---
title: "On Divination · De divinatione"
author: "Cicero"
translator: "William Armistead Falconer"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 6 of 9
url: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/6/
cite: "Cicero, tr. William Armistead Falconer, On Divination · De divinatione, section 6. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/6/"
---

# On Divination · De divinatione

*Cicero, tr. William Armistead Falconer*

Can the future be known? Cicero’s brother Quintus defends omens, dreams and oracles; Cicero takes them apart.

> Latin: ed. William Armistead Falconer, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi0474.phi053, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: William Armistead Falconer, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi0474.phi053.perseus-eng1). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 6. Book II · sections 31–60

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/6/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-de-divinatione/6/#p-N

[¶0] 31. "Equally amusing is your story about Pherecydes, who, after looking at some water just drawn from a well, foretold an earthquake. It would be presumptuous enough, I think, for natural philosophers to attempt to explain the cause of an earthquake after it had happened; but can they actually tell, from looking at fresh water, that an earthquake is going to happen? Such nonsense is often heard in the schools, but one does not have to believe everything one hears.

> Latin: 31. “An hoc eiusdem modi est, quale Pherecydeum illud quod est a te dictum? qui cum aquam ex puteo vidisset haustam, terrae motum dixit futurum., credo, impudenter, quod, cum factus est motus, dicere audent, quae vis id effecerit; etiamne futurum esse aquae iugis colore praesentiunt? istius modi dicuntur in scholis, sed credere omnia vide ne non sit necesse.”

[¶1] 32. But grant that these absurdities of Democritus are true—when do we ever consult entrails to learn about crops or health, or when have we acquired information on these partiticulars from a soothsayer after he had made an inspection of entrails? The soothsayers warn us of dangers by fire and flood and sometimes they prophesy the inheritance, sometimes the loss, of money; they discuss the favourable and the unfavourable cleft; they view the head of the liver with the utmost care from every side. If, perchance, the liver's head should be wanting they regard it as the most unpropitious sign that could have happened.

> Latin: 32. “sint sane ista Democritea vera; quando ea nos extis exquirimus? aut quando aliquid eius modi ab haruspice inspectis extis audivimus? aqua aut ab igni pericula monent; tum hereditates, tum damna denuntiant; fissum familiare et vitale tractant; caput iecoris ex omni parte diligentissime considerant; si vero id non est inventum, nihil putant accidere potuisse tristius.”

[¶2] 33. "Such signs, as I have shown before, certainly could not come within your classification of the kinds of divination 'dependent on observation.' Therefore they are not the result of immemorial usage, but they are the inventions of art— if there can be any art in the occult. But what relationship have they with the laws of nature? Assuming that all the works of nature are firmly bound together in a harmonious whole (which, I observe, is the view of the natural philosophers and especially of those men who maintain that the universe is a unit), what connexion can there be between the universe and the finding of a treasure? For instance, if the entrails foretell an increase in my fortune and they do so in accordance with some law of nature, then, in the first place, there is some relationship between them and the universe, and in the second place, my financial gain is regulated by the laws of nature. Are not the natural philosophers ashamed to utter such nonsense? And yet a certain contact between the different parts of nature may be admitted and I concede it. The Stoics have collected much evidence to prove it. They claim, for example, that the livers of mice become larger in winter; that the dry pennyroyal blooms the very day of the winter solstice, and that its seed-pods become inflated and burst and the seeds enclosed therein are sent in various directions; that at times when certain strings of the lyre are struck others sound; that it is the habit of oysters and of all shell-fish to grow with the growth of the moon and to become smaller as it wanes; and that trees are considered easiest to cut down in winter and in the dark of the moon, because they are then free from sap.

> Latin: 33. “Haec observari certe non potuerunt, ut supra docui. igitur artis inventa, non vetustatis, si est ars ulla rerum incognitarum. rerum autem natura quam cognationem habent? quae ut uno consensu iuncta sit et continens, quod video placuisse physicis, eisque maxime, qui omne quod esset, unum esse dixerunt, quid habere mundus potest cum thesauri inventione coniunctum? enim extis pecuniae mihi amplificatio ostenditur idque fit natura, primum exta sunt coniuncta mundo, deinde meum lucrum natura rerum continetur. pudet physicos haec dicere? enim iam sit aliqua in natura rerum cognatio, quam esse concedo. enim Stoici colligunt. et musculorum iecuscula bruma dicuntur augeri, et puleium aridum florescere brumali ipso die, et inflatas rumpi vesiculas, et semina [malorum], quae in eis mediis inclusa sint, in contrarias partis se vertere; iam nervos in fidibus aliis pulsis resonare alios; ostreisque et conchyliis omnibus contingere, ut cum luna pariter crescant pariterque decrescant; arboresque ut hiemali tempore cum luna simul senescente, quia tum exsiccatae sint, tempestive caedi putentur.”

[¶3] 34. "There is no need to go on and mention the seas and straits with their tides, whose ebb and flow are governed by the motion of the moon. Innumerable instances of the same kind may be given to prove that some natural connexion does exist between objects apparently unrelated. Concede that it does exist; it does not contravene the point I make, that no sort of a cleft in a liver is prophetic of financial gain. What natural tie, or what 'symphony,' so to speak, or association, or what' sympathy,' as the Greeks term it, can there be between a cleft in a liver and a petty addition to my purse? Or what relationship between my miserable money-getting, on the one hand, and heaven, earth, and the laws of nature on the other? "However, I will concede even this if you wish, though it will greatly weaken my case to admit that there is any connexion between nature and the condition of the entrails;

> Latin: 34. “Quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam? quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubernantur. licet eiusdem modi proferri, ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat. Demus hoc; nihil enim huic disputationi adversatur; num etiam, si fissum cuiusdam modi fuerit in iecore, lucrum ostenditur? qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci appellant, convenire potest aut fissum iecoris cum lucello meo aut meus quaesticulus cum caelo, terra rerumque natura?” “Concedam hoc ipsum, si vis, etsi magnam iacturam causae fecero, si ullam esse convenientiam naturae cum extis concessero;”

[¶4] 35. yet, suppose the concession made, how is it brought about that the man in search of favourable signs will find a sacrifice suited to his purpose? I thought the question insoluble. But what a fine solution is offered! I am not ashamed of you—I am actually astonished at your memory; but I am ashamed of Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius who say exactly what you said: ' The choice of the sacrificial victim is directed by the sentient and divine power which pervades the entire universe. "But even more absurd is that other pronouncement of theirs which you adopted: ' At the moment of sacrifice a change in the entrails takes place; something is added or something taken away; for all things are obedient to the Divine Will.'

> Latin: 35. “sed tamen eo concesso qui evenit, ut is, qui impetrire velit, convenientem hostiam rebus suis immolet? erat, quod ego non rebar posse dissolvi. At quam festive dissolvitur! me non tui quidem, cuius etiam memoriam admiror, sed Chrysippi, Antipatri, Posidonii, qui idem istuc quidem dicunt, quod est dictum a te, ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam, quae toto confusa mundo sit.” “Illud vero multo etiam melius, quod et a te usurpatum est et dicitur ab illis: cum immolare quispiam velit, tum fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; deorum enim numini parere omnia.”

[¶5] 36. Upon my word, no old woman is credulous enough now to believe such stuff! Do you believe that the same bullock, if chosen by one man, will have a liver without a head, and if chosen by another will have a liver with a head? And is it possible that this sudden going or coming of the liver's head occurs so that the entrails may adapt themselves to the situation of the person who offers the sacrifice? Do you Stoics fail to see in choosing the victim it is almost like a throw of the dice, especially as facts prove it? For when the entrails of the first victim have been without a head, which is the most fatal of all signs, it often happens that the sacrifice of the next victim is altogether favourable. Pray what became of the warnings of the first set of entrails? And how was the favour of the gods so completely and so suddenly gained? "But, you say, 'Once, when Caesar was offering a sacrifice, there was no heart in the entrails of the sacrificial bull; and, since it would have been impossible for the victim to live without a heart, the heart must have disappeared at the moment of immolation.'

> Latin: 36. “iam, mihi crede, ne aniculae quidem existimant. An censes eundem vitulum, si alius delegerit, sine capite iecur inventurum; si alius, cui capite? decessio capitis aut accessio subitone fieri potest, ut se exta ad immolatoris fortunam accommodent? perspicitis aleam quandam esse in hostiis deligendis, praesertim cum res ipsa doceat? enim [tristissima] exta sine capite fuerint, quibus nihil videtur esse dirius, proxima hostia litatur saepe pulcherrime. igitur illae minae superiorum extorum? aut quae tam subito facta est deorum tanta placatio?” “Sed affers in tauri opimi extis immolante Caesare cor non fuisse; id quia non potuerit accidere ut sine corde victima illa viveret, iudicandum esse tum interisse cor cum immolaretur.”

[¶6] 37. How does it happen that you understand the one fact, that the bull could not have lived without a heart and do not realize the other, that the heart could not suddenly have vanished I know not where? As for me, possibly I do not know what vital function the heart performs; if I do I suspect that the bull's heart, as the result of a disease, became much wasted and shrunken and lost its resemblance to a heart. But, assuming that only a little while before the heart was in the sacrificial bull, why do you think it suddenly disappeared at the very moment of immolation? Don't you think, rather, that the bull lost his heart when he saw that Caesar in his purple robe had lost his head? "Upon my word you Stoics surrender the very city of philosophy while defending its outworks! For, by your insistence on the truth of soothsaying, you utterly overthrow physiology. There is a head to the liver and a heart in the entrails, presto! they will vanish the very second you have sprinkled them with meal and wine! Aye, some god will snatch them away! Some invisible power will destroy them or eat them up! Then the creation and destruction of all things are not due to nature, and there are some things which spring from nothing or suddenly become nothing. Was any such statement ever made by any natural philosopher? 'It is made,' you say, 'by soothsayers.' Then do you think that soothsayers are worthier of belief than natural philosophers?

> Latin: 37. “fit, ut alterum intellegas, sine corde non potuisse bovem vivere, alterum non videas, cor subito non potuisse nescio quo avolare? enim possum vel nescire, quae vis sit cordis ad vivendum, vel suspicari contactum aliquo morbo bovis exile et exiguum et vietum cor et dissimile cordis fuisse. vero quid habes, quare putes, si paulo ante cor fuerit in tauro opimo, subito id in ipsa immolatione interisse? An quod aspexit vestitu purpureo excordem Caesarem, ipse corde privatus est?” “Urbem philosophiae, mihi crede, proditis, dum castella defenditis; nam, dum haruspicinam veram esse vultis, physiologiam totam pervertitis. est in iecore, cor in extis; iam abscedet, simul ac molam et vinum insperseris; deus id eripiet, vis aliqua conficiet aut exedet! ergo omnium ortus atque obitus natura conficiet, et erit aliquid, quod aut ex nihilo oriatur aut in nihilum subito occidat. hoc physicus dixit umquam? ‘Haruspices dicunt.’ His igitur quam physicis credendum potius existumas?”

[¶7] 38. "Again, when sacrifices are offered to more than one god at the same time, how does it happen that the auspices are favourable in one case and unfavourable in another? Is it not strange fickleness in the gods to threaten disaster in the first set of entrails and to promise a blessing in the next? Or is there such discord among the gods— often even among those who are nearest of kin— that the entrails of the sacrifice you offer to Apollo, for example, are favourable and of those you offer at the same time to Diana are unfavourable? When victims for the sacrifice are brought up at haphazard it is perfectly clear that the character of entrails that you will receive will depend on the victim chance may bring. Oh! but someone will say, 'The choice itself is a matter of divine guidance, just as in the case of lots the drawing is directed by the gods!' I shall speak of lots presently; although you really do not strengthen the cause of sacrifices by comparing them to lots; but you do weaken the cause of lots by comparing them with sacrifices.

> Latin: 38. “Quid? cum pluribus deis immolatur, qui tandem evenit, ut litetur aliis, aliis non litetur? quae autem inconstantia deorum est, ut primis minentur extis, bene promittant secundis? aut tanta inter eos dissensio, saepe etiam inter proximos, ut Apollinis exta bona sint, Dianae non bona? est tam perspicuum quam, cum fortuito hostiae adducantur, talia cuique exta esse, qualis cuique obtigerit hostia? ‘At enim id ipsum habet aliquid divini, quae cuique hostia obtingat, tamquam in sortibus, quae cui ducatur.’ Mox de sortibus; quamquam tu quidem non hostiarum causam confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortis collatione hostiarum.”

[¶8] 39. When I send a slave to Aequimaelium to bring me a lamb for a sacrifice and he brings me the lamb which has entrails suited to the exigencies of my particular case, it was not chance, I suppose, but a god that led the slave to that particular lamb! If you say that in this case too chance is, as it were, a sort of lot in accordance with the divine will, then I am sorry that our Stoic friends have given the Epicureans so great an opportunity for laughter, for you know how much fun they make of statements like that.

> Latin: 39. “An, cum in Aequimaelium misimus, qui afferat agnum, quem immolemus, is mihi agnus affertur, qui habet exta rebus accommodata, et ad eum agnum non casu, sed duce deo servus deducitur! si casum in eo quoque dicis esse quasi sortem quandam cum deorum voluntate coniunctam, doleo tantam Stoicos nostros Epicureis irridendi sui facultatem dedisse; non enim ignoras quam ista derideant.”

[¶9] 40. "And they can laugh with the better grace because Epicurus, to make the gods ridiculous, represents them as transparent, with the winds blowing through them, and living between two worlds (as if between our two groves ) from fear of the downfall. He further says that the gods have limbs just as we have, but make no use of them. Hence, while he takes a roundabout way to destroy the gods, he does not hesitate to take a short road to destroy divination. At any rate Epicurus is consistent, but the Stoics are not; for his god, who has no concern for himself or for anybody else, cannot impart divination to men. And neither can your Stoic god impart divination, although he rules the world and plans for the good of mankind.

> Latin: 40. “Et quidem illi facilius facere possunt; deos enim ipsos iocandi causa induxit Epicurus perlucidos et perflabilis et habitantis tamquam inter duos lucos sic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinarum, eosque habere putat eadem membra quae nos, nec usum ullum habere membrorum. hic circumitione quadam deos tollens recte non dubitat divinationem tollere; sed non, ut hic sibi constat, item Stoici. enim deus nihil habens nec sui nec alieni negoti non potest hominibus divinationem impertire. autem deus potest non impertire ut nihilo minus mundum regat et hominibus consulat.”

[¶10] 41. Why then do you Stoics involve yourselves in these sophistries, which you can never explain? Members of your school, when they are more hurried than usual, generally give us this syllogism: 'If there are gods, there is divination; but there are gods, therefore there is divination.' A more logical one would be this: 'There is no divination, therefore there are no gods.' Observe how rashly they commit themselves to the proposition, 'if there is no divination, there are no gods.' I say 'rashly,' for it is evident that divination has been destroyed and yet we must hold on to the gods.

> Latin: 41. “igitur vos induitis in eas captiones, quas numquam explicetis? enim, cum magis properant, concludere solent: ‘Si di sunt, est divinatio; sunt autem di; est ergo divinatio.’ Multo est probabilius: ‘Non est autem divinatio; non sunt ergo di.’ Vide, quam temere committant, ut, si nulla sit divinatio. nulli sint di. enim perspicue tollitur, deos esse retinendum est.”

[¶11] 42. "In demolishing divination by means of entrails we have utterly demolished the soothsayer's art; for the same fate awaits divination by means of lightnings and portents. According to your view, long-continued observation is employed in the case of lightnings, and reason and conjecture are generally employed in the case of portents. But what is it that has been observed in the case of lightnings? The Etruscans divided the sky into sixteen parts. Of course it was easy enough for them to double the four parts into which we divide it and then double that total and tell from which one of those divisions a bolt of lightning had come. In the first place, what difference does its location make? and, in the second place, what does it foretell? It is perfectly evident that, out of the wonder and fear excited in primitive man by lightning and thunderbolts, sprang his belief that those phenomena were caused by omnipotent Jove. And so we find it recorded in our augural annals: 'When Jove thunders or lightens it is impious to hold an election.'

> Latin: 42. “Atque hac extispicum divinatione sublata omnis haruspicina sublata est. enim sequuntur et fulgura. autem in fulguribus observatio diuturna, in ostentis ratio plerumque coniecturaque adhibetur. est igitur, quod observatum sit in fulgure? in sedecim partis diviserunt Etrusci. id quidem fuit, quattuor, quas nos habemus, duplicare, post idem iterum facere, ut ex eo dicerent, fulmen qua ex parte venisset. id quid interest? deinde quid significat? perspicuum est ex prima admiratione hominum, quod tonitrua iactusque fulminum extimuissent, credidisse ea efficere rerum omnium praepotentem Iovem? in nostris commentariis scriptum habemus: ‘Iove tonante, fulgurante comitia populi habere nefas.’”

[¶12] 43. This was ordained, perhaps, from reasons of political expediency; for our ancestors wished to have some excuse for not holding elections sometimes. And so lightning is an unfavourable sign only in case of an election; in all other cases we consider it the best of auspices, if it appears on the left side. But I shall speak of auspices in another connexion—now I am going to discuss lightnings. "There is, then, no statement less worthy of a natural philosopher than that anything can be foretold with a certainty by uncertain signs. Of course I do not think you are credulous enough to believe that Jove's thunderbolt was made on Mount Aetna by the Cyclopes.

> Latin: 43. “Hoc fortasse rei publicae causa constitutum est; comitiorum enim non habendorum causas esse voluerunt. comitiorum solum vitium est fulmen, quod idem omnibus rebus optimum auspicium habemus, si sinistrum fuit. de auspiciis alio loco, nunc de fulguribus.” “Quid igitur minus a physicis dici debet quam quicquam certi significari rebus incertis? enim te puto esse eum, qui Iovi fulmen fabricatos esse Cyclopas in Aetna putes;”

[¶13] 44. For if he had but one bolt his hurling it so often would be strange Nor would he be able to give men so many advices by thunderbolts as to what they should or should not do. But the Stoics account for the thunderbolt thus: 'When the cold exhalations from the earth begin to circulate they become winds; when these winds enter a cloud they begin to break-up and scatter its thinnest portions; if they do this very rapidly and with great violence, thunder and lightning are thereby produced. Again, when clouds collide their heat is forcibly driven out and the thunderbolt is the result.' Realizing, then, that these phenomena are due to natural causes, and happen without regularity and at no certain time, shall we look to them for signs of future events? It is passing strange, if Jupiter warns us by means of thunderbolts, that he sends so many to no purpose!

> Latin: 44. “nam esset mirabile, quo modo id Iuppiter toties iaceret, cum unum haberet; nec vero fulminibus homines quid aut faciendum esset aut cavendum moneret. enim Stoicis eos anhelitus terrae, qui frigidi sint, cum fluere coeperint, ventos esse; cum autem se in nubem induerint eiusque tenuissimam quamque partem coeperint dividere atque disrumpere idque crebrius facere et vehementius, tum et fulgores et tonitrua existere; si autem nubium conflictu ardor expressus se emiserit, id esse fulmen. igitur vi naturae, nulla constantia, nullo rato tempore videmus effici, ex eo significationem rerum consequentium quaerimus?, si ista Iuppiter significaret, tam multa frustra fulmina emitteret!”

[¶14] 45. What, for example, is his object in hurling them into the middle of the sea? or, as he so often does, on to the tops of lofty mountains? Why, pray, does he waste them in solitary deserts? And why does he fling them on the shores of peoples who do not take any notice of them? "Oh! but you say, 'the head was found in the Tiber.' As if I contended that your soothsayers were devoid of art! My contention is that there is no divination. By dividing the heavens in the manner already indicated and by noting what happened in each division the soothsayers learn whence the thunderbolt comes and whither it goes, but no method can show that the thunderbolt has any prophetic value. However, you array those verses of mine against me:
For high-thundering Jove, as he stood on starry Olympus,
Hurtled his blows at the temples and monuments raised in his honour,
And on the Capitol's site unloosed the bolts of his lightning. 'Then,' the poem goes on to say, 'the statue of Natta, the images of the gods and the piece representing Romulus and Remus, with their wolf-nurse, were struck by a thunderbolt and fell to the ground. The prophecies made by the soothsayers from these events were fulfilled to the letter.'

> Latin: 45. “enim proficit, cum in medium mare fulmen iecit? quid, cum in altissimos montis, quod plerumque fit? quid, cum in desertas solitudines? quid, cum in earum gentium oras, in quibus haec ne observantur quidem?” “At ‘inventum est caput in Tiberi.’ Quasi ego artem aliquam istorum esse negem! divinationem nego. enim distributio, quam ante dixi, et certarum rerum notatio docet, unde fulmen venerit, quo concesserit; quid significet autem, nulla ratio docet. urges me meis versibus:
nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo
ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit
et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis.” “‘statua Nattae, tum simulacra deorum Romulusque et Remus cum altrice belua vi fulminis icti conciderunt, deque his rebus haruspicum extiterunt responsa verissima.’”

[¶15] 46. Besides, you quote me as authority for the remarkable fact that, at the very time when proof of the conspiracy was being presented to the Senate, the statue of Jupiter, which had been contracted for two years before, was being erected on the Capitol. "'Will you then '—for thus you pleaded with me—' will you then persuade yourself to take sides against me in this discussion, in the face of your own writings and of your own practice? ' You are my brother and on that account I shrink from recrimination. But what, pray, is causing you distress in this matter? Is it the nature of the subject? Or is it my insistence on finding out the truth? And so I waive your charge of my inconsistency— I am asking you for an explanation of the entire subject of soothsaying. But you betook yourself to a strange place of refuge. You knew that you would be in straits when I asked your reason for each kind of divination, and, hence, you had much to say to this effect: 'Since I see what divination does I do not ask the reason or the cause why it does it. The question is, what does it do? not, why does it do it? ' As if I would grant either that divination accomplished anything, or that it was permissible for a philosopher not to ask why anything happened!

> Latin: 46. “Mirabile autem illud, quod eo ipso tempore, quo fieret indicium coniurationis in senatu, signum Iovis biennio post, quam erat locatum, in Capitolio collocabatur.” “‘Tu igitur animum induces’ (sic enim mecum agebas) ‘causam istam et contra facta tua et contra scripta defendere?’ Frater es; eo vereor. quid tibi hic tandem nocet? resne, quae talis est, an ego, qui verum explicari volo? nihil contra dico, a te rationem totius haruspicinae peto. te mirificam in latebram coniecisti; quod enim intellegeres fore ut premerere, cum ex te causas unius cuiusque divinationis exquirerem, multa verba fecisti te, cum res videres, rationem causamque nor quaerere; quid fieret, non cur fieret, ad rem pertinere. ego aut fieri concederem aut esset philosophi causam cur quidque fieret, non quaerere!”

[¶16] 47. It was in that same connexion that you brought forth my Prognostics and some samples of herbs—the scammony and aristolochia root—saying that you could see their virtue and effect but did not know the cause. "But your illustrations are not pertinent at all. For example, the causes of meteorological phenomena have been investigated by Boëthus the Stoic, whom you mentioned, and by our friend Posidonius; and even if the causes are not discovered by them, yet the phenomena themselves are capable of observation and study. But what opportunity was there for long-continued observation in the case where Natta's statue and the brazen tablets of laws were struck by lightning? 'The Nattas,' you say, 'were of the Pinarian gens and of noble birth, therefore danger was to be expected from the nobility.' So clever of Jupiter to devise such a means to warn us of danger! 'The statue of the infant Romulus,' you observe, ' was struck by a thunderbolt; hence danger was thereby predicted to the city which he founded.' How wise of Jupiter to use signs in conveying information to us! Again, you say, 'Jupiter's statue was being set up at the very time the conspiracy was being exposed.' You, of course, prefer to attribute this coincidence to a divine decree rather than to chance. The man to whom Cotta and Torquatus let the contract for the statue did not, I presume, delay the completion of his work either from lack of energy or from lack of funds, but his hand was stayed till the appointed hour by the immortal gods!

> Latin: 47. “eo quidem loco et Prognostica nostra pronuntiabas et genera herbarum, scammoniam aristolochiamque radicem, quarum causam ignorares, vim et effectum videres.” “Dissimile totum; nam et prognosticorum causas persecuti sunt et Boethus Stoicus, qui est a te nominatus, et noster etiam Posidonius, et, si causae non reperiantur istarum rerum, res tamen ipsae observari animadvertique possunt. Nattae vero statua aut aera legum de caelo tacta quid habent observatum ac vetustum? ‘Pinarii Nattae nobiles; a nobilitate igitur periculum.’ Hoc tam callide Iuppiter cogitavit! ‘Romulus lactens fulmine ictus; urbi igitur periculum ostenditur, ei quam ille condidit.’ Quam scite per notas nos certiores facit Iuppiter! ‘At eodem tempore signum Iovis collocabatur, quo coniuratio indicabatur.’ Et tu scilicet mavis numine deorum id factum quam casu arbitrari, et redemptor, qui columnam illam de Cotta et de Torquato conduxerat faciendam, non inertia aut inopia tardior fuit, sed a deis immortalibus ad istam horam reservatus est!”

[¶17] 48. "I am not a hopeless sceptic on the subject of such warnings really being sent by the gods; however, I do not know that they are and I want to learn the actual facts from you. Again, when certain other events occurred as they had been foretold by diviners and I attributed the coincidence to chance, you talked a long time about chance. You said, for example, 'For the Venus-throw to result from one cast of the four dice might be due to chance; but if a hundred Venus-throws resulted from one hundred casts this could not be due to chance.' In the first place I do not know why it could not; but I do not contest the point, for you are full of the same sort of examples—like that about the scattering of the paints and that one about the hog's snout, and you had very many other examples besides. You also mentioned that myth from Carneades about the head of Pan —as if the likeness could not have been the result of chance! and as if every block of marble did not necessarily have within it heads worthy of Praxiteles! For his masterpieces were made by chipping away the marble, not by adding anything to it; and when, after much chipping, the lineaments of a face were reached, one then realized that the work now polished and complete had always been inside the block.

> Latin: 48. “Non equidem plane despero ista esse vera, sed nescio et discere a te volo. cum mihi quaedam casu viderentur sic evenire, ut praedicta essent a divinantibus, dixisti multa de casu; ut ‘Venerium iaci posse casu quattuor talis iactis, sed quadringentis centum Venerios non posse casu consistere.’ Primum nescio cur non possint, sed non pugno; abundas enim similibus. et respersionem pigmentorum et rostrum suis et alia permulta. Carneadem fingere dicis de capite Panisci; quasi non potuerit id evenire casu et non in omni marmore necesse sit inesse vel Praxitelia capita! enim ipsa efficiuntur detractione, necque quicquam illuc affertur a Praxitele; sed cum multa sunt detracta et ad lineamenta oris perventum est, tum intellegas illud quod iam expolitum sit intus fuisse.”

[¶18] 49. Therefore, it is possible that some such figure as Carneades described did spontaneously appear in the Chian quarries. On the other hand, the story may be untrue. Again, you have often noticed clouds take the form of a lion or a hippocentaur. Therefore it is possible for chance to imitate reality, and this you just now denied. "But since entrails and lightnings have been sufficiently discussed it remains for us to examine portents, if we are to treat soothsaying in its entirety. You spoke of a mule bearing a colt. Such an event excites wonder because it seldom occurs; but if it had been impossible it would not have occurred. And it may be urged with effect against all portents that the impossible never has happened and that the possible need not excite any wonder. Now, in case of some new occurrence, ignorance of its cause is what excites our wonder; whereas, the same ignorance as to things of frequent occurrence does not. For the man who marvels that a mule has foaled does not understand how a mare foals and is ignorant of animal parturition in general. What he sees frequently causes him no astonishment even though he does not know how it happened. If something happens which he never saw before he considers it a portent. Then, which is the portent— the mule's conception or its parturition?

> Latin: 49. “Potest igitur tale aliquid etiam sua sponte in lapicidinis Chiorum extitisse. sit hoc fictum.? in nubibus numquam animadvertisti leonis formam aut hippocentauri Potest igitur, quod modo negabas, veritatem casus imitari.” “Sed quoniam de extis et de fulgoribus satis est disputatum, ostenta restant, ut tota haruspicina sit pertractata. partus prolatus est a te. mirabilis, propterea quia non saepe fit; sed si fieri non potuisset, facta non esset. hoc contra omnia ostenta valeat numquam, quod fieri non potuerit, esse factum; sin potuerit non esse mirandum. enim ignoratio in re nova mirationem facit; eadem ignoratio si in rebus usitatis est, non miramur. qui mulam peperisse miratur, is, quo modo equa pariat, aut omnino quae natura partum animantis faciat, ignorat. quod crebro videt, non miratur, etiamsi cur fiat nescit; quod ante non vidit, id si evenit, ostentum esse censet. igitur, cum concepit mula, an cum peperit, ostentum est?”

[¶19] 50. The conception, it may be, is contrary to the usual course of nature, but the parturition follows as a necessary sequel of conception. "It seems useless to say more about soothsaying. However, let us examine its origin and thus we shall very readily determine its value. The tradition is that, once upon a time, in the district of Tarquinii, while a field was being ploughed, the ploughshare went deeper than usual and a certain Tages suddenly sprang forth and spoke to the ploughman. Now this Tages, according to the Etruscan annals, is said to have had the appearance of a boy, but the wisdom of a seer. Astounded and much frightened at the sight, the rustic raised a great cry; a crowd gathered and, indeed, in a short time, the whole of Etruria assembled at the spot. Tages then spoke at length to his numerous hearers, who received with eagerness all that he had to say, and committed it to writing. His whole address was devoted to an exposition of the science of soothsaying. Later, as new facts were learned and tested by reference to the principles imparted by Tages, they were added to the original fund of knowledge. "This is the story as we get it from the Etruscans themselves and as their records preserve it, and this, in their own opinion, is the origin of their art.

> Latin: 50. “contra naturam fortasse, sed partus prope necessarius.” “Sed quid plura? ortum videamus haruspicinae; sic facillime quid habeat auctoritatis iudicabimus. Tages quidam dicitur in agro Tarquiniensi, cum terra araretur et sulcus altius esset impressus, extitisse repente et eum affatus esse, qui arabat. autem Tages, ut in libris est Etruscorum, puerili specie dicitur visus, sed senili fuisse prudentia. aspectu cum obstupuisset bubulcus clamoremque maiorem cum admiratione edidisset, concursum esse factum, totamque brevi tempore in eum locum Etruriam convenisse; tum illum plura locutum multis audientibus, qui omnia verba eius exceperint litterisque mandarint; omnem autem orationem fuisse eam, qua haruspicinae disciplina contineretur; eam postea crevisse rebus novis cognoscendis et ad eadem illa principia referendis.” “Haec accepimus ab ipsis, haec scripta conservant, hunc fontem habent disciplinae.”

[¶20] 51. Now do we need a Carneades or an Epicurus to refute such nonsense? Who in the world is stupid enough to believe that anybody ever ploughed up —which shall I say—a god or a man? If a god, why did he, contrary to his nature, hide himself in the ground to be uncovered and brought to the light of day by a plough? Could not this so-called god have delivered this art to mankind from a more exalted station? But if this fellow Tages was a man, pray, how could he have lived covered with earth? Finally, where had he himself learned the things he taught others? But really in spending so much time in refuting such stuff I am more absurd than the very people who believe it. "But indeed, that was quite a clever remark which Cato made many years ago: 'I wonder,' said he, 'that a soothsayer doesn't laugh when he sees another soothsayer.'

> Latin: 51. “ergo opus est ad haec refellenda Carneade? Epicuro? quisquam ita desipiens, qui credat exaratum esse— deum dicam an hominem? deus, cur se contra naturam in terram abdiderat, ut patefactus aratro lucem aspiceret?? Idem nonne poterat deus hominibus disciplinam superiore e loco tradere? autem homo ille Tages fuit, quonam modo potuit terra oppressus vivere? porro illa potuit, quae docebat alios, ipse didicisse? ego insipientior quam illi ipsi, qui ista credunt, qui quidem contra eos tam diu disputem.” “Vetus autem illud Catonis admodum scitum est, qui mirari se aiebat quod non rideret haruspex haruspicem cum vidisset.”

[¶21] 52. For how many things predicted by them really come true? If any do come true, then what reason can be advanced why the agreement of the event with the prophecy was not due to chance? While Hannibal was in exile at the court of King Prusias he advised the king to go to war, but the king replied, 'I do not dare, because the entrails forbid.' ' And do you,' said Hannibal, 'put more reliance in pieces of ox-meat than you do in a veteran commander?' Again, when Caesar himself was warned by a most eminent soothsayer not to cross over to Africa before the winter solstice, did he not cross? If he had not done so all the forces opposed to him would have effected a junction. Why need I give instances—and, in fact, I could give countless ones—where the prophecies of soothsayers either were without result or the issue was directly the reverse of the prophecy?

> Latin: 52. “enim quaque res evenit praedicta ab istis?, si evenit quippiam, quid afferri potest, cur non casu id evenerit? Prusias, cum Hannibali apud eum exsulanti depugnari placeret, negabat se audere, quod exta prohiberent. ‘Ain tu,’ inquit, ‘carunculae vitulinae mavis quam imperatori veteri credere?’ Quid? Caesar cum a summo haruspice moneretur, ne in Africam ante brumam transmitteret, nonne transmisit? quod ni fecisset, uno in loco omnes adversariorum copiae convenissent. ego haruspicum responsa commemorem (possum equidem innumerabilia) quae aut nullos habuerint exitus aut contrarios?”

[¶22] 53. Ye gods, how many times they were mistaken in the late civil war! What oracular messages the soothsayers sent from Rome to our Pompeian party then in Greece! What assurances they gave to Pompey! For he placed great reliance in divination by means of entrails and portents. I have no wish to call these instances to mind, and indeed it is unnecessary —especially to you, since you had personal knowledge of them. Still, you are aware that the result was nearly always contrary to the prophecy. But enough on this point: let us now come to portents.

> Latin: 53. “civili bello, di immortales! quam multa luserunt! nobis in Graeciam Roma responsa haruspicum missa sunt! dicta Pompeio! etenim ille admodum extis et ostentis movebatur. lubet commemorare, nec vero necesse est, tibi praesertim qui interfuisti; vides tamen omnia fere contra ac dicta sint evenisse. haec hactenus; nunc ad ostenta veniamus.”

[¶23] 54. "You have cited many instances of portents from the verses which I wrote during my consulship; you adduced many others which occurred prior to the Marsian War and which are included in Sisenna's compilation, and you mentioned a great number which are recorded by Callisthenes and which preceded the unfortunate battle of the Spartans at Leuctra. I shall, of course, speak of each of these instances separately, in so far as they require notice; but I must first discuss portents generally. Now, what is the nature of these intimations, or of this advance-information, as it were, sent out by the gods to apprise us of coming disasters? In the first place, why do immortal gods see fit to give us warnings which we can't understand without the aid of interpreters? In the next place, why do they warn us of things which we cannot avoid? Why, even a mortal, if he has a proper sense of duty, does not warn his friends of imminent disasters which can in no way be escaped. Physicians, for example, although they know many times that their patients are going to die of a present disease, yet never tell them so; for a forewarning of an evil is justified only when to the warning is joined a means of escape.

> Latin: 54. “Multa me consule a me ipso scripta recitasti, multa ante Marsicum bellum a Sisenna collecta attulisti, multa ante Lacedaemoniorum malam pugnam in Leuctricis a Callisthene commemorata dixisti; de quibus dicam equidem singulis, quoad videbitur, sed dicendum etiam est de universis. est enim ista a deis profecta significatio et quasi denuntiatio calamitatum? autem volunt di immortales primum ea significantes, quae sine interpretibus non possimus intellegere, deinde ea, quae cavere nequeamus? At hoc ne homines quidem probi faciunt, ut amicis impendentis calamitates praedicant quas illi effugere nullo modo possint; ut medici, quamquam intellegunt saepe, tamen numquam aegris dicunt illo morbo eos esse morituros; omnis enim praedictio mali tum probatur, cum ad praedictionem cautio adiungitur.”

[¶24] 55. How, then, did portents or their interpreters help the Spartans of long ago, or our Pompeian friends in more recent times? If these signs you speak of are to be considered as sent by the gods, why were they so obscure? For, if we had the right to know what was going to happen, it should have been stated to us clearly: or, if the gods did not wish us to know, they should not have told us—even in riddles. "Now every sort of conjecture—and divination depends on conjecture—is often applied by the wit of man to many different and even contradictory uses. As in judicial causes the prosecutor draws one inference and the lawyer for the defendant another from the same set of facts, and yet the inferences of both are plausible; so, in all investigations in which it is customary to employ conjecture, ambiguity is found. Moreover, in the case of things that happen now by chance now in the usual course of nature (sometimes too mistakes are caused by taking appearance for reality), it is the height of folly to hold the gods as the direct agents and not to inquire into the causes of such things.

> Latin: 55. “igitur aut ostenta aut eorum interpretes vel Lacedaemonios olim vel nuper nostros adiuverunt? si signa deorum putanda sunt, cur tam obscura fuerunt? si enim, ut intellegeremus quid esset eventurum, aperte declarari oportebat, aut ne occulte quidem, si ea sciri nolebant.” “Iam vero coniectura omnis, in qua nititur divinatio, ingeniis hominum in multas aut diversas aut etiam contrarias partis saepe deducitur. enim in causis iudicialibus alia coniectura est accusatoris, alia defensoris et tamen utriusque credibilis, sic in omnibus eis rebus, quae coniectura investigari videntur, anceps reperitur oratio. autem res tum natura, tum casus affert (non numquam etiam errorem creat similitudo), magna stultitia est earum rerum deos facere effectores, causas rerum non quaerere.”

[¶25] 56. "You believe that the Boeotian bards at Lebadia foretold victory for the Thebans from the crowing of cocks; for cocks, you say, are wont to be silent when defeated and to crow when victorious. Do you really believe that Jupiter would have employed chickens to convey such a message to so great a state? And is it true that these fowls are not accustomed to crow except when they are victorious But at that time they did crow and they had not been victorious. ' Oh! that was a portent, 'you say. A fine portent indeed! you talk as if a fish and not a cock had done the crowing! But come; is there any time, day or night, when they are not liable to crow? And if the pleasant sensation—or 'joy' if you will—which comes from victory causes them to crow, then, possibly, joy springing from some other source may have the same effect.

> Latin: 56. “Tu vates Boeotios credis Lebadiae vidisse ex gallorum gallinaceorum cantu victoriam esse Thebanorum, quia galli victi silere solerent, canere victores. igitur per gallinas Iuppiter tantae civitati signum dabat? An illae aves, nisi cum vicerunt, canere non solent? At tum canebant nec vicerant. enim est, inquies, ostentum. vero! quasi pisces, non galli cecinerint! autem est tempus, quo illi non cantent, vel nocturnum vel diurnum? victores alacritate et quasi laetitia ad canendum excitantur, potuit accidisse alia quoque laetitia, qua ad cantum moverentur.”

[¶26] 57. By the way, Democritus gives a very good explanation of why cocks crow before day. 'Their food,' he says, ' after it has been digested, is expelled from the craw and is distributed over the entire body. By the time that process is completed they have had sleep enough and begin to crow.' And then, 'in the silence of the night,' as Ennius says, ' they indulge their russet throats in song and beat their flapping wings.' In view, then, of the fact that this creature is prone to crow of its own volition at any time, and may be made to crow either by nature or by chance, how did it ever occur to Callisthenes to say that the gods conveyed prophecies to men by the crowing of cocks?

> Latin: 57. “Democritus quidem optimis verbis causam explicat cur ante lucem galli canant; depulso enim de pectore et in omne corpus diviso et mitificato cibo cantus edere quiete satiatos; qui quidem ‘silentio noctis,’ ut ait Ennius,
favent faucíbus russis
cantu plausuque prem’int alas.
igitur hoc animal tam sit canorum sua sponte, quid in mentem venit Callistheni dicere deos gallis signum dedisse cantandi, cum id vel natura vel casus efficere potuisset?”

[¶27] 58. "'Reports,' you say, 'were made to the Senate that there was a shower of blood, that the river Atratus actually flowed with blood and that the statues of the gods dripped with sweat. ' You do not think for a moment that Thales, Anaxagoras, or any other natural philosopher would have believed such reports? Sweat and blood you may be sure do not come except from animate bodies. An effect strikingly like blood is produced by the admixture of water with certain kinds of soil; and the moisture which forms on the outside of objects, as we see it on our plastered walls when the south wind blows, seems to resemble sweat. Such occurrences, which in time of war appear to the timid to be most frequent and most real, are scarcely noticed in times of peace. Moreover, in periods of fear and of danger stories of portents are not only more readily believed, but they are invented with greater impunity.

> Latin: 58. “‘Sanguinem pluisse senatui nuntiatum est, Atratum etiam fluvium fluxisse sanguine, deorum sudasse simulacra.’ Num censes his nuntiis Thalen aut Anaxagoran aut quemquam physicum crediturum fuisse? nec enim sanguis nec sudor nisi e corpore. et decoloratio quaedam ex aliqua contagione terrena maxime potest sanguini similis esse, et umor adlapsus extrinsecus, ut in tectoriis videmus austro, sudorem videtur imitari. haec in bello plura et maiora videntur timentibus, eadem non tam animadvertuntur in pace; accedit illud etiam, quod in metu et periculo cum creduntur facilius, tum finguntur impunius.”

[¶28] 59. But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life? 'But,' you say, ' the fact that just before the Marsian War mice gnawed the shields at Lanuvium was pronounced by the soothsayers to be a very direful portent.' As if it mattered a whit whether mice, which are gnawing something day and night, gnawed shields or sieves! Hence, by the same token, the fact that, at my house, mice recently gnawed my Plato's Republic should fill me with alarm for the Roman republic; or if they had gnawed my Epicurus On Pleasure I should have expected a rise in the market price of food!

> Latin: 59. “autem ita leves atque inconsiderati sumus, ut, si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus? ‘Ante vero Marsicum bellum quod clipeos Lanuvi,’ ut a te dictum est, ‘mures rosissent, maximum id portentum haruspices esse dixerunt.’ Quasi vero quicquam intersit, mures diem noctem aliquid rodentes scuta an cribra corroserint! si ista sequimur, quod Platonis nuper apud me mures corroserunt de re publica debui pertimescere, aut, si Epicuri de Voluptate liber rosus esset, putarem annonam in macello cariorem fore!”

[¶29] 60. "Are we going to be frightened at these tales of portents, whether of animal or of human birth? Not to be too verbose, all portents have one and the same explanation and it is this: whatever comes into existence, of whatever kind, must needs find its cause in nature; and hence, even though it may be contrary to experience, it cannot be contrary to nature. Therefore, explore the cause, if you can, of every strange thing that excites your astonishment. If you do not' find the cause be assured, nevertheless, that nothing could have happened without a cause, and employ the principles of natural philosophy to banish the fear which the novelty of the apparition may have occasioned. Then no earthquake or opening of the heavens, no showers of stones or blood, no shooting stars, or comets, will fill you with alarm.

> Latin: 60. “An vero illa nos terrent, si quando aliqua portentosa aut ex pecude aut ex homine nata dicuntur? omnium, ne sim longior, una ratio est. enim oritur, qualecumque est, causam habeat a natura necesse est, ut, etiamsi praeter consuetudinem extiterit, praeter naturam tamen non possit existere. igitur investigato in re nova atque admirabili, si poteris; si nullam reperies, illud tamen exploratum habeto, nihil fieri potuisse sine causa, eumque terrorem, quem tibi rei novitas attulerit, naturae ratione depellito. te nec terrae fremitus, nec caeli discessus, nec lapideus aut sanguineus imber, nec traiectio stellae, nec faces visae terrebunt.”