--- title: "The Civil War · Commentarii de Bello Civili" author: "Julius Caesar" translator: "Arthur George Peskett" languages: [la, en] shelf: "Classical Latin" section: 4 of 11 url: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-civil-war/4/ cite: "Julius Caesar, tr. Arthur George Peskett, The Civil War · Commentarii de Bello Civili, section 4. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-civil-war/4/" --- # The Civil War · Commentarii de Bello Civili *Julius Caesar, tr. Arthur George Peskett* Caesar’s own account of his war with Pompey, from the Rubicon to Alexandria. > Latin: ed. Arthur George Peskett, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi0448.phi002, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Arthur George Peskett, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi0448.phi002.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 4. Book I · chapters 67–87 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-civil-war/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/caesar-civil-war/4/#p-N [¶0] 67. Petreius and Afranius hold a discussion in council, the question before them being the time of starting. Many thought that they should march by night, urging that they could reach the defiles before it was noticed. Others took the fact that the cry had been raised the previous night in Caesar’s camp as a proof that secret departure was impossible. They pointed out that Caesar’s horsemen poured around at night and beset every place and every path; that night battles should be avoided because the soldiers in the terror of civil strife are wont to consider their fears rather than their obligations. But daylight, they urged, in itself brings a sense of shame when all are looking on, and the presence of military tribunes and centurions also contributes much, and that it was by such considerations that troops are wont to be restrained and kept in allegiance. On every ground, therefore, they must break through by day: though some loss should be sustained, yet the place they are after can be captured without impairing the army as a whole. This opinion prevails in the council and they determine to set out next day at early dawn. > Latin: 67. Disputatur in consilio a Petreio atque Afranio et tempus profectionis quaeritur. Plerique censebant, ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri, quam sentiretur. Alii, quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset in Caesaris castris, argumenti sumebant loco non posse clam exiri. Circumfundi noctu equitatum Caesaris atque omnia loca atque itinera obsidere; nocturnaque proelia esse vitanda, quod perterritus miles in civili dissensione timori magis quam religioni consulere consuerit. At lucem multum per se pudorem omnium oculis, multum etiam tribunorum militum et centurionum praesentiam afferre; quibus rebus coërceri milites et in officio contineri soleant. Quare omni ratione esse interdiu perrumpendum: etsi aliquo accepto detrimento tamen summa exercitus salva locum, quem petant, capi posse. Haec vincit in consilio sententia, et prima luce postridie constituunt proficisci. [¶1] 68. Caesar after reconnoitring the district leads all his forces out of camp when the sky grows light and, making a wide circuit, conducts his army by no clearly marked route. For the roads that led to the Ebro and to Octogesa were blocked by the interposition of the enemy’s camp. He himself had to cross very large and difficult valleys, steep rocks in many places impeded their march, so that arms were of necessity passed from hand to hand, and the men accomplished a great part of their way unarmed and helped up one by another. But no one shirked this toil, because they thought it would prove the end of all their labours, if only they should be able to cut off the foe from the Ebro and prevent him from foraging. > Latin: 68. Caesar exploratis regionibus albente caelo omnes copias castris educit magnoque circuitu nullo certo) itinere exercitum ducit. Nam quae itinera ad Hiberum atque Octogesam pertinebant castris hostium oppositis tenebantur. Ipsi erant transcendendae valles maximae ac difficillimae; saxa multis locis praerupta iter impediebant, ut arma per manus necessario traderentur, militesque inermes sublevatique alii ab aliis magnam partem itineris conficerent. Sed hunc laborem recusabat nemo, quod eum omnium laborum finem fore existimabant, si hostem Hibero intercidere et frumento prohibere potuissent. [¶2] 69. And first of all the Afranian soldiers joyfully ran out of their camp to see the spectacle and pursued our men with insulting cries, saying that they were fleeing under the stress of lack of necessary food, and were on their way back to Ilerda. For the direction of their march was different from that proposed, and they seemed to be going in the contrary direction. The Afranian officers extolled their own policy in having kept themselves in camp, and their opinion was greatly strengthened by the fact that they saw the foe started on their way without any baggage train, so that they were confident that they could not hold out much longer against privation. But when they saw the column gradually wheeling to the right and observed the vanguard already outflanking the line of their own camp, no one was so slow, so impatient of labour, as not to feel that they must at once leave the camp and go to meet the foe. The cry “To arms!” is raised, and the whole force, a few cohorts only being left on guard, goes forth and hurries on a straight course to the Ebro. > Latin: 69. Ac primo Afraniani milites visendi causa laeti ex castris procurrebant contumeliosisque vocibus prosequebantur nostros: necessarii victus inopia coactos fugere atque ad Ilerdam reverti. Erat enim iter a proposito diversum, contrariamque in partem iri videbatur. Duces vero eorum consilium suum laudibus efferebant, quod se castris tenuissent; multumque eorum opinionem adiuvabat, quod sine iumentis impedimentisque ad iter profectos videbant, ut non posse inopiam diutius sustinere confiderent. Sed, ubi paulatim retorqueri agmen ad dextram conspexerunt iamque primos superare regionem castrorum animum adverterunt, nemo erat adeo tardus aut fugiens laboris, quin statim castris exeundum atque occurrendum putaret. Conclamatur ad arma, atque omnes copiae paucis praesidio relictis cohortibus exeunt rectoque ad Hiberum itinere contendunt. [¶3] 70. The whole contest turned on speed—which of the two would first seize the defiles and the hills—but the difficulties of the roads delayed Caesar’s army, while Caesar’s pursuing cavalry hindered the forces of Afranius. Matters, however, had of necessity come to such a pass with the Afranians that, if they should first reach the hills that they aimed at, they would themselves escape peril, while they would be unable to save the baggage of the whole army and the cohorts left in the camp; for when these were cut off by Caesar’s army it was by no means possible for assistance to be conveyed to them. Caesar completed the distance first, and finding a plain after crossing the great rocks, he draws up his line therein opposite the enemy. Afranius, seeing the foe in front of him, while his rear was being harassed by the cavalry, finding a hill near, halted on it. From this spot he dispatches four light-armed cohorts to a mountain which was the loftiest of all in sight. He orders them to hurry at full speed and occupy it, with the intention of himself hastening thither with all his forces, and by a change of route arriving at Octogesa by the ridge. When the light-armed men were making for this by an oblique route, Caesar’s horsemen, perceiving it, charged the cohorts; nor could they, with their small shields, hold out for ever so short a time against the cavalry attack, but are all surrounded by them and slain in the sight of both armies. > Latin: 70. Erat in celeritate omne positum certamen, utri prius angustias montesque occuparent; sed exercitum Caesaris viarum difficultates tardabant, Afranii copias equitatus Caesaris insequens morabatur. Res, tamen ab Afranianis huc erat necessario deducta, ut, si priores montes, quos petebant, attigissent, ipsi periculum vitarent, impedimenta totius exercitus cohortesque in castris relictas servare non possent; quibus interclusis exercitu Caesaris auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat. Confecit prior iter Caesar atque ex magnis rupibus nactus planitiem in hac contra hostem aciem instruit. Afranius, cum ab equitatu novissimum agmen premeretur, ante se hostem videret, collem quendam nactus ibi constitit. Ex eo loco IIII cetratorum cohortes in montem, qui erat in conspectu omnium excelsissimus, mittit. Hunc magno cursu concitatos iubet occupare, eo consilio, uti ipse eodem omnibus copiis contenderet et mutato itinere iugis Octogesam perveniret. Hunc eum obliquo itinere cetrati peterent, conspicatus equitatus Caesaris in cohortes impetum fecit; nec minimam partem temporis equitum vim cetrati sustinere potuerunt omnesque ab eis circumventi in conspectu utriusque exercitus interficiuntur. [¶4] 71. There was now opportunity for a successful action. Nor, indeed, did it escape Caesar that an army demoralized by such a loss received under their eyes could not hold out, especially as they were surrounded on every side by cavalry, since the engagement was taking place in level and open country; and such action was demanded of him from every quarter. Legates, centurions, and tribunes hurried to him begging him not to hesitate to join battle; they pointed out that the spirits of the whole force were as keen as possible; on the other hand, the Afranians had in many ways shown signs of fear, by the fact that they had not succoured their own men, that they were not going down from the hill, that they were scarcely holding their ground against the cavalry charges, and that, crowded together, with their colours congregated in one spot, they were keeping neither to their ranks nor to their standards. If it was the inequality of site that he feared, yet an opportunity of fighting in some place or other would be afforded him, because Afranius was certainly bound to come down from his position, and could not continue to hold it without water. > Latin: 71. Erat occasio bene gerendae rei. Neque vero id Caesarem fugiebat, tanto sub oculis accepto detrimento perterritum exercitum sustinere non posse, praesertim circumdatum undique equitatu,cum in Ioco aequo atque aperto confligeretur; idque ex omnibus' partibus ab eo flagitabatur. Concurrebant legati,' centuriones tribunique militum: ne dubitaret proelium committere; omnium esse militum paratissimos animos. Afranianos contra multis rebus sui timoris signa misisse: quod suis non subvenissent, quod de colle non decederent, quod VIX equitum incursus sustinerent collatisque in unum locum signis conferti neque ordines neque signa servarent. Quod si iniquitatem loci timeret, datum iri tamen aliquo loco pugnandi facultatem, quod certe inde decedendum esset Afranio nec sine aqua permanere posset. [¶5] 72. Caesar had entertained the hope that, having cut off his adversaries from their food supply, lie would be able to finish the business without exposing his men to fighting or bloodshed. Why should he lose any of his men even in a successful battle? Why should he suffer soldiers who had served him so well to be wounded? Why, in a word, should he make trial of fortune? Especially as it was as much the duty of a commander to win by policy as by the sword. He was moved, moreover, by compassion for his fellow-citizens whose slaughter he saw to be inevitable. He preferred to gain his object without loss or harm to them. This policy of his did not commend itself to the majority; in fact, the soldiers said openly among themselves that, since such an opportunity of victory was being let slip, they would not fight even when Caesar wished them to. He adheres to his intention, and moves a little way from his position so as to diminish the alarm of the foe. Petreius and Afranius return to their camp when the chance is offered them. Caesar, after distributing outposts on the hills, shutting off every route to the Ebro, entrenches himself as near as possible to the enemy’s camp. > Latin: 72. Caesar in eam spem venerat, se sine pugna et sine vulnere suorum rem conficere posse, quod re frumentaria adversarios interclusisset. Cur etiam secundo proelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? praesertim cum non minus esset imperatoris consilio superare quam gladio. Movebatur etiam misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat; quibus salvis atque incolumibus rem obtinere malebat. Hoc consilium Caesaris plerisque non probabatur: milites vero palam inter se loquebantur, quoniam talis occasio victoriae dimitteretur, etiam cum vellet Caesar, sese non esse pugnaturos. Ille in sua sententia perseverat ei paulum ex eo loco digreditur, ut timorem adversariis minuat. Petreius atque Afranius oblata facultate in castra sese referunt. Caesar praesidiis montibus dispositis omni ad Hiberum intercluso itinere quam proxime potest hostium castris castra communit. [¶6] 73. On the next day the enemy’s officers, dismayed at having lost all prospect of supplies and of reaching the Ebro, took counsel on their other measures. There was one route in case they wished to return to Ilerda, another if they made for Tarraco. While deliberating thereon, word is brought them that their water-carriers are being harassed by our cavalry. Having ascertained this, they distribute numerous outposts of horsemen and auxiliary cohorts, and between them place cohorts of the legions, and set about making a line of rampart from the camp to the water, so that they might be able to get water within their defences, both without alarm and without outposts. Petreius and Afranius share this task between them, and themselves proceed to some distance for the purpose of carrying out the work. > Latin: 73. Postero die duces adversariorum perturbati, quod omnem rei frumentariae Summisque Hiberi spem dimiserant, de reliquis rebus consultabant. Erat unum iter, Ilerdam si reverti vellent; alterum, si Tarraconem peterent. Haec consiliantibus eis nuntiantur aquatores ab equitatu premi nostro. Qua re cognita crebras stationes disponunt equitum et cohortium alariarum legionariasque intendunt cohortes vallumque ex castris ad aquam ducere incipiunt, ut intra munitionem et sine timore et sine stationibus aquari possent. Id opus inter se Petreius atque Afranius partiuntur ipsique perficiundi operis causa longius progrediuntur. [¶7] 74. At their departure the soldiers, getting a free opportunity for conversation, come out everywhere, and each one inquires after any acquaintance or fellow-townsman that he had in Caesar’s camp and summons him forth. First they all express gratitude to the others collectively for having spared them the day before, when they were in a state of panic: “To your kindness,” they said, “we owe our life.” Then they inquire about the good faith of the general, whether they would be justified in committing themselves to him, and express regret that they did not do so at first, and that they engaged in a conflict with friends and kinsmen. Stirred by such speeches, the men demand a solemn promise from the general for the life of Petreius and Afranius, fearing lest they should seem to have conceived some crime in their hearts or to have betrayed their party. If these conditions are assured they guarantee to transfer their colours at once and send centurions of the first rank to Caesar as deputies to treat of peace. Meanwhile some bring their friends into the camp to entertain them, others are led off by their acquaintances, so that the two camps seemed already fused into one, and many military tribunes and centurions come to Caesar and commend themselves to him. The same thing is done by the Spanish chieftains whom the enemy had called out and were keeping with them in camp as hostages. These sought for their own acquaintances and guest-friends by whom they might severally have an opportunity of being commended to the notice of Caesar. The youthful son of Afranius also pleaded with Caesar through the envoy Sulpicius for his own and his father’s safety. The whole place was full of rejoicing and congratulation, on the one side of those who were deemed to have avoided such perils, on the other of those who were seen to have wrought such achievements without bloodshed; and Caesar in the general estimation reaped a great advantage from his traditional leniency, and his policy met with the approval of all. > Latin: 74. Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem vulgo procedunt, et quem quisque in castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirit atque evocat. Primum agunt gratias omnibus, quod sibi perterritis pridie pepercissent: eorum se beneficio vivere. Deinde de imperatoris fide quaerunt, rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint, queruntur. His provocati sermonibus fidem ab imperatore de Petreii atque Afranii vita petunt, ne quod in se scelus concepisse neu suos prodidisse videantur. Quibus confirmans rebus se statim signa translaturos confirmant legatosque de pace primorum ordinum centuriones ad Caesarem mittunt. Interim alii suos in castra invitandi causa adducunt, alii ab suis abducuntur, adeo ut una castra iam facta ex binis viderentur; compluresque tribuni militum et centuriones ad Caesarem veniunt seque ei commendant. Idem hoc fit a principibus Hispaniae, quos evocaverant et secum in castris habebant obsidum loco. Hi suos notos hospitesque quaerebant, per quem quisque eorum aditum commendationis haberet ad Caesarem. Afranii etiam filius adulescens de sua ac parentis sui salute cum Caesare per Sulpicium legatum agebat. Erant plena laetitia et gratulatione omnia, eorum, qui tanta pericula vitasse, et eorum, qui sine vulnere tantas res confecisse videbantur, I magnumque fructum suae pristinae lenitatis omnium iudicio Caesar ferebat, consiliumque eius a cunctis probabatur. [¶8] 75. When these events were announced Afranius abandons the work that he had begun and returns to camp, apparently resolved to bear with a quiet and equal mind whatever chance should befall. But Petreius does not fail himself. He arms his retinue; with this and his official staff of light-armed men and with a few barbarian horsemen, his own retainers, whom he had been wont to maintain to guard his person, he makes a sudden onset on the rampart, interrupts the soldiers’ colloquies, drives our men from the camp, and slays all he catches. The rest gather together and, territos- fied by the sudden peril, wrap their left hands in their cloaks, draw their swords, and thus defend themselves from the light infantry and horsemen, trusting in the proximity of their camp, and retire to it, defended by the cohorts which are on guard at the gates. > Latin: 75. Quibus rebus nuntiatis Afranius ab instituto opere discedit seque in castra recipit, sic paratus, ut, videbatur, ut, quicumque accidisset casus, hunc quieto et aequo animo ferret. Petreius vero non deserit sese. Armat familiam; cum hae et praetoria cohorte cetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis, beneficiariis suis, quos suae custodiae causa habere consuerat, improviso ad vallum advolat, colloquia i militum interrumpit, nostros repellit a castris, quos deprendit interficit. Reliqui coëunt inter se et repentino periculo exterriti sinistras sagis involvunt gladiosque destringunt atque ita se a cetratis equitibusque defendunt castrorum propinquitate confisi seque in castra recipiunt et ab eis cohortibus, quae erant in statione ad portas, defenduntur. [¶9] 76. When this action was over Petreius goes the round of the maniples and calls on his men, beseeching them with tears not to hand over himself or their commander Pompeius to the foe for punishment. A crowd quickly gathers at the general’s headquarters. He demands that all should swear not to desert or betray the army and its officers, nor to take measures for their own safety apart from the rest. He first takes this oath himself, and also compels Afranius to take the same. Next come the military tribunes and centurions; the rank and file come forward and take the oath century by century. They issue orders that any soldier of Caesar who is in the company of one of their men should be brought forward by him. When produced they kill him publicly at the headquarters. But many of them are concealed by those who had entertained them, and are let go at. night through the ramparts. Thus the intimidation employed by the generals, cruelty in punishment, and the obligation of their fresh oath removed all prospect I of present surrender, changed the inclination of the soldiery, and brought matters back to the old condition of hostility. > Latin: 76. Quibus rebus confectis flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, neu se neu Pompeium, imperatorem suum, adversariis ad supplicium tradant, obsecrat. Fit celeriter concursus in praetorium. Postulat, ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis consilium capturos. Princeps in haec verba iurat ipse; idem iusiurandum adigit Afranium; subsequuntur tribuni militum centurionesque; centuriatim producti milites idem iurant. Edicunt, penes quem quisque sit Caesaris miles, ut producatur: productos palam in praetorio interficiunt. Sed plerosque ei, qui receperant, celant noctuque per vallum emittunt. Sic terror oblatus a ducibus, crudelitas in supplicio, nova religio iurisiurandi spem praesentis deditionis sustulit mentesque militum convertit et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit. [¶10] 77. Caesar gives orders that the men of the other side who had come into his camp at the time of the colloquy should be sought for with the utmost diligence and sent back. But out of their number several military tribunes and centurions remained with him of their own accord. These he afterwards held in high honour; centurions he restored to their former ranks, Roman knights to the post of tribune. > Latin: 77. Caesar, qui milites adversariorum in castra per tempus colloquii venerant, summa diligentia conquiri et remitti iubet. Sed ex numero tribunorum militum centurionumque nonnulli sua voluntate apud eum remanserunt. Quos ille postea magno in honore habuit; centuriones in priores ordines, equites Romanos in tribunicium restituit honorem, Premebantur Afraniani pabulatione, aquabantur aegre. [¶11] 78. The Afranians were in straits with their foraging and were getting water with difficulty. The legionaries had some store of corn because they had been ordered to bring a twenty-two days’ supply from Ilerda; the light-armed and auxiliaries had none, since their opportunities for providing it were scanty and their bodies were not trained to carry burdens. And so a great number of them fled to Caesar every day. Such were the straits of the enemy’s situation. But of the two plans set before them the simpler seemed to be to return to Ilerda, because they had left a little corn there. They were confident that they would there evolve their plans for the future. Tarraco was a long way off, and they understood that in so long a journey their fortune might meet with various mischances. This plan having approved itself, they depart from the camp. Caesar, after sending forward his cavalry to annoy and hinder their rear, himself follows with the legions. No moment passed without their rearguard having to fight with the horsemen. > Latin: 78. Frumenti copiam legionarii nonnullam habebant, quod dierum XXII ab Ilerda frumentum iussi erant efferre, cetrati auxiliaresque, nullam, quorum erant et facultates ad parandum exiguae et corpora insueta ad onera portanda. Itaque magnus eorum cotidie numerus ad Caesarem perfugiebat. In his erat angustiis res. Sed ex propositis consiliis duobus explicitius videbatur Ilerdam reverti, quod ibi paulum frumenti reliquerant. Ibi se reliquum consilium explicaturos confidebant. Tarraco aberat longius; quo spatio plures rem posse casus recipere intellegebant. Hoc probato consilio ex castris proficiscuntur. Caesar equitatu praemisso, qui novissimum agmen carperet atque impediret, ipse cum legionibus subsequitur. Nullum intercedebat tempus, quin extremi cum equitibus proeliarentur. [¶12] 79. Their method of fighting was as follows: lightly equipped cohorts closed in their rearguard and several of these kept halting in the level districts; if a hill had to be climbed, the nature of the ground in itself averted peril, since from the higher ground those who had gone in front protected their comrades who were ascending; whenever a valley or a slope lay before them and those who had gone on in front could not bring aid to those who were delayed, while the horsemen from higher ground kept hurling missiles against them from behind, then indeed the position was most critical. The only course left for them was, whenever they approached such places, to order a halt of the legions and to repel the cavalry by a vigorous charge, and when they had dislodged it, starting forward immediately at a run, to descend in a body into the valleys, and so, after crossing them, again to halt on the higher ground. For they were so far from being aided by their cavalry, of whom they had a considerable number, that they actually received them for protection, demoralized as they were by the previous battles, into the centre of their column, and none of them could stray from the route without being caught by Caesar’s horse. > Latin: 79. Genus erat hoc pugnae. Expeditae cohortes novissimum agmen claudebant pluresque in locis campestribus subsistebant. Si mons erat ascendendus, facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat, quod ex locis superioribus, qui antecesserat, suos ascendentes protegebant; cum vallis aut locus declivis suberat, neque ei, qui antecesserat, morantibiis opem ferre poterant, equites vero ex loco superiore in aversos tela coniciebant, tum magno erat in periculo res. Relinquebatur, ut, cum eiusmodi locis esset appropinquatum, legionum signa consistere iuberent magnoque impetu equitatum repellerent, eo submoto repente incitati cursu sese in valles universi demitterent atque ita transgressi rursus in locis superioribus consisterent. Nam tantum ab equitum suorum auxiliis aberant, quorum numerum habebant magnum, ut cos superioribus perterritus proeliis in medium reciperent agmen ultroque cos tuerentur; quorum nulli ex itinere excedere licebat, quin ab equitatu Caesaris exciperetur. [¶13] 80. Fighting in this way, men advance slowly and tentatively, frequently halting to support their comrades, and so it happened on this occasion. For after proceeding four miles and being seriously harassed by the cavalry, they occupy a lofty hill and there entrench a camp with one front only facing the foe, and do not unload their baggage animals. When they observed Caesar’s camp pitched, his tents set up, and the horsemen dispersed on foraging duty, they suddenly sally forth about the sixth hour of the same day and, hoping that the pursuit would be delayed by the departure of our cavalry, begin their march. On observing this, Caesar, having rested his legions, follows them up and leaves a few cohorts to guard the baggage. He orders the foragers to follow on at the tenth hour and the horsemen to be recalled. The cavalry quickly returns to its daily employment during the march. Keen fighting goes on in the rear of the foe so that they are almost put to flight, and many men from the ranks, also several centurions, are slain. Meanwhile Caesar’s main force was pressing on and threatening them in mass. > Latin: 80. Tali dum pugnatur modo, lente atque paulatim proceditur, crebroque, ut sint auxilio suis, subsistunt; ut tum accidit. Milia enim progressi mi vehementiusque peragitati ab equitatu montem excelsum capiunt ibique una fronte contra hostem castra muniunt neque iumentis onera deponunt. Ubi Caesaris castra posita tabernaculaque constituta et dimissos equites pabulandi causa animum adverterunt, sese subito proripiunt hora circiter sexta eiusdem diei et spem nacti morae discessu nostrorum equitum iter facere incipiunt. Qua re animum adversa Caesar refectis legionibus subsequitur, praesidio impedimentis paucas cohortes relinquit; hora X subsequi pabulatores equitesque revocari iubet. Celeriter equitatus ad cotidianum itineris officium revertitur. Pugnatur acriter ad novissimum agmen, adeo ut paene terga convertant, compluresque milites, etiam nonnulli centuriones, interficiuntur. Instabat agmen Caesaris atque universum imminebat. [¶14] 81. Then, indeed, having no opportunities of searching for a suitable place for their camp nor of advancing, they are obliged to halt and pitch their camp far from water and in a place unfavourable by nature. But, for the same reasons that are set forth above, Caesar no longer harasses them with hostilities, and on that day he did not allow tents to be set up, in order that his men might all be more ready to pursue, in case they should break out either by night or by day. Observing the faulty position of their camp, the enemy push forward outworks throughout the night and exchange one camp for another. They engage in the same task next day from early dawn, and spend the whole day over it. But the more they advanced with their work and pushed forward their camp, the further they were from water, and remedies were provided for their present ill only by incurring fresh ills. On the approach of night no one goes out of camp for watering; on the following day, leaving a guard in the camp, they lead out all their forces for water, but no one is sent out for fodder. Caesar preferred that they should be harassed by such sufferings and submit to a compulsory surrender rather than fight a pitched battle. Nevertheless he attempts to fence them in with a rampart and ditch, so as to hinder as far as possible sudden sallies on their part, to which he thought they would necessarily have recourse. And so forced by want of fodder, and to lighten their equipment for marching, they order all their baggage animals to be killed. > Latin: 81. Tum vero neque ad explorandum idoneum locum castris neque ad progrediendum data facultate consistunt necessario et procul ab aqua et natura iniquo loco castra ponunt. Sed isdem de causis Caesar, quae supra sunt demonstratae, proelio non lacessit et eo die tabernacula statui passus non est, quo paratiores essent ad insequendum omnes, sive noctu sive interdiu erumperent. Illi animadverso vitio castrorum tota nocte munitiones proferunt castraque castris convertunt. Hoc idem postero dic a prima luce faciunt totumque in ea re diem consumunt. Sed quantum opere processerant et castra protulerant, tanto aberant ab aqua longius, et praesenti malo aliis malis remedia dabantur. Prima nocte aquandi causa nemo egreditur ex castris; proximo die praesidio in castris relicto universas ad aquam copias educunt, pabulatum emittitur nemo. His eos suppliciis male haberi Caesar et necessariam subire deditionem quam proelio decertare malebat. Conatur tamen cos vallo fossaque circummunire, ut quam maxime repentinas eorum eruptiones demoretur; quo necessario descensuros existimabam Illi et inopia pabuli adducti et, quo essent expeditiores, omnia sarcinaria iumenta interfici iubent. [¶15] 82. In these operations and plans two days are consumed; on the third day a great part of Caesar’s work had already reached completion. The enemy, in order to hinder the rest of the defences, giving the signal about the ninth hour, lead out the legions and draw up their line close to the camp. Caesar recalls his legions from their work, orders all the cavalry to assemble, and draws up his line; for to appear to have shunned a battle against the general sentiment of the troops, and his credit in the eyes of the world, involved serious detriment to his cause. But, for the same reasons that have been already made known, he was led to object to a pitched battle, and all the more because by reason of the narrow intervening space, even if the enemy were driven to flight, a victory could not greatly promote his final success. For the two camps were distant from one another not more than two thousand paces. The two lines occupied two-thirds of this space; the remaining third was empty, left free for the onset and charge of the troops. If battle were joined, the propinquity of the camps afforded the conquered a speedy retreat in their flight. For this reason he had made up his mind to resist them if they advanced their colours, but not to be the first to attack. > Latin: 82. In his operibus consiliisque biduum consumitur; tertio die magna iam pars operis Caesaris processerat. Illi impediendae reliquae munitionis causa hora circiter vim signo dato legiones educunt aciemque sub castris instruunt. Caesar ab opere legiones revocat, equitatum omnem convenire iubet, aciem instruit; contra opinionem enim militum famamque omnium videri proelium defugisse magnum detrimentum afferebat. Sed eisdem de causis, quae sunt cognitae, quo minus dimicare vellet, movebatur, atque hoc etiam magis, quod spatii brevitate etiam in fugam coniectis adversariis non multum ad summam victoria iuvare poterat. Non enim amplius pedum milibus duobus ab castris castra distabant; hinc duas partes acies occupabant duae; tertia vacabat ad incursum atque impetum militum relicta. Si proelium committeretur, propinquitas castrorum celerem superatis ex fuga receptum dabat. Hae de causa constituerat signa inferentibus resistere, prior proelio non lacessere. [¶16] 83. The Afranian line was a double one of five legions. The third line of reserves was occupied by the auxiliary cohorts. Caesar’s line was threefold, but the first line was held by four cohorts from each of the five legions, next to these came three reserve cohorts, and again three more, each from its respective legion; the bowmen and slingers were enclosed in the centre of the force, while cavalry protected the flanks. The battle array being thus drawn out, each commander seemed to have gained his purpose, Caesar not to engage in battle unless compelled, Afranius to hinder Caesar’s works. However, the situation is prolonged and the battle array is main- tained till sunset; then each side withdraws to camp. On the next day Caesar prepares to complete the defence works he had started; the enemy make trial of the ford of the River Sicoris to see if they could cross. Observing this, Caesar throws his light-armed Germans and part of his cavalry across the river and places frequent outposts along the banks. > Latin: 83. Acies erat Afraniana duplex legionum V; tertium in subsidiis locum alariae cohortes obtinebant; Caesaris triplex; sed primam aciem quaternae cohortes ex V legionibus tenebant, has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cuiusque legionis subsequebantur; sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat. Tali instructa acie tenere uterque propositum videbatur: Caesar, ne nisi coactus proelium committeret; ille, ut opera Caesaris impediret. Producitur tamen res, aciesque ad solis occasum continentur; inde utrique in castra discedunt. Postero die munitiones institutas Caesar parat perficere; illi vadum fluminis Sicoris temptare, si transire possent. Qua re animadversa Caesar Germanos levis armaturae equitumque partem flumen traicit crebrasque in ripis custodias disponit. [¶17] 84. At last blockaded in every way, their baggage animals now kept without fodder for four days, through their want of water, firewood, and forage, they beg for a conference, and that too, if possible, in a place out of reach of the soldiers. When this stipulation was refused by Caesar, but permission was granted provided they chose to confer in public, the son of Afranius is offered to Caesar as a hostage. They come to a place which Caesar chose. In the hearing of each army Afranius speaks. “You must not be angry with us or our men because we have chosen to keep faith with our commander Gn. Pompeius. But we have already done enough for duty and we have suffered punishment enough by enduring the want of every necessary; now indeed, hemmed in almost like wild beasts, we are kept from water, kept from moving, and cannot bear the pain in our bodies or the shame in our minds. And so we confess ourselves beaten: we pray and beseech, if any room for compassion is left, that you should not think it necessary to proceed to the extreme of punishment.” Such are the sentiments he expresses in the most humble and submissive language. > Latin: 84. Tandem omnibus rebus obsessi, quartum iam diem sine pabulo retentis iumentis, aquae, lignorum, frumenti inopia colloquium petunt et id, si fieri possit, semoto a militibus loco. Ubi id a Caesare negatum et, palam si colloqui vellent, concessum est, datur obsidis loco Caesari filius Afranii. Venitur in eum locum, quem Caesar delegit. Audiente utroque exercitu loquitur Afranius: non esse aut ipsis aut militibus succensendum, quod fidem erga imperatorem suum Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint. Sed satis iam fecisse officio satisque supplicii tulisse perpessos omnium rerum inopiam; nunc vero paene ut feras circummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi ingressu, neque corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse. Itaque se victos confiteri; orare atque obsecrare, si qui locus misericordiae relinquatur, ne ad ultimum supplicium progredi necesse habeat. Haec quam potest demississime et subiectissime exponit. [¶18] 85. To this Caesar replies: “No one in the whole army could have played this part, whether of querulous lament or of self-commiseration, less suitably than you. All the rest have done their duty: I, who was unwilling to fight even when conditions were favourable, time and place suitable, that there might be absolutely nothing to prejudice the chances of peace,; my army, which preserved and protected those whom it held in its power, even when it had been injured and its soldiers slain; lastly, the men of your army who voluntarily pleaded for reconciliation, a matter wherein they thought it right to have regard to the life of all their comrades. Thus the part played by all ranks has been based on compassion, but the leaders themselves have shrunk from peace; they have observed the rights neither of conference nor of truce, and with utmost cruelty have slain men who through want of experience were deceived by a pretended colloquy. So that has happened to them which is usually wont to happen to men of overmuch obstinacy and arrogance—namely, to recur to that which they have a little while before despised and to make that the chief object of their desire. Nor do I now make demands whereby my resources may be increased by reason of your humiliation or some fortunate conjuncture of events, but I wish the armies which you have now maintained against me for so many years to be disbanded. For no other reason but this were six legions sent into Spain and a seventh levied there, or so many large fleets equipped or leaders of military experience sent to the front. None of these provisions were made for the pacifying of the Spanish provinces, none for the advantage of the province, which from the long continuance of peace required no assistance. All these measures have been for long in course of preparation against me; against me imperial powers of a novel kind are set up, such as that one and the same person should preside over city affairs outside the gates and should hold in absence two of the most warlike provinces for so many years; against me are the rights of magistrates subverted, so that they are not sent into the provinces as always hitherto after the praetorship and consulship, but as approved and elected by a small clique; against me even the plea of age is of no avail to prevent men approved in former wars being called out to control armies; in my case alone the rule is not observed which has always been allowed to all commanders, that when they have conducted affairs successfully they should return home, either with some distinction or at any rate without ignominy, and disband their army. Yet I have borne all these wrongs patiently and will bear them, nor is it my present object to retain for myself an army taken from you, which, however, it would not be difficult for me to do, but to prevent you from having one that you can use against me. So then, as has been said, let us quit our provinces and disband our army; if that is so arranged I will injure no one. This is my one and final condition of peace.” > Latin: 85. Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partes vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse. Reliquos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse: se, qui etiam bona condicione, et loco et tempore aequo, confligere noluerit, ut quam integerrima essent ad pacem omnia; exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque interfectis, quos in sua potestate habuerit, conservarit et texerit; illius denique exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda pace egerint; qua in re omnium suorum vitae consulendum putarint. Sic omnium ordinum partes in misericordia constitisse: ipsos duces a pace abhorruisse; cos neque colloquii neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse. Accidisse igitur his, quod plerumque hominum nimia pertinacia atque arrogantia accidere soleat, uti eo recurrant et id cupidissime petant, quod paulo ante contempserint. Neque nunc se illorum humilitate neque aliqua temporis opportunitate postulare, quibus rebus opes augeantur suae; sed eos exercitus, quos contra se multos iam annos aluerint, velle dimitti. Neque enim sex legiones alia de causa missas in Hispaniam septimamque ibi conscriptam neque tot tantasque classes paratas neque submissos duces rei militaris peritos. Nihil horum ad pacandas Hispanias, nihil ad usum provinciae provisum, quae propter diuturnitatem pacis nullum auxilium desiderant. Omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens tot annis obtineat; in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur; in se etiam aetatis excusationem nihil valere, cum superioribus bellis probati ad obtinendos exercitus evocentur; in se uno non servari, quod sit omnibus datum semper imperatoribus, ut rebus feliciter gestis aut cum honore aliquo aut certe sino ignominia domum revertantur exercitumque dimittant. Quae tamen omnia et se tulisse patienter et esse laturum; neque nunc id agere, ut ab illis abductum exercitum teneat ipse, quod tamen sibi difficile non sit, sed ne illi habeant, quo contra se uti possint. Proinde, ut esset dictum, provinciis excederent exercitumque dimitterent; si id sit factum, se nociturum nemini. Hanc unam atque extremam esse pacis condicionem. [¶19] 86. Now it was very acceptable and pleasant to the troops, as could be known merely by the indications they gave, that men who had expected some merited penalty should win the boon of discharge without asking for it. For when a discussion was introduced about the place and time of the arrangement, the whole body of men began to signify by voice and hand from the rampart where they stood that they should be discharged at once, and that the undertaking could not be assured if it were put off to another time, whatever pledges might be given in the interval. When the point had been briefly discussed in either sense, the final result was that those who had a domicile or holding in Spain should be discharged at once, the rest at the River Varus. Pledges are given by Caesar that no wrong should be done to them, and that no one should be compelled to take the oath of allegiance against his will. > Latin: 86. Id vero militibus fuit pergratum et iucundum, ut ex ipsa significatione cognosci potuit, ut, qui aliquid iusti incommodi exspectavissent, ultro praemium missionis ferrent. Nam cum de loco et tempore eius rei controversia inferretur, et voce et manibus universi ex vallo, ubi constiterant, significare coeperunt, ut statim dimitterentur, neque omni interposita fide firmum esse posse, si in aliud tempus differretur. Paucis cum esset in utramque partem verbis disputatum, res huc deducitur, ut ei, qui habeant domicilium aut possessionem in Hispania, statim, reliqui ad Varum flumen dimittantur; ne quid eis noceatur, neu quis invitus sacramentum dicere cogatur, a Caesare cavetur. [¶20] 87. Caesar promises to provide them with corn from that time while on their way to the River Varus. He also adds that whatever any one of them has lost in war, when such property is in the hands of his own soldiers, should be restored to the losers; after making a fair valuation, he pays the men a sum of money for these effects. Hereafter whatever disputes the soldiers had amongst themselves, of their own accord they came to Caesar for final decision. When the legions on the verge of mutiny were demanding their pay from Petreius and Afranius, who said that the time for it had not yet come, a request was made that Caesar should investigate the point, and each was satisfied with his decision. About a third of the army having been discharged within two days, Caesar ordered his own two legions to march first, the rest to follow close, so as to encamp at no great distance apart, and set the legate, Q. Fufius Calenus, in charge of this duty. In accordance with this instruction they marched from Spain to the River Varus, and there the rest of the army was disbanded. > Latin: 87. Caesar ex eo tempore, dum ad flumen Varum veniatur, se frumentum daturum pollicetur. Addit etiam, ut, quod quisque eorum in bello amiserit, quae sint penes milites suos, eis, qui amiserint, restituatur; militibus aequa facta aestimatione pecuniam pro his rebus dissolvit. Quascumque postea controversias inter se milites habuerunt, sua sponte ad Caesarem in ius adierunt. Petreius atque Afranius cum stipendium ab legionibus paene seditione facta flagitarentur, cuius illi diem nondum venisse dicerent, Caesar ut cognosceret, postulatum est, eoque utrique, quod statuit, contenti fuerunt. Parte circiter tertia exercitus eo biduo dimissa duas legiones suas antecedere, reliquas subsequi iussit, ut non longo inter se spatio castra facerent, eique negotio Q. Fufium Calenum legatum praeficit. Hoc eius praescripta ex Hispania ad Varum flumen est iter factum, atque ibi reliqua pars exercitus dimissa est.