1. If the authority of those who are advocates in a person's defence be of any weight, the cause of Lucius Cornelius has been defended by the most honourable men; if their experience is to be regarded, it has been defended by the most skillful lawyers; if we look to their ability, by the most eloquent of orators; or if it is their sincerity and zeal that we should regard, it has been upheld by those who are his greatest friends, and who are united to Lucius Cornelius not merely by mutual services, but by the greatest intimacy. What part, then, have I in this defence? That which is given to me by such influence as you have been pleased to allow me; by moderate experience; and by an ability which is by no means equal to my inclination to serve him. For as to the other men by whom he has been defended, I see that to them he is under great obligations; but how much I am under obligations to him I will explain to you at another time. This I assert at the beginning of my speech,—that if I cannot by my exertions properly requite all those men who have been friendly to my safety and to my dignity, I will at all events recompense them as far as in my power by at all times both feeling and declaring my obligations and my gratitude.
1. auctoritates patronorum in iudiciis valent, ab amplissimis viris L. Corneli causa defensa est; si usus, a peritissimis; si ingenia, ab eloquentissimis; si studia, ab amicissimis et cum beneficiis cum L. Cornelio tum maxima familiaritate coniunctis. sunt igitur meae partes? tantae quantam vos in me esse voluistis, usus mediocris, ingeni minime voluntati paris. ceteris a quibus est defensus hunc debere plurimum video; ego quantum ei debeam, alio loco; principio orationis hoc pono, me omnibus qui amici fuerint saluti et dignitati meae, si minus referenda gratia satis facere potuerim, praedicanda et habenda certe satis esse facturum.
2. How great was the energy displayed by Cnaeus Pompeius in speaking yesterday, O judges, how great his fluency, how great the riches of his eloquence, was shown plainly enough, not only by the secret feelings of your minds, but by your evident and unconcealed admiration. For I never heard anything which appeared to me more acute as regards the state of the law, … I never heard a more copious recollection of precedents; I never heard a more skillful argument concerning treaties, nor any statements of more illustrious authority concerning our wars, or of more weight and dignity with reference to the general interests of the republic; I never heard any one speak more modestly concerning himself, or more eloquently concerning the cause and the charge.
2. fuerit hesterno die Cn. Pompei gravitas in dicendo, iudices, quae facultas, quae copia, non opinione tacita vestrorum animorum, sed perspicua admiratione declarari videbatur. enim umquam audivi quod mihi de iure subtilius dici videretur, nihil memoria maiore de exemplis, nihil peritius de foederibus, nihil inlustriore auctoritate de bellis, nihil de re publica gravius, nihil de ipso modestius, nihil de causa et crimine ornatius:
3. So that that saying appeared to me to be a true one, which though some men devoted to literature and to learned studies were said to have given utterance to it, appeared nevertheless to be something incredible; namely, that the man whose soul contained every virtue, could with the most perfect ease do everything which he might wish to do. For how could there have been a greater fertility and variety and richness of eloquence in Lucius Crassus, a man born to a most singular gift of oratory if even he had pleaded this cause than was displayed by that man who was able to devote just so much time to this study as he spared from the uninterrupted succession of wars and victories in which his life has been passed from childhood up to this time?
3. ut mihi iam verum videatur illud esse quod non nulli litteris ac studiis doctrinae dediti quasi quiddam incredibile dicere putabantur, ei qui omnis animo virtutes penitus comprehendisset omnia quae faceret ⟨recte procedere⟩. enim in L. Crasso potuit, homine nato ad dicendi singularem quandam facultatem, si hanc causam ageret, maior esse ubertas, varietas, copia quam fuit in eo qui tantum potuit impertire huic studio temporis quantum ipse a pueritia usque ad hanc aetatem a continuis bellis et victoriis conquievit?
4. And all this makes my task of summing up the more difficult. For, in truth, I am coming after an oration which has not just passed by your ears, but has sunk deep into the minds of all of you, so that you may very probably derive more pleasure from the recollection of that speech, than you can from the hearing not only of mine, but of any one else's speech whatever. But in this I am forced to comply with the wishes not only of Cornelius, whose desires I cannot possibly thwart in this his hour of danger, but also with those of Cnaeus Pompeius, who has wished me the panegyrist of and the assistant in this action, and this determination, and this kindness of his, as I lately was in another cause which was pleaded before you, O judges.
4. mihi difficilior est hic extremus perorandi locus. ei succedo orationi quae non praetervecta sit auris vestras, sed in animis omnium penitus insederit, ut plus voluptatis ex recordatione illius orationis quam non modo ex mea, sed ex cuiusquam oratione capere possitis. mos est gerundus non modo Cornelio, cuius ego voluntati in eius periculis nullo modo deesse possum, sed etiam Cn. Pompeio, qui sui facti, sui iudici, sui benefici voluit me esse, ut apud eosdem vos, iudices, nuper in alia causa fuerim, et praedicatorem et actorem.
5. And it appears to me that this is what the defendant himself deserves, that this is what the unexampled renown of this excellent man deserves, that this is what essentially belongs to the discharge of your duty, and that this is due to the cause itself, that, what it is quite notorious that Cnaeus Pompeius did, all men should allow he had a lawful right to do. For there is nothing more true than that which he himself said yesterday, that Lucius Cornelius had now all his fortunes at stake, without being accused of any single crime of any description. For he is not said to have stolen the rights of a citizen, nor to have given any false account of his family, nor to have proceeded in an underhand manner by any shameless falsehood, nor to have crept fraudulently into the register. One thing alone is imputed to him, that he was born at Gades; a fact which no one denies. All the rest the prosecutor admits. He admits that he served in Spain, in a most severe war, with Quintus Metellus, with Caius Memmius; that he served both in the fleet and in the army; and, when Pompeius came into Spain and began to have Memmius for his quaestor, that he never left Memmius; that he went to take possession of Carthage; that he was present at those two hardly contested and most important battles of Sucro and the Durius; that he remained with Pompeius to the end of the war.
5. mihi quidem hoc dignum re publica videtur, hoc deberi huius excellentis viri praestantissimae gloriae, hoc proprium esse vestri offici, hoc satis esse causae ut, quod fecisse Cn. Pompeium constet, id omnes ei licuisse concedant. verius nihil est quam quod hesterno die dixit ipse, ita L. Cornelium de fortunis omnibus dimicare ut nullius in delicti crimen vocaretur. enim furatus esse civitatem, non genus suum ementitus, non in aliquo impudenti mendacio delituisse, non inrepsisse in censum dicitur: unum obicitur, natum esse Gadibus, quod negat nemo. accusator fatetur, hunc in Hispania durissimo bello cum Q. Metello, cum C. Memmio et in classe et in exercitu fuisse; ut Pompeius in Hispaniam venerit Memmiumque habere quaestorem coeperit, numquam a Memmio discessisse, Carthagine esse obsessum, acerrimis illis proeliis et maximis, Sucronensi et Turiensi, interfuisse, cum Pompeio ad extremum belli tempus fuisse.
6. These are the battles of Cornelius. Such were his exertions; such was his industry; such were his dangers encountered on behalf of our republic; such was his valour, worthy of a general; while his hopes were hopes of a reward in proportion to his dangers. The rewards themselves are not the actions of him who obtained them, but of him who conferred them. Therefore on account of this conduct he was presented by Cnaeus Pompeius with the freedom of the city. That the prosecutor does not deny; but he finds fault with it, in such a manner that, as far as Balbus himself is concerned, his cause is approved of even at the moment that it is sought to punish him; in the case of Pompeius, his conduct is disapproved of, but no punishment is designed for him. And this is the way in which they wish to condemn the fame and fortune of a most innocent man and the conduct of a most admirable commander. Therefore it is the status of Cornelius as a citizen, and the action of Pompeius that are now on their trial before this court. For you admit that this man was born of a most honourable rank in that state to which he belongs, and that from his earliest manhood disregarding all his private affairs, he has passed his whole time in our wars in the company of our own generals, and that he has been absent from no labour, from no siege, and from no battle. All these things are full of glory, and are the peculiar glory of Cornelius; nor is there any crime in any part of such conduct.
6. sunt propria Corneli, pietas in rem publicam nostram, labor, adsiduitas, dimicatio, virtus digna summo imperatore, spes pro periculis praemiorum; praemia quidem ipsa non sunt in eius facto qui adeptus est, sed in eius qui dedit. Donatus igitur est ob eas causas a Cn. Pompeio civitate. accusator non negat, sed reprehendit, ut in Cornelio causa ipsius probetur, poena quaeratur, in Pompeio causa laedatur, poena sit nulla nisi famae: sic innocentissimi hominis fortunas, praestantissimi imperatoris factum condemnari volunt. in iudicium caput Corneli, factum Pompei vocatur. enim in ea civitate in qua sit natus honestissimo loco natum esse concedis, et ab ineunte aetate relictis rebus suis omnibus in nostris bellis nostris cum imperatoribus esse versatum, nullius laboris, nullius obsessionis, nullius proeli expertem fuisse. sunt omnia cum plena laudis tum propria Corneli, nec in iis rebus crimen est ullum.
7. Where then is his crime? Is it because Pompeius presented him with the freedom of the city? Is that a crime of Balbus's? By no means, unless honour is to be accounted ignominy. Whose crime is it then? In reality nobody's at all; but if we look at the pleading of the prosecutor, it is clearly the crime of that man alone who gave him the freedom of the city. But if he had been influenced by interest, he would probably have selected some less worthy man for that reward. Even had he selected a good man, he would not have chosen one who had deserved as well of the state as Balbus; even if his action had been one of which it could not have been said that it was contrary to what was lawful, it would have been said that it was contrary to what was becoming. But all such vituperation would have deserved to be rejected by you, O judges.
7. igitur est crimen? eum Pompeius civitate donavit. crimen?, nisi honos ignominia putanda est. igitur? vera nullius, actione accusatoris eius unius qui donavit; qui si adductus gratia minus idoneum hominem praemio adfecisset, quin etiam si virum bonum sed non ita meritum, si denique aliquid non contra ac liceret factum diceretur, sed contra atque oporteret, tamen esset omnis eius modi reprehensio a vobis, iudices, repudianda.
8. But at present what is it that is said? What does the prosecutor say? That Pompeius did what it was not lawful for him to do; which is a more serious charge than if he were to say that that had been done by him which was not expedient. For there are things which are not expedient even if they are lawful. But whatever is not lawful is most certainly not expedient. Am I now, O judges, to hesitate to urge that it is impossible to doubt that we ought to confess that what it is notorious that Cnaeus Pompeius did was not only lawful, but also expedient for him to do?
8. vero quid dicitur? ait accusator? Pompeium quod ei facere non licuerit; quod gravius est quam si id factum ab eo diceret quod non oportuisset. enim aliquid quod non oporteat, etiam si licet; quicquid vero non licet, certe non oportet. ego nunc cuncter sic agere, iudices, non esse fas dubitari quin, quod Cn. Pompeium fecisse constet, id non solum licuisse sed etiam decuisse fateamur?
9. For what qualification is wanting in this man, that, if he had it, we should consider that this liberty might lawfully be given and allowed to him? Is it experience in affairs? a man who during even the latter days of his childhood was beginning his course of the most important wars and commands? most of whose equals in age have seen a camp less frequently than he has celebrated a triumph? who has celebrated as many triumphs as there are countries and parts of the world? who has won as many victories in war as there are kinds of war in the nature of things? Is it ability? when even the very results and terminations of transactions have been, not the guides, but the companions of his counsels? a man in whom the most extraordinary good fortune has so kept pace with extraordinary valour, that, in the opinion of all men, more credit was due to the man than to the goddess; Have modesty, or integrity, or religion, or diligence ever been wanting in that man? a man than whom our provinces, and all free nations, and all kings, and the very most distant people of the earth have not only never seen one more chaste, more moderate, and more religious, but have never in their hopes or wishes even imagined one.
9. enim abest huic homini quod, si adesset, iure haec ei tribui et concedi putaremus? Vsusne rerum? qui pueritiae tempus extremum principium habuit bellorum atque imperiorum maximorum, cuius plerique aequales minus saepe castra viderunt quam hic triumphavit, qui tot habet triumphos quot orae sunt partesque terrarum, tot victorias bellicas quot sunt in rerum natura genera bellorum. ingenium? quin etiam ipsi casus eventusque rerum non duces, sed comites eius consiliorum fuerunt: in quo uno ita summa fortuna cum summa virtute certavit ut omnium iudicio plus homini quam deae tribueretur. pudor, an integritas, an religio in eo, an diligentia umquam requisita est? provinciae nostrae, quem liberi populi, quem reges, quem ultimae gentes castiorem, moderatiorem, sanctiorem non modo viderunt, sed aut sperando umquam aut optando cogitaverunt?
10. Why need I speak of his authority, which is as great as it ought to be, springing from such great virtue and glory? Is it not then, O judges, a shameful thing for the Roman people, that after the senate and people of Rome have conferred on that man the rewards of the most honourable dignity; when he not only did not ask for commands, but when he even refused them, an inquiry into his conduct should be now taking place, in such terms that there should be a discussion as to whether it was lawful for him to do what he has done; or whether, I will not say, it was lawful, but whether it was impious for him to do so? (for he is said to have done it in contravention of a treaty,—that is to say, in contradiction to the religion and good faith of the Roman people.) Is it not disgraceful to you yourselves?
10. dicam de auctoritate? quae tanta est quanta in his tantis virtutibus ac laudibus esse debet. senatus populusque Romanus amplissimae dignitatis praemia dedit non postulanti, imperia vero etiam recusanti, huius de facto, iudices, ita quaeri ut id agatur, licueritne ei facere quod fecit, an vero non dicam non licuerit, sed nefas fuerit— contra foedus enim, id est contra populi Romani religionem et fidem fecisse dicitur—non turpe rei publicae, nonne vobis?
11. I, when a boy, have heard my father say this. When Quintus Metellus, the son of Lucius, was prosecuted for extortion and peculation, he, that man to whom the safety of his country was dearer than the sight of it, who had rather abandon his city than his opinion; when he, I say, was before the court, and when his account-books were being carried round to the judges that they might see the entry of one item, I have heard that there was not one judge among them Roman knights, most excellent men as they were, who did not avert his eyes, and turn himself altogether away, lest any one of them should appear for a moment to have doubted whether what such a man had entered in his public accounts was true or false. And shall we open the question of the legality of a decree of Cnaeus Pompeius, pronounced in accordance with the vote of the senate? Shall we compare it with the words of the laws? with the treaties? Shall we scrutinise everything with the most unfriendly minuteness?
11. hoc de parente meo puer, cum Q. Metellus Luci filius causam de pecuniis repetundis diceret, ille, ille vir, cui patriae salus dulcior quam conspectus fuit, qui de civitate decedere quam de sententia maluit—hoc igitur causam dicente, cum ipsius tabulae circumferrentur inspiciendi nominis causa, fuisse iudicem ex illis equitibus Romanis gravissimis viris neminem quin removeret oculos ⟨et⟩ se totum averteret, ne forte, quod ille in tabulas publicas rettulisset, dubitasse quisquam verumne an falsum esset videretur: nos Cn. Pompei decretum, iudices, de consili sententia pronuntiatum recognoscemus, cum legibus conferemus, cum foederibus, omnia acerbissima diligentia perpendemus?
12. They say that at Athens, when some man, who had lived among the Athenians with a high character for piety and wisdom, had given his evidence in public, and (as is the custom of the Greeks) was approaching the altar for the purpose of taking an oath in confirmation of it, all the judges cried out that he need not take the oath. When Greeks were unwilling to appear to imagine that the good faith of a well-proved man felt itself more bound by the formality of an oath than by the simple obligation of truth, shall we have a doubt as to what sort of man Cnaeus Pompeius has been in respect of his regard for the religious observance of laws and treaties?
12. Athenis aiunt, cum quidam apud eos qui sancte graviterque vixisset testimonium publice dixisset et, ut mos Graecorum est, iurandi causa ad aras accederet, una voce omnis iudices ne is iuraret reclamasse. ⟨⟩ Graeci homines spectati viri noluerunt religione videri potius quam veritate fidem esse constrictam: nos etiam in ipsa religione et legum et foederum conservanda qualis fuerit Cn. Pompeius dubitabimus?
13. For do you mean that he acted in violation of the treaties ignorantly, or knowingly? If you say that he did so knowingly, O, for the name of our empire! O, for the preeminent dignity of the Roman people! O, for the glory of Cnaeus Pompeius, so widely and universally diffused, in such a manner that the home of his renown has but the same boundaries and limits as our common empire! O you nations and cities; and peoples, and kings, and tetrarchs, and tyrants, you witnesses not only of the valour of Cnaeus Pompeius in war, but also of his conscientiousness in peace! You too I implore, you, O voiceless lands, and you, O soil of the most remote districts; you, O seas, O harbours, O islands, O shores! For what land is there what place of habitation what spot in which there are not the deeply imprinted traces of this man's courage, and humanity, and spirit and wisdom? Will any one venture to say that this man endued with such incredible and unheard of dignity and wisdom and virtue and consistency, has knowingly neglected and violated and broken treaties!
13. enim inscientem vultis contra foedera fecisse an scientem? scientem,—O nomen nostri imperi! O populi Romani excellens dignitas! O Cn. Pompei sic late longeque diffusa laus ut eius gloriae domicilium communis imperi finibus terminetur! O nationes, urbes, populi, reges, tetrarchae, tyranni,—testes Cn. Pompei non solum virtutis in bello sed etiam religionis in pace! denique, mutae regiones, imploro, et sola terrarum ultimarum; vos, maria, portus, insulae, litora! est enim ora, quae sedes, qui locus in quo non exstent huius cum fortitudinis tum vero humanitatis, cum animi tum consili impressa vestigia? quisquam, incredibili quadam atque inaudita gravitate virtute constantia praeditum, foedera scientem neglexisse violasse rupisse dicere audebit?
14. The prosecutor indulges me with a gesture. He intimates that Cnaeus Pompeius acted ignorantly. As if it were a lighter charge, when one has been occupied in affairs of state in so important a republic, and been presiding over the most serious transactions, to do anything which you know not to be legal, or to be utterly ignorant what is legal. Do you really mean that he did not know, he who had waged a most formidable and important war in Spain, what were the rights of the city of Gades? or that he did not catch the correct interpretation of a treaty made with the people, as not understanding their language? Will any one then dare to say that Cnaeus Pompeius is ignorant of that which the most ordinary men, men of no knowledge of the world, of no military experience, which every common amanuensis professes to be acquainted with?
14. mihi gestu accusator: inscientem Cn. Pompeium fecisse significat,—quasi vero levius sit, cum in tanta re publica versere et maximis negotiis praesis, facere aliquid quod scias non licere, quam omnino non scire quid liceat! utrum ⟨qui in⟩ Hispania bellum acerrimum et maximum gesserat quo iure Gaditana civitas esse nesciebat, an, cum ius illius populi nosset, interpretationem foederis non tenebat? igitur quisquam Cn. Pompeium ignorasse dicere audebit quod mediocres homines, quod nullo usu, nullo studio praediti militari, quod librarioli denique scire ⟨se⟩ profiteantur?
15. I, indeed, think on the contrary, O judges, that while Cnaeus Pompeius excels in every kind and variety of accomplishment, even of those which are not easily learnt without the most perfect leisure for their study, his most extraordinary credit and his most admirable knowledge consists in his thorough acquaintance with the treaties, and agreements, and conditions of other peoples, kings, and foreign nations, in short, with the entire laws of war and peace; unless, indeed, you mean to make out that the things which our books teach us while in the shade and at our leisure, Cnaeus Pompeius was incapable of learning, either from books, when he was in the enjoyment of peace, or from the actual transactions, when he was engaged in the business of the state. It is my opinion, O judges, this action is more to be attributed to the fault of the times than of the individual. Nor will I say any more about a trial of so scandalous a description. For it is the stain and disgrace of this age to envy virtue, and to seek to crush the budding flower of worth and dignity. In truth, if Cnaeus Pompeius had lived five hundred years ago, that man from whom, while a young man and a Roman knight, the senate had often sought aid for the general safety; whose exploits had had all nations for their stage, being crowned everywhere by the most illustrious victories, both by land and sea; of which three triumphs had been the witnesses, proving that the whole world was made subject to our empire; whom the Roman people had distinguished with unexampled honours, in that case if it were now said among you that anything that he had done had been done in contravention of a treaty, who would listen to such a statement?
15. contra existimo, iudices, cum in omni genere ac varietate artium, etiam illarum quae sine summo otio non facile discuntur, Cn. Pompeius excellat, singularem quandam laudem et praestabilem ⟨eius⟩ esse scientiam in foederibus, pactionibus, condicionibus populorum, regum, exterarum nationum, in universo denique belli iure atque pacis; nisi forte ea quae nos libri docent in umbra atque otio, ea Cn. Pompeium neque cum requiesceret litterae, neque cum rem gereret regiones ipsae docere potuerunt., ut ego sentio, iudices, causa dicta est. magis ego nunc vitiis quam genere iudici plura dicam; est enim haec saeculi quaedam macula atque labes, virtuti invidere, velle ipsum florem dignitatis infringere. si Pompeius abhinc annos quingentos fuisset, is vir a quo senatus adulescentulo atque equite Romano saepe communi saluti auxilium expetisset, cuius res gestae omnis gentis cum clarissima victoria terra marique peragrassent, cuius tres triumphi testes essent totum orbem terrarum nostro imperio teneri, quem populus Romanus ⟨honoribus⟩ in⟨signibus⟩ singularibusque decorasset,—si nunc apud nos id quod is fecisset contra foedus factum diceretur, quis audiret?
16. No one. For his death would have put an end to the envy of him, his achievements would rest in the glory of his undying name. As then his virtue, if it were only heard of by us, would leave no room for doubt or question, shall it when present among us, when it has been experienced and beheld by ourselves, be injured by the voice of detractors?
16. profecto; mors enim cum exstinxisset invidiam, res eius gestae sempiterni nominis gloria niterentur. igitur audita virtus dubitationi locum non daret, huius ⟨visa⟩ atque perspecta obtrectatorum voce laedetur?
17. I will, therefore, say nothing about Pompeius in the rest of my speech; but I entreat you, O judges, to retain in your minds and memories what I have said. On the subject of the law, of the treaty, of precedents and of the uninterrupted usage of our state, I shall repeat those things which have been said already. For neither has Marcus Crassus who, as was natural to expect from his eloquence and from his honesty, has in the most careful manner explained the whole bearings of the case to you nor has Cnaeus Pompeius whose speech abounded in every possible ornament of oratory, left me anything new, anything untouched by them to dilate upon: but since, though I drew back, they both wished that this last labour of putting, as it were, a finishing stroke to their work, should be undertaken by me, I beg of you that you will consider that I have undertaken this office and employment more out of regard for what I thought my duty, than from any desire of making a display as an orator.
17. igitur Pompeium iam oratione mea reliqua, sed vos, iudices, animis ac memoria tenetote. lege, de foedere, de exemplis, de perpetua consuetudine civitatis nostrae renovabo ea quae dicta sunt; nihil enim mihi novi, nihil integri neque M. Crassus, qui totam causam et pro facultate et pro fide sua diligentissime vobis explicavit, neque Cn. Pompeius, cuius oratio omnibus ornamentis abundavit, ad dicendum reliquit. quoniam me recusante placuit ambobus adhiberi hunc a me quasi perpoliendi quendam operis extremum laborem, peto a vobis ut me offici potius quam dicendi studio hanc suscepisse operam ac munus putetis.
18. And, before I approach the law of the case and the cause of Cornelius, it seems to me desirable to say a little about the common condition of all of us, for the sake of deprecating the malevolence of any one. If, O judges, whatever may be the rank in which any one is born or whatever the station in which he is placed by birth in respect of fortune that same station he ought to maintain to his old age, and if all men whom either fortune has raised or whom their own labour or industry has ennobled, are to be visited with punishment, then there does not appear to have been a more severe law or condition of life imposed on Lucius Cornelius than on many other virtuous and gallant men. But if the virtue and genius and humanity of many men, though born in the meanest class of life, and in the lowest degree of fortune, has not only obtained them friendship and a plentiful estate, but has gained them also the greatest praise and honour and glory and dignity, then I cannot understand why envy should be more prompt to attack Lucius Cornelius, than your justice should to come to the assistance of his modesty.
18. prius quam adgrediar ad ius causamque Corneli, quiddam de communi condicione omnium nostrum deprecandae malivolentiae causa breviter commemorandum videtur. quo quisque loco nostrum est, iudices, natus, aut si, in qua fortuna est nascendi initio constitutus, hunc vitae statum usque ad senectutem obtinere debet, et si omnes quos aut fortuna extulit aut ipsorum inlustravit labor et industria poena sunt adficiendi, non gravior L. Cornelio quam multis viris bonis atque fortibus constitui lex vitae et condicio videretur: sin autem multorum virtus, ingenium, humanitas ex infimo genere et fortunae gradu non modo amicitias et rei familiaris copias consecuta est, sed summam laudem, honores, gloriam, dignitatem, non intellego cur potius invidia violatura virtutem L. Corneli quam aequitas vestra pudorem eius adiutura videatur.
19. And therefore I do not ask of you what it is very important to ask, in order that I may not seem to throw any doubts on your wisdom or your humanity; but I must beg of you not to feel any hatred towards genius, not to be enemies of industry, not to think that humanity deserves to be oppressed, or virtue to be punished. This I beg also; that if you see that my client's cause is of itself a sound and just one, you will allow his personal good qualities and accomplishments to be an assistance to him now that he is on his trial, rather than a hindrance. The cause of Cornelius, O judges, arises from the law which Lucius Gellius and Cnaeus Cornelius passed in accordance with the resolution of the senate. By that law we see that it is provided that those men shall be Roman citizens whom Cnaeus Pompeius shall separately present with the freedom of the city in accordance with the opinion of his council. Pompeius here in court asserts that Lucius Cornelius was so presented with it. The public records prove this to be the fact: the prosecutor admits it. But he says that no man of a people joined to us by treaty was capable by law of becoming one of our citizens, unless his own people ratified the measure.
19. quod maxime petendum est a vobis idcirco non peto, iudices, ne de vestra sapientia atque de vestra humanitate dubitare videar: est autem petendum ne oderitis ingenium, ne inimici sitis industriae, ne humanitatem opprimendam, ne virtutem puniendam putetis. peto, ut, si causam ipsam per se firmam esse et stabilem videritis, hominis ipsius ornamenta adiumento causae potius quam impedimento esse malitis., iudices, causa Corneli ex ea lege quam L. Gellius Cn. Cornelius ex senatus sententia tulerunt; qua lege videmus ⟨rite⟩ esse sanctum ut cives Romani sint ii quos Cn. Pompeius de consili sententia singillatim civitate donaverit. Donatum esse L. Cornelium praesens Pompeius dicit, indicant publicae tabulae. fatetur, sed negat ex foederato populo quemquam potuisse, nisi is populus fundus factus esset, in hanc civitatem venire.
20. Oh what a splendid interpreter of the law! what a fine authority on points of antiquity! what an admirable corrector and reformer of our state, to imagine that treaties impose such a penalty on those who are bound by them, as to make them all incapable of receiving our rewards and kindnesses! For what can possibly be said more ignorant than that it is requisite for the federate cities to ratify such a transaction? For that is not a right peculiar to federate cities, but to all free nations. But the whole of this, O judges, has at all times depended on this consideration, and on this intention,—that when the Roman people had ordered anything, if the allied peoples and the Latins had adopted and ratified it, and if the law which we had among ourselves was in this manner established among some people on a firm footing, then that people should be bound by the obligations of that law; not in such a manner as to detract in the least from our privileges, but that those nations might enjoy either that law which was established among us, or some other advantage and benefit.
20. O praeclarum interpretem iuris, auctorem antiquitatis, correctorem atque emendatorem nostrae civitatis, qui hanc poenam foederibus adscribat, ut omnium praemiorum beneficiorumque nostrorum expertis faciat foederatos! enim potuit dici imperitius quam foederatos populos fieri fundos oportere? nam id non magis est proprium foederatorum quam omnium liberorum. totum hoc, iudices, in ea fuit positum semper ratione atque sententia ut, cum iussisset populus Romanus aliquid, si id adscivissent socii populi ac Latini, et si ea lex, quam nos haberemus, eadem in populo aliquo tamquam in fundo resedisset, ut tum lege eadem is populus teneretur, non ut de nostro iure aliquid deminueretur, sed ut illi populi aut iure eo quod a nobis esset constitutum aut aliquo commodo aut beneficio uterentur.
21. Caius Furius, in the time of our ancestors, passed a law concerning wills Quintus Voconius passed another concerning the inheritances of women; innumerable other laws have been passed about civil law; the Latins have adopted whatever of them they have chosen; even by the Julian law itself, by which the rights of citizenship were given to the allies and to the Latins, it was decreed that those people who did not ratify the law should not have the freedom of the city, which circumstance gave rise to a great contention among the people of Heraclea, and among the people of Neapolis, as a great part of the population in those states preferred the liberty which they enjoyed by virtue of their treaty with us to the rights of citizenship. Lastly, this is the meaning both of that law and of that expression, that the peoples who do ratify it enjoy its advantages owing to our kindness, and not owing to any right of their own.
21. apud maiores nostros legem C. Furius de testamentis, tulit Q. Voconius de mulierum hereditatibus; innumerabiles aliae leges de civili iure sunt latae; quas Latini voluerunt, adsciverunt; ipsa denique Iulia, qua lege civitas est sociis et Latinis data, qui fundi populi facti non essent civitatem non haberent. quo magna contentio Heracliensium et Neapolitanorum fuit, cum magna pars in iis civitatibus foederis sui libertatem civitati anteferret. haec vis est istius et iuris et verbi, ut fundi populi beneficio nostro, non suo iure fiant.
22. When the Roman people has enacted anything, if it be a matter of that sort, that it appears it may be granted also to some other nations, whether joined to us by a treaty, or free to decide themselves which law they prefer using, not about our affairs, but about their own; then it seems necessary to inquire whether they have adopted and ratified our law, or not; but the senate never intended that those peoples should have the power of ratifying or declining to ratify measures which concern our republic, our empire our wars, our victory, and our safety. But if it is not to be lawful for our generals, and for the senate, and for the Roman people, by holding out rewards to them, to tempt all the bravest and most virtuous men out of the cities of our allies and friends to encounter dangers in behalf of our safety, then we shall be deprived of what is a most exceeding advantage to us, and of what has often been a very great protection and support to us in dangerous and critical times.
22. aliquid populus Romanus iussit, id si est eius modi ut quibusdam populis, sive foederatis sive liberis, permittendum esse videatur ut statuant ipsi non de nostris sed de suis rebus, quo iure uti velint, tum utrum fundi facti sint an non quaerendum esse videatur; de nostra vero re publica, de nostro imperio, de nostris bellis, de victoria, de salute fundos populos fieri noluerunt. si imperatoribus nostris, si senatui, si populo Romano non licebit propositis praemiis elicere ex civitatibus sociorum atque amicorum fortissimum atque optimum quemque ad subeunda pro salute nostra pericula, summa utilitate ac maximo saepe praesidio periculosis atque asperis temporibus carendum nobis erit.
23. But, in the name of the immortal gods! what sort of alliance, what sort of friendship, what sort of treaty is that by virtue of which our city in its time of danger is to have no defender from Massilia, or from Gades, or from Saguntum; or, if there should arise an assistant to us from those cities, any one who may have aided our generals with the help afforded by his labour, or by his riches, or by his personal danger,—any one who may have often fought hand to hand in our ranks against our enemies, who may have repeatedly exposed himself to the weapons of the enemy, to battle for his life, to imminent death,—that such a one can by no possible means be rewarded with the honours contained in our rights of citizenship?
23. , per deos immortalis, quae est ista societas, quae amicitia, quod foedus, ut aut nostra civitas careat in suis periculis Massiliensi propugnatore, careat Gaditano, careat Saguntino, aut, si quis ex his populis sit exortus qui nostros duces auxilio laboris, commeatus periculo suo iuverit, qui cum hoste nostro comminus in acie saepe pugnarit, qui se saepe telis hostium, qui dimicationi capitis, qui morti obiecerit, nulla condicione huius civitatis praemiis adfici possit?
24. For it is a very serious consideration for the Roman people, if they are not to be able to avail themselves of the help of allies who are endued with any extraordinary virtue, and who may be willing to join themselves to us, and to consider our danger their own; and it is also an injurious and insulting thing towards the allies, and for those federate states that we are now discussing, that our most faithful and united allies should be shut out from these rewards and from these honours, which are open to our mercenary troops, which are open to our enemies, which are open often even to our slaves. For we see that mercenary troops in numbers from Africa, Sicily, Sardinia and other provinces have had the freedom of the city conferred on them, and we know that those enemies who have come over to our commanders and have been of great use to our republic have been made citizens and lastly that slaves,—beings whose rights, and fortune, and condition are the lowest of all,—who have deserved well of the republic we see constantly presented publicly with liberty, that is to say, with the rights of citizenship.
24. in populum Romanum grave est non posse uti sociis excellenti virtute praeditis, qui velint cum periculis nostris sua communicare; in socios vero ipsos, et in eos de quibus agimus foederatos, iniuriosum et contumeliosum est iis praemiis et iis honoribus exclusos esse fidelissimos et coniunctissimos socios quae pateant stipendiariis, pateant hostibus, pateant saepe servis. stipendiarios ex Africa, Sicilia, Sardinia, ceteris provinciis multos civitate donatos videmus, et, qui hostes ad nostros imperatores perfugissent et magno usui rei publicae nostrae fuissent, scimus civitate esse donatos; servos denique, quorum ius, fortuna, condicio infima est, bene de re publica meritos persaepe libertate, id est civitate, publice donari videmus.
25. Do you then, O you patron of all treaties and federate states, lay down this as the condition of the people of Gades, your fellow-citizens, that what is lawful for those nations which we have subdued with our arms, and reduced under our dominion, having the people of Gades for our assistants while doing so, namely, that if the Roman people shall permit it, they may have the rights of citizenship conferred on them by the senate or by our generals,—is not to be lawful for the men of Gades themselves? Suppose they had determined by their own decrees or laws that no one of their fellow citizens should enter the camp of a general of the Roman people, that no one should incur any personal risk or danger of his life in defence of our empire, that we should not be allowed to avail ourselves of the assistance of the people of Gades whenever we chose, and that in his private capacity no individual, being eminent for courage and valour, should dare to struggle to his own personal danger, in defence of our empire; we should naturally be very indignant at that, at the resources of the Roman people being diminished, at the courage of brave men being damped, and at our being deprived of the aid afforded us by the zeal of nations unconnected with us in our behalf, and by the valour of foreign peoples.
25. tu igitur, patrone foederum ac foederatorum, condicionem statuis Gaditanis, tuis civibus, ut, quod iis quos magnis adiutoribus tuis ⟨usi civibus⟩ armis subegimus atque in dicionem nostram redegimus liceat, si populus Romanus permiserit, ut ab senatu, etiam per imperatores nostros civitate donentur, id ne liceat ipsis? si suis decretis legibusve sanxissent ne quis suorum civium castra imperatorum populi Romani iniret, ne quis se pro nostro imperio in periculum capitis atque in vitae discrimen inferret, Gaditanorum auxiliis, cum vellemus, uti nobis ut liceret, privatus vero ne quis vir et animo et virtute praecellens pro nostro imperio periculo suo dimicaret, graviter id iure ferremus, minui auxilia populi Romani, debilitari animos fortissimorum virorum, alienigenarum nos hominum studiis atque paterna virtute privari.
26. But it makes no difference, O judges, whether the federate states enact these laws that no one shall be permitted to leave those states for the purpose of sharing in the dangers of our wars, or that those things cannot possibly be ratified which we have given to their citizens on account of their virtue. For we should not any the more have the advantage of these men for our assistants if we once take away all the rewards of virtue, than we should if we were to make it absolutely unlawful for them to meddle at all in our laws. In truth, as, ever since the original birth of man, there have been but few men found, who, without any hope of reward, have been willing to expose their lives to the weapons of the enemy even for the sake of their own country, do you suppose that there will be any one who will expose himself to dangers in the defence of a republic with which he has not any connection, when not only no reward is held out to him, but when all reward for such conduct is prohibited from being bestowed?
26. nihil interest, iudices, utrum haec foederati iura constituant, ut ne cui liceat ex iis civitatibus ad nostrorum bellorum pericula accedere, an, quae nos eorum civibus virtutis causa tribuerimus, ea rata esse non possint; nihil enim magis uteremur iis adiutoribus, sublatis virtutis praemiis, quam si omnino iis versari in nostris bellis non liceret. cum pro sua patria pauci post genus hominum natum reperti sint qui nullis praemiis propositis vitam suam hostium telis obiecerint, pro aliena re publica quemquam fore putatis qui se opponat periculis non modo nullo proposito praemio, sed etiam interdicto?
27. But not only was that a most ignorant thing to say, which was said, about states ratifying and accepting our laws, as that is a privilege common to all free peoples, and not peculiar to federate cities; from which it must inevitably be understood, either that no one of the allies can be made a Roman citizen, or else that an inhabitant of the federate states may likewise be made one; but this great teacher of ours is ignorant also of the whole bearings of the law respecting a man's change of citizenship; which, O judges, is a thing which is not only clearly laid down in the public laws, but which depends also on the inclination of individuals. For, according to our law, no one can change his city against his will, nor can he be prevented from changing it, if he pleases, provided only that he be adopted by that state of which he wishes to become a citizen. As, for instance, if the people of Gades passed a bill concerning any Roman citizen by name, that he should become a citizen of Gades, our citizen would in consequence of that bill acquire a complete power of changing his city, and would not be hindered by any treaty from becoming a citizen of Gades after having been a citizen of Rome.
27. cum est illud imperitissime dictum de populis fundis, quod commune liberorum est populorum, non proprium foederatorum,—ex quo intellegi necesse est aut neminem ex sociis civem fieri posse aut etiam posse ex foederatis,— tum vero ius omne noster iste magister mutandae civitatis ignorat, quod est, iudices, non solum in legibus publicis positum, sed etiam in privatorum voluntate. enim nostro neque mutare civitatem quisquam invitus potest, neque si velit mutare non potest, modo adsciscatur ab ea civitate cuius esse se civitatis velit: ut, si Gaditani sciverint nominatim de aliquo cive Romano ut sit is civis Gaditanus, magna potestas sit nostro civi mutandae civitatis, nec foedere impediatur quo minus ex civi Romano civis Gaditanus possit esse.
28. According to our civil law, no one can be a citizen of two cities at the same time; a man cannot be a citizen of this city, who has dedicated himself to another city. And he may do so not only by dedication, which is a thing which we have seen happen in their misfortunes to most illustrious men, to Quintus Maximus, and Caius Laenas, and Quintus Philippus at Nuceria, and to Caius Cato at Tarraco, to Quintus Caepio and Publius Rutilius at Smyrna, who all became citizens of those cities. (They could not lose their rights of citizenship here, before they had as it were changed their country by their change of citizenship.) But a change of citizenship can also take place by a man's returning to his original city. Nor was it without reason that a motion was submitted to the people concerning Cnaeus Publicius Menander, a freedman, whom in the time of our ancestors some ambassadors of ours when going into Greece wished to take with them as an interpreter, that that Publicius if he returned to his home, and after that again came back to Rome, should still be a Roman citizen. For, in the recollection of earlier times, many Roman citizens of their own free will, not having been condemned by any process of law, nor having been in danger, have left our state and joined themselves as citizens to other cities.
28. civitatum civis noster esse iure civili nemo potest: non esse huius civitatis qui se alii civitati dicarit potest. solum dicatione, quod in calamitate clarissimis viris Q. Maximo, C. Laenati, Q. Philippo Nuceriae, C. Catoni Tarracone, Q. Caepioni, P. Rutilio Zmyrnae vidimus accidisse, ut earum civitatum fierent cives, ⟨cum⟩ hanc ante amittere non potuissent quam hoc solum civitatis mutatione vertissent, sed etiam postliminio potest civitatis fieri mutatio. enim sine causa de Cn. Publicio Menandro, libertino homine, quem apud maiores legati nostri in Graeciam proficiscentes interpretem secum habere voluerunt, ad populum latum ⟨est⟩ ut is Publicius, si domum revenisset et inde Romam redisset, ne minus civis esset. etiam superiore memoria cives Romani sua voluntate, indemnati et incolumes, his rebus relictis alias se in civitates contulerunt.
29. But if it is lawful for a Roman citizen to become a citizen of Gades, either by exile, or by a return to his original city, or by a discarding of his rights of citizenship here, (to come now to the treaty, which, however, in fact has nothing to do with the cause in hand; for what we are discussing is the right of citizenship, and not the treaties,) what reason is there why a citizen of Gades may not be allowed to become a citizen of this city? My opinion, indeed, goes quite the other way. For as there is a path from all cities to our city, and as the road to all other cities is open to our citizens, so also, in proportion as each city is more closely united with us in alliance and friendship, by agreement, and covenant, and treaty, the more does that state appear to me to be entitled to a participation in our kindness and in our rewards. … But all other cities would without any hesitation receive our men into the rights of citizenship with them if we also had the same laws that other nations have. But we cannot he citizens of this city and of any other city at the same time though in all other cities this is allowed.
29. si civi Romano licet esse Gaditanum sive exsilio sive postliminio sive reiectione huius civitatis,—ut iam ad foedus veniam, quod ad causam nihil pertinet: de civitatis enim iure, non de foederibus disceptamus,—quid est quam ob rem civi Gaditano in hanc civitatem venire non liceat? longe secus sentio. cum ex omnibus civitatibus via sit in nostram, cumque nostris civibus pateat ad ceteras iter civitates, tum vero, ut quaeque nobiscum maxime societate amicitia sponsione pactione foedere est coniuncta, ita mihi maxime communione beneficiorum praemiorum civitatis contineri videtur. ceterae civitates omnes non dubitarent nostros homines recipere in suas civitates, si idem nos iuris haberemus quod ceteri; sed nos non possumus et huius esse civitatis et cuiusvis praeterea, ceteris concessum est.
30. Therefore in the Greek cities we see that Rhodians and Lacedaemonians and men from all quarters are enrolled among the citizens of Athens, and that the same individuals are citizens of many cities at the same time. And I have seen some ignorant men, citizens of ours, led by this mistake, sitting at Athens among the judges and members of the Areopagus, in a regular tribe and class of Athenian citizens, being ignorant that it they acquired the rights of citizenship there they lost their rights here, unless they recovered them by a subsequent return to their rights here, and a renunciation of the others. But no one who had any acquaintance with our laws or our customs, who wished to retain his rights as a citizen of Rome, ever dedicated himself to another city. But the whole of this topic of my speech, and the whole of this discussion, O judges, has reference to the common right of changing one's city; it has nothing in it which is peculiar to the religious observance of treaties. For I am defending the universal principle, that there is no nation on the whole face of the earth,—whether at variance with the Roman people through some quarrel and hatred, or, on the other hand, united with us by the closest loyalty and mutual good-will,—as to which we are forbidden to adopt any one of its citizens as our own, or to present any one of them with the freedom of our city.
30. in Graecis civitatibus videmus Atheniensis, Rhodios, Lacedaemonios, ceteros undique adscribi multarumque esse eosdem homines civitatum. errore ductos vidi egomet non nullos imperitos homines, nostros civis, Athenis in numero iudicum atque Areopagitarum, certa tribu, certo numero, cum ignorarent, si illam civitatem essent adepti, hanc se perdidisse nisi postliminio reciperassent. vero nostri moris ac iuris nemo umquam, qui hanc civitatem retinere vellet, in aliam se civitatem dicavit. hic totus locus disputationis atque orationis meae, iudices, pertinet ad commune ius mutandarum civitatum: nihil habet quod sit proprium religionis ac foederum. enim rem universam, nullam esse gentem ex omni regione terrarum, neque tam dissidentem a populo Romano odio quodam atque discidio, neque tam fide benivolentiaque coniunctam, ex qua nobis interdictum sit ne quem adsciscere civem aut civitate donare possimus.
31. Oh how admirable are our laws, and with what god-like wisdom were they established by our ancestors from the very first beginning of the Roman name, especially the law that no one of our people can be a citizen of more than one city, (for it is inevitable that dissimilar states must have a great variety in their laws,) and that no one can be compelled against his will to change his city, nor against his will to remain a citizen of any city. For these are the firmest foundations of our liberty, that every individual should have it in his own power to retain or abandon his privileges. And without any dispute, that has been the most solid foundation of our empire, and the thing which has above all others increased the renown of the Roman name, that that first man, the creator of this city, Romulus, taught by the treaty which he made with the Sabines, that it was expedient to increase the population of this city by the adoption of even enemies as citizens. And in compliance with his authority and with the precedent which he established, the presentation of the freedom of our city to others has never been interrupted by our ancestors. Therefore, many tribes from Latium, the people of Tusculum, the people of Lanuvium, and all other peoples of all other races, have been received into the privileges of our city;—as, for instance, the Sabines, the Hernici, and the Volsci; the citizens of which cities were not compelled to change the city to which they belonged, if they were unwilling to do so; nor if any of them had acquired the privileges of our citizens by the kindness of the Roman people, would the treaty made with them appear to have been violated.
31. O iura praeclara atque divinitus iam inde a principio Romani nominis a maioribus nostris comparata, ne quis nostrum plus quam unius civitatis esse possit,—dissimilitudo enim civitatum varietatem iuris habeat necesse est,—ne quis invitus civitate mutetur neve in civitate maneat invitus! sunt enim fundamenta firmissima nostrae libertatis, sui quemque iuris et retinendi et dimittendi esse dominum. vero sine ulla dubitatione maxime nostrum fundavit imperium et populi Romani nomen auxit, quod princeps ille creator huius urbis, Romulus, foedere Sabino docuit etiam hostibus recipiendis augeri hanc civitatem oportere; cuius auctoritate et exemplo numquam est intermissa a maioribus nostris largitio et communicatio civitatis. et ex Latio multi, ut Tusculani, ut Lanuvini, et ex ceteris generibus gentes universae in civitatem sunt receptae, ut Sabinorum, Volscorum, Hernicorum; quibus ex civitatibus nec coacti essent civitate mutari, si qui noluissent, nec, si qui essent civitatem nostram beneficio populi Romani consecuti, violatum foedus eorum videretur.
32. But some treaties are in existence, as for instance those with the Germans, the Insubres, the Helvetians, and the Iapidae, and with some of the barbarian tribes in Gaul in which there is a special exception made that no one of them is to be received by us as a citizen of Rome. And if the exception prevents such a step from being lawful, it is quite evident that it is lawful where there is no such exception made. Where, then, is the exception made in the treaty between us and the city of Gades, that the Roman people is not to receive any one of the citizens of Gades into their citizenship? Nowhere. And if there were any such clause, the Gellian and Cornelian law would have annulled it which expressly gave to Pompeius a power of giving the freedom of the city to anybody whatever. “The whole treaty,” says the prosecutor, “is such an exception, because it was ratified with solemn oaths.” I can excuse you if you do not know much about the laws of the Carthaginians, for you had left your own city; and you were not able to examine our laws very strictly; for they prevented your having any opportunity of instituting such an examination by a public sentence.
32. quaedam foedera exstant, ut Cenomanorum, Insubrium, Helvetiorum, Iapydum, non nullorum item ex Gallia barbarorum, quorum in foederibus exceptum est ne quis eorum a nobis civis recipiatur. si exceptio facit ne liceat, ubi ⟨non sit exceptum, ibi⟩ necesse est licere. Vbi est igitur ⟨in⟩ foedere Gaditano, ne quem populus Romanus Gaditanum recipiat civitate?. sicubi esset, lex id Gellia et Cornelia, quae definite potestatem Pompeio civitatem donandi dederat, sustulisset. “,” inquit, “est foedus, Si qvid sacrosanctvm est.” tibi, si neque Poenorum iura calles (reliqueras enim civitatem tuam) neque nostras potuisti leges inspicere; ipsae enim te a cognitione sua iudicio publico reppulerunt.
33. What was there in that enactment which was passed concerning Pompeius by Gellius and Lentulus in their consulship in which any exception appears to have been made of treaties which had been ratified by an oath? For first of all, nothing can be ratified in such a manner except what the burgesses or the common people have so ratified. In the second place, such ratifications are to be accounted sacred, either because of the form of ratification itself, or because the invocation of the gods and dedication of the law, … or else, because of some punishment to which the life of that man is devoted who acts in contravention of it. What argument, then, of this sort can you allege with respect to our treaty with the city of Gades? Do you assert that that treaty was solemnly ratified by the devotion of the life of any offender against it, or by any invocation of the gods to uphold the law? I assert that nothing was ever submitted to the burgesses or to the common people with respect to that treaty [I assert that no law was enacted, and no punishment appointed.] When, therefore even if it had been enacted that we were not to receive any man as a citizen, still that would have been ratified which the people enacted subsequently, nor would any exception have appeared to have been made by that expression, “If anything had been formally ratified by an oath,” do you venture to say that anything is formally ratified in this way, with respect to which the Roman people has never come to any decision at all?
33. fuit in rogatione ea quae de Pompeio a Gellio et a Lentulo consulibus lata est, in quo aliquid sacrosanctum exceptum videretur? enim sacrosanctum esse nihil potest nisi quod populus plebesve sanxit; deinde sanctiones sacrandae sunt aut genere ipso aut obtestatione et consecratione legis aut poenae, cum caput eius qui contra fecerit consecratur. habes igitur dicere de Gaditano foedere eius modi? utrum capitis consecratione an obtestatione legis sacrosanctum esse confirmas? omnino umquam de isto foedere ad populum, nihil ad plebem latum esse neque legem neque poenam consecratam esse dico. quibus igitur etiam si latum esset ne quem civem reciperemus, tamen id esset quod postea populus iussisset ratum, nec quicquam illis verbis Si qvid sacrosanctvm est exceptum videretur, de iis, cum populus Romanus nihil umquam iusserit, quicquam audes dicere sacrosanctum fuisse?
34. Nor, O judges, has this argument of mine any tendency to invalidate our treaty with the city of Gades. For it would not become me to say anything against the rights of a city which has deserved very well at our hands, against the invariable opinion of antiquity, and against the authority of the senate. For once, at a very critical period of this republic, when Carthage, being exceedingly powerful by sea and land, relying on the two Spains, was threatening this empire, and when those two thunderbolts of our empire, Cnaeus and Publius Scipio, had suddenly perished in Spain, Lucius Marcius, a centurion of the first division, is said to have made a treaty with the people of Gades. And as this treaty was maintained more in consequence of the loyalty of that people, of our justice, and, indeed, of its own antiquity, than because it was ratified by any public bond of religion, the people of Gades, being wise men and well instructed in public law, when Marcus Lepidus and Quintus Catulus were consuls, made a request to the senate for a more regular treaty; and then the treaty was renewed or made (whichever you please to call it) with the men of Gades. And concerning that treaty the Roman people never recorded any vote; and they cannot possibly be bound by any religious obligation which has been contracted without their orders.
34. vero oratio mea ad infirmandum foedus Gaditanorum, iudices, pertinet; neque enim est meum contra ius optime meritae civitatis, contra opinionem vetustatis, contra auctoritatem senatus dicere. Duris enim quondam temporibus rei publicae nostrae, cum praepotens terra marique Carthago nixa duabus Hispaniis huic imperio immineret, et cum duo fulmina nostri imperi subito in Hispania, Cn. et P. Scipiones, exstincti occidissent, L. Marcius, primi pili centurio, cum Gaditanis foedus fecisse dicitur. cum magis fide illius populi, iustitia nostra, vetustate denique ipsa quam aliquo publico vinculo religionis teneretur, sapientes homines et publici iuris periti, Gaditani, M. Lepido Q. Catulo consulibus a senatu de foedere postulaverunt. est cum Gaditanis foedus vel renovatum vel ictum; de quo foedere populus Romanus sententiam non tulit, qui iniussu suo nullo pacto potest religione obligari.