, and entered it triumphantly by that quarter of the town which was held by the enemy garrison. Nor was he mistaken in his own conclusion that, as soon as they heard of that battle, the enemy would cease to think any longer in terms of war. On his arrival he reaped the well-earned fruits of valour and magnanimity: for the entire population of townsfolk threw down their arms, abandoned their fortifications, assumed that garb in which suppliants are used to placate tyrants with earnest prayers, and brought forth all the sacred emblems by the sanctity of which they had been wont to conjure the embittered and wrathful hearts of their kings: even so did they hasten to meet Caesar on his arrival and surrendered themselves to him. Caesar took them formally under his protection and consoled them then, passing through the enemy fortifications, he came to his own quarter of the town amid loud cheers of congratulation from his own troops, who rejoiced at the happy issue, not only of the war itself and the fighting, but also of his arrival under such circumstances.
32. Re felicissime celerrimeque gesta Caesar magnae victoriae fiducia proximo terrestri itinere Alexandream eum equitibus contendit atque ea parte oppidi victor introiit quae praesidio hostium tenebatur. Neque eum consilium suum fefellit quin hostes eo proelio audito nihil iam de bello essent cogitaturi. Dignum adveniens fructum virtutis et animi magnitudinis tulit: omnis enim multitudo oppidanorum armis proiectis munitionibusque suis relictis, veste ea sumpta qua supplices dominantis deprecari censuerunt, sacrisque omnibus prolatis quorum religione precari offensos natosque animos regum erant soliti, advenienti Caesari occurrerunt seque ei dediderunt. Caesar in fidem receptos consolatus per hostium munitiones in suam partem oppidi magna gratulatione venit suorum, qui non tantum bellum ipsum ac dimicationem sed etiam talem adventum eius felicem fuisse laetabantur.
33. Having made himself master of Egypt and Alexandria, Caesar appointed as kings those whose names Ptolemaeus had written down in his will with an earnest appeal to the Roman people that they should not be altered. The elder of the two boys— the late king—being now no more, Caesar assigned the kingdom to the younger one and to Cleopatra, the elder of the two daughters, who had remained his loyal adherent whereas Arsinoe, the younger daughter, in whose name, as we have shewn, Ganymedes had long been exercising an unbridled sway, he determined to remove from the realm, to prevent any renewed dissensions coming into being among factious folk before the dominion of the royal pair could be consolidated by the passage of time. The veteran Sixth legion he took away with him: all the others he left there, the more to bolster up the dominion of the said rulers, who could enjoy neither the affection of their people, inasmuch as they had remained throughout staunch friends of Caesar, nor the authority of a long-established reign, it being but a few days since they came to the throne. At the same time he deemed it conducive to the dignity of our empire and to public expediency that, if the rulers remained loyal, they should be protected by our troops: whereas if they proved ungrateful, those same troops could hold them in check. Having thus completed all his dispositions, he set out in person for Syria.
33. Caesar Aegypto atque Alexandrea potitus reges constituit quos Ptolomaeus testamento scripserat atque obtestatus erat populum Romanum ne mutarentur. Nam maiore ex duobus pueris, rege, amisso minori tradidit regnum maiorique ex duabus filiis, Cleopatrae, quae manserat in fide praesidiisque eius; minorem. Arsinoen, cuius nomine diu regnasse impotenter Ganymeden docuimus, deducere ex regno statuit, ne qua rursus nova dissensio, prius quam diuturnitate confirmarentur regibus imperia, per homines seditiosos nasceretur. Legiones ibi veterana sexta secum reducta ceteras reliquit, quo firmius esset eorum regum imperium, qui neque amorem suorum habere poterant, quod fideliter permanserant in Caesaris amicitia, neque vetustatis auctoritatem, paucis diebus reges constituti. Simul ad imperi nostri dignitatem utilitatemque publicam pertinere existimabat, si permanerent in fide reges, praesidiis eos nostris esse tutos; si essent ingrati, posse isdem praesidiis coerceri. Sic rebus omnibus confectis et collocatis ipse profectus est in Syriam.
34. While these events were taking place in Egypt, king Deiotarus came to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar had assigned the government of Asia and the neighbouring provinces, to beg him not to allow Lesser Armenia, his own kingdom, or Cappadocia, the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, to be occupied and over-run by Pharnaces: for unless they were liberated from this scourge, he could not carry out his instructions and pay out the money he had promised to Caesar. As Domitius not only considered the money to be indispensable for defraying military expenses, but also decided it was a shameful affront to the Roman people and to the triumphant C. Caesar as well as a slight to himself that the kingdoms of their allies and friends should be seized by a foreign king, he forthwith sent a deputation to Pharnaces, bidding him withdraw from Armenia and Cappadocia and not assail the rights and majesty of the Roman people by resorting to civil war. In the belief that this warning would have greater force if he approached closer to that area with an army, he set out for his legions; then, taking with him one of the three, the Thirty-Sixth, he sent to Caesar in Egypt the two which the latter had called for in his despatch. One of these two did not arrive in time for the Alexandrian war, as it was sent by the overland route through Syria. Cn. Domitius reinforced the Thirty-Sixth legion with two from Deiotarus, which the latter had had for several years, having built them up on our system of discipline and armament; he also added to it 100 horsemen, and took a like number from Ariobarzanes. He sent P. Sestius to C. Plaetorius, the quaestor, with instructions to bring the legion which had been formed from the hastily improvised forces in Pontus and Quintus Patisius to Cilicia to muster auxiliary troops. All these forces speedily assembled at Comana according to the orders of Domitius.
34. Dum haec in Aegypto geruntur, rex Deiotarus ad Domitium Calvinum, cui Caesar Asiam finitimasque provincias administrandas tradiderat, venit oratum ne Armeniam minorem, regnum suum, neve Cappadociam, regnum Ariobarzanis, possideri vastarique pateretur a Pharnace; quo malo nisi liberarentur, imperata se facere pecuniamque promissam Caesari non posse persolvere. Domitius, non tantum ad explicandos sumptus rei militaris cum pecuniam necessariam esse iudicaret, sed etiam turpe populo Romano et C. Caesari victori sibique infame esse statueret regna sociorum atque amicorum ab externo rege occupari, nuntios confestim ad Pharnacem misit, Armenia Cappadociaque decederet neve occupatione belli civilis populi Romani ius maiestatemque temptaret. Hanc denuntiationem cum maiorem vim habituram existimaret, si propius eas regiones cum exercitu accessisset, ad legiones profectus unam ex tribus. XXXVI., secum ducit, duas in Aegyptum ad Caesarem mittit litteris eius evocatas; quarum altera bello Alexandrino non occurrit, quod itinere terrestri per Syriam erat missa. Adiungit Cn. Domitius legioni XXXVI. duas ab Deiotaro, quas ille disciplina atque armatura nostra compluris annos constitutas habebat, equitesque C. totidemque ab Ariobarzane sumit. Mittit P. Sestium ad C. Plaetorium quaestorem, ut legionem adduceret quae ex tumultuariis militibus in Ponto confecta erat, Quantumque Patisium in Ciliciam ad auxilia arcessenda. Quae copiae celeriter omnes iussu Domiti Comana convenerunt.
35. Meantime the envoys brought back this reply from Pharnaces: “he had withdrawn from Cappadocia, but had recovered Lesser Armenia, which he ought to possess by due right of inheritance from his father. In short, the issue touching that kingdom should be kept open for Caesar’s decision for he was ready to do what Caesar should decide.” Now Cn. Domitius observed that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia not from free choice but of necessity, since he could defend Armenia next door to his own kingdom more easily than the more distant Cappadocia, and also because he had supposed that Domitius would bring up all three legions and that when he heard that two of those legions had been sent to Caesar, this had heightened his rash resolve to stay on in Armenia. Consequently Domitius proceeded to insist that Pharnaces should withdraw from that kingdom also: “as far as legal right went, there was no difference between Cappadocia and Armenia, nor had he any right to demand that the question should be left open pending Caesar’s arrival; a matter was ‘open’ when it remained just as it had been.” Having given him this reply Domitius set out for Armenia with the forces I have recorded above, and began by marching along the higher ground. From Comana in Pontus there is, in fact, a lofty, wooded ridge which extends into Lesser Armenia and forms the boundary between Cappadocia and Armenia. This route, as he saw, offered definite advantages, namely that on the higher ground no sudden enemy attack could develop, and that, as Cappadocia adjoined this ridge, it was likely to assist him by affording an abundance of supplies.
35. Interim legati a Pharnace responsa referunt: Cappadocia se decessisse. Armeniam minorem recepisse, quam paternis nomine iure obtinere deberet. Denique eius regni causa integra Caesari servaretur: paratum enim se facere quod is statuisset. Cn. Domitius eum animadverteret eum Cappadocia decessisse non voluntate adductum sed necessitate, quod facilius Armeniam defendere posset subiectam suo regno quam Cappadociam longius remotam, quodque omnis tris legiones adducturum Domitium putasset, ex quibus cum duas ad Caesarem missas audisset, audacius in Armenia substitisse, perseverare coepit, ut eo quoque regno decederet; neque enim aliud ius esse Cappadociae atque Armeniae, nec iuste cum postulare ut in Caesaris adventum res integra differetur; id enim esse integrum quod ita esset ut fuisset. His responsis datis eum eis copiis quas supra scripsi profectus est in Armeniam locisque superioribus iter facere instituit: nam ex Ponto a Comanis iugum editum silvestre est, pertinens in Armeniam minorem, quo Cappadocia finitur ab Armenia cuius itineris has esse certas opportunitates vidit, quod in locis superioribus nullus impetus repentinus accidere hostium poterat, et quod Cappadocia his iugis subiecta magnam commeatus copiam erat sumministratura.
36. Meanwhile Pharnaces sent several embassies to Domitius to discuss peace and to take princely gifts for Domitius. All these he firmly rejected and replied to the envoys that as far as he was concerned nothing should take precedence over the prestige of the Roman people and the recovery of the kingdoms of its allies. Then, after completing an uninterrupted succession of long marches, he began to approach Nicopolis, a town in Lesser Armenia which is actually situated in the plain, though it is hemmed in on two sides by high mountains at a fairish distance. Here he pitched camp roughly seven miles from Nicopolis. From this camp he had to traverse a narrow and confined defile: and for this reason Pharnaces arrayed the pick of his infantry and practically all his cavalry in an ambush, giving orders, moreover, that a large number of cattle should be pastured at various points within this gorge, and that the peasants and burghers should go about openly in that area. His object in so doing was that, if Domitius should pass through that defile as a friend, he might have no suspicions of an ambush, as he would observe both men and beasts moving about the countryside, as if friends were in the offing; while if he should come in no friendly spirit, treating it as enemy territory, his troops might become scattered in the process of plundering and so be cut down piecemeal.
36. Compluris interim legationes Pharnaces ad Domitium mittit quae de pace agerent regiaque munera Domitio ferrent. Ea constanter omnia aspernabatur nec sibi quicquam fore antiquius quam dignitatem populi Romani et regna sociorum reciperare legatis respondebat. Magnis et continuis itineribus confectis cum adventaret ad Nicopolim, quod oppidum positum in Armenia minore est plano ipso loco, montibus tamen altis ab duobus lateribus obiectis satis magno intervallo ab oppido remotis, castra posuit longe a Nicopoli circiter milia passuum VII. Quibus ex castris cum locus angustus atque impeditus esset transeundus, Pharnaces in insidiis delectos pedites omnisque paene disposuit equites, magnam autem multitudinem pecoris intra eas fauces dissipati iussit paganosque et oppidanos in his locis obversari, ut sive amicus Domitius eas angustias transiret, nihil de insidiis suspicaretur, cum in agris et pecora et homines animum adverteret versari tamquam amicorum adventu, sive inimicus ut in hostium finis veniret, praeda diripienda milites dissiparentur dispersique caederentur.
37. While making these dispositions he still constantly continued sending delegations to Domitius to talk of peace and friendship, as he believed that by these self-same tactics Domitius could the more readily be duped. But on the other hand Domitius’ hopes of peace afforded him a motive for tarrying in the camp, where he was. Consequently, as Pharnaces had now lost his immediate opportunity and was afraid that his ambush might be discovered, he recalled his troops to camp. On the morrow Domitius advanced nearer Nicopolis and pitched his camp over against the town. While our troops were fortifying it, Pharnaces drew up his line of battle according to his own established custom. This, in fact, was formed with its front as a single straight line, with each of the wings reinforced by three supporting-lines and on the same principle support lines were also posted in the centre, while in the two spaces, on the right hand and the left, single ranks were drawn up. Having once begun the task of fortifying his camp, Domitius completed it, with part of his forces posted in front of the rampart.
37. Haec cum administraret, numquam tamen intermittebat legatos de pace atque amicitia mittere ad Domitium, cum hoc ipso crederet facilius eum decipi posse. At contra spes pacis Domitio in isdem castris morandi attulit causam. Ita Pharnaces, amissa proximi temporis occasione cum vereretur ne cognoscerentur insidiae, suos in castra revocavit. Domitius postero die propius Nicopolim accessit castraque oppido contulit. Quae dum muniunt nostri, Pharnaces aciem instruxit more suo atque instituto. In fronte enim simplici derecta acie cornua trinis firmabantur subsidiis; eadem ratione haec media collocabantur acie duobus dextra sinistraque intervallis simplicibus ordinibus instructis. Perfecit inceptum castrorum opus Domitius parte copiarum pro vallo constituta.