--- title: "For Cluentius · Pro A. Cluentio" author: "Cicero" translator: "Charles Duke Yonge" languages: [la, en] shelf: "Classical Latin" section: 3 of 6 url: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-pro-cluentio/3/ cite: "Cicero, tr. Charles Duke Yonge, For Cluentius · Pro A. Cluentio, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-pro-cluentio/3/" --- # For Cluentius · Pro A. Cluentio *Cicero, tr. Charles Duke Yonge* A man accused of poisoning his stepfather, in a family story of murders and bribed juries. > Latin: ed. Albert Curtis Clark, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi0474.phi010, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Charles Duke Yonge, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi0474.phi010.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 3. Sections 70–103 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-pro-cluentio/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/cicero-pro-cluentio/3/#p-N [¶0] 70. Therefore, he contrives a singular plan. And you will the more easily, O judges, believe the things which are said by us, if you will direct your minds back a considerable space, so as to recollect the way of life and disposition of Caius Stalenus. For according to the opinion that is formed of a man's habits do people conjecture what has or has not been done by him. As he was a man needy, expensive, audacious, cunning, perfidious, and as he saw so vast a sum of money laid up in his house, a most miserable and unfurnished receptacle for it, he began to revolve in his mind every sort of cunning and fraud. “Must I give it to the judges? In that case, what shall I get myself, except danger and infamy? Can I contrive no means by which Oppianicus must be condemned? Why not? There is nothing in the world that cannot be managed somehow. If any chance delivers him from danger, must I not return the money? Let us, then, drive him on headlong, and crush him in utter ruin.” > Latin: 70. rem excogitat singularem. haec, iudices, quae vera dicuntur a nobis facilius credetis, si cum animis vestris longo intervallo recordari C.Gaii Staieni vitam et naturam volueritis; nam perinde ut opinio est de cuiusque moribus, ita quid ab eo factum aut non factum sit existimari potest. esset egens, sumptuosus, audax, callidus, perfidiosus, et cum domi suae miserrimus in locis inanissimis tantum nummorum positum videret, ad omnem malitiam et fraudem versare mentem suam coepit. “dem iudicibus? mihi ipsi igitur praeter periculum et infamiam quid quaeretur? excogitem quam ob rem Oppianicum damnari necesse sit? tandem? — nihil enim est quod non fieri possit — si quis eum forte casus ex periculo eripuerit, nonne reddendum est? igitur impellamus” inquit “et perditum prosternamus.” [¶1] 71. He adopts this plan,—he promises some of the most insignificant of the judges some money; then he keeps it back, hoping by this means (as he thought that the respectable men would, of their own accord, judge with impartiality) to make those who were less esteemed furious against Oppianicus on account of their disappointment. Therefore, as he had always been a blundering and a perverse fellow, he begins with Bulbus, and finding him sulky and yawning because he had got nothing for a long time, he gives him a gentle spur. “What will you do,” says he, “will you help me, O Bulbus, so that we need not serve the republic for nothing?” But he, as soon as he heard this—“For nothing,” said he, “I will follow whenever you like. But what have you got?” Then he promises him forty thousand sesterces if Oppianicus is acquitted. And he begs him to summon the rest of those with whom he is accustomed to converse, and he, the contriver of the whole business, adds Gutta to Bulbus. > Latin: 71. hoc consili ut pecuniam quibusdam iudicibus levissimis polliceatur, deinde eam postea supprimat ut, quoniam gravis homines sua sponte severe iudicaturos putabat, eos qui leviores erant destitutione iratos Oppianico redderet., ut erat semper praeposterus atque perversus, initium facit a Bulbo et eum, quod iam diu nihil quaesierat, tristem atque oscitantem leviter impellit. “tu?” inquit “ecquid me adiuvas, Bulbe, ne gratiis rei publicae serviamus?” vero simul atque hoc audivit “ne gratiis”: “voles ” inquit “sequar; sed quid adfers?” ei quadraginta milia, si esset absolutus Oppianicus, pollicetur et eum ut ceteros appellet quibuscum loqui consuesset rogat atque etiam ipse conditor totius negoti Guttam aspergit huic Bulbo. [¶2] 72. Therefore, he did not seem at all bitter after the taste he had had of his discourse. One or two days passed, when the matter appeared somewhat doubtful. He wanted the agent and some security for the money. Then Bulbus addresses the man with a cheerful countenance, as caressingly as he can “What will you do,” says he, “O Paetus?” (For Stalenus had chosen this surname for himself from the images of the Aelii, lest if he called himself Ligur, he should seem to be using the name of his nation rather than that of his family.) “Men are asking me where the money is about which you talked to me.” On this that most manifest rogue, fed on gains acquired by tampering with the courts of justice, as he had now all his hopes and all his heart set upon that sum of money which he had got in his house, begins to frown. (Recollect his face, and the expression that you have seen him put on.) He complains that he has been thrown out by Oppianicus; and he, a man wholly made up of fraud and lies, and who had even improved those vices which he had by nature, by careful study, and by a regular sort of system of wickedness, declares positively that he has been cheated by Oppianicus; and he adds this assertion,—that he will be condemned by the vote which in his case every one was to give openly. > Latin: 72. minime amarus eis visus est qui aliquid ex eius sermone speculae degustarant. Vnus et alter dies intercesserat cum res parum certa videbatur; sequester et confirmator pecuniae desiderabatur. appellat hilari voltu hominem Bulbus ut blandissime potest: “tu” inquit “Paete?” — hoc enim sibi Staienus cognomen ex imaginibus Aeliorum delegerat ne, si se Ligurem fecisset, nationis magis suae quam generis uti cognomine videretur — “qua de re mecum locutus es, quaerunt a me ubi sit pecunia.” ille planus improbissimus quaestu iudiciario pastus, qui illi pecuniae quam condiderat spe iam atque animo incubaret, contrahit frontem — recordamini faciem atque illos eius fictos simulatosque voltus — et, qui esset totus ex fraude et mendacio factus quique ea vitia quae ab natura habebat etiam studio atque artificio quodam malitiae condivisset, pulchre adseverat sese ab Oppianico destitutum atque hoc addit testimoni, sua illum sententia, cum palam omnes laturi essent, condemnatum iri. [¶3] 73. The report had reached the bench, that there was mention made of corruption being practiced among the judges;—the matter had not been kept as secret as it ought to have been, and yet was not so thoroughly detected as it was desirable that it should be for the sake of the republic. While the matter was so obscure, and every one in such doubt, on a sudden Canutius, a very clever man, and who had got some suspicion that Stalenus had been tampered with, but who thought that the business was not definitively settled, determined to set sentence pronounced. The judges said that they were willing. And at that time Oppianicus himself was in no great alarm. He thought that the whole business had been settled by Stalenus. > Latin: 73. sermo in consilio pecuniae quandam mentionem inter iudices esse versatam. neque tam fuerat occulta quam erat occultanda, neque tam erat aperta quam rei publicae causa aperienda. ea obscuritate ac dubitatione omnium Cannutio, perito homini, qui quodam odore suspicionis Staienum corruptum esse sensisset neque dum rem perfectam arbitraretur, placuit repente pronuntiare: dixerunt. tum Oppianicus non magno opere pertimuit; rem a Staieno perfectam esse arbitrabatur. [¶4] 74. The judges who were to deliberate on the case were thirty-two in number: an acquittal would be obtained by the votes of sixteen of them. Forty thousand sesterces given to each judge ought to make up that number of votes, and then the vote of Stalenus himself, who would be induced by the hope of a greater reward still, would crown the whole, making the seventeenth. And it happened by chance, because the matter was concluded in this way on a sudden, that Stalenus himself was not present. He was acting as counsel for the defence in some cause or other before a judge. Habitus did not mind that, nor did Canutius. But Oppianicus and his patron Lucius Quinctius were not so well pleased; and as Lucius Quinctius was at that time a tribune of the people, he reproached Caius Junius the judge most bitterly, and insisted upon it that they should not deliberate on their decision without the presence of Stalenus, and as they appeared to be purposely rather careless in communicating with him on the subject by means of the lictors, he himself went out of the criminal court into the civil court, where Stalenus was engaged, and, as he had the power to do, adjourned that court, and himself brought Stalenus back to the bench. > Latin: 74. consilium erant ituri iudices xxxii. xvi absolutio confici poterat. HS xl milia in singulos iudices distributa eum numerum sententiarum conficere debebant ut ad cumulum spe maiorum praemiorum ipsius Staieni sententia septima decima accederet. etiam casu tum, quod illud repente erat factum, Staienus ipse non aderat; causam nescio quam apud iudicem defendebat. hoc patiebatur, facile Cannutius, at non Oppianicus neque patronus eius L.Lucius Quinctius; qui, cum esset illo tempore tribunus plebis, convicium C.Gaio Iunio iudici quaestionis maximum fecit ut ne sine illo in consilium iretur; cumque id ei per viatores consulto neglegentius agi videretur, ipse e publico iudicio ad privatum Staieni iudicium profectus est et illud pro potestate dimitti iussit; Staienum ipse ad subsellia adduxit. [¶5] 75. The judges rise to give decisions, when Oppianicus said, as he had at that time a right to do, that he wished the votes to be given openly; his object being that Stalenus might know what was to be paid to each judge. There were different kinds of judges, a few were bribed, but all were unfavorable. As men who are accustomed to receive bribes in the Campus Martius are usually exceedingly hostile to those candidates whose money they think is kept back, so the judges of the same sort were then very indignant against this defendant. The others considered him very guilty, but they waited for the votes of those who they thought had been bribed, that by seeing their votes they might judge who it was that they had been bribed by. Behold now—the lots were drawn with such a result that Bulbus, Stalenus, and Gutta were the first who were, to deliver their opinions. There was the greatest anxiety on the part of every one to see what vote would be given by these worthless and corrupt judges. And they all condemn him without the slightest hesitation. > Latin: 75. in consilium, cum sententias Oppianicus, quae tum erat potestas, palam ferri velle dixisset ut Staienus scire posset quid cuique deberet. Varia iudicum genera; nummarii pauci sed omnes irati. Vt qui accipere in campo consuerunt eis candidatis quorum nummos suppressos esse putant inimicissimi solent esse, sic eius modi iudices infesti tum reo venerant; ceteri nocentissimum esse arbitrabantur, sed exspectabant sententias eorum quos corruptos esse putabant ut ex eis constituerent a quo iudicium corruptum videretur. tibi eius modi sortitio ut in primis Bulbo et Staieno et Guttae esset iudicandum! omnium exspectatio quidnam sententiae ferrent leves ac nummarii iudices. illi omnes sine ulla dubitatione condemnant. [¶6] 76. On this, great scruples arose in men's minds, and some doubt as to what had really been done. Then some of the judges, wise men, trained in the old-fashioned principles of the ancient tribunals, as they could: not acquit a most guilty man, and yet, as they did not like at once to condemn a man, in whose case there appeared reason to suspect that bribery had been employed against him, before they were able to ascertain the truth of this suspicion, gave as their decision, “Not proven.” But some severe men, who made up their minds that regard ought to be had to the intention with which a thing was done by any one, although they believed that others had only given a correct decision through the influence of bribery, nevertheless thought that it behoved them to decide consistently with their previous decisions. Accordingly, they condemned him. There were five in all, who, whether they did so out of ignorance, or out of pity, or from being influenced by some secret suspicion, or by some latent ambition, acquitted that innocent Oppianicus of yours altogether. > Latin: 76. tum iniectus est hominibus scrupulus et quaedam dubitatio quidnam esset actum. homines sapientes et ex vetere illa disciplina iudiciorum, qui neque absolvere hominem nocentissimum possent neque eum de quo esset orta suspicio pecunia oppugnatum re illa incognita primo condemnare vellent, non liquere dixerunt. nulli autem severi homines qui hoc statuerunt, quo quisque animo quid faceret spectari oportere, etsi alii pecunia accepta verum iudicabant, tamen nihilo minus se superioribus suis iudiciis constare putabant oportere; itaque damnarunt. omnino fuerunt qui illum vestrum innocentem Oppianicum sive imprudentia sive misericordia sive aliqua suspicione sive ambitione adducti absolverunt. [¶7] 77. After Oppianicus had been condemned, immediately Lucius Quinctius, an excessive seeker after popularity, who was accustomed to catch at every wind of report, and at every word uttered in the assemblies, thought that he had an opportunity of rising himself, by exciting odium against the senators; because he thought that the decisions of that body were already falling into disfavour in the eyes of the people. One or two assemblies are held, very violent and stormy: a tribune of the people kept loudly asserting that the judges had taken money to condemn an innocent prisoner: he kept saying, that the fortunes of all men were at stake; that there were no courts of justice; that no one could be safe who had a wealthy enemy. Men ignorant of the whole business, who had never even seen Oppianicus, and who thought that a most virtuous citizen, that a most modest man had been crushed by money, being exasperated by this suspicion, began to demand that the whole matter should be brought forward and inquired into, and in fact, to require an investigation of the whole business; and at that very time Stalenus, having been sent for by Oppianicus, came by night to the house of Titus Annius, a most honourable man, and a most intimate friend of my own. > Latin: 77. Oppianico statim L.Lucius Quinctius, homo maxime popularis, qui omnis rumorum et contionum ventos conligere consuesset, oblatam sibi facultatem putavit ut ex invidia senatoria posset crescere, quod eius ordinis iudicia minus iam probari populo arbitrabatur. una atque altera contio vehemens et gravis; accepisse pecuniam iudices ut innocentem reum condemnarent tribunus plebis clamitabat; agi fortunas omnium dicebat; nulla esse iudicia; qui pecuniosum inimicum haberet, incolumem esse neminem posse. totius ignari negoti, qui Oppianicum numquam vidissent, virum optimum et hominem pudentissimum pecunia oppressum esse arbitrarentur, incensi suspicione rem in medium vocare coeperunt et causam illam totam deposcere. [¶8] 78. By this time the whole business is known to every one;—what Oppianicus said to him about the money; how he said that he would restore the money; how respectable men heard the whole of their conversation, having been placed in a secret place with that view; how the whole matter was laid open, and mentioned publicly in the forum, and how all the money was extorted from and compelled to be restored by Stalenus. The character of this Stalenus, already known to and thoroughly ascertained by the people, was such as to make no suspicion unnatural; still, those who were present in the assembly did not understand that the money which he had promised to pay on behalf of the defendant, had been kept back by him.—For this they were not told. They were aware that reports of bribery had been at work in the court of justice; they heard that a defendant had been condemned who was innocent; they saw that he had been condemned by Stalenus's vote. They judged, because they knew the man that it had not been done for nothing. A similar suspicion existed with respect to Bulbus, and Gutta, and some others. > Latin: 78. illo ipso tempore in aedis T.Titi Anni, hominis honestissimi, necessarii et amici mei, noctu Staienus arcessitus ab Oppianico venit. cetera nota sunt omnibus, ut cum illo Oppianicus egerit de pecunia, ut ille se redditurum esse dixerit, ut eum sermonem audierint omnem viri boni qui tum consulto propter in occulto stetissent, ut res patefacta et in forum prolata et pecunia omnis Staieno extorta atque erepta sit. Staieni persona populo iam nota atque perspecta ab nulla turpi suspicione abhorrebat; suppressam esse ab eo pecuniam quam pro reo pronuntiasset qui erant in contione non intellegebant; neque enim docebantur. esse in iudicio mentionem pecuniae sentiebant, innocentem reum condemnatum audiebant, Staieni sententia condemnatum videbant; non gratiis id ab eo factum esse, quod hominem norant, iudicabant. Similis in Bulbo, in Gutta, in aliis non nullis suspicio consistebat. [¶9] 79. Therefore, I confess, (for I may now make the confession with impunity, especially in this place,) that not only the habits of life of Oppianicus, but that even his name was unknown to the people before that trial. Moreover that, as it did seem a most scandalous thing for an innocent man to have been crushed by the influence of money; and as the general profligacy of Stalenus, and the baseness of some others of the judges who resembled him, increased this suspicion; and as Lucius Quinctius pleaded his cause, a man not only of the greatest influence, but also of exceeding skill in arousing the feelings of the multitude; by these circumstances a very great degree of suspicion was excited against, and a very great degree of odium attached to that tribunal. And I recollect, that Caius Junius who had presided over that trial, was thrown, as it were, into the fresh fire; and that he, a man of aedilitian rank, who was already praetor in the universal opinion of all men, was driven out of the forum and even out of the city, not by any regular discussion, but by the outcry raised against him by all men. > Latin: 79. confiteor — licet enim iam impune hoc praesertim in loco confiteri — quod Oppianici non modo vita sed etiam nomen ante illud tempus populo ignotum fuisset, indignissimum porro videretur circumventum esse innocentem pecunia, hanc deinde suspicionem augeret Staieni improbitas et non nullorum eius similium iudicum turpitudo, causam autem ageret L.Lucius Quinctius, homo cum summa potestate praeditus tum ad inflammandos animos multitudinis accommodatus, summam illi iudicio invidiam infamiamque esse conflatam. in hanc flammam recentem tum C. Iunium qui illi quaestioni praefuerat iniectum esse memini, et illum hominem aedilicium iam praetorem opinionibus omnium constitutum non disceptatione dicendi sed clamore hominum de foro atque adeo de civitate esse sublatum. [¶10] 80. And I am not sorry that I am defending the cause of Aulus Cluentius at this time rather than at that time. For the cause remains the same, and cannot by any means be altered; the violence of the times, and the unpopularity then stirred up, has passed away; so that the evil that existed in the time is now no injury to us, the good which there was in the cause is still advantageous to us. And, therefore, I perceive now how attentively I am listened to, not only by those to whom the judgment and the power of deciding belongs, but even by those whose influence is confined to their mere opinion. But if at that time I had been speaking, I should not have been listened to: not that the circumstances were different; they are exactly the same; but because the time was different—and of that you may feel quite sure. Who at that time could have dared to say? Oppianicus had been condemned because he was guilty? who now ventures to deny it? Who at that time could have ventured to assert that Oppianicus had endeavoured to corrupt the bench of judges with money? at the present time who is there who can deny it? Who, at that time, would have been suffered to mention that Oppianicus was prosecuted, after having been already condemned by two previous investigations? who is there at the present time who can attempt to invalidate this statement? > Latin: 80. me paenitet hoc tempore potius quam illo causam A.Auli Cluenti defendere. enim manet eadem, quae mutari nullo modo potest, temporis iniquitas atque invidia recessit, ut quod in tempore mali fuit nihil obsit, quod in causa boni fuit prosit. nunc quem ad modum audiar sentio, non modo ab eis quorum iudicium ac potestas est sed etiam ab illis quorum tantum est existimatio. tum si dicerem, non audirer, non quod alia res esset, immo eadem, sed tempus aliud. adeo sic cognoscite. tum auderet dicere nocentem condemnatum esse Oppianicum? quis nunc audet negare? tum posset arguere ab Oppianico temptatum esse iudicium pecunia? quis id hoc tempore infitiari potest? tum liceret docere Oppianicum reum factum esse tum denique cum duobus proximis praeiudiciis condemnatus esset? quis est qui id hoc tempore infirmare conetur? [¶11] 81. Wherefore, all party feeling being now out of the question, for time has removed that, my oration has begged you to dismiss it from your minds, and your good faith and justice has discarded it from an inquiry into truth; it is there besides in the cause that remains in doubt? It is perfectly notorious that bribery was practiced or attempted at that trial. The question is, By whom was it practiced; by the prosecutor, or by the defendant? The prosecutor says, “In the first place, I was prosecuting him on the most serious charges, so that I had no need of bribery; in the second place, I was prosecuting a man who was already condemned, so that he could not have been saved even by bribery; and lastly, even if he had been acquitted, my position and my fortune would have been uninjured by his acquittal.” What does the defendant say, on the other hand? “In the first place, I was alarmed at the very number and atrocity of the charges; in the second place, I felt that, after the Fabricii had been condemned on account of their being privy to my wickedness, I was condemned myself; lastly, I was in such a condition that my whole position and all my fortunes depended entirely on that one trial, from which I was in danger.” > Latin: 81. re invidia remota quam dies mitigavit, oratio mea deprecata est, vestra fides atque aequitas a veritatis disceptatione reiecit, quid est praeterea quod in causa relinquatur? esse in iudicio pecuniam constat; ea quaeritur unde profecta sit, ab accusatore an ab reo. accusator haec: “gravissimis criminibus accusabam, ut nihil opus esset pecunia; deinde condemnatum adducebam, ut ne eripi quidem pecunia posset; postremo, etiam si absolutus fuisset, mearum tamen omnium fortunarum status incolumis maneret.” contra reus? “ipsam multitudinem criminum et atrocitatem pertimescebam; deinde Fabriciis propter conscientiam mei sceleris condemnatis me esse condemnatum sentiebam: postremo in eum casum veneram ut omnis mearum fortunarum status unius iudici periculo contineretur.” [¶12] 82. Come now, since the one had many and grave reasons for bribing the judges, and the other had none, let us try to trace the course of the money itself. Cluentius has kept his accounts with the greatest accuracy; and this system has this in it, that by that means nothing can possibly be added to or taken from the income without its being known. It is eight years after that cause occupied men's attention that you are now handling, stirring up, and inquiring into everything which relates to it, both in his accounts and in the papers of others; and in the meantime you find no trace of any money of Cluentius's in the whole business. What then? Can we trace the money of Albius by the scent, or can you guide us, so that we may be able to enter into his very chamber, and find it there? There are in one place six hundred and forty thousand sesterces; they are in the possession of one most audacious man; they are in the possession of a judge. What would you have more? > Latin: 82. , quoniam corrumpendi iudici causas ille multas et gravis habuit, hic nullam, profectio ipsius pecuniae requiratur. tabulas diligentissime Cluentius. autem res habet hoc certe ut nihil possit neque additum neque detractum de re familiari latere. Anni sunt octo cum ista causa in ista meditatione versatur, cum omnia quae ad eam rem pertinent et ex huius et ex aliorum tabulis agitatis, tractatis, inquiritis, cum interea Cluentianae pecuniae vestigium nullum invenitis.? Albiana pecunia vestigiisne nobis odoranda est an ad ipsum cubile vobis ducibus venire possumus? uno in loco HS dcxl, tenentur apud hominem audacissimum, tenentur apud iudicem; quid voltis amplius? [¶13] 83. Oh, but Stalenus was not commissioned to corrupt the judges by Oppianicus, but by Cluentius. Why, when the judges were retiring to deliberate, did Cluentius and Canutius allow him to go away? Why, when they were going to give their votes, did they not require the presence of Stalenus the judge, to whom they had given the money Oppianicus did not for him; Quinctius did demand his presence. The tribunitian power was interposed to prevent a decision being come to without Stalenus. But he condemned him. To be sure, for he had given this condemnatory vote as a sort of pledge to Bulbus and the rest to prove that he had been cheated by Oppianicus. If, therefore, on one side, there is a reason for corrupting the tribunal; on one side, money; on one side, Stalenus; on one side, every description of fraud and audacity: and on the other side, modesty, an honourable life, and no suspicion of corruption, and no object in corrupting the tribunal; allow, now that the truth is made clear and all error dispelled, the discredit of that baseness to adhere to that side to which all the other wickednesses are attached; and allow the odium of it to depart at last from that man, whom you do not perceive to have ever been connected with any fault. > Latin: 83. enim Staienus non fuit ab Oppianico sed a Cluentio ad iudicium corrumpendum constitutus. eum, cum in consilium iretur, Cluentius et Cannutius abesse patiebantur? cur, cum in consilium mittebant, Staienum iudicem cui pecuniam dederant non requirebant? Oppianicus querebatur, Quinctius flagitabat; sine Staieno ne in consilium iretur tribunicia potestate effectum est. condemnavit. enim condemnationem dederat obsidem Bulbo et ceteris ut destitutus ab Oppianico videretur. re si istinc causa corrumpendi iudici, si istinc pecunia, istinc Staienus, istinc denique omnis fraus et audacia est, hinc pudor, honesta vita, nulla suspicio pecuniae, nulla corrumpendi iudici causa, patimini veritate patefacta atque omni errore sublato eo transire illius turpitudinis infamiam ubi cetera maleficia consistunt, ab eo invidiam discedere aliquando ad quem numquam accessisse culpam videtis. [¶14] 84. Oh, but Oppianicus gave Stalenus money, not to corrupt the judges, but to conciliate their favour. Can you, O Attius, can a man endued with your prudence, to say nothing of your knowledge of the world, and practice in pleading, say such a thing as this? For they say that he is the wisest man; to whom everything which is necessary is sure to occur of his own accord; and that he is next best to him, who is guided by the clever experience of another. But in folly it is just the contrary; for he is less foolish to whom no folly occurs spontaneously, than he who approves of the folly which occurs to another. That idea of conciliating favour Stalenus thought of, while the case was fresh, when he was held by the throat as it were; or rather, as people said at the time, he took the hint from Publius Cethegus, when he published that fable about conciliation and favour. > Latin: 84. enim pecuniam Staieno dedit Oppianicus non ad corrumpendum iudicium sed ad conciliationem gratiae. Tene hoc, Atti, dicere, tali prudentia, etiam usu atque exercitatione praeditum! esse dicunt eum cui quod opus sit ipsi veniat in mentem; proxime accedere illum qui alterius bene inventis obtemperet. stultitia contra est. enim stultus est is cui nihil in mentem venit quam ille qui quod stulte alteri venit in mentem comprobat. Staienus tum recenti re, cum faucibus premeretur — ⟨sive⟩ ultro excogitavit sive, ut homines tum loquebantur, a P.Publio Cethego admonitus ⟨est⟩ — istam dedit conciliationis et gratiae fabulam. [¶15] 85. For you can recollect that this was what men said at the time; that Cethegus, because he hated the man and because he wished to get rid of such rascality out of the republic, and because he saw that he who had confessed that, while a judge, he had secretly and irregularly taken money from a defendant, could not possibly get off, had given him treacherous advice. If Cethegus behaved dishonestly in this matter, he appears to me to have wished to get rid of an adversary; but if the case was such that Stalenus could not possibly deny that he had received the money, (and nothing could be more dangerous or more disgraceful than to confess for what purpose he had received it,) the advice of Cethegus is not to be blamed. > Latin: 85. fuisse hunc tum hominum sermonem recordari potestis, Cethegum, quod hominem odisset et quod eius improbitatem versari in re publica nollet et quod videret eum qui se ab reo pecuniam, cum iudex esset, clam atque extra ordinem accepisse confessus esset, salvum esse non posse, minus ei fidele consilium dedisse. hoc si improbus Cethegus fuit, videtur mihi adversarium removere voluisse; sin erat eius modi causa ut Staienus nummos se accepisse negare non posset, nihil autem erat periculosius nec turpius quam ad quam rem accepisset confiteri, non est consilium Cethegi reprendendum. [¶16] 86. But the case of Stalenus then was very different from what your case is now, O Attius. He, being pressed by the facts, could not possibly say anything which was not more creditable than confessing what had really happened. But I do marvel that you should have now brought up again the very same plea which was then hooted out of court and rejected; for how could Cluentius possibly become friends with Oppianicus, when he was at enmity with his mother? The names of the defendant and prosecutor were recorded in the public documents; the Fabricii had been condemned; Albius could not possibly escape if there were any other prosecutor, nor could Cluentius abandon the prosecution without rendering himself liable to the imputation of having trumped up a false accusation. > Latin: 86. alia causa tum Staieni fuit, alia nunc, Atti, tua est. cum re premeretur, quodcumque diceret, honestius diceret quam si quod erat factum fateretur; te vero illud idem quod tum explosum et eiectum est nunc rettulisse demiror. enim poterat tum in gratiam redire cum Oppianico Cluentius, qui cum matre? in tabulis publicis reus et accusator; condemnati erant Fabricii; nec elabi alio accusatore poterat Albius nec sine ignominia calumniae relinquere accusationem Cluentius. [¶17] 87. Was the money given to procure any collusion? That, too, has a direct reference to corrupting the judges. But what was the necessity for employing a judge as an agent in such a business? And above all things, what need was there for transacting the whole business through the agency of Stalenus, a man perfectly unconnected with either party, —a most sordid and infamous man—rather than through the intervention of some respectable person, some common friend or connection of both parties? But why need I discuss this matter at length, as if there were any obscurity in the business, when the very money which was given to Stalenus, proves by its amount and by its sum total, not only how much it was, but for what purpose it was given? I say that it was necessary to bribe sixteen judges, in order to procure the acquittal of Oppianicus; I say that six hundred and forty thousand sesterces were taken to Stalenus's house. If, as you say, this was for the purpose of conciliating good-will, what is the meaning of that addition of forty thousand sesterces? but if, as we say, it was in order that forty thousand sesterces might be given to each judge, then Archimedes himself could not calculate more accurately. > Latin: 87. vero praevaricaretur? nam id quoque ad corrumpendum iudicium pertinet. quid opus erat ad eam rem iudice sequestre? et omnino quam ob rem tota ista res per Staienum potius, hominem ab utroque alienissimum, sordidissimum, turpissimum, quam per bonum aliquem virum ageretur et amicum necessariumque communem? quid ego haec pluribus quasi de re obscura disputo, cum ipsa pecunia quae Staieno data est numero ac summa sua non modo quanta fuerit sed etiam ad quam rem fuerit ostendat? Sedecim dico iudices ut Oppianicus absolveretur corrumpendos fuisse; ad Staienum dcxl milia nummum esse delata., ut tu dicis, gratiae conciliandae causa, quadraginta istorum accessio milium quid valet? si, ut nos dicimus, ut quadragena milia nummum sedecim iudicibus darentur, non Archimedes melius potuit discribere. [¶18] 88. But a great many decisions have been come to, tending to prove that the tribunal was corrupted by Cluentius. I say, on the other hand, that before this time, that matter has never been brought before the court at all on its own merits. The matter has been so very much canvassed, and has been so long the subject of discussion, that this is the very first day that a word has been said in defence of Cluentius; this is the very first day that truth, relying on these judges, he ventured to lift up her voice against the popular feeling. However, what are all those numerous decisions? for I have prepared myself to encounter everything, and I am ready to show that the decisions which were said to have been come to afterwards, bearing on that decision, were, as to some of them, more like an earthquake or a tempest, than an orderly judgment or a regular decision; that, as to some of them they had no weight against Habitus at all; that some of them even told in his favour; and that some were such that they were never called judicial decisions at all, and never even thought so. > Latin: 88. enim iudicia facta permulta sunt a Cluentio iudicium esse corruptum. vero ante hoc tempus omnino ista ipsa res suo nomine in iudicium numquam est vocata. multum agitata, ita diu iactata ista res est ut hodierno die primum causa illa defensa sit, hodierno die primum veritas vocem contra invidiam his iudicibus freta miserit. tamen ista multa iudicia quae sunt? enim me ad omnia confirmavi et sic paravi ut docerem quae facta postea iudicia de illo iudicio dicerentur, partim ruinae similiora aut tempestati quam iudicio et disceptationi fuisse, partim nihil contra valere, partim etiam pro hoc esse, partim esse eius modi ut neque appellata umquam iudicia sint neque existimata. [¶19] 89. Here I, rather for the sake of adhering to the usual custom, than from any fear that you would not do so of your own accord, will beg of you to listen to me with attention, while I discuss each of these decisions. Caius Junius, who presided over that trial, has been condemned; add that also, if you please,—he was condemned at the time that he was a criminal judge. No relaxation of the prosecution or mitigation of the law was procured by the means of any one of the tribunes of the people. At a time that it was contrary to law for him to be taken away from the investigation of the case before him to discharge any duty to the republic whatever;—at that very time, I say, he was hurried off to the investigation. But to what investigation? For the expression of your countenances, O judges, invites me to say freely what I had thought I must have suppressed. > Latin: 89. ego magis ut consuetudinem servem quam quod vos non vestra hoc sponte faciatis, petam a vobis ut me, dum de his singulis disputo, iudices, attente audiatis. est C.Gaius Iunius qui ei quaestioni praefuerat; adde etiam illud, si placet: tum est condemnatus cum esset iudex quaestionis. modo causae sed ne legi quidem quicquam per tribunum plebis laxamenti datum est. tempore illum a quaestione ad nullum aliud rei publicae munus abduci licebat, eo tempore ad quaestionem ipse abreptus est. quam quaestionem? enim vestri, iudices, me invitant ut quae reticenda putaram libeat iam libere dicere. [¶20] 90. What shall I say? Was that then an investigation, or a discussion, or a decision? I will suppose it was. Let him, who wishes today to speak on the subject of the people having been excited, say whose wishes were at that time complied with; let him say on what account Junius gave his decision. Whomsoever you ask, you will get this answer;—Because he received money, because he unfairly crushed an innocent man. This is the common opinion. But if that were the truth, he ought to have been prosecuted under the same law as Habitus is impeached under. But he himself was carrying on an investigation according to that law. Quinctius would have waited a few days. But he was unwilling to accuse him as a private man, and when the odium of the business had been allayed. You see then that all the hope of the accuser was not in the cause itself, but in the time and in the influence of individuals. > Latin: 90. ? illa tandem quaestio aut disceptatio aut iudicium fuit? fuisse. qui volt hodie de illo populo concitato, cui tum populo mos gestus est, qua de re Iunius causam dixerit; quemcumque rogaveris, hoc respondebit, quod pecuniam acceperit, quod innocentem circumvenerit. haec opinio., si ita esset, hac lege accusatum fuisse oportuit qua accusatur. ipse ea lege quaerebat. dies exspectasset Quinctius. neque privatus accusare nec sedata iam invidia volebat. igitur non in causa sed in tempore ac potestate spem omnem accusatoris fuisse. [¶21] 91. He sought a fine. According to what law? Because he had not taken the oath to observe the law: a thing which never yet was brought against any man as a crime: and because Caius Verres, the city praetor, a very conscientious and careful man, had not the list out of which judges were to be chosen in the place of those who had been rejected, in that book which was then produced full of erasures. On all these accounts Caius Junius was condemned, O judges, for these trivial and unproved reasons, which had no business to have been ever brought before the court at all. And therefore he was defeated, not on the merits of his case, but by the time. > Latin: 91. petivit. lege? in legem non iurasset, quae res nemini umquam fraudi fuit, et quod C.Gaius Verres, praetor urbanus, homo sanctus et diligens, subsortitionem eius in eo codice non haberet qui tum interlitus proferebatur. de causis C.Gaius Iunius condemnatus est, iudices, levissimis et infirmissimis, quas omnino in iudicium adferri non oportuit. oppressus est non causa sed tempore. [¶22] 92. Do you think that this decision ought to be any hindrance to Cluentius? On what account? If Junius had not appointed the judges in the place of those who had been objected to according to law—if he had omitted to take the oath to obey the law—does it follow that any decision bearing on Cluentius's case was pronounced or implied in his condemnation? “No,” says he; “but he was condemned by these laws, because he had committed an offence against another law.” Can those who admit this urge also in defence that that was a regular decision? “Therefore,” says he, “the praetor was hostile to Junius on this account, because the tribunal was thought to have been bribed by his means.” Was then the whole cause changed at this time? Is the case different, is the principle of that decision different, is the nature of the whole business different now from what it was then? I do not think that of all the things that were done then anything can be altered. > Latin: 92. vos Cluentio iudicium putatis obesse oportere? quam ob causam? ex lege subsortitus non erat Iunius aut si in aliquam legem aliquando non iuraverat, idcirco illius damnatione aliquid de Cluentio iudicabatur? “” inquit; “sed ille idcirco illis legibus condemnatus est, quod contra aliam legem commiserat.” hoc confitentur, possunt idem illud iudicium fuisse defendere? “” inquit “idcirco infestus tum populus Romanus fuit C.Gaio Iunio, quod illud iudicium corruptum per eum putabatur.” igitur hoc tempore causa mutata est? num alia res, alia ratio illius iudici, alia natura totius negoti nunc est ac tum fuit? opinor ex eis rebus quae gestae sunt rem ullam potuisse mutari. [¶23] 93. What, then, is the reason why our defence is listened to with such silence now, but that all opportunity of defending himself was refused to Junius then? Because at that time there was nothing in the cause but envy, mistake, suspicion, daily assemblies, seditiously stirred up by appeals to popular feeling. The same tribune of the people was the accuser before the assemblies, and the prosecutor in the courts of law. Be came into the court of justice not from the, assembly, but bringing the whole assembly with him. Those steps of Aurelius, which were new at that time, appeared as if they had been built on purpose for a theatre for the display of that tribunal. And when the prosecutor had filled them with men in a state of great excitement, there was not only no opportunity of speaking in favour of the defendant, but none of even rising up to speak. > Latin: 93. ergo est causae quod nunc nostra defensio audiatur tanto silentio, tum Iunio defendendi sui potestas erepta sit? tum in causa nihil erat praeter invidiam, errorem, suspicionem, contiones cotidianas seditiose ac populariter concitatas. tribunus plebis idem in contionibus, idem ad subsellia; ad iudicium non modo de contione sed etiam cum ipsa contione veniebat. illi Aurelii tum novi quasi pro theatro illi iudicio aedificati videbantur; quos ubi accusator concitatis hominibus complerat, non modo dicendi ab reo sed ne surgendi quidem potestas erat. [¶24] 94. It happened lately, before Caius Orchinius, my colleague, that the judges refused to sanction a prosecution against Faustus Sulla, in a cause concerning some money which remained unpaid. Not because they considered that Sulla was an outlaw, or because they thought the cause of the public money insignificant or contemptible; but because, when a tribune of the people was the accuser, they did not think that there could be a fair trial. What? Shall I compare Sulla with Junius? or this tribune of the people with Quinctius? or one time with the other time? Sulla, with his great wealth, his numerous relations, connections, friends, and clients; but in the case of Junius all these things were small, and insignificant, and collected and acquired by his own exertions. The one a tribune of the people, moderate, modest, not only not seditious himself, but an enemy to seditious men; the other bitter, fond of raking up accusations, a hunter after popularity, and a turbulent man. The present a tranquil and a peaceable time; the former time one ruffled with every imaginable storm of ill-will. And as all this was the case, still in the case of Faustus those judges decided that a defendant was brought before the court on very unfair terms, when his adversary was in possession of the greatest power known to the state, which he could avail himself of to add force to his accusations. > Latin: 94. apud C.Gaium Orchivium, conlegam meum, locus ab iudicibus Fausto Sullae de pecuniis residuis non est constitutus, non quo illi aut exlegem esse Sullam aut causam pecuniae publicae contemptam atque abiectam putarent, sed quod accusante tribuno plebis condicione aequa disceptari posse non putaverunt. conferam? Sullamne cum Iunio, an hunc tribunum plebis cum Quinctio, an vero tempus cum tempore? Sulla maximis opibus, cognatis, adfinibus, necessariis, clientibus plurimis, haec autem apud Iunium parva et infirma et ipsius labore quaesita atque conlecta; hic tribunus plebis modestus, pudens, non modo non seditiosus sed etiam seditiosis adversarius, ille autem acerbus, criminosus, popularis homo ac turbulentus; tempus hoc tranquillum atque placatum, illud omnibus invidiae tempestatibus concitatum. cum ita essent, in Fausto tamen illi iudices statuerunt iniqua condicione reum causam dicere, cum adversario eius ad ius accusationis summa vis potestatis accederet. [¶25] 95. And this principle you, O judges, ought, as your wisdom and humanity prompts and enables you to do, to consider over in your mind carefully; and to be thoroughly aware what disaster and what danger the tribunitian power can bring upon every one individual among us, especially when it is egged on by party spirit, and by assemblies of the people, stirred up in a seditious manner. In the very best times, forsooth, when men defended themselves, not by boastings addressed to the populace, but by their own worth and innocence, still neither Publius Popillius, nor Quintus Metellus, most illustrious and most honourable men, could withstand the power of the tribunes; much less at the present time, with such manners as we now have, and such magistrates, can we possibly be saved without the aid of your wisdom, and without the relief which is afforded by the courts of justice. > Latin: 95. quidem rationem vos, iudices, diligenter pro vestra sapientia et humanitate cogitare et penitus perspicere debetis, quid mali, quantum periculi uni cuique nostrum inferre possit vis tribunicia, conflata praesertim invidia et contionibus seditiose concitatis. hercule temporibus, tum cum homines se non iactatione populari sed dignitate atque innocentia tuebantur, tamen nec P.Publius Popilius neque Q.Quintus Metellus, clarissimi viri atque amplissimi, vim tribuniciam sustinere potuerunt, nedum his temporibus, his moribus, his magistratibus sine vestra sapientia ac sine iudiciorum remediis salvi esse possimus. [¶26] 96. That court of justice then, O judges, was not like a court of justice; for in it there was no moderation preserved, no regard was had to custom and usage, nor was the cause of the defendant properly advocated. It was all violence, and, as I have said before, a sort of earthquake or tempest,—it was anything rather than a court of justice, or a legal discussion, or a judicial investigation. But if there be any one who thinks that that was a regular proceeding, and who thinks it right to adhere to the decision that was then delivered; still he ought to separate this cause from that one. For it is said that a great many things were demanded of him either because he had not taken the oath to observe the law, or because he had not cast lots for electing judges in the room of those to whom objection had been made in a legal manner. But the case of Cluentius can in no particular be connected with these, laws, in accordance with which a penalty was sought to be recovered from Junius. > Latin: 96. fuit illud igitur iudicium iudici simile, iudices, non fuit, in quo non modus ullus est adhibitus, non mos consuetudoque servata, non causa defensa; vis illa fuit et, ut saepe iam dixi, ruina quaedam atque tempestas et quidvis potius quam iudicium aut disceptatio aut quaestio. si quis est qui illud iudicium fuisse arbitretur et qui his rebus iudicatis standum putet, is tamen hanc causam ab illa debet seiungere. illo enim, sive quod in legem non iurasset sive quod ex lege subsortitus iudicem non esset, multa petita esse dicitur; Cluenti autem ratio cum illis legibus quibus a Iunio multa petita est nulla potest ex parte esse coniuncta. [¶27] 97. Oh, but Bulbus also was condemned. Add that he was condemned of treason, in order that you may understand that this trial has no connection with that one. But this charge was brought against him. I confess it; but it was also made evident by the letters of Caius Cosconius and by the evidence of many witnesses, that a legion in Illyricum had been tampered with by him; and that charge was one peculiarly belonging to that sort of investigation, and was one which was comprehended under the law of treason. But this was an exceedingly great disadvantage to him. That is mere guess work; and if we may have recourse to that, take care, I beg you, that my conjecture be not far the more accurate of the two. For my opinion is, that Bulbus, because he was a worthless, base, dishonest man, and because he came before the court contaminated with many crimes of the deepest dye, was on that account the more easily condemned. But you, out of Bulbus's whole case, select that which seems to suit your own purpose, in order that you may say that it was that which influenced the judges. > Latin: 97. enim etiam Bulbus est condemnatus. “maiestatis,” ut intellegas hoc iudicium cum illo non esse coniunctum. est hoc illi crimen obiectum., sed etiam legionem esse ab eo sollicitatam in Illyrico C.Gaii Cosconi litteris et multorum testimoniis planum factum est, quod crimen erat proprium illius quaestionis et quae res lege maiestatis tenebatur. hoc obfuit ei maxime. ista divinatio est; qua si uti licet, vide ne mea coniectura multo sit verior. enim sic arbitror, Bulbum, quod homo nequam, turpis, improbus, multis flagitiis contaminatus in iudicium sit adductus, idcirco facilius esse damnatum. mihi ex tota causa Bulbi quod tibi commodum est eligis ut id esse secutos iudices dicas. [¶28] 98. Therefore, this decision in the case of Bulbus ought not to be any greater injury to this cause, than those two which were mentioned by the prosecutor in the case of Publius Popillius and Titus Gutta, who were prosecuted for corruption,—who were accused by men who had themselves been convicted of bribery, and whom I do not imagine to have been restored to their original position merely because they had proved that these other men also had taken money for the purpose of influencing their decision, or because they proved to the judges that they had detected others in the same sort of offence of which they had themselves been guilty; and that, therefore, they were entitled to the rewards offered by the law. Therefore, I think that no one can doubt that that conviction for bribery can in no possible way be connected with the cause of Cluentius and with your decision. > Latin: 98. hoc Bulbi iudicium non plus huic obesse causae debet quam illa quae commemorata sunt ab accusatore duo iudicia P.Publii Popili et Ti.Tiberii Guttae, qui causam de ambitu dixerunt, qui accusati sunt ab eis qui erant ipsi ambitus condemnati; quos ego non idcirco esse arbitror in integrum restitutos quod planum fecerint illos ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepisse sed quod iudicibus probarint, cum in eodem genere in quo ipsi offendissent alios reprendissent, se ad praemia legis venire oportere. neminem dubitare existimo quin illa damnatio ambitus nulla ex parte cum causa Cluenti vestroque iudicio coniuncta esse possit. [¶29] 99. What! not if Stalenus was condemned? I do not say at this present moment, O judges, that which I am not sure ought to be said at all, that he was convicted of treason,—I do not read over to you the testimonies of most honourable men, which were given against Stalenus by men who were lieutenants, and prefects, and military tribunes, under Mamercus Aemilius, that most illustrious man, by whose evidence it was made quite plain that it was chiefly through his instrumentality, when he was quaestor, that a seditious spirit was stirred up in the army. I do not even read to you that evidence which was given concerning these six hundred thousand sesterces, which when he had received on presences connected with the trial of Safinius, he retained and embezzled as he did afterwards in the case of the trial of Oppianicus. > Latin: 99. quod Staienus est condemnatus? dico hoc tempore, iudices, id quod nescio an dici oporteat, illum maiestatis esse condemnatum; non recito testimonia hominum honestissimorum quae in Staienum sunt dicta ab eis qui Mam. Aemilio, clarissimo viro, legati et praefecti et tribuni militares fuerunt; quorum testimoniis planum factum est maxime eius opera, cum quaestor esset, in exercitu seditionem esse conflatam; ne illa quidem testimonia recito quae dicta sunt de HS dc quae ille, cum accepisset nomine iudici Safiniani, sicut in Oppianici iudicio postea, reticuit atque suppressit. [¶30] 100. I say nothing of all these things, and of many others which were stated against Stalenus at that trial. This I do say,—that Publius and Lucius Cominius, Roman knights, most honourable and eloquent men, had the same dispute with Stalenus then, whom they were accusing, that I now have with Attius. The Cominii said the same thing that I say now,—that Stalenus received money from Oppianicus to induce him to corrupt the tribunal, and Stalenus said that he had received it to conciliate good-will towards him. > Latin: 100. et haec et alia permulta quae illo iudicio in Staienum dicta sunt; hoc dico, eandem tum fuisse P.Publio et L.Lucio Cominiis, equitibus Romanis, honestis hominibus et disertis, controversiam cum Staieno quem accusabant quae nunc mihi est cum Attio. Cominii dicebant idem quod ego dico, Staienum ab Oppianico pecuniam accepisse ut iudicium corrumperet; Staienus conciliandae gratiae causa se accepisse dicebat. [¶31] 101. This conciliation of good-will was laughed at, and so was this assumption of the character of a good man, as in the gilded statues which he erected in front of the temple of Juturna, at the bottom of which he had the following inscription engraved,—“that the kings had been restored by him to the favour of the people.” All his frauds and dishonest tricks were brought under discussion; his whole life, which has been spent in such a way as that, was laid open; his domestic poverty, the profits which he made in the courts of law, were all brought to light: an interpreter of peace and concord who regulated everything by the bribes which he received was not approved of. Therefore, Stalenus was condemned at that time, while he urged the same defence as Attius did. > Latin: 101. haec illius reconciliatio et persona viri boni suscepta, sicut in statuis inauratis quas posuit ad Iuturnae, quibus subscripsit reges ab se in gratiam esse reductos. omnes eius fraudes atque fallaciae, tota vita in eius modi ratione versata aperiebatur, egestas domestica, quaestus forensis in medium proferebatur, nummarius interpres pacis et concordiae non probabatur. tum Staienus cum idem defenderet quod Attius condemnatus est; [¶32] 102. When the Cominii did the same thing that I have done throughout the whole of this cause, people approved of them. Wherefore, if by the condemnation of Stalenus it was decided that Oppianicus had desired to corrupt the judges,—that Oppianicus had given one of the judges money to purchase the votes of the other judges, (since it has been already settled that either Cluentius is guilty of that offence, or else Oppianicus, but that no trace whatever is found of any money belonging to Cluentius having been ever given to any judge, while money belonging to Oppianicus was taken away, after the trial was over, from a judge,)—can it be doubtful that that conviction of Stalenus does not only not make against Cluentius, but is the greatest possible confirmation of our cause and of our defence? > Latin: 102. Cominii cum hoc agerent quod nos in tota causa egimus probaverunt. ob rem, si Staieni damnatione Oppianicum iudicium corrumpere voluisse, Oppianicum iudici ad emendas sententias dedisse pecuniam iudicatum est, ⟨et,⟩ cum ita constitutum sit ut in illa culpa aut Cluentius sit aut Oppianicus, Cluenti nummus nullus iudici datus ullo vestigio reperitur, Oppianici pecunia post iudicium factum ab iudice ablata est: potest esse dubium quin illa damnatio Staieni non modo non sit contra Cluentium sed maxime nostram causam defensionemque confirmet? [¶33] 103. Therefore, I see now that the case respecting the decision of Junius is of this nature, that I think it ought to be called an inroad of sedition, an instance of the violence of the multitude, an outrage on the part of a tribune, any thing rather than a judicial proceeding. But if any one calls that a regular trial, still he must inevitably admit this,—that that penalty which was sought to be recovered from Junius cannot by any means be connected with the cause of Cluentius. That decision of the tribunal over which Junius presided, was brought about by evidence. The cases of Bulbus, of Popillius, and of Gutta, do not make against Cluentius. That of Stalenus is actually in favour of Cluentius. Let us now see if there is any other decision which we can produce which is favourable to Cluentius. Was not Caius Fidiculanius Falcula, who had condemned Oppianicus, prosecuted especially because—and that was the point which in that trial was the hardest to excuse—he had sat as judge a few days after the appointment of a substitute? He was, indeed, prosecuted, and that twice. For Lucius Quinctius had brought him into extreme unpopularity by means of daily seditious and turbulent assemblies. On one trial a penalty was sought to be recovered from him, as from Junius, because he had sat as judge, not in his own decury, nor according to the law. He was prosecuted at a rather more peaceable time than Junius, but under almost the same law, and on very nearly the same indictment. But because at the trial shore was no sedition, no violence, and no crowd, he was easily acquitted at the first hearing. I do not count this acquittal. … What was Fidiculanius said to have done? > Latin: 103. adhuc Iuni iudicium video esse eius modi ut incursionem potius seditionis, vim multitudinis, impetum tribunicium quam iudicium appellandum putem. si quis illud iudicium appellet, tamen hoc confiteatur necesse est, nullo modo illam multam quae ab Iunio petita sit cum Cluenti causa posse coniungi. igitur Iunianum per vim factum est, Bulbi et Popili et Guttae contra Cluentium non est, Staieni etiam pro Cluentio est. ecquod aliud iudicium quod pro Cluentio sit proferre possimus. tandem causam C.Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula qui Oppianicum condemnarat, cum praesertim, id quod fuit in illo iudicio invidiosissimum, paucos dies ex subsortitione sedisset? et bis quidem dixit. summam enim L.Lucius Quinctius invidiam contionibus eum cotidianis seditiosis et turbulentis adduxerat. Vno iudicio multa est ab eo petita, sicut ab Iunio, quod non suae decuriae munere neque ex lege sedisset. Paulo sedatiore tempore est accusatus quam Iunius, sed eadem fere lege et crimine. nulla in iudicio seditio neque vis nec turba versata est, prima actione facillime est absolutus. numero hanc absolutionem; nihilo minus enim potest, ut illam multam non commiserit, accepisse tamen ob rem iudicandam, ⟨sicut causam pecunia ob rem iudicandam⟩ capta nusquam Staienus ea quidem lege dixit. crimen illud quaestionis eius non fuit.