91. But they did not live the same number of years, for the life of Procles was shorter by a year than that of his brother and his deeds were far more glorious. But for my part I say that even this concession which our excellent friend Diogenes makes to the Chaldeans in a sort of collusive way, is in itself unintelligible. For the Chaldeans, according to their own statements, believe that a person's destiny is affected by the condition of the moon at the time of his birth, and hence they make and record their observations of the stars which appear to be in conjunction with the moon on his birthday. As a result, in forming their judgements, they depend on the sense of sight, which is the least trustworthy of the senses, whereas they should employ reason and intelligence. For the science of mathematics, which the Chaldeans ought to know, teaches us how close the moon comes to the earth, which indeed it almost touches; how far it is from Mercury, the nearest star; how much further yet it is from Venus; and what a great interval separates it from the sun, which is supposed to give it light. The three remaining distances are beyond computation: from the Sun to Mars, from Mars to Jupiter, from Jupiter to Saturn. Then there is the distance from Saturn to the limits of heaven—the ultimate bounds of space.
91. “At nec totidem annos vixerunt; anno enim Procli vita brevior fuit, multumque is fratri rerum gestarum gloria praestitit. At ego id ipsum quod vir optimus, Diogenes, Chaldaeis quasi quadam praevaricatione concedit, nego posse intellegi. cum, ut ipsi dicunt, ortus nascentium luna moderetur, eaque animadvertant et notent sidera natalicia Chaldaei, quaecumque lunae iuncta videantur, oculorum fallacissimo sensu iudicant ea, quae ratione atque animo videre debebant. enim ratio mathematicorum, quam istis notam esse oportebat, quanta humilitate luna feratur terram paene contingens, quantum absit a proxima Mercuri stella, multo autem longius a Veneris, deinde alio intervallo distet a sole, cuius lumine collustrari putatur. vero tria intervalla infinita et inmensa, a sole ad Martis, inde ad Iovis, ab eo ad Saturni stellam, inde ad caelum ipsum, quod extremum atque ultimum mundi est.”
92. In view, therefore, of these almost limitless distances, what influence can the planets exercise upon the moon, or rather, upon the earth? "Again, when the Chaldeans say, as they are bound to do, that all persons born anywhere in the habitable earth under the same horoscope, are alike and must have the same fate, is it not evident that these would-be interpreters of the sky are of a class who are utterly ignorant of the nature of the sky? For the earth is, as it were, divided in half and our view limited by those circles which the Greeks call o(ri/zontes, and which we may in all accuracy term finientes or horizons. Now these horizons vary without limit according to the position of the spectator. Hence, of necessity, the rising and setting of the stars will not occur at the same time for all persons.
92. “potest igitur contagio ex infinito paene intervallo pertinere ad lunam vel potius ad terram?” “Quid? cum dicunt, id quod eis dicere necesse est, omnis omnium ortus, quicumque gignantur in omni terra, quae incolatur, eosdem esse, eademque omnibus, qui eodem statu caeli et stellarum nati sint, accidere necesse esse, nonne eius modi sunt, ut ne caeli quidem naturam interpretes istos caeli nosse appareat? enim illi orbes, qui caelum quasi medium dividunt et aspectum nostrum definiunt, qui a Graecis ὁρίζοντες nominantur, a nobis ‘finientes’ rectissime nominari possunt, varietatem maximam habeant aliique in aliis locis sint, necesse est ortus occasusque siderum non fieri eodem tempore apud omnis.”
93. But if this stellar force affects the heavens now in one way and now in another, how is it possible for this force to operate alike on all persons who are born at the same time, in view of the fact that they are born under vastly different skies? In those places in which we live the Dogstar rises after the solstice, in fact, several days later. But among the Troglodytes, we read, it sets before the solstice. Hence if we should now admit that some stellar influence affects persons who are born upon the earth, then it must be conceded that all persons born at the same time may have different natures owing to the differences in their horoscopes. This is a conclusion by no means agreeable to the astrologers; for they insist that all persons born at the same time, regardless of the place of birth, are born to the same fate.
93. “eorum vi caelum modo hoc modo illo modo temperatur, qui potest eadem vis esse nascentium, cum caeli tanta sit dissimilitudo? his locis quae nos incolimus, post solstitium Canicula exoritur, et quidem aliquot diebus, at apud Troglodytas, ut scribitur, ante solstitium; ut, si iam concedamus aliquid vim caelestem ad eos, qui in terra gignuntur, pertinere, confitendum sit illis eos, qui nascuntur eodem tempore posse in dissimilis incidere naturas propter caeli dissimilitudinem; quod minime illis placet; volunt enim illi omnis eodem tempore ortos, qui ubique sint nati, eadem condicione nasci.”
94. "But what utter madness in these astrologers, in considering the effect of the vast movements and changes in the heavens, to assume that wind and rain and weather anywhere have no effect at birth! In neighbouring places conditions in these respects are so different that frequently, for instance, we have one state of weather at Tusculum and another at Rome. This is especially noticeable to mariners who often observe extreme changes of weather take place while they are rounding the capes. Therefore, in view of the fact that the heavens are now serene and now disturbed by storms, is it the part of a reasonable man to say that this fact has no natal influence—and of course it has not—and then assert that a natal influence is exerted by some subtle, imperceptible, well-nigh inconceivable force which is due to the condition of the sky, which condition, in turn, is due to the action of the moon and stars? "Again, is it no small error of judgement that the Chaldeans fail to realize the effect of the parental seed which is an essential element in the process of generation? For, surely, no one fails to see that the appearance and habits, and generally, the carriage and gestures of children are derived from their parents. This would not be the case if the characteristics of children were determined, not by the natural power of heredity, but by the phases of the moon and by the condition of the sky.
94. “Sed quae tanta dementia est, ut in maximis motibus mutationibusque caeli nihil intersit, qui ventus, qui imber, quae tempestas ubique sit! quarum rerum in proximis locis tantae dissimilitudines saepe sunt, ut alia Tusculi, alia Romae eveniat saepe tempestas; quod, qui navigant, maxime animadvertunt, cum in flectendis promunturiis ventorum mutationes maximas saepe sentiunt. igitur cum sit tum serenitas, tum perturbatio caeli, estne sanorum hominum hoc ad nascentium ortus pertinere non dicere, quod non certe pertinet, illud nescio quid tenue, quod sentiri nullo modo, intellegi autem vix potest, quae a luna ceterisque sideribus caeli temperatio fiat, dicere ad puerorum ortus pertinere?” “Quid? quod non intellegunt seminum vim, quae ad gignendum procreandumque plurimum valeat, funditus tolli, mediocris erroris est? enim non videt et formas et mores et plerosque status ac motus effingere a parentibus liberos? quod non contingeret, si haec non vis et natura gignentium efficeret, sed temperatio lunae caelique moderatio.”
95. And, again, the fact that men who were born at the very same instant, are unlike in character, career, and in destiny, makes it very clear that the time of birth has nothing to do in determining man's course in life. That is, unless perchance we are to believe that nobody else was conceived and born at the very same time that Africanus was. For was there ever anyone like him?
95. “? quod uno et eodem temporis puncto nati dissimilis et naturas et vitas et casus habent, parumne declarat nihil ad agendam vitam nascendi tempus pertinere? nisi forte putamus neminem eodem tempore ipso et conceptum et natum, quo Africanum. quis igitur talis fuit?”
96. "Furthermore, is it not a well-known and undoubted fact that many persons who were born with certain natural defects have been restored completely by Nature herself, after she had resumed her sway, or by surgery or by medicine? For example, some, who were so tongue-tied that they could not speak, have had their tongues set free by a cut from the surgeon's knife. Many more have corrected a natural defect by intelligent exertion. Derosthenes is an instance: according to the account given by Phalereus, he was unable to pronounce the Greek letter rho but by repeated effort learned to articulate it perfectly. But if such defects had been engendered and implanted by a star nothing could have changed them. Do not unlike places produce unlike men? It would be an easy matter to sketch rapidly in passing the differences in mind and body which distinguish the Indians from the Persians and the Ethiopians from the Syrians—differences so striking and so pronounced as to be incredible.
96. “Quid? illudne dubium est, quin multi, cum ita nati essent, ut quaedam contra naturam depravata haberent, restituerentur et corrigerentur ab natura, cum se ipsa revocasset, aut arte atque medicina? ut, quorum linguae sic inhaererent, ut loqui non possent, eae scalpello resectae liberarentur. etiam naturae vitium meditatione atque exercitatione sustulerunt, ut Demosthenem scribit Phalereus, cum rho dicere nequiret, exercitatione fecisse, ut planissime diceret. haec astro ingenerata et tradita essent, nulla res ea mutare posset.? dissimilitudo locorum nonne dissimilis hominum procreationes habet? quas quidem percurrere oratione facile est, quid inter Indos et Persas et Aethiopas et Syros differat corporibus, animis, ut incredibilis varietas dissimilitudoque sit.”
97. Hence it is evident that one's birth is more affected by local environment than by the condition of the moon. Of course, the statement quoted by you that the Babylonians for 470,000 years had taken the horoscope of every child and had tested it by the results, is untrue; for if this had been their habit they would not have abandoned it. Moreover we find no writer who says that the practice exists or who knows that it ever did exist. "You observe that I am not repeating the arguments of Carneades, but those of Panaetius, the head of the Stoic school. But now on my own initiative I put the following questions: Did all the Romans who fell at Cannae have the same horoscope? Yet all had one and the same end. Were all the men eminent for intellect and genius born under the same star? Was there ever a day when countless numbers were not born?
97. “quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae status ad nascendum valere. quod aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis experiendisque pueris, quicumque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse, fallunt; si enim esset factitatum, non esset desitum; neminem autem habemus auctorem, qui aut fieri dicat aut factum sciat.” “Videsne me non ea dicere quae Carneades, sed ea quae princeps Stoicorum Panaetius dixerit? autem etiam hoc requiro: omnesne qui Cannensi pugna ceciderint uno astro fuerint? exitus quidem omnium unus et idem fuit.? qui ingenio atque animo singulares, num astro quoque uno? quod enim tempus, quo non innumerabiles nascantur? at certe similis nemo Homeri.”
98. And yet there never was another Homer. Again: if it matters under what aspect of the sky or combination of the stars every animate being is born, then necessarily the same conditions affect inanimate things also: can any statement be more ridiculous than that? Be that as it may, our good friend Lucius Tarutius of Firmum, who was steeped in Chaldaic lore, made a calculation, based on the assumption that our city's birthday was on the Feast of Pales (at which time tradition says it was founded by Romulus), and from that calculation Tarutius even went so far as to assert that Rome was born when the moon was in the sign of Libra and from that fact unhesitatingly prophesied her destiny.
98. “, si ad rem pertinet, quo modo caelo affecto compositisque sideribus quodque animal oriatur, valeat id necesse est etiam in rebus inanimis; quo quid dici potest absurdius? L. quidem Tarutius Firmanus, familiaris noster, in primis Chaldaicis rationibus eruditus, urbis etiam nostrae natalem diem repetebat ab iis Parilibus, quibus eam a Romulo conditam accepimus, Romamque, in iugo cum esset luna, natam esse dicebat, nec eius fata canere dubitabat.”
99. What stupendous power delusion has! And was the city's natal day also subject to the influence of the moon and stars? Assume, if you will, that it matters in the case of a child under what arrangement of the heavenly bodies it draws its first breath, does it also follow that the stars could have had any influence over the bricks and cement of which the city was built? But why say more against a theory which every day's experience refutes? I recall a multitude of prophecies which the Chaldeans made to Pompey, to Crassus and even to Caesar himself (now lately deceased), to the effect that no one of them would die except in old age, at home and in great glory. Hence it would seem very strange to me should anyone, especially at this time, believe in men whose predictions he sees disproved every day by actual results.
99. “O vim maximam erroris! urbis natalis dies ad vim stellarum et lunae pertinebat? in puero referre, ex qua affectione caeli primum spiritum duxerit; num hoc in latere aut in caemento, ex quibus urbs effecta est, potuit valere? quid plura? cotidie refelluntur. multa ego Pompeio, quam multa Crasso, quam multa huic ipsi Caesari, a Chaldaeis dicta memini, neminem eorum nisi senectute, nisi domi, nisi cum claritate esse moriturum! ut mihi permirum videatur quemquam exstare, qui etiam nunc credat eis quorum praedicta cotidie videat re et eventis refelli.”
100. “There remain the two kinds of divination which we are said to derive from nature and not from art—vaticination and dreams,—these, my dear Quintus, if agreeable to you, let us now discuss.” “Delighted, I assure you,” said he, “for I am in entire accord with the views which you have so far expressed. To be quite frank, your argument has merely strengthened the opinion which I already had, for my own reasoning had convinced me that the Stoic view of divination smacked too much of superstition. I was more impressed by the reasoning of the Peripatetics, of Dicaearchus, of ancient times, and of Cratippus, who still flourishes. According to their opinion there is within the human soul some sort of power—' oracular,' I might call it—by which the future is foreseen when the soul is inspired by a divine frenzy, or when it is released by sleep and is free to move at will. I should like very much to learn your views of these two classes of divination and by what arguments you disprove them.”
100. “duo divinandi genera quae habere dicimur a natura, non ab arte, vaticinandi et somniandi; de quibus, Quinte,” inquam, “si placet, disseramus.” “vero,” inquit, “placet; his enim, quae adhuc disputasti, prorsus adsentior, et, vere ut loquar. quamquam tua me oratio confirmavit, tamen etiam mea sponte nimis superstitiosam de divinatione Stoicorum sententiam iudicabam; haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat et veteris Dicaearchi et eius, qui nunc floret, Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraclum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere. His de generibus quid sentias et quibus ea rationibus infirmes, audire sane velim.”
101. After this statement had been made by Quintus, I began again, making a new start, so to speak: "I am well aware, my dear Quintus, that, while you have always felt a doubt about all other kinds of divination, you approve of the two you just mentioned—divination by frenzy and divination by dreams, both of which, it is thought, flow from a soul set free. Let me, then, state my opinion of these two kinds of divination. But, first, let me examine that syllogism of the Stoics and of our friend Cratippus and see how sound it is. You stated the syllogism of Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater in this way: "'If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man, or they themselves do not know what the future will be; or they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what the future will be; or they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give to man forewarnings of the future; or they, though gods, cannot give signs of coming events.
101. cum ille dixisset, tum ego rursus quasi ab alio principio sum exorsus dicere: “ignoro,” inquam, “Quinte, te semper ita sensisse, ut de ceteris divinandi generibus dubitares, ista duo, furoris et somnii, quae a libera mente fluere viderentur, probares. igitur de istis ipsis duobus generibus mihi quid videatur, si prius et Stoicorum conclusio rationis et Cratippi nostri quid valeat videro. enim et Chrysippum et Diogenem et Antipatrum concludere hoc modo:” “‘Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant; aut existimant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum; aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus quae sunt futura; aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt.’”
102. But it is not true that the gods do not love us (for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race); nor is it true that they do not know what they themselves have determined and planned; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen (for man would be more prudent if he knew); nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts of the future (for there is no more excellent quality than kindness); nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; therefore, it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods; therefore they give us such signs; and it is not true, if they give us such signs, that they give us no means of understanding those signs, otherwise their signs would be useless; nor, if they give us the means, is it true that there is no divination: therefore divination exists.'
102. “‘At neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici); neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt; neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae futura sunt (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus); neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius); neque non possunt futura praenoscere; non igitur di sunt nec significant nobis futura; sunt autem di; significant ergo: et non, si significant futura, nullas dant vias nobis ad significationum scientiam (frustra enim significarent); nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio; est igitur divinatio.’”
103. "What keen-witted men! With how very few words they think the business dispatched! But to establish their syllogism they take propositions for granted which are not conceded at all; yet a chain of reasoning, to be valid, should proceed from premises which are not doubtful to the conclusion which is in dispute. "Pray observe the neat way in which Epicurus (whom you Stoics usually call a blundering idiot) proves that what we term ' the universe' is infinite. 'That,' said he, 'which is finite has an end.' Who would deny that? Again, 'That which has an end is seen from some point outside itself.' That, too, must be granted. 'But the universe is not seen from without itself.' We cannot question that proposition either. 'Therefore, since it has no end the universe must be infinite.'
103. “O acutos homines! quam paucis verbis confectum negotium putant! sumunt ad concludendum quorum eis nihil conceditur. autem rationis ea probanda est, in qua ex rebus non dubiis id quod dubitatur efficitur.” “Videsne Epicurum, quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici, quem ad modum, quod in natura rerum omne esse dicimus, id infinitum esse concluserit? ‘Quod finitum est,’ inquit, ‘habet extremum.’ Quis hoc non dederit? ‘Quod autem habet extremum, id cernitur ex alio extrinsecus.’ Hoc quoque est concedendum. ‘At, quod omne est, id non cernitur ex alio extrinsecus.’ Ne hoc quidem negari potest. ‘Nihil igitur cum habeat extremum, infinitum sit necesse est.’”
104. You see how Epicurus proceeds from admitted premises to the proposition to be established. But this you Stoic logicians do not do; for you not only do not assume premises which everybody concedes, but you even assume premises which, if granted, do not tend in the least to establish what you wish to prove. For you start with this assumption: ' If there are gods they are kindly disposed towards men.' Now who will grant you that? Epicurus? But he says that the gods do not trouble a whit about themselves or about anybody else. Is it our own Ennius? But he says with general approval and applauseI always said that there were gods on high,And this I never will neglect to say;But my opinion is they do not careWhat destiny befalls the human race.To be sure he proceeds to give the reason for his opinion in succeeding lines, but there is no need to repeat them. Enough has been shown to make it clear that your Stoic friends assume as certain what is the subject of doubt and discussion.
104. “ut ad rem dubiam concessis rebus pervenerit? vos dialectici non facitis; nec solum ea non sumitis ad concludendum quae ab omnibus concedantur, sed ea sumitis, quibus concessis nihilo magis efficiatur quod velitis. enim hoc sumitis: ‘Si sunt di, benefici in homines sunt.’ Quis hoc vobis dabit?? Qui negat quicquam deos nec alieni curare nec sui.” “An noster Ennius? magno plausu loquitur assentiente populo:égo deum genus ésse semper dÍxi et dicam caélitum,séd eos non curáre opinor, quÍd agat humanum genus.quidem cur sic opinetur rationem subicit; sed nihil est necesse dicere quae sequuntur; tantum sat est intellegi, id sumere istos pro certo, quod dubium controversumque sit.”
105. "But the syllogism goes on to say: 'The gods are not ignorant of anything, for all things were ordained by them.' But what a heavy attack is made on this very point by scholars who deny that such and such things were ordained by the immortal gods! ' But it is to our interest to know what is going to happen.' Yet Dicaearchus has written a large volume to prove that it is better not to know than to know the future. They say further: ' It is not inconsistent with the dignity of gods to give knowledge of the future.' But entirely consistent, I presume, for them to peer into every man's house to see what he needs! 'It is not true that the gods cannot know the future.'
105. “Sequitur porro, ‘nihil deos ignorare, quod omnia sint ab eis constituta.’ Hic vero quanta pugna est doctissimorum hominum negantium esse haec a dis inmortalibus constituta! ‘At nostra interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt.’ Magnus Dicaearchi liber est nescire ea melius esse quam scire. ‘id esse alienum maiestate deorum.’ Scilicet casas omnium introspicere ut videant quid cuique conducat!”
106. But their ability to know is denied by those who maintain that it is not certain what the future will be. Now don't you see what doubtful premises they assume to be certain and take for granted? Next they hurl this dialectical dart: 'Therefore it is not true both that there are gods and yet that they do not give signs of the future.' And of course they think that the matter is now settled. Then they make another assumption: 'But there are gods.' Even that is not conceded by everybody. 'Therefore they give signs of the future.' Not necessarily so: for they may not give us signs of the future and still be gods. 'Nor is it true that, if they give such signs, they give no means of interpreting those signs.' But it may be that they have the means and yet do not impart them to man; for why would they impart them to the Etruscans rather than to the Romans? Again, the Stoics say: ' If the gods do impart the means, that is divination.' Grant that they do (which is absurd), what is the good if we do not understand? Their conclusion is: ' Therefore there is divination.' Suppose that is their conclusion, still they have not proved it; for, as they themselves have taught us, the truth cannot be proved from false premises. Hence their entire argument falls to the ground.
106. “‘Neque non possunt futura praenoscere.’ posse ei quibus non placet esse certum, quid futurum sit. igitur, quae dubia sint, ea sumi pro certis atque concessis? contorquent et ita concludunt: ‘Non igitur et sunt di nec significant futura.’ Id enim iam perfectum arbitrantur.— Deinde assumunt: ‘Sunt autem di,’ quod ipsum non ab omnibus conceditur. ‘Significant ergo.’ Ne id quidem sequitur; possunt enim non significare et tamen esse di. ‘Nec, si significent, non dant vias aliquas ad scientiam significationis.’ At id quoque potest, ut non dent homini, ipsi habeant; cur enim Tuscis potius quam Romanis darent? ‘Nec, si dant vias, nulla est divinatio.’ Fac dare deos, quod absurdum est, quid refert, si accipere non possumus? est: ‘Est igitur divinatio.’ Sit extremum, effectum tamen non est; ex falsis enim, ut ab ipsis didicimus, verum effici non potest. igitur tota conclusio.”
107. "Now let us come to the argument of that most worthy gentleman, our intimate friend, Cratippus: "'Though without eyes,' he says,' it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, too, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet to establish the existence of divination it is enough that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore the existence of divination must be conceded.' "Delightfully and briefly put; but after he has twice made gratuitous assumptions, even though he has found us quite generous in making concessions, yet his further assumption cannot possibly be conceded.
107. “Veniamus nunc ad optimum virum, familiarem nostrum, Cratippum:” “‘Si sine oculis,’ inquit, ‘non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere, qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. igitur, si sine divinatione non potest officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem, cum quis divinationem habeat, errare aliquando nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem, semel aliquid ita esse divinatum, nihil ut fortuito cecidisse videatur; sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia; esse igitur divinationem confitendum est.’” “Festive et breviter; sed cum bis sumpsit quod voluit, etiamsi faciles nos ad concedendum habuerit, id tamen quod assumit concedi nullo modo potest.”
108. He says in substance, 'If the eyes are sometimes at fault, yet, because they have sometimes seen correctly, the power of sight resides within them; likewise if a person has once foreseen something by means of divination, yet even when he errs in his predictions, he must be held to have the power of divination.' "Pray point out, my dear Cratippus, the similarity in these propositions of yours. I confess that it is not apparent to me. For the eyes in seeing correctly employ a sense conferred by nature; while the soul, if it ever has a true vision of the future, whether by vaticination or by dreams, relies upon luck or chance. This you must admit unless, perchance, you think that those who consider dreams as dreams and nothing more, are going to concede that the fulfilment of any dream was ever due to anything but luck. While we may grant your two major premises,—these the Greeks call lh/mmata, but we prefer to call them by their Latin equivalent sumptiones—yet we will not grant your minor premise— which the Greeks call pro/slhyis.
108. “‘Si,’ inquit, ‘aliquando oculi peccent, tamen, quia recte aliquando viderint, inest in eis vis videndi; item si quis semel aliquid in divinatione viderit, is, etiam cum peccet, tamen existimandus sit habere vim divinandi.’” “Vide, quaeso, Cratippe noster, quam sint ista similia; nam mihi non videntur. enim vera cernentes utuntur natura atque sensu; animi, si quando vel vaticinando vel somniando vera viderunt, usi sunt fortuna atque casu; nisi forte concessuros tibi existimas eos, qui somnia pro somniis habent, si quando aliquod somnium verum evaserit, non id fortuito accidisse. demus tibi istas duas sumptiones (ea quae λήμματα appellant dialectici, sed nos Latine loqui malumus), assumptio tamen (quam πρόσληψιν eidem vocant), non dabitur.”
109. "Cratippus states his minor premise thus: 'But there are countless instances of prophecies being fulfilled without the intervention of luck.' On the contrary, I say there isn't even one. Observe how keen the controversy grows! Now that the minor premise is denied the conclusion fails. But he retorts: ' You are unreasonable not to grant it, it is so evident.' Why 'evident'? 'Because many prophecies come true.' And what of the fact that many more don't come true? Does not this very uncertainty, which is characteristic of luck, demonstrate that their fulfilment is accounted for by luck and not by any law of nature? Furthermore, my dear Cratippus—for my controversy is with you—if that argument of yours is sound, don't you see that it is equally available in behalf of the means of divination practised by soothsayers, augurs, Chaldeans and by interpreters of lightnings, portents, and lots? For each of these classes will furnish you with at least one instance of a prophecy that came to pass. Therefore either they too are all means of divining—and this you very properly deny—or, if they are not, then, so far as I can see, the two classes which you permit to remain are not means of divining. Hence the same reasoning employed by you to establish the two kinds which you accept may be used to establish the others which you reject.
109. “Assumit autem Cratippus hoc modo: ‘Sunt autem innumerabiles praesensiones non fortuitae.’ At ego dico nullam., quanta sit controversia. assumptione non concessa nulla conclusio est. ‘At impudentes sumus qui, cum tam perspicuum sit, non concedamus.’ Quid est ‘perspicuum’? ‘Multa vera,’ inquit, ‘evadere.’ Quid, quod multo plura falsa? ipsa varietas, quae est propria fortunae, fortunam esse causam, non naturam esse docet?, si tua ista conclusio, Cratippe, vera est—tecum enim mihi res est—non intellegis eadem uti posse et haruspices et fulguratores et interpretes ostentorum et augures et sortilegos et Chaldaeos? quorum generum nullum est ex quo non aliquid sicut praedictum sit evaserit. aut ea quoque genera divinandi sunt, quae tu rectissime improbas, aut, si ea non sunt, non intellego cur haec duo sint quae relinquis. ergo ratione haec inducis, eadem illa possunt esse, quae tollis.”
110. "But what weight is to be given to that frenzy of yours, which you term ' divine' and which enables the crazy man to see what the wise man does not see, and invests the man who has lost human intelligence with the intelligence of gods? We Romans venerate the verses of the Sibyl who is said to have uttered them while in a frenzy. Recently there was a rumour, which was believed at the time, but turned out to be false, that one of the interpreters of those verses was going to declare in the Senate that, for our safety, the man whom we had as king in fact should be made king also in name. If this is in the books, to what man and to what time does it refer? For it was clever in the author to take care that whatever happened should appear foretold because all reference to persons or time had been omitted.
110. “Quid vero habet auctoritatis furor iste, quem ‘divinum’ vocatis ut, quae sapiens non videat, ea videat insanus, et is qui humanos sensus amiserit divinos adsecutus sit? Sibyllae versus observamus, quos illa furens fudisse dicitur. interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur eum, quem re vera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus. si est in libris, in quem hominem et in quod tempus est? enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur hominum et temporum definitione sublata.”
111. He also employed a maze of obscurity so that the same verses might be adapted to different situations at different times. Moreover, that this poem is not the work of frenzy is quite evident from the quality of its composition (for it exhibits artistic care rather than emotional excitement), and is especially evident from the fact that it is written in what are termed 'acrostics,' wherein the initial letters of each verse taken in order convey a meaning; as, for example, in some of Ennius's verses, the initial letters form the words, Quintus Ennius Fecit, that is, ' Quintus Ennius wrote it.' That surely is the work of concentrated thought and not of a frenzied brain.
111. “Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut eidem versus alias in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. esse autem illud carmen furentis cum ipsum poëma declarat (est enim magis artis et diligentiae quam incitationis et motus), tum vero ea, quae ἀκροστιχίς dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versuum litteris aliquid conectitur, ut in quibusdam Ennianis: ‘Quintus Ennius fecit.’ Id certe magis est attenti animi quam furentis.”
112. And in the Sibylline books, throughout the entire work, each prophecy is embellished with an acrostic, so that the initial letters of each of the lines give the subject of that particular prophecy. Such a work comes from a writer who is not frenzied, who is painstaking, not crazy. Therefore let us keep the Sibyl under lock and key so that in accordance with the ordinances of our forefathers her books may not even be read without permission of the Senate and may be more effective in banishing rather than encouraging superstitious ideas. And let us plead with the priests to bring forth from those books anything rather than a king, whom henceforth neither gods nor men will suffer to exist in Rome. "But many persons in a frenzy often utter true prophecies, as Cassandra did when she said.Already on the mighty deep...and when, a little later, she exclaimed,Alas! behold!...
112. “in Sibyllinis ex primo versu cuiusque sententiae primis litteris illius sententiae carmen omne praetexitur. scriptoris est, non furentis, adhibentis diligentiam, non insani. ob rem Sibyllam quidem sepositam et conditam habeamus, ut, id quod proditum est a maioribus, iniussu senatus ne legantur quidem libri valeantque ad deponendas potius quam ad suscipiendas religiones; cum antistitibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Romae posthac nec di nec homines esse patientur.” “At multi saepe vera vaticinati, ut Cassandra:iamque mari magno …eademque paulo post:eheu videte …” “igitur me cogis etiam fabulis credere?
113. Then, I suppose you are going to force me to believe in myths? Let them be as charming as you please and as finished as possible in language, thought, rhythm, and melody, still we ought not to give credence to fictitious incidents or to quote them as authority. On that principle no reliance, in my opinion, should be placed in the prophecies of your Publicius —whoever he may have been—or in those of the Marcian bards or in those of the hazy oracles of Apollo: some were obviously false and others mere senseless chatter and none of them were ever believed in by any man of ordinary sense, much less by any person of wisdom.
113. quae delectationis habeant, quantum voles, verbis, sententiis, numeris, cantibus adiuventur; auctoritatem quidem nullam debemus nec fidem commenticiis rebus adiungere. modo nec ego Publicio nescio cui, nec Marciis vatibus, nec Apollinis opertis, credendum existimo; quorum partim ficta aperte, partim effutita temere numquam, ne mediocri quidem cuiquam, non modo prudenti probata sunt.”
114. 'Oh! but what about that oarsman in Coponius's fleet,' you say, 'didn't he truly foretell what afterwards came to pass? ' He did indeed, and the very things that all of us at the time feared would happen. For news was coming to us that the armies of Caesar and Pompey were facing each other in Thessaly. We thought that Caesar's troops had more reckless courage because they were fighting against their country and greater strength because of their long military training. Besides there was not one of us who did not dread the outcome of the battle, but our apprehension was not openly shown and was such as not to be discreditable to men of strong character. As for that Greek sailor, is it strange if, in the extremity of his fear, he, as most people do in such cases, lost his courage, reason, and self-control? In his mental excitement and aberration, he merely stated that things would occur, which, when he was himself, he feared would come to pass. In heaven's name, pray tell me, then, which you think was more likely to have had the power to interpret the decrees of the immortal gods—that crazy sailor, or someone of our party then on the ground-Cato, Varro, Coponius or I?
114. “‘Quid?’ inquies, ‘remex ille de classe Coponi nonne ea praedixit, quae facta sunt?’ Ille vero, et ea quidem quae omnes eo tempore ne acciderent timebamus. enim in Thessalia castris collata audiebamus, videbaturque nobis exercitus Caesaris et audaciae plus habere, quippe qui patriae bellum intulisset, et roboris propter vetustatem; casum autem proeli nemo nostrum erat quin timeret; sed, ita ut constantibus hominibus par erat, non aperte. autem Graecus, quid mirum si, magnitudine timoris, ut plerumque fit, a constantia atque a mente atque a se ipse discessit? qua perturbatione animi, quae, sanus cum esset, timebat ne evenirent, ea demens eventura esse dicebat. tandem, per deos atque homines! magis veri simile est vesanum remigem an aliquem nostrum qui ibi tum eramus, me, Catonem, Varronem, Coponium ipsum, consilia deorum immortalium perspicere potuisse?”
115. "But now I come to you,Apollo, sacred guard of earth's true core,Whence first came frenzied, wild prophetic words.Chrysippus filled a whole volume with your oracles; of these some, as I think, were false; some came true by chance, as happens very often even in ordinary speech; some were so intricate and obscure that their interpreter needs an interpreter and the oracles themselves must be referred back to the oracle; and some so equivocal that they require a dialectician to construe them. For example, when the following oracular response was made to Asia's richest king:When Croesus o'er the river Halys goesHe will a mighty kingdom overthrow,Croesus thought that he would overthrow his enemy's kingdom, whereas he overthrew his own.
115. “Sed iam ad te venio,ó sancte Apollo, qui úbilicum cértum terrarum óbsides,únde superstitiósa primum saéva evasit vóx fera.enim oraculis Chrysippus totum volumen implevit partim falsis, ut ego opinor, partim casu veris, ut fit in omni oratione saepissime; partim flexiloquis et obscuris, ut interpres egeat interprete, et sors ipsa ad sortes referenda sit; partim ambiguis, et quae ad dialecticum deferenda sint. cum illa sors edita est opulentissimo regi Asiae:Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam pervertet opum vim,hostium vim se perversurum putavit, pervertit autem suam.”
116. But in either event the oracle would have been true. Besides, why need I believe that this oracle was ever given to Croesus? or why should I consider Herodotus more truthful than Ennius? and was the former less able to invent stories about Croesus than Ennius was about Pyrrhus? For instance, nobody believes Ennius when he says that Apollo's oracle gave the following response to Pyrrhus:O son of Aeacus, my prediction isThat you the Roman army will defeat.In the first place Apollo never spoke in Latin; second, that oracle is unknown to the Greeks; third, in the days of Pyrrhus Apollo had already ceased making verses, and, finally, although “the sons of Aeacus have ever been,” as Ennius says,a stolid race,And more for valour than for wisdom famed,still Pyrrhus would have had sense enough to see that the equivocal line—“You the Roman army will defeat”—was no more favourable to him than to the Romans. As for that equivocal response which deceived Croesus, it might have deceived—Chrysippus, for example; but the one made to Pyrrhus wouldn't have fooled—even Epicurus!
116. “igitur eorum accidisset, verum oraclum fuisset. autem hoc credam umquam editum Croeso? aut Herodotum cur veraciorem ducam Ennio? minus ille potuit de Croeso quam de Pyrrho fingere Ennius? enim est qui credat Apollinis ex oraculo Pyrrho esse responsum:aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse?Latine Apollo numquam locutus est; deinde ista sors inaudita Graecis est; praeterea Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat; postremo, quamquam semper fuit, ut apud Ennium est,stolidum genus Aeacidarum,bellipotentes sunt magis quam sapientipotentes,tamen hanc amphiboliam versus intellegere potuisset, ‘vincere te Romanos’ nihilo magis in se quam in Romanos valere; nam illa amphibolia quae Croesum decepit, vel Chrysippum potuisset fallere, haec vero ne Epicurum quidem!”
117. "However, the main question is this: Why are Delphic oracles (of which I have just given you examples) not uttered at the present time and have not been for a long time? And why are they regarded with the utmost contempt? When pressed at this point their apologists affirm that 'the long flight of time has gradually dissipated the virtue of the place whence came those subterranean exhalations which inspired the Pythian priestess to utter oracles.' One might think that they are talking about wine or brine which do evaporate. But the question is about the virtue of a place—a virtue which you call not only 'natural' but even 'divine,'—pray how did it evaporate? 'By length of time,' you say. But what length of time could destroy a divine power? And what is as divine as a subterranean exhalation that inspires the soul with power to foresee the future—a power such that it not only sees things a long time before they happen, but actually foretells them in rhythmic verse? When did the virtue disappear? Was it after men began to be less credulous?
117. “Sed, quod caput est, cur isto modo iam oracla Delphis non eduntur non modo nostra aetate, sed iam diu, ut modo nihil possit esse contemptius? loco cum urguentur, ‘evanuisse,’ aiunt, ‘vetustate vim loci eius, unde anhelitus ille terrae fieret, quo Pythia mente incitata oracla ederet.’ De vino aut salsamento putes loqui, quae evanescunt vetustate. De vi loci agitur, neque solum naturali, sed etiam divina; quae quo tandem modo evanuit? ‘Vetustate,’ inquies. ‘vetustas’ est quae vim divinam conficere possit? tam divinum autem quam afflatus e terra mentem ita movens, ut eam providam rerum futurarum efficiat, ut ea non modo cernat multo ante, sed etiam numero versuque pronuntiet? ista vis autem evanuit? an postquam homines minus creduli esse coeperunt?”
118. "By the way, Demosthenes, who lived nearly three hundred years ago, used to say even then that the Pythian priestess 'philippized, in other words, that she was Philip's ally. By this expression he meant to infer that she had been bribed by Philip. Hence we may conclude that in other instances the Delphic oracles were not entirely free of guile. But, for some inexplicable cause, those superstitious and half-cracked philosophers of yours would rather appear absurd than anything else in the world. You Stoics, instead of rejecting these incredible tales, prefer to believe that a power had gradually faded into nothingness, whereas if it ever had existed it certainly would be eternal.
118. “Demosthenes quidem, qui abhinc annos prope trecentos fuit, iam tum φιλιππίζειν Pythiam dicebat, id est quasi cum Philippo facere. autem eo spectabat, ut eam a Philippo corruptam diceret. licet existimare in aliis quoque oraculis Delphicis aliquid non sinceri fuisse. nescio quo modo isti philosophi superstitiosi et paene fanatici quidvis malle videntur quam se non ineptos. mavultis et extinctum esse id quod si umquam fuisset, certe aeternum esset, quam ea quae non sunt credenda non credere.”
119. "There is a like error in regard to dreams. How far-fetched is the argument in their defence! 'Our souls' (according to the view of your school) ' are divine and are derived from an external source; the universe is filled with a multitude of harmonious souls; therefore, because of its divinity and its contact with other souls, the human soul during sleep foresees what is to come.' But Zeno thinks that sleep is nothing more than a contraction—a slipping and a collapse, as it were—of the human soul. Then Pythagoras and Plato, who are most respectable authorities, bid us, if we would have trustworthy dreams, to prepare for sleep by following a prescribed course in conduct and in eating. The Pythagoreans make a point of prohibiting the use of beans, as if thereby the soul and not the belly was filled with wind! Somehow or other no statement is too absurd for some philosophers to make.
119. “Similis est error in somniis; quorum quidem defensio repetita quam longe est! animos censent esse nostros, eosque esse tractos extrinsecus, animorumque consentientium multitudine completum esse mundum; hac igitur mentis et ipsius divinitate et coniunctione cum externis mentibus cerni, quae sint futura. autem animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere id ipsum esse dormire. Pythagoras et Plato, locupletissimi auctores, quo in somnis certiora videamus, praeparatos quodam cultu atque victu proficisci ad dormiendum iubent. quidem Pythagorei utique abstinere, quasi vero eo cibo mens, non venter, infletur! nescio quo modo nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.”
120. "Then shall we believe that the souls of sleepers while dreaming are spontaneously moved? or, as Democritus thinks, that they are impelled to action by phantoms from without? Whether the one theory or the other be correct, the fact remains that men in sleep assume many false apparitions to be true. Likewise, to men who are sailing, stationary objects on shore seem to be moving; and also, sometimes in looking at a lamp, by some sort of optical illusion we see two flames instead of one. Why need I mention how many non-existent things are seen by men who are drunk or crazy? And if we are to put no trust in such apparitions of the waking man I do not understand why we should put any trust in dreams. Of course you may argue, if you will, about these tricks of vision as you would about dreams, and say, for example, that when stationary objects appear to be in motion, it foretells an earthquake or a sudden flight; and when the lamp's flame appears to be double it portends that insurrection and rebellion are afoot!
120. “Utrum igitur censemus dormientium animos per sene ipsos in somniando moveri, an, ut Democritus censet, externa et adventicia visione pulsari? enim sic est sive illo modo, videri possunt permulta somniantibus falsa pro veris. et navigantibus moveri videntur ea quae stant, et quodam obtutu oculorum duo pro uno lucernae lumina. dicam, insanis, quid ebriis, quam multa falsa videantur? eius modi visis credendum non est, cur somniis credatur, nescio. tam licet de his erroribus, si velis, quam de somniis disputare, ut ea quae stant, si moveri videantur, terrae motum significare dicas aut repentinam aliquam fugam; gemino autem lucernae lumine declarari dissensionem ac seditionem moveri!”