In the year B.C. 67, Aulus Gabinius had obtained the passing of a decree by which Pompey was invested for three years with the supreme command over all the Mediterranean, and over all the coasts of that sea, to a distance of four hundred furlongs from the sea. And in this command he had acted with great vigour and with complete success; destroying all the pirates' strongholds, and distributing the men themselves as colonists among the inland towns of Asia Minor and Greece. After this achievement he did not return to Rome, but remained in Asia, making various regulations for the towns which he had conquered. During this period Lucullus had been prosecuting the war against Mithridates, and proceeding gradually in the reduction of Pontus; he had penetrated also into Mesopotamia, but had subsequently been distressed by seditions in his army, excited by Clodius, his brother-in-law; and these seditions had given fresh courage to Mithridates who had fallen on Caius Triarius, one of his lieutenants, and routed his army with great slaughter. At the time that Pompey commenced his campaign against the pirates, the consul Marcus Aquillius Glabrio was sent to supersede Lucullus in his command, but he was perfectly incompetent to oppose Mithridates, who seemed likely with such an enemy to recover all the power of which Lucullus had deprived him. So in the year B.C. 66, while Glabrio was still in Bithynia, and Pompey in Asia Minor, Caius Manilius, a tribune of the people, brought forward a proposition, that, in addition to the command which Pompey already possessed, he should be invested with unlimited power in Bithynia, Pontus, and Armenia, for the purpose of conducting the war against Mithridates. The measure was strongly opposed by Catulus and by Hortensius, but it was supported by Caesar, and by Cicero in the following speech, which is the first which he ever addressed to the people; and the proposition was carried. Although, O Romans, your numerous assembly has always seemed to me the most agreeable body that any one can address, and this place, which is most honourable to plead in, has also seemed always the most distinguished place for delivering an oration in, still I have been prevented from trying this road to glory, which has at all times been entirely open to every virtuous man, not indeed by my own will, but by the system of life which I have adopted from my earliest years. For as hitherto I have not dared, on account of my youth, to intrude upon the authority of this place, and as I considered that no arguments ought to be brought to this place except such as were the fruit of great ability, and worked up with the greatest industry, I have thought it fit to devote all my time to the necessities of my friends. And accordingly, this place has never been unoccupied by men who were defending your cause, and my industry, which has been virtuously and honestly employed about the dangers of private individuals, has received its most honourable reward in your approbation. For when, on account of the adjournment of the comitia, I was three times elected the first praetor by all the centuries, I easily perceived, O Romans, what your opinion of me was, and what conduct you enjoined to others. Now, when there is that authority in me which you, by conferring honours on me, have chosen that there should be, and all that facility in pleading which almost daily practice in speaking can give a vigilant man who has habituated himself to the forum, at all events, if I have any authority, I will employ it before those who have given it to me; and if I can accomplish anything by speaking, I will display it to those men above all others, who have thought fit, by their decision, to confer honours on that qualification.
mihi semper frequens conspectus vester multo iucundissimus, hic autem locus ad agendum amplissimus, ad dicendum ornatissimus est visus, Quirites, tamen hoc aditu laudis qui semper optimo cuique maxime patuit non mea me voluntas adhuc sed vitae meae rationes ab ineunte aetate susceptae prohibuerunt. cum antea nondum huius auctoritatem loci attingere auderem statueremque nihil huc nisi perfectum ingenio, elaboratum industria adferri oportere, omne meum tempus amicorum temporibus transmittendum putavi. neque hic locus vacuus fuit umquam ab eis qui vestram causam defenderent et meus labor in privatorum periculis caste integreque versatus ex vestro iudicio fructum est amplissimum consecutus. cum propter dilationem comitiorum ter praetor primus centuriis cunctis renuntiatus sum, facile intellexi, Quirites, et quid de me iudicaretis et quid aliis praescriberetis. cum et auctoritatis in me tantum sit quantum vos honoribus mandandis esse voluistis, et ad agendum facultatis tantum quantum homini vigilanti ex forensi usu prope cotidiana dicendi exercitatio potuit adferre, certe et, si quid auctoritatis in me est, apud eos utar qui eam mihi dederunt et, si quid in dicendo consequi possum, eis ostendam potissimum qui ei quoque rei fructum suo iudicio tribuendum esse duxerunt.
3. And, above all things, I see that I have reason to rejoice on this account, that, since I am speaking in this place, to which I am so entirely unaccustomed, I have a cause to advocate in which eloquence can hardly fail any one; for I have to speak of the eminent and extraordinary virtue of Cnaeus Pompey; and it is harder for me to find out how to end a discourse on such a subject, than how to begin one. So that what I have to seek for is not so much a variety of arguments, as moderation in employing them.
3. illud in primis mihi laetandum iure esse video quod in hac insolita mihi ex hoc loco ratione dicendi causa talis oblata est in qua oratio deesse nemini possit. est enim de Cn. Pompei singulari eximiaque virtute; huius autem orationis difficilius est exitum quam principium invenire. mihi non tam copia quam modus in dicendo quaerendus est.
4. And, that my oration may take its origin from the same source from which all this cause is to be maintained; an important war, and one perilous to your revenues and to your allies, is being waged against you by two most powerful kings, Mithridates and Tigranes. One of these having been left to himself, and the other having been attacked, thinks that an opportunity offers itself to him to occupy all Asia. Letters are brought from Asia every day to Roman knights, most honourable men, who have great property at stake, which is all employed in the collection of your revenues; and they, in consequence of the intimate connection which I have with their order, have come to me and entrusted me with the task of pleading the cause of the republic, and warding off danger from their private fortunes.
4. ut inde oratio mea proficiscatur unde haec omnis causa ducitur, bellum grave et periculosum vestris vectigalibus atque sociis a duobus potentissimis adfertur regibus, Mithridate et Tigrane, quorum alter relictus, alter lacessitus occasionem sibi ad occupandam Asiam oblatam esse arbitratur. Romanis, honestissimis viris, adferuntur ex Asia cotidie litterae, quorum magnae res aguntur in vestris vectigalibus exercendis occupatae; qui ad me pro necessitudine quae mihi est cum illo ordine causam rei publicae periculaque rerum suarum detulerunt, Bithyniae quae nunc vestra provincia est vicos exustos esse compluris, regnum Ariobarzanis quod finitimum est vestris vectigalibus totum esse in hostium potestate;
5. They say that many of the villages of Bithynia, which is at present a province belonging to you, have been burnt; that the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, which borders on those districts from which you derive a revenue, is wholly in the power of the enemy; that Lucullus, after having performed great exploits, is departing from that war; that it is not enough that whoever succeeds him should be prepared for the conduct of so important a war; that one general is demanded and required by all men, both allies and citizens, for that war; that he alone is feared by the enemy, and that no one else is.
5. L.ucium Lucullum magnis rebus gestis ab eo bello discedere; huic qui successerit, non satis esse paratum ad tantum bellum administrandum; unum ab omnibus sociis et civibus ad id bellum imperatorem deposci atque expeti, eundem hunc unum ab hostibus metui, praeterea neminem.
6. You see what the case is; now consider what you ought to do. It seems to me that I ought to speak in the first place of the sort of war that exists; in the second place, of its importance; and lastly, of the selection of a general. The kind of war is such as ought above all others to excite and inflame your minds to a determination to persevere in it. It is a war in which the glory of the Roman people is at stake; that glory which has been handed down to you from your ancestors, great indeed in everything, but most especially in military affairs. The safety of our friends and allies is at stake, in behalf of which your ancestors have waged many most important wars. The most certain and the largest revenues of the Roman people are at stake; and if they be lost, you will be at a loss for the luxuries of peace, and the sinews of war. The property of many citizens is at stake, which you ought greatly to regard, both for your own sake, and for that of the republic
6. quae sit videtis; nunc quid agendum sit ipsi considerate. mihi videtur de genere belli, deinde de magnitudine, tum de imperatore deligendo esse dicendum. est eius belli quod maxime vestros animos excitare atque inflammare ad persequendi studium debeat. quo agitur populi Romani gloria quae vobis a maioribus cum magna in omnibus rebus tum summa in re militari tradita est; agitur salus sociorum atque amicorum pro qua multa maiores vestri magna et gravia bella gesserunt; aguntur certissima populi Romani vectigalia et maxima quibus amissis et pacis ornamenta et subsidia belli requiretis; aguntur bona multorum civium quibus est a vobis et ipsorum causa et rei publicae consulendum.
7. And since you have at all times been covetous of glory and greedy of praise beyond all other nations, you have to wipe out that stain, received in the former Mithridates War, which has now fixed itself deeply and eaten its way into the Roman name, the stain arising from the fact that he, who in one day marked down by one order, and one single letter, all the Roman citizens in all Asia, scattered as they were over so many cities, for slaughter and butchery, has not only never yet suffered any chastisement worthy of his wickedness, but now, twenty-three years after that time, is still a king, and a king in such a way that he is not content to hide himself in Pontus, or in the recesses of Cappadocia, but he seeks to emerge from his hereditary kingdom, and to range among your revenues, in the broad light of Asia.
7. quoniam semper appetentes gloriae praeter ceteras gentis atque avidi laudis fuistis, delenda vobis est illa macula Mithridatico bello superiore concepta quae penitus iam insedit ac nimis inveteravit in populi Romani nomine, quod is qui uno die tota in Asia tot in civitatibus uno nuntio atque una significatione ⟨omnis⟩ civis Romanos necandos trucidandosque curavit, non modo adhuc poenam nullam suo dignam scelere suscepit sed ab illo tempore annum iam tertium et vicesimum regnat, et ita regnat ut se non Ponti neque Cappadociae latebris occultare velit sed emergere ex patrio regno atque in vestris vectigalibus, hoc est in Asiae luce, versari.
8. Indeed up to this time your generals have been, contending with the king so as to carry off tokens of victory rather than actual victory. Lucius Sulla has triumphed, Lucius Murena has triumphed over Mithridates, two most gallant men, and most consummate generals; but yet they have triumphed in such a way that he, though routed and defeated, was still king. Not but what praise is to be given to those generals for what they did. Pardon must be conceded to them for what they left undone; because the republic recalled Sulla from that war into Italy, and Sulla recalled Murena.
8. adhuc ita nostri cum illo rege contenderunt imperatores ut ab illo insignia victoriae, non victoriam reportarent. L.ucius Sulla, triumphavit L.ucius Murena de Mithridate, duo fortissimi viri et summi imperatores, sed ita triumpharunt ut ille pulsus superatusque regnaret. tamen illis imperatoribus laus est tribuenda quod egerunt, venia danda quod reliquerunt, propterea quod ab eo bello Sullam in Italiam res publica, Murenam Sulla revocavit.
9. But Mithridates employed all the time which he had left to him, not in forgetting the old war, but in preparing for a new one; and, after he had built and equipped very large fleets, and had got together mighty armies from every nation he could, and had pretended to be preparing war against the tribes of the Bosphorus, his neighbours, sent ambassadors and letters as far as Spain to those chiefs with whom we were at war at the time, in order that, as you would by that means have war waged against you in the two parts of the world the furthest separated and most remote of all from one another, by two separate enemies warring against you with one uniform plan, you, hampered by the double enmity, might find that you were fighting for the empire itself.
9. Mithridates autem omne reliquum tempus non ad oblivionem veteris belli sed ad comparationem novi contulit. postea, cum maximas aedificasset ornassetque classis exercitusque permagnos quibuscumque ex gentibus potuisset comparasset et se Bosphoranis, finitimis suis, bellum inferre simularet, usque in Hispaniam legatos ac litteras misit ad eos duces quibuscum tum bellum gerebamus, ut, cum duobus in locis disiunctissimis maximeque diversis uno consilio a binis hostium copiis bellum terra marique gereretur, vos ancipiti contentione districti de imperio dimicaretis.
10. However; the danger on one side, the danger from Sertorius and from Spain, which had much the most solid foundation and the most formidable strength, was warded off by the divine wisdom and extraordinary valour of Cnaeus Pompeius. And on the other side of the empire, affairs were so managed by Lucilius Lucullus, that most illustrious of men, that the beginning, of all those achievements in those countries, great and eminent as they were, deserve to be attributed not to his good fortune but to his valour; but the latter events which have taken place lately, ought to be imputed not to his fault, but to his ill-fortune. However, of Lucullus I will speak hereafter, and I will speak, O Romans, in such a manner, that his true glory shall not appear to be at all disparaged by my pleading, nor, on the other hand, shall any undeserved credit seem to be given to him.
10. tamen alterius partis periculum, Sertorianae atque Hispaniensis, quae multo plus firmamenti ac roboris habebat, Cn.Gnaei Pompei divino consilio ac singulari virtute depulsum est; in altera parte ita res ab L.Lucio Lucullo, summo viro, est administrata ut initia illa rerum gestarum magna atque praeclara non felicitati eius sed virtuti, haec autem extrema quae nuper acciderunt non culpae sed fortunae tribuenda esse videantur. de Lucullo dicam alio loco, et ita dicam, Quirites, ut neque vera laus ei detracta oratione mea neque falsa adficta esse videatur;
11. At present, when we are speaking of the dignity and glory of your empire, since that is the beginning of my oration, consider what feelings you think you ought to entertain. Your ancestors have often waged war on account of their merchants and seafaring men having been injuriously treated. What ought to be your feelings when so many thousand Roman citizens have been put to death by one order and at one time? Because their ambassadors had been spoken to with insolence, your ancestors determined that Corinth, the light of all Greece, should be destroyed. Will you allow that king to remain unpunished, who has murdered a lieutenant of the Roman people of consular rank, having tortured him with chains and scourging, and every sort of punishment? They would not allow the freedom of Roman citizens to be diminished; will you be indifferent to their lives being taken? They avenged the privileges of our embassy when they were violated by a word; will you abandon an ambassador who has been put to death with every sort of cruelty?
11. de vestri imperi dignitate atque gloria, quoniam is est exorsus orationis meae, videte quem vobis animum suscipiendum putetis. nostri saepe pro mercatoribus aut naviculariis nostris iniuriosius tractatis bella gesserunt; vos tot milibus civium Romanorum uno nuntio atque uno tempore necatis quo tandem animo esse debetis? quod erant appellati superbius, Corinthum patres vestri totius Graeciae lumen exstinctum esse voluerunt; vos eum regem inultum esse patiemini qui legatum populi Romani consularem vinculis ac verberibus atque omni supplicio excruciatum necavit? libertatem imminutam civium Romanorum non tulerunt; vos ereptam vitam neglegetis? legationis verbo violatum illi persecuti sunt; vos legatum omni supplicio interfectum relinquetis?
12. Take care lest, as it was a most glorious thing for them, to leave you such wide renown and such a powerful empire, it should be a most discreditable thing for you, not to be able to defend and preserve that which you have received. What more shall I say? Shall I say, that the safety of our allies is involved in the greatest hazard and danger? King Ariobarzanes has been driven from his kingdom, an ally and friend of the Roman people; two kings are threatening all Asia, who are not only most hostile to you, but also to your friends and allies. And every city throughout all Asia, and throughout all Greece, is compelled by the magnitude of the danger to put its whole trust in the expectation of your assistance. They do not dare to beg of you any particular general, especially since you have sent them another, nor do they think that they can do this without extreme danger.
12. ne, ut illis pulcherrimum fuit tantam vobis imperi gloriam tradere, sic vobis turpissimum sit id quod accepistis tueri et conservare non posse.? quod salus sociorum summum in periculum ac discrimen vocatur, quo id tandem animo ferre debetis? est expulsus Ariobarzanes rex, socius populi Romani atque amicus; imminent duo reges toti Asiae non solum vobis inimicissimi sed etiam vestris sociis atque amicis; civitates autem omnes cuncta Asia atque Graecia vestrum auxilium exspectare propter periculi magnitudinem coguntur; imperatorem a vobis certum deposcere, cum praesertim vos alium miseritis, neque audent neque id se facere sine summo periculo posse arbitrantur.
13. They see and feel this, the same thing which you too see and feel,—that there is one man in whom all qualities are in the highest perfection, and that he is near, (which circumstance makes it seem harder to be deprived of him,) by whose mere arrival and name, although it was a maritime war for which he came, they are nevertheless aware that the attacks of the enemy were retarded and repressed. They then, since they cannot speak freely, silently entreat you to think them (as you have thought your allies in the other provinces) worthy of having their safety recommended to such a man; and to think them worthy even more than others, because we often send men with absolute authority into such a province as theirs, of such character, that, even if they protect them from the enemy, still their arrival among the cities of the allies is not very different from an invasion of the enemy. They used to hear of him before, now they see him among them; a man of such moderation, such mildness, such humanity, that those seem to be the happiest people among whom he remains for the longest time.
13. enim et sentiunt hoc idem quod vos, unum virum esse in quo summa sint omnia, et eum propter esse, quo etiam carent aegrius; cuius adventu ipso atque nomine, tametsi ille ad maritimum bellum venerit, tamen impetus hostium repressos esse intellegunt ac retardatos. vos, quoniam libere loqui non licet, taciti rogant ut se quoque dignos existimetis quorum salutem tali viro commendetis, atque hoc etiam magis quod ceteras in provincias eius modi homines cum imperio mittimus ut, etiam si ab hoste defendant, tamen ipsorum adventus in urbis sociorum non multum ab hostili expugnatione differant, hunc audiebant antea, nunc praesentem vident tanta temperantia, tanta mansuetudine, tanta humanitate ut ei beatissimi esse videantur apud quos ille diutissime commoretur.
14. Wherefore, if on account of their allies, though they themselves had not been roused by any injuries, your ancestors waged war against Antiochus, against Philip, against the Aetolians, and against the Carthaginians; with how much earnestness ought you, when you yourselves have been provoked by injurious treatment, to defend the safety of the allies, and at the same time, the dignity of your empire? especially when your greatest revenues are at stake. For the revenues of the other provinces, O Romans, are such that we can scarcely derive enough from them for the protection of the provinces themselves. But Asia is so rich and so productive, that in the fertility of its soil, and in the variety of its fruits, and in the vastness of its pasture lands, and in the multitude of all those things which are matters of exportation, it is greatly superior to all other countries. Therefore, O Romans, this province, if you have any regard for what tends to your advantage in time of war, and to your dignity in time of peace, must be defended by you, not only from all calamity, but from all fear of calamity.
14. re si propter socios nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt, quanto vos studiosius convenit iniuriis provocatos sociorum salutem una cum imperi vestri dignitate defendere, praesertim cum de maximis vestris vectigalibus agatur? ceterarum provinciarum vectigalia, Quirites, tanta sunt ut eis ad ipsas provincias tuendas vix contenti esse possimus, Asia vero tam opima est ac fertilis ut et ubertate agrorum et varietate fructuum et magnitudine pastionis et multitudine earum rerum quae exportentur facile omnibus terris antecellat. haec vobis provincia, Quirites, si et belli utilitatem et pacis dignitatem retinere voltis, non modo a calamitate sed etiam a metu calamitatis est defendenda.
15. For in other matters when calamity comes on one, then damage is sustained; but in the case of revenues, not only the arrival of evil, but the bare dread of it, brings disaster. For when the troops of the enemy are not far off, even though no actual irruption takes place, still the flocks are abandoned, agriculture is relinquished, the sailing of merchants is at an end. And accordingly, neither from harbour dues, nor from tenths, nor from the tax on pasture lands, can any revenue be maintained. And therefore it often happens that the produce of an entire year is lost by one rumour of danger, and by one alarm of war.
15. in ceteris rebus cum venit calamitas, tum detrimentum accipitur; at in vectigalibus non solum adventus mali sed etiam metus ipse adfert calamitatem. cum hostium copiae non longe absunt, etiam si inruptio nulla facta est, tamen pecua relinquuntur, agri cultura deseritur, mercatorum navigatio conquiescit. neque ex portu neque ex decumis neque ex scriptura vectigal conservari potest; qua re saepe totius anni fructus uno rumore periculi atque uno belli terrore amittitur.
16. What do you think ought to be the feelings of those who pay us tribute, or of those who get it in, and exact it, when two kings with very numerous armies are all but on the spot? when one inroad of cavalry may in a very short time carry off the revenue of a whole year? when the publicans think that they retain the large households of slaves which they have in the salt-works, in the fields, in the harbours, and custom-houses, at the greatest risk? Do you think that you can enjoy these advantages unless you preserve those men who are productive to you, free not only, as I said before, from calamity, but even from the dread of calamity?
16. tandem igitur animo esse existimatis aut eos qui vectigalia nobis pensitant, aut eos qui exercent atque exigunt, cum duo reges cum maximis copiis propter adsint, cum una excursio equitatus perbrevi tempore totius anni vectigal auferre possit, cum publicani familias maximas quas in salinis habent, quas in agris, quas in portibus atque in custodiis magno periculo se habere arbitrentur? vos illis rebus frui posse, nisi eos qui vobis fructui sunt conservaveritis non solum, ut ante dixi, calamitate sed etiam calamitatis formidine liberatos?
17. And even this must not be neglected by you, which I had proposed to myself as the last thing to be mentioned, when I was to speak of the kind of war, for it concerns the property of many Roman citizens; whom you, as becomes your wisdom, O Romans, must regard with the most careful solicitude. The publicans, most honourable and accomplished men, have taken all their resources and all their wealth into that province; and their property and fortunes ought, by themselves, to be an object of your special care. In truth, if we have always considered the revenues as the sinews of the republic, certainly we shall be right if we call that order of men which collects them, the prop and support of all the other orders.
17. ne illud quidem vobis neglegendum est quod mihi ego extremum proposueram, cum essem de belli genere dicturus, quod ad multorum bona civium Romanorum pertinet; quorum vobis pro vestra sapientia, Quirites, habenda est ratio diligenter. et publicani, homines honestissimi atque ornatissimi, suas rationes et copias in illam provinciam contulerunt, quorum ipsorum per se res et fortunae vobis curae esse debent., si vectigalia nervos esse rei publicae semper duximus, eum certe ordinem qui exercet illa firmamentum ceterorum ordinum recte esse dicemus.
18. In the next place, clever and industrious men, of all the other orders of the state, are some of them actually trading themselves in Asia, and you ought to show a regard for their interests in their absence; and others of them have large sums invested in that province. It will, therefore become your humanity to protect a large number of those citizens from misfortune; it will become your wisdom to perceive that the misfortune of many citizens cannot be separated from the misfortune of the republic. In truth, firstly, it is of but little consequence for you afterwards to recover for the publicans revenues which have been once lost; for the same men have not afterwards the same power of contracting for them, and others have not the inclination, through fear.
18. ex ceteris ordinibus homines gnavi atque industrii partim ipsi in Asia negotiantur, quibus vos absentibus consulere debetis, partim eorum in ea provincia pecunias magnas conlocatas habent. igitur humanitatis vestrae magnum numerum civium calamitate prohibere, sapientiae videre multorum civium calamitatem a re publica seiunctam esse non posse. illud primum parvi refert, vos publicanis amissa vectigalia postea victoria reciperare; neque enim isdem redimendi facultas erit propter calamitatem neque aliis voluntas propter timorem.
19. In the next place, that which the same Asia, and that same Mithridates taught us, at the beginning of the Asiatic war that, at all events, we, having learnt by disaster, ought to keep in our recollection. For we know that then, when many had lost large fortunes in Asia, all credit failed at Rome, from payments being hindered. For it is not possible for many men to lose their property and fortunes in one city, without drawing many along with them into the same vortex of disaster. But do you now preserve the republic from this misfortune; and believe me, (you yourselves see that it is the case,) this credit, and this state of the money-market which exists at Rome and in the forum, is bound up with, and is inseparable from, those fortunes which are invested in Asia. Those fortunes cannot fall without credit here being undermined by the came blow, and perishing along with them. Consider, then, whether you ought to hesitate to apply yourselves with all zeal to that war, in which the glory of your name, the safety of your allies, your greatest revenues, and the fortunes of numbers of your citizens, will be protected at the same time as the republic.
19. quod nos eadem Asia atque idem iste Mithridates initio belli Asiatici docuit, id quidem certe calamitate docti memoria retinere debemus. tum, cum in Asia magnas permulti res amiserunt, scimus Romae solutione impedita fidem concidisse. enim possunt una in civitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere ut non pluris secum in eandem trahant calamitatem: a quo periculo prohibete rem publicam. — mihi credite id quod ipsi videtis — haec fides atque haec ratio pecuniarum quae Romae, quae in foro versatur, implicata est cum illis pecuniis Asiaticis et cohaeret; ruere illa non possunt ut haec non eodem labefacta motu concidant. re videte num dubitandum vobis sit omni studio ad id bellum incumbere in quo gloria nominis vestri, salus sociorum, vectigalia maxima, fortunae plurimorum civium coniunctae cum re publica defendantur.
20. Since I have spoken of the description of war, I will now say a few words about its magnitude. For this may be said of it,—that it is a kind of war so necessary, that it must absolutely be waged, and yet not one of such magnitude as to be formidable. And in this we must take the greatest care that those things do not appear to you contemptible which require to be most diligently guarded against. And that all men may understand that I give Lucius Lucullus all the praise that is due to a gallant man, and most wise man, and to a most consummate general, I say that when he first arrived in Asia, the forces of Mithridates were most numerous, well appointed, and provided with every requisite; and that the finest city in Asia, and the one, too, that was most friendly to us, the city of Cyzicus, was besieged by the king in person, with an enormous army, and that the siege had been pressed most vigorously, when Lucius Lucullus, by his valour, and perseverance, and wisdom, relieved it from the most extreme danger.
20. de genere belli dixi, nunc de magnitudine pauca dicam. enim hoc dici, belli genus esse ita necessarium ut sit gerendum, non esse ita magnum ut sit pertimescendum. quo maxime laborandum est ne forte ea vobis quae diligentissime providenda sunt contemnenda esse videantur. ut omnes intellegant me L.Lucio Lucullo tantum impertire laudis quantum forti viro et sapienti homini et magno imperatori debeatur, dico eius adventu maximas Mithridati copias omnibus rebus ornatas atque instructas fuisse, urbemque Asiae clarissimam nobisque amicissimam Cyzicenorum oppressam esse ab ipso rege maxima multitudine et oppugnatam vehementissime; quam L.Lucius Lucullus virtute, adsiduitate, consilio summis obsidionis periculis liberavit.
21. I say that he also, when general, defeated and destroyed that great and well-appointed fleet, which the chiefs of Sertorius's party were leading against Italy with furious zeal; I say besides, that by him numerous armies of the enemy were destroyed in several battles, and that Pontus was opened to our legions, which before his time had been closed against the Roman people on every side; and that Sinope and Amisus, towns in which the king had palaces, adorned and furnished with every kind of magnificence, and many other cities of Pontus and Cappadocia, were taken by his mere approach and arrival near them; that the king himself was stripped of the kingdom possessed by his father and his grandfather, and forced to betake himself as a suppliant to other kings and other nations; and that all these great deeds were achieved without any injury to the allies of the Roman people, or any diminution of its revenues. I think that this is praise enough;—such praise that you must see, O Romans, that Lucius Lucullus has not been praised as much from this rostrum by any one of these men who are objecting to this law and arguing against our cause.
21. eodem imperatore classem magnam et ornatam quae ducibus Sertorianis ad Italiam studio atque odio inflammata raperetur superatam esse atque depressam; magnas hostium praeterea copias multis proeliis esse deletas patefactumque nostris legionibus esse Pontum qui antea populo Romano ex omni aditu clausus fuisset; Sinopen atque Amisum, quibus in oppidis erant domicilia regis omnibus rebus ornata ac referta, ceterasque urbis Ponti et Cappadociae permultas uno aditu adventuque esse captas; regem spoliatum regno patrio atque avito ad alios se reges atque ad alias gentis supplicem contulisse; atque haec omnia salvis populi Romani sociis atque integris vectigalibus esse gesta. opinor hoc esse laudis atque ita, Quirites, ut hoc vos intellegatis, a nullo istorum qui huic obtrectant legi atque causae L.Lucium Lucullum similiter ex hoc loco esse laudatum.
22. Perhaps now it will be asked, how, when all this has been already done, there can be any great war left behind. I will explain this, O Romans; for this does not seem an unreasonable question. At first Mithridates fled from his kingdom, as Medea is formerly said to have fled from the same region of Pontus; for they say that she, in her flight, strewed about the limbs of her brother in those places along which her father was likely to pursue her, in order that the collection of them, dispersed as they were, and the grief which would afflict his father, might delay the rapidity of his pursuit. Mithridates, flying in the same manner, left in Pontus the whole of the vast quantity of gold and silver, and of beautiful things which he had inherited from his ancestors, and which he himself had collected and brought into his own kingdom, having obtained them by plunder in the former war from all Asia. While our men were diligently occupied in collecting all this, the king himself escaped out of their hands. And so grief retarded the father of Medea in his pursuit, but delight delayed our men.
22. fortasse nunc quem ad modum, cum haec ita sint, reliquum possit magnum esse bellum., Quirites; non enim hoc sine causa quaeri videtur. ex suo regno sic Mithridates profugit ut ex eodem Ponto Medea illa quondam fugisse dicitur, quam praedicant in fuga fratris sui membra in eis locis qua se parens persequeretur dissipavisse, ut eorum conlectio dispersa maerorque patrius celeritatem consequendi retardaret. Mithridates fugiens maximam vim auri atque argenti pulcherrimarumque rerum omnium quas et a maioribus acceperat et ipse bello superiore ex tota Asia direptas in suum regnum congesserat in Ponto omnem reliquit. dum nostri conligunt omnia diligentius, rex ipse e manibus effugit. illum in persequendi studio maeror, hos laetitia tardavit.
23. In this alarm and flight of his, Tigranes, the king of Armenia, received him, encouraged him while despairing of his fortunes, gave him new spirit in his depression, and recruited with new strength his powerless condition. And after Lucius Lucullus arrived in his kingdom, very many tribes were excited to hostilities against our general. For those nations which the Roman people never had thought either of attacking in war or tampering with, had been inspired with fear. There was, besides, a general opinion which had taken deep root, and had spread over all the barbarian tribes in those districts, that our army had been led into those countries with the object of plundering a very wealthy and most religiously worshipped temple. And so, many powerful nations were roused against us by a fresh dread and alarm. But our army although it had taken a city of Tigranes's kingdom, and had fought some successful battles, still was out of spirits at its immense distance from Rome, and its separation from its friends.
23. in illo timore et fuga Tigranes, rex Armenius, excepit diffidentemque rebus suis confirmavit et adflictum erexit perditumque recreavit. in regnum postea quam L.Lucius Lucullus cum exercitu venit, plures etiam gentes contra imperatorem nostrum concitatae sunt. enim metus iniectus eis nationibus quas numquam populus Romanus neque lacessendas bello neque temptandas putavit; erat etiam alia gravis atque vehemens opinio quae per animos gentium barbararum pervaserat, fani locupletissimi et religiosissimi diripiendi causa in eas oras nostrum esse exercitum adductum. nationes multae atque magnae novo quodam terrore ac metu concitabantur. autem exercitus, tametsi urbem ex Tigrani regno ceperat et proeliis usus erat secundis, tamen nimia longinquitate locorum ac desiderio suorum commovebatur.
24. At present I will not say more; for the result of these feelings of theirs was, that they were more anxious for a speedy return home than for any further advance into the enemies' country. But Mithridates had by this time strengthened his army by reinforcements of those men belonging to his own dominions who had assembled together, and by large promiscuous forces belonging to many other kings and tribes. And we see that this is almost invariably the case, that kings when in misfortune easily induce many to pity and assist them, especially such as are either kings themselves, or who live under kingly power, because to them the name of king appears something great and sacred.
24. iam plura non dicam; fuit enim illud extremum ut ex eis locis a militibus nostris reditus magis maturus quam progressio longior quaereretur. Mithridates autem se et suam manum iam confirmarat eorum opera qui ad eum ex ipsius regno concesserant et magnis adventiciis auxiliis multorum regum et nationum iuvabatur. hoc fere sic fieri solere accepimus ut regum adflictae fortunae facile multorum opes adliciant ad misericordiam, maximeque eorum qui aut reges sunt aut vivunt in regno, ut eis nomen regale magnum et sanctum esse videatur.
25. And accordingly he, when conquered, was able to accomplish what, when he was in the full enjoyment of his powers, he never dared even to wish for. For when he had returned to his kingdom, he was not content (though that had happened to him beyond all his hopes) with again setting his foot on that land after he had been expelled from it; but he even volunteered an attack on your army, flushed as it was with glory and victory. Allow me, in this place, O Romans, (just as poets do who write of Roman affairs,) to pass over our disaster, which was so great that it came to Lucius Lucullus's ears, not by means of a messenger despatched from the scene of action, but through the report of common conversation.
25. tantum victus efficere potuit quantum incolumis numquam est ausus optare. cum se in regnum suum recepisset, non fuit eo contentus quod ei praeter spem acciderat, ut illam postea quam pulsus erat terram umquam attingeret, sed in exercitum nostrum clarum atque victorem impetum fecit. hoc loco, Quirites, sicut poetae solent qui res Romanas scribunt, praeterire me nostram calamitatem, quae tanta fuit ut eam ad auris imperatoris non ex proelio nuntius sed ex sermone rumor adferret. in illo ipso malo gravissimaque belli offensione L.
26. At the very time of this misfortune,—of this most terrible disaster in the whole war, Lucius Lucullus, who might have been able, to a great extent, to remedy the calamity, being compelled by your orders, because you thought, according to the old principle of your ancestors, that limits ought to be put to length of command, discharged a part of his soldiers who had served their appointed time, and delivered over part to Glabrio. I pass over many things designedly; but you yourselves can easily conjecture how important you ought to consider that war which most powerful kings are uniting in,—which disturbed nations are renewing,—which nations, whose strength is unimpaired, are undertaking, and which anew general of yours has to encounter after a veteran army has been defeated.
26. Lucullus, qui tamen aliqua ex parte eis incommodis mederi fortasse potuisset, vestro iussu coactus qui imperi diuturnitati modum statuendum vetere exemplo putavistis, partim militum qui iam stipendiis confectis erant dimisit, partim ⟨M’.⟩ Glabrioni tradidit. praetereo consulto; sed ea vos coniectura perspicite quantum illud bellum factum putetis quod coniungant reges potentissimi, renovent agitatae nationes, suscipiant integrae gentes, novus imperator noster accipiat vetere exercitu pulso.
27. I appear to have said enough to make you see why this war is in its very nature unavoidable, in its magnitude dangerous. It remains for me to speak of the general who ought to be selected for that war, and appointed to the management of such important affairs. I wish, O Romans, that you had such an abundance of brave and honest men, that it was a difficult subject for your deliberations, whom you thought most desirable to be appointed to the conduct of such important affairs, and so vast a war. But now, when there is Cnaeus Pompeius alone, who has exceeded in valour, not only the glory of these men who are now alive, but even all recollections of antiquity, what is there that, in this case, can raise a doubt in the mind of any one?
27. multa mihi verba fecisse videor qua re esset hoc bellum genere ipso necessarium, magnitudine periculosum. ut de imperatore ad id bellum deligendo ac tantis rebus praeficiendo dicendum esse videatur. Vtinam, Quirites, virorum fortium atque innocentium copiam tantam haberetis ut haec vobis deliberatio difficilis esset quemnam potissimum tantis rebus ac tanto bello praeficiendum putaretis! vero cum sit unus Cn.Gnaeus Pompeius qui non modo eorum hominum qui nunc sunt gloriam sed etiam antiquitatis memoriam virtute superarit, quae res est quae cuiusquam animum in hac causa dubium facere possit?
28. For I think that these four qualities are indispensable in a great general,—knowledge of military affairs, valour, authority and good fortune. Who, then, ever was, or ought to have been, better acquainted with military affairs than this man? who, the moment that he left school and finished his education as a boy, at a time when there was a most important war going on, and most active enemies were banded against us, went to his father's army and to the discipline of the camp; who, when scarcely out of his boyhood, became a soldier of a consummate general,—when entering on manhood, became himself the general of a mighty army; who has been more frequently engaged with the enemy, than any one else has ever disputed with an adversary; who has himself, as general, conducted more wars than other men have read of; who has subdued more provinces than other men have wished for; whose youth was trained to the knowledge of military affairs, not by the precepts of others, but by commanding himself,—not by the disasters of war, but by victories,—not by campaigns, but by triumphs. In short, what description of war can there be in which the fortune of the republic has not given him practice? Civil war, African war, Transalpine war, Spanish war, promiscuous war of the most warlike cities and nations, servile war, naval war, every variety and diversity of wars and of enemies, has not only been encountered by this one man, but encountered victoriously; and these exploits show plainly that there is no circumstance, in military practice which can elude the knowledge of this man.
28. enim sic existimo, in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere, scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem. igitur hoc homine scientior umquam aut fuit aut esse debuit? qui e ludo atque e pueritiae disciplinis bello maximo atque acerrimis hostibus ad patris exercitum atque in militiae disciplinam profectus est, qui extrema pueritia miles in exercitu summi fuit imperatoris, ineunte adulescentia maximi ipse exercitus imperator, qui saepius cum hoste conflixit quam quisquam cum inimico concertavit, plura bella gessit quam ceteri legerunt, pluris provincias confecit quam alii concupiverunt, cuius adulescentia ad scientiam rei militaris non alienis praeceptis sed suis imperiis, non offensionibus belli sed victoriis, non stipendiis sed triumphis est erudita. denique genus esse belli potest in quo illum non exercuerit fortuna rei publicae?, Africanum, Transalpinum, Hispaniense mixtum ex civibus atque ex bellicosissimis nationibus, servile, navale bellum, varia et diversa genera et bellorum et hostium non solum gesta ab hoc uno sed etiam confecta nullam rem esse declarant in usu positam militari quae huius viri scientiam fugere possit.
29. But now, what language can be found equal to the valour of Cnaeus Pompeius? What statement can any one make which shall be either worthy of him, or new to you, or unknown to any one? For those are not the only virtuous of a general which are usually thought so,—namely, industry in business, fortitude amid dangers, energy in acting, rapidity in executing, wisdom in foreseeing; which all exist in as great perfection in that one man as in all the other generals put together whom we have either seen or heard of.
29. vero virtuti Cn.Gnaei Pompei quae potest oratio par inveniri? est quod quisquam aut illo dignum aut vobis novum aut cuiquam inauditum possit adferre? enim solae sunt virtutes imperatoriae quae volgo existimantur, labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo, quae tanta sunt in hoc uno quanta in omnibus reliquis imperatoribus quos aut vidimus aut audivimus non fuerunt. Testis est Italia quam ille ipse victor L.
30. Italy is my witness, which that illustrious conqueror himself, Lucius Sulla, confessed had been delivered by this man's valour and ready assistance. Sicily is my witness, which he released when it was surrounded on all sides by many dangers, not by the dread of his power, but by the promptitude of his wisdom. Africa is my witness, which, having been overwhelmed by numerous armies of enemies, overflowed with the blood of those same enemies. Gaul is my witness, through which a road into Spain was laid open to our legions by the destruction of the Gauls. Spain is my witness, which has repeatedly seen our many enemies there defeated and subdued by this man. Again and again, Italy is my witness, which, when it was weighed down by the disgraceful and perilous servile war, entreated aid from this man, though he, was at a distance; and that war, having dwindled down and wasted away at the expectation of Pompeius, was destroyed and buried by his arrival.
30. Sulla huius virtute et subsidio confessus est liberatam; testis Sicilia quam multis undique cinctam periculis non terrore belli sed consili celeritate explicavit; testis Africa quae magnis oppressa hostium copiis eorum ipsorum sanguine redundavit; testis Gallia per quam legionibus nostris iter in Hispaniam Gallorum internicione patefactum est; testis Hispania quae saepissime plurimos hostis ab hoc superatos prostratosque conspexit; testis iterum et saepius Italia quae, cum servili bello taetro periculosoque premeretur, ab hoc auxilium absente expetivit, quod bellum exspectatione eius attenuatum atque imminutum est, adventu sublatum ac sepultum.
31. But now, also every coast, all foreign nations and countries, all seas, both in their open waters and in every bay, and creek, and harbour, are my witnesses. For during these last years, what place in any part of the sea had so strong a garrison as to be safe from him? what place was so much hidden as to escape his notice? Whoever put to sea without being aware that he was committing himself to the hazard of death or slavery, either from storms or from the sea being crowded with pirates? Who would ever have supposed that a war of such extent, so mean, so old a war, a war so extensive in its theatre and so widely scattered, could have been terminated by all our generals put together in one year, or by one general in all the years of his life?
31. nunc vero iam omnes orae atque omnes terrae gentes nationes, maria denique omnia cum universa tum in singulis oris omnes sinus atque portus. enim toto mari locus per hos annos aut tam firmum habuit praesidium ut tutus esset, aut tam fuit abditus ut lateret? navigavit qui non se aut mortis aut servitutis periculo committeret, cum aut hieme aut referto praedonum mari navigaret? tantum bellum, tam turpe, tam vetus, tam late divisum atque dispersum quis umquam arbitraretur aut ab omnibus imperatoribus uno anno aut omnibus annis ab uno imperatore confici posse?
32. In all these later years what province have you had free from pirates? what revenue has been safe? what ally have you been able to protect? to whom have your fleets been any defence? How many islands do you suppose have been deserted? how many cities of the allies do you think have been either abandoned out of fear of the pirates, or have been taken by them? But why do I speak of distant events? It was—it was, indeed, formerly—a characteristic of the Roman people to carry on its wars at a distance from home, and to defend by the bulwarks of its power not its own homes, but the fortunes of its allies. Need I say, that the sea has during all these latter years been closed against your allies, when even our own armies never ventured to cross over from Brundusium, except in the depth of winter? Need I complain that men who were coming to you from foreign nations were taken prisoners, when even the ambassadors of the Roman people were forced to be ransomed? Need I say, that the sea was not safe for merchants, when twelve axes came into the power of the pirates?
32. provinciam tenuistis a praedonibus liberam per hosce annos? quod vectigal vobis tutum fuit? quem socium defendistis? cui praesidio classibus vestris fuistis? quam multas existimatis insulas esse desertas, quam multas aut metu relictas aut a praedonibus captas urbis esse sociorum? quid ego longinqua commemoro? hoc quondam, fuit proprium populi Romani longe a domo bellare et propugnaculis imperi sociorum fortunas, non sua tecta defendere. ego vestris mare per hosce annos clausum fuisse dicam, cum exercitus vestri numquam Brundisio nisi hieme summa transmiserint? ad vos ab exteris nationibus venirent, captos querar, cum legati populi Romani redempti sint? mare tutum non fuisse dicam, cum duodecim secures in praedonum potestatem pervenerint?
33. Need I mention, how Cnidus, and Colophon, and Samos, most noble cities, and others too in countless numbers, were taken by them, when you know that your own harbours, and those harbours too from which you derive, as it were, your very life and breath, were in the power of the pirates? Are you ignorant that the harbour of Caieta, that illustrious harbour, when full of ships, was plundered by the pirates under the very eyes of the praetor? and that from Misenum, the children of the very man who had before that waged war against the pirates in that place, were carried off by the pirates? For why should I complain of the disaster of Ostia, and of that stain and blot on the republic, when almost under your very eyes, that fleet which was under the command of a Roman consul was taken and destroyed by the pirates? O ye immortal gods! could the incredible and godlike virtue of one man in so short a time bring so much light to the republic, that you who had lately been used to see a fleet of the enemy before the mouth of the Tiber, should now hear that there is not one ship belonging to the pirates on this side of the Atlantic?
33. Cnidum aut Colophonem aut Samum, nobilissimas urbis, innumerabilisque alias captas esse commemorem, cum vestros portus atque eos portus quibus vitam ac spiritum ducitis in praedonum fuisse potestate sciatis? vero ignoratis portum Caietae celeberrimum et plenissimum navium inspectante praetore a praedonibus esse direptum, ex Miseno autem eius ipsius liberos qui cum praedonibus antea bellum gesserat a praedonibus esse sublatos? quid ego Ostiense incommodum atque illam labem atque ignominiam rei publicae querar, cum prope inspectantibus vobis classis ea cui consul populi Romani praepositus esset a praedonibus capta atque depressa est? di immortales! tantamne unius hominis incredibilis ac divina virtus tam brevi tempore lucem adferre rei publicae potuit ut vos, qui modo ante ostium Tiberinum classem hostium videbatis, ei nunc nullam intra Oceani ostium praedonum navem esse audiatis?
34. And although you have seen with what rapidity these things were done, still that rapidity ought not to be passed over by me in speaking of them.—For who ever, even if he were only going for the purpose of transacting business or making profit, contrived in so short a time to visit so many places, and to perform such long journeys, with as great celerity as Cnaeus Pompeius has performed his voyage, bearing with him the terrors of war as our general? He, when the weather could hardly be called open for sailing, went to Sicily, explored the coasts of Africa; from thence he came with his fleet to Sardinia, and these three great granaries of the republic he fortified with powerful garrisons and fleets;
34. haec qua celeritate gesta sint, quamquam videtis, tamen a me in dicendo praetereunda non sunt. enim umquam aut obeundi negoti aut consequendi quaestus studio tam brevi tempore tot loca adire, tantos cursus conficere potuit, quam celeriter Cn.Gnaeo Pompeio duce tanti belli impetus navigavit? qui nondum tempestivo ad navigandum mari Siciliam adiit, Africam exploravit, inde Sardiniam cum classe venit atque haec tria frumentaria subsidia rei publicae firmissimis praesidiis classibusque munivit.
35. when, leaving Sardinia, he came to Italy, having secured the two Spains and Cisalpine Gaul with garrisons and ships. Having sent vessels also to the coast of Illyricum, and to every part of Achaia and Greece, he also adorned the two seas of Italy with very large fleets, and very sufficient garrisons; and he himself going in person, added all Cilicia to the dominions of the Roman people, on the forty-ninth day after he set out from Brundusium. Will the pirates who were anywhere to be found, were either taken prisoners and put to death, or else had surrendered themselves voluntarily to the power and authority of this one man. Also, when the Cretans had sent ambassadors to implore his mercy even into Pamphylia to him, he did not deny them hopes of being allowed to surrender, and he exacted hostages from them. And thus Cnaeus Pompeius at the end of winter prepared, at the beginning of spring undertook, and by the middle of summer terminated, this most important war, which had lasted so long, which was scattered in such distant and such various places, and by which every nation and country was incessantly distressed.
35. Inde cum se in Italiam recepisset, duabus Hispaniis et Gallia Transalpina praesidiis ac navibus confirmata, missis item in oram Illyrici maris et in Achaiam omnemque Graeciam navibus Italiae duo maria maximis classibus firmissimisque praesidiis adornavit, ipse autem ut Brundisio profectus est, undequinquagesimo die totam ad imperium populi Romani Ciliciam adiunxit; omnes qui ubique praedones fuerunt partim capti interfectique sunt, partim unius huius se imperio ac potestati dediderunt. Cretensibus, cum ad eum usque in Pamphyliam legatos deprecatoresque misissent, spem deditionis non ademit obsidesque imperavit. tantum bellum, tam diuturnum, tam longe lateque dispersum, quo bello omnes gentes ac nationes premebantur, Cn.Gnaeus Pompeius extrema hieme apparavit, ineunte vere suscepit, media aestate confecit.
36. This is the godlike and incredible virtue of that general. What more shall I say? How many and how great are his other exploits which I began to mention a short time back; for we are not only to seek for skill in war in a consummate and perfect general, but there are many other eminent qualities which are the satellites and companions of this virtue. And first of all, how great should be the incorruptibility of generals! How great should be their moderation in everything! How perfect their good faith! How universal should be their affability! how brilliant their genius! how tender their humanity! And let us briefly consider to what extent these qualities exist in Cnaeus Pompeius. For they are all of the highest importance, O Romans, but yet they are to be seen and ascertained more by comparison with the conduct of others than by any display which they make of themselves.
36. haec divina atque incredibilis virtus imperatoris.? ceterae quas paulo ante commemorare coeperam quantae atque quam multae sunt! enim bellandi virtus solum in summo ac perfecto imperatore quaerenda est sed multae sunt artes eximiae huius administrae comitesque virtutis. primum quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores, quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia, quanta fide, quanta facilitate, quanto ingenio, quanta humanitate! quae breviter qualia sint in Cn.Gnaeo Pompeio consideremus. enim sunt omnia, Quirites, sed ea magis ex aliorum contentione quam ipsa per sese cognosci atque intellegi possunt.