137. But I ask of you whether Lucius Lucullus, the consul, a very wise man, passed that law according to that resolution of the senate? I ask whether Marcus Lucullus and Caius Cassius passed that law, against whom, when they were the consuls elect, the senate passed the very same resolution? They did not pass it. And that which you assert to have been brought about by Habitus's money, though you do not confirm your assertion by even the very slightest circumstances of suspicion, was done in the first instance by the justice and wisdom of those consuls, in order that men might not think that what the senate had decreed for the purpose of extinguishing the flames of present unpopularity, might afterwards be referred to the people. The Roman people itself afterwards, which formerly when excited by the fictitious complaints of Lucius Quinctius, a tribune of the people, had demanded that thing and the proposal of that law, now being influenced by the tears of the son of Caius Junius, a little boy, rejected the whole law and the whole proposition with the greatest outcry and with the greatest eagerness.
137. quaero a vobis num istam legem ex isto senatus consulto L.Lucius Lucullus consul, homo sapientissimus, tulerit, num anno post M.Marcus Lucullus et C.Gaius Cassius, in quos tum consules designatos idem illud senatus decreverat. tulerunt; et quod tu pecunia factum esse arguis neque id ulla tenuissima suspicione confirmas, factum est primum illorum aequitate et sapientia consulum, ut, quod senatus decreverat ad illud invidiae praesens incendium restinguendum, id postea referendum ad populum non arbitrarentur. deinde populus Romanus qui L.Lucii Quincti fictis querimoniis antea concitatus rem illam et rogationem flagitarat, idem C.Gaii Iuni fili, pueri parvoli, lacrimis commotus maximo clamore et concursu totam quaestionem illam et legem repudiavit.
138. From which that was easy to be understood which has been often said,—that as the sea, which by its own nature is tranquil, is often agitated and disturbed by the violence of the winds, so, too, the Roman people is, when left to itself, placable, but is easily roused by the language of seditious men, as by the most violent storm. There is also one other very great authority besides, which I had almost passed over in a shameful manner; for it is said to be my own. Attius read out of some oration or other, which he said was mine, a certain exhortation to the judges to judge honestly, and a certain mention of judicial decisions in other cases, which had not been approved of, and also of that very trial before Junius; just as if I had not said at the beginning of this defence, that had been a trial which had incurred great unpopularity; or as if, when I was discussing the discredit into which the courts of justice had fallen in some instances, I could possibly at that time pass over that one which was so notorious.
138. quo intellegi potuit, id quod saepe dictum est, ut mare quod sua natura tranquillum sit ventorum vi agitari atque turbari, sic populum Romanum sua sponte esse placatum, hominum seditiosorum vocibus ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari. etiam reliqua permagna auctoritas quam ego turpiter paene praeterii; mea enim esse dicitur. ex oratione nescio qua Attius quam meam esse dicebat cohortationem quandam iudicum ad honeste iudicandum et commemorationem cum aliorum iudiciorum quae probata non essent tum illius ipsius iudici Iuniani; proinde quasi ego non ab initio huius defensionis dixerim invidiosum illud iudicium fuisse aut, cum de infamia iudiciorum disputarem, potuerim illud quod tam populare esset illo tempore praeterire.
139. But I, if I said anything of that sort, did not mention it as a thing within my own knowledge, nor did I state it in evidence; and that speech was prompted rather by the occasion, than by my judgment and deliberate intention. For when I was acting as accuser, and had proposed to myself at the beginning to rouse the feelings of the Roman people and of the judges; and as I was mentioning all the errors of the courts of justice, relying not on my own opinion, but on the common report of men; I could not pass over that matter which had been so universally discussed. But whoever thinks that he has my positive opinions recorded indelibly in those orations which we have delivered in the courts of justice, is greatly mistaken. For all those speeches are speeches of the cause, and of the occasion, and are not the speeches of the men or of the advocates themselves. For if the causes themselves could speak for themselves, no one would employ an orator. But, as it is, we are employed, in order to say, not things which are to be considered as asserted on our own authority, but things which are derived from the circumstances of the cause itself.
139. vero si quid eius modi dixi, neque cognitum commemoravi neque pro testimonio dixi, et illa oratio potius temporis mei quam iudici et auctoritatis fuit. enim accusarem et mihi initio proposuissem ut animos et populi Romani et iudicum commoverem, cumque omnis offensiones iudiciorum non ex mea opinione sed ex hominum rumore proferrem, istam rem quae tam populariter esset agitata praeterire non potui. errat vehementer, si quis in orationibus nostris quas in iudiciis habuimus auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur. enim illae causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum aut patronorum. si causae ipsae pro se loqui possent, nemo adhiberet oratorem. adhibemur ut ea dicamus, non quae auctoritate nostra constituantur sed quae ex re ipsa causaque ducantur.
140. They say that that able man, Marcus Antonius, was accustomed to say, “that he had never written a speech, in order that, if at any time he had said anything which was not desirable, he might be able to deny that he had said it.” Just as if whatever were said or pleaded by us was not retained in men's memories, if we did not ourselves commit it to writing. But I, with respect to speeches of that sort, am guided by the authority of many men, and especially of that most eloquent and most wise man, Lucius Crassus; who—when he was defending Lucius Plancius, whom Marcus Brutus, a man both vehement and able as a speaker, was prosecuting; when Brutus, having set two men to read, made them read alternate chapters out of two speeches of his, entirely contrary to one another, because when he was arguing against that motion which was introduced against the colony of Narbo, he disparaged the authority of the senate as much as he could, but when he was urging the adoption of the Servilian law, he extolled the senate with the most excessive praises; and when he had read out of that oration many things which had been spoken with some harshness against the Roman knights, in order to inflame the minds of those judges against Crassus—is said to have been a good deal agitated.
140. ingeniosum, M.Marcum Antonium, aiunt solitum esse dicere “idcirco se nullam umquam orationem scripsisse ut, si quid aliquando non opus esset ab se esse dictum, posset negare dixisse”; proinde quasi, si quid a nobis dictum aut actum sit, id nisi litteris mandarimus, hominum memoria non comprehendatur. vero in isto genere libentius cum multorum tum hominis eloquentissimi et sapientissimi, L.Lucii Crassi, auctoritatem sequor qui, cum Cn.Gnaeum Plancum defenderet accusante M.Marco Bruto, homine in dicendo vehementi et callido, cum Brutus duobus recitatoribus constitutis ex duabus eius orationibus capita alterna inter se contraria recitanda curasset, quod in dissuasione rogationis eius quae contra coloniam Narbonensem ferebatur quantum potest de auctoritate senatus detrahit, in suasione legis Serviliae summis ornat senatum laudibus, et multa in equites Romanos cum ex ea oratione asperius dicta recitasset quo animi illorum iudicum in Crassum incenderentur, aliquantum esse commotus dicitur.
141. And so, in making his reply, he first of all explained the difference between the two times, so that the speech might appear to have arisen from the case and from its circumstances; after that, in order that Brutus might learn what a man, not only eloquent but endued with the greatest wit and facetiousness, he had provoked, he himself in his turn brought up three readers with a book a piece, all which books Marcus Brutus, the father of the prosecutor, had left, on the civil law. When the first lines of them were read, those which I take to be known to all of you, “It happened by chance that I and Brutus my son were in the country near Privernum,” he asked what had become of his farm at Privernum. “I and Brutus my son were in the district of Alba.” He begged to know where his Alban farm was. “Once, when I and Brutus my son had sat down in the fields near Tibur.” Where was his farm near Tibur? And he said that “Brutus, a wise man, seeing the profligacy of his son, evidently wished to leave a record behind him of what farms he left him. And if he could with any decency have written that he had been in the bath with a son of that age, he would not have passed it over; and still that he preferred inquiring about those baths, not from the books of his father, but from the registers and the census.” Crassus then chastised Brutus in this manner, and made him repent of his readings. For perhaps he had been annoyed at being reproved for those speeches which he had delivered in the affairs of the republic; in which perhaps deliberate wisdom is more required than in those in court.
141. in respondendo primum exposuit utriusque rationem temporis ut oratio ex re et ex causa habita videretur, deinde ut intellegere posset Brutus quem hominem et non solum qua eloquentia verum etiam quo lepore et quibus facetiis praeditum lacessisset, tris ipse excitavit recitatores cum singulis libellis quos M. Brutus, pater illius accusatoris, de iure civili reliquit. Eorum initia cum recitarentur, ea quae vobis nota esse arbitror: “evenit ut ruri in Privernati essemus ego et Brutus filius,” fundum Privernatem flagitabat; “Albano eramus ego et Brutus filius,” Albanum poscebat; “Tiburti forte cum adsedissemus ego et Brutus filius,” Tiburtem fundum requirebat; Brutum autem, hominem sapientem, quod fili nequitiam videret, quae praedia ei relinqueret testificari voluisse dicebat. si potuisset honeste scribere se in balneis cum id aetatis filio fuisse, non praeterisset; eas se tamen ab eo balneas non ex libris patris sed ex tabulis et ex censu quaerere. Crassus tum ita Brutum ultus est ut illum recitationis suae paeniteret; moleste enim fortasse tulerat se in eis orationibus reprehensum quas de re publica habuisset, in quibus forsitan magis requiratur constantia. autem illa recitata esse non moleste fero.
142. But I am not at all vexed at those things having been read. For they were not unsuited to the state of the times which then existed, nor to the cause in which they were spoken. Nor did I take any obligation on myself when I spoke them, to prevent my defending this cause with honour and freedom. But suppose I were now to confess, that I had now become acquainted with the real merits of Cluentius's case, but that I was previously influenced by popular opinion concerning it, who could blame me especially when, O judges, it is most reasonable that this also should be granted me by you, which I begged at the beginning, and which I request now, that if you have brought with you into court a somewhat unfavourable opinion of this cause, you will lay it aside now that you have thoroughly investigated the case and learnt the whole truth.
142. enim ab illo tempore quod tum erat, neque ab ea causa quae tum agebatur aliena fuerunt; neque mihi quicquam oneris suscepi, cum ita dixi, quo minus honeste hanc causam et libere possem defendere. si velim confiteri me causam A.Auli Cluenti nunc cognosse, antea fuisse in ea opinione populari, quis tandem id possit reprehendere? praesertim, iudices, cum a vobis quoque ipsis hoc impetrari sit aequissimum quod ego et ab initio petivi et nunc peto ut, si quam huc graviorem de illo iudicio opinionem attulistis, hanc causa perspecta atque omni veritate cognita deponatis.
143. Now since, O Titus Attius, I replied to everything which was said by you concerning the condemnation of Oppianicus, you must inevitably confess that you were very much deceived when you thought that I would defend the cause of Aulus Cluentius, not by arguing on his own actions, but on the law. For you very often said that you had been informed that I intended to defend this action, relying on the protection of the law. Is it so? Are we, then, without knowing it, betrayed by our friends? and is there some one among those whom we think our friends, who carries intelligence of our plans to our adversaries? Who reported this to you? Who was so dishonest? But to whom did I tell it? No one I imagine, is in fault; but in truth it was the law itself which suggested this to you. But do I appear to have defended it in such a way as to have made throughout the whole case the least mention of the law? Do I appear to have defended this cause differently from the way in which I should have defended it if Habitus had been guilty by law, supposing the facts to be proved? Certainly, as far as a man may assert a thing positively, I have omitted no opportunity of clearing him from the odious imputation sought to be cast on him.
143. , quoniam ad omnia quae abs te dicta sunt, T.Titi Atti, de Oppianici damnatione respondi, confiteare necesse est te opinionem multum fefellisse, quod existimaris me causam A.Auli Cluenti non facto eius sed lege defensurum. hoc persaepe dixisti tibi sic renuntiari, me habere in animo causam hanc praesidio legis defendere. est? ab amicis imprudentes videlicet prodimur, et est nescio quis de eis quos amicos nobis arbitramur qui nostra consilia ad adversarios deferat. hoc tibi renuntiavit, quis tam improbus fuit? cui ego autem narravi?, ut opinor, in culpa est; nimirum tibi istud lex ipsa renuntiavit. num tibi ita defendisse videor ut tota in causa mentionem ullam legis fecerim, num secus hanc causam defendisse ac si lege teneretur?, ut hominem confirmare oportet, nullus est locus a me purgandi istius invidiosi criminis praetermissus.
144. What do I mean, then? Some one will ask, perhaps, whether I have any objection to ward off danger from a client's life by the protection with which the law supplies me? I have no objection at all, O judges; but I adhere to my own plan of action. In a trial in which all honourable and a wise man is concerned, I have been accustomed, not only to consult my own judgment, but very much also to be guided by the judgment and inclination of him whom I am defending. For when this cause was brought to me, as to a person who ought to know the laws on which we are employed, and to which we devote ourselves, I said at once to Habitus that he was perfectly safe from the law about “those who conspired together to procure a man's condemnation;” but that our order was liable to be impeached under that law. And he began to beg and entreat me not to defend him by urging points of law. And when I said what I thought, he brought me over to his opinion; for he affirmed with tears that he was not more desirous of retaining his freedom as a citizen, than of preserving his character.
144. ergo est? quaeret fortasse quispiam displiceatne mihi legum praesidio capitis periculum propulsare. vero, iudices, non displicet, sed utor instituto meo. hominis honesti prudentisque iudicio non solum meo consilio uti consuevi sed multum etiam eius quem defendo et consilio et voluntati obtempero. ut haec ad me causa delata est, qui leges eas ad quas adhibemur et in quibus versamur nosse deberem, dixi statim eo: qui coisset quo quis condemnaretur illum esse liberum, teneri autem nostrum ordinem. ille me orare atque obsecrare coepit ne sese lege defenderem. ego quae mihi videbantur dicerem, traduxit me ad suam sententiam; adfirmabat enim lacrimans non se cupidiorem esse civitatis retinendae quam existimationis.
145. I complied with his wishes, and yet I did it (for it is not a thing which we ought to do at all times) because I saw that the cause itself could be amply defended on its own merits, without any reference to law at all. I saw that in this defence, which I now have employed, there was more dignity, but that in that one which he begged me not to use, there would be less trouble. But if I had no other object in view beyond merely gaining this cause, I should have read the laws to you, and then have summed up. Nor am I moved by that argument which Attius uses when he says that it is a scandalous thing that, if a senator should procure a wrongful conviction of any one, he should be made liable to the laws, but that if a Roman knight does the same, he should not.
145. homini gessi et tamen idcirco feci — neque enim id semper facere debemus — quod videbam per se ipsam causam sine lege copiosissime posse defendi. in hac defensione qua iam sum usus plus dignitatis, in illa qua me hic uti noluit minus laboris futurum. si nihil aliud esset actum nisi ut hanc causam obtineremus, lege recitata perorassem. me illa oratio commovet, quod ait Attius indignum esse facinus, si senator iudicio quempiam circumvenerit, legibus eum teneri; si eques Romanus hoc idem fecerit, non teneri.
146. Although I should grant to you that it would be a scandalous thing, (and the fact I will examine into presently,) still you must inevitably grant to me that it is a much more scandalous thing that the laws should be departed from in that state which is entirely held together by the laws; for this is the bond of this dignity which we enjoy in the republic, this is the foundation of our liberty, this is the source of justice. The mind, and spirit, and wisdom, and intentions of the city are all situated in the laws. As our bodies cannot, if deprived of the mind, so the state, if deprived of law, cannot use its separate parts, which are to it as its sinews, its blood, and its limbs. The ministers of the law are the magistrates; the interpreters of the law are the judges; lastly, we are all servants of the laws, for the very purpose of being able to be freemen.
146. Vt tibi concedam hoc indignum esse quod cuius modi sit iam videro, tu mihi concedas necesse est multo esse indignius in ea civitate quae legibus contineatur discedi ab legibus. enim vinculum est huius dignitatis qua fruimur in re publica, hoc fundamentum libertatis, hic fons aequitatis; mens et animus et consilium et sententia civitatis posita est in legibus. Vt corpora nostra sine mente, sic civitas sine lege suis partibus ut nervis ac sanguine et membris uti non potest. ministri magistratus, legum interpretes iudices, legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus.
147. What is the reason, O Naso, why you sit in that place? What is the power by which those judges, invested with such dignity, are separated from you? And you too, O judges, how is it that out of such a multitude of citizens, you with your small numbers decide on the fortunes of man? By what right is it that Attius said whatever he chose? Why have I had an opportunity of speaking at such length? What is the meaning of all these secretaries and lictors, and all the rest of those whom I see assisting at this investigation? I think that all these things take place according to law, and that the whole of this trial is conducted and governed (as I said before) by the mind, as it were, of the law. What, then, shall we say? Is this the only investigation that is so conducted? What became of the question of classing Marcus Plaetorius and Caius Flaminius as assassins? What became of the charge of peculation brought against Caius Orchinius? or of my oration, when prosecuting a charge of embezzlement? or of the speech of Caius Aquillius, before whom a case of bribery is at this moment being tried? or of all the other investigations that are habitually taking place? Survey all the different parts of the republic; you will see that everything takes place under the general dominion, and according to the special enactment of the laws.
147. est, Q.Quinto Naso, cur tu in isto loco sedeas? quae vis est qua abs te hi iudices tali dignitate praediti coerceantur? autem, iudices, quam ob rem ex tanta multitudine civium tam pauci de hominum fortunis sententiam fertis? iure Attius quae voluit dixit? mihi tam diu potestas dicendi datur? sibi autem illi scribae, quid lictores, quid ceteri quos apparere huic quaestioni video volunt? haec omnia lege fieri totumque hoc iudicium, ut ante dixi, quasi mente quadam regi legis et administrari. ergo? haec quaestio sola ita gubernatur? M.Marci Plaetori et C. Flamini inter sicarios, quid C.Gaii Orchivi peculatus, quid mea de pecuniis repetundis, quid C.Gaii Aquili apud quem nunc de ambitu causa dicitur, quid reliquae quaestiones? omnis rei publicae partis; omnia legum imperio et praescripto fieri videbitis.
148. If anyone, O Titus Attius, were to wish to prosecute you before me as judge, you would cry out that you were not liable under the law about extortion. Nor would this demurrer of yours be any confession that you had appropriated the money illegally; but it would be merely a refusal to encounter a labour and a danger which you were not obliged to encounter by the law. Now see what is being done, and what law is laid down by you. The law, according to the provisions of which this investigation has been instituted, orders the judge who presides over the investigation, that is to say, Quintus Voconius, with the other judges, who are his colleagues, (it means you, O judges,) to make inquiry concerning the fact of poisoning. To make inquiry with respect to whom? The subject is interminable. “Whoever has made it, or sold it, or bought it, or had it in his possession, or administered it.” What does the same law subjoin immediately afterwards? Read—“And bring him to a capital trial.” Whom? He who has conspired? he who has agreed? Not so. What, then, is meant? Tell me. “Whoever is a military tribune of the four first legions, or a quaestor, or a tribune of the people.” Then all the magistrates are named. “Or who has delivered or shall deliver his opinion in the senate?” What then? “If any one of them has agreed, or shall agree, has conspired, or shall conspire, to get any one condemned in a criminal trial.” “Any one of them:” Of whom? Of those, forsooth, who have been enumerated above. What does it signify in which way the law was framed? Although it is plain enough, yet the law itself shows its own meaning; for when it binds all the world, it uses this expression: “Whoever has committed or shall commit an act of poisoning.” All men and women, freemen and slaves, are brought under the power of the court. If, again, it had wished to include conspiracy, it would have added, “or who has conspired.” Now it runs, “And let any one who has conspired, or shall conspire, be brought to a capital trial, before one who has filled any magistracy, or who has delivered his opinion in the senate.”
148. quis apud me, T.Titi Atti, te reum velit facere, clames te lege pecuniarum repetundarum non teneri; neque haec tua recusatio confessio sit captae pecuniae sed laboris et periculi non legitimi declinatio. quid agatur et quid abs te iuris constituatur vide. lex ea, qua lege haec quaestio constituta est, iudicem quaestionis, hoc est Q.Quintum Voconium, cum eis iudicibus qui ei obvenerint — vos appellat, iudices — quaerere de veneno. quem quaerere? est. quicumque fecerit, vendiderit, emerit, habuerit, dederit. eadem lex statim adiungit? recita. deque eius capite quaerito.? qui coierit, convenerit? ita est. ergo est? dic. qui tribunus militum legionibus quattuor primis, quive quaestor, tribunus plebis — deinceps omnis magistratus nominavit — quive in senatu sententiam dixit, dixerit. tum? qui eorum coiit, coierit, convenit, convenerit quo quis iudicio publico condemnaretur. “eorum”? quorum? qui supra scripti sunt. intersit utro modo scriptum sit, etsi est apertum, ipsa tamen lex nos docet. Vbi enim omnis mortalis adligat, ita loquitur: qui venenum malum fecit, fecerit. viri, mulieres, liberi, servi in iudicium vocantur. idem de coitione voluisset, adiunxisset: quive coierit. ita est: qeque eius capite quaerito qui magistratum habuerit quive in senatu sententiam dixerit, qui eorum coiit, coierit. is est Cluentius?
149. Does that apply to Cluentius? Certainly not. Who, then, is Cluentius? He is a man who still does not wish to get off on a trial by any quibble of law. Well, then, I discard the law. I comply with Cluentius's wishes; still I will say a few things which are not connected with my client's case, by way of reply to you, O Attius. For there is something in this cause which Cluentius thinks concerns him; there is also something which I think concerns me. He thinks it is for his interest that his defence should rest on the facts and merits of the case, not on the letter of the law; but I think that it concerns me not to appear defeated by Attius in any discussion. For this is not the only cause that I have to plead; my labour is at the service of every one who can be content with my ability as their advocate. I do not wish any one of those who are present to think, if I remain silent, that I approve of what has been said by Attius respecting the law. Wherefore, O Cluentius, I am complying with your wishes in this your cause; and I do not read any law in this court, nor do I allege any law in your favour. But I will not omit those things which I think are expected from me.
149. non est. ergo est Cluentius? tamen defendi causam suam lege noluit. abicio legem, morem Cluentio gero. tamen, Atti, pauca quae ab huius causa seiuncta sunt respondebo. enim quiddam in hac causa quod Cluentius ad se, est aliquid quod ego ad me putem pertinere. sua putat interesse se re ipsa et gesto negotio, non lege defendi; ego autem mea existimo interesse me nulla in disputatione ab Attio videri esse superatum. enim mihi haec causa sola dicenda est; omnibus hic labor meus propositus est quicumque hac facultate defensionis contenti esse possunt. quemquam eorum qui adsunt existimare me quae de lege ab Attio dicta sunt, si reticuerim, comprobare. ob rem, Cluenti, de te tibi obsequor; neque ego legem recito neque hoc loco pro te dico, sed ea quae a me desiderari arbitror non relinquam.
150. It seems to you, O Attius, to be a scandalous thing that every one should not be bound by the same laws. In the first place, (suppose I do grant to you that it is a most scandalous thing,) it is an evil of this sort, that it is a proof that we have need to have the laws altered, not that we are not to obey the laws while they are in existence. In the next place, what senator has ever made this complaint, that when, by the kindness of the Roman people, he had attained a higher rank, he did not think he ought by that promotion to be put under more severe conditions of law? How many advantages are there, which we are without; how many troubles and annoyances are there which we undergo.—And all these things are compensated by the advantages of honour and dignity. Now apply these same conditions of life to the equestrian order, and to the other ranks of the state. They will not endure them; for they think that fewer inconveniences of the laws, and of the courts of justice, ought to be allotted to them, who have either never been able to mount to the higher ranks of the state, or have never tried.
150. tibi videtur, Atti, esse non isdem legibus omnis teneri., ut id iniquissimum esse confitear, eius modi est ut commutatis eis opus sit legibus, non ut his quae sunt non pareamus. quis umquam hoc senator recusavit ne, cum altiorem gradum dignitatis beneficio populi Romani esset consecutus, eo se putaret durioribus legum condicionibus uti oportere? multa sunt commoda quibus caremus, quam multa molesta et difficilia quae subimus! atque haec omnia tamen honoris et amplitudinis commodo compensantur. nunc ad equestrem ordinem atque in ceteros ordines easdem vitae condiciones; non perferent. enim minus multos sibi laqueos legum et condicionum ac iudiciorum propositos esse oportere qui summum locum civitatis aut non potuerunt ascendere aut non petiverunt.
151. And, to say nothing of all other laws, by which we are bound, and from which all the other ranks are released, Caius Gracchus passed this law, “That no one should be circumvented.” And he passed, it for the sake of the common people, not against the common people. Afterwards Lucius Sulla, a man who had not the slightest connection with the common people, still, when he was appointing a trial concerning a case of this sort to take place according to the provisions of this very law, by which you are sitting as judges at the present moment, did not dare to bind the Roman people with this new sort of proceeding, whom he had received free from any such obligation. But if he had thought it practicable to do so, from the hatred which he bore the equestrian order, he would not have been more glad to do anything than to turn the whole fury of that proscription of his which he let loose upon the old judges, on this single tribunal.
151. ut omittam leges alias omnis quibus nos tenemur, ceteri autem sunt ordines liberati, hanc ipsam legem: quis iudicio circumveniretur, C.Gaius Gracchus tulit; eam legem pro plebe, non in plebem tulit. L.Lucius Sulla, homo a populi causa remotissimus, tamen, cum eius rei quaestionem hac ipsa lege constitueret qua vos hoc tempore iudicatis, populum Romanum quem ab hoc genere liberum acceperat adligare novo quaestionis genere ausus non est. si fieri posse existimasset, pro illo odio quod habuit in equestrem ordinem nihil fecisset libentius quam omnem illam acerbitatem proscriptionis suae qua est usus in veteres iudices in hanc unam quaestionem contulisset.
152. Nor is there any other object aimed at now, (believe me, O judges, and provide for what you must provide for,) except the bringing the whole equestrian body within the danger of this law. Not that this is the object of every one, but of a few. For those senators who easily keep themselves in integrity and innocence, such as (I will speak the truth,) you yourselves are, and those others who have lived free from covetousness are anxious that the knights, as they are next to the senatorial body in rank, should also be most closely united to them by community of feeling. But those who wish to engross all power to themselves, and to prevent any from existing in any other man, or in any other rank, think that by holding this single fear over them, they will be able to bring the Roman knights under their power, if it is once established that investigations of this sort can be held upon those men who have acted as judges. For they see that the authority of this order is strengthened, they see that its judicial decisions are approved; but if this fear be suspended over you they feel confident that they shall be able to pluck the sting out of your severity.
152. nunc quicquam agitur — mihi credite, iudices, et prospicite id quod providendum est — nisi ut equites Romani in huiusce legis periculum concludantur; neque hoc agitur ab omnibus sed a paucis. ei senatores qui se facile tuentur integritate et innocentia, quales, ut vere dicam, vos estis et ceteri qui sine cupiditate vixerunt, equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos, concordia coniunctissimos esse cupiunt; sed ei qui sese volunt posse omnia neque praeterea quicquam esse aut in homine ullo aut in ordine, hoc uno metu se putant equites Romanos in potestatem suam redacturos, si constitutum sit ut de eis qui rem iudicarint huiusce modi iudicia fieri possint. enim auctoritatem huius ordinis confirmari, vident iudicia comprobari; hoc metu proposito evellere se aculeum severitatis vestrae posse confidunt.
153. For, who would dare to decide with truth and firmness in the case of a man possessed of at all greater power or riches than the generality, when he sees that he himself may be afterwards prosecuted with reference to that case, for having been guilty of some agreement or conspiracy? O the gallant men, the Roman knights! who resisted that most eminent and most powerful man, Marcus Drusus, when tribune of the people, when he was aiming at nothing with respect to the whole body of nobility which existed at that time, except contriving that they, who had sat as judges, might be themselves brought before the court by proceedings of this sort. Then Caius Flavius Pusio, Cnaeus Titinnius, Caius Maecenas, those props of the Roman people, and the other men of this order, did not do the same thing that Cluentius does now, in refusing, because they thought that they should by that means incur some blame; but they most openly resisted, when they demurred to these proceedings, and said openly, with the greatest courage and honesty, that they might have arrived by the decision of the Roman people at the highest rank, if they had chosen to set their hearts on seeking honours; that they were aware how much splendour, how much honour, and how much dignity there was in that sort of life; and that they had not despised these things, but had been content with their own order, which had been the rank of their fathers before them; and that they had preferred following that tranquil course of life, removed from the storms of unpopularity, and from the intricacies of these judicial proceedings.
153. enim de homine audeat paulo maioribus opibus praedito vere et fortiter iudicare, cum videat sibi de eo quod coierit aut consenserit causam esse dicendam? O viros fortis, equites Romanos, qui homini clarissimo ac potentissimo, M.Marco Druso, tribuno plebis, restiterunt, cum ille nihil aliud ageret cum illa cuncta quae tum erat nobilitate, nisi ut ei qui rem iudicassent huiusce modi quaestionibus in iudicium vocarentur! C.Gaius Flavius, Cn.Gnaeus Titinius, C.Gaius Maecenas, illa robora populi Romani, ceterique eiusdem ordinis non fecerunt idem quod nunc Cluentius, ut aliquid culpae suscipere se putarent recusando, sed apertissime repugnarunt, cum et recusarent et palam fortissime atque honestissime dicerent, se potuisse iudicio populi Romani in amplissimum locum pervenire, si sua studia ad honores petendos conferre voluissent. vidisse in ea vita qualis splendor inesset, quanta ornamenta, quae dignitas; quae se non contempsisse sed ordine suo patrumque suorum contentos fuisse et vitam illam tranquillam et quietam, remotam a procellis invidiarum et huiusce modi iudiciorum sequi maluisse.
154. They said, that either the proper age for offering themselves as candidates for honours ought to be restored to them, or, since that was impossible, that that condition of life had better remain which they had followed when they abstained from being candidates; that it was unjust that they, who had avoided all the decorations of those honours, on account of the multitude of their dangers, should be deprived of the kindness of the people, and yet not be free from the dangers of these new tribunals; that a senator could not make this complaint, because he had originally offered himself as a candidate for them, knowing all the conditions, and because he had a great many honourable circumstances which in his case might lessen the inconvenience,—the place, the authority, the dignity it gave him at home, the name and influence it conferred on him among foreign nations, the toga praetexta, the curule chair, the ensigns of the rank, the forces, the armies, the military command, the provinces, all which things our ancestors wished to be the greatest rewards for virtuous actions, and by them they wished, also, that there should be the greatest dangers held out, as a terror to offences. They did not refuse to be prosecuted under this law, under which Habitus is now prosecuted, which was then called the Sempronian law, and now is called the Cornelian law. For they were aware that the equestrian order is not bound by that law; but they were anxious not to be bound by any new law.
154. sibi ad honores petendos aetatem integram restitui oportere aut, quoniam id non posset, eam condicionem vitae quam secuti petitionem reliquissent manere. esse eos qui honorum ornamenta propter periculorum multitudinem praetermisissent populi beneficiis esse privatos, iudiciorum novorum periculis non carere. hoc queri non posse, propterea quod ea condicione proposita petere coepisset quodque permulta essent ornamenta quibus eam mitigare molestiam posset, locus, auctoritas, domi splendor, apud exteras nationes nomen et gratia, toga praetexta, sella curulis, insignia, fasces, exercitus, imperia, provinciae; quibus in rebus cum summa recte factis maiores nostri praemia tum plura peccatis pericula proposita esse voluerunt. non hoc recusabant ne ea lege accusarentur qua nunc accusatur, quae tunc erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia — intellegebant enim ea lege equestrem ordinem non teneri — sed ne nova lege adligarentur laborabant.
155. Habitus has never demurred even to this, not to giving an account of his course of life according to the provisions of a law by which he was not at all bound. And if this condition pleases you, let us all strive to have this investigation extended to all ranks and orders in the city. But in the mean time, in the name of the immortal gods! since we have all our advantages, our laws, our liberty, and our safety by means of the laws, let us not depart from the laws. And at the same time let us consider what a scandalous thing it is for the Roman people to be now pursuing another object; for them to have entrusted to you the republic and their own fortunes; to be themselves without any care; to have no fear of being bound by the decision of a few judges, by a law which they have never sanctioned, and by a form of judicial investigation of which they think themselves independent.
155. ne hoc quidem umquam recusavit quo minus vel ea lege rationem vitae suae redderet qua non teneretur. si vobis condicio placet, omnes id agamus ut haec quam primum in omnis ordines quaestio perferatur. quidem, per deos immortalis! quoniam omnia commoda nostra, iura, libertatem, salutem denique legibus obtinemus, a legibus non recedamus, simul et illud quam sit iniquum cogitemus, populum Romanum aliud nunc agere, vobis rem publicam et fortunas suas commisisse, sine cura esse, non metuere ne lege ea quam numquam ipse iusserit et quaestione qua se solutum liberumque esse arbitretur per paucos iudices astringatur.
156. For Titus Attius, a virtuous and eloquent young man, conducts this case in such a manner; saying that all the citizens are bound by all the laws; and you attend and listen in silence, as you ought to do. Aulus Cluentius, a Roman knight, is prosecuted according to that law by which the senators, and those who have served magistracies, alone are bound. I, by his desire, am prevented from demurring to this and from establishing the main bulwark of my defence on the citadel of the law. If Cluentius gains his cause, as we, relying on your equity, feel sure that he will, all will believe, what indeed will be the truth, that he has gained it because of his innocence, since he has been defended in such a manner as this; but in the law, all appeal to which he discarded, he found no protection at all.
156. enim sic causam T.Titus Attius, adulescens bonus et disertus, omnis civis legibus teneri omnibus; vos auditis et attenditis silentio, sicut facere debetis. A.Aulus Cluentius, eques Romanus, causam dicit ea lege, qua lege senatores et ei qui magistratum habuerunt soli tenentur; mihi per eum recusare et in arce legis praesidia constituere defensionis meae non licet. obtinuerit causam Cluentius, sicuti vestra aequitate nixi confidimus, omnes existimabunt, id quod erit, obtinuisse propter innocentiam, quoniam ita defensus sit; in lege autem quam attingere noluerit praesidi nil fuisse.
157. Here now is something which concerns me, as I said before, and which I ought to make good to the satisfaction of the Roman people, since my condition of life is such that the whole of my care and labour is devoted to defending every one from danger. I see how great, and how dangerous, and how bound less a field of investigation is attempted to be opened by the prosecutors, when they endeavour to transfer that law, which was framed with reference to our order alone, to the whole Roman people. And in that law are the words—“Who has conspired.” You see how wide an application that may have. “Or agreed.” That is just as vague and indefinite. “Or consented.” But this is not only vague and indefinite, but is also obscure and unintelligible. “Or given any false evidence.” Who is there of the common people at Rome, who has ever given any evidence at all, who is not, as you see, exposed to this danger, if Titus Attius is to have his own way? At all events I assert this positively, that no one will ever give evidence for the future, if this tribunal is held over the common people of Rome.
157. nunc est quiddam quod ad me pertineat, de quo ante dixi, quod ego populo Romano praestare debeam, quoniam is meae vitae status est ut omnis mihi cura et opera posita sit in hominum periculis defendendis. quanta et quam periculosa et quam infinita quaestio temptetur ab accusatoribus, cum eam legem quae in nostrum ordinem scripta sit in populum Romanum transferre conentur. in lege est: qui coierit, quod quam late pateat videtis. convenerit; aeque incertum et infinitum est. consenserit; hoc vero cum infinitum tum obscurum et occultum. falsumve testimonium dixerit; quis de plebe Romana testimonium dixit umquam cui non hoc periculum T.Tito Attio auctore paratum esse videatis? nam dicturum quidem certe, si hoc iudicium plebi Romanae propositum sit, neminem umquam esse confirmo.
158. But I make this promise to every one, if by chance any one is brought into trouble by this law, who is not properly liable to this law, that if he will employ me to defend him, I will defend his cause by the protection that the law affords, and that I will prove my ease easily to these judges, or to any others who resemble them, and that I will use every means of defence with which the law provides me, which I am now not permitted to use, by the man with whose wishes I am bound to comply. For I ought not to doubt, O judges, that, if a cause of this sort be brought before you, of a man who does not come under the provisions of that law, even if he be unpopular, or if he seem to be disliked by many, or even if you hate him yourselves, and are unwilling to acquit him, still you will acquit him; and you will be guided rather by your sense of duty than by your personal hatred.
158. hoc polliceor omnibus, si cui forte hac lege negotium facessetur qui lege non teneatur, si is uti me defensore voluerit, me eius causam legis praesidio defensurum et vel his iudicibus vel horum similibus facillime probaturum, et omni me defensione usurum esse legis, qua nunc ut utar ab eo cuius voluntati mihi obtemperandum est non conceditur. enim debeo dubitare, iudices, quin, si qua ad vos causa eius modi delata sit eius qui lege non teneatur, etiam si is invidiosus aut multis offensus esse videatur, etiam si eum oderitis, etiam si inviti absoluturi sitis, tamen absolvatis et religioni potius vestrae quam odio pareatis.
159. For it is the part of a wise judge, to think that he has just that power permitted to him by the Roman people, which is committed and entrusted to him; and to remember that not only is power given to him, but also that confidence is placed in him: that he is a man capable of acquitting a man whom he hates, of condemning one whom he does not hate; and of always thinking not what he himself wishes, but what the law and the obligation of his oath requires of him—of considering according to what law the defendant is brought before him, who the defendant is into whose conduct he is inquiring, and what are the facts which are being investigated. All these things require to be looked at, and also it is the part of a great and wise man, O judges, when he has taken in his hand his judicial tablet, to think that he is not alone, and that it is not lawful for him to do whatever he wishes; but that he must employ in his deliberations law, equity, religion, and good faith; that he must discard lust, hatred, envy, fear, and all evil passions, and must think that consciousness implanted in one's mind, which we have received from the immortal gods, and which cannot be taken from us, to be the most powerful motive of all. And if that is a witness of virtuous counsels and virtuous actions throughout our whole lives, we shall live without any fear, and in the greatest honour.
159. enim sapientis iudicis cogitare tantum sibi a populo Romano esse permissum quantum commissum sit et creditum, et non solum sibi potestatem datam verum etiam fidem habitam esse meminisse; posse quem oderit absolvere, quem non oderit condemnare, et semper non quid ipse velit sed quid lex et religio cogat cogitare; animadvertere qua lege reus citetur, de quo reo cognoscat, quae res in quaestione versetur. haec sunt videnda, tum vero illud est hominis magni, iudices, atque sapientis, cum illam iudicandi causa tabellam sumpserit, non se reputare solum esse nec sibi quodcumque concupierit licere, sed habere in consilio legem, religionem, aequitatem, fidem; libidinem autem, odium, invidiam, metum cupiditatesque omnis amovere maximique aestimare conscientiam mentis suae quam ab dis immortalibus accepimus, quae a nobis divelli non potest; quae si optimorum consiliorum atque factorum testis in omni vita nobis erit, sine ullo metu et summa cum honestate vivemus.
160. If Titus Attius had known these things, or thought of them, certainly he would not have ventured to say what he did assert at great length, that a judge decides whatever he chooses, and ought not to be bound by the laws. But now concerning all these topics I think I have said too much, if judged by the inclination of Cluentius; little enough, if we love to the dignity of the republic; but quite enough with reference to your wisdom. There are a few topics remaining, which because they belonged to your investigation they thought ought to be considered and urged by them, that they might not be considered the most worthless of all men, as they would deserve to be if they brought nothing into the court but their own personal ill-feeling. And that you may see that it is of necessity that I have urged the topics which I have now been mentioning, at considerable length, listen to what remains. You will then understand that all those points of the defence which could be stated in a few words, have been stated with the greatest brevity possible.
160. si T.Titus Attius aut cognovisset aut cogitasset, profecto ne conatus quidem esset dicere, id quod multis verbis egit, iudicem quod ei videatur statuere et non devinctum legibus esse oportere. de rebus mihi pro Cluenti voluntate nimium, pro rei dignitate parum, pro vestra prudentia satis dixisse videor. perpauca sunt; quae quia vestrae quaestionis erant, idcirco illi statuerunt fingenda esse sibi et proferenda ne omnium turpissimi reperirentur, si in iudicium nihil praeter invidiam attulissent. ut existimetis me necessario de his rebus de quibus iam dixerim pluribus egisse verbis, attendite reliqua; profecto intellegetis ea quae paucis demonstrari potuerint brevissime esse defensa.
161. You have said that an injury was done by the family of my client to Cnaeus Decius, a Samnite; him I mean who was proscribed, in his calamity. He was never treated by any one more liberally than by Cluentius. It was the riches of Cluentius that relieved him in his distresses; and he himself, and all his friends and relations, know it well. You have said “that his stewards offered violence to and assaulted the shepherds of Ancarius and Pacenus.” When some dispute (as is often the case) had arisen in the hills between the shepherds, the stewards of Habitus defended the property and private possessions of their master. The parties expostulated with one another, the cause was proved to the satisfaction of the others, and the matter was settled without any trial or any recourse to law.
161. Cn.Gnaeo Decidio Samniti, ei qui proscriptus est, iniuriam in calamitate eius ab huius familia factam esse dixit. nullo ille liberalius quam a Cluentio tractatus est. illum opes in rebus eius incommodissimis sublevarunt, atque hoc cum ipse tum omnes eius amici necessariique cognorunt. Anchari et Paceni pastoribus huius vilicos vim et manus attulisse. quaedam in callibus, ut solet, controversia pastorum esset orta, vilici rem domini et privatam possessionem defenderunt. esset expostulatio facta, causa illis demonstrata sine iudicio controversiaque discessum est.
162. You have said, “when a relation of Publius Aelius had been disinherited by his will, this man, who was no relation of his, was declared his heir.” Publius Aelius acted so from his knowledge of Habitus's merit. He was not present at the making of the will, and that will was signed by Oppianicus as a witness. You have said, “that he refused to pay Florius a legacy bequeathed to him in the will.” That is not the case; but as thirty sesterces had been written instead of three hundred, and as it did not appear to him to have been very carefully worded, he only wished him to consider what he received as due to his liberality. He first denied that the money was legally due, but, having done so, he then paid it without any dispute. You have said, “that the wife of a certain Samnite named Caelius was, after the war, recovered from Cluentius.” He had bought the woman as a slave from the brokers; but the moment that he heard that she was a free woman he restored her to Caelius without any action.
162. P.Publii Aeli testamento propinquus exheredatus cum esset, heres hic alienior institutus est. P.Publius Aelius merito fecit, neque hic in testamento faciendo interfuit, idque testamentum ab huius inimico Oppianico est obsignatum. Floro legatum ex testamento infitiatum esse. est ita; sed cum HS xxx scripta essent pro HS xxxx neque ei cautum satis videretur, voluit eum aliquid acceptum referre liberalitati suae. deberi negavit, post sine controversia solvit. Cei cuiusdam Samnitis uxorem post bellum ab hoc esse repetitam. cum emisset a sectoribus, quo tempore eam primum liberam esse audivit, sine iudicio reddidit Ceio.
163. You have said, “that there is a man named Ennius, whose property Habitus is in possession of.” This Ennius is a needy man, a bumper-up of false accusations, a hired tool of Oppianicus; who for many years remained quiet; then at last he accused a slave of Habitus of theft; lately, he began to claim things from Habitus himself. By that private proceeding, he will not (believe me), though we may perhaps be his advocates, escape calumny. And also, as it is reported to us, you suborn an entertainer of many guests, a certain Aulus Binnius, an innkeeper on the Latin road, to say that violence was offered to him in his own tavern by Aulus Cluentius and his slaves. But about that man I have no need at present to say anything. If he invited them, as is commonly the case, we will treat the man so as to make him sorry for having gone out of his way.
163. Ennium esse quendam cuius bona teneat. hic Ennius egens quidam calumniator, mercennarius Oppianici, qui permultos annos quievit; deinde aliquando cum servis furti egit, nuper ab ipso petere coepit. illo privato iudicio, mihi credite, vobis isdem fortasse patronis calumniam non effugiet. etiam, ut nobis renuntiatur, hominem multorum hospitum, A.Aulum Bivium quendam, coponem de via Latina, subornatis qui sibi a Cluentio servisque eius in taberna sua manus adlatas esse dicat. de homine nihil etiam nunc dicere nobis est necesse. invitaverit, id quod solet, sic hominem accipiemus ut moleste ferat se de via decessisse.
164. You have now, O judges, everything which the prosecutors, after eight years' meditation, have been able to collect against the morals of Aulus Cluentius during his whole life, the man whom they state to be so hated and unpopular. Charges how insignificant in their kind! how false in their facts! how briefly replied to! Learn now this, which has a reference to your oath, which belongs to your tribunal, which is a burden the law has imposed on you, in accordance with which you have assembled here,—the law, I mean, about accusations of poison; so that all may understand in how few words this cause may be summed up, and how many things have been said by me which had a great deal to do with the inclination of my client, but very little with your decision.
164. , iudices, quae in totam causam de moribus A.Auli Cluenti quem illi invidiosum esse reum volunt annos octo meditati accusatores conlegerint, quam levia genere ipso, quam falsa re, quam brevia responsu! nunc id quod ad vestrum ius iurandum pertinet, quod vestri iudici est, quod vobis oneris imposuit ea lex qua coacti huc convenistis, de criminibus veneni, ut omnes intellegant quam paucis verbis haec causa perorari potuerit, et quam multa a me dicta sint quae ad huius voluntatem maxime, ad vestrum iudicium minime pertinerent.
165. It has been urged in the case for the prosecution, that Caius Vibius Capax was taken off by poison by this Aulus Cluentius. It happens very seasonably that a man is present, endowed with the greatest good faith, and with every virtue, Lucius Plaetorius, a senator, who was connected by ties of hospitality with, and was an intimate friend of that man Capax. He used to live with him at Rome; it was in his house that he was taken in, in his house that he died. “But Cluentius is his heir.” I say that he died without a will, and that the possession of his property was given by the praetor's edict to this man, his sister's son, a most virtuous young man, and one held in the highest esteem for honourable conduct, Numerius Cluentius, who is present in court.
165. est C.Gaium Vibium ab hoc A.Aulo Cluentio veneno esse sublatum. adest homo summa fide et omni virtute praeditus, L.Lucius Plaetorius, senator qui illius Vibi hospes fuit et familiaris. hunc ille Romae habitavit, apud hunc aegrotavit, huius domi est mortuus. heres est Cluentius. dico esse mortuum possessionemque eius bonorum ex edicto praetoris huic illius sororis filio, adulescenti pudentissimo et in primis honesto, equiti Romano, datam, N.Numerio Cluentio quem videtis.
166. There is another poisoning charge. They say that poison was, by the contrivance of Habitus, prepared for this young Oppianicus, when, according to the custom of the citizens of Larinum, a large party was dining at his wedding feast; that, as it was being administered in mead, a man of the name of Balbutius, his intimate friend, intercepted it on its way, drank it, and died immediately. If I were to deal with this charge as one that required to be refuted, I should treat those matters at great length, which, as it is, my speech will pass over in a few words.
166. venefici crimen Oppianico huic adulescenti, cum eius in nuptiis more Larinatium multitudo hominum pranderet, venenum consilio paratum; id cum daretur in mulso, Balbutium quendam, eius familiarem, intercepisse, bibisse, statimque esse mortuum. ego si sic agerem tamquam mihi crimen esset diluendum, haec pluribus verbis dicerem per quae nunc paucis percurrit oratio mea.
167. What has Habitus ever done that he is not to be thought a man incapable of such an atrocity as this? And what reason had he for being so exceedingly afraid of Oppianicus, when he could not possibly say a word in this case, and while accusers could not possibly be wanting, as long as his mother was alive? which you will soon have proved to you. Was it his object to have no sort of danger wanting to his cause, that this new crime was added to it? But what opportunity had he of giving him poison on that day, and in so large a company? Moreover, by whom was it given? Whence was it got? How, too, was the cup allowed to be intercepted? Why was not another given to him over again? There are many arguments which may be urged; but I still not appear to wish to urge them, and still not to do so. For the facts of the case shall speak for themselves.
167. umquam in se admisit ut hoc tantum ab eo facinus non abhorrere videatur? quid autem magno opere Oppianicum metuebat, cum ille verbum omnino in hac ipsa causa nullum facere potuerit, huic autem accusatores viva matre deesse non possint? id quod iam intellegetis. ut de causa eius periculi nihil decederet, ad causam novum crimen accederet? autem tempus veneni dandi illo die, illa frequentia? per quem porro datum? unde sumptum? quae deinde interceptio poculi? cur non de integro autem datum? sunt quae dici possunt, sed non committam ut videar non dicendo voluisse dicere; res enim se ipsa defendit.
168. I say that that young man, whom you say died the moment that he had drank that cup, did not die at all on that day. O great and impudent lie! Now see the rest of the truth. I say that he, having come to the dinner while labouring under an indigestion, and still, as people of that age often do, had not spared himself, was taken ill, continued ill some days, and so died. Who is my witness for this fact? The man who is a witness also of his own grief—his own father. The father, I say, of the young man himself: he, who, from his grief of mind, would have been easily inclined by even the slightest suspicion to appear as a witness against Aulus Cluentius, gives evidence in his favour. Read his evidence. But do you, unless it is too grievous for you, rise for a moment, and endure the pain which this necessary recollection of your trouble causes you; on which I will not dwell too long, since, as became a virtuous citizen, you have not allowed your own grief to be the cause of distress or of a false accusation to an innocent man. [The testimony of Balbutius the father is read.]
168. illum adulescentem quem statim epoto poculo mortuum esse dixistis omnino illo die esse mortuum. Magnum crimen et impudens mendacium! cetera. illum, cum ad illud prandium crudior venisset et, ut aetas illa fert, sibi tamen non pepercisset, aliquot dies aegrotasse et ita esse mortuum. huic rei testis est? qui sui luctus, pater; pater, inquam, illius adulescentis, quem propter animi dolorem pertenuis suspicio potuisset ex illo loco testem in A.Aulum Cluentium constituere, is hunc suo testimonio sublevat; quod recita. autem, nisi molestum est, paulisper exsurge; perfer hunc dolorem commemorationis necessariae, in qua ego diutius non morabor quoniam, quod fuit viri optimi, fecisti ut ne cui innocenti maeror tuus calamitatem et falsum crimen adferret.