---
title: "On Divination · De divinatione"
author: "Cicero"
translator: "William Armistead Falconer"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/
cite: "Cicero, tr. William Armistead Falconer, On Divination · De divinatione. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/"
---

# On Divination · De divinatione

*Cicero, tr. William Armistead Falconer*

Can the future be known? Cicero’s brother Quintus defends omens, dreams and oracles; Cicero takes them apart.

> Latin: ed. William Armistead Falconer, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi0474.phi053, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: William Armistead Falconer, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi0474.phi053.perseus-eng1). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Book I · sections 1–33](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/1.md)
2. [Book I · sections 34–65](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/2.md)
3. [Book I · sections 66–101](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/3.md)
4. [Book I · sections 102–132](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/4.md)
5. [Book II · sections 1–30](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/5.md)
6. [Book II · sections 31–60](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/6.md)
7. [Book II · sections 61–90](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/7.md)
8. [Book II · sections 91–120](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/8.md)
9. [Book II · sections 121–150](https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/9.md)

## 1. Book I · sections 1–33

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/1/#p-N

[¶0] 1. There is an ancient belief, handed down to us even from mythical times and firmly established by the general agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that divination of some kind exists among men; this the Greeks call mantikh/—that is, the foresight and knowledge of future events. A really splendid and helpful thing it is—if only such a faculty exists—since by its means men may approach very near to the power of gods. And, just as we Romans have done many other things better than the Greeks, so have we excelled them in giving to this most extraordinary gift a name, which we have derived from divi, a word meaning “gods,” whereas, according to Plato's interpretation, they have derived it from furor, a word meaning “frenzy.”

> Latin: 1. opinio est iam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci μαντικήν appellant, id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum. quaedam res et salutaris, si modo est ulla, quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere. ut alia nos melius multa quam Graeci, sic huic praestantissimae rei nomen nostri a divis, Graeci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt.

[¶1] 2. Now I am aware of no people, however refined and learned or however savage and ignorant, which does not think that signs are given of future events, and that certain persons can recognize those signs and foretell events before they occur. First of all—to seek authority from the most distant sources—the Assyrians, on account of the vast plains inhabited by them, and because of the open and unobstructed view of the heavens presented to them on every side, took observations of the paths and movements of the stars, and, having made note of them, transmitted to posterity what significance they had for each person. And in that same nation the Chaldeans—a name which they derived not from their art but their race —have, it is thought, by means of long-continued observation of the constellations, perfected a science which enables them to foretell what any man's lot will be and for what fate he was born. The same art is believed to have been acquired also by the Egyptians through a remote past extending over almost countless ages. Moreover, the Cilicians, Pisidians, and their neighbours, the Pamphylians—nations which I once governed—think that the future is declared by the songs and flights of birds, which they regard as most infallible signs.

> Latin: 2. quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam neque tam immanem atque barbaram, quae non significari futura et a quibusdam intellegi praedicique posse censeat. Assyrii, ut ab ultimis auctoritatem repetam, propter planitiem magnitudinemque regionum, quas incolebant, cum caelum ex omni parte patens atque apertum intuerentur, traiectiones motusque stellarum observitaverunt, quibus notatis, quid cuique significaretur memoriae prodiderunt. in natione Chaldaei, non ex artis sed ex gentis vocabulo nominati, diuturna observatione siderum scientiam putantur effecisse, ut praedici posset quid cuique eventurum et quo quisque fato natus esset. artem etiam Aegyptii longinquitate temporum innumerabilibus paene saeculis consecuti putantur. Cilicum autem et Pisidarum gens et his finitima Pamphylia, quibus nationibus praefuimus ipsi, volatibus avium cantibusque certissimis signis declarari res futuras putant.

[¶2] 3. And, indeed, what colony did Greece ever send into Aeolia, Ionia, Asia, Sicily, or Italy without consulting the Pythian or Dodonian oracle, or that of Jupiter Hammon? Or what war did she ever undertake without first seeking the counsel of the gods? Nor is it only one single mode of divination that has been employed in public and in private. For, to say nothing of other nations, how many our own people have embraced! In the first place, according to tradition, Romulus, the father of this City, not only founded it in obedience to the auspices, but was himself a most skilful augur. Next, the other Roman kings employed augurs; and, again, after the expulsion of the kings, no public business was ever transacted at home or abroad without first taking the auspices. Furthermore, since our fore- fathers believed that the soothsayers' art had great efficacy in seeking for omens and advice, as well as in cases where prodigies were to be interpreted and their effects averted, they gradually introduced that art in its entirety from Etruria, lest it should appear that any kind of divination had been disregarded by them.

> Latin: 3. vero Graecia coloniam misit in Aeoliam, Ioniam, Asiam, Siciliam, Italíam sine Pythio aut Dodonaeo aut Hammonis oraculo? aut quod bellum susceptum ab ea sine consilio deorum est? unum genus est divinationis publice privatimque celebratum., ut omittam ceteros populos, noster quam multa genera complexus est! huius urbis parens Romulus non solum auspicato urbem condidisse, sed ipse etiam optimus augur fuisse traditur. auguribus et reliqui reges usi, et exactis regibus, nihil publice sine auspiciis nec domi nec militiae gerebatur. magna vis videretur esse et inpetriendis consulendisque rebus et monstris interpretandis ac procurandis in haruspicum disciplina, omnem hanc ex Etruria scientiam adhibebant, ne genus esset ullum divinationis, quod neglectum ab eis videretur.

[¶3] 4. And since they thought that the human mind, when in an irrational and unconscious state, and moving by its own free and untrammelled impulse, was inspired in two ways, the one by frenzy and the other by dreams, and since they believed that the divination of frenzy was contained chiefly in the Sibylline verses, they decreed that ten men should be chosen from the State to interpret those verses. In this same category also were the frenzied prophecies of soothsayers and seers, which our ancestors frequently thought worthy of belief—like the prophecies of Cornelius Culleolus, during the Octavian War. Nor, indeed, were the more significant dreams, if they seemed to concern the administration of public affairs, disregarded by our Supreme Council. Why, even within my own memory, Lucius Julius, who was consul with Publius Rutilius, by a vote of the Senate rebuilt the temple of Juno, the Saviour, in accordance with a dream of Caecilia, daughter of Balearicus.

> Latin: 4. cum duobus modis animi sine ratione et scientia motu ipsi suo soluto et libero incitarentur, uno furente, altero somniante, furoris divinationem Sibyllinis maxime versibus contineri arbitrati eorum decem interpretes delectos e civitate esse voluerunt. quo genere saepe hariolorum etiam et vatum furibundas praedictiones, ut Octaviano bello Cornelii Culleoli, audiendas putaverunt. vero somnia graviora, si quae ad rem publicam pertinere visa sunt, a summo consilio neglecta sunt. etiam memoria nostra templum Iunonis Sospitae L. Iulius, qui cum P. Rutilio consul fuit, de senatus sententia refecit ex Caeciliae, Baliarici filiae, somnio.

[¶4] 5. Now my opinion is that, in sanctioning such usages, the ancients were influenced more by actual results than convinced by reason. However certain very subtle arguments to prove the trustworthiness of divination have been gathered by philosophers. Of these—to mention the most ancient—Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety; but all the others, with the exception of Epicurus, who babbled about the nature of the gods, approved of divination, though not in the same degree. For example, Socrates and all of the Socratic School, and Zeno and his followers, continued in the faith of the ancient philosophers and in agreement with the Old Academy and with the Peripatetics. Their predecessor, Pythagoras, who even wished to be considered an augur himself, gave the weight of his great name to the same practice; and that eminent author, Democritus, in many passages, strongly affirmed his belief in a presentiment of things to come. Moreover, Dicaearchus, the Peripatetic, though he accepted divination by dreams and frenzy, cast away all other kinds; and my intimate friend, Cratippus, whom I consider the peer of the greatest of the Peripatetics, also gave credence to the same kinds of divination but rejected the rest.

> Latin: 5. haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. vero exquisita quaedam argumenta, cur esset vera divinatio, collecta sunt. E quibus, ut de antiquissimis loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus, qui deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulit; reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ei qui ab eo essent profecti manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus; cumque huic rei magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurimisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum comprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit; Cratippus quoque familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, eisdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit.

[¶5] 6. The Stoics, on the other hand (for Zeno in his writings had, as it were, scattered certain seed which Cleanthes had fertilized somewhat), defended nearly every sort of divination. Then came Chrysippus, a man of the keenest intellect, who exhaustively discussed the whole theory of divination in two books, and, besides, wrote one book on oracles and another on dreams. And following him, his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, published one book, Antipater two, and my friend, Posidonius, five. But Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, a pupil, too, of Antipater, and, even a pillar of the Stoic school, wandered off from the Stoics, and, though he dared not say that there was no efficacy in divination, yet he did say that he was in doubt. Then, since the Stoics—much against their will I grant you—permitted this famous Stoic to doubt on one point will they not grant to us Academicians the right to do the same on all other points, especially since that about which Panaetius is not clear is clearer than the light of day to the other members of the Stoic school?

> Latin: 6. cum Stoici omnia fere illa defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrimo vir ingenio, Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraculis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidonii doctor, discipulus Antipatri, degeneravit Panaetius; nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. illi in aliqua re invitissimis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus, a Stoicis non concedetur, praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius?

[¶6] 7. At any rate, this praiseworthy tendency of the Academy to doubt has been approved by the solemn judgement of a most eminent philosopher. Accordingly, since I, too, am in doubt as to the proper judgement to be rendered in regard to divination because of the many pointed and exhaustive arguments urged by Carneades against the Stoic view, and since I am afraid of giving a too hasty assent to a proposition which may turn out either false or insufficiently established, I have determined carefully and persistently to compare argument with argument just as I did in my three books On the Nature of the Gods. For a hasty acceptance of an erroneous opinion is discreditable in any case, and especially so in an inquiry as to how much weight should be given to auspices, to sacred rites, and to religious observances; for we run the risk of committing a crime against the gods if we disregard them, or of becoming involved in old women's superstition if we approve them.

> Latin: 7. haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissimi philosophi iudicio et testimonio comprobata est. nobismet ipsis quaerentibus quid sit de divinatione iudicandum, quod a Carneade multa acute et copiose contra Stoicos disputata sint, verentibusque ne temere vel falsae rei vel non satis cognitae assentiamur, faciendum videtur ut diligenter etiam atque etiam argumenta cum argumentis comparemus, ut fecimus in eis tribus libris quos de natura deorum scripsimus. cum omnibus in rebus temeritas in assentiendo errorque turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime in quo iudicandum est quantum auspiciis rebusque divinis religionique tribuamus; est enim periculum, ne aut neglectis iis impia fraude aut susceptis anili superstitione obligemur.

[¶7] 8. This subject has been discussed by me frequently on other occasions, but with somewhat more than ordinary care when my brother Quintus and I were together recently at my Tusculan villa. For the sake of a stroll we had gone to the Lyceum, which is the name of my upper gymnasium, when Quintus remarked: “I have just finished a careful reading of the third book of your treatise, On the Nature of the Gods, containing Cotta's discussion, which, though it has shaken my views of religion, has not overthrown them entirely.” “Very good,” said I; “for Cotta's argument is intended rather to refute the arguments of the Stoics than to destroy man's faith in religion.” Quintus then replied: “Cotta says the very same thing, and says it repeatedly, in order, as I think, not to appear to violate the commonly accepted canons of belief; yet it seems to me that, in his zeal to confute the Stoics, he utterly demolishes the gods.

> Latin: 8. de rebus et alias saepe et paulo accuratius nuper, cum essem cum Q. fratre in Tusculano, disputatum est. cum ambulandi causa in Lyceum venissemus (id enim superiori gymnasio nomen est), “,” inquit, “tuum paulo ante tertium de Natura Deorum, in quo disputatio Cottae, quamquam labefactavit sententiam meam, non funditus tamen sustulit.” “vero,” inquam; “etenim ipse Cotta sic disputat ut Stoicorum magis argumenta confutet quam hominum deleat religionem.” Quintus: “quidem istuc,” inquit, “a Cotta, et vero saepius, credo, ne communia iura migrare videatur; sed studio contra Stoicos disserendi deos mihi videtur funditus tollere.”

[¶8] 9. However, I am really at no loss for a reply to his reasoning; for in the second book Lucilius has made an adequate defence of religion and his argument, as you yourself state at the end of the third book, seemed to you nearer to the truth than Cotta's. But there is a question which you passed over in those books because, no doubt, you thought it more expedient to inquire into it in a separate discussion: I refer to divination, which is the foreseeing and foretelling of events considered as happening by chance. Now let us see, if you will, what efficacy it has and what its nature is. My own opinion is that, if the kinds of divination which we have inherited from our forefathers and now practise are trustworthy, then there are gods and, conversely, if there are gods then there are men who have the power of divination.”

> Latin: 9. rationi non sane desidero quid respondeam; satis enim defensa religio est in secundo libro a Lucilio, cuius disputatio tibi ipsi, ut in extremo tertio scribis, ad veritatem est visa propensior., quod praetermissum est in illis libris (credo, quia commodius arbitratus es separatim id quaeri deque eo disseri), id est de divinatione, quae est earum rerum, quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio., si placet, videamus quam habeat vim et quale sit. enim sic existimo, si sint ea genera divinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quaeque colimus, esse deos, vicissimque, si di sint, esse qui divinent.

[¶9] 10. “Why, my dear Quintus,” said I, “you are defending the very citadel of the Stoics in asserting the interdependence of these two propositions: 'if there is divination there are gods,' and,' if there are gods there is divination.' But neither is granted as readily as you think. For it is possible that nature gives signs of future events without the intervention of a god, and it may be that there are gods without their having conferred any power of divination upon men.” To this he replied: “I, at any rate, find sufficient proof to satisfy me of the existence of gods and of their concern in human affairs in my conviction that there are some kinds of divination which are clear and manifest. With your permission I will set forth my views on this subject, provided you are at leisure and have nothing else which you think should be preferred to such a discussion.”

> Latin: 10. “tu quidem Stoicorum,” inquam, “Quinte, defendis, siquidem ista sic reciprocantur, ut et, si divinatio sit, di sint et, si di sint, sit divinatio. Quorum neutrum tam facile quam tu arbitraris conceditur. et natura significari futura sine deo possunt, et ut sint di potest fieri ut nulla ab eis divinatio generi humano tributa sit.” ille: “vero,” inquit, “satis est argumenti et esse deos et eos consulere rebus humanis, quod esse clara et perspicua divinationis genera iudico. De quibus quid ipse sentiam, si placet, exponam, ita tamen, si vacas animo neque habes aliquid, quod huic sermoni praevertendum putes.”

[¶10] 11. “Really, my dear Quintus,” said I, “I always have time for philosophy. Moreover, since there is nothing else at this time that I can do with pleasure, I am all the more eager to hear what you think about divination.” “There is, I assure you,” said he, "nothing new or original in my views; for those which I adopt are not only very old, but they are endorsed by the consent of all peoples and nations. There are two kinds of divination: the first is dependent on art, the other on nature.

> Latin: 11. “vero,” inquam, “philosophiae, Quinte, semper vaco; hoc autem tempore, cum sit nihil aliud quod libenter agere possim, multo magis aveo audire de divinatione quid sentias.” “,” inquit, “equidem novi, nec quod praeter ceteros ipse sentiam; nam cum antiquissimam sententiam, tum omnium populorum et gentium consensu comprobatam sequor. sunt enim divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae.”

[¶11] 12. Now—to mention those almost entirely dependent on art—what nation or what state disregards the prophecies of soothsayers, or of interpreters of prodigies and lightnings, or of augurs, or of astrologers, or of oracles, or—to mention the two kinds which are classed as natural means of divination—the forewarnings of dreams, or of frenzy? Of these methods of divining it behoves us, I think, to examine the results rather than the causes. For there is a certain natural power, which now, through long-continued observation of signs and now, through some divine excitement and inspiration, makes prophetic announcement of the future. "Therefore let Carneades cease to press the question, which Panaetius also used to urge, whether Jove had ordered the crow to croak on the left side and the raven on the right. Such signs as these have been observed for an unlimited time, and the results have been checked and recorded. Moreover, there is nothing which length of time cannot accomplish and attain when aided by memory to receive and records to preserve.

> Latin: 12. “est autem gens aut quae civitas quae non aut extispicum aut monstra aut fulgora interpretantium, aut augurum, aut astrologorum, aut sortium (ea enim fere artis sunt), aut somniorum aut vaticinationum (haec enim duo naturalia putantur), praedictione moveatur? quidem rerum eventa magis arbitror quam causas quaeri oportere. Est enim vis et natura quaedam, quae tum observatis longo tempore significationibus, tum aliquo instinctu inflatuque divino futura praenuntiat.” “Quare omittat urguere Carneades, quod faciebat etiam Panaetius requirens, Iuppiterne cornicem a laeva, corvum ab dextera, canere iussisset. sunt haec tempore immenso et eventis animadversa et notata. est autem quod non longinquitas temporum excipiente memoria prodendisque monumentis efficere atque assequi possit.”

[¶12] 13. We may wonder at the variety of herbs that have been observed by physicians, of roots that are good for the bites of wild beasts, for eye affections, and for wounds, and though reason has never explained their force and nature, yet through their usefulness they have won approval for the medical art and for their discoverer. "But come, let us consider instances, which although outside the category of divination, yet resemble it very closely
The heaving sea oft warns of coming storms,
When suddenly its depths begin to swell;
And hoary rocks, o'erspread with snowy brine,
To the sea, in boding tones, attempt reply;
Or when from lofty mountain-peak upsprings
A shrilly whistling wind, which stronger grows
With each repulse by hedge of circling cliffs. "Your book, Prognostics, is full of such warning signs, but who can fathom their causes? And yet I see that the Stoic Boëthus has attempted to do so and has succeeded to the extent of explaining the phenomena of sea and sky.

> Latin: 13. “licet quae sint animadversa a medicis herbarum genera, quae radicum ad morsus bestiarum, ad oculorum morbos, ad vulnera, quorum vim atque naturam ratio numquam explicavit, utilitate et ars est et inventor probatus.” “Age ea, quae quamquam ex alio genere sunt, tamen divinationi sunt similiora, videamus:
atque etiam ventos praemonstrat saepe futuros
inflatum mare, cum subito penitusque tumescit,
saxaque cana salis niveo spumata liquore
tristificas certant Neptuno reddere voces,
aut densus stridor cum celso e vertice montis
ortus adaugescit scopulorum saepe repulsus.” “Atque his rerum praesensionibus Prognostica tua referta sunt. igitur elicere causas praesensionum potest? video Boëthum Stoicum esse conatum, qui hactenus aliquid egit, ut earum rationem rerum explicaret, quae in mari caelove fierent.”

[¶13] 14. But who can give a satisfactory reason why the following things occur?
Blue-grey herons, in fleeing the raging abyss of the ocean,
Utter their warnings, discordant and wild, from tremulous gullets,
Shrilly proclaiming that storms are impending and laden with terrors.
Often at dawn, when Aurora releases the frost in the dew-drops,
Does the nightingale pour from its breast predictions of evil;
Then does it threaten and hurl from its throat its incessant complaining.
Often the dark-hued crow, while restlessly roaming the seashore,
Plunges its crest in the flood, as its neck encounters the billows.

> Latin: 14. “vero cur eveniant, quis probabiliter dixerit?”
rava fulix itidem fugiens e gurgite ponti
nuntiat horribilis clamans instare procellas
haud modicos tremulo fundens e gutture cantus.
saepe etiam pertriste canit de pectore carmen
et matutinis acredula vocibus instat,
vocibus instat et assiduas iacit ore querellas,
cum primum gelidos rores aurora remittit.
fuscaque non numquam cursans per litora cornix
demersit caput et fluctum cervice recepit.

[¶14] 15. "Hardly ever do we see such signs deceive us and yet we do not see why it is so.
Ye, too, distinguish the signs, ye dwellers in waters delightful,
When, with a clamour, you utter your cries that are empty of meaning,
Stirring the fountains and ponds with absurd and ridiculous croaking.
Who could suppose that frogs had this foresight? And yet they do have by nature some faculty of premonition, clear enough of itself, but too dark for human comprehension.
Slow, clumsy oxen, their glances upturned to the light of the heavens,
Sniff at the air with their nostrils and know it is freighted with moisture.
I do not ask why, since I know what happens.
Now 'tis a fact that the evergreen mastic, e'er burdened with leafage,
Thrice is expanding and budding and thrice producing its berries;
Triple its signs for the purpose of showing three seasons for ploughing.

> Latin: 15. “Videmus haec signa numquam fere mentientia nec tamen cur ita fiat videmus.
vos quoque signa videtis, aquai dulcis alumnae,
cum clamore paratis inanis fundere voces
absurdoque sono fontis et stagna cietis.
est qui ranunculos hoc videre suspicari possit? inest in ranunculis vis et natura quaedam significans aliquid per se ipsa satis certa, cognitioni autem hominum obscurior.
mollipedesque boves spectantes lumina caeli
naribus umiferum duxere ex aëre sucum.
quaero cur, quoniam quid eveniat intellego.
iam vero semper viridis semperque gravata
lentiscus triplici solita grandescere fetu
ter fruges fundens tria tempora monstrat arandi.”

[¶15] 16. Nor do I ever inquire why this tree alone blooms three times, or why it makes the appearance of its blossoms accord with the proper time for ploughing. I am content with my knowledge that it does, although I may not know why. Therefore, as regards all kinds of divination I will give the same answer that I gave in the cases just mentioned. "I see the purgative effect of the scammony root and I see an antidote for snake-bite in the aristolochia plant —which, by the way, derives its name from its discoverer who learned of it in a dream —I see their power and that is enough; why they have it I do not know. Thus as to the cause of those premonitory signs of winds and rains already mentioned I am not quite clear, but their force and effect I recognize, understand, and vouch for. Likewise as to the cleft or thread in the entrails: I accept their meaning; I do not know their cause. And life is full of individuals in just the same situation that I am in, for nearly everybody employs entrails in divining. Again: is it possible for us to doubt the prophetic value of lightning? Have we not many instances of its marvels? and is not the following one especially remarkable? When the statue of Summanus which stood on the top of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus—his statue was then made of clay—was struck by a thunderbolt and its head could not be found anywhere, the soothsayers declared that it had been hurled into the Tiber; and it was discovered in the very spot which they had pointed out.

> Latin: 16. “hoc quidem quaero, cur haec arbor una ter floreat aut cur arandi maturitatem ad signum floris accommodet; hoc sum contentus, quod, etiamsi, cur quidque fiat, ignorem, quid fiat, intellego. omni igitur divinatione idem, quod pro rebus eis, quas commemoravi, respondebo.” “Quid scammoneae radix ad purgandum, quid aristolochia ad morsus serpentium possit—quae nomen ex inventore repperit, rem ipsam inventor ex somnio—video, quod satis est; cur possit, nescio. Sic ventorum et imbrium signa, quae dixi, rationem quam habeant, non satis perspicio; vim et eventum agnosco, scio, approbo., quid fissum in extis, quid fibra valeat, accipio; quae causa sit, nescio. horum quidem plena vita est; extis enim omnes fere utuntur. Quid? de fulgurum vi dubitare num possumus? cum multa alia mirabilia, tum illud in primis? Summanus in fastigio Iovis optimi maximi, qui tum erat fictilis, e caelo ictus esset nec usquam eius simulacri caput inveniretur, haruspices in Tiberim id depulsum esse dixerunt; idque inventum est eo loco qui est ab haruspicibus demonstratus.”

[¶16] 17. “But what authority or what witness can I better employ than yourself? I have even learned by heart and with great pleasure the following lines uttered by the Muse, Urania, in the second book of your poem entitled, My Consulship:
First of all, Jupiter, glowing with fire from regions celestial,
Turns, and the whole of creation is filled with the light of his glory;
And, though the vaults of aether eternal begird and confine him,
Yet he, with spirit divine, ever searching the earth and the heavens,
Sounds to their innermost depths the thoughts and the actions of mortals.
When one has learned the motions and variant paths of the planets,
Stars that abide in the seat of the signs, in the Zodiac's girdle,
(Spoken of falsely as vagrants or rovers in Greek nomenclature,
Whereas in truth their distance is fixed and their speed is determined,)
Then will he know that all are controlled by an Infinite Wisdom.

> Latin: 17. “Sed quo potius utar aut auctore aut teste quam te? cuius edidici etiam versus, et lubenter quidem, quos in secundo de Urania Musa pronuntiat:
principio aetherio flammatus Iuppiter igni
vertitur et totum conlustrat lumine mundum,
menteque divina caelum terrasque petessit,
quae penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat
aetheris aeterni saepta atque inclusa cavernis., si stellarum motus cursusque vagantis
nosse velis, quae sint signorum in sede locatae
(quae verbo et falsis Graiorum vocibus errant,
re vera certo lapsu spatioque feruntur),
omnia iam cernes divina mente notata.”

[¶17] 18. You, being consul, at once did observe the swift constellations,
Noting the glare of luminous stars in direful conjunction;
Then you beheld the tremulous sheen of the Northern aurora,
When, on ascending the mountainous heights of snowy Albanus,
You offered joyful libations of milk at the Feast of the Latins;
Ominous surely the time wherein fell that Feast of the Latins:
Many a warning was given, it seemed, of slaughter nocturnal;
Then, of a sudden, the moon at her full was blotted from heaven—
Hidden her features resplendent, though night was bejewelled with planets;
Then did that dolorous herald of War, the torch of Apollo,
Mount all aflame to the dome of the sky, to the zenith of heaven,
Seeking a place on the westerly slopes, where the sun has its setting;
Then did a Roman depart from these radiant abodes of the living,
Stricken by terrible lightning from heavens serene and unclouded.
Then through the fruit-laden body of earth ran the shock of an earthquake;
Spectres at night were observed, appalling and changeful of figure,
Giving their warning that war was at hand, and internal commotion;
Over all lands there outpoured, from the frenzied bosoms of prophets,
Dreadful predictions, gloomy forecasts of impending disaster.

> Latin: 18. “
primum astrorum volucris te consule motus
concursusque gravis stellarum ardore micantis
tu quoque, cum tumulos Albano in monte nivalis
lustrasti et laeto mactasti lacte Latinas,
vidisti et claro tremulos ardore cometas,
multaque misceri nocturna strage putasti,
quod ferme dirum in tempus cecidere Latinae,
eum claram speciem concreto lumine luna
abdidit et subito stellanti nocte perempta est.
quid vero Phoebi fax, tristis nuntia belli,
quae magnum ad columen flammato ardore volabat,
praecipitis caeli partis obitusque petessens?
aut cum terribili perculsus fulmine civis
luce serenanti vitalia lumina liquit?
aut cum se gravido tremefecit corpore tellus?
iam vero variae nocturno tempore visae
terribiles formae bellum motusque monebant,
multaque per terras vates oracla furenti
pectore fundebant tristis minitantia casus,” “
atque ea, quae lapsu tandem cecidere vetusto,
haec fore perpetuis signis clarisque frequentans
ipse deum genitor caelo terrisque canebat.

[¶18] 19. And the misfortunes which happened at last and were long in their passing—
These were foretold by the Father of Gods, in earth and in heaven,
Through unmistakable signs that he gave and often repeated.
Now, of those prophecies made when Torquatus and Cotta
were consuls,—
Made by a Lydian diviner, by one of Etruscan extraction—
All, in the round of your crowded twelve months, were brought to fulfilment.
For high-thundering Jove, as he stood on starry Olympus,
Hurled forth his blows at the temples and monuments raised in his honour,
And on the Capitol's site he unloosed the bolts of his lightning.
Then fell the brazen image of Natta, ancient and honoured:
Vanished the tablets of laws long ago divinely enacted;
Wholly destroyed were the statues of gods by the heat of the lightning.

> Latin: 19. ea, Torquato quae quondam et consule Cotta
ediderat Tyrrhenae gentis haruspex,
omnia fixa tuus glomerans determinat annus.
nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo
ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit
et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis.
tum species ex aere vetus venerataque Nattae
concidit, elapsaeque vetusto numine leges,
et divom simulacra peremit fulminis ardor.”

[¶19] 20. Here was the Martian beast, the nurse of Roman dominion
Suckling with life-giving dew, that issued from udders distended,
Children divinely begotten, who sprang from the loins of the War God;
Stricken by lightning she toppled to earth, bearing with her the children;
Torn from her station, she left the prints of her feet in descending.
Then what diviner, in turning the records and tomes of the augurs,
Failed to relate the mournful forecasts the Etruscans had written?
Seers all advised to beware the monstrous destruction and slaughter,
Plotted by Romans who traced their descent from a noble ancestry;
Or they proclaimed the law's overthrow with voices insistent,
Bidding us rescue the city from flames, and the deities' temples;
Fearful they bade us become of horrible chaos and carnage;
These, by a rigorous Fate, would be certainly fixed and determined,
Were not a sacred statue of Jove, one comely of figure,
High on a column erected beforehand, with eyes to the eastward;
Then would the people and venerable senate be able to fathom
Hidden designs, when that statue—its face to the sun at its rising—
Should behold from its station the seats of the people and Senate.

> Latin: 20. “
silvestris erat Romani nominis altrix,, quae parvos Mavortis semine natos
uberibus gravidis vitali rore rigabat;
quae tum cum pueris flammato fulminis ictu
concidit atque avolsa pedum vestigia liquit.
quis non artis scripta ac monumenta volutans
voces tristificas chartis promebat Etruscis?
omnes civili generosa stirpe profectam
vitare ingentem cladem pestemque monebant,
vel legum exitium constanti voce ferebant,
templa deumque adeo flammis urbemque iubebant
eripere et stragem horribilem caedemque vereri;
atque haec fixa gravi fato ac fundata teneri,
ni prius excelsum ad columen formata decore
sancta Iovis species claros spectaret in ortus;
tum fore ut occultos populus sanctusque senatus
cernere conatus posset, si solis ad ortum
conversa inde patrum sedes populique videret.”

[¶20] 21. Long was the statue delayed and much was it hindered in making.
Finally, you being consul, it stood in its lofty position.
Just at the moment of time, which the gods had set and predicted,
When on column exalted the sceptre of Jove was illumined,
Did Allobrogian voices proclaim to Senate and people
What destruction by dagger and torch was prepared for our country.
Rightly, therefore, the ancients whose monuments you have in keeping,
Romans whose rule over peoples and cities was just and courageous,
Rightly your kindred, foremost in honour and pious devotion,
Far surpassing the rest of their fellows in shrewdness and wisdom,
Held it a duty supreme to honour the Infinite Godhead.
Such were the truths they beheld who painfully searching for wisdom
Gladly devoted their leisure to study of all that was noble, Who, in Academy's shade and Lyceum's dazzling effulgence,
Uttered the brilliant reflections of minds abounding in culture.

> Latin: 21. “
tardata diu species multumque morata,
consule te, tandem celsa est in sede locata,
atque una fixi ac signati temporis hora
Iuppiter excelsa clarabat sceptra columna,
et clades patriae flamma ferroque parata
vocibus Allobrogum patribus populoque patebat.
igitur veteres, quorum monumenta tenetis,
qui populos urbisque modo ac virtute regebant.
rite etiam vestri, quorum pietasque fidesque
praestitit et longe vicit sapientia cunctos,
praecipue coluere vigenti numine divos.
adeo penitus cura videre sagaci,
otia qui studiis lacti tenuere decoris,” “
inque Academia umbrifera nitidoque Lyceo
fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artis.

[¶21] 22. Torn from these studies, in youth's early dawn, your country recalled you,
Giving you place in the thick of the struggle for public preferment;
Yet, in seeking surcease from the worries and cares that oppress you,
Time, that the State leaves free, you devote to us and to learning. "In view, therefore, of your acts, and in view too of your own verses which I have quoted and which were composed with the utmost care, could you be persuaded to controvert the position which I maintain in regard to divination?

> Latin: 22. e quibus ereptum primo iam a flore iuventae
te patria in media virtutum mole locavit.
tu tamen anxiferas curas requiete relaxas,
quod patriae vacat, id studiis nobisque sacrasti.” “Tu igitur animum poteris inducere contra ea, quae a me disputantur de divinatione, dicere, qui et gesseris ea, quae gessisti, et ea, quae pronuntiavi, accuratissime scripseris?”

[¶22] 23. "But what? You ask, Carneades, do you, why these things so happen, or by what rules they may be understood? I confess that I do not know, but that they do so fall out I assert that you yourself see. ' Mere accidents,' you say. Now, really, is that so? Can anything be an 'accident' which bears upon itself every mark of truth? Four dice are cast and a Venus throw results—that is chance; but do you think it would be chance, too, if in one hundred casts you made one hundred Venus throws? It is possible for paints flung at random on a canvas to form the outlines of a face; but do you imagine that an accidental scattering of pigments could produce the beautiful portrait of Venus of Cos? Suppose that a hog should form the letter' A' on the ground with its snout; is that a reason for believing that it could write out Ennius's poem The Andromache? "Carneades used to have a story that once in the Chian quarries when a stone was split open there appeared the head of the infant god Pan; I grant that the figure may have borne some resemblance to the god, but assuredly the resemblance was not such that you could ascribe the work to a Scopas. For it is undeniably true that no perfect imitation of a thing was ever made by chance.

> Latin: 23. “Quid? quaeris, Carneades, cur haec ita fiant aut qua arte perspici possint? me fateor, evenire autem te ipsum dico videre. ‘Casu,’ inquis. vero? quicquam potest casu esse factum, quod omnes habet in se numeros veritatis? tali iacti casu Venerium efficiunt; num etiam centum Venerios, si quadringentos talos ieceris, casu futuros putas? temere pigmenta in tabula oris liniamenta efficere possunt; num etiam Veneris Coae pulchritudinem effici posse aspersione fortuita putas? rostro si humi A litteram impresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris Andromacham Ennii ab ea posse describi? Carneades in Chiorum lapicidinis saxo diffisso caput extitisse Panisci; credo, aliquam non dissimilem figuram, sed certe non talem ut eam factam a Scopa diceres. Sic enim se profecto res habet, ut numquam perfecte veritatem casus imitetur.”

[¶23] 24. "'But,' it is objected, 'sometimes predictions are made which do not come true.' And pray what art—and by art I mean the kind that is dependent on conjecture and deduction—what art, I say, does not have the same fault? Surely the practice of medicine is an art, yet how many mistakes it makes! And pilots—do they not make mistakes at times? For example, when the armies of the Greeks and the captains of their mighty fleet set sail from Troy, they, as Pacuvius says,
Glad at leaving Troy behind them, gazed upon the fish at play,
Nor could get their fill of gazing—thus they whiled the time away.
Meantime, as the sun was setting, high uprose the angry main;
Thick and thicker fell the shadows; night grew black with blinding rain.
Then, did the fact that so many illustrious captains and kings suffered shipwreck deprive navigation of its right to be called an art? And is military science of no effect because a general of the highest renown recently lost his army and took to flight? Again, is statecraft devoid of method or skill because political mistakes were made many times by Gnaeus Pompey, occasionally by Marcus Cato, and once or twice even by yourself? So it is with the responses of soothsayers, and, indeed, with every sort of divination whose deductions are merely probable; for divination of that kind depends on inference and beyond inference it cannot go.

> Latin: 24. “‘At non numquam ea, quae praedicta sunt minus eveniunt.’ Quae tandem id ars non habet? earum dico artium, quae coniectura continentur et sunt opinabiles. An medicine ars non putanda est? quam tamen multa fallunt.? gubernatores nonne falluntur? An Achivorum exercitus et tot navium rectores non ita profecti sunt ab Ilio, ut ‘profectione laeti piscium lasciviam intuerentur,’ ut ait Pacuvius, ‘nec tuendi satietas capere posset?’
interea prope iam óccidente sóle inhorrescít mare,
ténebrae conduplicántur noctisque ét nimbum occaecát nigror.
Num igitur tot clarissimorum ducum regumque naufragium sustulit artem gubernandi? aut num imperatorum scientia nihil est, quia summus imperator nuper fugit amisso exercitu? aut num propterea nulla est rei publicae gerendae ratio atque prudentia, quia multa Cn. Pompeium, quaedam M. Catonem, non nulla etiam te ipsum fefellerunt? est haruspicum responsio omnisque opinabilis divinatio; coniectura enim nititur, ultra quam progredi non potest.” “fallit fortasse non numquam, sed tamen ad veritatem saepissime derigit; est enim ab omni aeternitate repetita, in qua cum paene innumerabiliter res eodem modo evenirent isdem signis antegressis, ars est effecta eadem saepe animadvertendo ac notando.” “Auspicia vero vestra quam constant! quae quidem nunc a Romanis auguribus ignorantur (bona hoc tua venia dixerim), a Cilicibus, Pamphyliis, Pisidis, Lyciis tenentur.”

[¶24] 26. It sometimes misleads perhaps, but none the less in most cases it guides us to the truth. For this same conjectural divination is the product of boundless eternity and within that period it has grown into an art through the repeated observation and recording of almost countless instances in which the same results have been preceded by the same signs. "Indeed how trustworthy were the auspices taken when you were augur! At the present time—pray pardon me for saying so—Roman augurs neglect auspices, although the Cilicians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, and Lycians hold them in high esteem. I need not remind you of that most famous and worthy man, our guest-friend, King Deiotarus, who never undertook any enterprise without first taking the auspices. On one occasion after he had set out on a journey for which he had made careful plans beforehand, he returned home because of the warning given him by the flight of an eagle. The room in which he would have been staying, had he continued on his road, collapsed the very next night. This is why, as he told me himself, he had time and again abandoned a journey even though he might have been travelling for many days. By the way, that was a very noble utterance of his which he made after Caesar had deprived him of his tetrarchy and kingdom, and had forced him to pay an indemnity too. 'Notwithstanding what has happened,' said he,' I do not regret that the auspices favoured my joining Pompey. By so doing I enlisted my military power in defence of senatorial authority, Roman liberty, and the supremacy of the empire. The birds, at whose instance I followed the course of duty and of honour, counselled well, for I value my good name more than riches.' His conception of augury, it seems to me, is the correct one. "For with us magistrates make use of auspices, but they are 'forced auspices,' since the sacred chickens in eating the dough pellets thrown must let some fall from their beaks.

> Latin: 26. “quid ego hospitem nostrum, clarissimum atque optimum virum, Deiotarum regem, commemorem, qui nihil umquam nisi auspicato gerit? cum ex itinere quodam proposito et constituto revertisset aquilae admonitus volatu, conclave illud, ubi erat mansurus, si ire perrexisset, proxima nocte corruit.” “, ut ex ipso audiebam, persaepe revertit ex itinere, cum iam progressus esset multorum dierum viam. quidem hoc praeclarissimum est, quod, posteaquam a Caesare tetrarchia et regno pecuniaque multatus est, negat se tamen eorum auspiciorum, quae sibi ad Pompeium proficiscenti secunda evenerint, paenitere; senatus enim auctoritatem et populi Romani libertatem atque imperii dignitatem suis armis esse defensam, sibique eas aves, quibus auctoribus officium et fidem secutus esset, bene consuluisse; antiquiorem enim sibi fuisse possessionibus suis gloriam. mihi videtur igitur vere augurari.” “Nam nostri quidem magistratus auspiciis utuntur coactis; necesse est enim offa obiecta cadere frustum ex pulli ore cum pascitur.”

[¶25] 28. But, according to the writings of you augurs, a tripudium results if any of the food should fall to the ground, and what I spoke of as a 'forced augury' your fraternity calls a tripudium solistimum. And so through the indifference of the college, as Cato the Wise laments, many auguries and auspices have been entirely abandoned and lost. "In ancient times scarcely any matter out of the ordinary was undertaken, even in private life, without first consulting the auspices, clear proof of which is given even at the present time by our custom of having ' nuptial auspices,' though they have lost their former religious significance and only preserve the name. For just as to-day on important occasions we make use of entrails in divining— though even they are employed to a less extent than formerly—so in the past resort was usually had to divination by means of birds. And thus it is that by failing to seek out the unpropitious signs we run into awful disasters.

> Latin: 28. “autem scriptum habetis hinc tripudium fieri, si ex ea quid in solum ceciderit, hoc quoque, quod dixi, coactum tripudium solistimum dicitis. multa auguria, multa auspicia, quod Cato ille sapiens queritur, neglegentia collegi amissa plane et deserta sunt.” “Nihil fere quondam maioris rei nisi auspicato ne privatim quidem gerebatur, quod etiam nunc nuptiarum auspices declarant, qui, re omissa, nomen tantum tenent. ut nunc extis (quamquam id ipsum aliquanto minus quam olim), sic tum avibus magnae res inpetriri solebant., sinistra dum non exquirimus, in dira et in vitiosa incurrimus.”

[¶26] 29. For example, Publius Claudius, son of Appius Caecus, and his colleague Lucius Junius, lost very large fleets by going to sea when the auguries were adverse. The same fate befell Agamemnon; for, after the Greeks had begun to
Raise aloft their frequent clamours, showing scorn of augur's art,
Noise prevailed and not the omen: he then bade the ships depart. "But why cite such ancient instances? We see what happened to Marcus Crassus when he ignored the announcement of unfavourable omens. It was on the charge of having on this occasion falsified the auspices that Gaius Ateius, an honourable man and a distinguished citizen, was, on insufficient evidence, stigmatized by the then censor Appius, who was your associate in the augural college, and an able one too, as I have often heard you say. I grant you that in pursuing the course he did Appius was within his rights as a censor, if, in his judgement, Ateius had announced a fraudulent augury. But he showed no capacity whatever as an augur in holding Ateius responsible for that awful disaster which befell the Roman people. Had this been the cause then the fault would not have been in Ateius, who made the announcement that the augury was unfavourable, but in Crassus, who disobeyed it; for the issue proved that the announce- ment was true, as this same augur and censor admits. But even if the augury had been false it could not have been the cause of the disaster; for unfavourable auguries—and the same may be said of auspices, omens, and all other signs—are not the causes of what follows: they merely foretell what will occur unless precautions are taken.

> Latin: 29. “P. Claudius, Appii Caeci filius, eiusque collega L. Iunius classis maximas perdiderunt, cum vitio navigassent. eodem modo evenit Agamemnoni; qui, cum Achivi coepissent
inter se strépere aperteque ártem obterere extíspicum,
sólvere imperát secundo rúmore adversáque avi.” “Sed quid vetera? M. Crasso quid acciderit, videmus, dirarum obnuntiatione neglecta. quo Appius, collega tuus, bonus augur, ut ex te audire soleo, non satis scienter virum bonum et civem egregium censor C. Ateium notavit, quod ementitum auspicia subscriberet.; fuerit hoc censoris, si iudicabat ementitum; at illud minime auguris, quod adscripsit ob eam causam populum Romanum calamitatem maximam cepisse. enim ea causa calamitatis fuit, non est in eo culpa, qui obnuntiavit, sed in eo, qui non paruit. enim fuisse obnuntiationem, ut ait idem augur et censor, exitus approbavit; quae si falsa fuisset, nullam afferre potuisset causam calamitatis. dirae, sicut cetera auspicia, ut omina, ut signa, non causas afferunt, cur quid eveniat, sed nuntiant eventura, nisi provideris.”

[¶27] 30. Therefore Ateius, by his announcement, did not create the cause of the disaster; but having observed the sign he simply advised Crassus what the result would be if the warning was ignored. It follows, then, that the announcement by Ateius of the unfavourable augury had no effect; or if it did, as Appius thinks, then the sin is not in him who gave the warning, but in him who disregarded it. "And whence, pray, did you augurs derive that staff, which is the most conspicuous mark of your priestly office? It is the very one, indeed, with which Romulus marked out the quarter for taking observations when he founded the city. Now this staff is a crooked wand, slightly curved at the top, and, because of its resemblance to a trumpet, derives its name from the Latin word meaning 'the trumpet with which the battle-charge is sounded.' It was placed in the temple of the Salii on the Palatine hill and, though the temple was burned, the staff was found uninjured.

> Latin: 30. “igitur obnuntiatio Atei causam finxit calamitatis, sed signo obiecto monuit Crassum, quid eventurum esset, nisi cavisset. aut illa obnuntiatio nihil valuit, aut si, ut Appius iudicat, valuit, id valuit ut peccatum haereat non in eo qui monuerit, sed in eo qui non obtemperarit.” “Quid? lituus iste vester quod clarissimum est insigne auguratus, unde vobis est traditus? eo Romulus regiones direxit tum cum urbem condidit. quidem Romuli lituus, id est incurvum et leviter a summo inflexum bacillum, quod ab eius litui quo canitur similitudine nomen invenit, cum situs esset in curia Saliorum, quae est in Palatio, eaque deflagravisset, inventus est integer.”

[¶28] 31. What ancient chronicler fails to mention the fact that in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, long after the time of Romulus, a quartering of the heavens was made with this staff by Attus Navius? Because of poverty Attus was a swineherd in his youth. As the story goes, he, having lost one of his hogs, made a vow that if he recovered it he would make an offering to the god of the largest bunch of grapes in his vineyard Accordingly, after he had found the hog, he took his stand, we are told, in the middle of the vineyard, with his face to the south and divided the vineyard into four parts. When the birds had shown three of these parts to be unfavourable, he subdivided the fourth and last part and then found, as we see it recorded, a bunch of grapes of marvellous size. "This occurrence having been noised abroad, all his neighbours began to consult him about their own affairs and thus greatly enhanced his name and fame.

> Latin: 31. “? multis annis post Romulum Prisco regnante Tarquinio quis veterum scriptorum non loquitur, quae sit ab Atto Navio per lituum regionum facta discriptio? cum propter paupertatem sues puer pasceret, una ex iis amissa vovisse dicitur, si recuperasset, uvam se deo daturum, quae maxima esset in vinea; itaque sue inventa ad meridiem spectans in vinea media dicitur constitisse, cumque in quattuor partis vineam divisisset trisque partis aves abdixissent, quarta parte, quae erat reliqua, in regiones distributa, mirabili magnitudine uvam, ut scriptum videmus, invenit.” “Qua re celebrata cum vicini omnes ad eum de rebus suis referrent, erat in magno nomine et gloria.”

[¶29] 32. The consequence was that King Priscus summoned him to his presence. The king, wishing to make trial of his skill as an augur, said to him: 'I am thinking of something; tell me whether it can be done or not.' Attus, having taken the auspices, replied that it could be done. Thereupon Tarquin said that what he had been thinking of was the possibility of cutting a whetstone in two with a razor, and ordered the trial to be made. So the stone was brought into the comitium, and, while the king and his people looked on, it was cut in two with a razor. The result was that Tarquin employed him as his augur, and the people consulted him about their private concerns.

> Latin: 32. “quo factum est, ut eum ad se rex Priscus arcesseret. cum temptaret scientiam auguratus, dixit ei cogitare se quiddam; id possetne fieri consuluit., augurio acto, posse respondit. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novacula posse praecidi. Attum iussisse experiri. cotem in comitium allatam, inspectante et rege et populo, novacula esse discissam. eo evenit ut et Tarquinius augure Atto Navio uteretur et populus de suis rebus ad eum referret.”

[¶30] 33. Moreover, according to tradition, the whetstone and razor were buried in the comitium and a stone curbing placed over them. "Let us declare this story wholly false; let us burn the chronicles that contain it; let us call it a myth and admit almost anything you please rather than the fact that the gods have any concern in human affairs. But look at this: does not the story about Tiberius Gracchus found in your own writings acknowledge that augury and soothsaying are arts? He, having placed his tabernaculum, unwittingly violated augural law by crossing the pomerium before completing the auspices; nevertheless he held the consular election. The fact is well known to you since you have recorded it. Besides, Tiberius Gracchus, who was himself an augur, confirmed the authority of auspices by confessing his error; and the soothsayers, too, greatly enhanced the reputation of their calling, when brought into the Senate immediately after the election, by declaring that the election supervisor had acted without authority.

> Latin: 33. “autem illam et novaculam defossam in comitio supraque impositum puteal accepimus.” “Negemus omnia, comburamus annales, ficta haec esse dicamus, quidvis denique potius quam deos res humanas curare fateamur.? quod scriptum apud te est de Ti. Graccho, nonne et augurum et haruspicum comprobat disciplinam? qui cum tabernaculum vitio cepisset imprudens, quod inauspicato pomerium transgressus esset, comitia consulibus rogandis habuit. res est et a te ipso mandata monumentis. et ipse augur Ti. Gracchus auspiciorum auctoritatem confessione errati sui comprobavit; et haruspicum disciplinae magna accessit auctoritas, qui recentibus comitiis in senatum introducti negaverunt iustum comitiorum rogatorem fuisse.”

## 2. Book I · sections 34–65

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/2/#p-N

[¶0] 34. "I agree, therefore, with those who have said that there are two kinds of divination: one, which is allied with art; the other, which is devoid of art. Those diviners employ art, who, having learned the known by observation, seek the unknown by deduction. On the other hand those do without art who, unaided by reason or deduction or by signs which have been observed and recorded, forecast the future while under the influence of mental excitement, or of some free and unrestrained emotion. This condition often occurs to men while dreaming and sometimes to persons who prophesy while in a frenzy—like Bacis of Boeotia, Epimenides of Crete and the Sibyl of Erythraea. In this latter class must be placed oracles—not oracles given by means of' equalized lots' —but those uttered under the impulse of divine inspiration; although divination by lot is not in itself to be despised, if it has the sanction of antiquity, as in the case of those lots which, according to tradition, sprang out of the earth; for in spite of everything, I am inclined to think that they may, under the power of God, be so drawn as to give an appropriate response. Men capable of correctly interpreting all these signs of the future seem to approach very near to the divine spirit of the gods whose wills they interpret, just as scholars do when they interpret the poets.

> Latin: 34. “Eis igitur assentior, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum, quod particeps esset artis, alterum, quod arte careret. enim ars in eis qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. autem arte ei qui, non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu, futura praesentiunt, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non numquam vaticinantibus per furorem, ut Bacis Boeotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Erythraea. generis oracula etiam habenda sunt, non ea, quae aequatis sortibus ducuntur, sed illa, quae instinctu divino afflatuque funduntur; etsi ipsa sors contemnenda non est, si auctoritatem habet vetustatis, ut eae sunt sortes, quas e terra editas accepimus; quae tamen ductae ut in rem apte cadant, fieri credo posse divinitus. omnium interpretes, ut grammatici poetarum, proxime ad eorum, quos interpretantur, divinationem videntur accedere.”

[¶1] 35. "What sort of cleverness is it, then, that would attempt by sophistry to overthrow facts that antiquity has established? I fail—you tell me—to discover their cause. That, perhaps, is one of Nature's hidden secrets. God has not willed me to know the cause, but only that I should use the means which he has given. Therefore, I will use them and I will not allow myself to be persuaded that the whole Etruscan nation has gone stark mad on the subject of entrails, or that these same people are in error about lightnings, or that they are false interpreters of portents; for many a time the rumblings and roarings and quakings of the earth have given to our republic and to other states certain forewarnings of subsequent disaster.

> Latin: 35. “Quae est igitur ista calliditas res vetustate robustas calumniando velle pervertere? reperio causam. fortasse obscuritate involuta natura; non enim me deus ista scire, sed his tantum modo uti voluit. igitur nec adducar aut in extis totam Etruriam delirare aut eandem gentem in fulguribus errare aut fallaciter portenta interpretari, cum terrae saepe fremitus, saepe mugitus, saepe motus multa nostrae rei publicae, multa ceteris civitatibus gravia et vera praedixerint.”

[¶2] 36. Why, then, when here recently a mule (which is an animal ordinarily sterile by nature) brought forth a foal, need anyone have scoffed because the soothsayers from that occurrence prophesied a progeny of countless evils to the state? "What, pray, do you say of that well-known incident of Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius? He was censor and consul twice; besides that he was a most competent augur, a wise man and a preeminent citizen. Yet he, according to the account left us by his son Gaius, having caught two snakes in his home, called in the soothsayers to consult them. They advised him that if he let the male snake go his wife must die in a short time; and if he released the female snake his own death must soon occur. Thinking it more fitting that a speedy death should overtake him rather than his young wife, who was the daughter of Publius Africanus, he released the female snake and died within a few days. Let us laugh at the soothsayers, brand them as frauds and impostors and scorn their calling, even though a very wise man, Tiberius Gracchus, and the results and circumstances of his death have given proof of its trustworthiness; let us scorn the Babylonians, too, and those astrologers who, from the top of Mount Caucasus, observe the celestial signs and with the aid of mathematics follow the courses of the stars; let us, I say, convict of folly, falsehood, and shamelessness the men whose records, as they themselves assert, cover a period of four hundred and seventy thousand years; and let us pronounce them liars, utterly indifferent to the opinion of succeeding generations.

> Latin: 36. “? qui irridetur, partus hic mulae nonne, quia fetus extitit in sterilitate naturae, praedictus est ab haruspicibus incredibilis partus malorum?” “Quid? Ti. Gracchus P. F., qui bis consul et censor fuit, idemque et summus augur et vir sapiens civisque praestans, nonne, ut C. Gracchus, filius eius, scriptum reliquit, duobus anguibus domi comprehensis haruspices convocavit? qui cum respondissent, si marem emisisset, uxori brevi tempore esse moriendum, si feminam, ipsi; aequius esse censuit se maturam oppetere mortem quam P. Africani filiam adulescentem; feminam emisit, ipse paucis post diebus est mortuus. haruspices, vanos, futiles esse dicamus, quorumque disciplinam et sapientissimus vir et eventus ac res comprobavit, contemnamus; contemnamus etiam Babylonios, et eos, qui e Caucaso caeli signa servantes numeris stellarum cursus persequuntur., inquam, hos aut stultitiae aut vanitatis aut impudentiae, qui quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum, ut ipsi dicunt, monumentis comprehensa continent, et mentiri iudicemus, nec saeculorum reliquorum iudicium quod de ipsis futurum sit pertimescere.”

[¶3] 37. Come, let us admit that the barbarians are all base deceivers, but are the Greek historians liars too? "Speaking now of natural divination, everybody knows the oracular responses which the Pythian Apollo gave to Croesus, to the Athenians, Spartans, Tegeans, Argives, and Corinthians. Chrysippus has collected a vast number of these responses, attested in every instance by abundant proof. But I pass them by as you know them well. I will urge only this much, however, in defence: the oracle at Delphi never would have been so much frequented. so famous, and so crowded with offerings from peoples and kings of every land, if all ages had not tested the truth of its prophecies. For a long time now that has not been the case.

> Latin: 37. “Age, barbari vani atque fallaces; num etiam Graiorum historia mentita est?” “Quae Croeso Pythius Apollo, ut de naturali divinatione dicam, quae Atheniensibus, quae Lacedaemoniis, quae Tegeatis, quae Argivis, quae Corinthiis respondent, quis ignorat? innumerabilia oracula Chrysippus nec ullum sine locuplete auctore atque teste; quae, quia nota tibi sunt, relinquo; defendo unum hoc: Numquam illud oraculum Delphis tam celebre et tam clarum fuisset neque tantis donis refertum omnium populorum atque regum, nisi omnis aetas oraculorum illorum veritatem esset experta. iam diu non facit.”

[¶4] 38. Therefore, as at present its glory has waned because it is no longer noted for the truth of its prophecies, so formerly it would not have enjoyed so exalted a reputation if it had not been trustworthy in the highest degree. Possibly, too, those subterraneous exhalations which used to kindle the soul of the Pythian priestess with divine inspiration have gradually vanished in the long lapse of time; just as within our own knowledge some rivers have dried up and disappeared, while others, by winding and twisting, have changed their course into other channels. But explain the decadence of the oracle as you wish, since it offers a wide field for discussion, provided you grant what cannot be denied without distorting the entire record of history, that the oracle at Delphi made true prophecies for many hundreds of years.

> Latin: 38. “igitur nunc minore gloria est, quia minus oraculorum veritas excellit, sic tum nisi summa veritate in tanta gloria non fuisset. Potest autem vis illa terrae quae mentem Pythiae divino afflatu concitabat evanuisse vetustate, ut quosdam evanuisse et exaruisse amnes aut in alium cursum contortos et deflexos videmus. ut vis acciderit, magna enim quaestio est, modo maneat id quod negari non potest, nisi omnem historiam perverterimus, multis saeclis verax fuisse id oraculum.”

[¶5] 39. "But let us leave oracles and come to dreams. In his treatise on this subject Chrysippus, just as Antipater does, has assembled a mass of trivial dreams which he explains according to Antiphon's rules of interpretation. The work, I admit, displays the acumen of its author, but it would have been better if he had cited illustrations of a more serious type. Now, Philistus, who was a learned and painstaking man and a contemporary of the times of which he writes, gives us the following story of the mother of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse: while she was with child and was carrying this same Dionysius in her womb, she dreamed that she had been delivered of an infant satyr. When she referred this dream to the interpreters of portents, who in Sicily were called ' Galeotae,' they replied, so Philistus relates, that she would bring forth a son who would be very eminent in Greece and would enjoy a long and prosperous career.

> Latin: 39. “Sed omittamus oracula; veniamus ad somnia. De quibus disputans Chrysippus, multis et minutis somniis colligendis, facit idem quod Antipater ea conquirens, quae Antiphontis interpretatione explicata declarant illa quidem acumen interpretis, sed exemplis grandioribus decuit uti. mater, eius qui Syracosiorum tyrannus fuit, ut scriptum apud Philistum est, et doctum hominem et diligentem et aequalem temporum illorum, cum praegnans hunc ipsum Dionysium alvo contineret, somniavit se peperisse Satyriscum. interpretes portentorum, qui Galeotae tum in Sicilia nominabantur, responderunt, ut ait Philistus, eum, quem illa peperisset, clarissimum Graeciae diuturna cum fortuna fore.”

[¶6] 40. "May I not recall to your memory some stories to be found in the works of Roman and of Greek poets? For example, the following dream of the Vestal Virgin is from Ennius:
The vestal from her sleep in fright awoke
And to the startled maid, whose trembling hands
A lamp did bear, thus spoke in tearful tones:
'O daughter of Eurydice, thou whom
Our father loved, from my whole frame departs
The vital force. For in my dreams I saw
A man of beauteous form, who bore me off
Through willows sweet, along the fountain's brink,
To places strange. And then, my sister dear,
Alone, with halting step and longing heart,
I seemed to wander, seeking thee in vain;
There was no path to make my footing sure.

> Latin: 40. “Num te ad fabulas revoco vel nostrorum vel Graecorum poëtarum? enim et apud Ennium Vestalis illa:
excita cum tremulis anus attulit artubu’ lumen,
talia tum memorat lacrimans exterrita somno:
‘Eurydica prognata, pater quam noster amavit,’
‘vires vitaque corpu’ meum nunc deserit omne’.
‘nam me visus homo pulcher per amoena salicta’
‘et ripas raptare locosque novos; ita sola’
‘postilla, germana soror, errare videbar’
‘tardaque vestigare et quaerere te neque posse’
‘corde capessere; semita nulla pedem stabilibat.’
” “
‘exin compellare pater me voce videtur’
‘his verbis: “O gnata, tibi sunt ante gerendae”’
‘“aerumnae, post ex fluvio fortuna resistet.”’

[¶7] 41. And then I thought my father spoke these words
“Great sorrows, daughter, thou must first endure
Until thy fortune from the Tiber rise.”
When this was said he suddenly withdrew;
Nor did his cherished vision come again,
Though oft I raised my hand to heaven's dome
And called aloud in tearful, pleading voice.
Then sleep departing left me sick at heart.'

> Latin: 41. ‘haec effatu’ pater, germana, repente recessit’
‘nec sese dedit in conspectum corde cupitus,’
‘quamquam multa manus ad caeli caerula templa’
‘tendebam lacrumans et blanda voce vocabam.’
‘vix aegro tum corde meo me somnus reliquit.’
” “Haec, etiamsi ficta sunt a poëta, non absunt tamen a consuetudine somniorum.

[¶8] 42. "This dream, I admit, is the fiction of a poet's brain, yet it is not contrary to our experience with real dreams. It may well be that the following story of the dream which greatly disturbed Priam's peace of mind is fiction too:
When mother Hecuba was great with child,
She dreamed that she brought forth a flaming torch.
Alarmed at this, with sighing cares possessed,
The king and father, Priam, to the gods
Did make a sacrifice of bleating lambs.
He, seeking peace and answer to the dream,
Implored Apollo's aid to understand
What great events the vision did foretell.
Apollo's oracle, with voice divine,
Then gave this explanation of the dream:
Thy next-born son forbear to rear, for he
Will be the death of Pergamos and Troy.

> Latin: 42. sane etiam illud commenticium, quo Priamus est conturbatus, quia
máter gravida párere se ardentém facem
visá est in somnis Hécuba; quo factó pater
rex ípse Priamus sómnio mentís metu
percúlsus curis súmptus suspirántibus
exsácrificabat hóstiis balántibus.
tum cóniecturam póstulat pacém petens,
ut se édoceret, óbsecrans Apóllinem,
quo sése vertant tántae sortes sómnium.
ibi éx oraclo vóce divina édidit
Apóllo, puerum, primus Priamo quí foret
ílla natus, témperaret tóllere;
eum ésse exitium Tróiae, pestem Pérgamo.”

[¶9] 43. Grant, I repeat, that these dreams are myths and in the same category put Aeneas's dream, related in the Greek annals of our countryman, Fabius Pictor. According to Pictor everything that Aeneas did or suffered turned out just as it had been predicted to him in a dream. "But let us look at examples nearer our own times. Would you dare call that famous dream of Tarquin the Proud a myth? He describes it himself in the following lines from the Brutus of Accius:

> Latin: 43. “haec, ut dixi, somnia fabularum, hisque adiungatur etiam Aeneae somnium, quod in nostri Fabi Pictoris Graecis annalibus eius modi est, ut omnia. quae ab Aenea gesta sunt quaeque illi acciderunt, ea fuerint, quae ei secundum quietem visa sunt.” “Sed propiora videamus. modi est Superbi Tarquini somnium, de quo in Bruto Acci loquitur ipse?”

[¶10] 44. At night's approach I sought my quiet couch
To soothe my weary limbs with restful sleep.
Then in my dreams a shepherd near me drove
A fleecy herd whose beauty was extreme.
I chose two brother rams from out the flock
And sacrificed the comelier of the twain.
And then, with lowered horns, the other ram
Attacked and bore me headlong to the ground.
While there I lay outstretched and wounded sore,
The sky a wondrous miracle disclosed:
The blazing star of day reversed its course
And glided to the right by pathway new.

> Latin: 44. “
quom iám quieti córpus nocturno ímpetu
dedí sopore plácans artus lánguidos,
visúst in somnis pástor ad me appéllere
pecús lanigerum exímia puchritúdine;
duós consanguineos árietes inde éligi
praeclárioremque álterum immoláre me;
deinde eíus germanum córnibus conítier,
in me árietare, eoque íctu me ad casúm dari;
exín prostratum térra, graviter saúcium,
resupínum in caelo cóntueri máximum ac
miríficum facinus: déxtrorsum orbem flámmeum
radiátum solis líquier cursú novo.”

[¶11] 45. Now observe how the diviners interpreted this dream:
It is not strange, O king, that dreams reflect
The day's desires and thoughts, its sights and deeds,
And everything we say or do awake.
But in so grave a dream as yours we see
A message clearly sent, and thus it warns:
Beware of him you deem bereft of wit
And rate no higher than a stupid ram,
Lest he, with wisdom armed, should rise to fame
And drive you from your throne. The sun's changed course
Unto the state portends immediate change.
And may that prove benignant to the state;
For since the almighty orb from left to right
Revolved, it was the best of auguries
That Rome would be supreme o'er all the earth.

> Latin: 45. “igitur somnii a coniectoribus quae sit interpretatio facta, videamus:
réx, quae in vita usúrpant homines, cógitant, cuŕánt, vident,
quaéque aiunt vigilántes agitantque, éa si cui in somno áccidunt,
mínus mirum est; séd in re tanta haud temere visa se ófferunt.
óin vide ne, quém tu esse hebetem députes aeque ác pecus,
is sapientiá munitum péctus egregié gerat
téque regno expéllat. nam id quod dé sole ostentúm est tibi,
pópulo commutátionem rérum portendít fore
pérpropinquam. haec béne verruncent pópulo. nam quod ad dexteram
cépit cursum ab laéva signum praépotens, pulchérrime
aúguratum est rém Romanam públicam sumám fore.”

[¶12] 46. "But come now and let us return to foreign instances. Heraclides Ponticus, a man of learning, and both a pupil and a disciple of Plato's, relates a dream of the mother of Phalaris. She fell asleep and dreamed that, while looking at the consecrated images of the gods set up in her house, she saw the statue of Mercury pouring blood from a bowl which it held in its right hand and that the blood, as it touched the ground, welled up and completely filled the house. The truth of the dream was subsequently established by the inhuman cruelty of her son. "Why need I bring forth from Dinon's Persian annals the dreams of that famous prince, Cyrus, and their interpretations by the magi? But take this instance: Once upon a time Cyrus dreamed that the sun was at his feet. Three times, so Dinon writes, he vainly tried to grasp it and each time it turned away, escaped him, and finally disappeared. He was told by the magi, who are classed as wise and learned men among the Persians, that his grasping for the sun three times portended that he would reign for thirty years. And thus it happened; for he lived to his seventieth year, having begun to reign at forty.

> Latin: 46. “Age nunc ad externa redeamus. Phalaridis scribit Ponticus Heraclides, doctus vir, auditor et discipulus Platonis, visam esse videre in somnis simulacra deorum, quae ipsa domi consecravisset; ex eis Mercurium e patera, quam dextera manu teneret, sanguinem visum esse fundere; qui cum terram attigisset, refervescere videretur sic, ut tota domus sanguine redundaret. matris somnium inmanis fili crudelitas comprobavit.” “Quid ego, quae magi Cyro illi principi interpretati sint, ex Dinonis Persicis proferam? cum dormienti ei sol ad pedes visus esset, ter eum scribit frustra appetivisse manibus, cum se convolvens sol elaberetur et abiret; ei magos dixisse, quod genus sapientium et doctorum habebatur in Persis, ex triplici appetitione solis triginta annos Cyrum regnaturum esse portendi. ita contigit; nam ad septuagesimum pervenit, cum quadraginta natus annos regnare coepisset.”

[¶13] 47. "It certainly must be true that even barbarians have some power of foreknowledge and of prophecy, if the following story of Callanus of India be true: As he was about to die and was ascending his funeral pyre, he said: 'What a glorious death! The fate of Hercules is mine. For when this mortal frame is burned the soul will find the light.' When Alexander directed him to speak if he wished to say anything to him, he answered: 'Thank you, nothing, except that I shall see you very soon. So it turned out, for Alexander died in Babylon a few days later. I am getting slightly away from dreams, but I shall return to them in a moment. Everybody knows that on the same night in which Olympias was delivered of Alexander the temple of Diana at Ephesus was burned, and that the magi began to cry out as the day was breaking: 'Asia's deadly curse was born last night.' But enough of Indians and magi.

> Latin: 47. “Est profecto quiddam etiam in barbaris gentibus praesentiens atque divinans, siquidem ad mortem proficiscens Callanus Indus, cum inscenderet in rogum ardentem, ‘O praeclarum discessum,’ inquit, ‘e vita, cum, ut Herculi contigit, mortali corpore cremato in lucem animus excesserit!’ Cumque Alexander eum rogaret, si quid vellet, ut diceret, ‘Optime,’ inquit; ‘propediem te videbo.’ Quod ita contigit; nam Babylone paucis post diebus Alexander est mortuus. parumper a somniis, ad quae mox revertar. nocte templum Ephesiae Dianae deflagravit, eadem constat ex Olympiade natum esse Alexandrum, atque, ubi lucere coepisset, clamitasse magos pestem ac perniciem Asiae proxima nocte natam. de Indis et magis.”

[¶14] 48. "Let us go back to dreams. Coelius writes that Hannibal wished to carry off a golden column from Juno's temple at Lacinium, but since he was in doubt whether it was solid or plated, he bored into it. Finding it solid he decided to take it away. But at night Juno came to him in a vision and warned him not to do so, threatening that if he did she would cause the loss of his good eye. That clever man did not neglect the warning. Moreover out of the gold filings he ordered an image of a calf to be made and placed on top of the column.

> Latin: 48. “Redeamus ad somnia. Hannibalem Coelius scribit, cum columnam auream, quae esset in fano Iunonis Laciniae, auferre vellet dubitaretque, utrum ea solida esset an extrinsecus inaurata, perterebravisse; cumque solidam invenisset, statuisse tollere; ei secundum quietem visam esse Iunonem praedicere, ne id faceret, minarique, si fecisset, se curaturam, ut eum quoque oculum, quo bene videret, amitteret. ab homine acuto non esse neglectum; itaque ex eo auro quod exterebratum esset buculam curasse faciendam et eam in summa columna collocavisse.”

[¶15] 49. Another story of Hannibal is found in the history written in Greek by Silenus, whom Coelius follows, and who, by the way, was a very painstaking student of Hannibal's career. After his capture of Saguntum Hannibal dreamed that Jupiter summoned him to a council of the gods. When he arrived Jupiter ordered him to carry the war into Italy, and gave him one of the divine council as a guide whom he employed when he began the march with his army. This guide cautioned Hannibal not to look back But, carried away by curiosity, he could refrain no longer and looked back. Then he saw a horrible beast of enormous size, enveloped with snakes, and wherever it went it overthrew every tree and shrub and every house. In his amazement Hannibal asked what the monster was. The god replied that it was the desolation of Italy and ordered him to press right on and not to worry about what happened behind him and in the rear.

> Latin: 49. “item in Sileni, quem Coelius sequitur, Graeca historia est (is autem diligentissime res Hannibalis persecutus est): Hannibalem, cum cepisset Saguntum, visum esse in somnis a Iove in deorum concilium vocari; quo cum venisset, Iovem imperavisse, ut Italiae bellum inferret, ducemque ei unum e concilio datum, quo illum utentem cum exercitu progredi coepisse; tum ei ducem illum praecepisse, ne respiceret; illum autem id diutius facere non potuisse elatumque cupiditate respexisse; tum visam beluam vastam et immanem circumplicatam serpentibus quacumque incederet omnia arbusta, virgulta, tecta pervertere; et eum admiratum quaesisse de deo quodnam illud esset tale monstrum, et deum respondisse vastitatem esse Italiae praecepisseque, ut pergeret protinus, quid retro atque a tergo fieret ne laboraret.”

[¶16] 50. "We read in a history by Agathocles that Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, during his siege of Syracuse heard a voice in his sleep telling him that he would dine the next day in Syracuse. At daybreak the following day a serious conflict broke out in his camp between the troops of the Carthaginians and their allies, the Siculi. When the Syracusans saw this they made a sudden assault on the camp and carried Hamilcar off alive. Thus the event verified the dream. "History is full of such instances, and so is everyday life.

> Latin: 50. “Apud Agathoclem scriptum in historia est Hamilcarem Karthaginiensem, cum oppugnaret Syracusas, visum esse audire vocem, se postridie cenaturum Syracusis; cum autem is dies illuxisset, magnam seditionem in castris eius inter Poenos et Siculos milites esse factam; quod cum sensissent Syracusani, inproviso eos in castra irrupisse, Hamilcaremque ab eis vivum esse sublatum. res somnium comprobavit.” “Plena exemplorum est historia, tum referta vita communis.”

[¶17] 51. And yet let me cite another: the famous Publius Decius, son of Quintus, and the first of that family to become consul, was military tribune in the consulship of Marcus Valerius and Aulus Cornelius while our army was being hard pressed by the Samnites. When, because of his rushing too boldly into the dangers of battle, he was advised to be more cautious, he replied, according to the annals, 'I dreamed that by dying in the midst of the enemy I should win immortal fame.' And though he was unharmed at that time and extricated the army from its difficulties, yet three years later, when consul, he devoted himself to death and rushed full-armed against the battle line of the Latins. By this act of his the Latins were overcome and destroyed; and so glorious was his death that his son sought the same fate.

> Latin: 51. “At vero P. Decius ille Q. F., qui primus e Deciis consul fuit, cum esset tribunus militum, M. Valerio A. Cornelio consulibus, a Samnitibusque premeretur noster exercitus, cum pericula proeliorum iniret audacius monereturque, ut cautior esset, dixit, quod extat in annalibus, sibi in somnis visum esse, cum in mediis hostibus versaretur, occidere cum maxima gloria. tum quidem incolumis exercitum obsidione liberavit; post triennium autem, cum consul esset, devovit se et in aciem Latinorum irrupit armatus. eius facto superati sunt et deleti Latini; cuius mors ita gloriosa fuit, ut eandem concupisceret filius.”

[¶18] 52. But let us come now, if you please, to the dreams of philosophers. "We read in Plato that Socrates, while in prison, said in a conversation with his friend Crito: 'I am to die in three days; for in a dream I saw a woman of rare beauty, who called me by name and quoted this verse from Homer:
'Gladly on Phthia's shore the third day's dawn shall behold thee.'
And history informs us that his death occurred as he had foretold. That disciple of Socrates, Xenophon—and what a man he was!—records the dreams he had during his campaign with Cyrus the Younger, and their remarkable fulfilment.

> Latin: 52. “veniamus nunc, si placet, ad somnia philosophorum.” “Est apud Platonem Socrates, cum esset in custodia publica, dicens Critoni, suo familiari, sibi post tertium diem esse moriendum; vidisse enim se in somnis pulchritudine eximia feminam, quae se nomine appellans, diceret Homericum quendam eius modi versum:
tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit., ut est dictum, sic scribitur contigisse. Xenophon Socraticus (qui vir et quantus!) in ea militia, qua cum Cyro minore perfunctus est, sua scribit somnia, quorum eventus mirabiles exstiterunt.”

[¶19] 53. Shall we say that Xenophon is either a liar or a madman? "And Aristotle, who was endowed with a matchless and almost godlike intellect,—is he in error, or is he trying to lead others into error in the following account of his friend, Eudemus the Cyprian? Eudemus, while on his way to Macedonia, reached Pherae, then a very famous city of Thessaly, but groaning under the cruel sway of the tyrant, Alexander. There he became so violently ill that the physicians despaired of his recovery. While sick he had a dream in which a youth of striking beauty told him that he would speedily get well; that the despot Alexander would die in a few days, and that he himself would return home five years later. And so, indeed, the first two prophecies, as Aristotle writes, were immediately fulfilled by the recovery of Eudemus and by the death of the tyrant at the hands of his wife's brothers. But at the end of five years, when, in reliance upon the dream, he hoped to return to Cyprus from Sicily, he was killed in battle before Syracuse. Accordingly the dream was interpreted to mean that when his soul left the body it then had returned home.

> Latin: 53. “Xenophontem an delirare dicemus?” “Quid? singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium, familiarem suum, iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur; in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum fuisse, ut omnes medici diffiderent; ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbrevi convalesceret, paucisque diebus interiturum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta, et convaluisse Eudemum, et ab uxoris fratribus interfectum tyrannum; quinto autem anno exeunte, cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum ilium ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse; ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum, ut, cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur.”

[¶20] 54. "To the testimony of philosophers let us add that of a most learned man and truly divine poet, Sophocles. A heavy gold dish having been stolen from the temple of Hercules, the god himself appeared to Sophocles in a dream and told who had committed the theft. But Sophocles ignored the dream a first and second time. When it came again and again, he went up to the Areopagus and laid the matter before the judges who ordered the man named by Sophocles to be arrested. The defendant after examination confessed his crime and brought back the dish. This is the reason why that temple is called 'the temple of Hercules the Informer.'

> Latin: 54. “Adiungamus philosophis doctissimum hominem, poëtam quidem divinum, Sophoclem; qui, cum ex aede Herculis patera aurea gravis subrepta esset, in somnis vidit ipsum deum dicentem, qui id fecisset. semel ille iterumque neglexit. idem saepius, ascendit in Areopagum, detulit rem; Areopagitae conprehendi iubent eum, qui a Sophocle erat nominatus; is, quaestione adhibita, confessus est pateramque rettulit. facto fanum illud Indicis Herculis nominatum est.”

[¶21] 55. "But why am I dwelling on illustrations from Greek sources when—though I can't explain it —those from our own history please me more? Now here is a dream which is mentioned by all our historians, by the Fabii and the Gellii and, most recently, by Coelius: During the Latin War when the Great Votive Games were being celebrated for the first time the city was suddenly called to arms and the games were interrupted. Later it was determined to repeat them, but before they began, and while the people were taking their seats, a slave bearing a yoke was led about the circus and beaten with rods. After that a Roman rustic had a dream in which someone appeared to him and said that he disapproved of the leader of the games and ordered this statement to be reported to the Senate. But the rustic dared not do as he was bid The order was repeated by the spectre with a warning not to put his power to the test. Not even then did the rustic dare obey. After that his son died and the same vision was repeated the third time. Thereupon he became ill and told his friends of his dream. On their advice he was carried to the Senate-house on a litter and, having related his dream to the Senate, his health was restored and he walked home unaided. And so, the tradition is, the Senate gave credence to the dream and had the games repeated.

> Latin: 55. “Sed quid ego Graecorum? nescio quo modo me magis nostra delectant. hoc historici, Fabii, Gellii, sed proxime Coelius: Cum bello Latino ludi votivi maximi primum fierent, civitas ad arma repente est excitata, itaque ludis intermissis instaurativi constituti sunt. ante quam fierent, cumque iam populus consedisset, servus per circum cum virgis caederetur furcam ferens ductus est. cuidam rustico Romano dormienti visus est venire, qui diceret praesulem sibi non placuisse ludis, idque ab eodem iussum esse eum senatui nuntiare; illum non esse ausum. esse idem iussum et monitum, ne vim suam experiri vellet; ne tum quidem esse ausum. filium eius esse mortuum, eandem in somnis admonitionem fuisse tertiam. illum etiam debilem factum rem ad amicos detulisse, quorum de sententia lecticula in curiam esse delatum, cumque senatui somnium enarravisset, pedibus suis salvum domum revertisse. somnio comprobato a senatu ludos illos iterum instauratos memoriae proditum est.”

[¶22] 56. "According to this same Coelius, Gaius Gracchus told many persons that his brother Tiberius came to him in a dream when he was a candidate for the quaestorship and said: 'However much you may try to defer your fate, nevertheless you must die the same death that I did.' This happened before Gaius was tribune of the people, and Coelius writes that he himself heard it from Gaius who had repeated it to many others. Can you find anything better authenticated than this dream? "And who, pray, can make light of the two following dreams which are so often recounted by Stoic writers? The first one is about Simonides, who once saw the dead body of some unknown man lying exposed and buried it. Later, when he had it in mind to go on board a ship he was warned in a vision by the person to whom he had given burial not to do so and that if he did he would perish in a shipwreck. Therefore he turned back and all the others who sailed were lost.

> Latin: 56. “C. vero Gracchus multis dixit, ut scriptum apud eundem Coelium est, sibi in somnis quaesturam petenti Ti. fratrem visum esse dicere, quam vellet cunctaretur, tamen eodem sibi leto, quo ipse interisset, esse pereundum., ante quam tribunus plebi C. Gracchus factus esset, et se audisse scribit Coelius et dixisse illum multis. somnio quid inveniri potest certius?” “Quid? illa duo somnia, quae creberrime commemorantur a Stoicis, quis tandem potest contemnere? unum de Simonide: Qui cum ignotum quendam proiectum mortuum vidisset eumque humavisset haberetque in animo navem conscendere, moneri visus est, ne id faceret, ab eo, quem sepultura affecerat; si navigasset, eum naufragio esse periturum; itaque Simonidem redisse, perisse ceteros, qui tum navigassent.”

[¶23] 57. "The second dream is very well known and is to this effect: Two friends from Arcadia who were taking a journey together came to Megara, and one traveller put up at an inn and the second went to the home of a friend. After they had eaten supper and retired, the second traveller, in the dead of the night, dreamed that his companion was imploring him to come to his aid, as the innkeeper was planning to kill him. Greatly frightened at first by the dream he arose, and later, regaining his composure, decided that there was nothing to worry about and went back to bed. When he had gone to sleep the same person appeared to him and said: 'Since you would not help me when I was alive, I beg that you will not allow my dead body to remain unburied. I have been killed by the innkeeper, who has thrown my body into a cart and covered it with dung. I pray you to be at the city gate in the morning before the cart leaves the town.' Thoroughly convinced by the second dream he met the cart-driver at the gate in the morning, and, when he asked what he had in the cart, the driver fled in terror. The Arcadian then removed his friend's dead body from the cart, made complaint of the crime to the authorities, and the innkeeper was punished. What stronger proof of a divinely inspired dream than this can be given?

> Latin: 57. “Alterum ita traditum clarum admodum somnium: Cum duo quidam Arcades familiares iter una facerent et Megaram venissent, alterum ad cauponem devertisse, ad hospitem alterum. ut cenati quiescerent, concubia nocte visum esse in somnis ei, qui erat in hospitio, illum alterum orare, ut subveniret, quod sibi a caupone interitus pararetur; eum primo perterritum somnio surrexisse; dein cum se collegisset idque visum pro nihilo habendum esse duxisset, recubuisse; tum ei dormienti eundem illum visum esse rogare, ut, quoniam sibi vivo non subvenisset, mortem suam ne inultam esse pateretur; se interfectum in plaustrum a caupone esse coniectum et supra stercus iniectum; petere, ut mane ad portam adesset, prius quam plaustrum ex oppido exiret. vero eum somnio commotum mane bubulco praesto ad portam fuisse, quaesisse ex eo, quid esset in plaustro; illum perterritum fugisse, mortuum erutum esse, cauponem re patefacta poenas dedisse. hoc somnio dici potest divinius?”

[¶24] 58. "But why go on seeking illustrations from ancient history? I had a dream which I have often related to you, and you one which you have often told to me. When I was governor of Asia I dreamed that I saw you on horseback riding toward the bank of some large river, when you suddenly plunged forward, fell into the stream, and wholly disappeared from sight. I was greatly alarmed and trembled with fear. But in a moment you reappeared mounted on the same horse, and with a cheerful countenance ascended the opposite bank where we met and embraced each other. The meaning of the dream was readily explained to me by experts in Asia who from it predicted those events which subsequently occurred.

> Latin: 58. “Sed quid aut plura aut vetera quaerimus? tibi meum narravi, saepe ex te audivi tuum somnium: me, cum Asiae proconsul praeessem, vidisse in quiete, cum tu equo advectus ad quandam magni fluminis ripam provectus subito atque delapsus in flumen nusquam apparuisses, me contremuisse timore perterritum; tum te repente laetum exstitisse eodemque equo adversam ascendisse ripam, nosque inter nos esse complexes. coniectura huius somnii, mihique a peritis in Asia praedictum est fore eos eventus rerum, qui acciderunt.”

[¶25] 59. "I come now to your dream. I heard it, of course, from you, but more frequently from our Sallustius. In the course of your banishment, which was glorious for us but disastrous to the State, you stopped for the night at a certain country-house in the plain of Atina. After lying awake most of the night, finally, about daybreak, you fell into a very profound sleep. And though your journey was pressing, yet Sallustius gave instructions to maintain quiet and would not permit you to be disturbed. But you awoke about the second hour and related your dream to him. In it you seemed to be wandering sadly about in solitary places when Gaius Marius, with his fasces wreathed in laurel, asked you why you were sad, and you replied that you had been driven from your country by violence. He then bade you be of good cheer, took you by the right hand, and delivered you to the nearest lictor to be conducted to his memorial temple, saying that there you should find safety. Sallustius thereupon, as he relates, cried out, 'a speedy and a glorious return awaits you.' He further states that you too seemed delighted at the dream. Immediately thereafter it was reported to me that as soon as you heard that it was in Marius' temple that the glorious decree of the Senate for your recall had been enacted on motion of the consul, a most worthy and most eminent man, and that the decree had been greeted by unprecedented shouts of approval in a densely crowded theatre, you said that no stronger proof could be given of a divinely inspired dream than this.

> Latin: 59. “Venio nunc ad tuum. equidem ex te ipso, sed mihi saepius noster Sallustius narravit, cum in illa fuga nobis gloriosa, patriae calamitosa, in villa quadam campi Atinatis maneres magnamque partem noctis vigilasses, ad lucem denique arcte et graviter dormire te coepisse., quamquam iter instaret, se tamen silentium fieri iussisse neque esse passum te excitari; cum autem experrectus esses hora secunda fere, te sibi somnium narravisse: visum tibi esse, cum in locis solis maestus errares, C. Marium cum fascibus laureatis quaerere ex te, quid tristis esses, cumque tu te patria vi pulsum esse dixisses, prehendisse eum dextram tuam et bono animo te iussisse esse lictorique proximo tradidisse, ut te in monumentum suum deduceret, et dixisse in eo tibi salutem fore. et se exclamasse Sallustius narrat reditum tibi celerem et gloriosum paratum, et te ipsum visum somnio delectari. illud mihi ipsi celeriter nuntiatum est ut audivisses in monumento Mari de tuo reditu magnificentissimum illud senatus consultum esse factum referente optimo et clarissimo viro consule, idque frequentissimo theatro incredibili clamore et plausu comprobatum, dixisse te nihil illo Atinati somnio fieri posse divinius.”

[¶26] 60. "'Ah,' it is objected, 'but many dreams are untrustworthy.' Rather, perhaps, their meaning is hidden from us. But grant that some are untrustworthy, why do we declaim against those that are trustworthy? The fact is the latter would be much more frequent if we went to our rest in proper condition. But when we are burdened with food and drink our dreams are troubled and confused. Observe what Socrates says in Plato's Republic: "'When a man goes to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul languid and inert, but having that other portion, which has in it a certain brutishness and wild savagery, immoderately gorged with drink and food, then does that latter portion leap up and hurl itself about in sleep without check. In such a case every vision presented to the mind is so devoid of thought and reason that the sleeper dreams that he is committing incest with his mother, or that he is having unlawful commerce indiscriminately with gods and men, and frequently too, with beasts; or even that he is killing someone and staining his hands with impious bloodshed; and that he is doing many vile and hideous things recklessly and without shame.

> Latin: 60. “At multa falso. obscura fortasse nobis. sint falsa quaedam; contra vera quid dicimus? quidem multo plura evenirent, si ad quietem integri iremus. onusti cibo et vino perturbata et confusa cernimus., quid Socrates in Platonis Politia loquatur. enim:” “‘Cum dormientibus ea pars animi, quae mentis et rationis sit particeps, sopita langueat; illa autem, in qua feritas quaedam sit atque agrestis immanitas, cum sit immoderato tumefacta potu atque pastu, exsultare eam in somno immoderateque iactari. huic omnia visa obiciuntur a mente ac ratione vacua, ut aut cum matre corpus miscere videatur aut cum quovis alio vel homine vel deo, saepe belua, atque etiam trucidare aliquem et impie cruentari multaque facere impure atque taetre cum temeritate et impudentia.’”

[¶27] 61. But, on the other hand, when the man, whose habits of living and of eating are wholesome and temperate, surrenders himself to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul eager and erect, and satisfied by a feast of noble thoughts, and having that portion which feeds on carnal pleasures neither utterly exhausted by abstinence nor cloyed by over-indulgence—for, as a rule, the edge of thought is dulled whether nature is starved or overfed—and, when such a man, in addition, has that third portion of the soul, in which the fire of anger burns, quieted and subdued—thus having the two irrational portions under complete control—then will the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul shine forth and show itself keen and strong for dreaming and then will his dreams be peaceful and worthy of trust.' I have reproduced Plato's very words.

> Latin: 61. “‘At qui salubri et moderato cultu atque victu quieti se tradiderit ea parte animi, quae mentis et consili est, agitata et erecta saturataque bonarum cogitationum epulis, eaque parte animi, quae voluptate alitur, nec inopia enecta nec satietate affluenti (quorum utrumque praestringere aciem mentis solet, sive deest naturae quidpiam sive abundat atque affluit), illa etiam tertia parte animi, in qua irarum existit ardor, sedata atque restincta, tum eveniet duabus animi temerariis partibus compressis, ut illa tertia pars rationis et mentis eluceat et se vegetam ad somniandum acremque praebeat, tum ei visa quietis occurrent tranquilla atque veracia.’ Haec verba ipsa Platonis expressi.”

[¶28] 62. "Then shall we listen to Epicurus rather than to Plato? As for Carneades, in his ardour for controversy he asserts now this and now that. ' But,' you retort, 'Epicurus says what he thinks.' But he thinks nothing that is ever well reasoned, or worthy of a philosopher. Will you, then, put this man before Plato or Socrates, who though they gave no reason, would yet prevail over these petty philosophers by the mere weight of their name? Now Plato's advice to us is to set out for the land of dreams with bodies so prepared that no error or confusion may assail the soul. For this reason, it is thought, the Pythagoreans were forbidden to indulge in beans; for that food produces great flatulence and induces a condition at war with a soul in search of truth.

> Latin: 62. “Epicurum igitur audiemus potius? Carneades concertationis studio modo ait hoc, modo illud. ‘ait ille ait quod sentit.’ Sentit autem nihil umquam elegans, nihil decorum. ergo antepones Platoni et Socrati qui ut rationem non redderent, auctoritate tamen hos minutos philosophos vincerent? igitur Plato sic ad somnum proficisci corporibus affectis, ut nihil sit quod errorem animis perturbationemque afferat. quo etiam Pythagoricis interdictum putatur ne faba vescerentur, quod habet inflationem magnam is cibus tranquillitati mentis quaerentis vera contrariam.”

[¶29] 63. When, therefore, the soul has been withdrawn by sleep from contact with sensual ties, then does it recall the past, comprehend the present, and foresee the future. For though the sleeping body then lies as if it were dead, yet the soul is alive and strong, and will be much more so after death when it is wholly free of the body. Hence its power to divine is much enhanced by the approach of death. For example, those in the grasp of a serious and fatal sickness realize the fact that death impends; and so, visions of dead men generally appear to them and then their desire for fame is strongest; while those who have lived otherwise than as they should, feel, at such a time, the keenest sorrow for their sins.

> Latin: 63. “ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura praevidet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. multo magis faciet post mortem, cum omnino corpore excesserit. appropinquante morte multo est divinior. et id ipsum vident, qui sunt morbo gravi et mortifero affecti, instare mortem; itaque eis occurrunt plerumque imagines mortuorum, tumque vel maxime laudi student; eosque, qui secus quam decuit, vixerunt, peccatorum suorum tum maxime paenitet.”

[¶30] 64. "Moreover, proof of the power of dying men to prophesy is also given by Posidonius in his well-known account of a certain Rhodian, who, when on his death-bed, named six men of equal age and foretold which of them would die first, which second, and so on. Now Posidonius holds the view that there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second, the air is full of immortal souls, already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep. And, as I said just now, it is when death is at hand that men most readily discern signs of the future.

> Latin: 64. “Divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius, quod affert, Rhodium quendam morientem sex aequales nominasse et dixisse, qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset. tribus modis censet deorum appulsu homines somniare: uno, quod praevideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur; altero, quod plenus aër sit inmortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi di cum dormientibus colloquantur., ut modo dixi, facilius evenit appropinquante morte, ut animi futura augurentur.”

[¶31] 65. This is illustrated by the story which I related about Callanus and by Homer's account of Hector, who, as he was dying, prophesied the early death of Achilles. "It is clear that, in our ordinary speech, we should not have made such frequent use of the word praesagire, meaning ' to sense in advance, or to presage,' if the power of presaging had been wholly non-existent. An illustration of its use is seen in the following well-known line from Plautus:
My soul presaged as I left home that my leaving was in vain.
Now sagire means 'to have a keen perception.' Accordingly certain old women are called sagae, because they are assumed to know a great deal, and dogs are said to be 'sagacious.' And so one who has knowledge of a thing before it happens is said to 'presage,' that is, to perceive the future in advance.

> Latin: 65. “quo et illud est Callani, de quo ante dixi, et Homerici Hectoris, qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat.” “Neque enim illud verbum temere consuetudo approbavisset, si ea res nulla esset omnino:
praésagibat ánimus frustra me íre, cum exirém domo.
enim sentire acute est; ex quo sagae anus, quia multa scire volunt, et sagaces dicti canes. igitur, qui ante sagit, quam oblata res est, dicitur praesagire, id est futura ante sentire.”

## 3. Book I · sections 66–101

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/3/#p-N

[¶0] 66. "Therefore the human soul has an inherent power of presaging or of foreknowing infused into it from without, and made a part of it by the will of God. If that power is abnormally developed, it is called 'frenzy' or 'inspiration,' which occurs when the soul withdraws itself from the body and is violently stimulated by a divine impulse, as in the following instance, where Hecuba says to Cassandra:
But why those flaming eyes, that sudden rage?
And whither fled that sober modesty,
Till now so maidenly and yet so wise?'
and Cassandra answers:
O mother, noblest of thy noble sex!
I have been sent to utter prophecies:
Against my will Apollo drives me mad
To revelation make of future ills.
O virgins! comrades of my youthful hours,
My mission shames my father, best of men.
O mother dear! great loathing for myself
And grief for thee I feel. For thou hast borne
To Priam goodly issue—saving me.
'Tis sad that unto thee the rest bring weal,
I woe; that they obey, but I oppose.
What a tender and pathetic poem, and how suitable to her character! though it is not altogether relevant, I admit.

> Latin: 66. “Inest igitur in animis praesagitio extrinsecus iniecta atque inclusa divinitus., si exarsit acrius, furor appellatur, cum a corpore animus abstractus divino instinctu concitatur.
H.:
séd quid oculis rábere visa est dérepente ardéntibus?
úbi illa paulo ante sápiens, vírginalis modéstia?
C.:
máter, optimá tu multo múlier melior múlierum,
míssa sum supérstitiosis háriolatiónibus;
nam mé Apollo fátis fandis démentem invitám ciet.
vírgines vero aéqualis, pátris mei meum factúm pudet,
óptumi vir. mea mater, túi me miseret, méi piget.
óptumam progéniem Priamo péperisti extra me; hóc dolet,
méd obesse, illós prodesse, me óbstare, illos óbsequi.
O poëma tenerum et moratum atque molle! hoc minus ad rem;”

[¶1] 67. However, the point which I wish to press, that true prophecies are made during frenzy, has found expression in the following lines:
It comes! it comes! that bloody torch, in fire
Enwrapped, though hid from sight these many years!
Bring aid, my countrymen, and quench its flames!
It is not Cassandra who next speaks, but a god in human form:
Already, on the mighty deep is built
A navy swift that hastes with swarms of woe.
Its ships are drawing nigh with swelling sails,
And bands of savage men will fill our shores.

> Latin: 67. “illud, quod volumus, expressum est, ut vaticinari furor vera soleat.
ádest, adest fax óbvoluta sánguine atque íncendio!
múltos annos látuit; cives, férte opem et restínguite.
inclusus corpore humano iam, non Cassandra, loquitur:
iámque mari magnó classis cita
téxitur; exitium éxamen rapit;
adveniet, fera vélivolantibus
návibus complebít manus litora.”

[¶2] 68. "I seem to be relying for illustrations on myths drawn from tragic poets. But you yourself are my authority for an instance of the same nature, and yet it is not fiction but a real occurrence. Gaius Coponius, a man of unusual capacity and learning, came to you at Dyrrachium while he, as praetor, was in command of the Rhodian fleet, and told you of a prediction made by a certain oarsman from one of the Rhodian quinqueremes. The prediction was that in less than thirty days Greece would be bathed in blood; Dyrrachium would be pillaged; its defenders would flee to their ships and, as they fled, would see behind them the unhappy spectacle of a great conflagration; but the Rhodian fleet would have a quick passage home. This story gave you some concern, and it caused very great alarm to those cultured men, Marcus Varro and Marcus Cato, who were at Dyrrachium at the time. In fact, a few days later Labienus reached Dyrrachium in flight from Pharsalus, with the news of the loss of the army. The rest of the prophecy was soon fulfilled.

> Latin: 68. “Tragoedias loqui videor et fabulas. At ex te ipso non commenticiam rem, sed factam eiusdem generis audivi: C. Coponium ad te venisse Dyrrhachium, cum praetorio imperio classi Rhodiae praeesset, cumprime hominem prudentem atque doctum, eumque dixisse remigem quendam e quinqueremi Rhodiorum vaticinatum madefactum iri minus xxx diebus Graeciam sanguine, rapinas Dyrrhachi et conscensionem in naves cum fuga fugientibusque miserabilem respectum incendiorum fore; sed Rhodiorum classi propinquum reditum ac domum itionem dari; tum neque te ipsum non esse commotum Marcumque Varronem et M. Catonem, qui tum ibi erant, doctos homines, vehementer esse perterritos; paucis sane post diebus ex Pharsalia fuga venisse Labienum; qui cum interitum exercitus nuntiavisset, reliqua vaticinationis brevi esse confecta.”

[¶3] 69. For the granaries were pillaged and their contents scattered and strewn all about the streets and alleys. You and your companions, in great alarm, suddenly embarked, and as you looked back at night towards the town you saw the flames of the merchant ships, which the soldiers (not wishing to follow) had set on fire. Finally, when your party had been deserted by the Rhodian fleet you realized that the prophecy had been fulfilled.

> Latin: 69. “et ex horreis direptum effusumque frumentum vias omnis angiportusque constraverat, et naves subito perterriti metu conscendistis, et noctu ad oppidum respicientes flagrantis onerarias quas incenderant milites, quia sequi noluerant, videbatis; postremo a Rhodia classe deserti verum vatem fuisse sensistis.”

[¶4] 70. "As briefly as I could, I have discussed divination by means of dreams and frenzy, which, as I said, are devoid of art. Both depend on the same reasoning, which is that habitually employed by our friend Cratippus: 'The human soul is in some degree derived and drawn from a source exterior to itself. Hence we understand that outside the human soul there is a divine soul from which the human soul is sprung. Moreover, that portion of the human soul which is endowed with sensation, motion, and carnal desire is inseparable from bodily influence; while that portion which thinks and reasons is most vigorous when it is most distant from the body.'

> Latin: 70. “Exposui quam brevissime potui somni et furoris oracula, quae carere arte dixeram. amborum generum una ratio est, qua Cratippus noster uti solet; animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos et haustos (ex quo intellegitur esse extra divinum animum, humanus unde ducatur); humani autem animi eam partem, quae sensum, quae motum, quae appetitum habeat, non esse ab actione corporis seiugatam; quae autem pars animi rationis atque intellegentiae sit particeps, eam tum maxime vigere, cum plurimum absit a corpore.”

[¶5] 71. And so, after giving examples of true prophecies through frenzy and dreams, Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way: "'Though without eyes it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has even once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, therefore, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may sometimes be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet it is enough to establish the existence of divination that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore, the existence of divination must be conceded.'

> Latin: 71. “, expositis exemplis verarum vaticinationum et somniorum, Cratippus solet rationem concludere hoc modo:” “‘Si sine oculis non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere, qui vel semel ita est usus oculis ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. igitur, si sine divinatione non potest officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem quis, cum divinationem habeat, errare aliquando nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel aliquid esse ita divinatum ut nihil fortuito cecidisse videatur; sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia; esse igitur divinationem confitendum est.’”

[¶6] 72. "But those methods of divination which are dependent on conjecture, or on deductions from events previously observed and recorded, are, as I have said before, not natural, but artificial, and include the inspection of entrails, augury, and the interpretation of dreams. These are disapproved of by the Peripatetics and defended by the Stoics. Some are based upon records and usage, as is evident from the Etruscan books on divination by means of inspection of entrails and by means of thunder and lightning, and as is also evident from the books of your augural college; while others are dependent on conjecture made suddenly and on the spur of the moment. An instance of the latter kind is that of Calchas in Homer, prophesying the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows. We find another illustration of conjectural divination in the history of Sulla in an occurrence which you witnessed. While he was offering sacrifices in front of his head-quarters in the Nolan district a snake suddenly came out from beneath the altar. The soothsayer, Gaius Postumius, begged Sulla to proceed with his march at once. Sulla did so and captured the strongly fortified camp of the Samnites which lay in front of the town of Nola.

> Latin: 72. “Quae vero aut coniectura explicantur aut eventis animadversa ac notata sunt, ea genera divinandi, ut supra dixi, non naturalia, sed artificiosa dicuntur; in quo haruspices, augures coniectoresque numerantur. improbantur a Peripateticis, a Stoicis defenduntur. alia sunt posita in monumentis et disciplina, quod Etruscorum declarant et haruspicini et fulgurales et tonitruales libri, vestri etiam augurales; alia autem subito ex tempore coniectura explicantur, ut apud Homerum Calchas, qui ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratus est; et ut in Sullae scriptum historia videmus, quod te inspectante factum est, ut, cum ille in agro Nolano immolaret ante praetorium, ab infima ara subito anguis emergeret, cum quidem C. Postumius haruspex oraret ilium ut in expeditionem exercitum educeret. cum Sulla fecisset, tum ante oppidum Nolam fortissima Samnitium castra cepit.”

[¶7] 73. "Still another instance of conjectural divination occurred in the case of Dionysius, a little while before lie began to reign. He was travelling through the Leontine district, and led his horse down into a river. The horse was engulfed in a whirlpool and disappeared. Dionysius did his utmost to extricate him but in vain and, so Philistus writes, went away greatly troubled. When he had gone on a short distance he heard a whinny, looked back and, to his joy, saw his horse eagerly following and with a swarm of bees in its mane. The sequel of this portent was that Dionysius began to reign within a few days.

> Latin: 73. “Facta coniectura etiam in Dionysio est paulo ante quam regnare coepit; qui, cum per agrum Leontinum iter faciens, equum ipse demisisset in flumen, submersus equus voraginibus non exstitit; quem cum maxima contentione non potuisset extrahere, discessit, ut ait Philistus, aegre ferens. autem aliquantum progressus esset, subito exaudivit hinnitum respexitque et equum alacrem laetus aspexit, cuius in iuba examen apium consederat. ostentum habuit hanc vim, ut Dionysius paucis post diebus regnare coeperit.”

[¶8] 74. "Again: what a warning was given to the Spartans just before the disastrous battle of Leuctra, when the armour clanked in the temple of Hercules and his statue dripped with sweat! But at the same time, according to Callisthenes, the folding doors of Hercules' temple at Thebes, though closed with bars, suddenly opened of their own accord, and the armour which had been fastened on the temple walls, was found on the floor. And, at the same time, at Lebadia, in Boeotia, while divine honours were being paid to Trophonius, the cocks in the neighbourhood began to crow vigorously and did not leave off. Thereupon the Boeotian augurs declared that the victory belonged to the Thebans, because it was the habit of cocks to keep silence when conquered and to crow when victorious.

> Latin: 74. “Quid? Lacedaemoniis paulo ante Leuctricam calamitatem quae significatio facta est, cum in Herculis fano arma sonuerunt Herculisque simulacrum multo sudore manavit! At eodem tempore Thebis, ut ait Callisthenes, in templo Herculis valvae clausae repagulis subito se ipsae aperuerunt, armaque quae fixa in parietibus fuerant ea sunt humi inventa. eodem tempore apud Lebadiam Trophonio res divina fieret, gallos gallinaceos in eo loco sic assidue canere coepisse, ut nihil intermitterent; tum augures dixisse Boeotios Thebanorum esse victoriam, propterea quod avis illa victa silere soleret, canere, si vicisset.”

[¶9] 75. "The Spartans received many warnings given at that time of their impending defeat at Leuctra. For example, a crown of wild, prickly herbs suddenly appeared on the head of the statue erected at Delphi in honour of Lysander, the most eminent of the Spartans. Furthermore, the Spartans had set up some golden stars in the temple of Castor and Pollux at Delphi to commemorate the glorious victory of Lysander over the Athenians, because, it was said, those gods were seen accompanying the Spartan fleet in that battle. Now, just before the battle of Leuctra these divine symbols—that is, the golden stars at Delphi, already referred to— fell down and were never seen again.

> Latin: 75. “Eademque tempestate multis signis Lacedaemoniis Leuctricae pugnae calamitas denuntiabatur. et Lysandri, qui Lacedaemoniorum clarissimus fuerat, statuae, quae Delphis stabat, in capite corona subito exstitit ex asperis herbis et agrestibus; stellaeque aureae, quae Delphis erant a Lacedaemoniis positae post navalem illam victoriam Lysandri, qua Athenienses conciderunt, qua in pugna quia Castor et Pollux cum Lacedaemoniorum classe visi esse dicebantur. insignia deorum, stellae aureae, quas dixi, Delphis positae paulo ante Leuctricam pugnam deciderunt, neque repertae sunt.”

[¶10] 76. But the most significant warning received by the Spartans was this: they sent to consult the oracle of Jupiter at Dodona as to the chances of victory. After their messengers had duly set up the vessel in which were the lots, an ape, kept by the king of Molossia for his amusement, disarranged the lots and everything else used in consulting the oracle, and scattered them in all directions. Then, so we are told, the priestess who had charge of the oracle said that the Spartans must think of safety and not of victory.

> Latin: 76. “Maximum vero illud portentum isdem Spartiatis fuit, quod, cum oraculum ab Iove Dodonaeo petivissent de victoria sciscitantes legatique vas illud in quo inerant sortes collocavissent, simia, quam rex Molossorum in deliciis habebat, et sortes ipsas et cetera, quae erant ad sortem parata, disturbavit et aliud alio dissipavit. ea, quae praeposita erat oraculo, sacerdos dixisse dicitur de salute Lacedaemoniis esse non de victoria cogitandum.”

[¶11] 77. "Again, did not Gaius Flaminius by his neglect of premonitory signs in his second consulship in the Second Punic War cause great disaster to the State? For, after a review of his army, he had moved his camp and was marching towards Arretium to meet Hannibal, when his horse, for no apparent reason, suddenly fell with him just in front of the statue of Jupiter Stator. Although the soothsayers considered this a divine warning not to join battle, he did not so regard it. Again, after the auspices by means of the tripudium had been taken the keeper of the sacred chickens advised the postponement of battle. Flaminius then asked,' Suppose the chickens should never eat, what would you advise in that case?' 'You should remain in camp,' was the reply. 'Fine auspices indeed!' said Flaminius, 'for they counsel action when chickens' crops are empty and inaction when chickens' crops are filled.' So he ordered the standards to be plucked up and the army to follow him. Then, when the standard-bearer of the first company could not loosen his standard, several soldiers came to his assistance, but to no purpose. This fact was reported to Flaminius, and he, with his accustomed obstinacy, ignored it. The consequence was that within three hours his army was cut to pieces and he himself was slain.

> Latin: 77. “Quid? bello Punico secundo nonne C. Flaminius consul iterum neglexit signa rerum futurarum magna cum clade rei publicae? exercitu lustrato cum Arretium versus castra movisset et contra Hannibalem legiones duceret, et ipse et equus eius ante signum Iovis Statoris sine causa repente concidit, nec eam rem habuit religioni obiecto signo, ut peritis videbatur, ne committeret proelium. Idem cum tripudio auspicaretur, pullarius diem proeli committendi differebat. Flaminius ex eo quaesivit, si ne postea quidem pulli pascerentur, quid faciendum censeret. ille quiescendum respondisset, Flaminius: ‘Praeclara vero auspicia, si esurientibus pullis res geri poterit, saturis nihil geretur!’ Itaque signa convelli et se sequi iussit. tempore cum signifer primi hastati signum non posset movere loco, nec quicquam proficeretur, plures cum accederent, Flaminius, re nuntiata, suo more, neglexit. tribus eis horis concisus exercitus atque ipse interfectus est.”

[¶12] 78. Coelius has added the further notable fact that, at the very time this disastrous battle was going on, earthquakes of such violence occurred in Liguria, in Gaul, on several islands, and in every part of Italy, that a large number of towns were destroyed, landslips took place in many regions, the earth sank, rivers flowed upstream, and the sea invaded their channels. "Trustworthy conjectures in divining are made by experts. For instance, when Midas, the famous king of Phrygia, was a child, ants filled his mouth with grains of wheat as he slept. It was predicted that he would be a very wealthy man; and so it turned out. Again, while Plato was an infant, asleep in his cradle, bees settled on his lips and this was interpreted to mean that he would have a rare sweetness of speech. Hence in his infancy his future eloquence was foreseen.

> Latin: 78. “illud etiam, quod addidit Coelius, eo tempore ipso, cum hoc calamitosum proelium fieret, tantos terrae motus in Liguribus, Gallia compluribusque insulis totaque in Italia factos esse, ut multa oppida conruerint, multis locis labes factae sint terraeque desederint fluminaque in contrarias partes fluxerint atque in amnes mare influxerit.” “Fiunt certae divinationum coniecturae a peritis. Midae illi Phrygi, cum puer esset, dormienti formicae in os tritici grana congesserunt. fore praedictum est; quod evenit. At Platoni cum in cunis parvulo dormienti apes in labellis consedissent, responsum est singulari illum suavitate orationis fore. futura eloquentia provisa in infante est.”

[¶13] 79. And what about your beloved and charming friend Roscius? Did he lie or did the whole of Lanuvium lie for him in telling the following incident: In his cradle days, while he was being reared in Solonium, a plain in the Lanuvian district, his nurse suddenly awoke during the night and by the light of a lamp observed the child asleep with a snake coiled about him. She was greatly frightened at the sight and gave an alarm. His father referred the occurrence to the soothsayers, who replied that the boy would attain unrivalled eminence and glory. Indeed, Pasiteles has engraved the scene in silver and our friend Archias has described it in verse. "Then what do we expect? Do we wait for the immortal gods to converse with us in the forum, on the street, and in our homes? While they do not, of course, present themselves in person, they do diffuse their power far and wide—sometimes enclosing it in caverns of the earth and sometimes imparting it to human beings. The Pythian priestess at Delphi was inspired by the power of the earth and the Sibyl by that of nature. Why need you marvel at this? Do we not see how the soils of the earth vary in kind? Some are deadly, like that about Lake Ampsanctus in the country of the Hirpini and that of Plutonia in Asia, both of which I have seen. Even in the same neighbourhood, some parts are salubrious and some are not; some produce men of keen wit, others produce fools. These diverse effects are all the result of differences in climate and differences in the earth's exhalations.

> Latin: 79. “? amores ac deliciae tuae, Roscius, num aut ipse aut pro eo Lanuvium totum mentiebatur? cum esset in cunabulis educareturque in Solonio, qui est campus agri Lanuvini, noctu lumine apposito experrecta nutrix animadvertit puerum dormientem circumplicatum serpentis amplexu. aspectu exterrita clamorem sustulit. autem Rosci ad haruspices rettulit, qui responderunt nihil illo puero clarius, nihil nobilius fore. hanc speciem Pasiteles caelavit argento et noster expressit Archias versibus.” “Quid igitur expectamus? an dum in foro nobiscum di immortales, dum in viis versentur, dum domi? qui quidem ipsi se nobis non offerunt, vim autem suam longe lateque diffundunt, quam tum terrae cavernis includunt, tum hominum naturis implicant. terrae vis Pythiam Delphis incitabat, naturae Sibyllam. enim? non videmus quam sint varia terrarum genera? ex quibus et mortifera quaedam pars est, ut et Ampsancti in Hirpinis et in Asia Plutonia, quae vidimus, et sunt partes agrorum aliae pestilentes, aliae salubres, aliae, quae acuta ingenia gignant, aliae, quae retusa; quae omnia fiunt et ex caeli varietate et ex disparili aspiratione terrarum.”

[¶14] 80. It often happens, too, that the soul is violently stirred by the sight of some object, or by the deep tones of a voice, or by singing. Frequently anxiety or fear will have that effect, as it did in the case of Hesione, who
Did rave like one by Bacchic rites made mad
And mid the tombs her Teucer called aloud. "And poetic inspiration also proves that there is a divine power within the human soul. Democritus says that no one can be a great poet without being in a state of frenzy, and Plato says the same thing. Let Plato call it 'frenzy' if he will, provided he praises it as it was praised in his Phaedrus. And what about your own speeches in law suits? Can the delivery of you lawyers be impassioned, weighty, and fluent unless your soul is deeply stirred? Upon my word, many a time have I seen in you such passion of look and gesture that I thought some power was rendering you unconscious of what you did; and, if I may cite a less striking example, I have seen the same in your friend Aesopus.

> Latin: 80. “etiam saepe specie quadam, saepe vocum gravitate et cantibus ut pellantur animi vehementius, saepe etiam cura et timore, qualis est illa
flexánima tamquam lýmphata aut Bacchí sacris
commóta in tumulis Teúcrum commemoráns suum.” “Atque etiam illa concitatio declarat vim in animis esse divinam. enim sine furore Democritus quemquam poëtam magnum esse posse, quod idem dicit Plato., si placet, appellet furorem, dum modo is furor ita laudetur, ut in Phaedro Platonis laudatus est.? vestra oratio in causis, quid ipsa actio potest esse vehemens et gravis et copiosa, nisi est animus ipse commotior? etiam in te saepe vidi et, ut ad leviora veniamus, in Aesopo, familiari tuo, tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quaedam abstraxisse a sensu mentis videretur.”

[¶15] 81. "Frequently, too, apparitions present themselves and, though they have no real substance, they seem to have. This is illustrated by what is said to have happened to Brennus and to his Gallic troops after he had made an impious attack on the temple of Apollo at Delphi. The story is that the Pythian priestess, in speaking from the oracle, said to Brennus:
To this the virgins white and I will see.
The result was that the virgins were seen fighting against the Gauls, and their army was overwhelmed with snow. "Aristotle thought that even the people who rave from the effects of sickness and are called 'hypochondriacs' have within their souls some power of foresight and of prophecy. But, for my part, I am inclined to think that such a power is not to be attributed either to a diseased stomach or to a disordered brain. On the contrary, it is the healthy soul and not the sickly body that has the power of divination.

> Latin: 81. “Obiciuntur etiam saepe formae quae reapse nullae sunt, speciem autem offerunt; quod contigisse Brenno dicitur eiusque Gallicis copiis, cum fano Apollinis Delphici nefarium bellum intulisset. enim ferunt ex oraclo ecfatam esse Pythiam:
ego próvidebo rem ístam et albae vírgines.
quo factum ut viderentur virgines ferre arma contra et nive Gallorum obrueretur exercitus.” “Aristoteles quidem eos etiam, qui valetudinis vitio furerent et melancholici dicerentur, censebat habere aliquid in animis praesagiens atque divinum. autem haud scio an nec cardiacis hoc tribuendum sit nec phreneticis; animi enim integri non vitiosi est corporis divinatio.”

[¶16] 82. The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning: "'If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future;

> Latin: 82. “quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur:” “‘Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant; aut existimant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus quae sunt futura; aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici); neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt; neque nostra nihil interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt (erimus enim cautiores si sciemus); neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius); neque non possunt futura praenoscere;’”

[¶17] 83. therefore it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods, therefore they give us such signs; and if they give such signs, it is not true that they give us no means to understand those signs—otherwise their signs would be useless; and if they give us the means, it is not true that there is no divination; therefore there is divination.'

> Latin: 83. “‘non igitur sunt di nec significant futura; sunt autem di, significant ergo; et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam (frustra enim significarent); nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio; est igitur divinatio.’”

[¶18] 84. "Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater employ the same reasoning. Then what ground is there to doubt the absolute truth of my position? For I have on my side reason, facts, peoples, and races, both Greek and barbarian, our own ancestors, the unvarying belief of all ages, the greatest philosophers, the poets, the wisest men, the builders of cities, and the founders of republics. Are we not satisfied with the unanimous judgement of men, and do we wait for beasts to give their testimony too?

> Latin: 84. “Hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur. est igitur cur dubitandum sit quin sint ea quae disputavi verissima, si ratio mecum facit, si eventa, si populi, si nationes, si Graeci, si barbari, si maiores etiam nostri, si denique hoc semper ita putatum est, si summi philosophi, si poëtae, si sapientissimi viri, qui res publicas constituerunt, qui urbes condiderunt? An, dum bestiae loquantur exspectamus? hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non sumus?”

[¶19] 85. The truth is that no other argument of any sort is advanced to show the futility of the various kinds of divination which I have mentioned except the fact that it is difficult to give the cause or reason of every kind of divination. You ask, 'Why is it that the soothsayer, when he finds a cleft in the lung of the victim, even though the other vitals are sound, stops the execution of an undertaking and defers it to another day?' 'Why does an augur think it a favourable omen when a raven flies to the right, or a crow to the left?' 'Why does an astrologer consider that the moon's conjunction with the planets Jupiter and Venus at the birth of children is a favourable omen, and its conjunction with Saturn or Mars unfavourable?' Again, 'Why does God warn us when we are asleep and fail to do so when we are awake?' Finally, 'Why is it that mad Cassandra foresees coming events and wise Priam cannot do the same?'

> Latin: 85. “vero quicquam aliud affertur cur ea quae dico divinandi genera nulla sint, nisi, quod difficile dictu videtur, quae cuiusque divinationis ratio, quae causa sit. ‘Quid enim habet haruspex, cur pulmo incisus etiam in bonis extis dirimat tempus et proferat diem?’ ‘Quid augur, cur a dextra corvus, a sinistra cornix, faciat ratum?’ ‘Quid astrologus cur stella Iovis aut Veneris coniuncta cum luna ad ortus puerorum salutaris sit, Saturni Martisve contraria?’ ‘Cur autem deus dormientes nos moneat, vigilantes neglegat?’ ‘Quid deinde causae est cur Cassandra furens futura prospiciat, Priamus sapiens hoc idem facere non queat?’”

[¶20] 86. "You ask why everything happens. You have a perfect right to ask, but that is not the point at issue now. The question is, Does it happen, or does it not? For example, if I were to say that the magnet attracted iron and drew it to itself, and I could not tell you why, then I suppose you would utterly deny that the magnet had any such power. At least that is the course you pursue in regard to the existence of the power of divination, although it is established by our own experience and that of others, by our reading and by the traditions of our forefathers. Why, even before the dawn of philosophy, which is a recent discovery, the average man had no doubt about divination, and, since its development, no philosopher of any sort of reputation has had any different view.

> Latin: 86. “Cur fiat quidque, quaeris. omnino; sed non nunc id agitur; fiat necne fiat, id quaeritur., si magnetem lapidem esse dicam qui ferrum ad se adliciat et attrahat, rationem cur id fiat, afferre nequeam, fieri omnino neges. idem facis in divinatione, quam et cernimus ipsi et audimus et legimus et a patribus accepimus. ante philosophiam patefactam, quae nuper inventa est, hac de re communis vita dubitavit, et, posteaquam philosophia processit, nemo aliter philosophus sensit, in quo modo esset auctoritas.”

[¶21] 87. I have already cited Pythagoras, Democritus, and Socrates and, of the ancients, I have excluded no one except Xenophanes. To them I have added the Old Academy, the Peripatetics; and the Stoics. The only dissenter is Epicurus. But why wonder at that? for is his opinion of divination any more discreditable than his view that there is no such thing as a disinterested virtue? "But is there a man anywhere who is uninfluenced by clear and unimpeachable records signed and sealed by the hand of Time? For example, Homer writes that Calchas was by far the best augur among the Greeks and that he commanded the Greek fleet before Troy. His command of the fleet I suppose was due to his skill as an augur and not to his skill in seamanship.

> Latin: 87. “de Pythagora, de Democrito, de Socrate, excepi de antiquis praeter Xenophanem neminem; adiunxi veterem Academiam, Peripateticos, Stoicos; unus dissentit Epicurus. vero hoc turpius, quam quod idem nullam censet gratuitam esse virtutem?” “Quis est autem quem non moveat clarissimis monumentis testata consignataque antiquitas? Calchantem augurem scribit Homerus longe optimum, eumque ducem classium fuisse ad Ilium, auspiciorum credo scientia, non locorum.”

[¶22] 88. Amphilochus and Mopsus were kings of Argos, but they were augurs too, and they founded Greek cities on the coasts of Cilicia. And even before them were Amphiaraus and Tiresias. They were no lowly and unknown men, nor were they like the persons described by Ennius,
Who, for their own gain, uphold opinions that are false,
but they were eminent men of the noblest type and foretold the future by means of augural signs. In speaking of Tiresias, even when in the infernal regions, Homer says that he alone was wise, that the rest were mere wandering shadows. As for Amphiaraus, his reputation in Greece was such that he was honoured as a god, and oracular responses were sought in the place where he was buried.

> Latin: 88. “et Mopsus Argivorum reges fuerunt, sed eidem augures, eique urbis in ora maritima Ciliciae Graecas condiderunt; atque etiam ante hos Amphiaraus et Tiresias non humiles et obscuri neque eorum similes, ut apud Ennium est,
quí sui quaestus caúsa fictas súscitant senténtias.
sed clari et praestantes viri, qui avibus et signis admoniti futura dicebant; quorum de altero etiam apud inferos Homerus ait ‘solum sapere, ceteros umbrarum vagari modo’; Amphiaraum autem sic honoravit fama Graeciae, deus ut haberetur, atque ut ab eius solo, in quo est humatus, oracla peterentur.”

[¶23] 89. "Furthermore, did not Priam, the Asiatic king, have a son, Helenus, and a daughter, Cassandra, who prophesied, the first by means of auguries and the other when under a heaven-inspired excitement and exaltation of soul? In the same class, as we read in the records of our forefathers, were those famous Marcian brothers, men of noble birth. And does not Homer relate that Polyidus of Corinth not only made many predictions to others, but that he also foretold the death of his own son, who was setting out for Troy? As a general rule among the ancients the men who ruled the state had control likewise of augury, for they considered divining, as well as wisdom, becoming to a king. Proof of this is afforded by our State wherein the kings were augurs; and, later, private citizens endowed with the same priestly office ruled the republic by the authority of religion.

> Latin: 89. “Quid? Asiae rex Priamus nonne et Helenum filium et Cassandram filiam divinantes habebat, alterum auguriis, alteram mentis incitatione et permotione divina? in genere Marcios quosdam fratres, nobili loco natos, apud maiores nostros fuisse scriptum videmus.? Polyidum Corinthium nonne Homerus et aliis multa et filio ad Troiam proficiscenti mortem praedixisse commemorat? apud veteres, qui rerum potiebantur, iidem auguria tenebant; ut enim sapere, sic divinare regale ducebant. testis est nostra civitas, in qua et reges augures et postea privati eodem sacerdotio praediti rem publicam religionum auctoritate rexerunt.”

[¶24] 90. "Nor is the practice of divination disregarded even among uncivilized tribes, if indeed there are Druids in Gaul—and there are, for I knew one of them myself, Divitiacus, the Aeduan, your guest and eulogist. He claimed to have that knowledge of nature which the Greeks call ' physiologia,' and he used to make predictions, sometimes by means of augury and sometimes by means of conjecture. Among the Persians the augurs and diviners are the magi, who assemble regularly in a sacred place for practice and consultation, just as formerly you augurs used to do on the Nones.

> Latin: 90. “Eaque divinationum ratio ne in barbaris quidem gentibus neglecta est, siquidem et in Gallia Druidae sunt, e quibus ipse Divitiacum Aeduum, hospitem tuum laudatoremque, cognovi, qui et naturae rationem, quam φυσιολογίαν Graeci appellant, notam esse sibi profitebatur et partim auguriis, partim coniectura, quae essent futura, dicebat. in Persis augurantur et divinant magi, qui congregantur in fano commentandi causa atque inter se conloquendi, quod etiam idem vos quondam facere Nonis solebatis.”

[¶25] 91. Indeed, no one can become king of the Persians until he has learned the theory and the practice of the magi. Moreover, you may see whole families and tribes devoted to this art. For example, Telmessus in Caria is a city noted for its cultivation of the soothsayer's art, and there is also Elis in Peloponnesus, which has permanently set aside two families as soothsayers, the Iamidae and the Clutidae, who are distinguished for superior skill in their art. In Syria the Chaldeans are pre-eminent for their knowledge of astronomy and for their quickness of mind.

> Latin: 91. “quisquam rex Persarum potest esse, qui non ante magorum disciplinam scientiamque perceperit. autem videre et genera quaedam et nationes huic scientiae deditas. in Caria est, qua in urbe excellit haruspicum disciplina; itemque Elis in Peloponneso familias duas certas habet, Iamidarum unam, alteram Clutidarum, haruspicinae nobilitate praestantes. Syria Chaldaei cognitione astrorum sollertiaque ingeniorum antecellunt.”

[¶26] 92. "Again, the Etrurians are very skilful in observing thunderbolts, in interpreting their meaning and that of every sign and portent. That is why, in the days of our forefathers, it was wisely decreed by the Senate, when its power was in full vigour, that, of the sons of the chief men, six should be handed over to each of the Etruscan tribes for the study of divination, in order that so important a profession should not, on account of the poverty of its members, be withdrawn from the influence of religion, and converted into a means of mercenary gain. On the other hand the Phrygians, Pisidians, Cilicians, and Arabians rely chiefly on the signs conveyed by the flights of birds, and the Umbrians, according to tradition, used to do the same.

> Latin: 92. “Etruria autem de caelo tacta scientissime animadvertit eademque interpretatur, quid quibusque ostendatur monstris atque portentis. bene apud maiores nostros senatus tum, cum florebat imperium, decrevit, ut de principum filiis sex singulis Etruriae populis in disciplinam traderentur, ne ars tanta propter tenuitatem hominum a religionis auctoritate abduceretur ad mercedem atque quaestum. Phryges autem et Pisidae et Cilices et Arabum natio avium significationibus plurimum obtemperant, quod idem factitatum in Umbria accepimus.”

[¶27] 93. "Now, for my part, I believe that the character of the country determined the kind of divination which its inhabitants adopted. For example, the Egyptians and Babylonians, who live on the level surface of open plains, with no hills to obstruct a view of the sky, have devoted their attention wholly to astrology. But the Etruscans, being in their nature of a very ardent religious temperament and accustomed to the frequent sacrifice of victims, have given their chief attention to the study of entrails. And as on account of the density of the atmosphere signs from heaven were common among them, and furthermore since that atmospheric condition caused many phenomena both of earth and sky and also certain prodigies that occur in the conception and birth of men and cattle—for these reasons the Etruscans have become very proficient in the interpretation of portents. Indeed, the inherent force of these means of divination, as you like to observe, is clearly shown by the very words so aptly chosen by our ancestors to describe them. Because they 'make manifest' (ostendunt), 'portend ' (portendunt), ' intimate ' (monstrant),'predict ' (praedicunt), they are called ' manifestations,' ' portents,' ' intimations,' and 'prodigies.'

> Latin: 93. “Ac mihi quidem videntur e locis quoque ipsis, qui a quibusque incolebantur, divinationum opportunitates esse ductae. Aegyptii et Babylonii in camporum patentium aequoribus habitantes, cum ex terra nihil emineret, quod contemplationi caeli officere posset, omnem curam in siderum cognitione posuerunt. Etrusci autem, quod religione imbuti studiosius et crebrius hostias immolabant, extorum cognitioni se maxime dediderunt, quodque propter aeris crassitudinem de caelo apud eos multa fiebant, et quod ob eandem causam multa inusitata partim e caelo, alia ex terra oriebantur, quaedam etiam ex hominum pecudumve conceptu et satu, ostentorum exercitatissimi interpretes exstiterunt. quidem vim, ut tu soles dicere, verba ipsa prudenter a maioribus posita declarant. enim ostendunt, portendunt, monstrant, praedicunt, ostenta, portenta, monstra, prodigia dicuntur.”

[¶28] 94. But the Arabians, Phrygians, and Cilicians, being chiefly engaged in the rearing of cattle, are constantly wandering over the plains and mountains in winter and summer and, on that account, have found it quite easy to study the songs and flights of birds. The same is true of the Pisidians and of our fellowcountrymen, the Umbrians. While the Carians, and especially the Telmessians, already mentioned, because they live in a country with a very rich and prolific soil, whose fertility produces many abnormal growths, have turned their attention to the study of prodigies.

> Latin: 94. “autem et Phryges et Cilices, quod pastu pecudum maxime utuntur campos et montes, hieme et aestate peragrantes, propterea facilius cantus avium et volatus notaverunt; eademque et Pisidiae causa fuit et huic nostrae Umbriae. Caria tota praecipueque Telmesses, quos ante dixi, quod agros uberrimos maximeque fertiles incolunt, in quibus multa propter fecunditatem fingi gignique possunt. in ostentis animadvertendis diligentes fuerunt.”

[¶29] 95. "But who fails to observe that auspices and all other kinds of divination flourish best in the best regulated states? And what king or people has there ever been who did not employ divination? I do not mean in time of peace only, but much more even in time of war, when the strife and struggle for safety is hardest. Passing by our own countrymen, who do nothing in war without examining entrails and nothing in peace without taking the auspices, let us look at the practice of foreign nations The Athenians, for instance, in every public assembly always had present certain priestly diviners, whom they call manteis. The Spartans assigned an augur to their kings as a judicial adviser, and they also enacted that an augur should be present in their Council of Elders, which is the name of their Senate. In matters of grave concern they always consulted the oracle at Delphi, or that of Jupiter Hammon or that of Dodona.

> Latin: 95. “Quis vero non videt in optima quaque re publica plurimum auspicia et reliqua divinandi genera valuisse? rex umquam fuit, quis populus, qui non uteretur praedictione divina? neque solum in pace, sed in bello multo etiam magis, quo maius erat certamen et discrimen salutis. nostros, qui nihil in bello sine extis agunt, nihil sine auspiciis domi externa videamus: namque et Athenienses omnibus semper publicis consiliis divinos quosdam sacerdotes, quos μάντεις vocant, adhibuerunt, et Lacedaemonii regibus suis augurem assessorem dederunt, itemque senibus (sic enim consilium publicum appellant) augurem interesse voluerunt, iidemque de rebus maioribus semper aut Delphis oraclum aut ab Hammone aut a Dodona petebant.”

[¶30] 96. Lycurgus himself, who once governed the Spartan state, established his laws by authority of Apollo's Delphic oracle, and Lysander, who wished to repeal them, was prevented from doing so by the religious scruples of the people. Moreover, the Spartan rulers, not content with their deliberations when awake, used to sleep in a shrine of Pasiphaë which is situated in a field near the city, in order to dream there, because they believed that oracles received in repose were true.

> Latin: 96. “quidem, qui Lacedaemoniorum rem publicam temperavit, leges suas auctoritate Apollinis Delphici confirmavit; quas cum vellet Lysander commutare, eadem est prohibitus religione. etiam qui praeerant Lacedaemoniis, non contenti vigilantibus curis, in Pasiphaae fano, quod est in agro propter urbem, somniandi causa excubabant, quia vera quietis oracla ducebant.”

[¶31] 97. "I now return to instances at home. How many times the Senate has ordered the decemvirs to consult the Sibylline books! How often in matters of grave concern it has obeyed the responses of the soothsayers! Take the following examples: When at one time, two suns and, at another, three moons. were seen; when meteors appeared; when the sun shone at night; when rumblings were heard in the heavens; when the sky seemed to divide, showing balls of fire enclosed within; again, on the occasion of the landslip in Privernum, report of which was made to the Senate; and when Apulia was shaken by a most violent earthquake and the land sank to an incredible depth—in all these cases of portents which warned the Roman people of mighty wars and deadly revolutions, the responses of the soothsayers were in agreement with the Sibylline verses.

> Latin: 97. “Ad nostra iam redeo. senatus decemviros ad libros ire iussit! quantis in rebus quamque saepe responsis haruspicum paruit! et cum duo visi soles sunt et cum tres lunae et cum faces, et cum sol nocte visus est, et cum e caelo fremitus auditus, et cum caelum discessisse visum est atque in eo animadversi globi, delata etiam ad senatum labe agri Privernatis, cum ad infinitam altitudinem terra desedisset Apuliaque maximis terrae motibus conquassata esset—quibus portentis magna populo Romano bella perniciosaeque seditiones denuntiabantur. his omnibus responsa haruspicum cum Sibyllae versibus congruebant.”

[¶32] 98. "And what of those other instances? As when, for example, the statue of Apollo at Cumae and that of Victory at Capua dripped with sweat; when that unlucky prodigy, the hermaphrodite, was born; when the river Atratus ran with blood; when there were showers frequently of stone, sometimes of blood, occasionally of earth and even of milk; and finally, when lightning struck the statue of the Centaur on the Capitoline hill, the gates and some people on the Aventine and the temples of Castor and Pollux at Tusculum and of Piety at Rome— in each of these cases did not the soothsayers give prophetic responses which were afterwards fulfilled? And were not these same prophecies found in the Sibylline books?

> Latin: 98. “Quid? cum Cumis Apollo sudavit, Capuae Victoria? quid? ortus androgyni nonne fatale quoddam monstrum fuit? quid? cum fluvius Atratus sanguine fluxit? quid? cum saepe lapidum, sanguinis non numquam, terrae interdum, quondam etiam lactis imber affluxit? quid? cum in Capitolio ictus Centaurus e caelo est, in Aventino portae et homines, Tusculi aedes Castoris et Pollucis, Romaeque Pietatis: nonne et haruspices ea responderunt, quae evenerunt, et in Sibyllae libris eaedem repertae praedictiones sunt?”

[¶33] 99. "In recent times, during the Marsian war, the temple of Juno Sospita was restored because of a dream of Caecilia, the daughter of Quintus Caecilius Metellus. This is the same dream that Sisenna discussed as marvellous, in that its prophecies were fulfilled to the letter, and yet later —influenced no doubt by some petty Epicureanhe goes on inconsistently to maintain that dreams are not worthy of belief. This writer, however, has nothing to say against prodigies; in fact he relates that, at the outbreak of the Marsian War, the statues of the gods dripped with sweat, rivers ran with blood, the heavens opened, voices from unknown sources were heard predicting dangerous wars, and finally—the sign considered by the soothsayers the most ominous of all—the shields at Lanuvium were gnawed by mice.

> Latin: 99. “Caeciliae Q. filiae somnio modo Marsico bello templum est a senatu Iunoni Sospitae restitutum. quidem somnium Sisenna cum disputavisset mirifice ad verbum cum re convenisse, tum insolenter, credo ab Epicureo aliquo inductus, disputat somniis credi non oportere. contra ostenta nihil disputat exponitque initio belli Marsici et deorum simulacra sudavisse, et sanguinem fluxisse, et discessisse caelum, et ex occulto auditas esse voces, quae pericula belli nuntiarent, et Lanuvi clipeos, quod haruspicibus tristissimum visum esset, a muribus esse derosos.”

[¶34] 100. "And what do you say of the following story which we find in our annals? During the Veientian War, when Lake Albanus had overflowed its banks, a certain nobleman of Veii deserted to us and said that, according to the prophecies of the Veientian books, their city could not be taken while the lake was at flood, and that if its waters were permitted to overflow and take their own course to the sea the result would be disastrous to the Roman people; on the other hand, if the waters were drained off in such a way that they did not reach the sea the result would be to our advantage. In consequence of this announcement our forefathers dug that marvellous canal to drain off the waters from the Alban lake. Later when the Veientians had grown weary of war and had sent ambassadors to the Senate to treat for peace, one of them is reported to have said that the deserter had not dared to tell the whole of the prophecy contained in the Veientian books, for those books, he said, also foretold the early capture of Rome by the Gauls. And this, as we know, did occur six years after the fall of Veii.

> Latin: 100. “Quid, quod in annalibus habemus Veienti bello, cum lacus Albanus praeter modum crevisset, Veientem quendam ad nos hominem nobilem perfugisse, eumque dixisse ex fatis, quae Veientes scripta haberent, Veios capi non posse, dum lacus is redundaret; et, si lacus emissus lapsu et cursu suo ad mare profluxisset, perniciosum populo Romano; sin autem ita esset eductus, ut ad mare pervenire non posset, tum salutare nostris fore? quo illa admirabilis a maioribus Albanae aquae facta deductio est. autem Veientes bello fessi legatos ad senatum misissent, tum ex eis quidam dixisse dicitur non omnia ilium transfugam ausum esse senatui dicere; in isdem enim fatis scriptum Veientes habere fore ut brevi a Gallis Roma caperetur, quod quidem sexennio post Veios captos factum esse videmus.”

[¶35] 101. "Again, we are told that fauns have often been heard in battle and that during turbulent times truly prophetic messages have been sent from mysterious places. Out of many instances of this class I shall give only two, but they are very striking. Not long before the capture of the city by the Gauls, a voice, issuing from Vesta's sacred grove, which slopes from the foot of the Palatine Hill to the New Road, was heard to say, 'the walls and gates must be repaired; unless this is done the city will be taken.' Neglect of this warning, while it was possible to heed it, was atoned for after the supreme disaster had occurred; for, adjoining the grove, an altar, which is now to be seen enclosed with a hedge, was dedicated to Aius the Speaker. The other illustration has been reported by many writers. At the time of the earthquake a voice came from Juno's temple on the citadel commanding that an expiatory sacrifice be made of a pregnant sow. From this fact the goddess was called Juno the Adviser. Are we, then, lightly to regard these warnings which the gods have sent and our forefathers adjudged to be trustworthy?

> Latin: 101. “Saepe etiam et in proeliis fauni auditi et in rebus turbidis veridicae voces ex occulto missae esse dicuntur; cuius generis duo sint ex multis exempla, sed maxima: nam non multo ante urbem captam exaudita vox est a luco Vestae, qui a Palati radice in novam viam devexus est, ut muri et portae reficerentur; futurum esse, nisi provisum esset, ut Roma caperetur. neglectum tum, cum caveri poterat, post acceptam illam maximam cladem expiatum est; ara enim Aio Loquenti, quam saeptam videmus, exadversus eum locum consecrata est. etiam scriptum a multis est, cum terrae motus factus esset, ut sue plena procuratio fieret, vocem ab aede Iunonis ex arce extitisse; quocirca Iunonem illam appellatam Monetam. igitur et a dis significata et a nostris maioribus iudicata contemnimus?”

## 4. Book I · sections 102–132

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/4/#p-N

[¶0] 102. "Nor is it only to the voices of the gods that the Pythagoreans have paid regard but also to the utterances of men which they term 'omens.' Our ancestors, too, considered such 'omens' worthy of respect, and for that reason, before entering upon any business enterprise, used to say, ' May the issue be prosperous, propitious, lucky, and successful.' At public celebrations of religious rites they gave the command, 'Guard your tongues'; and in issuing the order for the Latin festival the customary injunction was, ' Let the people refrain from strife and quarrelling.' So too, when the sacred ceremony of purification was held by one starting on an expedition to found a colony, or when the commander-in-chief was reviewing his army, or the censor was taking his census, it was the rule to choose men with names of good omen to lead the victims. Furthermore, the consuls in making a levy of troops take pains to see that the first soldier enlisted is one with a lucky name.

> Latin: 102. “Neque solum deorum voces Pythagorei observitaverunt, sed etiam hominum, quae vocant omina. maiores nostri quia valere censebant, idcirco omnibus rebus agendis, ‘Quod bonum, faustum, felix fortunatumque esset’ praefabantur; rebusque divinis, quae publice fierent, ut ‘faverent linguis,’ imperabatur; inque feriis imperandis, ut ‘litibus et iurgiis se abstinerent.’ Itemque in lustranda colonia ab eo qui eam deduceret, et cum imperator exercitum, censor populum, lustraret, bonis nominibus, qui hostias ducerent, eligebantur. idem in dilectu consules observant, ut primus miles fiat bono nomine.”

[¶1] 103. You, of course, are aware that you, both as consul at home and later as commander in the field, employed the same precaution with the most scrupulous care. In the case, too, of the prerogative tribe or century, our forefathers determined that it should be the 'omen' of a proper election. "Now let me give some well-known examples of omens: When Lucius Paulus was consul the second time, and had been chosen to wage war against King Perses, upon returning home on the evening of the day on which he had been appointed, he noticed, as he kissed his little daughter Tertia (at that time a very small child), that she was rather sad. 'What is the matter, Tertia, my dear? Why are you sad?' 'Oh! father, Persa is dead.' Paulus clasped the child in a closer embrace and said, 'Daughter, I accept that as an omen.' Now ' Persa' was the name of a little dog that had died.

> Latin: 103. “quidem a te scis et consule et imperatore summa cum religione esse servata. etiam maiores omen iustorum comitiorum esse voluerunt.” “Atque ego exempla ominum nota proferam: L. Paulus consul iterum, cum ei bellum ut cum rege Perse gereret obtigisset, ut ea ipsa die domum ad vesperum rediit, filiolam suam Tertiam, quae tum erat admodum parva, osculans animum advertit tristiculam. ‘Quid est,’ inquit, ‘mea Tertia? quid tristis es?’ ‘Mi pater,’ inquit, ‘Persa periit.’ Tum ille arctius puellam complexus, ‘Accipio,’ inquit, ‘mea filia, omen.’ Erat autem mortuus catellus eo nomine.”

[¶2] 104. I heard Lucius Flaccus, the high priest of Mars, relate the following story: Metellus' daughter, Caecilia, who was desirous of arranging a marriage for her sister's daughter, went, according to the ancient custom, to a small chapel to receive an omen. A long time passed while the maiden stood and Caecilia was seated on a chair without any word being spoken. Finally, the former grew weary and said to her aunt: 'Let me sit awhile on your chair.' ' Certainly, my child,' said Caecilia, 'you may have my place.' And this was an omen of what came to pass, for in a short time Caecilia died and the girl married her aunt's husband. I realize perfectly well that the foregoing omens may be lightly regarded and even be laughed at, but to make light of signs sent by the gods is nothing less than to disbelieve in the existence of the gods.

> Latin: 104. “L. Flaccum, flaminem Martialem, ego audivi, cum diceret Caeciliam Metelli, cum vellet sororis suae filiam in matrimonium collocare, exisse in quoddam sacellum ominis capiendi causa, quod fieri more veterum solebat. virgo staret et Caecilia in sella sederet neque diu ulla vox exstitisset, puellam defatigatam petisse a matertera, ut sibi concederet, paulisper ut in eius sella requiesceret; illam autem dixisse: ‘Vero, mea puella, tibi concedo meas sedes.’ Quod omen res consecuta est; ipsa enim brevi mortua est, virgo autem nupsit, cui Caecilia nupta fuerat. posse contemni vel etiam rideri praeclare intellego, sed id ipsum est deos non putare, quae ab eis significantur, contemnere.”

[¶3] 105. "Why need I speak of augurs? That is your role; the duty to defend auspices, I maintain, is yours. For it was to you, while you were consul, that the augur Appius Claudius declared that because the augury of safety was unpropitious a grievous and violent civil war was at hand. That war began a few months later, but you brought it to an end in still fewer days. Appius is one augur of whom I heartily approve, for not content merely with the sing-song ritual of augury, he, alone, according to the record of many years, has maintained a real system of divination. I know that your colleagues used to laugh at him and call him at one time ' a Pisidian ' and at another ' a Soran.' They did not concede to augury any power of prevision or real knowledge of the future, and used to say that it was a superstitious practice shrewdly invented to gull the ignorant. But the truth is far otherwise, for neither those herdsmen whom Romulus governed, nor Romulus himself, could have had cunning enough to invent miracles with which to mislead the people. It is the trouble and hard work involved in mastering the art that has induced this eloquent contempt; for men prefer to say glibly that there is nothing in auspices rather than to learn what auspices are.

> Latin: 105. “Quid de auguribus loquar? partes sunt, tuum, inquam, auspiciorum patrocinium debet esse. App. Claudius augur consuli nuntiavit addubitato Salutis augurio bellum domesticum triste ac turbulentum fore; quod paucis post mensibus exortum paucioribus a te est diebus oppressum. quidem auguri vehementer assentior; solus enim multorum annorum memoria non decantandi auguri, sed divinandi tenuit disciplinam. irridebant collegae tui eumque tum Pisidam, tum Soranum augurem esse dicebant; quibus nulla videbatur in auguriis aut praesensio aut scientia veritatis futurae; sapienter aiebant ad opinionem imperitorum esse fictas religiones. longe secus est; neque enim in pastoribus illis, quibus Romulus praefuit, nec in ipso Romulo haec calliditas esse potuit, ut ad errorem multitudinis religionis simulacra fingerent. difficultas laborque discendi disertam neglegentiam reddidit; malunt enim disserere nihil esse in auspiciis quam quid sit ediscere.”

[¶4] 106. "Now—to employ you as often as I can as my authority—what could be more clearly of divine origin than the auspice which is thus described in your Marius?
Behold, from out the tree, on rapid wing,
The eagle that attends high-thundering Jove
A serpent bore, whose fangs had wounded her;
And as she flew her cruel talons pierced
Quite through its flesh. The snake, tho' nearly dead,
Kept darting here and there its spotted head;
And, as it writhed, she tore with bloody beak
Its twisted folds. At last, with sated wrath
And grievous wounds avenged, she dropped her prey,
Which, dead and mangled, fell into the sea;
And from the West she sought the shining East.
When Marius, reader of divine decrees,
Observed the bird's auspicious, gliding course,
He recognized the goodly sign foretold
That he in glory would return to Rome;
Then, on the left, Jove's thunder pealed aloud
And thus declared the eagle's omen true.

> Latin: 106. “Quid est illo auspicio divinius quod apud te in Mario est? ut utar potissimum auctore te:
hic Iovis altisoni subito pinnata satelles
arboris e trunco serpentis saucia morsu
subigit ipsa feris transfigens unguibus anguem
semianimum et varia graviter cervice micantem;
quem se intorquentem lanians rostroque cruentans,
iam satiata animos, iam duros ulta dolores,
abicit ecflantem et laceratum adfligit in unda,
seque obitu a solis nitidos convertit ad ortus.
hanc ubi praepetibus pinnis lapsuque volantem
conspexit Marius, divini numinis augur,
faustaque signa suae laudis reditusque notavit;
partibus intonuit caeli pater ipse sinistris.
sic aquilae clarum firmavit Iuppiter omen.”

[¶5] 107. "As for that augural art of Romulus of which I spoke, it was pastoral and not city-bred, nor was it 'invented to gull the ignorant,' but received by trustworthy men, who handed it on to their descendants. And so we read in Ennius the following story of Romulus, who was an augur, and of his brother Remus, who also was an augur:
When each would rule they both at once appealed
Their claims, with anxious hearts, to augury.
Then Remus took the auspices alone
And waited for the lucky bird; while on
The lofty Aventine fair Romulus
His quest did keep to wait the soaring tribe:
Their contest would decide the city's name
As Rome or Remora. The multitude
Expectant looked to learn who would be king.
As, when the consul is about to give
The sign to start the race, the people sit
With eyes intent on barrier doors from whose Embellished jaws the chariots soon will come;
So now the people, fearful, looked for signs
To know whose prize the mighty realm would be.

> Latin: 107. “Atque ille Romuli auguratus pastoralis, non urbanus fuit, nec fictus ad opiniones inperitorum, sed a certis acceptus et posteris traditus. Romulus augur, ut apud Ennium est, cum fratre item augure
curantes magna cum cura tum concupientes
regni dant operam simul auspicio augurioque.
hinc Remus auspicio se devovet atque secundam
solus avem servat. at Romulus pulcher in alto
quaerit Aventino, servat genus altivolantum.
certabant, urbem Romam Remoramne vocarent.
omnibus cura viris, uter esset induperator.
exspectant; veluti, consul quom mittere signum
volt, omnes avidi spectant ad carceris oras,” “
quam mox emittat pictis e faucibus currus,
sic exspectabat populus atque ore timeba:;

[¶6] 108. Meantime the fading sun into the shades
Of night withdrew and then the shining dawn
Shot forth its rays. 'Twas then an augury,
The best of all, appeared on high—a bird
That on the left did fly. And, as the sun
Its golden orb upraised, twelve sacred birds
Flew down from heaven and betook themselves
To stations set apart for goodly signs.
Then Romulus perceived that he had gained
A throne whose source and prop was augury.

> Latin: 108. rebus utri magni victoria sit data regni.
interea sol albus recessit in infera noctis.
exin candida se radiis dedit icta foras lux,
et simul ex alto longe pulcherrima praepes
laeva volavit avis; simul aureus exoritur sol,
cedunt de caelo ter quattuor corpora sancta
avium, praepetibus sese pulchrisque locis dant.
conspicit inde sibi data Romulus esse priora,
auspicio regni stabilita scamna solumque.”

[¶7] 109. "But let us bring the discussion back to the point from which it wandered. Assume that I can give no reason for any of the instances of divination which I have mentioned and that I can do no more than show that they did occur, is that not a sufficient answer to Epicurus and to Carneades? And what does it matter if, as between artificial and natural divination, the explanation of the former is easy and of the latter is somewhat hard? For the results of those artificial means of divination, by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and astrology, have been the subject of observation for a long period of time. But in every field of inquiry great length of time employed in continued observation begets an extraordinary fund of knowledge, which may be acquired even without the intervention or inspiration of the gods, since repeated observa- tion makes it clear what effect follows any given cause, and what sign precedes any given event.

> Latin: 109. “Sed ut, unde hue digressa est, eodem redeat oratio. nihil queam disputare quam ob rem quidque fiat, et tantum modo fieri ea quae commemoravi, doceam, parumne Epicuro Carneadive respondeam?, si etiam ratio exstat artificiosae praesensionis facilis, divinae autem paulo obscurior? enim extis, quae fulgoribus, quae portentis, quae astris praesentiuntur, haec notata sunt observatione diuturna. autem vetustas omnibus in rebus longinqua observatione incredibilem scientiam; quae potest esse etiam sine motu atque impulsu deorum, cum, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, crebra animadversione perspectum est.”

[¶8] 110. "The second division of divination, as I said before, is the natural; and it, according to the exact teaching of physics, must be ascribed to divine Nature, from which, as the wisest philosophers maintain, our souls have been drawn and poured forth. And since the universe is wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind, it must be that human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls. But when men are awake their souls, as a rule, are subject to the demands of everyday life and are withdrawn from divine association because they are hampered by the chains of the flesh.

> Latin: 110. “Altera divinatio est naturalis, ut ante dixi; quae physica disputandi subtilitate referenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est contagione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri. vigilantes animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt diiunguntque se a societate divina vinclis corporis impediti.”

[¶9] 111. "However, there is a certain class of men, though small in number, who withdraw themselves from carnal influences and are wholly possessed by an ardent concern for the contemplation of things divine. Some of these men make predictions, not as the result of direct heavenly inspiration, but by the use of their own reason. For example, by means of natural law, they foretell certain events, such as a flood, or the future destruction of heaven and earth by fire Others, who are engaged in public life, like Solon of Athens, as history describes him, discover the rise of tyranny long in advance. Such men we may call 'foresighted'—that is, 'able to foresee the future'; but we can no more apply the term 'divine' to them than we can apply it to Thales of Miletus, who, as the story goes, in order to confound his critics and thereby show that even a philosopher, if he sees fit, can make money, bought up the entire olive crop in the district of Miletus before it had begun to bloom.

> Latin: 111. “Rarum est quoddam genus eorum, qui se a corpore avocent et ad divinarum rerum cognitionem cura omni studioque rapiantur. sunt auguria non divini impetus, sed rationis humanae; nam et natura futura praesentiunt, ut aquarum eluviones et deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum; alii autem in re publica exercitati, ut de Atheniensi Solone accepimus, orientem tyrannidem multo ante prospiciunt; quos prudentes possumus dicere, id est providentes, divinos nullo modo possumus; non plus quam Milesium Thalem, qui, ut obiurgatores suos convinceret ostenderetque etiam philosophum, si ei commodum esset, pecuniam facere posse, omnem oleam ante quam florere coepisset, in agro Milesio, coemisse dicitur.”

[¶10] 112. Perhaps he had observed, from some special knowledge he had on the subject, that the crop would be abundant. And, by the way, he is said to have been the first man to predict the solar eclipse which took place in the reign of Astyages. "There are many things foreseen by physicians, pilots, and also by farmers, but I do not call the predictions of any of them divination. I do not even call that a case of divination when Anaximander, the natural philosopher, warned the Spartans to leave the city and their homes and to sleep in the fields under arms, because an earthquake was at hand. Then the whole city fell down in ruins and the extremity of Mount Taygetus was torn away like the stern of a ship in a storm. Not even Pherecydes, the famous teacher of Pythagoras, will be considered a prophet rather than a natural philosopher, because he predicted an earthquake from the appearance of some water drawn from an unfailing well.

> Latin: 112. “fortasse quadam scientia olearum ubertatem fore. quidem idem primus defectionem solis, quae Astyage regnante facta est, praedixisse fertur.” “Multa medici, multa gubernatores, agricolae etiam multa praesentiunt, sed nullam eorum divinationem voco, ne illam quidem qua ab Anaximandro physico moniti Lacedaemonii sunt ut urbem et tecta linquerent armatique in agro excubarent, quod terrae motus instaret, tum cum et urbs tota corruit et e monte Taygeto extrema montis quasi puppis avulsa est. Pherecydes quidem, ille Pythagorae magister, potius divinus habebitur quam physicus, quod, cum vidisset haustam aquam de iugi puteo, terrae motus dixit instare.”

[¶11] 113. "In fact, the human soul never divines naturally, except when it is so unrestrained and free that it has absolutely no association with the body, as happens in the case of frenzy and of dreams. Hence both these kinds of divination have been sanctioned by Dicaearchus and also, as I said, by our friend Cratippus. Let us grant that these two methods (because they originate in nature) take the highest rank in divination; but we will not concede that they are the only kind. But if, on the other hand, Dicaearchus and Cratippus believe that there is nothing in observation, they hold a doctrine destructive of the foundation on which many things in every- day life depend. However, since these men make us some concession—and that not a small one—in granting us divination by frenzy and dreams, I see no cause for any great war with them, especially in view of the fact that there are some philosophers who do not accept any sort of divination whatever.

> Latin: 113. “Nec vero umquam animus hominis naturaliter divinat, nisi cum ita solutus est et vacuus ut ei plane nihil sit cum corpore, quod aut vatibus contingit aut dormientibus. ea duo genera a Dicaearcho probantur et, ut dixi, a Cratippo nostro; si propterea, quod ea proficiscuntur a natura, sint summa sane, modo ne sola; sin autem nihil esse in observatione putant, multa tollunt quibus vitae ratio continetur. Sed quoniam dant aliquid, idque non parvum, vaticinationes cum somniis, nihil est quod cum his magnopere pugnemus, praesertim cum sint qui omnino nullam divinationem probent.”

[¶12] 114. "Those then, whose souls, spurning their bodies, take wings and fly abroad—inflamed and aroused by a sort of passion—these men, I say, certainly see the things which they foretell in their prophecies. Such souls do not cling to the body and are kindled by many different influences. For example, some are aroused by certain vocal tones, as by Phrygian songs, many by groves and forests, and many others by rivers and seas. I believe, too, that there were certain subterranean vapours which had the effect of inspiring persons to utter oracles. In all these cases the frenzied soul sees the future long in advance, as Cassandra did in the following instance:
Alas! behold! some mortal will decide
A famous case between three goddesses:
Because of that decision there will come
A Spartan woman, but a Fury too.
It is in this state of exaltation that many predictions have been made, not only in prose but also
In verse which once the fauns and bards did sing.

> Latin: 114. “Ergo et ei, quorum animi spretis corporibus evolant atque excurrunt foras, ardore aliquo inflammati atque incitati, cernunt illa profecto quae vaticinantes pronuntiant; multisque rebus inflammantur tales animi qui corporibus non inhaerent, ut ei qui sono quodam vocum et Phrygiis cantibus incitantur. nemora silvaeque, multos amnes aut maria commovent. etiam anhelitus quosdam fuisse terrarum quibus inflatae mentes oracla funderent. furibunda mens videt ante multo, quae sint futura. de genere illa sunt:
eheu videte! iudicabit inclitum iudicium
inter deas tres aliquis; quo iudicio Lacedaemonia
mulier, furiarum una, adveniet.
enim modo multa a vaticinantibus saepe praedicta sunt, neque solum verbis, sed etiam
versibus quos olim Fauni vatesque canebant.”

[¶13] 115. Likewise Marcius and Publicius, according to tradition, made their prophecies in verse, and the cryptic utterances of Apollo were expressed in the same form. "Such is the rationale of prophecy by means of frenzy, and that of dreams is not much unlike it. For the revelations made to seers when awake are made to us in sleep. While we sleep and the body lies as if dead, the soul is at its best, because it is then freed from the influence of the physical senses and from the worldly cares that weigh it down. And since the soul has lived from all eternity and has had converse with numberless other souls, it sees everything that exists in nature, provided that moderation and restraint have been used in eating and in drinking, so that the soul is in a condition to watch while the body sleeps. Such is the explanation of divination by dreams.

> Latin: 115. “Marcius et Publicius vates cecinisse dicuntur; quo de genere Apollinis operta prolata sunt.” “Atque haec quidem vatium ratio est, nec dissimilis sane somniorum. quae vigilantibus accidunt vatibus, eadem nobis dormientibus. enim animus in somnis liberque est sensibus omni ac impeditione curarum iacente et mortuo paene corpore. quia vixit ab omni aeternitate versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quae in natura rerum sunt, videt, si modo temperatis escis modicisque potionibus ita est affectus ut sopito corpore ipse vigilet. somniantis est divinatio.”

[¶14] 116. "At this point it is pertinent to mention Antiphon's well-known theory of the interpretation of dreams. His view is that the interpreters of dreams depend upon technical skill and not upon inspiration. He has the same view as to the interpretation of oracles and of frenzied utterances; for they all have their interpreters, just as poets have their commentators. Now it is clear that divine nature would have done a vain thing if she had merely created iron, copper, silver, and gold and had not shown us how to reach the veins in which those metals lie; the gift of field crops and orchard fruits would have been useless to the human race without a knowledge of how to cultivate them and prepare them for food; and building material would be of no service without the carpenter's art to convert it into lumber. So it is with everything that the gods have given for the advantage of mankind, there has been joined some art whereby that advantage may be turned to account. The same is true of dreams, prophecies, and oracles: since many of them were obscure and doubtful, resort was had to the skill of professional interpreters.

> Latin: 116. “Hic magna quaedam exoritur, neque ea naturalis, sed artificiosa somniorum Antiphontis interpretatio; eodemque modo et oraculorum et vaticinationum, sunt enim explanatores omnium horum, ut grammatici poetarum. ut aurum et argentum, aes, ferrum frustra natura divina genuisset, nisi eadem docuisset quem ad modum ad eorum venas perveniretur; nec fruges terrae bacasve arborum cum utilitate ulla generi humano dedisset, nisi earum cultus et conditiones tradidisset; materia deinde quid iuvaret, nisi consectionis eius fabricam haberemus; sic cum omni utilitate quam di hominibus dederunt, ars aliqua coniuncta est per quam illa utilitas percipi possit. igitur somniis, vaticinationibus, oraclis, quod erant multa obscura, multa ambigua, explanationes adhibitae sunt interpretum.”

[¶15] 117. "Now there is a great problem as to how prophets and dreamers can see things, which, at the time, have no actual existence anywhere. But that question would be solved quite readily if we were to investigate certain other questions which demand consideration first. For the theory in regard to the nature of the gods, so clearly developed in the second book of your work on that subject, includes this whole question. If we maintain that theory we shall establish the very point which I am trying to make: namely, 'that there are gods; that they rule the universe by their foresight; and that they direct the affairs of men—not merely of men in the mass, but of each individual.' If we succeed in holding that position—and for my part I think it impregnable—then surely it must follow that the gods give to men signs of coming events.

> Latin: 117. “modo autem aut vates aut somniantes ea videant, quae nusquam etiam tune sint, magna quaestio est. explorata si sint ea, quae ante quaeri debeant, sint haec, quae quaerimus, faciliora. enim totam hanc quaestionem ea ratio, quae est de natura deorum, quae a te secundo libro est explicata dilucide. si obtinemus, stabit illud, quod hunc locum continet, de quo agimus, ‘esse deos, et eorum providentia mundum administrari, eosdemque consulere rebus humanis, nec solum universis, verum etiam singulis.’ Haec si tenemus, quae mihi quidem non videntur posse convelli, profecto hominibus a dis futura significari necesse est.”

[¶16] 118. "But it seems necessary to settle the principle on which these signs depend. For, according to the Stoic doctrine, the gods are not directly responsible for every fissure in the liver or for every song of a bird; since, manifestly, that would not be seemly or proper in a god and furthermore is impossible. But, in the beginning, the universe was so created that certain results would be preceded by certain signs, which are given sometimes by entrails and by birds, sometimes by lightnings, by portents, and by stars, sometimes by dreams, and sometimes by utterances of persons in a frenzy. And these signs do not often deceive the persons who observe them properly. If prophecies, based on erroneous deductions and interpretations, turn out to be false, the fault is not chargeable to the signs but to the lack of skill in the interpreters. "Assuming the proposition to be conceded that there is a divine power which pervades the lives of men, it is not hard to understand the principle directing those premonitory signs which we see come to pass. For it may be that the choice of a sacrificial victim is guided by an intelligent force, which is diffused throughout the universe; or, it may be that at the moment when the sacrifice is offered, a change in the vitals occurs and something is added or taken away; for many things are added to, changed, or diminished in an instant of time.

> Latin: 118. “Sed distinguendum videtur quonam modo. non placet Stoicis singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum; neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus. quibus bene percepta sunt, ei non saepe falluntur; male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio, sed interpretum inscientia.” “Hoc autem posito atque concesso, esse quandam vim divinam hominum vitam continentem, non difficile est, quae fieri certe videmus, ea qua ratione fiant, suspicari. et ad hostiam deligendam potest dux esse vis quaedam sentiens, quae est toto confusa mundo, et tum ipsam, cum immolare velis, extorum fieri mutatio potest, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; parvis enim momentis multa natura aut affingit aut mutat aut detrahit.”

[¶17] 119. Conclusive proof of this fact, sufficient to put it beyond the possibility of doubt, is afforded by incidents which happened just before Caesar's death. While he was offering sacrifices on the day when he sat for the first time on a golden throne and first appeared in public in a purple robe, no heart was found in the vitals of the votive ox. Now do you think it possible for any animal that has blood to exist without a heart? Caesar was unmoved by this occurrence, even though Spurinna warned him to beware lest thought and life should fail him—both of which, he said, proceeded from the heart. On the following day there was no head to the liver of the sacrifice. These portents were sent by the immortal gods to Caesar that he might foresee his death, not that he might prevent it. Therefore, when those organs, without which the victim could not have lived, are found wanting in the vitals, we should understand that the absent organs disappeared at the very moment of immolation.

> Latin: 119. “ne dubitare possimus, maximo est argumento quod paulo ante interitum Caesaris contigit. cum immolaret illo die quo primum in sella aurea sedit et cum purpurea veste processit, in extis bovis opimi cor non fuit. igitur censes ullum animal, quod sanguinem habeat, sine corde esse posse? ille rei novitate non perculsus cum Spurinna diceret timendum esse ne et consilium et vita deficeret; earum enim rerum utramque a corde proficisci. die caput in iecore non fuit. quidem illi portendebantur a dis immortalibus ut videret interitum, non ut caveret. igitur eae partes in extis non reperiuntur sine quibus victuma illa vivere nequisset, intellegendum est in ipso immolationis tempore eas partes quae absint interisse.”

[¶18] 120. "The Divine Will accomplishes like results in the case of birds, and causes those known as alites, which give omens by their flight, to fly hither and thither and disappear now here and now there, and causes those known as oscines, which give omens by their cries, to sing now on the left and now on the right. For if every animal moves its body forward, sideways, or backward at will, it bends, twists, extends, and contracts its members as it pleases, and performs these various motions almost mechanically; how much easier it is for such results to be accomplished by a god, whose divine will all things obey!

> Latin: 120. “Eademque efficit in avibus divina mens, ut tum huc, tum illuc volent alites, tum in hac, tum in illa parte se occultent, tum a dextra, tum a sinistra parte canant oscines. si animal omne, ut vult, ita utitur motu sui corporis, prono, obliquo, supino, membraque, quocumque vult, flectit, contorquet, porrigit, contrahit eaque ante efficit paene, quam cogitat, quanto id deo est facilius, cuius numini parent omnia!”

[¶19] 121. The same power sends us signs, of which history has preserved numerous examples. We find the following ones recorded: when just before sunrise the moon was eclipsed in the sign of Leo, this indicated that Darius and the Persians would be overcome in battle by the Macedonians under Alexander, and that Darius would die. Again, when a girl was born with two heads, this foretold sedition among the people and seduction and adultery in the home. When a woman dreamed that she had been delivered of a lion, this signified that the country in which she had the dream would be conquered by foreign nations. "Another instance of a similiar kind is related by Herodotus: Croesus's son, when an infant, spoke, and this prodigy foretold the utter overthrow of his father's family and kingdom. What history has failed to record the fact that while Servius Tullius slept his head burst into flame? Therefore, just as a man has clear and trustworthy dreams, provided he goes to sleep, not only with his mind prepared by noble thoughts, but also with every precaution taken to induce repose; so, too, he, when awake, is better prepared to interpret truly the messages of entrails, stars, birds, and all other signs, provided his soul is pure and undefiled.

> Latin: 121. “mittit et signa nobis eius generis, qualia permulta historia tradidit, quale scriptum illud videmus: si luna paulo ante solis ortum defecisset in signo Leonis, fore ut armis Dareus et Persae ab Alexandro et Macedonibus vincerentur Dareusque moreretur; et si puella nata biceps esset, seditionem in populo fore, corruptelam et adulterium domi; et si mulier leonem peperisse visa esset, fore ut ab exteris gentibus vinceretur ea res publica in qua id contigisset.” “Eiusdem generis etiam illud est, quod scribit Herodotus, Croesi filium, cum esset infans, locutum; quo ostento regnum patris et domum funditus concidisse. arsisse Servio Tullio dormienti quae historia non prodidit? igitur, qui se tradit quieti praeparato animo cum bonis cogitationibus, tum rebus ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in somnis; sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior.”

[¶20] 122. "It is this purity of soul, no doubt, that explains that famous utterance which history attributes to Socrates and which his disciples in their books often represent him as repeating: 'There is some divine influence'—daimo/nion, he called it— 'which I always obey, though it never urges me on, but often holds me back.' And it was the same Socrates—and what better authority can we quote? —who was consulted by Xenophon as to whether he should join Cyrus. Socrates, after stating what seemed to him the best thing to do, remarked: ' But my opinion is only that of a man. In matters of doubt and perplexity I advise that Apollo's oracle be consulted.' This oracle was always consulted by the Athenians in regard to the more serious public questions.

> Latin: 122. “Hoc nimirum est illud quod de Socrate accepimus, quodque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum saepe dicitur: esse divinum quiddam, quod δαιμόνιον appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit numquam impellenti, saepe revocanti. Socrates quidem (quo quem auctorem meliorem quaerimus?) Xenophonti consulenti sequereturne Cyrum, posteaquam exposuit, quae ipsi videbantur: ‘Et nostrum quidem,’ inquit, ‘humanum est consilium; sed de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referendum,’ ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de maioribus rebus semper rettulerunt.”

[¶21] 123. "It is also related of Socrates that one day he saw his friend Crito with a bandage on his eye. 'What's the matter, Crito?' he inquired. 'As I was walking in the country the branch of a tree, which had been bent, was released and struck me in the eye.' ' Of course,' said Socrates, ' for, after I had had divine warning, as usual, and tried to call you back, you did not heed.' It is also related of him that after the unfortunate battle was fought at Delium under command of Laches, he was fleeing in company with his commander, when they came to a place where three roads met. Upon his refusal to take the road that the others had chosen he was asked the reason and replied: 'The god prevents me.' Those who fled by the other road fell in with the enemy's cavalry. Antipater has gathered a mass of remarkable premonitions received by Socrates, but I shall pass them by, for you know them and it is useless for me to recount them.

> Latin: 123. “Scriptum est item, cum Critonis, sui familiaris, oculum alligatum vidisset, quaesivisse, quid esset; cum autem ille respondisset in agro, ambulanti ramulum adductum, ut remissus esset, in oculum suum recidisse, tum Socrates: ‘Non enim paruisti mihi revocanti, cum uterer, qua soleo, praesagitione divina.’ Idem etiam Socrates, cum apud Delium male pugnatum esset Lachete praetore fugeretque cum ipso Lachete, ut ventum est in trivium, eadem, qua ceteri, fugere noluit. quaerentibus, cur non eadem via pergeret, deterreri se a deo dixit; cum quidem ei, qui alia via fugerant, in hostium equitatum inciderunt. collecta sunt ab Antipatro quae mirabiliter a Socrate divinata sunt, quae praetermittam, tibi enim nota sunt, mihi ad commemorandum non necessaria.”

[¶22] 124. However, the following utterance of that philosopher, made after he had been wickedly condemned to death, is a noble one—I might almost call it' divine ': 'I am very content to die,' he said; 'for neither when I left my home nor when I mounted the platform to plead my cause, did the god give any sign, and this he always does when some evil threatens me. "And so my opinion is that the power of divination exists, notwithstanding the fact that those who prophesy by means of art and conjecture are oftentimes mistaken. I believe that, just as men may make mistakes in other callings, so they may in this. It may happen that a sign of doubtful meaning is assumed to be certain or, possibly, either a sign was itself unobserved or one that annulled an observed sign may have gone unnoticed. But, in order to establish the proposition for which I contend it is enough for me to find, not many, but even a few instances of divinely inspired prevision and prophecy.

> Latin: 124. “tamen eius philosophi magnificum ac paene divinum, quod, cum impiis sententiis damnatus esset, aequissimo animo se dixit mori; neque enim domo egredienti neque illud suggestum, in quo causam dixerat, ascendenti signum sibi ullum, quod consuesset, a deo quasi mali alicuius impendentis datum.” “Equidem sic arbitror, etiamsi multa fallant eos, qui aut arte aut coniectura divinare videantur, esse tamen divinationem; homines autem, ut in ceteris artibus, sic in hac posse falli. Potest accidere, ut aliquod signum dubie datum pro certo sit acceptum, potest aliquod latuisse aut ipsum, aut quod esset illi contrarium. autem ad hoc, de quo disputo, probandum satis est non modo plura, sed etiam pauciora divine praesensa et praedicta reperiri.”

[¶23] 125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence. "Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call ei(marme/nh, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening.

> Latin: 125. “etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum.” “Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura, vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda. igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. autem id appello, quod Graeci Juap/evrv, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat.”

[¶24] 126. Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not ignorantly, but scientifically, 'the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come.' Hence it is that it may be known by observation what effect will in most instances follow any cause, even if it is not known in all; for it would be too much to say that it is known in every case. And it is probable that these causes of coming events are perceived by those who see them during frenzy or in sleep.

> Latin: 126. “quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id, quod superstitiose, sed id, quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. fit, ut et observatione notari possit, quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper (nam id quidem affirmare difficile est), easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab eis, qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant.”

[¶25] 127. "Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena.

> Latin: 127. “Praeterea cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui colligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat, quae futura sint. cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. et ei vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ei, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium.”

[¶26] 128. "Therefore it is not strange that diviners have a presentiment of things that exist nowhere in the material world: for all things ' are,' though, from the standpoint of' time,' they are not present. As in seeds there inheres the germ of those things which the seeds produce, so in causes are stored the future events whose coming is foreseen by reason or conjecture, or is discerned by the soul when inspired by frenzy, or when it is set free by sleep. Persons familiar with the rising, setting, and revolutions of the sun, moon, and other celestial bodies, can tell long in advance where any one of these bodies will be at a given time. And the same thing may be said of men who, for a long period of time, have studied and noted the course of facts and the connexion of events, for they always know what the future will be; or, if that is putting it too strongly, they know in a majority of cases; or, if that will not be conceded either, then, surely, they sometimes know what the future will be. These and a few other arguments of the same kind for the existence of divination are derived from Fate.

> Latin: 128. “Non est igitur ut mirandum sit ea praesentiri a divinantibus, quae nusquam sint; sunt enim omnia, sed tempore absunt. ut in seminibus vis inest earum rerum, quae ex eis progignuntur, sic in causis conditae sunt res futurae, quas esse futuras aut concitata mens aut soluta somno cernit aut ratio aut coniectura praesentit. ut ei qui solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum ortus, obitus motusque cognorunt, quo quidque tempore eorum futurum sit, multo ante praedicunt, sic, qui cursum rerum eventorumque consequentiam diuturnitate pertractata notaverunt, aut semper aut, si id difficile est, plerumque, quodsi ne id quidem conceditur, non numquam certe, quid futurum sit, intellegunt. haec quidem et quaedam eiusdem modi argumenta, cur sit divinatio, ducuntur a fato.”

[¶27] 129. "Moreover, divination finds another and a positive support in nature, which teaches us how great is the power of the soul when it is divorced from the bodily senses, as it is especially in sleep, ' and in times of frenzy or inspiration. For, as the souls of the gods, without the intervention of eyes or ears or tongue, understand each other and what each one thinks (hence men, even when they offer silent prayers and vows, have no doubt that the gods understand them), so the souls of men, when released by sleep from bodily chains, or when stirred by inspiration and delivered up to their own impulses, see things that they cannot see when they are mingled with the body.

> Latin: 129. “A natura autem alia quaedam ratio est, quae docet quanta sit animi vis seiuncta a corporis sensibus, quod maxime contingit aut dormientibus aut mente permotis. enim deorum animi sine oculis, sine auribus, sine lingua sentiunt inter se, quid quisque sentiat (ex quo fit, ut homines, etiam cum taciti optent quid aut voveant, non dubitent, quin di illud exaudiant), sic animi hominum, cum aut somno soluti vacant corpore aut mente permoti per se ipsi liberi incitati moventur, cernunt ea quae permixti cum corpore animi videre non possunt.”

[¶28] 130. And while it is difficult, perhaps, to apply this principle of nature to explain that kind of divination which we call artificial, yet Posidonius, who digs into the question as deep as one can, thinks that nature gives certain signs of future events. Thus Heraclides of Pontus records that it is the custom of the people of Ceos, once each year, to make a careful observation of the rising of the Dog-star and from such observation to conjecture whether the ensuing year will be healthy or pestilential. For if the star rises dim and, as it were enveloped in a fog, this indicates a thick and heavy atmosphere, which will give off very unwholesome vapours; but if the star appears clear and brilliant, this is a sign that the atmosphere is light and pure and, as a consequence, will be conducive to good health.

> Latin: 130. “hanc quidem rationem naturae difficile est fortasse traducere ad id genus divinationis, quod ex arte profectum dicimus, sed tamen id quoque rimatur, quantum potest, Posidonius. censet in natura signa quaedam rerum futurarum. Ceos accepimus ortum Caniculae diligenter quotannis solere servare coniecturamque capere, ut scribit Ponticus Heraclides, salubrisne an pestilens annus futurus sit. si obscurior et quasi caliginosa stella extiterit, pingue et concretum esse caelum, ut eius adspiratio gravis et pestilens futura sit; sin illustris et perlucida stella apparuerit, significari caelum esse tenue purumque et propterea salubre.”

[¶29] 131. "Again, Democritus expresses the opinion that the ancients acted wisely in providing for the inspection of the entrails of sacrifices; because, as he thinks, the colour and general condition of the entrails are prophetic sometimes of health and sometimes of sickness and sometimes also of whether the fields will be barren or productive. Now, if it is known by observation and experience that these means of divination have their source in nature, it must be that the observations made and records kept for a long period of time have added much to our knowledge of this subject. Hence, that natural philosopher introduced by Pacuvius into his play of Chryses, seems to show very scanty apprehension of the laws of nature when he speaks as follows:
The men who know the speech of birds and more
Do learn from other livers than their own—
'Twere best to hear, I think, and not to heed.
I do not know why this poet makes such a statement when only a few lines further on he says clearly enough:
Whate'er the power may be, it animates,
Creates, gives form, increase, and nourishment
To everything; of everything the sire,
It takes all things unto itself and hides
Within its breast; and as from it all things
Arise, likewise to it all things return.
Since all things have one and the same and that a common home, and since the human soul has always been and will always be, why, then, should it not be able to understand what effect will follow any cause, and what sign will precede any event? “This,” said Quintus, “is all that I had to say on divination.”

> Latin: 131. “Democritus autem censet sapienter instituisse veteres, ut hostiarum immolatarum inspicerentur exta; quorum ex habitu atque ex colore tum salubritatis, tum pestilentiae signa percipi, non numquam etiam, quae sit vel sterilitas agrorum vel fertilitas futura. si a natura profecta observatio atque usus agnovit, multa afferre potuit dies quae animadvertendo notarentur, ut ille Pacuvianus, qui in Chryse physicus inducitur, minime naturam rerum cognosse videatur:
… nam istis qui linguam avium intéllegunt
plusque éx alieno iécore sapiunt quam éx suo,
magis aúdiendum quam auscultandum cénseo.? quaeso, cum ipse paucis interpositis versibus dicas satis luculente:
quicquid est hoc, ómnia animat, fórmat, alit, augét, creat,
sépelit recipitque ín sese omnia ómniumque idémst pater,
índidemque eademque oriuntur de íntegro atque eodem óccidunt.
est igitur, cur, cum domus sit omnium una, eaque communis, cumque animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint, cur ei, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, perspicere non possint?” “habui,” inquit, “de divinatione quae dicerem.”

[¶30] 132. I will assert, however, in conclusion, that I do not recognize fortune-tellers, or those who prophesy for money, or necromancers, or mediums, whom your friend Appius makes it a practice to consult.
In fine, I say, I do not care a fig
For Marsian augurs, village mountebanks,
Astrologers who haunt the circus grounds,
Or Isis-seers, or dream interpreters:
—for they are not diviners either by knowledge or skill, —
But superstitious bards, soothsaying quacks,
Averse to work, or mad, or ruled by want,
Directing others how to go, and yet
What road to take they do not know themselves;
From those to whom they promise wealth they beg
A coin. From what they promised let them take
Their coin as toll and pass the balance on.
Such are the words of Ennius who only a few lines further back expresses the view that there are gods and yet says that the gods do not care what human beings do. But for my part, believing as I do that the gods do care for man, and that they advise and often forewarn him, I approve of divination which is not trivial and is free from falsehood and trickery. When Quintus had finished I remarked, “My dear Quintus, you have come admirably well prepared.”

> Latin: 132. “illa testabor, non me sortilegos neque eos, qui quaestus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia quidem, quibus Appius, amicus tuus, uti solebat, agnoscere:
non habeo denique nauci Marsum augurem;
non vicanos haruspices, non de circo astrologos;
non Isiacos coniectores, non interpretes sómnium;
—non enim sunt ei aut scientia aut arte divini—
séd superstitiósi vates ímpudentesque hárioli
aút inertes aút insani aut quíbus egestas ímperat,
quí sibi semitám non sapiunt, álteri monstránt viam;
quíbus divitias póllicentur, áb iis drachumam ipsí petunt.
de hÍs divitiis síbi deducant dráchmam, reddant cétera.
haec quidem Ennius, qui paucis ante versibus esse deos censet, sed eos non curare opinatur, quid agat humanum genus. autem, qui et curare arbitror et monere etiam ac multa praedicere, levitate, vanitate, malitia exclusa divinationem probo.” cum dixisset Quintus, “tu quidem,” inquam, “paratus, Quinte, venisti … ” mihi multumque et diu cogitanti quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla maior occurrebat quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus;

## 5. Book II · sections 1–30

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/5/#p-N

[¶0] 1. After serious and long continued reflection as to how I might do good to as many people as possible and thereby prevent any interruption of my service to the State, no better plan occurred to me than to conduct my fellow-citizens in the ways of the noblest learning—and this, I believe, I have already accomplished through my numerous books. For example, in my work entitled Hortensius, I appealed as earnestly as I could for the study of philosophy. And in my Academics, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system which I thought least arrogant, and at the same time most consistent and refined.

> Latin: 1. quod compluribus iam libris me arbitror consecutum. et cohortati sumus, ut maxime potuimus, ad philosophiae studium eo libro, qui est inscriptus Hortensius, et, quod genus philosophandi minime arrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus.

[¶1] 2. And, since the foundation of philosophy rests on the distinction between good and evil, I exhaustively treated that subject in five volumes and in such a way that the conflicting views of the different philosophers might be known. Next, and in the same number of volumes, came the Tusculan Disputations, which made plain the means most essential to a happy life. For the first volume treats of indifference to death, the second of enduring pain, the third of the alleviation of sorrow, the fourth of other spiritual disturbances; and the fifth embraces a topic which sheds the brightest light on the entire field of philosophy since it teaches that virtue is sufficient of itself for the attainment of happiness.

> Latin: 2. fundamentum esset philosophiae positum in finibus bonorum et malorum, perpurgatus est is locus a nobis quinque libris, ut, quid a quoque, et quid contra quemque philosophum diceretur, intellegi posset. subsecuti libri Tusculanarum disputationum res ad beate vivendum maxime necessarias aperuerunt. Primus enim est de contemnenda morte, secundus de tolerando dolore, de aegritudine lenienda tertius, quartus de reliquis animi perturbationibus, quintus eum locum complexus est, qui totam philosophiam maxime illustrat; docet enim ad beate vivendum virtutem se ipsa esse contentam.

[¶2] 3. After publishing the works mentioned I finished three volumes On the Nature of the Gods, which contain a discussion of every question under that head. With a view of simplifying and extending the latter treatise I started to write the present volume On Divination, to which I plan to add a work on Fate; when that is done every phase of this particular branch of philosophy will be sufficiently discussed. To this list of works must be added the six volumes which I wrote while holding the helm of state, entitled On the Republic—a weighty subject, appropriate for philosophic discussion, and one which has been most elaborately treated by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the entire Peripatetic school. What need is there to say anything of my treatise On Consolation? For it is the source of very great comfort to me and will, I think, be of much help to others. I have also recently thrown in that book On Old Age, which I sent my friend Atticus; and, since it is by philosophy that a man is made virtuous and strong, my Cato is especially worthy of a place among the foregoing books.

> Latin: 3. rebus editis tres libri perfecti sunt de Natura Deorum, in quibus omnis eius loci quaestio continetur. ut plane esset cumulateque perfecta, de Divinatione ingressi sumus his libris scribere; quibus, ut est in animo, de Fato si adiunxerimus, erit abunde satis factum toti huic quaestioni. his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de Re publica, quos tum scripsimus, cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus. locus philosophiaeque proprius a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque Peripateticorum familia tractatus uberrime. quid ego de Consolatione dicam? quae mihi quidem ipsi sane aliquantum medetur, ceteris item multum illam profuturam puto. est etiam nuper liber is, quem ad nostrum Atticum de Senectute misimus; in primisque, quoniam philosophia vir bonus efficitur et fortis, Cato noster in horum librorum numero ponendus est.

[¶3] 4. Inasmuch as Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, both of whom were celebrated for their keenness of intellect and particularly for their copiousness of speech, have joined rhetoric with philosophy, it seems proper also to put my rhetorical books in the same category; hence we shall include the three volumes On Oratory, the fourth entitled Brutus, and the fifth called The Orator. I have named the philosophic works so far written: to the completion of the remaining books of this series I was hastening with so much ardour that if some most grievous cause had not inter- vened there would not now be any phase of philosophy which I had failed to elucidate and make easily accessible in the Latin tongue. For what greater or better service can I render to the common wealth than to instruct and train the youth— especially in view of the fact that our young men have gone so far astray because of the present moral laxity that the utmost effort will be needed to hold them in check and direct them in the right way?

> Latin: 4. Aristoteles itemque Theophrastus, excellentes viri cum subtilitate, tum copia, cum philosophia dicendi etiam praecepta coniunxerint, nostri quoque oratorii libri in eundem librorum numerum referendi videntur. tres erunt de, quartus Brutus, quintus Orator. haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris illustratus pateret. enim munus rei publicae afferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem, his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refrenanda atque coercenda sit?

[¶4] 5. Of course, I have no assurance—it could not even be expected—that they will all turn to these studies. Would that a few may! Though few, their activity may yet have a wide influence in the state. In fact, I am receiving some reward for my labour even from men advanced in years; for they are finding comfort in my books, and by their ardour in reading are raising my eagerness for writing to a higher pitch every day. Their number, too, I learn, is far greater than I had expected. Furthermore, it would redound to the fame and glory of the Roman people to be made independent of Greek writers in the study of philosophy, and this result I shall certainly bring about if my present plans are accomplished.

> Latin: 5. vero id effici posse confido, quod ne postulandum quidem est, ut omnes adulescentes se ad haec studia convertant. utinam! quorum tamen in re publica late patere poterit industria. ex eis etiam fructum capio laboris mei, qui iam aetate provecti in nostris libris adquiescunt; quorum studio legendi meum scribendi studium vehementius in dies incitatur; quos quidem plures, quam rebar, esse cognovi. illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant;

[¶5] 6. The cause of my becoming an expounder of philosophy sprang from the grave condition of the State during the period of the Civil War, when, being unable to protect the Republic, as had been my custom, and finding it impossible to remain inactive, I could find nothing else that I preferred to do that was worthy of me. Therefore my countrymen will pardon me—rather they will thank me—because, when the State was in the power of one man, I refused to hide myself, to quit my place, or to be cast down; I did not bear myself like one enraged at the man or at the times; and, further, I neither so fawned upon nor admired another's fortune as to repent me of my own. For one thing in particular I had learned from Plato and from philosophy, that certain revolutions in government are to be expected; so that states are now under a monarchy, now under a democracy, and now under a tyranny.

> Latin: 6. quod adsequar profecto, si instituta perfecero. mihi quidem explicandae philosophiae causam adtulit casus gravis civitatis, cum in armis civilibus nec tueri meo more rem publicam nec nihil agere poteram nec, quid potius, quod quidem me dignum esset, agerem, reperiebam. igitur mihi veniam mei cives vel gratiam potius habebunt, quod, cum esset in unius potestate res publica, neque ego me abdidi neque deserui neque afflixi neque ita gessi, quasi homini aut temporibus iratus, neque porro ita aut adulatus aut admiratus fortunam sum alterius, ut me meae paeniteret. enim ipsum a Platone philosophiaque didiceram, naturales esse quasdam conversiones rerum publicarum, ut eae tum a principibus tenerentur, tum a populis, aliquando a singulis.

[¶6] 7. When the last-named fate had befallen my country, and I had been debarred from my former activities, I began to cultivate anew these present studies that by their means, rather than by any other, I might relieve my mind of its worries and at the same time serve my fellow-countrymen as best I could under the circumstances. Accordingly, it was in my books that I made my senatorial speeches and my forensic harangues; for I thought that I had permanently exchanged politics for philosophy. Now, however, since I have begun to be consulted again about public affairs, my time must be devoted to the State, or, rather, my undivided thought and care must be fixed upon it; and only so much time can be given to philosophy as will not be needed in the discharge of my duty to the commonwealth. But more of this at another time; now let us return to the discussion with which we started.

> Latin: 7. cum accidisset nostrae rei publicae, tum pristinis orbati muneribus haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus molestiis hac potissimum re levaretur et prodessemus civibus nostris, qua re cumque possemus. libris enim sententiam dicebamus, contionabamur, philosophiam nobis pro rei publicae procuratione substitutam putabamus. quoniam de re publica consuli coepti sumus, tribuenda est opera rei publicae, vel omnis potius in ea cogitatio et cura ponenda, tantum huic studio relinquendum, quantum vacabit a publico officio et munere. haec alias pluribus; nunc ad institutam disputationem revertamur.

[¶7] 8. After my brother Quintus had delivered his views on divination, as set out in the preceding volume, and we had walked as much as we wished, we took our seats in the library in my “Lyceum,” and I remarked: "Really, my dear Quintus, you have defended the Stoic doctrine with accuracy and like a Stoic. But the thing that delights me most is the fact that you illustrated your argument with many incidents taken from Roman sources-incidents, too, of a distinguished and noble type. I must now reply to what you said, but I must do so with great diffidence and with many misgivings, and in such a way as to affirm nothing and question everything. For if I should assume anything that I said to be certain I should myself be playing the diviner while saying that no such thing as divination exists!

> Latin: 8. cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset, quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca, quae in Lycio est, assedimus. ego: “tu quidem,” inquam, “Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et illustribus. est mili igitur ad ea, quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita nihil ut affirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. enim aliquid certi haberem quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego.”

[¶8] 9. "I am impressed with the force of the questions with which Carneades used to begin his discussions: ' What are the things within the scope of divination? Are they things that are perceived by the senses? But those are things that we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Is there, then, in such objects some quality that we can better perceive with the aid of prophecy and inspiration than we can with the aid of the senses alone? And is there any diviner, anywhere, who, if blind, like Tiresias, could tell the difference between white and black? Or, who, if deaf, could distinguish between different voices and different tones? Now you must admit that divination is not applicable in any case where knowledge is gained through the senses. "Nor is there any need of divination even in matters within the domain of science and of art. For, when people are sick, we, as a general rule, do not summon a prophet or a seer, but we call in a physician. Again, persons who want to learn to play on the harp or on the flute take lessons, not from a soothsayer, but from a musician.

> Latin: 9. “Etenim me movet illud, quod in primis Carneades quaerere solebat, quarumnam rerum divinatio esset, earumne, quae sensibus perciperentur. At eas quidem cernimus, audimus, gustamus, olfacimus, tangimus. quid ergo in his rebus est, quod provisione aut permotione mentis magis quam natura ipsa sentiamus? aut num nescio qui ille divinus, si oculis captus sit, ut Tiresias fuit, possit, quae alba sint, quae nigra, dicere aut, si surdus sit, varietates vocum aut modos noscere? nullam igitur earum rerum, quae sensu accipiuntur, divinatio adhibetur.” “Atqui ne in eis quidem rebus, quae arte tractantur, divinatione opus est. ad aegros non vates aut hariolos, sed medicos solemus adducere, nec vero, qui fidibus aut tibiis uti volunt, ab haruspicibus accipiunt earum tractationem, sed a musicis.”

[¶9] 10. The same rule applies in literature and in other departments of learning. And do you really believe that those who are credited with powers of divining, can, for that reason, tell whether the sun is larger than the earth, and whether it is as big as it seems to be? Or whether the moon shines by its own light or by that of the sun? Or do you think that they understand the motions of the sun and moon and of the five stars, which are called' planets '? Your reputed diviners do not claim that they can answer any of these questions; nor will they profess to tell whether geometrical figures are correctly drawn or not, for that is the business of mathematicians, not of seers. "Now let us consider matters within the purview of philosophy: When the question is as to what is morally right, or morally wrong, or as to what is neither the one nor the other, do we usually have our doubts resolved by diviners? In fact, do we often consult them in such a case? Certainly not, for problems of this kind belong to philosophers.

> Latin: 10. “in litteris ratio est reliquisque rebus, quarum est disciplina. censes eos, qui divinare dicuntur, posse respondere, sol maiorne quam terra sit an tantus, quantus videatur? lunaque suo lumine an solis utatur? sol, luna quem motum habeat? quem quinque stellae, quae errare dicuntur? haec, qui divini habentur, profitentur se esse dicturos, nec eorum, quae in geometria describuntur, quae vera, quae falsa sint; sunt enim ea mathematicorum, non hariolorum.” “De illis vero rebus, quae in philosophia versantur, num quid est, quod quisquam divinorum aut respondere soleat aut consuli, quid bonum sit, quid malum, quid neutrum? sunt enim haec propria philosophorum.”

[¶10] 11. Again, where the question is one of duty: who ever consults a soothsayer as to how he should demean himself towards his parents, his brothers, or his friends? or as to how he should use his wealth, his office, or his power? Such matters are usually referred to sages, not to diviners. "Furthermore, can any of the questions of dialectic or of physics be solved by divination? For example, is there one world, or are there many worlds? What are the primary elements from which all things are derived? Such problems belong to the science of physics. Again, suppose one should wish to know how to resolve the 'liar' fallacy, which the Greeks call 'yeudo/menon;' or how to meet the 'heap' fallacy, known in Greek as sorites (which, if a Latin equivalent were needed, could be represented by the word acervalis, but none is needed; for, just as the word 'philosophy' and many other words are of Greek origin and are in general use as Latin words, so it is with sorites), —in both these cases the logician, and not the diviner, would speak. "Assume, next, that the inquiry is as to the best form of government, or as to what laws or what customs are beneficial and what are harmful, will you call soothsayers out of Etruria to settle the question, or will you accept the decision of men of eminence chosen for their knowledge of statecraft?

> Latin: 11. “? de officio num quis haruspicem consulit, quem ad modum sit cum parentibus, cum fratribus, cum amicis vivendum? quem ad modum utendum pecunia, quem ad modum honore, quem ad modum imperio? sapientes haec, non ad divinos referri solent.” “Quid? quae a dialecticis aut a physicis tractantur, num quid eorum divinari potest? unusne mundus sit an plures, quae sint initia rerum, ex quibus nascuntur omnia? est ista prudentia. modo autem ‘mentientem,’ quem ψευδόμενον vocant, dissolvas, aut quem ad modum ‘soriti’ resistas (quem, si necesse sit, Latino verbo liceat ‘acervalem’ appellare; sed nihil opus est; ut enim ipsa philosophia et multa verba Graecorum, sic ‘sorites’ satis Latino sermone tritus est),—ergo haec quoque dialectici dicent, non divini.” “Quid? cum quaeritur, qui sit optimus rei publicae status, quae leges, qui mores aut utiles aut inutiles, haruspicesne ex Etruria arcessentur, an principes statuent et delecti viri periti rerum civilium?”

[¶11] 12. But if there is no place for divination in things perceived by the senses, or in those included among the arts, or in those discussed by philosophers, or in those which have to do with government, I see absolutely no need for it anywhere. For either it ought to be of use in every case, or, at least, some department in which it may be employed should be found. But divination is not of use in every case, as my reasoning has shown; nor can any field or subject matter be found over which it may exercise control. Therefore I am inclined to think that there is no such thing as divination. There is a much-quoted Greek verse to this effect:
The best diviner I maintain to be
The man who guesses or conjectures best.
Now do you think that a prophet will 'conjecture' better whether a storm is at hand than a pilot? or that he will by 'conjecture' make a more accurate diagnosis than a physician, or conduct a war with more skill than a general?

> Latin: 12. “nec earum rerum, quae subiectae sensibus sunt, ulla divinatio est nec earum, quae artibus continentur, nec earum, quae in philosophia disseruntur, nec earum, quae in re publica versantur, quarum rerum sit, nihil prorsus intellego; nam aut omnium debet esse, aut aliqua ei materia danda est, in qua versari possit. nec omnium divinatio est, ut ratio docuit, nec locus nec materia invenitur, cui divinationem praeficere possimus. igitur, ne nulla sit divinatio. quidam Graecus vulgaris in hanc sententiam versus:
bene quí coniciet, vátem hunc perhibebo óptumum.
igitur aut, quae tempestas impendeat, vates melius coniciet quam gubernator? aut morbi naturam acutius quam medicus? aut belli administrationem prudentius quam imperator coniectura assequetur?”

[¶12] 13. "But I observed, Quintus, that you prudently withdrew divination from conjectures based upon skill and experience in public affairs, from those drawn from the use of the senses and from those made by persons in their own callings. I observed, also, that you defined divination to be 'the foreknowledge and foretelling of things which happen by chance.' In the first place, that is a contradiction of what you have admitted. For the foreknowledge possessed by a physician, a pilot, and a general is of 'things which happen by chance.' Then can any soothsayer, augur, prophet, or dreamer conjecture better than a physician, a pilot, or a general that an invalid will come safely out of his sickness, or that a ship will escape from danger, or that an army will avoid an ambuscade?

> Latin: 13. “Sed animadverti, Quinte, te caute et ab eis coniecturis quae haberent artem atque prudentiam, et ab eis rebus quae sensibus aut artificiis perciperentur, abducere divinationem eamque ita definire: ‘divinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem, quae essent fortuitae.’ Primum eodem revolveris. et medici et gubernatoris et imperatoris praesensio est rerum fortuitarum. igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut vates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo evasurum aegrotum aut e periculo navem aut ex insidiis exercitum, quam medicus, quam gubernator, quam imperator?”

[¶13] 14. "And you went on to say that even the foreknowledge of impending storms and rains by means of certain signs was not divination, and, in that connexion, you quoted a number of verses from my translation of Aratus. Yet such coincidences' happen by chance,' for though they happen frequently they do not happen always. What, then, is this thing you call divination—this 'foreknowledge of things that happen by chance '—and where is it employed? You think that 'whatever can be foreknown by means of science, reason, experience, or conjecture is to be referred, not to diviners, but to experts.' It follows, therefore, that divination of' things that happen by chance' is possible only of things which cannot be foreseen by means of skill or wisdom. Hence, if someone had declared many years in advance that the famous Marcus Marcellus, who was consul three times, would perish in a shipwreck, this, by your definition, undoubtedly would have been a case of divination, since that calamity could not have been foreseen by means of any other skill or by wisdom. That is why you say that divination is the foreknowledge of such things as depend upon chance.

> Latin: 14. “Atqui ne illa quidem divinantis esse dicebas, ventos aut imbres impendentes quibusdam praesentire signis (in quo nostra quaedam Aratea memoriter a te pronuntiata sunt), etsi haec ipsa fortuita sunt; plerumque enim, non semper eveniunt. est igitur aut ubi versatur fortuitarum rerum praesensio, quam divinationem vocas? enim praesentiri aut arte aut ratione aut usu aut coniectura possunt, ea non divinis tribuenda putas, sed peritis. relinquitur, ut ea fortuita divinari possint, quae nulla nec arte nec sapientia provideri possunt; ut, si quis M. Marcellum illum, qui ter consul fuit, multis annis ante dixisset naufragio esse periturum, divinasset profecto; nulla enim arte alia id nec sapientia scire potuisset. ergo rerum, quae in fortuna positae sunt, praesensio divinatio est.”

[¶14] 15. "Can there, then, be any foreknowledge of things for whose happening no reason exists? For we do not apply the words 'chance,' 'luck,' 'accident,' or 'casualty' except to an event which has so occurred or happened that it either might not have occurred at all, or might have occurred in any other way. How, then, is it possible to foresee and to predict an event that happens at random, as the result of blind accident, or of unstable chance?

> Latin: 15. “Potestne igitur earum rerum, quae nihil habent rationis, quare futurae sint, esse ulla praesensio? est enim aliud fors, quid fortuna, quid casus, quid eventus, nisi cum sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel non cadere atque evenire, ut vel aliter cadere atque evenire potuerit? modo ergo id, quod temere fit caeco casu et volubilitate fortunae, praesentiri et praedici potest?”

[¶15] 16. By the use of reason the physician foresees the progress of a disease, the general anticipates the enemy's plans and the pilot forecasts the approach of bad weather. And yet even those who base their conclusions on accurate reasoning are often mistaken: for example, when the farmer sees his olive-tree in bloom he expects also, and not unreasonably, to see it bear fruit, but occasionally he is disappointed. If then mistakes are made by those who make no forecasts not based upon some reasonable and probable conjecture, what must we think of the conjectures of men who foretell the future by means of entrails, birds, portents, oracles, or dreams? I am not ready yet to take up one by one the various kinds of divination and show that the cleft in the liver, the croak of a raven, the flight of an eagle, the fall of a star, the utterances of persons in a frenzy, lots, and dreams have no prophetic value whatever; I shall discuss each of them in its turn— now I am discussing the subject as a whole.

> Latin: 16. “morbum ingravescentem ratione providet, insidias imperator, tempestates gubernator; et tamen ei ipsi saepe falluntur, qui nihil sine certa ratione opinantur; ut agricola, cum florem oleae videt, bacam quoque sese visurum putat, non sine ratione ille quidem sed non numquam tamen fallitur. falluntur ei qui nihil sine aliqua probabili coniectura ac ratione dicunt, quid existimandum est de coniectura eorum, qui extis aut avibus aut ostentis aut oraclis aut somniis futura praesentiunt? dico, quam haec signa nulla sint, fissum iecoris, corvi cantus, volatus aquilae, stellae traiectio, voces furentium, sortes, somnia; de quibus singulis dicam suo loco; nunc de universis.”

[¶16] 17. "How can anything be foreseen that has no cause and no distinguishing mark of its coming? Eclipses of the sun and also of the moon are predicted for many years in advance by men who employ mathematics in studying the courses and movements of the heavenly bodies; and the unvarying laws of nature will bring their predictions to pass. Because of the perfectly regular movements of the moon the astronomers calculate when it will be opposite the sun and in the earth's shadow —which is 'the cone of night ' —and when, necessarily, it will become invisible. For the same reason they know when the moon will be directly between the earth and the sun and thus will hide the light of the sun from our eyes. They know in what sign each planet will be at any given time and at what time each day any constellation will rise and set. You see the course of reasoning followed in arriving at these predictions.

> Latin: 17. “Qui potest provideri quicquam futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam neque notam cur futurum sit? defectiones itemque lunae praedicuntur in multos annos ab eis qui siderum cursus et motus numeris persequuntur; ea praedicunt enim quae naturae necessitas perfectura est. ex constantissimo motu lunae, quando illa e regione solis facta incurrat in umbram terrae, quae est meta noctis, ut eam obscurari necesse sit, quandoque eadem luna subiecta atque opposita soli nostris oculis eius lumen obscuret, quo in signo quaeque errantium stellarum quoque tempore futura sit, qui exortus quoque die signi alicuius aut qui occasus futurus sit. qui ante dicunt, quam rationem sequantur, vides.”

[¶17] 18. "But what course of reasoning is followed by men who predict the finding of a treasure or the inheritance of an estate? On what law of nature do such prophecies depend? But, on the other hand, if the prophecies just mentioned and others of the same class are controlled by some natural and immutable law such as regulates the movements of the stars, pray, can we conceive of anything happening by accident, or chance? Surely nothing is so at variance with reason and stability as chance. Hence it seems to me that it is not in the power even of God himself to know what event is going to happen accidentally and by chance. For if He knows, then the event is certain to happen; but if it is certain to happen, chance does not exist. And yet chance does exist, therefore there is no foreknowledge of things that happen by chance.

> Latin: 18. “Qui thesaurum inventum iri aut hereditatem venturam dicunt, quid sequuntur? aut in qua rerum natura inest id futurum? haec eaque, quae sunt eiusdem generis, habent aliquam talem necessitatem, quid est tandem, quod casu fieri aut forte fortuna putemus? enim est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae quam fortuna, ut mihi ne in deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat, quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. enim scit, certe illud eveniet; sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est; est autem fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio est.”

[¶18] 19. "But if you deny the existence of chance and assert that the course of everything present or future has been inevitably determined from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you said was 'the foreknowledge of things that happen by chance.' For if nothing can happen, nothing befall, nothing come to pass, except what has been determined from all eternity as bound to happen at a fixed time, how can there be such a thing as chance? And if there is no such thing as chance, what room is there for that divination, which you termed 'a foreknowledge of things that happen by chance'? And you were inconsistent enough, too, to say that everything that is or will be is controlled by Fate! Why, the very word ' Fate ' is full of superstition and old women's credulity, and yet the Stoics have much to say of this Fate of yours. A discussion on Fate is reserved for another occasion; at present I shall speak of it only in so far as it is necessary.

> Latin: 19. “Aut si negas esse fortunam et omnia, quae fiunt quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas ‘praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum.’ Si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? qua sublata qui locus est divinationi? a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio? dicebas omnia, quae fierent futurave essent, fato contineri. sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum; sed tamen apud Stoicos de isto fato multa dicuntur; de quo alias; nunc quod necesse est.”

[¶19] 20. "Of what advantage to me is divination if everything is ruled by Fate? On that hypothesis what the diviner predicts is bound to happen. Hence I do not know what to make of the fact that an eagle recalled our intimate friend Deiotarus from his journey; for if he had not turned back he must have been sleeping in the room when it was destroyed the following night, and, therefore, have been crushed in the ruins. And yet, if Fate had willed it, he would not have escaped that calamity; and vice versa. Hence, I repeat, what is the good of divination? Or what is it that lots, entrails, or any other means of prophecy warn me to avoid? For, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman fleets in the First Punic War should perish—the one by shipwreck and the other at the hands of the Carthaginians—they would have perished just the same even if the sacred chickens had made a tripudium solistimum in the consulship of Lucius Junius and Publius Claudius! On the other hand, if obedience to the auspices would have prevented the destruction of the fleets, then they did not perish in accordance with Fate. But you insist that all things happen by Fate; therefore there is no such thing as divination.

> Latin: 20. “Si omnia fato, quid mihi divinatio prodest? enim is, qui divinat, praedicit, id vero futurum est; ut ne illud quidem sciam quale sit, quod Deiotarum, familiarem nostrum et necessarium, ex itinere aquila revocavit; ‘qui, nisi revertisset, in eo conclavi ei cubandum fuisset, quod proxima nocte corruit; ruina igitur oppressus esset.’ At id neque, si fatum fuerat, effugisset nec, si non fuerat, in eum casum incidisset.” “Quid ergo adiuvat divinatio? aut quid est, quod me moneant aut sortes aut exta aut ulla praedictio? enim fatum fuit classes populi Romani bello Punico primo, alteram naufragio, alteram a Poenis depressam, interire, etiamsi tripudium solistimum pulli fecissent L. Iunio et P. Claudio consulibus, classes tamen interissent., cum auspiciis obtemperatum esset, interiturae classes non fuerunt, non interierunt fato; vultis autem omnia fato; nulla igitur est divinatio.”

[¶20] 21. "Again, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman army should perish at Lake Trasimenus in the Second Punic War, could that result have been avoided if the consul Flaminius had obeyed the signs and the auspices which forbade his joining battle? Assuredly not. Therefore, either the army did not perish by the will of Fate, or, if it did (and you are certainly bound as a Stoic to say that it did), the same result would have happened even if the auspices had been obeyed; for the decrees of Fate are unchangeable. Then what becomes of that vaunted divination of you Stoics? For if all things happen by Fate, it does us no good to be warned to be on our guard, since that which is to happen, will happen regardless of what we do. But if that which is to be can be turned aside, there is no such thing as Fate; so, too, there is no such thing as divination—since divination deals with things that are going to happen. But nothing is ' certain to happen' which there is some means of dealing with so as to prevent its happening.

> Latin: 21. “Quodsi fatum fuit bello Punico secundo exercitum populi Romani ad lacum Trasimenum interire, num id vitari potuit, si Flaminius consul eis signis eisque auspiciis, quibus pugnare prohibebatur, paruisset? non potuit. Aut igitur non fato interiit exercitus, aut, si fato (quod certe vobis ita dicendum est), etiamsi obtemperasset auspiciis, idem eventurum fuisset; mutari enim fata non possunt. est igitur ista divinatio Stoicorum? quae, si fato omnia fiunt, nihil nos admonere potest, ut cautiores simus; quoquo enim modo nos gesserimus, fiet tamen illud, quod futurum est; sin autem id potest flecti, nullum est fatum; ita ne divinatio quidem, quoniam ea rerum futurarum est. autem est pro certo futurum, quod potest aliqua procuratione accidere ne fiat.”

[¶21] 22. "And further, for my part, I think that a knowledge of the future would be a disadvantage. Consider, for example, what Priam's life would have been if he had known from youth what dire events his old age held in store for him! But let us leave the era of myths and come to events nearer home. In my work On Consolation I have collected instances of very grievous deaths that befell some of the most illustrious men of our commonwealth. Passing by men of earlier day, let us take Marcus Crassus. What advantage, pray, do you think it would have been to him, when he was at the very summit of power and wealth, to know that he was destined to perish beyond the Euphrates in shame and dishonour, after his son had been killed and his own army had been destroyed? Or do you think that Gnaeus Pompey would have found joy in his three consulships, in his three triumphs, and in the fame of his transcendent deeds, if he had known that he would be slain in an Egyptian desert, after he had lost his army, and that following his death those grave events would occur of which I cannot speak without tears?

> Latin: 22. “Atque ego ne utilem quidem arbitror esse nobis futurarum rerum scientiam. enim vita fuisset Priamo, si ab adulescentia scisset, quos eventus senectutis esset habiturus? a fabulis, propiora videamus. hominum nostrae civitatis gravissimos exitus in Consolatione collegimus. igitur? ut omittamus superiores, Marcone Crasso putas utile fuisse tum, cum maximis opibus fortunisque florebat, scire sibi interfecto Publio filio exercituque deleto trans Euphratem cum ignominia et dedecore esse pereundum? An Cn. Pompeium censes tribus suis consulatibus, tribus triumphis, maximarum rerum gloria laetaturum fuisse, si sciret se in solitudine Aegyptiorum trucidatum iri amisso exercitu, post mortem vero ea consecutura, quae sine lacrimis non possumus dicere?”

[¶22] 23. "Or what do we think of Caesar? Had he foreseen that in the Senate, chosen in most part by himself, in Pompey's hall, aye, before Pompey's very statue, and in the presence of many of his own centurions, he would be put to death by most noble citizens, some of whom owed all that they had to him, and that he would fall to so low an estate that no friend—no, not even a slave—would approach his dead body, in what agony of soul would he have spent his life! "Of a surety, then, ignorance of future ills is more profitable than the knowledge of them.

> Latin: 23. “Quid vero Caesarem putamus, si divinasset fore ut in eo senatu, quem maiore ex parte ipse cooptasset, in curia Pompeia, ante ipsius Pompei simulacrum, tot centurionibus suis inspectantibus, a nobilissimis civibus, partim etiam a se omnibus rebus ornatis, trucidatus ita iaceret ut ad eius corpus non modo amicorum, sed ne servorum quidem quisquam accederet, quo cruciatu animi vitam acturum fuisse?” “Certe igitur ignoratio futurorum malorum utilior est quam scientia.”

[¶23] 24. For, assuming that men knew the future it cannot in any wise be said—certainly not by the Stoics—that Pompey would not have taken up arms, that Crassus would not have crossed the Euphrates, or that Caesar would not have embarked upon the civil war. If so, then, the deaths that befell these men were not determined by Fate. But you will have it that everything happens by Fate; consequently, knowledge of the future would have done these men no good. In reality it would have entirely deprived the earlier portion of their lives of enjoyment; for how could they have been happy in reflecting what their ends would be? And so, however the Stoics turn and twist, all their shrewdness must come to naught. For, if a thing that is going to happen, may happen in one way or another, indifferently, chance is predominant; but things that happen by chance cannot be certain. But if it is certain what is going to befall me in reference to any matter and on every occasion, how do the soothsayers help me by saying that the greatest misfortunes await me?

> Latin: 24. “illud quidem dici. praesertim” “Stoicis, nullo modo potest: Non isset ad arma Pompeius, non transisset Crassus Euphratem, non suscepisset bellum civile Caesar. igitur fatalis exitus habuerunt; vultis autem evenire omnia fato; nihil ergo illis profuisset divinare; atque etiam omnem fructum vitae superioris perdidissent; quid enim posset eis esse laetum exitus suos cogitantibus?, quoquo sese verterint Stoici, iaceat necesse est omnis eorum sollertia. enim id quod eventurum est vel hoc, vel illo, modo potest evenire, fortuna valet plurimum; quae autem fortuita sunt, certa esse non possunt. autem certum est quid quaque de re quoque tempore futurum sit, quid est quod me adiuvent haruspices cum res tristissimas portendi dixerunt?”

[¶24] 25. "To the last point the Stoics make the rejoinder that 'every evil which is going to befall us is made lighter by means of religious rites.' But if nothing happens except in accordance with Fate, no evil can be made lighter by means of religious rites. Homer shows his appreciation of this fact when he represents Jupiter as complaining because he could not snatch his son Sarpedon from death when Fate forbade. The same thought is expressed in the following verses translated from a Greek poet:
That which has been decreed by Fate to be
Almighty Jove himself cannot prevent.
The whole idea of Fate in every detail is justly, as I think, the subject of derision even in Atellan farces,, x. 208; Cic. Adfam. ix. 16. 7. but in a discussion as serious as ours joking is out of place. So then let us sum up our argument: If it is impossible to foresee things that happen by chance because they are uncertain, there is no such thing as divination; if, on the contrary, they can be foreseen because they are preordained by Fate, still there is no such thing as divination, which, by your definition, deals with 'things that happen by chance.'

> Latin: 25. “Addunt ad extremum, ‘omnia levius casura rebus divinis procuratis.’ Si autem nihil fit extra fatum, nihil levari re divina potest. sentit Homerus cum querentem Iovem inducit quod Sarpedonem filium a morte contra fatum eripere non posset. idem significat Graecus ille in eam sententiam versus:
quod fóre paratum est, ìd summum exsuperát Iovem.
omnino fatum etiam Atellanio versu iure mihi esse irrisum videtur; sed in rebus tam severis non est iocandi locus. igitur ratio: Si enim provideri nihil potest futurum esse eorum, quae casu fiunt, quia esse certa non possunt, divinatio nulla est; sin autem idcirco possunt provideri, quia certa sunt et fatalia, rursus divinatio nulla est; eam enim tu fortuitarum rerum esse dicebas.”

[¶25] 26. But this introductory part of my discussion has been mere skirmishing with light infantry; now let me come to close quarters and see if I cannot drive in both wings of your argument. "You divided divination into two kinds, one artificial and the other natural. 'The artificial,' you said, 'consists in part of conjecture and in part of long-continued observation; while the natural is that which the soul has seized, or, rather, has obtained, from a source outside itself—that is, from God, whence all human souls have been drawn off, received, or poured out.' Under the head of artificial divination you placed predictions made from the inspection of entrails, those made from lightnings and portents, those made by augurs, and by persons who depend entirely upon premonitory signs. Under the same head you included practically every method of prophecy in which conjecture was employed.

> Latin: 26. “haec fuerit nobis tamquam levis armaturae prima orationis excursio; nunc comminus agamus experiamurque, si possimus cornua commovere disputationis tuae.” “Duo enim genera divinandi esse dicebas, unum ‘artificiosum,’ alterum ‘naturale.’ Artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex observatione diuturna. quod animus arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus ex divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. divinationis illa fere genera ponebas: extispicum eorumque qui ex fulguribus ostentisque praedicerent, tum augurum eorumque qui signis aut ominibus uterentur, omneque genus coniecturale in hoc fere genere ponebas.”

[¶26] 27. Natural divination, on the other hand, according to your view, is the result—'the effusion,' as it were—of mental excitement, or it is the prophetic power which the soul has during sleep while free from bodily sensation and worldly cares. Moreover, you derived every form of divination from three sources—God, Fate, and Nature. And although you could not give a reason for any kind of divination, still you carried on the war by marshalling an astonishing array of examples from fiction. Of such a course I wish to say emphatically that it is not becoming in a philosopher to introduce testimony which may be either true by accident, or false and fabricated through malice. You ought to have employed arguments and reason to show that all your propositions were true and you ought not to have resorted to so-called occurrences—certainly not to such occurrences as are unworthy of belief.

> Latin: 27. “autem naturale aut concitatione mentis edi et quasi fundi videbatur aut animo per somnum sensibus et curis vacuo provideri. autem divinationem omnem a tribus rebus, a deo, a fato, a natura. tamen cum explicare nihil posses, pugnasti commenticiorum exemplorum mirifica copia. De quo primum hoc libet dicere: Hoc ego philosophi non esse arbitror testibus uti, qui aut casu veri aut malitia falsi fictique esse possunt; argumentis et rationibus oportet, quare quidque ita sit, docere, non eventis, eis praesertim quibus mihi liceat non credere.”

[¶27] 28. "In discussing separately the various methods of divination, I shall begin with soothsaying, which, according to my deliberate judgement, should be cultivated from reasons of political expediency and in order that we may have a state religion. But we are alone and for that reason we may, without causing ill-will, make an earnest inquiry into the truth of soothsaying—certainly I can do so, since in most things my philosophy is that of doubt. In the first place, then, if you please, let us make an inspection' of entrails! Now can anybody be induced to believe that the things said to be predicted by means of entrails were learned by the soothsayers through 'long-continued observation'? How long, pray, did the observations last? How could the observations have continued for a long time? How did the soothsayers manage to agree among themselves what part of the entrails was unfavourable, and what part favourable; or what cleft in the liver indicated danger and what promised some advantage? Are the soothsayers of Etruria, Elis, Egypt, and of Carthage in accord on these matters? Apart from such an agreement being impossible in fact, it is impossible even to imagine; and, moreover, we see some nations interpreting entrails in one way and some in another; hence there is no uniformity of practice.

> Latin: 28. “Ut ordiar ab haruspicina, quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religionis colendam censeo. soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti., si placet, exta primum. igitur cuiquam potest ea, quae significari dicuntur extis, cognita esse a haruspicibus observatione diuturna? diuturna ista fuit? aut quam longinquo tempore observari potuit? aut quo modo est collatum inter ipsos, quae pars inimica, quae pars familiaris esset, quod fissum periculum, quod commodum aliquod ostenderet? An haec inter se haruspices Etrusci, Elii, Aegyptii, Poeni contulerunt? At id, praeterquam quod fieri non potuit, ne fingi quidem potest; alios enim alio more videmus exta interpretari, nec esse unam omnium disciplinam.”

[¶28] 29. "Surely if entrails have any prophetic force, necessarily that force either is in accord with the laws of nature, or is fashioned in some way by the will and power of the gods. But between that divine system of nature whose great and glorious laws pervade all space and regulate all motion what possible connexion can there be with—I shall not say the gall of a chicken, whose entrails, some men assert, give very clear indications of the future, but—the liver, heart, and lungs of a sacrificial ox? And what natural quality is there in the entrails which enables them to indicate the future?

> Latin: 29. “Et certe, si est in extis aliqua vis, quae declaret futura, necesse est eam aut cum rerum natura esse coniunctam aut conformari quodam modo numine deorum. cum rerum natura tanta tamque praeclara in omnes partes motusque diffusa quid habere potest commune non dicam gallinaceum fel (sunt enim, qui vel argutissima haec exta esse dicant), sed tauri opimi iecur aut cor aut pulmo? quid habet naturale, quod declarare possit, quid futurum sit?”

[¶29] 30. "Nevertheless Democritus jests rather prettily for a natural philosopher—and there is no more arrogant class—when he says:
No one regards the things before his feet,
But views with care the regions of the sky.
And yet Democritus gives his approval to divination by means of entrails only to the extent of believing that their condition and colour indicate whether hay and other crops will be abundant or the reverse, and he even thinks that the entrails give signs of future health or sickness. O happy mortal! He never failed to have his joke—that is absolutely certain. But was he so amused with petty trifles as to fail to see that his theory would be plausible only on the assumption that the entrails of all cattle changed to the same colour and condition at the same time? But if at the same instant the liver of one ox is smooth and full and that of another is rough and shrunken, what inference can be drawn from 'the condition and colour of the entrails'?

> Latin: 30. “Democritus tamen non inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil adrogantius:
quód est ante pedes, némo spectat, caéli scrutantúr plagas.
is tamen habitu extorum et colore declarari censet haec dumtaxat: pabuli genus et earum rerum quas terra procreet, vel ubertatem vel tenuitatem; salubritatem etiam aut pestilentiam extis significari putat. O mortalem beatum! cui certo scio ludum numquam defuisse. hominem tantis delectatum esse nugis, ut non videret tum futurum id veri simile, si omnium pecudum exta eodem tempore in eundem habitum se coloremque converterent? si eadem hora aliae pecudis iecur nitidum atque plenum est, aliae horridum et exile, quid est, quod declarari possit habitu extorum et colore?”

## 6. Book II · sections 31–60

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/6/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/6/#p-N

[¶0] 31. "Equally amusing is your story about Pherecydes, who, after looking at some water just drawn from a well, foretold an earthquake. It would be presumptuous enough, I think, for natural philosophers to attempt to explain the cause of an earthquake after it had happened; but can they actually tell, from looking at fresh water, that an earthquake is going to happen? Such nonsense is often heard in the schools, but one does not have to believe everything one hears.

> Latin: 31. “An hoc eiusdem modi est, quale Pherecydeum illud quod est a te dictum? qui cum aquam ex puteo vidisset haustam, terrae motum dixit futurum., credo, impudenter, quod, cum factus est motus, dicere audent, quae vis id effecerit; etiamne futurum esse aquae iugis colore praesentiunt? istius modi dicuntur in scholis, sed credere omnia vide ne non sit necesse.”

[¶1] 32. But grant that these absurdities of Democritus are true—when do we ever consult entrails to learn about crops or health, or when have we acquired information on these partiticulars from a soothsayer after he had made an inspection of entrails? The soothsayers warn us of dangers by fire and flood and sometimes they prophesy the inheritance, sometimes the loss, of money; they discuss the favourable and the unfavourable cleft; they view the head of the liver with the utmost care from every side. If, perchance, the liver's head should be wanting they regard it as the most unpropitious sign that could have happened.

> Latin: 32. “sint sane ista Democritea vera; quando ea nos extis exquirimus? aut quando aliquid eius modi ab haruspice inspectis extis audivimus? aqua aut ab igni pericula monent; tum hereditates, tum damna denuntiant; fissum familiare et vitale tractant; caput iecoris ex omni parte diligentissime considerant; si vero id non est inventum, nihil putant accidere potuisse tristius.”

[¶2] 33. "Such signs, as I have shown before, certainly could not come within your classification of the kinds of divination 'dependent on observation.' Therefore they are not the result of immemorial usage, but they are the inventions of art— if there can be any art in the occult. But what relationship have they with the laws of nature? Assuming that all the works of nature are firmly bound together in a harmonious whole (which, I observe, is the view of the natural philosophers and especially of those men who maintain that the universe is a unit), what connexion can there be between the universe and the finding of a treasure? For instance, if the entrails foretell an increase in my fortune and they do so in accordance with some law of nature, then, in the first place, there is some relationship between them and the universe, and in the second place, my financial gain is regulated by the laws of nature. Are not the natural philosophers ashamed to utter such nonsense? And yet a certain contact between the different parts of nature may be admitted and I concede it. The Stoics have collected much evidence to prove it. They claim, for example, that the livers of mice become larger in winter; that the dry pennyroyal blooms the very day of the winter solstice, and that its seed-pods become inflated and burst and the seeds enclosed therein are sent in various directions; that at times when certain strings of the lyre are struck others sound; that it is the habit of oysters and of all shell-fish to grow with the growth of the moon and to become smaller as it wanes; and that trees are considered easiest to cut down in winter and in the dark of the moon, because they are then free from sap.

> Latin: 33. “Haec observari certe non potuerunt, ut supra docui. igitur artis inventa, non vetustatis, si est ars ulla rerum incognitarum. rerum autem natura quam cognationem habent? quae ut uno consensu iuncta sit et continens, quod video placuisse physicis, eisque maxime, qui omne quod esset, unum esse dixerunt, quid habere mundus potest cum thesauri inventione coniunctum? enim extis pecuniae mihi amplificatio ostenditur idque fit natura, primum exta sunt coniuncta mundo, deinde meum lucrum natura rerum continetur. pudet physicos haec dicere? enim iam sit aliqua in natura rerum cognatio, quam esse concedo. enim Stoici colligunt. et musculorum iecuscula bruma dicuntur augeri, et puleium aridum florescere brumali ipso die, et inflatas rumpi vesiculas, et semina [malorum], quae in eis mediis inclusa sint, in contrarias partis se vertere; iam nervos in fidibus aliis pulsis resonare alios; ostreisque et conchyliis omnibus contingere, ut cum luna pariter crescant pariterque decrescant; arboresque ut hiemali tempore cum luna simul senescente, quia tum exsiccatae sint, tempestive caedi putentur.”

[¶3] 34. "There is no need to go on and mention the seas and straits with their tides, whose ebb and flow are governed by the motion of the moon. Innumerable instances of the same kind may be given to prove that some natural connexion does exist between objects apparently unrelated. Concede that it does exist; it does not contravene the point I make, that no sort of a cleft in a liver is prophetic of financial gain. What natural tie, or what 'symphony,' so to speak, or association, or what' sympathy,' as the Greeks term it, can there be between a cleft in a liver and a petty addition to my purse? Or what relationship between my miserable money-getting, on the one hand, and heaven, earth, and the laws of nature on the other? "However, I will concede even this if you wish, though it will greatly weaken my case to admit that there is any connexion between nature and the condition of the entrails;

> Latin: 34. “Quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam? quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubernantur. licet eiusdem modi proferri, ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat. Demus hoc; nihil enim huic disputationi adversatur; num etiam, si fissum cuiusdam modi fuerit in iecore, lucrum ostenditur? qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci appellant, convenire potest aut fissum iecoris cum lucello meo aut meus quaesticulus cum caelo, terra rerumque natura?” “Concedam hoc ipsum, si vis, etsi magnam iacturam causae fecero, si ullam esse convenientiam naturae cum extis concessero;”

[¶4] 35. yet, suppose the concession made, how is it brought about that the man in search of favourable signs will find a sacrifice suited to his purpose? I thought the question insoluble. But what a fine solution is offered! I am not ashamed of you—I am actually astonished at your memory; but I am ashamed of Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius who say exactly what you said: ' The choice of the sacrificial victim is directed by the sentient and divine power which pervades the entire universe. "But even more absurd is that other pronouncement of theirs which you adopted: ' At the moment of sacrifice a change in the entrails takes place; something is added or something taken away; for all things are obedient to the Divine Will.'

> Latin: 35. “sed tamen eo concesso qui evenit, ut is, qui impetrire velit, convenientem hostiam rebus suis immolet? erat, quod ego non rebar posse dissolvi. At quam festive dissolvitur! me non tui quidem, cuius etiam memoriam admiror, sed Chrysippi, Antipatri, Posidonii, qui idem istuc quidem dicunt, quod est dictum a te, ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam, quae toto confusa mundo sit.” “Illud vero multo etiam melius, quod et a te usurpatum est et dicitur ab illis: cum immolare quispiam velit, tum fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; deorum enim numini parere omnia.”

[¶5] 36. Upon my word, no old woman is credulous enough now to believe such stuff! Do you believe that the same bullock, if chosen by one man, will have a liver without a head, and if chosen by another will have a liver with a head? And is it possible that this sudden going or coming of the liver's head occurs so that the entrails may adapt themselves to the situation of the person who offers the sacrifice? Do you Stoics fail to see in choosing the victim it is almost like a throw of the dice, especially as facts prove it? For when the entrails of the first victim have been without a head, which is the most fatal of all signs, it often happens that the sacrifice of the next victim is altogether favourable. Pray what became of the warnings of the first set of entrails? And how was the favour of the gods so completely and so suddenly gained? "But, you say, 'Once, when Caesar was offering a sacrifice, there was no heart in the entrails of the sacrificial bull; and, since it would have been impossible for the victim to live without a heart, the heart must have disappeared at the moment of immolation.'

> Latin: 36. “iam, mihi crede, ne aniculae quidem existimant. An censes eundem vitulum, si alius delegerit, sine capite iecur inventurum; si alius, cui capite? decessio capitis aut accessio subitone fieri potest, ut se exta ad immolatoris fortunam accommodent? perspicitis aleam quandam esse in hostiis deligendis, praesertim cum res ipsa doceat? enim [tristissima] exta sine capite fuerint, quibus nihil videtur esse dirius, proxima hostia litatur saepe pulcherrime. igitur illae minae superiorum extorum? aut quae tam subito facta est deorum tanta placatio?” “Sed affers in tauri opimi extis immolante Caesare cor non fuisse; id quia non potuerit accidere ut sine corde victima illa viveret, iudicandum esse tum interisse cor cum immolaretur.”

[¶6] 37. How does it happen that you understand the one fact, that the bull could not have lived without a heart and do not realize the other, that the heart could not suddenly have vanished I know not where? As for me, possibly I do not know what vital function the heart performs; if I do I suspect that the bull's heart, as the result of a disease, became much wasted and shrunken and lost its resemblance to a heart. But, assuming that only a little while before the heart was in the sacrificial bull, why do you think it suddenly disappeared at the very moment of immolation? Don't you think, rather, that the bull lost his heart when he saw that Caesar in his purple robe had lost his head? "Upon my word you Stoics surrender the very city of philosophy while defending its outworks! For, by your insistence on the truth of soothsaying, you utterly overthrow physiology. There is a head to the liver and a heart in the entrails, presto! they will vanish the very second you have sprinkled them with meal and wine! Aye, some god will snatch them away! Some invisible power will destroy them or eat them up! Then the creation and destruction of all things are not due to nature, and there are some things which spring from nothing or suddenly become nothing. Was any such statement ever made by any natural philosopher? 'It is made,' you say, 'by soothsayers.' Then do you think that soothsayers are worthier of belief than natural philosophers?

> Latin: 37. “fit, ut alterum intellegas, sine corde non potuisse bovem vivere, alterum non videas, cor subito non potuisse nescio quo avolare? enim possum vel nescire, quae vis sit cordis ad vivendum, vel suspicari contactum aliquo morbo bovis exile et exiguum et vietum cor et dissimile cordis fuisse. vero quid habes, quare putes, si paulo ante cor fuerit in tauro opimo, subito id in ipsa immolatione interisse? An quod aspexit vestitu purpureo excordem Caesarem, ipse corde privatus est?” “Urbem philosophiae, mihi crede, proditis, dum castella defenditis; nam, dum haruspicinam veram esse vultis, physiologiam totam pervertitis. est in iecore, cor in extis; iam abscedet, simul ac molam et vinum insperseris; deus id eripiet, vis aliqua conficiet aut exedet! ergo omnium ortus atque obitus natura conficiet, et erit aliquid, quod aut ex nihilo oriatur aut in nihilum subito occidat. hoc physicus dixit umquam? ‘Haruspices dicunt.’ His igitur quam physicis credendum potius existumas?”

[¶7] 38. "Again, when sacrifices are offered to more than one god at the same time, how does it happen that the auspices are favourable in one case and unfavourable in another? Is it not strange fickleness in the gods to threaten disaster in the first set of entrails and to promise a blessing in the next? Or is there such discord among the gods— often even among those who are nearest of kin— that the entrails of the sacrifice you offer to Apollo, for example, are favourable and of those you offer at the same time to Diana are unfavourable? When victims for the sacrifice are brought up at haphazard it is perfectly clear that the character of entrails that you will receive will depend on the victim chance may bring. Oh! but someone will say, 'The choice itself is a matter of divine guidance, just as in the case of lots the drawing is directed by the gods!' I shall speak of lots presently; although you really do not strengthen the cause of sacrifices by comparing them to lots; but you do weaken the cause of lots by comparing them with sacrifices.

> Latin: 38. “Quid? cum pluribus deis immolatur, qui tandem evenit, ut litetur aliis, aliis non litetur? quae autem inconstantia deorum est, ut primis minentur extis, bene promittant secundis? aut tanta inter eos dissensio, saepe etiam inter proximos, ut Apollinis exta bona sint, Dianae non bona? est tam perspicuum quam, cum fortuito hostiae adducantur, talia cuique exta esse, qualis cuique obtigerit hostia? ‘At enim id ipsum habet aliquid divini, quae cuique hostia obtingat, tamquam in sortibus, quae cui ducatur.’ Mox de sortibus; quamquam tu quidem non hostiarum causam confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortis collatione hostiarum.”

[¶8] 39. When I send a slave to Aequimaelium to bring me a lamb for a sacrifice and he brings me the lamb which has entrails suited to the exigencies of my particular case, it was not chance, I suppose, but a god that led the slave to that particular lamb! If you say that in this case too chance is, as it were, a sort of lot in accordance with the divine will, then I am sorry that our Stoic friends have given the Epicureans so great an opportunity for laughter, for you know how much fun they make of statements like that.

> Latin: 39. “An, cum in Aequimaelium misimus, qui afferat agnum, quem immolemus, is mihi agnus affertur, qui habet exta rebus accommodata, et ad eum agnum non casu, sed duce deo servus deducitur! si casum in eo quoque dicis esse quasi sortem quandam cum deorum voluntate coniunctam, doleo tantam Stoicos nostros Epicureis irridendi sui facultatem dedisse; non enim ignoras quam ista derideant.”

[¶9] 40. "And they can laugh with the better grace because Epicurus, to make the gods ridiculous, represents them as transparent, with the winds blowing through them, and living between two worlds (as if between our two groves ) from fear of the downfall. He further says that the gods have limbs just as we have, but make no use of them. Hence, while he takes a roundabout way to destroy the gods, he does not hesitate to take a short road to destroy divination. At any rate Epicurus is consistent, but the Stoics are not; for his god, who has no concern for himself or for anybody else, cannot impart divination to men. And neither can your Stoic god impart divination, although he rules the world and plans for the good of mankind.

> Latin: 40. “Et quidem illi facilius facere possunt; deos enim ipsos iocandi causa induxit Epicurus perlucidos et perflabilis et habitantis tamquam inter duos lucos sic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinarum, eosque habere putat eadem membra quae nos, nec usum ullum habere membrorum. hic circumitione quadam deos tollens recte non dubitat divinationem tollere; sed non, ut hic sibi constat, item Stoici. enim deus nihil habens nec sui nec alieni negoti non potest hominibus divinationem impertire. autem deus potest non impertire ut nihilo minus mundum regat et hominibus consulat.”

[¶10] 41. Why then do you Stoics involve yourselves in these sophistries, which you can never explain? Members of your school, when they are more hurried than usual, generally give us this syllogism: 'If there are gods, there is divination; but there are gods, therefore there is divination.' A more logical one would be this: 'There is no divination, therefore there are no gods.' Observe how rashly they commit themselves to the proposition, 'if there is no divination, there are no gods.' I say 'rashly,' for it is evident that divination has been destroyed and yet we must hold on to the gods.

> Latin: 41. “igitur vos induitis in eas captiones, quas numquam explicetis? enim, cum magis properant, concludere solent: ‘Si di sunt, est divinatio; sunt autem di; est ergo divinatio.’ Multo est probabilius: ‘Non est autem divinatio; non sunt ergo di.’ Vide, quam temere committant, ut, si nulla sit divinatio. nulli sint di. enim perspicue tollitur, deos esse retinendum est.”

[¶11] 42. "In demolishing divination by means of entrails we have utterly demolished the soothsayer's art; for the same fate awaits divination by means of lightnings and portents. According to your view, long-continued observation is employed in the case of lightnings, and reason and conjecture are generally employed in the case of portents. But what is it that has been observed in the case of lightnings? The Etruscans divided the sky into sixteen parts. Of course it was easy enough for them to double the four parts into which we divide it and then double that total and tell from which one of those divisions a bolt of lightning had come. In the first place, what difference does its location make? and, in the second place, what does it foretell? It is perfectly evident that, out of the wonder and fear excited in primitive man by lightning and thunderbolts, sprang his belief that those phenomena were caused by omnipotent Jove. And so we find it recorded in our augural annals: 'When Jove thunders or lightens it is impious to hold an election.'

> Latin: 42. “Atque hac extispicum divinatione sublata omnis haruspicina sublata est. enim sequuntur et fulgura. autem in fulguribus observatio diuturna, in ostentis ratio plerumque coniecturaque adhibetur. est igitur, quod observatum sit in fulgure? in sedecim partis diviserunt Etrusci. id quidem fuit, quattuor, quas nos habemus, duplicare, post idem iterum facere, ut ex eo dicerent, fulmen qua ex parte venisset. id quid interest? deinde quid significat? perspicuum est ex prima admiratione hominum, quod tonitrua iactusque fulminum extimuissent, credidisse ea efficere rerum omnium praepotentem Iovem? in nostris commentariis scriptum habemus: ‘Iove tonante, fulgurante comitia populi habere nefas.’”

[¶12] 43. This was ordained, perhaps, from reasons of political expediency; for our ancestors wished to have some excuse for not holding elections sometimes. And so lightning is an unfavourable sign only in case of an election; in all other cases we consider it the best of auspices, if it appears on the left side. But I shall speak of auspices in another connexion—now I am going to discuss lightnings. "There is, then, no statement less worthy of a natural philosopher than that anything can be foretold with a certainty by uncertain signs. Of course I do not think you are credulous enough to believe that Jove's thunderbolt was made on Mount Aetna by the Cyclopes.

> Latin: 43. “Hoc fortasse rei publicae causa constitutum est; comitiorum enim non habendorum causas esse voluerunt. comitiorum solum vitium est fulmen, quod idem omnibus rebus optimum auspicium habemus, si sinistrum fuit. de auspiciis alio loco, nunc de fulguribus.” “Quid igitur minus a physicis dici debet quam quicquam certi significari rebus incertis? enim te puto esse eum, qui Iovi fulmen fabricatos esse Cyclopas in Aetna putes;”

[¶13] 44. For if he had but one bolt his hurling it so often would be strange Nor would he be able to give men so many advices by thunderbolts as to what they should or should not do. But the Stoics account for the thunderbolt thus: 'When the cold exhalations from the earth begin to circulate they become winds; when these winds enter a cloud they begin to break-up and scatter its thinnest portions; if they do this very rapidly and with great violence, thunder and lightning are thereby produced. Again, when clouds collide their heat is forcibly driven out and the thunderbolt is the result.' Realizing, then, that these phenomena are due to natural causes, and happen without regularity and at no certain time, shall we look to them for signs of future events? It is passing strange, if Jupiter warns us by means of thunderbolts, that he sends so many to no purpose!

> Latin: 44. “nam esset mirabile, quo modo id Iuppiter toties iaceret, cum unum haberet; nec vero fulminibus homines quid aut faciendum esset aut cavendum moneret. enim Stoicis eos anhelitus terrae, qui frigidi sint, cum fluere coeperint, ventos esse; cum autem se in nubem induerint eiusque tenuissimam quamque partem coeperint dividere atque disrumpere idque crebrius facere et vehementius, tum et fulgores et tonitrua existere; si autem nubium conflictu ardor expressus se emiserit, id esse fulmen. igitur vi naturae, nulla constantia, nullo rato tempore videmus effici, ex eo significationem rerum consequentium quaerimus?, si ista Iuppiter significaret, tam multa frustra fulmina emitteret!”

[¶14] 45. What, for example, is his object in hurling them into the middle of the sea? or, as he so often does, on to the tops of lofty mountains? Why, pray, does he waste them in solitary deserts? And why does he fling them on the shores of peoples who do not take any notice of them? "Oh! but you say, 'the head was found in the Tiber.' As if I contended that your soothsayers were devoid of art! My contention is that there is no divination. By dividing the heavens in the manner already indicated and by noting what happened in each division the soothsayers learn whence the thunderbolt comes and whither it goes, but no method can show that the thunderbolt has any prophetic value. However, you array those verses of mine against me:
For high-thundering Jove, as he stood on starry Olympus,
Hurtled his blows at the temples and monuments raised in his honour,
And on the Capitol's site unloosed the bolts of his lightning. 'Then,' the poem goes on to say, 'the statue of Natta, the images of the gods and the piece representing Romulus and Remus, with their wolf-nurse, were struck by a thunderbolt and fell to the ground. The prophecies made by the soothsayers from these events were fulfilled to the letter.'

> Latin: 45. “enim proficit, cum in medium mare fulmen iecit? quid, cum in altissimos montis, quod plerumque fit? quid, cum in desertas solitudines? quid, cum in earum gentium oras, in quibus haec ne observantur quidem?” “At ‘inventum est caput in Tiberi.’ Quasi ego artem aliquam istorum esse negem! divinationem nego. enim distributio, quam ante dixi, et certarum rerum notatio docet, unde fulmen venerit, quo concesserit; quid significet autem, nulla ratio docet. urges me meis versibus:
nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo
ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit
et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis.” “‘statua Nattae, tum simulacra deorum Romulusque et Remus cum altrice belua vi fulminis icti conciderunt, deque his rebus haruspicum extiterunt responsa verissima.’”

[¶15] 46. Besides, you quote me as authority for the remarkable fact that, at the very time when proof of the conspiracy was being presented to the Senate, the statue of Jupiter, which had been contracted for two years before, was being erected on the Capitol. "'Will you then '—for thus you pleaded with me—' will you then persuade yourself to take sides against me in this discussion, in the face of your own writings and of your own practice? ' You are my brother and on that account I shrink from recrimination. But what, pray, is causing you distress in this matter? Is it the nature of the subject? Or is it my insistence on finding out the truth? And so I waive your charge of my inconsistency— I am asking you for an explanation of the entire subject of soothsaying. But you betook yourself to a strange place of refuge. You knew that you would be in straits when I asked your reason for each kind of divination, and, hence, you had much to say to this effect: 'Since I see what divination does I do not ask the reason or the cause why it does it. The question is, what does it do? not, why does it do it? ' As if I would grant either that divination accomplished anything, or that it was permissible for a philosopher not to ask why anything happened!

> Latin: 46. “Mirabile autem illud, quod eo ipso tempore, quo fieret indicium coniurationis in senatu, signum Iovis biennio post, quam erat locatum, in Capitolio collocabatur.” “‘Tu igitur animum induces’ (sic enim mecum agebas) ‘causam istam et contra facta tua et contra scripta defendere?’ Frater es; eo vereor. quid tibi hic tandem nocet? resne, quae talis est, an ego, qui verum explicari volo? nihil contra dico, a te rationem totius haruspicinae peto. te mirificam in latebram coniecisti; quod enim intellegeres fore ut premerere, cum ex te causas unius cuiusque divinationis exquirerem, multa verba fecisti te, cum res videres, rationem causamque nor quaerere; quid fieret, non cur fieret, ad rem pertinere. ego aut fieri concederem aut esset philosophi causam cur quidque fieret, non quaerere!”

[¶16] 47. It was in that same connexion that you brought forth my Prognostics and some samples of herbs—the scammony and aristolochia root—saying that you could see their virtue and effect but did not know the cause. "But your illustrations are not pertinent at all. For example, the causes of meteorological phenomena have been investigated by Boëthus the Stoic, whom you mentioned, and by our friend Posidonius; and even if the causes are not discovered by them, yet the phenomena themselves are capable of observation and study. But what opportunity was there for long-continued observation in the case where Natta's statue and the brazen tablets of laws were struck by lightning? 'The Nattas,' you say, 'were of the Pinarian gens and of noble birth, therefore danger was to be expected from the nobility.' So clever of Jupiter to devise such a means to warn us of danger! 'The statue of the infant Romulus,' you observe, ' was struck by a thunderbolt; hence danger was thereby predicted to the city which he founded.' How wise of Jupiter to use signs in conveying information to us! Again, you say, 'Jupiter's statue was being set up at the very time the conspiracy was being exposed.' You, of course, prefer to attribute this coincidence to a divine decree rather than to chance. The man to whom Cotta and Torquatus let the contract for the statue did not, I presume, delay the completion of his work either from lack of energy or from lack of funds, but his hand was stayed till the appointed hour by the immortal gods!

> Latin: 47. “eo quidem loco et Prognostica nostra pronuntiabas et genera herbarum, scammoniam aristolochiamque radicem, quarum causam ignorares, vim et effectum videres.” “Dissimile totum; nam et prognosticorum causas persecuti sunt et Boethus Stoicus, qui est a te nominatus, et noster etiam Posidonius, et, si causae non reperiantur istarum rerum, res tamen ipsae observari animadvertique possunt. Nattae vero statua aut aera legum de caelo tacta quid habent observatum ac vetustum? ‘Pinarii Nattae nobiles; a nobilitate igitur periculum.’ Hoc tam callide Iuppiter cogitavit! ‘Romulus lactens fulmine ictus; urbi igitur periculum ostenditur, ei quam ille condidit.’ Quam scite per notas nos certiores facit Iuppiter! ‘At eodem tempore signum Iovis collocabatur, quo coniuratio indicabatur.’ Et tu scilicet mavis numine deorum id factum quam casu arbitrari, et redemptor, qui columnam illam de Cotta et de Torquato conduxerat faciendam, non inertia aut inopia tardior fuit, sed a deis immortalibus ad istam horam reservatus est!”

[¶17] 48. "I am not a hopeless sceptic on the subject of such warnings really being sent by the gods; however, I do not know that they are and I want to learn the actual facts from you. Again, when certain other events occurred as they had been foretold by diviners and I attributed the coincidence to chance, you talked a long time about chance. You said, for example, 'For the Venus-throw to result from one cast of the four dice might be due to chance; but if a hundred Venus-throws resulted from one hundred casts this could not be due to chance.' In the first place I do not know why it could not; but I do not contest the point, for you are full of the same sort of examples—like that about the scattering of the paints and that one about the hog's snout, and you had very many other examples besides. You also mentioned that myth from Carneades about the head of Pan —as if the likeness could not have been the result of chance! and as if every block of marble did not necessarily have within it heads worthy of Praxiteles! For his masterpieces were made by chipping away the marble, not by adding anything to it; and when, after much chipping, the lineaments of a face were reached, one then realized that the work now polished and complete had always been inside the block.

> Latin: 48. “Non equidem plane despero ista esse vera, sed nescio et discere a te volo. cum mihi quaedam casu viderentur sic evenire, ut praedicta essent a divinantibus, dixisti multa de casu; ut ‘Venerium iaci posse casu quattuor talis iactis, sed quadringentis centum Venerios non posse casu consistere.’ Primum nescio cur non possint, sed non pugno; abundas enim similibus. et respersionem pigmentorum et rostrum suis et alia permulta. Carneadem fingere dicis de capite Panisci; quasi non potuerit id evenire casu et non in omni marmore necesse sit inesse vel Praxitelia capita! enim ipsa efficiuntur detractione, necque quicquam illuc affertur a Praxitele; sed cum multa sunt detracta et ad lineamenta oris perventum est, tum intellegas illud quod iam expolitum sit intus fuisse.”

[¶18] 49. Therefore, it is possible that some such figure as Carneades described did spontaneously appear in the Chian quarries. On the other hand, the story may be untrue. Again, you have often noticed clouds take the form of a lion or a hippocentaur. Therefore it is possible for chance to imitate reality, and this you just now denied. "But since entrails and lightnings have been sufficiently discussed it remains for us to examine portents, if we are to treat soothsaying in its entirety. You spoke of a mule bearing a colt. Such an event excites wonder because it seldom occurs; but if it had been impossible it would not have occurred. And it may be urged with effect against all portents that the impossible never has happened and that the possible need not excite any wonder. Now, in case of some new occurrence, ignorance of its cause is what excites our wonder; whereas, the same ignorance as to things of frequent occurrence does not. For the man who marvels that a mule has foaled does not understand how a mare foals and is ignorant of animal parturition in general. What he sees frequently causes him no astonishment even though he does not know how it happened. If something happens which he never saw before he considers it a portent. Then, which is the portent— the mule's conception or its parturition?

> Latin: 49. “Potest igitur tale aliquid etiam sua sponte in lapicidinis Chiorum extitisse. sit hoc fictum.? in nubibus numquam animadvertisti leonis formam aut hippocentauri Potest igitur, quod modo negabas, veritatem casus imitari.” “Sed quoniam de extis et de fulgoribus satis est disputatum, ostenta restant, ut tota haruspicina sit pertractata. partus prolatus est a te. mirabilis, propterea quia non saepe fit; sed si fieri non potuisset, facta non esset. hoc contra omnia ostenta valeat numquam, quod fieri non potuerit, esse factum; sin potuerit non esse mirandum. enim ignoratio in re nova mirationem facit; eadem ignoratio si in rebus usitatis est, non miramur. qui mulam peperisse miratur, is, quo modo equa pariat, aut omnino quae natura partum animantis faciat, ignorat. quod crebro videt, non miratur, etiamsi cur fiat nescit; quod ante non vidit, id si evenit, ostentum esse censet. igitur, cum concepit mula, an cum peperit, ostentum est?”

[¶19] 50. The conception, it may be, is contrary to the usual course of nature, but the parturition follows as a necessary sequel of conception. "It seems useless to say more about soothsaying. However, let us examine its origin and thus we shall very readily determine its value. The tradition is that, once upon a time, in the district of Tarquinii, while a field was being ploughed, the ploughshare went deeper than usual and a certain Tages suddenly sprang forth and spoke to the ploughman. Now this Tages, according to the Etruscan annals, is said to have had the appearance of a boy, but the wisdom of a seer. Astounded and much frightened at the sight, the rustic raised a great cry; a crowd gathered and, indeed, in a short time, the whole of Etruria assembled at the spot. Tages then spoke at length to his numerous hearers, who received with eagerness all that he had to say, and committed it to writing. His whole address was devoted to an exposition of the science of soothsaying. Later, as new facts were learned and tested by reference to the principles imparted by Tages, they were added to the original fund of knowledge. "This is the story as we get it from the Etruscans themselves and as their records preserve it, and this, in their own opinion, is the origin of their art.

> Latin: 50. “contra naturam fortasse, sed partus prope necessarius.” “Sed quid plura? ortum videamus haruspicinae; sic facillime quid habeat auctoritatis iudicabimus. Tages quidam dicitur in agro Tarquiniensi, cum terra araretur et sulcus altius esset impressus, extitisse repente et eum affatus esse, qui arabat. autem Tages, ut in libris est Etruscorum, puerili specie dicitur visus, sed senili fuisse prudentia. aspectu cum obstupuisset bubulcus clamoremque maiorem cum admiratione edidisset, concursum esse factum, totamque brevi tempore in eum locum Etruriam convenisse; tum illum plura locutum multis audientibus, qui omnia verba eius exceperint litterisque mandarint; omnem autem orationem fuisse eam, qua haruspicinae disciplina contineretur; eam postea crevisse rebus novis cognoscendis et ad eadem illa principia referendis.” “Haec accepimus ab ipsis, haec scripta conservant, hunc fontem habent disciplinae.”

[¶20] 51. Now do we need a Carneades or an Epicurus to refute such nonsense? Who in the world is stupid enough to believe that anybody ever ploughed up —which shall I say—a god or a man? If a god, why did he, contrary to his nature, hide himself in the ground to be uncovered and brought to the light of day by a plough? Could not this so-called god have delivered this art to mankind from a more exalted station? But if this fellow Tages was a man, pray, how could he have lived covered with earth? Finally, where had he himself learned the things he taught others? But really in spending so much time in refuting such stuff I am more absurd than the very people who believe it. "But indeed, that was quite a clever remark which Cato made many years ago: 'I wonder,' said he, 'that a soothsayer doesn't laugh when he sees another soothsayer.'

> Latin: 51. “ergo opus est ad haec refellenda Carneade? Epicuro? quisquam ita desipiens, qui credat exaratum esse— deum dicam an hominem? deus, cur se contra naturam in terram abdiderat, ut patefactus aratro lucem aspiceret?? Idem nonne poterat deus hominibus disciplinam superiore e loco tradere? autem homo ille Tages fuit, quonam modo potuit terra oppressus vivere? porro illa potuit, quae docebat alios, ipse didicisse? ego insipientior quam illi ipsi, qui ista credunt, qui quidem contra eos tam diu disputem.” “Vetus autem illud Catonis admodum scitum est, qui mirari se aiebat quod non rideret haruspex haruspicem cum vidisset.”

[¶21] 52. For how many things predicted by them really come true? If any do come true, then what reason can be advanced why the agreement of the event with the prophecy was not due to chance? While Hannibal was in exile at the court of King Prusias he advised the king to go to war, but the king replied, 'I do not dare, because the entrails forbid.' ' And do you,' said Hannibal, 'put more reliance in pieces of ox-meat than you do in a veteran commander?' Again, when Caesar himself was warned by a most eminent soothsayer not to cross over to Africa before the winter solstice, did he not cross? If he had not done so all the forces opposed to him would have effected a junction. Why need I give instances—and, in fact, I could give countless ones—where the prophecies of soothsayers either were without result or the issue was directly the reverse of the prophecy?

> Latin: 52. “enim quaque res evenit praedicta ab istis?, si evenit quippiam, quid afferri potest, cur non casu id evenerit? Prusias, cum Hannibali apud eum exsulanti depugnari placeret, negabat se audere, quod exta prohiberent. ‘Ain tu,’ inquit, ‘carunculae vitulinae mavis quam imperatori veteri credere?’ Quid? Caesar cum a summo haruspice moneretur, ne in Africam ante brumam transmitteret, nonne transmisit? quod ni fecisset, uno in loco omnes adversariorum copiae convenissent. ego haruspicum responsa commemorem (possum equidem innumerabilia) quae aut nullos habuerint exitus aut contrarios?”

[¶22] 53. Ye gods, how many times they were mistaken in the late civil war! What oracular messages the soothsayers sent from Rome to our Pompeian party then in Greece! What assurances they gave to Pompey! For he placed great reliance in divination by means of entrails and portents. I have no wish to call these instances to mind, and indeed it is unnecessary —especially to you, since you had personal knowledge of them. Still, you are aware that the result was nearly always contrary to the prophecy. But enough on this point: let us now come to portents.

> Latin: 53. “civili bello, di immortales! quam multa luserunt! nobis in Graeciam Roma responsa haruspicum missa sunt! dicta Pompeio! etenim ille admodum extis et ostentis movebatur. lubet commemorare, nec vero necesse est, tibi praesertim qui interfuisti; vides tamen omnia fere contra ac dicta sint evenisse. haec hactenus; nunc ad ostenta veniamus.”

[¶23] 54. "You have cited many instances of portents from the verses which I wrote during my consulship; you adduced many others which occurred prior to the Marsian War and which are included in Sisenna's compilation, and you mentioned a great number which are recorded by Callisthenes and which preceded the unfortunate battle of the Spartans at Leuctra. I shall, of course, speak of each of these instances separately, in so far as they require notice; but I must first discuss portents generally. Now, what is the nature of these intimations, or of this advance-information, as it were, sent out by the gods to apprise us of coming disasters? In the first place, why do immortal gods see fit to give us warnings which we can't understand without the aid of interpreters? In the next place, why do they warn us of things which we cannot avoid? Why, even a mortal, if he has a proper sense of duty, does not warn his friends of imminent disasters which can in no way be escaped. Physicians, for example, although they know many times that their patients are going to die of a present disease, yet never tell them so; for a forewarning of an evil is justified only when to the warning is joined a means of escape.

> Latin: 54. “Multa me consule a me ipso scripta recitasti, multa ante Marsicum bellum a Sisenna collecta attulisti, multa ante Lacedaemoniorum malam pugnam in Leuctricis a Callisthene commemorata dixisti; de quibus dicam equidem singulis, quoad videbitur, sed dicendum etiam est de universis. est enim ista a deis profecta significatio et quasi denuntiatio calamitatum? autem volunt di immortales primum ea significantes, quae sine interpretibus non possimus intellegere, deinde ea, quae cavere nequeamus? At hoc ne homines quidem probi faciunt, ut amicis impendentis calamitates praedicant quas illi effugere nullo modo possint; ut medici, quamquam intellegunt saepe, tamen numquam aegris dicunt illo morbo eos esse morituros; omnis enim praedictio mali tum probatur, cum ad praedictionem cautio adiungitur.”

[¶24] 55. How, then, did portents or their interpreters help the Spartans of long ago, or our Pompeian friends in more recent times? If these signs you speak of are to be considered as sent by the gods, why were they so obscure? For, if we had the right to know what was going to happen, it should have been stated to us clearly: or, if the gods did not wish us to know, they should not have told us—even in riddles. "Now every sort of conjecture—and divination depends on conjecture—is often applied by the wit of man to many different and even contradictory uses. As in judicial causes the prosecutor draws one inference and the lawyer for the defendant another from the same set of facts, and yet the inferences of both are plausible; so, in all investigations in which it is customary to employ conjecture, ambiguity is found. Moreover, in the case of things that happen now by chance now in the usual course of nature (sometimes too mistakes are caused by taking appearance for reality), it is the height of folly to hold the gods as the direct agents and not to inquire into the causes of such things.

> Latin: 55. “igitur aut ostenta aut eorum interpretes vel Lacedaemonios olim vel nuper nostros adiuverunt? si signa deorum putanda sunt, cur tam obscura fuerunt? si enim, ut intellegeremus quid esset eventurum, aperte declarari oportebat, aut ne occulte quidem, si ea sciri nolebant.” “Iam vero coniectura omnis, in qua nititur divinatio, ingeniis hominum in multas aut diversas aut etiam contrarias partis saepe deducitur. enim in causis iudicialibus alia coniectura est accusatoris, alia defensoris et tamen utriusque credibilis, sic in omnibus eis rebus, quae coniectura investigari videntur, anceps reperitur oratio. autem res tum natura, tum casus affert (non numquam etiam errorem creat similitudo), magna stultitia est earum rerum deos facere effectores, causas rerum non quaerere.”

[¶25] 56. "You believe that the Boeotian bards at Lebadia foretold victory for the Thebans from the crowing of cocks; for cocks, you say, are wont to be silent when defeated and to crow when victorious. Do you really believe that Jupiter would have employed chickens to convey such a message to so great a state? And is it true that these fowls are not accustomed to crow except when they are victorious But at that time they did crow and they had not been victorious. ' Oh! that was a portent, 'you say. A fine portent indeed! you talk as if a fish and not a cock had done the crowing! But come; is there any time, day or night, when they are not liable to crow? And if the pleasant sensation—or 'joy' if you will—which comes from victory causes them to crow, then, possibly, joy springing from some other source may have the same effect.

> Latin: 56. “Tu vates Boeotios credis Lebadiae vidisse ex gallorum gallinaceorum cantu victoriam esse Thebanorum, quia galli victi silere solerent, canere victores. igitur per gallinas Iuppiter tantae civitati signum dabat? An illae aves, nisi cum vicerunt, canere non solent? At tum canebant nec vicerant. enim est, inquies, ostentum. vero! quasi pisces, non galli cecinerint! autem est tempus, quo illi non cantent, vel nocturnum vel diurnum? victores alacritate et quasi laetitia ad canendum excitantur, potuit accidisse alia quoque laetitia, qua ad cantum moverentur.”

[¶26] 57. By the way, Democritus gives a very good explanation of why cocks crow before day. 'Their food,' he says, ' after it has been digested, is expelled from the craw and is distributed over the entire body. By the time that process is completed they have had sleep enough and begin to crow.' And then, 'in the silence of the night,' as Ennius says, ' they indulge their russet throats in song and beat their flapping wings.' In view, then, of the fact that this creature is prone to crow of its own volition at any time, and may be made to crow either by nature or by chance, how did it ever occur to Callisthenes to say that the gods conveyed prophecies to men by the crowing of cocks?

> Latin: 57. “Democritus quidem optimis verbis causam explicat cur ante lucem galli canant; depulso enim de pectore et in omne corpus diviso et mitificato cibo cantus edere quiete satiatos; qui quidem ‘silentio noctis,’ ut ait Ennius,
favent faucíbus russis
cantu plausuque prem’int alas.
igitur hoc animal tam sit canorum sua sponte, quid in mentem venit Callistheni dicere deos gallis signum dedisse cantandi, cum id vel natura vel casus efficere potuisset?”

[¶27] 58. "'Reports,' you say, 'were made to the Senate that there was a shower of blood, that the river Atratus actually flowed with blood and that the statues of the gods dripped with sweat. ' You do not think for a moment that Thales, Anaxagoras, or any other natural philosopher would have believed such reports? Sweat and blood you may be sure do not come except from animate bodies. An effect strikingly like blood is produced by the admixture of water with certain kinds of soil; and the moisture which forms on the outside of objects, as we see it on our plastered walls when the south wind blows, seems to resemble sweat. Such occurrences, which in time of war appear to the timid to be most frequent and most real, are scarcely noticed in times of peace. Moreover, in periods of fear and of danger stories of portents are not only more readily believed, but they are invented with greater impunity.

> Latin: 58. “‘Sanguinem pluisse senatui nuntiatum est, Atratum etiam fluvium fluxisse sanguine, deorum sudasse simulacra.’ Num censes his nuntiis Thalen aut Anaxagoran aut quemquam physicum crediturum fuisse? nec enim sanguis nec sudor nisi e corpore. et decoloratio quaedam ex aliqua contagione terrena maxime potest sanguini similis esse, et umor adlapsus extrinsecus, ut in tectoriis videmus austro, sudorem videtur imitari. haec in bello plura et maiora videntur timentibus, eadem non tam animadvertuntur in pace; accedit illud etiam, quod in metu et periculo cum creduntur facilius, tum finguntur impunius.”

[¶28] 59. But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life? 'But,' you say, ' the fact that just before the Marsian War mice gnawed the shields at Lanuvium was pronounced by the soothsayers to be a very direful portent.' As if it mattered a whit whether mice, which are gnawing something day and night, gnawed shields or sieves! Hence, by the same token, the fact that, at my house, mice recently gnawed my Plato's Republic should fill me with alarm for the Roman republic; or if they had gnawed my Epicurus On Pleasure I should have expected a rise in the market price of food!

> Latin: 59. “autem ita leves atque inconsiderati sumus, ut, si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus? ‘Ante vero Marsicum bellum quod clipeos Lanuvi,’ ut a te dictum est, ‘mures rosissent, maximum id portentum haruspices esse dixerunt.’ Quasi vero quicquam intersit, mures diem noctem aliquid rodentes scuta an cribra corroserint! si ista sequimur, quod Platonis nuper apud me mures corroserunt de re publica debui pertimescere, aut, si Epicuri de Voluptate liber rosus esset, putarem annonam in macello cariorem fore!”

[¶29] 60. "Are we going to be frightened at these tales of portents, whether of animal or of human birth? Not to be too verbose, all portents have one and the same explanation and it is this: whatever comes into existence, of whatever kind, must needs find its cause in nature; and hence, even though it may be contrary to experience, it cannot be contrary to nature. Therefore, explore the cause, if you can, of every strange thing that excites your astonishment. If you do not' find the cause be assured, nevertheless, that nothing could have happened without a cause, and employ the principles of natural philosophy to banish the fear which the novelty of the apparition may have occasioned. Then no earthquake or opening of the heavens, no showers of stones or blood, no shooting stars, or comets, will fill you with alarm.

> Latin: 60. “An vero illa nos terrent, si quando aliqua portentosa aut ex pecude aut ex homine nata dicuntur? omnium, ne sim longior, una ratio est. enim oritur, qualecumque est, causam habeat a natura necesse est, ut, etiamsi praeter consuetudinem extiterit, praeter naturam tamen non possit existere. igitur investigato in re nova atque admirabili, si poteris; si nullam reperies, illud tamen exploratum habeto, nihil fieri potuisse sine causa, eumque terrorem, quem tibi rei novitas attulerit, naturae ratione depellito. te nec terrae fremitus, nec caeli discessus, nec lapideus aut sanguineus imber, nec traiectio stellae, nec faces visae terrebunt.”

## 7. Book II · sections 61–90

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/7/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/7/#p-N

[¶0] 61. "If I were to ask Chrysippus the causes of all the phenomena just mentioned, that distinguished writer on divination would never say that they happened by chance, but he would find an explanation for each of them in the laws of nature. For he would say: ' Nothing can happen without a cause; nothing actually happens that cannot happen; if that has happened which could have happened, then it should not be considered a portent; therefore there are no such things as portents.' Now if a thing is to be considered a portent because it is seldom seen, then a wise man is a portent; for, as I think, it oftener happens that a mule brings forth a colt than that nature produces a sage. Chrysippus, in this connexion, gives the following syllogism: 'That which could not have happened never did happen; and that which could have happened is no portent; therefore, in any view, there is no such thing as a portent.'

> Latin: 61. “Quorum omnium causas si a Chrysippo quaeram, ipse ille divinationis auctor numquam illa dicet facta fortuito naturalemque rationem omnium reddet: ‘Nihil enim fieri sine causa potest; nec quicquam fit, quod fieri non potest; nec, si id factum est, quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri; nulla igitur portenta sunt.’ Nam si, quod raro fit, id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est; saepius enim mulam peperisse arbitror quam sapientem fuisse. igitur ratio concluditur: ‘Nec id, quod non potuerit fieri, factum umquam esse, nec, quod potuerit, id portentum esse; ita omnino nullum esse portentum.’”

[¶1] 62. This is illustrated by the story of a clever response made by a certain diviner and interpreter of portents. A man referred to him for interpretation as a portent the fact that a snake was seen at his house, coiled about a beam. ' That was not a portent,' said the diviner; ' it would have been if the beam had been wrapped around the snake.' By this answer he said plainly enough: ' Nothing that can happen is to be considered a portent.' "You refer to a letter, written by Gaius Gracchus to Marcus Pomponius, stating that Tiberius Gracchus, father of Gaius, caught two snakes in his house and called together the soothsayers. And why a conference about snakes rather than about lizards or mice? You answer, 'Because we see lizards and mice every day; snakes we do not.' As if it makes any difference how often a thing happens if it can happen at all! And yet what surprises me is this: If the release of the female snake was to be fatal to Tiberius Gracchus and that of the male was to be the death of Cornelia, why in the world did he let either snake escape? For Gaius in his letter does not state that the soothsayers expressed any opinion as to the result if neither snake had been released. 'Be that as it may,' you reply, 'death overtook Gracchus.' That is granted, but his death was caused by some very serious illness and not by the release of the snake. Besides, soothsayers are not so unlucky that their predictions never come true—even by accident!

> Latin: 62. “Quod etiam coniector quidam et interpres portentorum non inscite respondisse dicitur ei, qui quondam ad eum retulisset quasi ostentum, quod anguis domi vectem circumiectus fuisset: ‘Tum esset,’ inquit, ‘ostentum, si anguem vectis circumplicavisset.’ Hoc ille responso satis aperte declaravit nihil habendum esse portentum quod fieri posset.” “‘C. Gracchus ad M. Pomponium scripsit duobus anguibus domi comprehensis haruspices a patre convocatos.’ Qui magis anguibus quam lacertis, quam muribus? ‘Quia sunt haec cotidiana, angues non item.’ Quasi vero referat, quod fieri potest, quam id saepe fiat. tamen miror, si emissio feminae anguis mortem afferebat Ti. Graccho, emissio autem maris anguis erat mortifera Corneliae, cur alteram utram emiserit; nihil enim scribit respondisse haruspices, si neuter anguis emissus esset, quid esset futurum. ‘At mors insecuta Gracchum est.’ Causa quidem, credo, aliqua morbi gravioris, non emissione serpentis; neque enim tanta est infelicitas haruspicum, ut ne casu quidem umquam fiat, quod futurum illi esse dixerint!”

[¶2] 63. "I should, of course, marvel at that famous story you got out of Homer about Calchas predicting the years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows—if I believed it! In a leisure moment I thus translated what Agamemnon in Homer says about this prophecy:
Be patient, men; with fortitude endure
Your grievous tasks till we can ascertain
If what our Calchas prophesies be true,
Or only idle fancies of his breast.
For all who have not left the light of day,
In gloomy shades to dwell, retain these signs
Imprinted on their minds. When Aulis first
Was decked with Grecian fleets, which carried death
For Priam, ruin for Troy, we stood about
The fountains cool and sought to please the gods
With gold-crowned bulls on smoking altars laid.
Beneath the plane-tree's shade, whence gushed a spring,
We saw a frightful dragon, huge of size,
With mighty folds, forth from an altar come,
By Jove impelled. It seized some sparrows hid
Within the plane-tree's leafy boughs and eight
Devoured; the ninth—the mother bird—began
To flutter round and utter plaintive cries:
From her the cruel beast her vitals tore.

> Latin: 63. “Nam illud mirarer—si crederem—quod apud Homerum Calchantem dixisti ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratum; de cuius coniectura sic apud Homerum, ut nos otiosi convertimus, loquitur Agamemnon:
ferte, viri, et duros animo tolerate labores,
auguris ut nostri Calchantis fata queamus
scire ratosne habeant an vanos pectoris orsus.
namque omnes memori portentum mente retentant,
qui non funestis liquerunt lumina fatis.
primum ut vestita est classibus Aulis,
quae Priamo cladem et Troiae pestemque ferebant,
nos circum latices gelidos fumantibus aris,
aurigeris divom placantes numina tauris,
sub platano umbrifera, fons unde emanat aquai,
vidimus immani specie tortuque draconem
terribilem, Iovis ut pulsu penetrabat ab ara;
qui platani in ramo foliorum tegmine saeptos
corripuit pullos; quos cum consumeret octo,
nona super tremulo genetrix clangore volabat;
cui ferus immani laniavit viscera morsu.”

[¶3] 64. Now when the mother and her tender brood
Were slain, the son of Saturn who had sent
The dragon forth, took it away; and then
Did change its form into enduring stone.
In fear we stood and watched the monster strange,
As midst the altars of the gods it moved.
Then Calchas, full of courage, thus did speak:
'Why paralysed with sudden fear, O Greeks?
These signs divine were sent by Jove himself.
And though these tardy signs were long delayed,
Their fame and glory will for ever live.
The number of the birds ye saw destroyed
By horrid tooth, portends how many years
Of war we shall endure in front of Troy.
The tenth year Troy will fall and then her fate
Will satisfy the Greeks.' Thus Calchas spoke
And what he prophesied ye see fulfilled.

> Latin: 64. “
hunc, ubi tam teneros volucris matremque peremit,
qui luci ediderat, genitor Saturnius idem
abdidit et duro formavit tegmina saxo.
nos autem timidi stantes mirabile monstrum
vidimus in mediis divom versarier aris.
tum Calchas haec est fidenti voce locutus:
‘quidnam torpentes subito obstipuistis, Achivi?’
‘nobis haec portenta deum dedit ipse creator’
‘tarda et sera nimis, sed fama ac laude perenni.’
‘nam quot avis taetro mactatas dente videtis,’
‘tot nos ad Troiam belli exanclabimus annos;’
‘quae decimo cadet et poena satiabit Achivos.’
edidit haec Calchas; quae iam matura videtis.”

[¶4] 65. But, pray, by what principle of augury does he deduce years rather than months or days from the number of sparrows? Again, why does he base his prophecy on little sparrows which are not abnormal sights and ignore the alleged fact—which is impossible —that the dragon was turned to stone? Finally, what is there about a sparrow to suggest 'years'? In connexion with your story of the snake which appeared to Sulla when he was offering sacrifices, I recall two facts: first, that when Sulla offered sacrifices, as he was about to begin his march against the enemy, a snake came out from under the altar; and, second, that the glorious victory won by him that day was due not to the soothsayer's art, but to the skill of the general.

> Latin: 65. “tandem vista auguratio est ex passeribus annorum potius quam aut mensuum aut dierum? autem de passerculis coniecturam facit, in quibus nullum erat monstrum, de dracone silet, qui, id quod fieri non potuit, lapideus dicitur factus? postremo quid simile habet passer annis? de angue illo qui Sullae apparuit immolanti, utrumque memini et Sullam, cum in expeditionem educturus esset, immolavisse, et anguem ab ara extitisse, eoque die rem praeclare esse gestam non haruspicis consilio, sed imperatoris.”

[¶5] 66. "There is nothing remarkable about the so-called portents of the kind just mentioned; but after they have happened they are brought within the field of prophecy by some interpretation. Take, for example, your stories of the grains of wheat heaped into the mouth of Midas when a boy, and of the bees which settled on the lips of Plato, when he was a child—they are more remarkable as guesses than as real prophecies. Besides, the incidents may have been fictitious; if not, then the fulfilment of the prophecy may have been accidental. As to that incident about Roscius it may, of course, be untrue that a snake coiled itself around him; but it is not so surprising that a snake was in his cradle—especially in Solonium where snakes are attracted in large numbers by the heat of the fireplaces. As to your statement that the soothsayers prophesied a career of unrivalled brilliancy for Roscius, it is a strange thing to me that the immortal gods foretold the glory of a future actor and did not foretell that of Africanus!

> Latin: 66. “Atque haec ostentorum genera mirabile nihil habent; quae cum facta sunt, tum ad coniecturam aliqua interpretatione revocantur, ut illa tritici grana in os pueri Midae congesta, aut apes quas dixisti in labris Platonis consedisse pueri—non tam mirabilia sint quam coniecta belle; quae tamen vel ipsa falsa esse, vel ea quae praedicta sunt, fortuito cecidisse potuerunt. De ipso Roscio potest illud quidem esse falsum, ut circumligatus fuerit angui, sed ut in cunis fuerit anguis, non tam est mirum, in Solonio praesertim, ubi ad focum angues nundinari solent. quod haruspices responderint nihil illo clarius, nihil nobilius fore, miror deos immortales histrioni futuro claritatem ostendisse, nullam ostendisse Africano!”

[¶6] 67. "And you have even collected the portent-stories connected with Flaminius: 'His horse,' you say, 'stumbled and fell with him.' That is very strange, isn't it? And, 'The standard of the first company could not be pulled up.' Perhaps the standard bearer had planted it stoutly and pulled it up timidly. What is astonishing in the fact that the horse of Dionysius came up out of the river, or that it had bees in its mane? And yet, because Dionysius began to reign a short time later—which was a mere coincidence—the event referred to is considered a portent! 'The arms sounded,' you say, 'in the temple of Hercules in Sparta; the folding-doors of the same god at Thebes, though securely barred, opened of their own accord, and the shields hanging upon the walls of that temple fell to the ground.' Now since none of these things could have happened without some exterior force, why should we say that they were brought about by divine agency rather than by chance?

> Latin: 67. “Atque etiam a te Flaminiana ostenta collecta sunt: quod ipse et equus eius repente conciderit; non sane mirabile hoc quidem! evelli primi hastati signum non potuerit; timide fortasse signifer evellebat, quod fidenter infixerat. Dionysi equus quid attulit admirationis, quod emersit e flumine quodque habuit apes in iuba? quia brevi tempore regnare coepit, quod acciderat casu, vim habuit ostenti! ‘At Lacedaemoniis in Herculis fano arma sonuerunt, eiusdemque dei Thebis valvae clausae subito se aperuerunt, eaque scuta, quae fuerant sublime fixa, sunt humi inventa.’ Horum cum fieri nihil potuerit sine aliquo motu, quid est, cur divinitus ea potius quam casu facta esse dicamus?”

[¶7] 68. "You mention the appearance—a 'sudden' appearance it was—of a crown of wild herbs on the head of Lysander's statue at Delphi. Really? And do you think the crown of herbs appeared before their seeds were formed? Besides, the wild herbs, in my opinion, came from seeds brought by birds and were not planted by human agency. Again, imagination can make anything on top of a head look like a crown. 'At the same time,' you say, ' the golden stars in the temple of Castor and Pollux at Delphi fell down and were nowhere to be found.' That appears to me to have been the work of thieves rather than of gods.

> Latin: 68. “At in Lysandri statuae capite Delphis extitit corona ex asperis herbis, et quidem subita.? Censes ante coronam herbae extitisse quam conceptum esse semen? autem asperam credo avium congestu, non humano satu; iam, quicquid in capite est, id coronae simile videri potest. quod eodem tempore stellas aureas Castoris et Pollucis Delphis positas decidisse, neque eas usquam repertas esse dixisti,—furum id magis factum quam deorum videtur.”

[¶8] 69. I am indeed astonished that Greek historians should have recorded the mischievous pranks of the Dodonean ape. For what is less strange than for this hideous beast to have turned over the vase and scattered the lots? And yet the historians declare that no portent more direful than this ever befell the Spartans! "You spoke also of the Veientine prophecy that 'if Lake Albanus overflowed and emptied into the sea, Rome would fall, but if held in check Veii would fall.' Well, it turned out that the water from the lake was drawn off—but it was drawn off through irrigation ditches—not to save the Capitol and the city, but to improve the farming lands. ' And, not long after this occurred, a voice was heard,' you say, 'warning the people to take steps to prevent the capture of Rome by the Gauls. Therefore an altar was erected on the Nova Via in honour of Aius the Speaker.' But why? Did your' Aius the Speaker,' before anybody knew who he was, both speak and talk and from that fact receive his name? And after he had secured a seat, an altar, and a name did he become mute? Your Juno Moneta may likewise be dismissed with a question: What did she ever admonish us about except the pregnant sow?

> Latin: 69. “vero Dodonaeae improbitatem historiis Graecis mandatam esse demiror. minus mirum quam illam monstruosissimam bestiam urnam evertisse, sortes dissupavisse? negant historici Lacedaemoniis ullum ostentum hoc tristius accidisse!” “Nam illa praedicta Veientium, ‘si lacus Albanus redundasset isque in mare fluxisset, Romam perituram; si repressus esset, Veios.’ Ita aqua Albana deducta ad utilitatem agri suburbani, non ad arcem urbemque retinendam. ‘At paulo post audita vox est monentis ut providerent ne a Gallis Roma caperetur; ex eo Aio Loquenti aram in nova via consecratam.’ Quid ergo? Aius iste Loquens, cum eum nemo norat, et aiebat et loquebatur et ex eo nomen invenit; posteaquam et sedem et aram et nomen invenit, obmutuit? idem dici de Moneta potest; a qua praeterquam de sue plena quid umquam moniti sumus?”

[¶9] 70. "Enough has been said of portents; auspices remain and so do lots—I mean ' lots' that are drawn, and not those uttered by prophets, and more correctly styled ' oracles.' I shall speak of oracles when I get to natural divination. In addition I must discuss the Chaldeans. But first let us consider auspices. 'To argue against auspices is a hard thing,' you say, 'for an augur to do.' Yes, for a Marsian, perhaps; but very easy for a Roman. For we Roman augurs are not the sort who foretell the future by observing the flights of birds and other signs. And yet, I admit that Romulus, who founded the city by the direction of auspices, believed that augury was an art useful in seeing things to come— for the ancients had erroneous views on many subjects. But we see that the art has undergone a change, due to experience, education, or the long lapse of time. However, out of respect for the opinion of the masses and because of the great service to the State we maintain the augural practices, discipline, religious rites and laws, as well as the authority of the augural college.

> Latin: 70. “Satis multa de ostentis; auspicia restant et sortes eae, quae ducuntur, non illae, quae vaticinatione funduntur, quae oracula verius dicimus; de quibus tum dicemus, cum ad naturalem divinationem venerimus. etiam de Chaldaeis; sed primum auspicia videamus. ‘Difficilis auguri locus ad contra dicendum.’ Marso fortasse, sed Romano facillimus. Non enim sumus ei nos augures, qui avium reliquorumve signorum observatione futura dicamus. tamen credo Romulum, qui urbem auspicato condidit, habuisse opinionem esse in providendis rebus augurandi scientiam (errabat enim multis in rebus antiquitas), quas, vel usu iam, vel doctrina, vel vetustate immutatam videmus; retinetur autem et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates rei publicae mos, religio, disciplina, ius augurium, collegi auctoritas.”

[¶10] 71. "In my opinion the consuls, Publius Claudius and Lucius Junius, who set sail contrary to the auspices, were deserving of capital punishment; for they should have respected the established religion and should not have treated the customs of their forefathers with such shameless disdain. Therefore it was a just retribution that the former was condemned by a vote of the people and that the latter took his own life. ' Flaminius,' you say,' did not obey the auspices, therefore he perished with his army.' But a year later Paulus did obey them; and did he not lose his army and his life in the battle of Cannae? Granting that there are auspices (as there are not), certainly those which we ordinarily employ—whether by the tripudium or by the observation of the heavens— are not auspices in any sense, but are the mere ghosts of auspices. "'Quintus Fabius, I wish you to assist me at the auspices.' He answers, ' I will.' (In our forefathers' time the magistrates on such occasions used to call in some expert person to take the auspices—but in these days anyone will do. But one must be an expert to know what constitutes ' silence,' for by that term we mean 'free of every augural defect.'

> Latin: 71. “Nec vero non omni supplicio digni P. Claudius L. Iunius consules, qui contra auspicia navigaverunt; parendum enim fuit religioni, nec patrius mos tam contumaciter repudiandus. igitur alter populi iudicio damnatus est, alter mortem sibi ipse conscivit. ‘Flaminius non paruit auspiciis, itaque periit cum exercitu.’ At anno post Paulus paruit; num minus cecidit in Cannensi pugna cum exercitu?, ut sint auspicia, quae nulla sunt, haec certe, quibus utimur, sive tripudio, sive de caelo, simulacra sunt auspiciorum, auspicia nullo modo.” “‘Q. Fabi, te mihi in auspicio esse volo.’ Respondet: ‘audivi.’ (Hic apud maiores nostros adhibebatur peritus, nunc quilibet. autem esse necesse est eum,qui, silentium quid sit,intellegat; id enim silentium dicimus in auspiciis, quod omni vitio caret.”

[¶11] 72. To understand that belongs to a perfect augur.) After the celebrant has said to his assistant, 'Tell me when silence appears to exist,' the latter, without looking up or about him, immediately replies, 'Silence appears to exist.' Then the celebrant says, 'Tell me when the chickens begin to eat.' 'They are eating now,' is the answer. But what are these birds they are talking about, and where are they? Someone replies,' It's poultry. It's in a cage and the person who brought it is called “a poulterer,” because of his business.' These, then, are the messengers of Jove! What difference does it make whether they eat or not? None, so far as the auspices are concerned. But, because of the fact that, while they eat, some food must necessarily fall from their mouths and strike upon the ground (terram pavire),— this at first was called terripavium, and later, terripudium; now it is called tripudium—therefore, when a crumb of food falls from a chicken's mouth a tripudium solistimum is announced to the celebrant.

> Latin: 72. “intellegere perfecti auguris est.)” “autem, qui in auspicium adhibetur, cum ita imperavit is, qui auspicatur, ‘Dicito, si silentium esse videbitur,’ nec suspicit nec circumspicit; statim respondet ‘silentium esse videri.’ Tum ille: ‘Dicito, si pascentur.’ ‘Pascuntur.’ Quae aves? aut ubi? ‘Attulit,’ inquit, ‘in cavea pullos is qui, ex eo ipso, nominatur pullarius.’ Haec sunt igitur aves internuntiae Iovis! pascantur necne quid refert? ad auspicia; sed quia, cum pascuntur, necesse est aliquid ex ore cadere et terram pavire—‘terripavium’ primo, post ‘terripudium’ dictum est; hoc quidem iam ‘tripudium’ dicitur. igitur offa cecidit ex ore pulli, tum auspicanti tripudium solistimum nuntiatur.”

[¶12] 73. "Then, how can there be anything divine about an auspice so forced and so extorted? That such a practice did not prevail with the augurs of ancient times is proven by an old ruling of our college which says,' Any bird may make a tripudium.' There might be an auspice if the bird were free to show itself outside its cage. In that case it might be called 'the interpreter and satellite of Jove.' But now, when shut up inside a cage and tortured by hunger, if it seizes greedily upon its morsel of pottage and something falls from its mouth, do you consider that is an auspice? Or do you believe that this was the way in which Romulus used to take the auspices?

> Latin: 73. “Ergo hoc auspicium divini quicquam habere potest, quod tam sit coactum et expressum? antiquissimos augures non esse usos argumento est, quod decretum collegi vetus habemus omnem avem tripudium facere posse. igitur esset auspicium si modo esset ei liberum se ostendisse; tum avis illa videri posset interpres et satelles Iovis. vero inclusa in cavea et fame enecta, si in offam pultis invadit, et si aliquid ex eius ore cecidit, hoc tu auspicium aut hoc modo Romulum auspicari solitum putas?”

[¶13] 74. Again, do you not think that formerly it was the habit of the celebrants themselves to make observation of the heavens? Now they order the poulterer, and he gives responses! We regard lightning on the left as a most favourable omen for everything except for an election, and this exception was made, no doubt, from reasons of political expediency so that the rulers of the State would be the judges of the regularity of an election, whether held to pass judgements in criminal cases, or to enact laws, or to elect magistrates. "'The consuls, Scipio and Figulus,' you say, 'resigned their office when the augurs rendered a decision based on a letter written by Tiberius Gracchus, to the effect that those consuls had not been elected according to augural law.' Who denies that augury is an art? What I deny is the existence of divination. But you say: ' Soothsayers have the power of divination'; and you mention the fact that, on account of the unexpected death of the person who had suddenly fallen while bringing in the report of the vote of the prerogative century, Tiberius Gracchus introduced the soothsayers into the Senate and they declared that 'the president' had violated augural law.

> Latin: 74. “de caelo servare non ipsos censes solitos, qui auspicabantur? imperant pullario; ille renuntiat. sinistrum auspicium optimum habemus ad omnis res praeterquam ad comitia; quod quidem institutum rei publicae causa est, ut comitiorum vel in iudiciis populi vel in iure legum vel in creandis magistratibus principes civitatis essent interpretes.” “‘At Ti. Gracchi litteris Scipio et Figulus consules, cum augures iudicassent eos vitio creatos esse, magistratu se abdicaverunt.’ Quis negat augurum disciplinam esse? divinationem nego. ‘At haruspices divini quos, cum Ti. Gracchus, propter mortem repentinam eius qui in praerogativa referenda subito concidisset, in senatum introduxisset, non iustum rogatorem fuisse dixerunt.’”

[¶14] 75. Now, in the first place, do not understand that by 'the president' they meant the president of the prerogative century, for he was dead; and, moreover, they could have told that by conjecture without the use of divination; or, in the second place, perhaps, they said so by accident which is in no wise to be left out of account in cases of this kind. For what could the Etruscan soothsayers have known, either as to whether the tabernaculum had been properly placed, or as to whether the regulations pertaining to the pomerium had been observed? For my part, I agree with Gaius Marcellus, rather than with Appius Claudius —both of whom were my colleagues—and I think that, although in the beginning augural law was established from a belief in divination, yet later it was maintained and preserved from considerations of political expediency.

> Latin: 75. “vide ne in eum dixerint qui rogator centuriae fuisset; is enim erat mortuus; id autem sine divinatione coniectura poterant dicere. fortasse casu, qui nullo modo est ex hoc genere tollendus. enim scire Etrusci haruspices aut de tabernaculo recte capto aut de pomeri iure potuerunt? assentior C. Marcello potius quam App. Claudio, qui ambo mei collegae fuerunt, existimoque ius augurum, etsi divinationis opinione principio constitutum sit, tamen postea rei publicae causa conservatum ac retentum.”

[¶15] 76. But we shall discuss the latter point at greater length in other discourses; let us dismiss it for the present. "Now let us examine augury as practised among foreign nations, whose methods are not so artificial as they are superstitious. They employ almost all kinds of birds, we only a few; they regard some signs as favourable, we, others. Deiotarus used to question me a great deal about our system of augury, and I him about that of his country. Ye gods! how much they differed! So much that in some cases they were directly the reverse of each other. He employed auspices constantly, we never do except when the duty of doing so is imposed by a vote of the people. Our ancestors would not undertake any military enterprise without consulting the auspices; but now, for many years, our wars have been conducted by pro-consuls and propraetors, who do not have the right to take auspices.

> Latin: 76. “de hoc loco plura in aliis, nunc hactenus.” “Externa enim auguria, quae sunt non tam artificiosa quam superstitiosa, videamus. fere avibus utuntur, nos admodum paucis; alia illis sinistra sunt, alia nostris. ex me Deiotarus percontari nostri auguri disciplinam, ego ex illo sui. immortales! quantum differebat! ut quaedam essent etiam contraria. ille eis semper utebatur, nos, nisi dum a populo auspicia accepta habemus, quam multum eis utimur? rem administrari maiores nostri nisi auspicato noluerunt; quam multi anni sunt, cum bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur, qui auspicia non habent!”

[¶16] 77. Therefore they have no tripudium and they cross rivers without first taking the auspices. What, then, has become of divining by means of birds? It is not used by those who conduct our wars, for they have not the right of auspices. Since it has been withdrawn from use in the field I suppose it is reserved for city use only! "As to divination ex acuminibus, which is altogether military, it was wholly ignored by that famous man, Marcus Marcellus, who was consul five times and, besides, was a commander-in-chief, as well as a very fine augur. In fact, he used to say that, if he wished to execute some manœuvre which he did not want interfered with by the auspices, he would travel in a closed litter. His method is of a kind with the advice which we augurs give, that the draught-cattle be ordered to be unyoked so as to prevent a iuge auspicium.

> Latin: 77. “nec amnis transeunt auspicato nec tripudio auspicantur. Ubi ergo avium divinatio? quae, quoniam ab eis, qui auspicia nulla habent, bella administrantur, ad urbanas res retenta videtur, a bellicis esse sublata.” “Nam ex acuminibus quidem, quod totum auspicium militare est, iam M. Marcellus ille quinquiens consul totum omisit, idem imperator, idem augur optimus. quidem ille dicebat, ‘si quando rem agere vellet, ne impediretur auspiciis, lectica operta facere iter se solere.’ Huic simile est, quod nos augures praecipimus, ne iuge auspicium obveniat ut iumenta iubeant diiungere.”

[¶17] 78. What else does a refusal to be warned by Jove accomplish except either to prevent an auspice from occurring, or, if it occurs, to prevent it from being seen? "Your story about Deiotarus is utterly absurd: ' He did not regret the auspices given him as he was setting out to join Pompey. They caused him to continue in the path of loyalty and friendship to the Roman people and to perform his duty; for he valued his reputation and glory more than kingdom and riches.' I dare say; but that has nothing to do with auspices. For the crow could not tell Deiotarus that he was doing right in preparing to defend the liberty of the Roman people. He ought to have realized that of himself, and in fact he did.

> Latin: 78. “est aliud nolle moneri a Iove nisi efficere ut, aut ne fieri possit auspicium, aut, si fiat, videri?” “Nam illud admodum ridiculum, quod negas, ‘Deiotarum auspiciorum, quae sibi ad Pompeium proficiscenti facta sint, paenitere, quod fidem secutus amicitiamque populi Romani functus sit officio: antiquiorem enim sibi fuisse laudem et gloriam quam regnum et possessiones suas.’ Credo equidem, sed hoc nihil ad auspicia; nec enim ei cornix canere potuit recte eum facere, quod populi Romani libertatem defendere pararet; ipse hoc sentiebat, sicuti sensit.”

[¶18] 79. Birds indicate that results will be unfavourable or favourable. In my view of the case Deiotarus employed the auspices of virtue, and virtue bids us not to look to fortune until the claims of honour are discharged. However, if the birds indicated that the issue would be favourable to Deiotarus they certainly deceived him. He fled from the battle with Pompey—a serious situation! He separated from Pompey—an occasion of sorrow! He beheld Caesar at once his enemy and his guest —what could have been more distressing than that? Caesar wrested from him the tetrarchy over the Trocmi and conferred it upon some obscure sycophant of his own from Pergamus; deprived him of Armenia, a gift from the Senate; accepted a most lavish hospitality at the hands of his royal host and left him utterly despoiled. But I wander too far: I must return to the point at issue. If we examine this matter from the standpoint of the results—and that was the question submitted to the determination of the birds—the issue was in no sense favourable to Deiotarus; but if we examine it from the standpoint of duty, he sought information on that score not from the auspices, but from his own conscience.

> Latin: 79. “eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos. auspiciis video esse usum Deiotarum, quae vetat spectare fortunam, dum praestetur fides. vero, si prosperos eventus ostenderunt, certe fefellerunt. e proelio cum Pompeio—grave tempus! ab eo—luctuosa res! Caesarem eodem tempore hostem et hospitem vidit—quid hoc tristius? cum ei Trocmorum tetrarchiam eripuisset et adseculae suo Pergameno nescio cui dedisset eidemque detraxisset Armeniam a senatu datam, cumque ab eo magnificentissimo hospitio acceptus esset, spoliatum reliquit et hospitem et regem. labor longius; ad propositum revertar. eventa quaerimus, quae exquiruntur avibus, nullo modo prospera Deiotaro; sin officia, a virtute ipsius, non ab auspiciis petita sunt.”

[¶19] 80. "Then dismiss Romulus's augural staff, which you say the hottest of fires was powerless to burn, and attach slight importance to the whetstone of Attus Navius. Myths should have no place in philosophy. It would have been more in keeping with your rôle as a philosopher to consider, first, the nature of divination generally, second, its origin, and third, its consistency. What, then, is the nature of an art which makes prophets out of birds that wander aimlessly about—now here, now there—and makes the action or inaction of men depend upon the song or flight of birds? and why was the power granted to some birds to give a favourable omen when on the left side and to others when on the right? Again, how, when, and by whom, shall we say that the system was invented? The Etruscans, it is true, find the author of their system in the boy who was ploughed up out of the ground; but whom have we? Attus Navius? But Romulus and Remus, both of whom, by tradition, were augurs, lived many years earlier. Are we to say that it was invented by the Pisidians, Cilicians, or Phrygians? It is your judgement, then, that those devoid of human learning are the authors of a divine science!

> Latin: 80. “Omitte igitur lituum Romuli, quem in maximo incendio negas potuisse comburi; contemne cotem Atti Navi. debet esse in philosophia commenticiis fabellis loci; illud erat philosophi potius, totius auguri primum naturam ipsam videre, deinde inventionem, deinde constantiam. est igitur natura, quae volucris huc et illuc passim vagantis efficiat ut significent aliquid et tum vetent agere, tum iubeant aut cantu aut volatu? cur autem aliis a laeva, aliis a dextra datum est avibus ut ratum auspicium facere possint? modo autem haec aut quando aut a quibus inventa dicemus? Etrusci tamen habent exaratum puerum auctorem disciplinae suae; nos quem? Navium? At aliquot annis antiquior Romulus et Remus, ambo augures, ut accepimus. An Pisidarum aut Cilicum aut Phrygum ista inventa dicemus? igitur humanitatis expertis habere divinitatis auctores!”

[¶20] 81. "'But,' you say, ' all kings, peoples, and nations employ auspices.' As if there were anything so absolutely common as want of sense, or as if you yourself in deciding anything would accept the opinion of the mob! How often will you find a man who will say that pleasure is not a good! Most people actually call it the highest good. Then will the Stoics abandon their views about pleasure because the crowd is against them? or do you think that the multitude follows the lead of the Stoics in very many matters? What wonder, then, if in auspices and in every kind of divination weak minds should adopt the superstitious practices which you have mentioned and should be unable to discern the truth?

> Latin: 81. “‘At omnes reges, populi, nationes utuntur auspiciis.’ Quasi vero quicquam sit tam valde quam nihil sapere vulgare, aut quasi tibi ipsi in iudicando placeat multitudo! quisque est qui voluptatem neget esse bonum? plerique etiam summum bonum dicunt. igitur eorum frequentia Stoici de sententia deterrentur? aut num plerisque in rebus sequitur eorum auctoritatem multitudo? mirum igitur, si in auspiciis et in omni divinatione imbecilli animi superstitiosa ista concipiant, verum dispicere non possint?”

[¶21] 82. Moreover, there is no uniformity, and no consistent and constant agreement between augurs. Ennius, speaking with reference to the Roman system of augury, said:
Then on the left, from out a cloudless sky,
Jove's thunder rolled its goodly omen forth.
But Homer's Ajax in complaining to Achilles of some ferocious deed or other of the Trojans, speaks in this wise:
For their success Jove thunders on the right.
So we regard signs on the left as best—Greeks and barbarians, those on the right. And yet I am aware that we call favourable signs sinistra, or 'left-hand' signs, even though they may be on the right. Undoubtedly our ancestors in choosing the left side and foreign nations the right were both influenced by what experience had shown them was the more favourable quarter in most cases.

> Latin: 82. “autem est inter augures conveniens et coniuncta constantia? nostri auguri consuetudinem dixit Ennius:
tum tonuit laevum bene tempestate serena.” “At Homericus Aiax apud Achillem querens de ferocitate Troianorum nescio quid hoc modo nuntiat:
prospera Iuppiter his dextris fulguribus edit.
Ita nobis sinistra videntur, Graiis et barbaris dextra meliora. haud ignoro, quae bona sint, ‘sinistra’ nos dicere, etiamsi dextra sint; sed certe nostri ‘sinistrum’ nominaverunt externique ‘dextrum,’ quia plerumque id melius videbatur.”

[¶22] 83. What a conflict this is! In view, then, of the differences between different nations in the responses, in the manner in which observations are made and in the kinds of birds and signs employed, need I assert that divination is compounded of a little error, a little superstition, and a good deal of fraud? "And to these superstitions you have actually joined omens! For example: ' Aemilia told Paulus that Persa was dead and her father accepted this as an omen.' ' Caecilia said that she surrendered her seat to her sister's daughter.' Then you go on and speak of the order of silence, favete linguis and the 'prerogative,' or omen of the elections. This is indeed turning the artillery of one's eloquence and learning against oneself! For while on the watch for these 'oracles' of yours could you be so free and calm of mind that you would have reason and not superstition to guide your course? Now, if a person in the course of his own business or conversation should make some remark, and a word spoken by him happened to apply to what you were doing or thinking, do you really believe that such an accident should cause you either fear or joy?

> Latin: 83. “quanta dissensio est!? quod aliis avibus utuntur, aliis signis, aliter observant, alia respondent, non necesse est fateri partim horum errore susceptum esse, partim superstitione, multa fallendo?” “Atque his superstitionibus non dubitasti etiam omina adiungere. ‘Aemilia Paulo Persam perisse, quod pater omen accepit.’ ‘Caecilia se sororis filiae sedes suas tradere.’ Iam illa: ‘Favete linguis’ et ‘praerogativam,’ omen comitiorum. est ipsum esse contra se copiosum et disertum! enim ista observans quieto et libero animo esse poteris, ut ad rem gerendam non superstitionem habeas, sed rationem ducem?? si quis aliquid ex sua re atque ex suo sermone dixerit et eius verbum aliquod apte ceciderit ad id, quod ages aut cogitabis, ea res tibi aut timorem afferet aut alacritatem?”

[¶23] 84. When Marcus Crassus was embarking his army at Brundisium a man who was selling Caunian figs at the harbour, repeatedly cried out,' Cauneas, Cauneas.' Let us say, if you will, that this was a warning to Crassus to bid him 'Beware of going,' and that if he had obeyed the omen he would not have perished. But if we are going to accept chance utterances of this kind as omens, we had better look out when we stumble, or break a shoe-string, or sneeze! "Lots and the Chaldean astrologers remain to be discussed before we come to prophets and to dreams.

> Latin: 84. “M. Crassus exercitum Brundisi imponeret, quidam in portu caricas Cauno advectas vendens ‘Cauneas’ clamitabat., si placet, monitum ab eo Crassum, ‘caveret ne iret’; non fuisse periturum, si omini paruisset. si suscipiamus, pedis offensio nobis et abruptio corrigiae et sternumenta erunt observanda.” “Sortes restant et Chaldaei, ut ad vates veniamus et ad somnia.”

[¶24] 85. And pray what is the need, do you think, to talk about the casting of lots? It is much like playing at morra, dice, or knuckle-bones, in which recklessness and luck prevail rather than reflection and judgement. The whole scheme of divination by lots was fraudulently contrived from mercenary motives, or as a means of encouraging superstition and error. But let us follow the method used in the discussion of soothsaying and consider the traditional origin of the most famous lots. According to the annals of Praeneste Numerius Suffustius, who was a distinguished man of noble birth, was admonished by dreams, often repeated, and finally even by threats, to split open a flint rock which was lying in a designated place. Frightened by the visions and disregarding the jeers of his fellow-townsmen he set about doing as he had been directed. And so when he had broken open the stone, the lots sprang forth carved on oak, in ancient characters. The site where the stone was found is religiously guarded to this day. It is hard by the statue of the infant Jupiter, who is represented as sitting with Juno in the lap of Fortune and reaching for her breast, and it is held in the highest reverence by mothers.

> Latin: 85. “igitur putas de sortibus? enim sors est? prope modum, quod micare, quod talos iacere, quod tesseras, quibus in rebus temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium valet. res est inventa fallaciis aut ad quaestum aut ad superstitionem aut ad errorem. ut in haruspicina fecimus, sic videamus, clarissimarum sortium quae tradatur inventio. Suffustium Praenestinorum monumenta declarant, honestum hominem et nobilem, somniis crebris, ad extremum etiam minacibus, cum iuberetur certo in loco silicem caedere, perterritum visis irridentibus suis civibus id agere coepisse; itaque perfracto saxo sortis erupisse in robore insculptas priscarum litterarum notis. est hodie locus saeptus religiose propter Iovis pueri, qui lactens cum Iunone Fortunae in gremio sedens mammam appetens castissime colitur a matribus.”

[¶25] 86. "There is a tradition that, concurrently with the finding of the lots and in the spot where the temple of Fortune now stands, honey flowed from an olive-tree. Now the soothsayers, who had declared that those lots would enjoy an unrivalled reputation, gave orders that a chest should be made from the tree and the lots placed in the chest. At the present time the lots are taken from their receptacle if Fortune directs. What reliance, pray, can you put in these lots, which at Fortune's nod are shuffled and drawn by the hand of a child? And how did they ever get in that rock? Who cut down the oak-tree? and who fashioned and carved the lots? Oh! but somebody says, ' God can bring anything to pass.' If so, then I wish he had made the Stoics wise, so that they would not be so pitiably and distressingly superstitious and so prone to believe everything they hear! This sort of divining, however, has now been discarded by general usage. The beauty and age of the temple still preserve the name of the lots of Praeneste—that is, among the common people, for no magistrate and no man of any reputation ever consults them; but in all other places lots have gone entirely out of use.

> Latin: 86. “Eodemque tempore in eo loco, ubi Fortunae nunc stat aedes, mel ex olea fluxisse dicunt, haruspicesque dixisse summa nobilitate illas sortis futuras, eorumque iussu ex illa olea arcam esse factam, eoque conditas sortis, quae hodie Fortunae monitu tolluntur. igitur in his potest esse certi, quae Fortunae monitu pueri manu miscentur atque ducuntur? quo modo autem istae positae in illo loco? quis robur illud cecidit, dolavit, inscripsit? ‘Nihil est,’ inquiunt, ‘quod deus efficere non possit.’ Utinam sapientis Stoicos effecisset ne omnia cum superstitiosa sollicitudine et miseria crederent! hoc quidem genus divinationis vita iam communis explosit; fani pulchritudo et vetustas Praenestinarum etiam nunc retinet sortium nomen, atque id in volgus.”

[¶26] 87. And this explains the remark which, according to Clitomachus, Carneades used to make that he had at no other place seen Fortune more fortunate than at Praeneste. Then let us dismiss this branch of divination. "Let us come to Chaldean manifestations. In discussing them Plato's pupil, Eudoxus, whom the best scholars consider easily the first in astronomy, has left the following opinion in writing: 'No reliance whatever is to be placed in Chaldean astrologers when they profess to forecast a man's future from the position of the stars on the day of his birth.'

> Latin: 87. “enim magistratus aut quis vir illustrior utitur sortibus? ceteris vero in locis sortes plane refrixerunt. Carneadem Clitomachus scribit dicere solitum, nusquam se fortunatiorem quam Praeneste vidisse Fortunam. hoc divinationis genus omittamus.” “Ad Chaldaeorum monstra veniamus; de quibus Eudoxus, Platonis auditor, in astrologia iudicio doctissimorum hominum facile princeps, sic opinatur, id quod scriptum reliquit, Chaldaeis in praedictione et in notatione cuiusque vitae ex natali die minime esse credendum.”

[¶27] 88. Panaetius, too, who was the only one of the Stoics to reject the prophecies of astrologers, mentions Anchialus and Cassander as the greatest astronomers of his day and states that they did not employ their art as a means of divining, though they were eminent in all other branches of astronomy. Scylax of Halicarnassus, an intimate friend of Panaetius, and an eminent astronomer, besides being the head of the government in his own city, utterly repudiated the Chaldean method of foretelling the future.

> Latin: 88. “etiam Panaetius, qui unus e Stoicis astrologorum praedicta reiecit, Anchialum et Cassandrum, summos astrologos illius aetatis, qua erat ipse, cum in ceteris astrologiae partibus excellerent, hoc praedictionis genere non usos. Halicarnassius, familiaris Panaetii excellens in astrologia idemque in regenda sua civitate princeps, totum hoc Chaldaicum praedicendi genus repudiavit.”

[¶28] 89. "But let us dismiss our witnesses and employ reasoning. Those men who defend the natal-day prophecies of the Chaldeans, argue in this way: ' In the starry belt which the Greeks call the Zodiac there is a certain force of such a nature that every part of that belt affects and changes the heavens in a different way, according to the stars that are in this or in an adjoining locality at a given time. This force is variously affected by those stars which are called 'planets' or 'wandering' stars. But when they have come into that sign of the Zodiac under which someone is born, or into a sign having some connexion or accord with the natal sign, they form what is called a 'triangle' or 'square.' Now since, through the procession and retrogression of the stars, the great variety and change of the seasons and of temperature take place, and since the power of the sun produces such results as are before our eyes, they believe that it is not merely probable, but certain, that just as the temperature of the air is regulated by this celestial force, so also children at their birth are influenced in soul and body and by this force their minds, manners, disposition, physical condition, career in life and destinies are determined.

> Latin: 89. “Sed ut ratione utamur omissis testibus, sic isti disputant qui haec Chaldaeorum natalicia praedicta defendunt. quandam esse, aiunt, signifero in orbe, qui Graece ζωδιακός dicitur, talem ut eius orbis una quaeque pars alia alio modo moveat immutetque caelum, perinde ut quaeque stellae in his finitimisque partibus sint quoque tempore, eamque vim varie moveri ab eis sideribus, quae vocantur errantia; cum autem in eam ipsam partem orbis venerint, in qua sit ortus eius, qui nascatur, aut in eam, quae coniunctum aliquid habeat aut consentiens, ea ‘triangula’ illi et ‘quadrata’ nominant. cum tempestatumque caeli conversiones commutationesque tantae fiant accessu stellarum et recessu, cumque ea vi solis efficiantur, quae videmus, non veri simile solum, sed etiam verum esse censent perinde, utcumque temperatus sit aer, ita pueros orientis animari atque formari, ex eoque ingenia, mores, animum, corpus, actionem vitae, casus cuiusque eventusque fingi.”

[¶29] 90. "What inconceivable madness! For it is not enough to call an opinion 'foolishness' when it is utterly devoid of reason. However, Diogenes the Stoic makes some concession to the Chaldeans. He says that they have the power of prophecy to the extent of being able to tell the disposition of any child and the calling for which he is best fitted. All their other claims of prophetic powers he absolutely denies. He says, for example, that twins are alike in appearance, but that they are generally unlike in career and in fortune. Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedaemonians, were twin brothers.

> Latin: 90. “O delirationem incredibilem! non enim omnis error stultitia dicenda est. etiam Diogenes Stoicus concedit aliquid, ut praedicere possint dumtaxat, quali quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit; cetera, quae profiteantur, negat ullo modo posse sciri; etenim geminorum formas esse similis, vitam atque fortunam plerumque disparem. Procles et Eurysthenes, Lacedaemoniorum reges, gemini fratres fueunt.”

## 8. Book II · sections 91–120

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/8/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/8/#p-N

[¶0] 91. But they did not live the same number of years, for the life of Procles was shorter by a year than that of his brother and his deeds were far more glorious. But for my part I say that even this concession which our excellent friend Diogenes makes to the Chaldeans in a sort of collusive way, is in itself unintelligible. For the Chaldeans, according to their own statements, believe that a person's destiny is affected by the condition of the moon at the time of his birth, and hence they make and record their observations of the stars which appear to be in conjunction with the moon on his birthday. As a result, in forming their judgements, they depend on the sense of sight, which is the least trustworthy of the senses, whereas they should employ reason and intelligence. For the science of mathematics, which the Chaldeans ought to know, teaches us how close the moon comes to the earth, which indeed it almost touches; how far it is from Mercury, the nearest star; how much further yet it is from Venus; and what a great interval separates it from the sun, which is supposed to give it light. The three remaining distances are beyond computation: from the Sun to Mars, from Mars to Jupiter, from Jupiter to Saturn. Then there is the distance from Saturn to the limits of heaven—the ultimate bounds of space.

> Latin: 91. “At nec totidem annos vixerunt; anno enim Procli vita brevior fuit, multumque is fratri rerum gestarum gloria praestitit. At ego id ipsum quod vir optimus, Diogenes, Chaldaeis quasi quadam praevaricatione concedit, nego posse intellegi. cum, ut ipsi dicunt, ortus nascentium luna moderetur, eaque animadvertant et notent sidera natalicia Chaldaei, quaecumque lunae iuncta videantur, oculorum fallacissimo sensu iudicant ea, quae ratione atque animo videre debebant. enim ratio mathematicorum, quam istis notam esse oportebat, quanta humilitate luna feratur terram paene contingens, quantum absit a proxima Mercuri stella, multo autem longius a Veneris, deinde alio intervallo distet a sole, cuius lumine collustrari putatur. vero tria intervalla infinita et inmensa, a sole ad Martis, inde ad Iovis, ab eo ad Saturni stellam, inde ad caelum ipsum, quod extremum atque ultimum mundi est.”

[¶1] 92. In view, therefore, of these almost limitless distances, what influence can the planets exercise upon the moon, or rather, upon the earth? "Again, when the Chaldeans say, as they are bound to do, that all persons born anywhere in the habitable earth under the same horoscope, are alike and must have the same fate, is it not evident that these would-be interpreters of the sky are of a class who are utterly ignorant of the nature of the sky? For the earth is, as it were, divided in half and our view limited by those circles which the Greeks call o(ri/zontes, and which we may in all accuracy term finientes or horizons. Now these horizons vary without limit according to the position of the spectator. Hence, of necessity, the rising and setting of the stars will not occur at the same time for all persons.

> Latin: 92. “potest igitur contagio ex infinito paene intervallo pertinere ad lunam vel potius ad terram?” “Quid? cum dicunt, id quod eis dicere necesse est, omnis omnium ortus, quicumque gignantur in omni terra, quae incolatur, eosdem esse, eademque omnibus, qui eodem statu caeli et stellarum nati sint, accidere necesse esse, nonne eius modi sunt, ut ne caeli quidem naturam interpretes istos caeli nosse appareat? enim illi orbes, qui caelum quasi medium dividunt et aspectum nostrum definiunt, qui a Graecis ὁρίζοντες nominantur, a nobis ‘finientes’ rectissime nominari possunt, varietatem maximam habeant aliique in aliis locis sint, necesse est ortus occasusque siderum non fieri eodem tempore apud omnis.”

[¶2] 93. But if this stellar force affects the heavens now in one way and now in another, how is it possible for this force to operate alike on all persons who are born at the same time, in view of the fact that they are born under vastly different skies? In those places in which we live the Dogstar rises after the solstice, in fact, several days later. But among the Troglodytes, we read, it sets before the solstice. Hence if we should now admit that some stellar influence affects persons who are born upon the earth, then it must be conceded that all persons born at the same time may have different natures owing to the differences in their horoscopes. This is a conclusion by no means agreeable to the astrologers; for they insist that all persons born at the same time, regardless of the place of birth, are born to the same fate.

> Latin: 93. “eorum vi caelum modo hoc modo illo modo temperatur, qui potest eadem vis esse nascentium, cum caeli tanta sit dissimilitudo? his locis quae nos incolimus, post solstitium Canicula exoritur, et quidem aliquot diebus, at apud Troglodytas, ut scribitur, ante solstitium; ut, si iam concedamus aliquid vim caelestem ad eos, qui in terra gignuntur, pertinere, confitendum sit illis eos, qui nascuntur eodem tempore posse in dissimilis incidere naturas propter caeli dissimilitudinem; quod minime illis placet; volunt enim illi omnis eodem tempore ortos, qui ubique sint nati, eadem condicione nasci.”

[¶3] 94. "But what utter madness in these astrologers, in considering the effect of the vast movements and changes in the heavens, to assume that wind and rain and weather anywhere have no effect at birth! In neighbouring places conditions in these respects are so different that frequently, for instance, we have one state of weather at Tusculum and another at Rome. This is especially noticeable to mariners who often observe extreme changes of weather take place while they are rounding the capes. Therefore, in view of the fact that the heavens are now serene and now disturbed by storms, is it the part of a reasonable man to say that this fact has no natal influence—and of course it has not—and then assert that a natal influence is exerted by some subtle, imperceptible, well-nigh inconceivable force which is due to the condition of the sky, which condition, in turn, is due to the action of the moon and stars? "Again, is it no small error of judgement that the Chaldeans fail to realize the effect of the parental seed which is an essential element in the process of generation? For, surely, no one fails to see that the appearance and habits, and generally, the carriage and gestures of children are derived from their parents. This would not be the case if the characteristics of children were determined, not by the natural power of heredity, but by the phases of the moon and by the condition of the sky.

> Latin: 94. “Sed quae tanta dementia est, ut in maximis motibus mutationibusque caeli nihil intersit, qui ventus, qui imber, quae tempestas ubique sit! quarum rerum in proximis locis tantae dissimilitudines saepe sunt, ut alia Tusculi, alia Romae eveniat saepe tempestas; quod, qui navigant, maxime animadvertunt, cum in flectendis promunturiis ventorum mutationes maximas saepe sentiunt. igitur cum sit tum serenitas, tum perturbatio caeli, estne sanorum hominum hoc ad nascentium ortus pertinere non dicere, quod non certe pertinet, illud nescio quid tenue, quod sentiri nullo modo, intellegi autem vix potest, quae a luna ceterisque sideribus caeli temperatio fiat, dicere ad puerorum ortus pertinere?” “Quid? quod non intellegunt seminum vim, quae ad gignendum procreandumque plurimum valeat, funditus tolli, mediocris erroris est? enim non videt et formas et mores et plerosque status ac motus effingere a parentibus liberos? quod non contingeret, si haec non vis et natura gignentium efficeret, sed temperatio lunae caelique moderatio.”

[¶4] 95. And, again, the fact that men who were born at the very same instant, are unlike in character, career, and in destiny, makes it very clear that the time of birth has nothing to do in determining man's course in life. That is, unless perchance we are to believe that nobody else was conceived and born at the very same time that Africanus was. For was there ever anyone like him?

> Latin: 95. “? quod uno et eodem temporis puncto nati dissimilis et naturas et vitas et casus habent, parumne declarat nihil ad agendam vitam nascendi tempus pertinere? nisi forte putamus neminem eodem tempore ipso et conceptum et natum, quo Africanum. quis igitur talis fuit?”

[¶5] 96. "Furthermore, is it not a well-known and undoubted fact that many persons who were born with certain natural defects have been restored completely by Nature herself, after she had resumed her sway, or by surgery or by medicine? For example, some, who were so tongue-tied that they could not speak, have had their tongues set free by a cut from the surgeon's knife. Many more have corrected a natural defect by intelligent exertion. Derosthenes is an instance: according to the account given by Phalereus, he was unable to pronounce the Greek letter rho but by repeated effort learned to articulate it perfectly. But if such defects had been engendered and implanted by a star nothing could have changed them. Do not unlike places produce unlike men? It would be an easy matter to sketch rapidly in passing the differences in mind and body which distinguish the Indians from the Persians and the Ethiopians from the Syrians—differences so striking and so pronounced as to be incredible.

> Latin: 96. “Quid? illudne dubium est, quin multi, cum ita nati essent, ut quaedam contra naturam depravata haberent, restituerentur et corrigerentur ab natura, cum se ipsa revocasset, aut arte atque medicina? ut, quorum linguae sic inhaererent, ut loqui non possent, eae scalpello resectae liberarentur. etiam naturae vitium meditatione atque exercitatione sustulerunt, ut Demosthenem scribit Phalereus, cum rho dicere nequiret, exercitatione fecisse, ut planissime diceret. haec astro ingenerata et tradita essent, nulla res ea mutare posset.? dissimilitudo locorum nonne dissimilis hominum procreationes habet? quas quidem percurrere oratione facile est, quid inter Indos et Persas et Aethiopas et Syros differat corporibus, animis, ut incredibilis varietas dissimilitudoque sit.”

[¶6] 97. Hence it is evident that one's birth is more affected by local environment than by the condition of the moon. Of course, the statement quoted by you that the Babylonians for 470,000 years had taken the horoscope of every child and had tested it by the results, is untrue; for if this had been their habit they would not have abandoned it. Moreover we find no writer who says that the practice exists or who knows that it ever did exist. "You observe that I am not repeating the arguments of Carneades, but those of Panaetius, the head of the Stoic school. But now on my own initiative I put the following questions: Did all the Romans who fell at Cannae have the same horoscope? Yet all had one and the same end. Were all the men eminent for intellect and genius born under the same star? Was there ever a day when countless numbers were not born?

> Latin: 97. “quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae status ad nascendum valere. quod aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis experiendisque pueris, quicumque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse, fallunt; si enim esset factitatum, non esset desitum; neminem autem habemus auctorem, qui aut fieri dicat aut factum sciat.” “Videsne me non ea dicere quae Carneades, sed ea quae princeps Stoicorum Panaetius dixerit? autem etiam hoc requiro: omnesne qui Cannensi pugna ceciderint uno astro fuerint? exitus quidem omnium unus et idem fuit.? qui ingenio atque animo singulares, num astro quoque uno? quod enim tempus, quo non innumerabiles nascantur? at certe similis nemo Homeri.”

[¶7] 98. And yet there never was another Homer. Again: if it matters under what aspect of the sky or combination of the stars every animate being is born, then necessarily the same conditions affect inanimate things also: can any statement be more ridiculous than that? Be that as it may, our good friend Lucius Tarutius of Firmum, who was steeped in Chaldaic lore, made a calculation, based on the assumption that our city's birthday was on the Feast of Pales (at which time tradition says it was founded by Romulus), and from that calculation Tarutius even went so far as to assert that Rome was born when the moon was in the sign of Libra and from that fact unhesitatingly prophesied her destiny.

> Latin: 98. “, si ad rem pertinet, quo modo caelo affecto compositisque sideribus quodque animal oriatur, valeat id necesse est etiam in rebus inanimis; quo quid dici potest absurdius? L. quidem Tarutius Firmanus, familiaris noster, in primis Chaldaicis rationibus eruditus, urbis etiam nostrae natalem diem repetebat ab iis Parilibus, quibus eam a Romulo conditam accepimus, Romamque, in iugo cum esset luna, natam esse dicebat, nec eius fata canere dubitabat.”

[¶8] 99. What stupendous power delusion has! And was the city's natal day also subject to the influence of the moon and stars? Assume, if you will, that it matters in the case of a child under what arrangement of the heavenly bodies it draws its first breath, does it also follow that the stars could have had any influence over the bricks and cement of which the city was built? But why say more against a theory which every day's experience refutes? I recall a multitude of prophecies which the Chaldeans made to Pompey, to Crassus and even to Caesar himself (now lately deceased), to the effect that no one of them would die except in old age, at home and in great glory. Hence it would seem very strange to me should anyone, especially at this time, believe in men whose predictions he sees disproved every day by actual results.

> Latin: 99. “O vim maximam erroris! urbis natalis dies ad vim stellarum et lunae pertinebat? in puero referre, ex qua affectione caeli primum spiritum duxerit; num hoc in latere aut in caemento, ex quibus urbs effecta est, potuit valere? quid plura? cotidie refelluntur. multa ego Pompeio, quam multa Crasso, quam multa huic ipsi Caesari, a Chaldaeis dicta memini, neminem eorum nisi senectute, nisi domi, nisi cum claritate esse moriturum! ut mihi permirum videatur quemquam exstare, qui etiam nunc credat eis quorum praedicta cotidie videat re et eventis refelli.”

[¶9] 100. “There remain the two kinds of divination which we are said to derive from nature and not from art—vaticination and dreams,—these, my dear Quintus, if agreeable to you, let us now discuss.” “Delighted, I assure you,” said he, “for I am in entire accord with the views which you have so far expressed. To be quite frank, your argument has merely strengthened the opinion which I already had, for my own reasoning had convinced me that the Stoic view of divination smacked too much of superstition. I was more impressed by the reasoning of the Peripatetics, of Dicaearchus, of ancient times, and of Cratippus, who still flourishes. According to their opinion there is within the human soul some sort of power—' oracular,' I might call it—by which the future is foreseen when the soul is inspired by a divine frenzy, or when it is released by sleep and is free to move at will. I should like very much to learn your views of these two classes of divination and by what arguments you disprove them.”

> Latin: 100. “duo divinandi genera quae habere dicimur a natura, non ab arte, vaticinandi et somniandi; de quibus, Quinte,” inquam, “si placet, disseramus.” “vero,” inquit, “placet; his enim, quae adhuc disputasti, prorsus adsentior, et, vere ut loquar. quamquam tua me oratio confirmavit, tamen etiam mea sponte nimis superstitiosam de divinatione Stoicorum sententiam iudicabam; haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat et veteris Dicaearchi et eius, qui nunc floret, Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraclum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere. His de generibus quid sentias et quibus ea rationibus infirmes, audire sane velim.”

[¶10] 101. After this statement had been made by Quintus, I began again, making a new start, so to speak: "I am well aware, my dear Quintus, that, while you have always felt a doubt about all other kinds of divination, you approve of the two you just mentioned—divination by frenzy and divination by dreams, both of which, it is thought, flow from a soul set free. Let me, then, state my opinion of these two kinds of divination. But, first, let me examine that syllogism of the Stoics and of our friend Cratippus and see how sound it is. You stated the syllogism of Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater in this way: "'If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man, or they themselves do not know what the future will be; or they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what the future will be; or they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give to man forewarnings of the future; or they, though gods, cannot give signs of coming events.

> Latin: 101. cum ille dixisset, tum ego rursus quasi ab alio principio sum exorsus dicere: “ignoro,” inquam, “Quinte, te semper ita sensisse, ut de ceteris divinandi generibus dubitares, ista duo, furoris et somnii, quae a libera mente fluere viderentur, probares. igitur de istis ipsis duobus generibus mihi quid videatur, si prius et Stoicorum conclusio rationis et Cratippi nostri quid valeat videro. enim et Chrysippum et Diogenem et Antipatrum concludere hoc modo:” “‘Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant; aut existimant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum; aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus quae sunt futura; aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt.’”

[¶11] 102. But it is not true that the gods do not love us (for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race); nor is it true that they do not know what they themselves have determined and planned; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen (for man would be more prudent if he knew); nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts of the future (for there is no more excellent quality than kindness); nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; therefore, it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods; therefore they give us such signs; and it is not true, if they give us such signs, that they give us no means of understanding those signs, otherwise their signs would be useless; nor, if they give us the means, is it true that there is no divination: therefore divination exists.'

> Latin: 102. “‘At neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici); neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt; neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae futura sunt (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus); neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius); neque non possunt futura praenoscere; non igitur di sunt nec significant nobis futura; sunt autem di; significant ergo: et non, si significant futura, nullas dant vias nobis ad significationum scientiam (frustra enim significarent); nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio; est igitur divinatio.’”

[¶12] 103. "What keen-witted men! With how very few words they think the business dispatched! But to establish their syllogism they take propositions for granted which are not conceded at all; yet a chain of reasoning, to be valid, should proceed from premises which are not doubtful to the conclusion which is in dispute. "Pray observe the neat way in which Epicurus (whom you Stoics usually call a blundering idiot) proves that what we term ' the universe' is infinite. 'That,' said he, 'which is finite has an end.' Who would deny that? Again, 'That which has an end is seen from some point outside itself.' That, too, must be granted. 'But the universe is not seen from without itself.' We cannot question that proposition either. 'Therefore, since it has no end the universe must be infinite.'

> Latin: 103. “O acutos homines! quam paucis verbis confectum negotium putant! sumunt ad concludendum quorum eis nihil conceditur. autem rationis ea probanda est, in qua ex rebus non dubiis id quod dubitatur efficitur.” “Videsne Epicurum, quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici, quem ad modum, quod in natura rerum omne esse dicimus, id infinitum esse concluserit? ‘Quod finitum est,’ inquit, ‘habet extremum.’ Quis hoc non dederit? ‘Quod autem habet extremum, id cernitur ex alio extrinsecus.’ Hoc quoque est concedendum. ‘At, quod omne est, id non cernitur ex alio extrinsecus.’ Ne hoc quidem negari potest. ‘Nihil igitur cum habeat extremum, infinitum sit necesse est.’”

[¶13] 104. You see how Epicurus proceeds from admitted premises to the proposition to be established. But this you Stoic logicians do not do; for you not only do not assume premises which everybody concedes, but you even assume premises which, if granted, do not tend in the least to establish what you wish to prove. For you start with this assumption: ' If there are gods they are kindly disposed towards men.' Now who will grant you that? Epicurus? But he says that the gods do not trouble a whit about themselves or about anybody else. Is it our own Ennius? But he says with general approval and applause
I always said that there were gods on high,
And this I never will neglect to say;
But my opinion is they do not care
What destiny befalls the human race.
To be sure he proceeds to give the reason for his opinion in succeeding lines, but there is no need to repeat them. Enough has been shown to make it clear that your Stoic friends assume as certain what is the subject of doubt and discussion.

> Latin: 104. “ut ad rem dubiam concessis rebus pervenerit? vos dialectici non facitis; nec solum ea non sumitis ad concludendum quae ab omnibus concedantur, sed ea sumitis, quibus concessis nihilo magis efficiatur quod velitis. enim hoc sumitis: ‘Si sunt di, benefici in homines sunt.’ Quis hoc vobis dabit?? Qui negat quicquam deos nec alieni curare nec sui.” “An noster Ennius? magno plausu loquitur assentiente populo:
égo deum genus ésse semper dÍxi et dicam caélitum,
séd eos non curáre opinor, quÍd agat humanum genus.
quidem cur sic opinetur rationem subicit; sed nihil est necesse dicere quae sequuntur; tantum sat est intellegi, id sumere istos pro certo, quod dubium controversumque sit.”

[¶14] 105. "But the syllogism goes on to say: 'The gods are not ignorant of anything, for all things were ordained by them.' But what a heavy attack is made on this very point by scholars who deny that such and such things were ordained by the immortal gods! ' But it is to our interest to know what is going to happen.' Yet Dicaearchus has written a large volume to prove that it is better not to know than to know the future. They say further: ' It is not inconsistent with the dignity of gods to give knowledge of the future.' But entirely consistent, I presume, for them to peer into every man's house to see what he needs! 'It is not true that the gods cannot know the future.'

> Latin: 105. “Sequitur porro, ‘nihil deos ignorare, quod omnia sint ab eis constituta.’ Hic vero quanta pugna est doctissimorum hominum negantium esse haec a dis inmortalibus constituta! ‘At nostra interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt.’ Magnus Dicaearchi liber est nescire ea melius esse quam scire. ‘id esse alienum maiestate deorum.’ Scilicet casas omnium introspicere ut videant quid cuique conducat!”

[¶15] 106. But their ability to know is denied by those who maintain that it is not certain what the future will be. Now don't you see what doubtful premises they assume to be certain and take for granted? Next they hurl this dialectical dart: 'Therefore it is not true both that there are gods and yet that they do not give signs of the future.' And of course they think that the matter is now settled. Then they make another assumption: 'But there are gods.' Even that is not conceded by everybody. 'Therefore they give signs of the future.' Not necessarily so: for they may not give us signs of the future and still be gods. 'Nor is it true that, if they give such signs, they give no means of interpreting those signs.' But it may be that they have the means and yet do not impart them to man; for why would they impart them to the Etruscans rather than to the Romans? Again, the Stoics say: ' If the gods do impart the means, that is divination.' Grant that they do (which is absurd), what is the good if we do not understand? Their conclusion is: ' Therefore there is divination.' Suppose that is their conclusion, still they have not proved it; for, as they themselves have taught us, the truth cannot be proved from false premises. Hence their entire argument falls to the ground.

> Latin: 106. “‘Neque non possunt futura praenoscere.’ posse ei quibus non placet esse certum, quid futurum sit. igitur, quae dubia sint, ea sumi pro certis atque concessis? contorquent et ita concludunt: ‘Non igitur et sunt di nec significant futura.’ Id enim iam perfectum arbitrantur.— Deinde assumunt: ‘Sunt autem di,’ quod ipsum non ab omnibus conceditur. ‘Significant ergo.’ Ne id quidem sequitur; possunt enim non significare et tamen esse di. ‘Nec, si significent, non dant vias aliquas ad scientiam significationis.’ At id quoque potest, ut non dent homini, ipsi habeant; cur enim Tuscis potius quam Romanis darent? ‘Nec, si dant vias, nulla est divinatio.’ Fac dare deos, quod absurdum est, quid refert, si accipere non possumus? est: ‘Est igitur divinatio.’ Sit extremum, effectum tamen non est; ex falsis enim, ut ab ipsis didicimus, verum effici non potest. igitur tota conclusio.”

[¶16] 107. "Now let us come to the argument of that most worthy gentleman, our intimate friend, Cratippus: "'Though without eyes,' he says,' it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, too, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet to establish the existence of divination it is enough that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore the existence of divination must be conceded.' "Delightfully and briefly put; but after he has twice made gratuitous assumptions, even though he has found us quite generous in making concessions, yet his further assumption cannot possibly be conceded.

> Latin: 107. “Veniamus nunc ad optimum virum, familiarem nostrum, Cratippum:” “‘Si sine oculis,’ inquit, ‘non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere, qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. igitur, si sine divinatione non potest officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem, cum quis divinationem habeat, errare aliquando nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem, semel aliquid ita esse divinatum, nihil ut fortuito cecidisse videatur; sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia; esse igitur divinationem confitendum est.’” “Festive et breviter; sed cum bis sumpsit quod voluit, etiamsi faciles nos ad concedendum habuerit, id tamen quod assumit concedi nullo modo potest.”

[¶17] 108. He says in substance, 'If the eyes are sometimes at fault, yet, because they have sometimes seen correctly, the power of sight resides within them; likewise if a person has once foreseen something by means of divination, yet even when he errs in his predictions, he must be held to have the power of divination.' "Pray point out, my dear Cratippus, the similarity in these propositions of yours. I confess that it is not apparent to me. For the eyes in seeing correctly employ a sense conferred by nature; while the soul, if it ever has a true vision of the future, whether by vaticination or by dreams, relies upon luck or chance. This you must admit unless, perchance, you think that those who consider dreams as dreams and nothing more, are going to concede that the fulfilment of any dream was ever due to anything but luck. While we may grant your two major premises,—these the Greeks call lh/mmata, but we prefer to call them by their Latin equivalent sumptiones—yet we will not grant your minor premise— which the Greeks call pro/slhyis.

> Latin: 108. “‘Si,’ inquit, ‘aliquando oculi peccent, tamen, quia recte aliquando viderint, inest in eis vis videndi; item si quis semel aliquid in divinatione viderit, is, etiam cum peccet, tamen existimandus sit habere vim divinandi.’” “Vide, quaeso, Cratippe noster, quam sint ista similia; nam mihi non videntur. enim vera cernentes utuntur natura atque sensu; animi, si quando vel vaticinando vel somniando vera viderunt, usi sunt fortuna atque casu; nisi forte concessuros tibi existimas eos, qui somnia pro somniis habent, si quando aliquod somnium verum evaserit, non id fortuito accidisse. demus tibi istas duas sumptiones (ea quae λήμματα appellant dialectici, sed nos Latine loqui malumus), assumptio tamen (quam πρόσληψιν eidem vocant), non dabitur.”

[¶18] 109. "Cratippus states his minor premise thus: 'But there are countless instances of prophecies being fulfilled without the intervention of luck.' On the contrary, I say there isn't even one. Observe how keen the controversy grows! Now that the minor premise is denied the conclusion fails. But he retorts: ' You are unreasonable not to grant it, it is so evident.' Why 'evident'? 'Because many prophecies come true.' And what of the fact that many more don't come true? Does not this very uncertainty, which is characteristic of luck, demonstrate that their fulfilment is accounted for by luck and not by any law of nature? Furthermore, my dear Cratippus—for my controversy is with you—if that argument of yours is sound, don't you see that it is equally available in behalf of the means of divination practised by soothsayers, augurs, Chaldeans and by interpreters of lightnings, portents, and lots? For each of these classes will furnish you with at least one instance of a prophecy that came to pass. Therefore either they too are all means of divining—and this you very properly deny—or, if they are not, then, so far as I can see, the two classes which you permit to remain are not means of divining. Hence the same reasoning employed by you to establish the two kinds which you accept may be used to establish the others which you reject.

> Latin: 109. “Assumit autem Cratippus hoc modo: ‘Sunt autem innumerabiles praesensiones non fortuitae.’ At ego dico nullam., quanta sit controversia. assumptione non concessa nulla conclusio est. ‘At impudentes sumus qui, cum tam perspicuum sit, non concedamus.’ Quid est ‘perspicuum’? ‘Multa vera,’ inquit, ‘evadere.’ Quid, quod multo plura falsa? ipsa varietas, quae est propria fortunae, fortunam esse causam, non naturam esse docet?, si tua ista conclusio, Cratippe, vera est—tecum enim mihi res est—non intellegis eadem uti posse et haruspices et fulguratores et interpretes ostentorum et augures et sortilegos et Chaldaeos? quorum generum nullum est ex quo non aliquid sicut praedictum sit evaserit. aut ea quoque genera divinandi sunt, quae tu rectissime improbas, aut, si ea non sunt, non intellego cur haec duo sint quae relinquis. ergo ratione haec inducis, eadem illa possunt esse, quae tollis.”

[¶19] 110. "But what weight is to be given to that frenzy of yours, which you term ' divine' and which enables the crazy man to see what the wise man does not see, and invests the man who has lost human intelligence with the intelligence of gods? We Romans venerate the verses of the Sibyl who is said to have uttered them while in a frenzy. Recently there was a rumour, which was believed at the time, but turned out to be false, that one of the interpreters of those verses was going to declare in the Senate that, for our safety, the man whom we had as king in fact should be made king also in name. If this is in the books, to what man and to what time does it refer? For it was clever in the author to take care that whatever happened should appear foretold because all reference to persons or time had been omitted.

> Latin: 110. “Quid vero habet auctoritatis furor iste, quem ‘divinum’ vocatis ut, quae sapiens non videat, ea videat insanus, et is qui humanos sensus amiserit divinos adsecutus sit? Sibyllae versus observamus, quos illa furens fudisse dicitur. interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur eum, quem re vera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus. si est in libris, in quem hominem et in quod tempus est? enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur hominum et temporum definitione sublata.”

[¶20] 111. He also employed a maze of obscurity so that the same verses might be adapted to different situations at different times. Moreover, that this poem is not the work of frenzy is quite evident from the quality of its composition (for it exhibits artistic care rather than emotional excitement), and is especially evident from the fact that it is written in what are termed 'acrostics,' wherein the initial letters of each verse taken in order convey a meaning; as, for example, in some of Ennius's verses, the initial letters form the words, Quintus Ennius Fecit, that is, ' Quintus Ennius wrote it.' That surely is the work of concentrated thought and not of a frenzied brain.

> Latin: 111. “Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut eidem versus alias in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. esse autem illud carmen furentis cum ipsum poëma declarat (est enim magis artis et diligentiae quam incitationis et motus), tum vero ea, quae ἀκροστιχίς dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versuum litteris aliquid conectitur, ut in quibusdam Ennianis: ‘Quintus Ennius fecit.’ Id certe magis est attenti animi quam furentis.”

[¶21] 112. And in the Sibylline books, throughout the entire work, each prophecy is embellished with an acrostic, so that the initial letters of each of the lines give the subject of that particular prophecy. Such a work comes from a writer who is not frenzied, who is painstaking, not crazy. Therefore let us keep the Sibyl under lock and key so that in accordance with the ordinances of our forefathers her books may not even be read without permission of the Senate and may be more effective in banishing rather than encouraging superstitious ideas. And let us plead with the priests to bring forth from those books anything rather than a king, whom henceforth neither gods nor men will suffer to exist in Rome. "But many persons in a frenzy often utter true prophecies, as Cassandra did when she said.
Already on the mighty deep...
and when, a little later, she exclaimed,
Alas! behold!...

> Latin: 112. “in Sibyllinis ex primo versu cuiusque sententiae primis litteris illius sententiae carmen omne praetexitur. scriptoris est, non furentis, adhibentis diligentiam, non insani. ob rem Sibyllam quidem sepositam et conditam habeamus, ut, id quod proditum est a maioribus, iniussu senatus ne legantur quidem libri valeantque ad deponendas potius quam ad suscipiendas religiones; cum antistitibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Romae posthac nec di nec homines esse patientur.” “At multi saepe vera vaticinati, ut Cassandra:
iamque mari magno …
eademque paulo post:
eheu videte …
” “igitur me cogis etiam fabulis credere?

[¶22] 113. Then, I suppose you are going to force me to believe in myths? Let them be as charming as you please and as finished as possible in language, thought, rhythm, and melody, still we ought not to give credence to fictitious incidents or to quote them as authority. On that principle no reliance, in my opinion, should be placed in the prophecies of your Publicius —whoever he may have been—or in those of the Marcian bards or in those of the hazy oracles of Apollo: some were obviously false and others mere senseless chatter and none of them were ever believed in by any man of ordinary sense, much less by any person of wisdom.

> Latin: 113. quae delectationis habeant, quantum voles, verbis, sententiis, numeris, cantibus adiuventur; auctoritatem quidem nullam debemus nec fidem commenticiis rebus adiungere. modo nec ego Publicio nescio cui, nec Marciis vatibus, nec Apollinis opertis, credendum existimo; quorum partim ficta aperte, partim effutita temere numquam, ne mediocri quidem cuiquam, non modo prudenti probata sunt.”

[¶23] 114. 'Oh! but what about that oarsman in Coponius's fleet,' you say, 'didn't he truly foretell what afterwards came to pass? ' He did indeed, and the very things that all of us at the time feared would happen. For news was coming to us that the armies of Caesar and Pompey were facing each other in Thessaly. We thought that Caesar's troops had more reckless courage because they were fighting against their country and greater strength because of their long military training. Besides there was not one of us who did not dread the outcome of the battle, but our apprehension was not openly shown and was such as not to be discreditable to men of strong character. As for that Greek sailor, is it strange if, in the extremity of his fear, he, as most people do in such cases, lost his courage, reason, and self-control? In his mental excitement and aberration, he merely stated that things would occur, which, when he was himself, he feared would come to pass. In heaven's name, pray tell me, then, which you think was more likely to have had the power to interpret the decrees of the immortal gods—that crazy sailor, or someone of our party then on the ground-Cato, Varro, Coponius or I?

> Latin: 114. “‘Quid?’ inquies, ‘remex ille de classe Coponi nonne ea praedixit, quae facta sunt?’ Ille vero, et ea quidem quae omnes eo tempore ne acciderent timebamus. enim in Thessalia castris collata audiebamus, videbaturque nobis exercitus Caesaris et audaciae plus habere, quippe qui patriae bellum intulisset, et roboris propter vetustatem; casum autem proeli nemo nostrum erat quin timeret; sed, ita ut constantibus hominibus par erat, non aperte. autem Graecus, quid mirum si, magnitudine timoris, ut plerumque fit, a constantia atque a mente atque a se ipse discessit? qua perturbatione animi, quae, sanus cum esset, timebat ne evenirent, ea demens eventura esse dicebat. tandem, per deos atque homines! magis veri simile est vesanum remigem an aliquem nostrum qui ibi tum eramus, me, Catonem, Varronem, Coponium ipsum, consilia deorum immortalium perspicere potuisse?”

[¶24] 115. "But now I come to you,
Apollo, sacred guard of earth's true core,
Whence first came frenzied, wild prophetic words.
Chrysippus filled a whole volume with your oracles; of these some, as I think, were false; some came true by chance, as happens very often even in ordinary speech; some were so intricate and obscure that their interpreter needs an interpreter and the oracles themselves must be referred back to the oracle; and some so equivocal that they require a dialectician to construe them. For example, when the following oracular response was made to Asia's richest king:
When Croesus o'er the river Halys goes
He will a mighty kingdom overthrow,
Croesus thought that he would overthrow his enemy's kingdom, whereas he overthrew his own.

> Latin: 115. “Sed iam ad te venio,
ó sancte Apollo, qui úbilicum cértum terrarum óbsides,
únde superstitiósa primum saéva evasit vóx fera.
enim oraculis Chrysippus totum volumen implevit partim falsis, ut ego opinor, partim casu veris, ut fit in omni oratione saepissime; partim flexiloquis et obscuris, ut interpres egeat interprete, et sors ipsa ad sortes referenda sit; partim ambiguis, et quae ad dialecticum deferenda sint. cum illa sors edita est opulentissimo regi Asiae:
Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam pervertet opum vim,
hostium vim se perversurum putavit, pervertit autem suam.”

[¶25] 116. But in either event the oracle would have been true. Besides, why need I believe that this oracle was ever given to Croesus? or why should I consider Herodotus more truthful than Ennius? and was the former less able to invent stories about Croesus than Ennius was about Pyrrhus? For instance, nobody believes Ennius when he says that Apollo's oracle gave the following response to Pyrrhus:
O son of Aeacus, my prediction is
That you the Roman army will defeat.
In the first place Apollo never spoke in Latin; second, that oracle is unknown to the Greeks; third, in the days of Pyrrhus Apollo had already ceased making verses, and, finally, although “the sons of Aeacus have ever been,” as Ennius says,
a stolid race,
And more for valour than for wisdom famed,
still Pyrrhus would have had sense enough to see that the equivocal line—“You the Roman army will defeat”—was no more favourable to him than to the Romans. As for that equivocal response which deceived Croesus, it might have deceived—Chrysippus, for example; but the one made to Pyrrhus wouldn't have fooled—even Epicurus!

> Latin: 116. “igitur eorum accidisset, verum oraclum fuisset. autem hoc credam umquam editum Croeso? aut Herodotum cur veraciorem ducam Ennio? minus ille potuit de Croeso quam de Pyrrho fingere Ennius? enim est qui credat Apollinis ex oraculo Pyrrho esse responsum:
aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse?
Latine Apollo numquam locutus est; deinde ista sors inaudita Graecis est; praeterea Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat; postremo, quamquam semper fuit, ut apud Ennium est,
stolidum genus Aeacidarum,
bellipotentes sunt magis quam sapientipotentes,
tamen hanc amphiboliam versus intellegere potuisset, ‘vincere te Romanos’ nihilo magis in se quam in Romanos valere; nam illa amphibolia quae Croesum decepit, vel Chrysippum potuisset fallere, haec vero ne Epicurum quidem!”

[¶26] 117. "However, the main question is this: Why are Delphic oracles (of which I have just given you examples) not uttered at the present time and have not been for a long time? And why are they regarded with the utmost contempt? When pressed at this point their apologists affirm that 'the long flight of time has gradually dissipated the virtue of the place whence came those subterranean exhalations which inspired the Pythian priestess to utter oracles.' One might think that they are talking about wine or brine which do evaporate. But the question is about the virtue of a place—a virtue which you call not only 'natural' but even 'divine,'—pray how did it evaporate? 'By length of time,' you say. But what length of time could destroy a divine power? And what is as divine as a subterranean exhalation that inspires the soul with power to foresee the future—a power such that it not only sees things a long time before they happen, but actually foretells them in rhythmic verse? When did the virtue disappear? Was it after men began to be less credulous?

> Latin: 117. “Sed, quod caput est, cur isto modo iam oracla Delphis non eduntur non modo nostra aetate, sed iam diu, ut modo nihil possit esse contemptius? loco cum urguentur, ‘evanuisse,’ aiunt, ‘vetustate vim loci eius, unde anhelitus ille terrae fieret, quo Pythia mente incitata oracla ederet.’ De vino aut salsamento putes loqui, quae evanescunt vetustate. De vi loci agitur, neque solum naturali, sed etiam divina; quae quo tandem modo evanuit? ‘Vetustate,’ inquies. ‘vetustas’ est quae vim divinam conficere possit? tam divinum autem quam afflatus e terra mentem ita movens, ut eam providam rerum futurarum efficiat, ut ea non modo cernat multo ante, sed etiam numero versuque pronuntiet? ista vis autem evanuit? an postquam homines minus creduli esse coeperunt?”

[¶27] 118. "By the way, Demosthenes, who lived nearly three hundred years ago, used to say even then that the Pythian priestess 'philippized, in other words, that she was Philip's ally. By this expression he meant to infer that she had been bribed by Philip. Hence we may conclude that in other instances the Delphic oracles were not entirely free of guile. But, for some inexplicable cause, those superstitious and half-cracked philosophers of yours would rather appear absurd than anything else in the world. You Stoics, instead of rejecting these incredible tales, prefer to believe that a power had gradually faded into nothingness, whereas if it ever had existed it certainly would be eternal.

> Latin: 118. “Demosthenes quidem, qui abhinc annos prope trecentos fuit, iam tum φιλιππίζειν Pythiam dicebat, id est quasi cum Philippo facere. autem eo spectabat, ut eam a Philippo corruptam diceret. licet existimare in aliis quoque oraculis Delphicis aliquid non sinceri fuisse. nescio quo modo isti philosophi superstitiosi et paene fanatici quidvis malle videntur quam se non ineptos. mavultis et extinctum esse id quod si umquam fuisset, certe aeternum esset, quam ea quae non sunt credenda non credere.”

[¶28] 119. "There is a like error in regard to dreams. How far-fetched is the argument in their defence! 'Our souls' (according to the view of your school) ' are divine and are derived from an external source; the universe is filled with a multitude of harmonious souls; therefore, because of its divinity and its contact with other souls, the human soul during sleep foresees what is to come.' But Zeno thinks that sleep is nothing more than a contraction—a slipping and a collapse, as it were—of the human soul. Then Pythagoras and Plato, who are most respectable authorities, bid us, if we would have trustworthy dreams, to prepare for sleep by following a prescribed course in conduct and in eating. The Pythagoreans make a point of prohibiting the use of beans, as if thereby the soul and not the belly was filled with wind! Somehow or other no statement is too absurd for some philosophers to make.

> Latin: 119. “Similis est error in somniis; quorum quidem defensio repetita quam longe est! animos censent esse nostros, eosque esse tractos extrinsecus, animorumque consentientium multitudine completum esse mundum; hac igitur mentis et ipsius divinitate et coniunctione cum externis mentibus cerni, quae sint futura. autem animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere id ipsum esse dormire. Pythagoras et Plato, locupletissimi auctores, quo in somnis certiora videamus, praeparatos quodam cultu atque victu proficisci ad dormiendum iubent. quidem Pythagorei utique abstinere, quasi vero eo cibo mens, non venter, infletur! nescio quo modo nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.”

[¶29] 120. "Then shall we believe that the souls of sleepers while dreaming are spontaneously moved? or, as Democritus thinks, that they are impelled to action by phantoms from without? Whether the one theory or the other be correct, the fact remains that men in sleep assume many false apparitions to be true. Likewise, to men who are sailing, stationary objects on shore seem to be moving; and also, sometimes in looking at a lamp, by some sort of optical illusion we see two flames instead of one. Why need I mention how many non-existent things are seen by men who are drunk or crazy? And if we are to put no trust in such apparitions of the waking man I do not understand why we should put any trust in dreams. Of course you may argue, if you will, about these tricks of vision as you would about dreams, and say, for example, that when stationary objects appear to be in motion, it foretells an earthquake or a sudden flight; and when the lamp's flame appears to be double it portends that insurrection and rebellion are afoot!

> Latin: 120. “Utrum igitur censemus dormientium animos per sene ipsos in somniando moveri, an, ut Democritus censet, externa et adventicia visione pulsari? enim sic est sive illo modo, videri possunt permulta somniantibus falsa pro veris. et navigantibus moveri videntur ea quae stant, et quodam obtutu oculorum duo pro uno lucernae lumina. dicam, insanis, quid ebriis, quam multa falsa videantur? eius modi visis credendum non est, cur somniis credatur, nescio. tam licet de his erroribus, si velis, quam de somniis disputare, ut ea quae stant, si moveri videantur, terrae motum significare dicas aut repentinam aliquam fugam; gemino autem lucernae lumine declarari dissensionem ac seditionem moveri!”

## 9. Book II · sections 121–150

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/9/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/9/#p-N

[¶0] 121. "By applying conjecture to the countless delusions of drunk or crazy men we may sometimes deduce what appears to be a real prophecy; for who, if he shoots at a mark all day long, will not occasionally hit it? We sleep every night and there is scarcely ever a night when we do not dream; then do we wonder that our dreams come true sometimes? Nothing is so uncertain as a cast of dice and yet there is no one who plays often who does not sometimes make a Venus-throw and occasionally twice or thrice in succession. Then are we, like fools, to prefer to say that it happened by the direction of Venus rather than by chance? And if we are to put no trust in false visions at other times I do not see what especial virtue there is in sleep to entitle its false visions to be taken as true.

> Latin: 121. “Iam ex insanorum aut ebriorum visis innumerabilia coniectura trahi possunt, quae futura videantur. est enim, qui totum diem iaculans non aliquando conliniet? noctes dormimus, neque ulla est fere, qua non somniemus, et miramur aliquando id quod somniarimus evadere? est tam incertum quam talorum iactus? tamen nemo est quin saepe iactans Venerium iaciat aliquando, non numquam etiam iterum ac tertium. igitur, ut inepti, Veneris id impulsu fieri malumus quam casu dicere? ceteris temporibus falsis visis credendum non est, non video, quid praecipui somnus habeat, in quo valeant falsa pro veris.”

[¶1] 122. On the other hand if nature had intended that sleepers should do what they dreamed, persons on going to bed would always have to be tied, otherwise they would commit more follies in their dreams than any madman ever did. "And if, because of their unreality, we are to have no faith in the visions of the insane, I do not understand why we place any confidence in dreams, which are far more confused. Is it because the insane do not tell their delusions to interpreters of visions while dreamers do? I ask you this: suppose I wished to read, write, or sing, or to play on the lute, or to solve some problem in geometry, physics, or logic, must I wait for a dream, or must I depend upon the peculiar knowledge which each of these several arts or sciences requires and without which none of them can be utilized or mastered? No; and not even if I wanted to sail a ship, would I pilot it as I might have dreamed I should; for the punishment would be immediate.

> Latin: 122. “Quodsi ita natura paratum esset, ut ea dormientes agerent, quae somniarent, alligandi omnes essent, qui cubitum irent; maiores enim quam ulli insani efficerent motus somniantes.” “Quodsi insanorum visis fides non est habenda, quia falsa sunt, cur credatur somniantium visis, quae multo etiam perturbatiora sunt, non intellego An quod insani sua visa coniectori non narrant, narrant, qui somniaverunt? etiam, si velim scribere quid, aut legere, aut canere, vel voce vel fidibus, aut geometricum quiddam, aut physicum, aut dialecticum explicare, somniumne exspectandum sit, an ars adhibenda, sine qua nihil earum rerum nec fieri nec expediri potest?, ne si navigare quidem velim, ita gubernem ut somniaverim; praesens enim poena sit.”

[¶2] 123. What would be the sense in the sick seeking relief from an interpreter of dreams rather than from a physician? Or do you think that Aesculapius and Serapis have the power to prescribe a cure for our bodily ills through the medium of a dream and that Neptune cannot aid pilots through the same means? or think you that though Minerva will prescribe physic in a dream without the aid of a physician, yet that the Muses will not employ dreams to impart a knowledge of reading, writing, and of other arts? If knowledge of a remedy for disease were conveyed by means of dreams, knowledge of the arts just mentioned would also be given by dreams. But since knowledge of these arts is not so conveyed neither is the knowledge of medicine. The theory that the medical art was imparted by means of dreams having been disproved, the basis of a belief in dreams is utterly destroyed.

> Latin: 123. “igitur convenit aegros a coniectore somniorum potius quam a medico petere medicinam? An Aesculapius an Serapis potest nobis praescribere per somnium curationem valetudinis, Neptunus gubernantibus non potest? et si sine medico medicinam dabit Minerva, Musae scribendi, legendi, ceterarum artium scientiam somniantibus non dabunt? At si curatio daretur valetudinis, haec quoque, quae dixi, darentur; quae quoniam non dantur, medicina non datur. sublata tollitur omnis auctoritas somniorum.”

[¶3] 124. "But, though the conclusion just stated is obvious, let us now look deeper into the question. Surely you must assume, either that there is a Divine Power which, in planning for our good, gives us information by means of dreams; or that, because of some natural connexion and association—the Greeks call it sumpa/qeia—interpreters of dreams know what sort of a dream is required to fit any situation and what sort of a result will follow any dream; or that neither of these suppositions is true, but that the usual result or consequence of every dream is known by a consistent system of rules based on long-continued observation. In the first place, then, it must be understood that there is no divine power which creates dreams. And indeed it is perfectly clear that none of the visions seen in dreams have their origin in the will of the gods; for the gods, for our sakes, would so interpose that we might be able to foresee the future.

> Latin: 124. “Sed haec quoque in promptu fuerint, nunc interiora videamus. enim divina vis quaedam consulens nobis somniorum significationes facit; aut coniectores ex quadam convenientia et coniunctione naturae, quam vocant συμπάθειαν, quid cuique rei conveniat ex somniis, et quid quamque rem sequatur, intellegunt; aut eorum neutrum est, sed quaedam observatio constans atque diuturna est, cum quid visum secundum quietem sit, quid evenire et quid sequi soleat. igitur intellegendum est nullam vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum. illud quidem perspicuum est, nulla visa somniorum proficisci a numine deorum; nostra enim causa di id facerent, ut providere futura possemus.”

[¶4] 125. "But how often, pray, do you find anyone who pays any attention to dreams or who understands or remembers them? On the other hand, how many treat them with disdain, and regard a belief in them as the superstition of a weak and effeminate mind! Moreover, why does God, in planning for the good of the human race, convey his warnings by means of dreams which men consider unworthy not only of worrying about, but even of remembering? For it is impossible that God does not know how people generally regard dreams; and to do anything needlessly and without a cause is unworthy of a god and is inconsistent even with the habits of right-thinking men. And hence, if most dreams are unnoticed and disregarded, either God is ignorant of that fact, or he does a vain thing in conveying information by means of dreams; but neither supposition accords with the nature of a god, therefore, it must be admitted that God conveys no information by means of dreams.

> Latin: 125. “Quotus igitur est quisque, qui somniis pareat, qui intellegat, qui meminerit? quam multi vero, qui contemnant eamque superstitionem imbecilli animi atque anilis putent! est igitur cur his hominibus consulens deus somniis moneat eos qui illa non modo cura, sed ne memoria quidem digna ducant? enim ignorare deus potest, qua mente quisque sit, nec frustra ac sine causa quid facere dignum deo est, quod abhorret etiam ab hominis constantia., si pleraque somnia aut ignorantur aut negleguntur, aut nescit hoc deus aut frustra somniorum significatione utitur; sed horum neutrum in deum cadit; nihil igitur a deo somniis significari fatendum est.”

[¶5] 126. "I also ask, if God gives us these visions as forewarnings, why does he not give them to us when we are awake rather than when we are asleep? For, whether our souls in sleep are impelled by some external and foreign force; or whether they are self-moved; or whether there is some other cause why, during sleep, we imagine ourselves seeing or hearing, or doing certain things—whatever the cause, it would apply just as well when we are awake. If the gods did send us warnings in our sleep and for our good they would do the same for us when we are awake, especially since, as Chrysippus says in replying to the Academicians, appearances seen when we are awake are much more distinct and trustworthy than those seen in dreams. It would, therefore, have been more in keeping with the beneficence of gods, in consulting for our good, to send us clear visions in our waking moments rather than unintelligible ones in our dreams. But since that is not the case, dreams ought not to be held divine.

> Latin: 126. “Illud etiam require, cur, si deus ista visa nobis providendi causa dat, non vigilantibus potius det quam dormientibus? enim externus et adventicius pulsus animos dormientium commovet, sive per se ipsi animi moventur, sive quae causa alia est cur secundum quietem aliquid videre, audire, agere videamur, eadem causa vigilantibus esse poterat; idque si nostra causa di secundum quietem facerent, vigilantibus idem facerent, praesertim cum Chrysippus Academicos refellens permulto clariora et certiora esse dicat quae vigilantibus videantur quam quae somniantibus. igitur divina beneficentia dignius, cum consulerent nobis, clariora visa dare vigilantibus quam obscuriora per somnum. quoniam non fit, somnia divina putanda non sunt.”

[¶6] 127. And, further, what is the need of a method which, instead of being direct, is so circuitous and roundabout that we have to employ men to interpret our dreams? And if it be true that God consults for our advantage he would say: 'Do this,' 'Don't do that,' and not give us visions when we are awake rather than when we are asleep. "And further, would anybody dare to say that all dreams are true? ' Some dreams are true,' says Ennius, ' but not necessarily all.' Pray how do you distinguish between the two? What mark have the false and what the true? And if God sends the true, whence come the false? Surely if God sends the false ones too what is more untrustworthy than God? Besides what is more stupid than to excite the souls of mortals with false and lying visions? But if true visions are divine while the false and meaningless ones are from nature, what sort of caprice decided that God made the one and nature made the other, rather than that God made them all, which your school denies, or that nature made them all? Since you deny that God made them all you must admit that nature made them all. By 'nature,' in this connexion, I mean that force because of which the soul can never be stationary and free from motion and activity. And when, because of the weariness of the body, the soul can use neither the limbs nor the senses, it lapses into varied and untrustworthy visions, which emanate from what Aristotle terms 'the clinging remnants of the soul's waking acts and thoughts.' These 'remnants,' when aroused, sometimes produce strange types of dreams. Now if some of these dreams are true and others false, I should like very much to know by what mark they may be distinguished. If there is none, why should we listen to your interpreters? But if there is one, I am eager for them to tell me what it is, but they will grow confused when I ask and will not answer.

> Latin: 127. “vero quid opus est circumitione et amfractu, ut sit utendum interpretibus somniorum potius quam directo., siquidem nobis consulebat, ‘Hoc facito,’ ‘hoc ne feceris,’ diceret idque visum vigilanti potius quam dormienti daret.” “Iam vero quis dicere audeat vera omnia esse somnia? ‘Aliquot somnia vera,’ inquit Ennius, ‘sed omnia non est necesse.’ Quae est tandem ista distinctio? quae vera, quae falsa habet? et, si vera a deo mittuntur, falsa unde nascuntur? nam si ea quoque divina quid inconstantius deo? quid inscitius autem est quam mentes mortalium falsis et mendacibus visis concitare? sin vera visa divina sunt, falsa autem et inania humana, quae est ista designandi licentia, ut hoc deus, hoc natura fecerit potius quam aut omnia deus, quod negatis, aut omnia natura? quod quoniam illud negatis, hoc necessario confitendum est.” “autem eam dico, qua numquam animus insistens agitatione et motu esse vacuus potest. cum languore corporis nec membris uti nec sensibus potest, incidit in visa varia et incerta ‘ex reliquiis,’ ut ait Aristoteles, ‘inhaerentibus earum rerum, quas vigilans gesserit aut cogitaverit.’ Quarum perturbatione mirabiles interdum existunt species somniorum; quae si alia falsa, alia vera, qua nota internoscantur, scire sane velim. nulla est, quid istos interpretes audiamus? sin quaepiam est, aveo audire, quae sit; sed haerebunt.”

[¶7] 129. "The question now arises as to which is the more probable: do the immortal gods, who are of surpassing excellence in all things, constantly flit about, not only the beds, but even the lowly pallets of mortals, wherever they may be, and when they find someone snoring, throw at him dark and twisted visions, which scare him from his sleep and which he carries in the morning to a dream-expert to unravel? or does nature bring it to pass that the ever-active soul sees in sleep phantoms of what it saw when the body was awake? Which is more consonant with philosophy: to explain these apparitions by the superstitious theories of fortune-telling hags, or by an explanation based on natural causes? But even if it were possible to draw trustworthy inferences from dreams, it could not be done by those who profess to have that power; for their fraternity is composed of the most shallow and the most ignorant of men. Yet your Stoics assert that no one can be a diviner unless he is a ' wise man.'

> Latin: 129. “Venit enim iam in contentionem, utrum sit probabilius, deosne immortalis, rerum omnium praestantia excellentis, cursare omnium mortalium qui ubique sunt, non modo lectos, verum etiam grabatos et, cum stertentem aliquem viderint, obicere eis visa quaedam tortuosa et obscura, quae illi exterriti somno ad coniectorem mane deferant? an natura fieri ut mobiliter animus agitatus, quod vigilans viderit, dormiens videre videatur? philosophia dignius, sagarum superstitione ista interpretari an explicatione naturae? ut, si iam fieri possit vera coniectura somniorum, tamen isti, qui profitentur, eam facere non possint; ex levissimo enim et indoctissimo genere constant. Stoici autem tui negant quemquam nisi sapientem divinum esse posse.”

[¶8] 130. "Chrysippus, indeed, defines divination in these words: 'The power to see, understand, and explain premonitory signs given to men by the gods.' 'Its duty,' he goes on to say, 'is to know in advance the disposition of the gods towards men, the manner in which that disposition is shown and by what means the gods may be propitiated and their threatened ills averted.' And this same philosopher defines the interpretation of dreams thus: ' It is the power to understand and explain the visions sent by the gods to men in sleep.' Then, if that be true, will just ordinary shrewdness meet these requirements, or rather is there not need of surpassing intelligence and absolutely perfect learning? But I have never seen such a man.

> Latin: 130. “Chrysippus quidem divinationem definit his verbis: ‘vim cognoscentem et videntem et explicantem signa, quae a dis hominibus portendantur; officium autem esse eius praenoscere, dei erga homines mente qua sint quidque significent, quem ad modumque ea procurentur atque expientur.’ Idemque somniorum coniectionem definit hoc modo: ‘esse vim cernentem et explanantem, quae a dis hominibus significentur in somnis.’ Quid ergo? ad haec mediocri opus est prudentia an et ingenio praestanti et eruditione perfecta? autem cognovimus neminem.”

[¶9] 131. "Therefore, even if I granted your contention as to the existence of divination—and this I will never do—still, you must realize that it would be impossible for us to find a diviner. Then what do the gods mean by sending us in our dreams visions which we cannot understand ourselves and which we cannot find anybody to interpret for us? If the gods send us these unintelligible and inexplicable dream-messages they are acting as Carthaginians and Spaniards would if they were to address our Senate in their own vernacular without the aid of an interpreter.

> Latin: 131. “Vide igitur, ne, etiamsi divinationem tibi esse concessero, quod numquam faciam, neminem tamen divinum reperire possimus. autem ista mens est deorum, si neque ea nobis significant in somnis quae ipsi per nos intellegamus, neque ea quorum interpretes habere possimus? similes enim sunt dei, si ea nobis obiciunt, quorum nec scientiam neque explanatorem habeamus, tamquam si Poeni aut Hispani in senatu nostro loquerentur sine interprete.”

[¶10] 132. Besides, what purpose is served by dark and enigmatic dreams? Surely the gods ought to want us to understand the advice they give us for our good. 'Oh!' but you retort,' Are poets and natural philosophers never obscure?' Indeed they are: Euphorion is even too obscure; but Homer is not.

> Latin: 132. “Iam vero quo pertinent obscuritates et aenigmata somniorum? intellegi enim a nobis di velle debebant ea quae nostra causa nos monerent.? poeta nemo physicus obscurus? vero nimis etiam obscurus Euphorion;”

[¶11] 133. Which of them, pray, is the better poet? Heraclitus is very obscure; Democritus is not so in the least: then are they to be compared? But you give me advice and for my good in words that I cannot understand. Then why do you advise me at all? That's like a doctor ordering a patient to take
A bloodless, earth-engendered thing that crawls
And bears its habitation on its back,
instead of saying in common, every-day speech, 'a snail.' Amphion, in a play by Pacuvius, speaks to the Athenians of a creature as
Four-footed, of stature short; rough, shy, and slow;
Fierce-eyed, with tiny head and serpent's neck;
When disembowelled and deprived of life,
It lives for ever in melodious song.
His meaning being too obscure the Athenians replied:
Speak plainer, else we cannot understand.
Whereupon he described it in a single word—'a tortoise.' Couldn't you have said so at first, you cithara-player?

> Latin: 133. “at non Homerus. igitur melior? Heraclitus obscurus, minime Democritus. igitur conferendi? causa me mones, quod non intellegam. me igitur mones? si quis medicus aegroto imperet, ut sumat
terrigenam, herbigradam, domiportam, sanguine cassam,
potius quam hominum more ‘cocleam’ diceret. Pacuvianus Amphio
quadrupes tardigrada, agrestis, humilis, aspera,
capite brevi, cervice anguina, aspecta truci,
eviscerata, inanima, cum animali sono.
dixisset obscurius, tum Attici respondent:
non intellegimus, nisi si aperte dixeris.
ille uno verbo: ‘Testudo.’ Non potueras hoc igitur a principio, citharista, dicere?”

[¶12] 134. "A diviner was consulted by a man who had dreamed that he saw an egg hanging from the bed-cords of the bed in his sleeping-room—the story is from Chrysippus On Dreams—and the diviner answered, 'A treasure is buried under your bed.' The man dug, found a quantity of gold surrounded with silver and sent the diviner as much of the silver as he thought fit. The diviner then inquired, 'Do I get none of the yolk? ' For, in his view, the yolk meant gold, the white of the egg, silver. Now, did no one else ever dream of an egg? If so, then why did this fellow, whoever he was, alone find a treasure by dreaming of an egg? What a lot of poor devils there are, deserving of divine assistance, who never were instructed by a dream how to find a treasure! Furthermore, why was this man given so obscure an intimation as that contained in the fancied resemblance between an egg and a treasure, instead of being as plainly directed as Simonides was when he was bidden not to go on board the ship?

> Latin: 134. “Defert ad coniectorem quidam somniasse se ovum pendere ex fascia lecti sui cubicularis— est hoc in Chrysippi libro somnium—; respondit coniector thesaurum defossum esse sub lecto., invenit auri aliquantum, idque circumdatum argento, misit coniectori quantulum visum est de argento. ille: ‘Nihilne,’ inquit, ‘de vitello?’ id enim ei ex ovo videbatur aurum declarasse reliquum argentum. igitur umquam alius ovum somniavit? cur ergo hic nescio qui thesaurum solus invenit? quam multi inopes digni praesidio deorum nullo somnio ad thesaurum reperiendum admonentur! autem ob causam tam est obscure admonitus ut ex ovo nasceretur thesauri similitudo, potius quam aperte thesaurum quaerere iuberetur, sicut aperte Simonides vetitus est navigare?”

[¶13] 135. My conclusion is that obscure messages by means of dreams are utterly inconsistent with the dignity of gods. "Let us now consider dreams that are clear and direct, like the dream of the man who was killed by the innkeeper at Megara; or like that of Simonides who was warned by the man he had buried not to sail; and also like Alexander's dream, which, to my surprise, my dear Quintus, you passed by without notice: Alexander's intimate friend, Ptolemaeus, had been struck in battle by a poisoned arrow and was at the point of death from his wound and suffering the most excruciating agony. Alexander, while sitting by the bedside of his friend, fell fast asleep. Thereupon, so the story goes, he dreamed that the pet serpent of his mother Olympias appeared to him carrying a root in its mouth and, at the same time, gave him the name of a place close by where it said the root grew. This root, the serpent told him, was of such great virtue that it would effect the speedy cure of Ptolemaeus. As soon as Alexander awoke he related his dream to his friends and men were sent to find the root. It is said that when the root was found it worked the cure not only of Ptolemaeus, but also of many soldiers who had been wounded by the same kind of arrow.

> Latin: 135. “obscura somnia minime consentanea maiestati deorum.” “Ad aperta et clara veniamus, quale est de illo interfecto a caupone Megaris; quale de Simonide, qui ab eo, quem humarat, vetitus est navigare; quale etiam de Alexandro, quod a te praeteritum esse miror, Quinte. Ptolemaeus, familiaris eius, in proelio telo venenato ictus esset eoque vulnere summo cum dolore moreretur, Alexander assidens somno est consopitus. secundum quietem visus ei dicitur draco is, quem mater Olympias alebat, radiculam ore ferre et simul dicere, quo illa loci nasceretur (neque is longe aberat ab eo loco), eius autem esse vim tantam, ut Ptolomaeum facile sanaret. Alexander experrectus narrasset amicis somnium, emissi sunt, qui illam radiculam quaererent; qua inventa et Ptolomaeus sanatus dicitur et multi milites, qui erant eodem genere teli vulnerati.”

[¶14] 136. "You, too, have drawn on history for dreams, a number of which you told. You spoke, for example, of the dreams of the mother of Phalaris, of Cyrus the Elder, of the mother of Dionysius, of the Carthaginians Hamilcar and Hannibal, and of Publius Decius. You mentioned that much-spoken-of dream about the slave who opened the votive games, also the dream of Gaius Gracchus and the recent one of Caecilia, the daughter of Balearicus. But these are other people's dreams and hence we know nothing about them and some of them are fabrications perhaps. For who stands sponsor for them? And what have we to say of our own dreams? Of your dream of me and of my horse emerging from the river and appearing on the bank? and of my dream of Marius, attended by his laurelled fasces, ordering me to be conducted to his monument? "All dreams, my dear Quintus, have one explanation and, in heaven's name, let us see that it is not set at naught by superstition and perversity.

> Latin: 136. “Multa etiam sunt a te ex historiis prolata somnia, matris Phalaridis, Cyri superioris, matris Dionysi, Poeni Hamilcaris, Hannibalis, P. Deci; pervulgatum iam illud de praesule, C. Gracchi etiam et recens Caeciliae, Baliarici filiae, somnium. haec externa ob eamque causam ignota nobis sunt, non nulla etiam ficta fortasse. enim auctor istorum? De nostris somniis quid habemus dicere? tu de emerso me et equo ad ripam, ego de Mario cum fascibus laureatis me in suum deduci iubente monumentum?” “somniorum, Quinte, una ratio est; quae, per deos immortalis! videamus ne nostra superstitione et depravatione superetur.”

[¶15] 137. Now what Marius do you think it was I saw? His 'likeness' or 'phantom,' I suppose—at least that is what Democritus thinks. Whence did the 'phantom' come? He would have it that 'phantoms ' emanate from material bodies and from actual forms. Then, it was the body of Marius from which my ' phantom' came? ' No,' says Democritus, ' but from his body that was.' So that 'phantom' of Marius was pursuing me to the plains of Atina? ' Oh, but the universe is full of “phantoms”; no picture of anything can be formed in the mind except as the result of the impact of “phantoms.”

> Latin: 137. “enim tu Marium visum a me putas? ‘Speciem,’ credo, eius et ‘imaginem,’ ut Democrito videtur. profectam ‘imaginem’? ‘A corporibus’ enim solidis et a certis figuris vult fluere ‘imagines.’ Quod igitur Marii corpus erat? ‘Ex eo,’ inquit, ‘quod fuerat.’ Ista igitur me ‘imago’ Mari in campum Atinatem persequebatur? ‘Plena sunt “imaginum” omnia’; nulla enim species cogitari potest nisi pulsu ‘imaginum.’”

[¶16] 138. 'Then are these 'phantoms' of yours so obedient to our beck and call that they come the instant we summon them? And is this true even of the 'phantoms' of things that do not exist? For what is there so unreal and unheard of that we cannot form a mental picture of it? We even shape things which we have never seen—as the sites of towns and the faces of men.

> Latin: 138. “ergo? istae ‘imagines’ ita nobis dicto audientes sunt ut, simul atque velimus, accurrant? etiamne earum rerum quae nullae sunt? est enim forma tam invisitata, tam nulla, quam non sibi ipse fingere animus possit? ut, quae numquam vidimus, ea tamen informata habeamus, oppidorum situs, hominum figuras.”

[¶17] 139. Then, by your theory, when I think of the walls of Babylon or of the face of Homer, some 'phantom' of what I have in mind 'strikes upon my brain'! Hence it is possible for us to know everything we wish to know, since there is nothing of which we cannot think. Therefore no 'phantoms from the outside steal in upon our souls in sleep; nor do 'phantoms ' stream forth at all. In fact I never knew anybody who could say nothing with more ponderous gravity than Democritus. "The soul is of such a force and nature that, when we are awake, it is active, not because of any extraneous impulse, but because of its own inherent power of self-motion and a certain incredible swiftness. When the soul is supported by the bodily members and by the five senses its powers of perception, thought, and apprehension are more trustworthy. But when these physical aids are removed and the body is inert in sleep, the soul then moves of itself. And so, in that state, visions flit about it, actions occur and it seems to hear and say many things.

> Latin: 139. “igitur, cum aut muros Babylonis aut Homeri faciem cogito, ‘imago’ illorum me aliqua pellit? igitur, quae volumus, nota nobis esse possunt; nihil est enim, de quo cogitare nequeamus; nullae ergo ‘imagines’ obrepunt in animos dormientium extrinsecus, nec omnino fluunt ullae, nec cognovi quemquam, qui maiore auctoritate nihil diceret.” “Animorum est ea vis eaque natura, ut vigeant vigilantes nullo adventicio pulsu, sed suo motu incredibili quadam celeritate. cum sustinentur membris et corpore et sensibus, omnia certiora cernunt, cogitant, sentiunt. autem haec subtracta sunt desertusque animus languore corporis, tum agitatur ipse per sese. in eo et formae versantur et actiones, et multa audiri, multa dici videntur.”

[¶18] 140. When the soul itself is weakened and relaxed many such sights and sounds, you may be sure, are seen and heard in all manner of confusion and diversity. Then especially do the 'remnants' of our waking thoughts and deeds move and stir within the soul. For example, in the time of my banishment Marius was often in my mind as I recalled with what great fortitude and courage he had borne his own heavy misfortunes, and this I think is the reason why I dreamed about him. "As for your dream, it occurred while you were thinking and worrying about me and then you had the vision of me as I suddenly arose from the river. For in the souls of us both were 'traces of our waking thoughts,' but with some added features, of course: as, for example, my dreaming of Marius's monument and your dreaming that the horse on which I rode sank with me and then reappeared.

> Latin: 140. “scilicet in imbecillo remissoque animo multa omnibus modis confusa et variata versantur, maximeque ‘reliquiae’ rerum earum moventur in animis et agitantur de quibus vigilantes aut cogitavimus aut egimus; ut mihi temporibus illis multum in animo Marius versabatur recordanti, quam ille gravem suum casum magno animo, quam constanti tulisset. credo causam de illo somniandi fuisse.” “Tibi autem de me cum sollicitudine cogitanti subito sum visus emersus e flumine. enim in utriusque nostrum animis ‘vigilantium cogitationum vestigia.’ At quaedam adiuncta sunt, ut mihi de monumento Mari, tibi, quod equus, in quo ego vehebar, mecum una demersus rursus apparuit.”

[¶19] 141. But do you suppose that there ever would have been any old woman crazy enough to believe in dreams, if by some lucky accident or chance they had not come true sometimes? But let us consider Alexander's dream of the talking serpent. The story may be true and it may be wholly false. In either case it is no miracle; for he did not hear the serpent speak, but thought he heard it and, strangest thing of all, he thought it spoke while it held the root in its mouth! But nothing seems strange to a man when he is dreaming. Now, if Alexander ever had such a vivid and trustworthy dream as this, I want to ask why he never had another one like it and why other men have not had many of the same kind? As for me, except for that dream about Marius, I really never had one that I can recall. Think then how many nights in my long life I have spent in vain!

> Latin: 141. “An tu censes ullam anum tam deliram futuram fuisse ut somniis crederet, nisi ista casu non numquam forte temere concurrerent? Alexandro draco loqui visus est. Potest omnino hoc esse falsum, potest verum; sed utrum est non est mirabile; non enim audivit ille draconem loquentem, sed est visus audire; et quidem, quo maius sit, cum radicem ore teneret locutus est. nihil est magnum somnianti. autem cur Alexandro tam illustre somnium, tam certum, nec huic eidem alias, nec multa ceteris? quidem praeter hoc Marianum nihil sane, quod meminerim. igitur consumptae tot noctes tam longa in aetate!”

[¶20] 142. Moreover, at the present time, owing to the interruption of my public labours, I have ceased my nocturnal studies, and (contrary to my former practice) I have added afternoon naps. Yet despite all this time spent in sleep I have not received a single prophecy in a dream, certainly not one about the great events now going on. Indeed, I never seem to be dreaming more than when I see the magistrates in the forum and the Senate in its chamber. "Coming now to the second branch of the present topic, is there some such natural connecting link, which, as I said before, the Greeks callsumpa/qeia, that the finding of a treasure must be deduced from dreaming of an egg? Of course physicians, from certain symptoms, know the incipiency and progress of a disease; and it is claimed that from some kinds of dreams they even can gather certain indications as to a patient's health, as whether the internal humours of the body are excessive or deficient. But what natural bond of union is there between dreams, on the one hand, and treasures, legacies, public office, victory and many other things of the same kind, on the other?

> Latin: 142. “quidem propter intermissionem forensis operae et lucubrationes detraxi et meridiationes addidi, quibus uti antea non solebam, nec tam multum dormiens ullo somnio sum admonitus, tantis praesertim de rebus, nec mihi magis umquam videor, quam cum aut in foro magistratus aut in curia senatum video, somniare.” “—ex divisione hoc secundum est— quae est continuatio coniunctioque naturae quam, ut dixi, vocant συμπάθειαν, eius modi, ut thesaurus ex ovo intellegi debeat? medici ex quibusdam rebus et advenientis et crescentis morbos intellegunt, non nullas etiam valetudinis significationes, ut hoc ipsum, pleni enectine simus, ex quodam genere somniorum intellegi posse dicunt. vero et hereditas et honos et victoria et multa generis eiusdem qua cum somniis naturali cognatione iunguntur?”

[¶21] 143. A person, it is said, while dreaming of coition, ejected gravel. In this case I can see a relation between the dream and the result; for the vision presented to the sleeper was such as to make it clear that what happened was due to natural causes and not to the delusion. But by what law of nature did Simonides receive that vision which forbade him to sail? or what was the connexion between the laws of nature and the dream of Alcibiades in which, according to history, shortly before his death, he seemed to be enveloped in the cloak of his mistress? Later, when his body had been cast out and was lying unburied and universally neglected, his mistress covered it with her mantle. Then do you say that this dream was united by some natural tie with the fate that befell Alcibiades, or did chance cause both the apparition and the subsequent event?

> Latin: 143. “quidam, cum in somnis complexu Venerio iungeretur, calculos eiecisse. sympathian; visum est enim tale obiectum dormienti, ut id, quod evenit naturae vis, non opinio erroris effecerit. igitur natura obtulit illam speciem Simonidi a qua vetaretur navigare? aut quid naturae copulatum habuit Alcibiadis quod scribitur somnium? qui paulo ante interitum visus est in somnis amicae esse amictus amiculo. cum esset proiectus inhumatus ab omnibusque desertus iaceret, amica corpus eius texit suo pallio. hoc inerat in rebus futuris et causas naturalis habebat, an, et ut videretur et ut eveniret, casus effecit?”

[¶22] 144. "Furthermore, is it not a fact that the conjectures of the interpreters of dreams give evidence of their authors' sagacity rather than afford any proof of a relation between dreams and the laws of nature? For example, a runner, who was planning to set out for the Olympic games, dreamed that he was riding in a chariot drawn by four horses. In the morning he went to consult an interpreter, who said to him, 'You will win, for that is implied in the speed and strength of horses.' Later the runner went to Antipho, who said, 'You are bound to lose, for do you not see that four ran ahead of you? And behold another runner!—for the books of Chrysippus and Antipater are full of such dreams—but to return to the runner: he reported to an interpreter that he had dreamed of having been changed into an eagle. The interpreter said to him, 'You are the victor, for no bird flies faster than the eagle.' This runner also consulted Antipho. 'Simpleton,' said the latter, 'don't you see that you are beaten? For that bird is always pursuing and driving other birds before it and itself is always last.'

> Latin: 144. “Quid? ipsorum interpretum coniecturae nonne magis ingenia declarant eorum quam vim consensumque naturae?, ad Olympia proficisci cogitans, visus est in somnis curru quadrigarum vehi. ad coniectorem. At ille: ‘Vinces,’ inquit; ‘id enim celeritas significat et vis equorum.’ idem ad Antiphontem. autem: ‘Vincare,’ inquit, ‘necesse est; an non intellegis quattuor ante te cucurrisse?’ Ecce alius cursor—atque horum somniorum et talium plenus est Chrysippi liber, plenus Antipatri—sed ad cursorem redeo: ad interpretem detulit aquilam se in somnis visum esse factum. At ille: ‘Vicisti; ista enim avi volat nulla vehementius.’ Huic eidem Antipho: ‘Baro,’ inquit, ‘victum te esse non vides? ista enim avis insectans alias avis et agitans semper ipsa postrema est.’”

[¶23] 145. "A married woman who was desirous of a child and was in doubt whether she was pregnant or not, dreamed that her womb had been sealed. She referred the dream to an interpreter. He told her that since her womb was sealed conception was impossible. But another interpreter said, 'You are pregnant, for it is not customary to seal that which is empty.' Then what is the dream-interpreter's art other than a means of using one's wits to deceive? And those incidents which I have given and the numberless ones collected by the Stoics prove nothing whatever except the shrewdness of men who employ slight analogies in order to draw now one inference and now another. There are certain indications from the condition of the pulse and breath and from many other symptoms in sickness by means of which physicians foretell the course of a disease. When pilots see cuttle-fish leaping or dolphins betaking themselves to a haven they believe that a storm is at hand. In such cases signs are given which are traceable to natural causes and explicable by reason, but that is far from true of the dreams spoken of a little while ago.

> Latin: 145. “Parere quaedam matrona cupiens, dubitans essetne praegnans, visa est in quiete obsignatam habere naturam.. Negavit eam, quoniam obsignata fuisset, concipere potuisse. At alter praegnantem esse dixit; nam inane obsignari nihil solere. est ars coniectoris eludentis ingenio? an ea, quae dixi, et innumerabilia, quae collecta habent Stoici, quicquam significant nisi acumen hominum ex similitudine aliqua coniecturam modo huc, modo illuc ducentium? signa quaedam habent ex venis et spiritu aegroti multisque ex aliis futura praesentiunt; gubernatores cum exsultantis lolligines viderunt aut delphinos se in portum conicientes, tempestatem significari putant. ratione explicari et ad naturam revocari facile possunt, ea vero, quae paulo ante dixi, nullo modo.”

[¶24] 146. "In our consideration of dreams we come now to the remaining point left for discussion, which is your contention that 'by long-continued observation of dreams and by recording the results an art has been evolved.' Really? Then, it is possible, I suppose, to ' observe ' dreams? If so, how? For they are of infinite variety and there is no imaginable thing too absurd, too involved, or too abnormal for us to dream about it. How, then, is it possible for us either to remember this countless and ever-changing mass of visions or to observe and record the subsequent results? Astronomers have recorded the movements of the planets and thereby have discovered an orderly course of the stars, not thought of before. But tell me, if you can, what is the orderly course of dreams and what is the harmonious relation between them and subsequent events? And by what means can the true be distinguished from the false, in view of the fact that the same dreams have certain consequences for one person and different consequences for another and seeing also that even for the same individual the same dream is not always followed by the same result? As a rule we do not believe a liar even when he tells the truth, but, to my surprise, if one dream turns out to be true, your Stoics do not withdraw their belief in the prophetic value of that one though it is only one out of many; rather, from the character of the one true dream, they establish the character of countless others that are false.

> Latin: 146. “At enim observatio diuturna (haec enim pars una restat) notandis rebus fecit artem. Ain tandem? somnia observari possunt? quonam modo? sunt enim innumerabiles varietates; nihil tam praepostere, tam incondite, tam monstruose cogitari potest, quod non possimus somniare. modo igitur, haec infinita et semper nova aut memoria complecti aut observando notare possumus? motus errantium stellarum notaverunt; inventus est enim ordo in eis stellis, qui non putabatur. tandem qui sit ordo aut quae concursatio somniorum? quo modo autem distingui possunt vera somnia a falsis, cum eadem et aliis aliter evadant et eisdem non semper eodem modo? ut mihi mirum videatur, cum mendaci homini ne verum quidem dicenti credere soleamus, quo modo isti, si somnium verum evasit aliquod, non ex multis potius uni fidem derogent quam ex uno innumerabilia confirment.”

[¶25] 147. "Therefore, if God is not the creator of dreams; if there is no connexion between them and the laws of nature; and finally, if, by means of observation no art of divining can be found in them, it follows that absolutely no reliance can be placed in dreams. This becomes especially evident when we consider that those who have the dreams deduce no prophecies from them; that those who interpret them depend upon conjecture and not upon nature; that in the course of the almost countless ages, chance has worked more miracles through all other agencies than through the agency of dreams; and, finally, that nothing is more uncertain than conjecture, which may be led not only into varying, but sometimes even into contradictory, conclusions.

> Latin: 147. “Si, igitur, neque deus est effector somniorum, neque naturae societas ulla cum somniis neque observatione inveniri potuit scientia, effectum est, ut nihil prorsus somniis tribuendum sit, praesertim cum illi ipsi qui ea vident nihil divinent, ei qui interpretantur coniecturam adhibeant, non naturam, casus autem innumerabilibus paene saeculis in omnibus plura mirabilia quam in somniorum visis effecerit, neque coniectura, quae in varias partis duci possit, non numquam etiam in contrarias, quicquam sit incertius.”

[¶26] 148. "Then let dreams, as a means of divination, be rejected along with the rest. Speaking frankly, superstition, which is widespread among the nations, has taken advantage of human weakness to cast its spell over the mind of almost every man. This same view was stated in my treatise On the Nature of the Gods; and to prove the correctness of that view has been the chief aim of the present discussion. For I thought that I should be rendering a great service both to myself and to my countrymen if I could tear this superstition up by the roots. But I want it distinctly understood that the destruction of superstition does not mean the destruction of religion. For I consider it the part of wisdom to preserve the institutions of our forefathers by retaining their sacred rites and ceremonies. Furthermore, the celestial order and the beauty of the universe compel me to confess that there is some excellent and eternal Being, who deserves the respect and homage of men.

> Latin: 148. “igitur haec quoque somniorum divinatio pariter cum ceteris., ut vere loquamur, superstitio, fusa per gentis, oppressit omnium fere animos atque hominum imbecillitatem occupavit. et in eis libris dictum est qui sunt de Natura Deorum, et hac disputatione id maxime egimus. enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamur, si eam funditus sustulissemus. vero—id enim diligenter intellegi volo—superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri.”

[¶27] 149. "Wherefore, just as it is a duty to extend the influence of true religion, which is closely associated with the knowledge of nature, so it is a duty to weed out every root of superstition. For superstition is ever at your heels to urge you on; it follows you at every turn. -It is with you when you listen to a prophet, or an omen; when you offer sacrifices or watch the flight of birds; when you consult an astrologer or a soothsayer; when it thunders or lightens or there is a bolt from on high; or when some so-called prodigy is born or is made. And since necessarily some of these signs are nearly always being given, no one who believes in them can ever remain in a tranquil state of mind.

> Latin: 149. “Quam ob rem, ut religio propaganda etiam est, quae est iuncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes eiiciendae. Instat enim et urget et, quo te cumque verteris, persequitur, sive tu vatem sive tu omen audieris, sive immolaris sive avem aspexeris, si Chaldaeum, si haruspicem videris, si fulserit, si tonuerit, si tactum aliquid erit de caelo, si ostenti simile natum factumve quippiam; quorum necesse est plerumque aliquid eveniat, ut numquam liceat quieta mente consistere.”

[¶28] 150. “Sleep is regarded as a refuge from every toil and care; but it is actually made the fruitful source of worry and fear. In fact dreams would be less regarded on their own account and would be viewed with greater indifference had they not been taken under the guardianship of philosophers—not philosophers of the meaner sort, but those of the keenest wit, competent to see what follows logically and what does not—men who are considered well-nigh perfect and infallible. Indeed, if their arrogance had not been resisted by Carneades, it is probable that by this time they would have been adjudged the only philosophers. While most of my war of words has been with these men, it is not because I hold them in especial contempt, but on the contrary, it is because they seem to me to defend their own views with the greatest acuteness and skill. Moreover, it is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no conclusions of its own, but to approve those which seem to approach nearest to the truth; to compare arguments; to draw forth all that may be said in behalf of any opinion; and, without asserting any authority of its own, to leave the judgement of the inquirer wholly free. That same method, which by the way we inherited from Socrates, I shall, if agreeable to you, my dear Quintus, follow as often as possible in our future discussions.” “Nothing could please me better,” Quintus replied. When this was said, we arose.

> Latin: 150. “videtur omnium laborum et sollicitudinum esse somnus. At ex eo ipso plurimae curae metusque nascuntur; qui quidem ipsi per se minus valerent et magis contemnerentur, nisi somniorum patrocinium philosophi suscepissent, nec ei quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti et consequentia et repugnantia videntes, qui prope iam absoluti et perfecti putantur. Quorum licentiae nisi Carneades restitisset, haud scio an soli iam philosophi iudicarentur. quibus omnis fere nobis disceptatio contentioque est, non quod eos maxime contemnamus, sed quod videntur acutissime sententias suas prudentissimeque defendere. autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas, et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum ac liberum. hanc consuetudinem, a Socrate traditam, eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur.” “vero,” inquit ille, “nihil potest esse iucundius.” Quae cum essent dicta, surreximus.