---
title: "On Medicine · De medicina"
author: "Celsus"
translator: "Walter George Spencer"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 1 of 34
url: https://scriptura.si/works/celsus-on-medicine/1/
cite: "Celsus, tr. Walter George Spencer, On Medicine · De medicina, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/celsus-on-medicine/1/"
---

# On Medicine · De medicina

*Celsus, tr. Walter George Spencer*

The best Roman account of medicine: diet, drugs and surgery, from the history of the art to the treatment of fractures.

> Latin: ed. Friedrich Marx, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi0836.phi002, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Walter George Spencer, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi0836.phi002.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. Book I · preface

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/celsus-on-medicine/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/celsus-on-medicine/1/#p-N

[¶0] pr. Just as agriculture promises nourishment to healthy bodies, so does the Art of Medicine promise health to the sick. Nowhere is this Art wanting, for the most uncivilized nations have had knowledge of herbs, and other things to hand for the aiding of wounds and diseases. This Art, however, has been cultivated among the Greeks much more than in other nations — not, however, even among them from their first beginnings, but only for a few generations before ours. Hence Aesculapius is celebrated as the most ancient authority, and because he cultivated this science, as yet rude and vulgar, with a little more than common refinement, he was numbered among the gods. After him his two sons, Podalirius and Machaon, who followed Agamemnon as leader to the Trojan War, gave no inconsiderable help to their comrades. Homer stated, however, not that they gave any aid in the pestilence or in the various sorts of diseases, but only that they relieved wounds by the knife and by medicaments. Hence it appears that by them those parts only of the Art were attempted, and that they were the oldest. From the same authority, indeed, it can be learned that diseases were then ascribed to the anger of the immortal gods, and from them help used to be sought; and it is probable that with no aids against bad health, none the less health was generally good because of good habits, which neither indolence nor luxury had vitiated: since it is these two which have afflicted the bodies of men, first in Greece, and later amongst us; and hence this complex Art of Medicine, not needed in former times, nor among other nations even now, scarcely protracts the lives of a few of us to the verge of old age.

> Latin: pr. Vt alimenta sanis corporibus agricultura, sic sanitatem aegris MEDICINA promittit. Haec nusquam quidem non est, siquidem etiam inperitissimae gentes herbas aliaque promta in auxilium uulnerum morborumque nouerunt. Verum tamen apud Graecos aliquanto magis quam in ceteris nationibus exculta est, ac ne apud hos quidem a prima origine, sed paucis ante nos saeculis. Vt pote cum uetustissimus auctor Aesculapius celebretur, qui quoniam adhuc rudem et uulgarem hanc scientiam paulo subtilius excoluit, in deorum numerum receptus est. Huius deinde duo filii Podalirius et Machaon bello Troiano ducem Agamemnonem secuti non mediocrem opem commilitonibus suis attulerunt; quos tamen Homerus non in pestilentia neque in uariis generibus morborum aliquid adtulisse auxilii, sed uulneribus tantummodo ferro et medicamentis mederi solitos esse proposuit. Ex quo apparet has partes medicinae solas ab is esse te⟨m⟩tatas, easque esse uetustissimas. Eodem uero auctore disci potest morbos tum ad iram deorum inmortalium relatos esse, et ab isdem opem posci solitam uerique simile est inter * nulla auxilia aduersae ualetudinis, plerumque tamen eam bonam contigisse ob bonos mores, quos neque desidia neque luxuria uitiarant; siquidem haec duo corpora prius in Graecia, deinde apud nos adflixerunt ideoque multiplex ista medicina, neque olim neque apud alias gentes necessaria, uix aliquos ex nobis ad senectutis principia perducit.

[¶1] Therefore even after these I have mentioned, no distinguished men practised the Art of Medicine until literary studies began to be pursued with more attention, which more than anything else are a necessity for the spirit, but at the same time are bad for the body. At first the science of healing was held to be part of philosophy, so that treatment of disease and contemplation of the nature of things began through the same authorities; clearly because healing was needed especially by those whose bodily strength had been weakened by restless thinking and night-watching. Hence we find that many who professed philosophy became expert in medicine, the most celebrated being Pythagoras, Empedocles and Democritus. But it was, as some believe, a pupil of the last, Hippocrates of Cos, a man first and foremost worthy to be remembered, notable both for professional skill and for eloquence, who separated this branch of learning from the study of philosophy. After him Diocles of Carystus, next Praxagoras and Chrysippus, then Herophilus and Erasistratus, so practised this art that they made advances even towards various methods of treatment.

> Latin: Ergo etiam post eos, de quibus re⟨t⟩tuli, nulli clari uiri medicinam exercuerunt, donec maiore studio litterarum disciplina agitari coepit; quae ut animo praecipue omnium necessaria, sic corpori inimica est. Primoque medendi scientia sapientiae pars habebatur, ut et morborum curatio et rerum naturae contemplatio sub isdem auctoribus nata sit: scilicet is hanc maxime requirentibus, qui corporum suorum robora quieta cogitatione nocturnaque uigilia minuerant. Ideoque multos ex sapientiae professoribus peritos eius fuisse accipimus, clarissimos uero ex is Pythagoran et Enpedoclen et Democritum. Huius autem, ut quidam crediderunt, discipulus Hippocrates Cous, primus ex omnibus memoria dignus, a studio sapientiae disciplinam hanc separauit, uir et arte et facundia insignis.

[¶2] During the same times the Art of Medicine was divided into three parts: one being that which cures through diet, another through medicaments, and the third by hand. The Greeks termed the first Διαιτητικήν, the second Φαρμακευτικήν, the third Χειρουργίαν. But of that part which cured diseases by diet those who were by far the most famous authorities, endeavouring to go more deeply into things, claimed for themselves also a knowledge of nature, without which it seemed that the Art of Medicine would be stunted and weak. After them first of all Serapion, declaring that this kind of reasoning method was in no way pertinent to Medicine, based it only upon practice and upon experience. To him followed Apollonius and Glaucias, and somewhat later Heraclides of Tarentum, and other men of no small note, who in accordance with what they professed called themselves Empirici (or Experimentalists). Thus this Art of Medicine which treats by diet was also divided into two parts, some claiming an Art based upon speculation, others on practice alone. But after those mentioned above no one troubled about anything except what tradition had handed down to him until Asclepiades changed in large measure the way of curing. Of his successors, Themison, late in life, diverged from Asclepiades in some respects. And it is through these men in particular that this health-giving profession of ours has grown up.

> Latin: Post quem Diocles Carystius, deinde Praxagoras et Chrysippus, tum Herophilus et Erasistratus sic artem hanc exercuerunt, ut etiam in diuersas curandi uias processerint. Isdemque temporibus in tres partes medicina diducta est, ut una esset quae uictu, altera quae medicamentis, tertia quae manu mederetur. Primam ΔΙΑΙΤΗΤΙΚΗΝ secundam ΦΑΡΜΑΚΕΥΤΙΚΗΝ tertiam ΧΕΙΡΟΥΡΓΙΑΝ Graeci nominarunt. Eius autem, quae uictu morbos curat, longe clarissimi auctores etiam altius quaedam agitare conati, rerum quoque naturae sibi cognitionem uindicarunt, tamquam sine ea trunca et debilis medicina esset. Post quos Serapion, primus omnium nihil hanc rationalem disciplinam pertinere ad medicinam professus, in usu tantum et experimentis eam posuit. Quem Apollonius et Glaucias et aliquanto post Heraclides Tarentinus et aliqui non mediocres uiri secuti ex ipsa professione se empiricos appellauerunt. Sic in duas partes ea quoque, quae uictu curat, medicina diuisa est, aliis rationalem artem, aliis usum tantum sibi uindicantibus, nullo uero quicquam post eos, qui supra comprehensi sunt, agitante, nisi quod acceperat, donec Asclepiades medendi rationem ex magna parte mutauit.

[¶3] Since of the divisions of the Art of Medicine, the one which heals diseases, as it is the most difficult, is also the most famous, we must speak about it first. And because there is a primary difference of opinion, so holding that the sole knowledge necessary is derived from experience, others propounding that practice is not efficient enough except after acquiring a reasoned knowledge of human bodies and of nature, I must indicate which are the principal statements on either side, so that I may the more easily interpose my own opinion also.

> Latin: Ex cuius successoribus Themison nuper ipse quoque quaedam in senectute deflexit. Et per hos quidem maxime uiros salutaris ista nobis professio increuit. Quoniam autem ex [tribus] medicinae partibus ut difficillima, sic etiam clarissima est ea, quae morbis medetur, ante omnia de hac dicendum est.

[¶4] They, then, who profess a reasoned theory of medicine propound as requisites, first, a knowledge of hidden causes involving diseases, next, of evident causes, after these of natural actions also, and lastly of the internal parts.

> Latin: Et quia prima in e⟨o⟩ dissensio est, quod alii sibi experimentorum tantummodo notitiam necessariam esse contendunt, alii nisi corporum rerumque ratione comperta non satis potentem usum esse proponunt, indicandum est, quae maxime ex utraque parte dicantur, quo facilius nostra quoque opinio interponi possit.

[¶5] They term hidden, the causes concerning which inquiry is made into the principles composing our bodies, what makes for and what against health. For they believe it impossible for one who is ignorant of the origin of diseases to learn how to treat them suitably. They say that it does not admit of doubt that there is need for differences in treatment, if, as certain of the professors of philosophy have stated, some excess, or some deficiency, among the four elements, creates adverse health; or, if all the fault is in the humours, as was the view of Herophilus; or in the breath, according to Hippocrates; or if blood is transfused into those blood-vessels which are fitted for pneuma, and excites inflammation which the Greeks term φλεγμόνην, and that inflammation effects such a disturbance as there is in fever, which was taught by Erasistratus; or if little bodies by being brought to a standstill in passing through invisible pores block the passage, as Asclepiades contended — his will be the right way of treatment, who has not failed to see the primary origin of the cause. They do not deny that experience is also necessary; but they say it is impossible to arrive at what should be done unless through some course of reasoning. For the older men, they say, did not cram the sick anyhow, but reasoned out what might be especially suitable, and then put to the test of experience what conjecture of a sort had previously led up to. Again they say that it makes no matter whether by now most remedies have been well explored already... if, nevertheless, they started from a reasoned theory; and that in fact this has also been done in many instances. Frequently, too, novel classes of disease occur about which hitherto practice has disclosed nothing, and so it is necessary to consider how such have commenced, without which no one among mortals can possibly find out whether this rather than that remedy should be used; this is the reason why they investigate the occult causes.

> Latin: Igitur ii, qui RATIONALEM medicinam profitentur, haec necessaria esse proponunt: abditarum et morbos continentium causarum notitiam, deinde euidentium; post haec etiam naturalium actionum, nouissime partium interiorum. Abditas causas uocant, in quibus requiritur, ex quibus principiis nostra corpora sint, quid secundam, quid aduersam ualetudinem faciat. Neque enim credunt posse eum scire, quomodo morbos curare conueniat, qui unde sint ignoret; neque esse dubium quin alia curatione opus sit, si ex quattuor principiis uel superans aliquod uel deficiens aduersam ualetudinem creat, ut quidam ex sapientiae professoribus dixerunt: alia, si in umidis omne uitium est, ut Herophilo uisum est; alia, si in spiritu, ut Hippocrati; alia, si sanguis in eas uenas, quae spiritui accommodatae sunt, transfunditur et inflammationem, quam Graeci ΦΛΕΓΜΟΝΗΝ nominant, excitat, eaque inflammatio talem motum efficit, qualis in febre est, ut Erasistrato placuit; alia, si manantia corpuscula per inuisibilia foramina subsistendo iter claudunt, ut Asclepiades contendit: eum uero recte curaturum, quem prima origo causae non fefellerit. Neque uero infitiantur experimenta quoque esse necessaria, sed ne ad haec quidem aditum fieri potuisse nisi ab aliqua ratione contendunt: non enim quidlibet antiquiores uiros aegris inculcasse, sed cogitasse quid maxime conueniret, et id usu explorasse, ad quod ante coniectura aliqua duxisset. Neque interesse, an nunc iam pleraque explorata sint * * *, si a consilio tamen coeperunt. Et id quidem in multis ita se habere.

[¶6] But they call evident those causes, concerning which they inquire, as to whether heat or cold, hunger or surfeit, or such like, has brought about the commencement of the disease; for they say that he will be the one to counter the malady who is not ignorant of its origin.

> Latin: Saepe uero etiam noua incidere genera morborum, in quibus nihil adhuc usus ostenderit et ideo necessarium sit animaduertere, unde ea coeperi⟨n⟩t; sine quo nemo reperire mortalium possit, cur hoc quam illo potius utatur. Et ob haec quidem in obscuro positas causas persecuntur.

[¶7] Further, they term natural actions of the body, those by which we draw in and emit breath, take in and digest food and drink, as also those actions through which food and drink are distributed into every part of the members. Moreover, they also inquire why our blood-vessels now subside, now swell up; what is the explanation of sleep and wakefulness: for without knowledge of these they hold that no one can encounter or remedy the diseases which spring up in connexion with them. Among these natural actions digestion seems of most importance, so they give it their chief attention. Some following Erasistratus hold that in the belly the food is ground up; others, following Plistonicus, a pupil of Praxagoras, that it putrefies; others believe with Hippocrates, that food is cooked up by heat. In addition there are the followers of Asclepiades, who propound that all such notions are vain and superfluous, that there is no concoction at all, but that material is transmitted through the body, crude as swallowed. And on these points there is little agreement indeed among them; but what does follow is that a different food is to be given to patients according as this or that view is true. For if it is ground up inside, that food should be selected which can be ground up the most readily; if it putrefies, that which does so most expeditiously; if heat concocts it, that which most excites heat. But none of these points need be inquired into if there be no concoction but such things be taken which persist most in the state in which they were when swallowed. In the same way, when breathing is laboured, when sleep or wakefulness disturbs, they deem him able to remedy it who had understood beforehand how these same natural actions happen.

> Latin: Euidentes uero has appellant, in quibus quaerunt, initium morbi calor attulerit an frigus, fames an satietas, et quae similia sunt: occursurum enim uitio dicunt eum, qui originem non ignorarit. Naturales uero corporis actiones appellant, per quas spiritum trahimus et emittimus, cibum potionemque et adsumimus et concoquimus, itemque per quas eadem haec in omnes membrorum partes digeruntur. Tum requirunt etiam, quare uenae nostrae modo summittant se, modo attollant; quae ratio somni, quae uigiliae sit; sine quorum notitia neminem putant uel occurrere uel mederi morbis inter haec nascentibus posse. Ex quibus quia maxime pertinere ad rem concoctio uidetur, huic potissimum insistunt; et duce alii Erasistrato teri cibum in uentre contendunt, alii Plistonico Praxagorae discipulo putrescere; alii credunt Hippocrati per calorem cibos concoqui; acceduntque Asclepiadis aemuli, qui omnia ista uana et superuacua esse proponunt: nihil enim concoqui, sed crudam materiam, sicut adsumpta est, in corpus omne diduci. Et haec quidem inter eos parum constant: illud uero conuenit, alium dandum cibum laborantibus, si hoc, alium, si illud uerum est: nam si teritur intus, eum quaerendum esse, qui facillime teri possit; si putrescit, eum, in quo hoc expeditissimum est; si calor concoquit, eum, qui maxime calorem mouet: at nihil ex his esse quaerendum, si nihil concoquitur, ea uero sumenda, quae maxime manent, qualia adsumpta sunt.

[¶8] Moreover, as pains, and also various kinds of diseases, arise in the more internal parts, they hold that no one can apply remedies for these who is ignorant about the parts themselves; hence it becomes necessary to lay open the bodies of the dead and to scrutinize their viscera and intestines. They hold that Herophilus did this in the best way by far, when they laid open men whilst alive — criminals received out of prison from the kings — and while these were still breathing, observed parts which beforehand nature had concealed, their position, colour, shape, size, arrangement, hardness, softness, smoothness, relation, processes and depressions of each, and whether any part is inserted into or is received into another. For when pain occurs internally, neither is it possible for one to learn what hurts the patient, unless he had acquainted himself with the position of each organ or intestine; nor can a diseased portion of the body be treated by one who does not know what that portion is. When a man's viscera are exposed in a wound, he who is ignorant of the colour of a part in health may be unable to recognize which part is intact, and which part damaged; thus he cannot even relieve the damaged part. External remedies too can be applied more aptly by one acquainted with the position, shape and size of the internal organs, and like reasonings hold good in all the instances mentioned above. Nor is it, as most people say, cruel that in the execution of criminals, and but a few of them, we should seek remedies for innocent people of all future ages.

> Latin: Eademque ratione, cum spiritus grauis est, cum somnus aut uigilia urguet, eum mederi posse arbitrantur, qui prius illa ipsa qualiter eueniant perceperit. Praeter haec, cum in interioribus partibus et dolores et morborum uaria genera nascantur, neminem putant his adhibere posse remedia, qui ipsa⟨s⟩ ignoret. Ergo necessarium esse incidere corpora mortuorum, eorumque uiscera atque intestina scrutari; longeque optime fecisse Herophilum et Erasistratum, qui nocentes homines a regibus ex carcere acceptos uiuos inciderint, considerarintque etiamnum spiritu remanente ea, quae natura ante clausisset, eorumque positum, colorem, figuram, magnitudinem, ordinem, duritiem, mollitiem, l⟨e⟩uorem, contactum, processus deinde singulorum et recessus, et siue quid inseritur alteri, siue quid partem alterius in se recipit: neque enim, cum dolor intus incidit, scire quid doleat eum, qui, qua parte quo⟨d⟩que uiscus intestinumue sit, non cognouerit neque curari id, quod aegrum est, posse ab eo, qui quid sit ignoret; et cum per uolnus alicuius uiscera patefacta sunt, eum, qui sanae cuiusque colorem partis ignoret, nescire quid integrum, quid corruptum sit; ita ne succurrere quidem posse corruptis.

[¶9] On the other hand, those who are called "Empirici" because they have experience, do indeed accept evident causes as necessary; but they contend that inquiry about obscure causes and natural actions is superfluous, because nature is not to be comprehended. That nature cannot be comprehended is in fact patent, they say, from the disagreement among those who discuss such matters; for on this question there is no agreement, either among professors of philosophy or among actual medical practitioners. Why, then, should anyone believe rather in Hippocrates than in Herophilus, why in him rather than in Asclepiades? If one wants to be guided by reasoning, they go on, the reasoning of all of them can appear not improbable; if by method of treatment, all of them have restored sick folk to health: therefore one ought not to derogate from anyone's credit, either in argument or in authority. Even philosophers would have become the greatest of medical practitioners, if reasoning from theory could have made them so; as it is, they have words in plenty, and no knowledge of healing at all. They also say that the methods of practice differ according to the nature of localities, and that one method is required in Rome, another in Egypt, another in Gaul; but that if the causes which produce diseases whether everywhere the same, the same remedies should be used everywhere; that often, too, the causes are apparent, as, for example, of ophthalmia, or of wounds, yet such causes do not disclose the treatment: that if the evident cause does not supply the knowledge, much less can a cause which is in doubt yield it. Since, therefore, the cause is as uncertain as it is incomprehensible, protection is to be sought rather from the ascertained and explored, as in all the rest of the Arts, that is, from what experience has taught in the actual course of treatment: for even a farmer, or a pilot, is made not by disputation but by practice. That such speculations are not pertinent to the Art of Medicine may be learned from the fact that men may hold different opinions on these matters, yet conduct their patients to recovery all the same. This has happened, not because they deduced lines of healing from obscure causes, nor from the natural actions, concerning which different opinions were held, but from experiences of what had previously succeeded. Even in its beginnings, they add, the Art of Medicine was not deduced from such questionings, but from experience; for of the sick who were without doctors, some in the first days of illness, longing for food, took it forthwith; others, owing to distaste, abstained; and the illness was more alleviated in those who abstained. Again, some partook of food whilst actually under the fever, some a little before, others after its remission, and it went best with those who did so after the fever had ended; and similarly some at the beginning adopted at once a rather full diet, others a scanty one, and those were made worse who had eaten plentifully. When this and the like happened day after day, careful men noted what generally answered the better, and then began to prescribe the same for their patients. Thus sprang up the Art of Medicine, which, from the frequent recovery of some and the death of others, distinguished between the pernicious and the salutary.

> Latin: Aptiusque extrinsecus inponi remedia conpertis interiorum et sedibus et figuris cognitaque eorum magnitudine; similesque omnia, quae posita ⟨supra⟩ sunt, rationes habere. Neque esse crudele, sicut plerique proponunt, hominum nocentium et horum quoque paucorum suppliciis remedia populis innocentibus saeculorum omnium quaeri. Contra ii, qui se ENPIRICOS ab experientia nominant, euidentes quidem causas ut necessarias amplectuntur: obscurarum uero causarum et naturalium actionum quaestionem ideo superuacuam esse contendunt, quoniam non conprehensibilis natura sit. Non posse uero conprehendi patere ex eorum, qui de his disputarunt, discordia, cum de ista re neque inter sapientiae professores, neque inter ipsos medicos conueniat. Cur enim potius aliquis Hippocrati credat quam Herophilo? cur huic potius quam Asclepiadi? Si rationes sequi uelit, omnium posse uideri non inprobabiles; si curationes, ab omnibus his aegros perductos esse ad sanitatem. Ita neque disputationi neque auctoritati cuiusquam fidem derogari oportuisse. Etiam sapientiae studiosos maximos medicos esse, si ratiocinatio hoc faceret: nunc illis uerba superesse, deesse medendi scientiam. Differre quoque pro natura locorum genera medicinae, et aliud opus esse Romae, aliud in Aegypto, aliud in Gallia. Quod si morbos haec [causae] facerent, quae ubique eadem essent, eadem remedia quoque ubique esse debuisse. Saepe etiam causas apparere, ut puta lippitudinis, uulneris, neque ex his patere medicinam. Quod si scientiam hanc non subiciat euidens causa, multo minus eam posse subicere, quae in dubio est. Cum igitur illa incerta, inconprehensibilis sit, a certis potius et exploratis petendum esse praesidium, id est is, quae experientia in ipsis curationibus docuerit, sicut in ceteris omnibus artibus. Nam ne agricolam quidem aut gubernatorem disputatione sed usu fieri. Ac nihil istas cogitationes ad medicinam pertinere eo quoque disci, quod qui diuersa de his senserint, ad eandem tamen sanitatem homines perduxerint: id enim fecisse, quia non ab obscuris causis neque a naturalibus actionibus, quae apud eos diuersae erant, sed ab experimentis, prout cuique responderant, medendi uias traxerint. Ne inter initia quidem ab istis quaestionibus deductam esse medicinam, sed ab experimentis: aegrorum enim, qui sine medicis erant, alios propter auiditatem primis diebus protinus cibum adsumpsisse, alios propter fastidium abstinuisse; leuatumque magis eorum morbum esse, qui abstinuerant. Itemque alios in ipsa febre aliquid edisse, alios paulo ante eam, alios post remissionem eius; optime deinde iis cessisse, qui post finem febris id fecer⟨a⟩nt;

[¶10] It was afterwards, they proceed, when the remedies had already been discovered, that men began to discuss the reasons for them: the Art of Medicine was not a discovery following upon reasoning, but after the discovery of the remedy, the reason for it was sought out. They ask, too, does reasoning teach the same as experience? If the same, it was needless; if something else, then it was even opposed to it: nevertheless, at first remedies had to be explored with the greatest care; now, however, they have been explored already; there were neither new sorts of diseases to be found out, nor was a novel remedy wanted. For even if there happened nowadays some unknown form of malady, nevertheless the practitioner had not to theorize over obscure matters, but straightway would see to which disease it came nearest, then would make trial of remedies similar to those which have succeeded often in a kindred affection, and so through its similarities find help; that is not to say that a practitioner had no need to take counsel, and that an irrational animal was capable of exhibiting this art, but that these conjectures about concealed matters are of no concern because it does not matter what produces the disease but what relieves it; nor does it matter how digestion takes place, but what is best digested, whether concoction comes about from this cause or that, and whether the process is concoction or merely distribution. We had no need to inquire in what way we breathe, but what relieves laboured breathing; not what may move the blood-vessels, but what the various kinds of movements signify. All this was to be learnt through experiences; and in all theorizing over a subject it is possible to argue on either side, and so cleverness and fluency may get the best of it; it is not, however, by eloquence but by remedies that diseases are treated. A man of few words who learns by practice to discern well, would make an altogether better practitioner than he who, unpractised, over-cultivates his tongue.

> Latin: eademque ratione alios inter principia protinus usos esse cibo pleniore, alios exiguo; grauioresque eos factos, qui se implerant. Haec similiaque cum cottidie inciderent, diligentes homines notasse quae plerumque melius responderent; deinde aegrotantibus ea praecipere coepisse. Sic medicinam ortam, subinde aliorum salute, aliorum interitu perniciosa discernentem a salutaribus. Repertis deinde iam remediis, homines de rationibus eorum disserere coepisse; nec post rationem medicinam esse inuentam, sed post inuentam medicinam rationem esse quaesitam. Requirere etiam s⟨e⟩, ratio idem doceat quod experientia an aliud: si idem, superuacuam esse; si aliud, etiam contrariam. Primo tamen remedia exploranda summa cura fuisse; nunc uero iam explorata esse; neque aut noua genera morborum reperiri, aut nouam desiderari medicinam. Quod si iam incidat mali genus aliquod ignotum, non ideo tamen fore medico de rebus cogitandum obscuris, sed eum protinus uisurum cui morbo id proximum sit, temptaturumque remedia similia illis, quae uicino malo saepe succurrerint, et per eius similitudines opem reperturum. Neque enim se dicere medicum consilio non egere et inrationale animal hanc artem posse praestare; sed has latentium rerum coniecturas ad rem non pertinere, quia non intersit, quid morbum faciat, sed quid tollat; neque ad rem pertineat, quomodo, sed quid optime digeratur, siue hac de causa concoctio incidat siue illa, et siue concoctio sit illa siue tantum digestio. Neque quaerendum esse quomodo spiremus, sed quid grauem et tardum spiritum expediat; neque quid uenas moueat, sed quid quaeque motus genera significent.

[¶11] Now the matters just referred to they deem to be superfluous; but what remains, cruel as well, to cut into the belly and chest of men whilst still alive, and to impose upon the Art which presides over human safety someone's death, and that too in the most atrocious way. Especially is this true when, of things which are sought for with so much violence, some can be learnt not at all, others can be learnt even without a crime. For when the body had been laid open, colour, smoothness, softness, hardness and all similars would not be such as they were when the body was untouched; because bodies, even when uninjured yet often change in appearance, they note, from fear, pain, want of food, indigestion, weariness and a thousand other mediocre affections; it is much more likely that the more internal parts, which are far softer, and to which the very light is something novel, should under the most severe of woundings, in fact mangling, undergo changes. Nor is anything more foolish, they say, than to suppose that whatever the condition of the part of a man's body in life, it will also be the same when he is dying, nay, when he is already dead; for the belly indeed, which is of less importance, can be laid open with the man still breathing; but as soon as the knife really penetrates to the chest, by cutting through the transverse septum, a sort of membrane which divides the upper from the lower parts (the Greeks call it dia/fragma), the man loses his life at once: so it is only when the man is dead that the chest and any of the viscera come into the view of the medical murderer, and they are necessarily those of a dead, not of a living man. It follows, therefore, that the medical man just plays the cut-throat, not that he learns what our viscera are like when we are alive. If, however, there be anything to be observed whilst a man is still breathing, chance often presents it to the view of those treating him. For sometimes a gladiator in the arena, or a soldier in battle, or a traveller who has been set upon by robbers, is so wounded that some or other interior part is exposed in one man or another. Thus, they say, an observant practitioner learns to recognize site, position, arrangement, shape and such like, not when slaughtering, but whilst striving for health; and he learns in the course of a work of mercy, what others would come to know by means of dire cruelty. That for these reasons, since most things are altered in the dead, some hold that even the dissection of the dead is unnecessary; although not cruel, it is none the less nasty; but all that is possible to come to know in the living, the actual treatment exhibits.

> Latin: Haec autem cognosci experimentis. Et in omnibus eiusmodi cogitationibus ⟨in⟩ utramque partem disseri posse; itaque ingenium et facundiam uincere, morbos autem non eloquentia sed remediis curari. Quae si quis elinguis usu discreta bene norit, hunc aliquanto maiorem medicum futurum, quam si sine usu linguam suam excoluerit. Atque ea quidem, de quibus est dictum, superuacua esse tantummodo: id uero, quod restat, etiam crudele, uiuorum hominum aluum atque praecordia incidi, et salutis humanae praesidem artem non solum pestem alicui, sed hanc etiam atrocissimam inferre; cum praesertim ex his, quae tanta violentia quaerantur, alia non possint omnino cognosci, alia possint etiam sine scelere. Nam colorem, l⟨e⟩uorem, mollitiem, duritiem, similiaque omnia non esse talia inciso corpore, qualia integro fuerint, quia, cum corpor⟨a⟩ inuiolata sint, haec tamen metu, dolore, inedia, cruditate, lassitudine, mille aliis mediocribus adfectibus saepe mutentur; multo magis ueri simile esse interiora, quibus maior mollities, lux ipsa noua sit, sub grauissimis uulneribus et ipsa trucidatione mutari. Neque quicquam esse stultius, quam quale quidque uiuo homine est, tale existimare esse moriente, immo iam mortuo. Nam uterum quidem, qui minus ad rem pertineat, spirante homine posse diduci: simul atque uero ferrum ad praecordia accessit et discissum transuersum saeptum est, quod membrana quaedam ⟨est quae⟩ superiores partes ab inferioribus ⟨di⟩ducit (ΔΙΑΦΡΑΓΜΑ Graeci uocant), hominem animam protinus amittere: ita mortui demum praecordia et uiscus omne in conspectum latrocinantis medici dari ut⟨ique⟩ necesse est tale, quale mortui sit, non quale uiui fuit. Itaque consequi medicum, ut hominem crudeliter iugulet, non ut sciat, qualia uiui uiscera habeamus. Si quid tamen sit, quod adhuc spirante homine conspectu subiciatur, id saepe casum offerre curantibus. Interdum enim gladiatorem in harena uel militem in acie uel uiatorem a latronibus exceptum sic uulnerari, ut eius interior aliqua pars aperiatur, et in alio alia;

[¶12] Since all these questions have been discussed often by practitioners, in many volumes and in large and contentious disputations, and the discussion continues, it remains to add such views as may seem nearest the truth. These are neither wholly in accord with one opinion or another, nor exceedingly at variance with both, but hold a sort of intermediate place between divers sentiments, a thing which may be observed in most controversies when men seek impartially for truth, as in the present case. For as regards the causes which either favour health or excite disease, how breath is drawn in or food distributed, not even philosophers attain to full knowledge, but seek it out by conjecture. But where there is no certain knowledge about a thing, mere opinion about it cannot find a certain remedy. And it is true that nothing adds more to a really rational treatment than experience. Although, therefore, many things, which are not strictly pertinent to the Arts as such, are yet helpful by stimulating the minds of those who practise them, so also this contemplation of the nature of things, although it does not make a practitioner, yet renders him more apt and perfected in the Art of Medicine. And it is probable that Hippocrates, Erasistratus and certain others, who were not content to busy themselves over fevers and ulcerations, but also to some extent searched into the nature of things, did not by this become practitioners, but by this became better practitioners. But reasoning is necessary to the Art of Medicine, not only when dealing with obscure causes, or natural actions, but often... for it is an art based on conjecture. However, in many cases not only does conjecture fail, but experience as well; and at times, neither fever, nor appetite, nor sleep follow their customary course. More rarely, yet now and again, a disease itself is new. That this does not happen is manifestly untrue, for in our time a lady, from whose genitals flesh had prolapsed and become gangrenous, died in the course of a few hours, whilst practitioners of the highest standing found out neither the class of malady nor a remedy. I conclude that they attempted nothing because no one was willing to risk a conjecture of his own in the case of a distinguished personage, for fear that he might seem to have killed, if he did not save her; yet it is probable that something might possibly have been thought of, had no such timidity prevailed, and perchance this might have been successful had one but tried it. In this sort of practice similarity is not always of service, and when it does prove serviceable, nevertheless there has been a process of reasoning, in the theorizing over similar classes of diseases and of remedies, as to which is the best remedy to use. When, therefore, such an incident occurs, the practitioner ought to arrive at something which may answer, even if perhaps not always, yet nevertheless more often than not. He will see, however, every novel plan, not from hidden things, for these are dubious and unascertainable, but from those which can be explored, that is, from evident causes. For what matters is this: whether fatigue or thirst, whether heat or cold, whether wakefulness or hunger, whether abundance in food or wine, whether intemperance in venery, has produced the disease. Nor should there be ignorance of the sick man's temperament; whether his body is rather humid or rather dry, whether his sinews are strong or weak, whether he is frequently or rarely ill; and when ill whether so severely or slightly, for a short or long while; the kind of life he has lived, laborious or quiet, accompanied by luxury or frugality. From such and similar data, one may often deduce a novel mode of treatment.

> Latin: ita sedem, positum, ordinem, figuram, similiaque alia cognoscere prudentem medicum, non caedem sed sanitatem molientem, idque per misericordiam discere, quod alii dira crudelitate cognorint. Ob haec ne mortuorum quidem lacerationem necessariam esse (quae etsi non crudelis, tamen foeda sit), cum aliter pleraque in mortuis se habeant; quantum uero in uiuis cognosci potest, ipsa curatio ostendat. Cum haec per multa uolumina perque magnas contentionis [disputationes] a medicis saepe tractata sint atque tractentur, subiciendum est, quae proxima uero uideri possint. Ea neque addicta alterutri opinioni sunt, neque ab utraque nimium abhorrentia, ⟨sed⟩ media quodammodo inter diuersas sententias; quod in plurimis contentionibus deprehendere licet sine ambitione uerum scrutantibus: ut in hac ipsa re. Nam quae demum causae uel secundam ualetudinem praestent, uel morbos excitent, quo modo spiritus aut cibus uel trahatur uel digeratur, ne sapientiae quidem professores scientia conprehendunt, sed coniectura persecuntur. Cuius autem rei non est certa notitia, eius opinio certum reperire remedium non potest. Verumque est ad ipsam curandi rationem nihil plus conferre quam experientiam. Quamquam igitur multa sint ad ipsas artes proprie non pertinentia, tamen eas adiuuant excitando artificis ingenium: itaque ista quoque naturae rerum contemplatio, quamuis non faciat medicum, aptiorem tamen medicinae reddit perfectumque. Veri⟨que⟩ simile est et Hippocraten et Erasistratum, et quicumque alii non contenti [sint] febres et ulcera agitare rerum quoque naturam aliqua parte scrutati sunt, non ideo quidem medicos fuisse, uerum id⟨eo⟩ quoque maiores medicos extitisse. Ratione uero opus est ipsi medicinae, etsi non inter obscuras causas neque inter naturales actiones, tamen saepe * *: est enim haec ars coniecturalis. Neque respondet ei plerumque non solum coniectura sed etiam experientia et interdum non febris, non †cibus, non somnus subsequitur, sicut adsueuit. Rarius sed aliquando morbus quoque ipse nouus est: quem non incidere manifeste falsum est, cum aetate nostra * * * quae ex naturalibus partibus carne prolapsa et arente intra paucas horas exspirauerit, sic ut nobilissimi medici neque genus mali neque remedium inuenerint. Quos ego nihil temptasse iudico, quia nemo in splendida persona periclitari coniectura sua uoluerit, ne occidisse, nisi seruasset, uideretur: ueri tamen simile est potuisse aliquid cogitare, detracta tali uerecundia, et fortasse responsurum fuisse id, quod aliquis esset expertus. Ad quod medicinae genus neque semper similitudo aliquid confert, et si quando confert, tamen id ipsum rationale est, inter similia genera et morborum et remediorum cogitare, quo potissimum medicamento sit utendum. Cum igitur talis res incidit, medicus aliquid oportet inueniat, quod non utique fortasse sed saepius tamen etiam respondeat. Petet autem nouum quodque consilium non ab rebus latentibus (istae enim dubiae et incertae sunt), sed ab iis, quae explorari possunt, id est euidentibus causis.