28. In Macedonia he was a military tribune. In that same province he was afterwards quaestor. In the first place, Macedonia is so attached to him as these men, the chief men of their respective cities, state it to be; who, though they were sent with another object, still, being moved by his unexpected danger, give him their countenance, sitting here by his side, and put forth all their exertions in his behalf; if they stand by him, they think that they shall be doing what is more acceptable to their fellow-citizens, than if they attend strictly and solely to their embassy, and to the commission that was entrusted to them. But Lucius Appuleius considers him so excellent a man, that by his attentions and kindness to him, he has gone beyond that principle of our ancestors which enjoins that praetors ought to consider themselves as standing in the light of parents to their quaestors. He was a tribune of the people, not perhaps as violent as those men whom you naturally extol, but certainly such a one, that if all had at all times been like him, a violent tribune would never have been wished for or regretted.
28. Macedonia tribunus militum fuit, in eadem provincia postea quaestor. Macedonia sic eum diligit ut indicant hi principes civitatum suarum; qui cum missi sint ob aliam causam, tamen huius repentino periculo commoti huic adsident, pro hoc laborant, huic si praesto fuerint, gratius se civitatibus suis facturos putant quam si legationem suam et mandata confecerint. L. vero Apuleius hunc tanti facit ut morem illum maiorum qui praescribit in parentum loco quaestoribus suis praetores esse oportere officiis benivolentiaque superarit. pl. fuit non fortasse tam vehemens quam isti quos tu iure laudas, sed certe talis, quales si omnes semper fuissent, numquam desideratus vehemens esset tribunus.
29. I say nothing of those things which if they are less brought on the stage than others, still at all events are always praised when they do come to light; for instance, how he lives among his own relations; in the first place with his father, (for in my opinion filial affection is the foundation of all the virtues,) whom he venerates as a god, (and indeed a parent does not stand in a very different relation to his children,) but loves as a companion, as a brother, as a friend of his own age. Why should I speak of his conduct to his uncle? to his connections? to his relations? to this Cnaeus Saturninus whom you see in court, a most gallant man? And you may judge how desirous this man was of his attaining honour, when you see how he partakes of his grief. Why should I speak of myself? for I seem to myself, now that he is in danger, to be put on my own defence too. Why should I speak of all these virtuous men whom you see in court, with their garments changed for mourning robes? But these are all solid and well marked proofs, O judges; these are evidences of integrity, not coloured by forensic artifice, but deeply dyed with the indelible marks of truth. All that running about and caressing of the people is very easy work; it is looked at at a distance, not taken into the hand and examined; it makes a fine show if you do not get too near and shake it.
29. illa quae, si minus in scaena sunt, at certe, cum sunt prolata, laudantur, ut vivat cum suis, primum cum parente—nam meo iudicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum—quem veretur ut deum—neque enim multo secus est parens liberis—amat vero ut sodalem, ut fratrem, ut aequalem. dicam cum patruo, cum adfinibus, cum propinquis, cum hoc Cn. Saturnino, ornatissimo viro? cuius quantam honoris huius cupiditatem fuisse creditis, cum videtis luctus societatem? de me dicam qui mihi in huius periculo reus esse videor? quid de his tot viris talibus quos videtis veste mutata? haec sunt indicia, iudices, solida et expressa, haec signa probitatis non fucata forensi specie, sed domesticis inusta notis veritatis. est illa occursatio et blanditia popularis; aspicitur, non attrectatur; procul apparet, non excutitur, non in manus sumitur.
30. I say, then, that this man is adorned with every high quality, both such as are eminent abroad and amiable at home. I admit that he was inferior to you in some points, such as those of name and family; but in others I assert that he was superior to every one within the recollection of the present generation, in the zeal of his fellow-citizens, and neighbours, and of the companies of farmers in his behalf; equal to any one in virtue, integrity, and modesty; and yet do you wonder at his being elected aedile? Do you try to defile the brilliancy of such a life as this with those imputations? You impute adulteries to him which no one can recognise, not only by having ever heard any one's name mentioned, but even by having heard a suspicion breathed against him. You call him twice-married, in order to invent new words, and not only new accusations. You say that some one was taken by him into his province to gratify his lust; but that is not an accusation, but a random lie, ventured on from the expectation of impunity. You say that an actress was ravished by him. And this is said to have happened at Atina, while he was quite young, by a sort of established licence of proceeding towards theatrical people, well known in all towns.
30. igitur rebus ornatum hominem tam externis quam domesticis, non nullis rebus inferiorem quam te, genere dico et nomine, superiorem aliis, municipum, vicinorum, societatum studio, meorum temporum memoria, parem virtute, integritate, modestia aedilem factum esse miraris? tu vitae splendorem maculis aspergis istis? adulteria, quae nemo non modo nomine sed ne suspicione quidem possit agnoscere. “” appellas, ut verba etiam fingas, non solum crimina. esse ab eo in provinciam aliquem dicis libidinis causa, quod non crimen est, sed impunitum in maledicto mendacium; raptam esse mimulam, quod dicitur Atinae factum a iuventute vetere quodam in scaenicos iure maximeque oppidano.
31. O how elegantly must his youth have been passed, when the only thing which is imputed to him is one that there was not much harm in, and when even that is found to be false. He released some one from prison illegally. The man you allude to was discharged out of ignorance—discharged, as you know, at the request of an intimate friend and a most virtuous young man; and the same man was arrested subsequently again. And these, and no others, are all the faults which you can discover to attribute to him throughout the whole of his life, while at the same time you affect to doubt his virtue, and religion, and integrity. “But his father,” says the prosecutor, “ought to be considered an objection to the son.” O what a harsh expression, how unworthy of your honesty, O Laterensis! To say that in a capital trial, that in a contest where all his fortunes are at stake, a father ought to be an objection to his son in the eyes of such men as these judges! when even if he were ever so mean, or ever so sordid, still, by the mere name of father, he would have weight with mild and merciful judges; would have weight I say, because of the common feelings of all men, and through the sweet recommendation of nature.
31. O adulescentiam traductam eleganter, cui quidem cum quod licuerit obiciatur, tamen id ipsum falsum reperiatur! aliquis e carcere. quidem emissus per imprudentiam, emissus, ut cognostis, necessarii hominis optimique adulescentis rogatu; idem postea praetoris mandatu requisitus. haec nec ulla alia sunt coniecta maledicta in eius vitam de cuius vos pudore, religione, integritate dubitetis. “vero,” inquit, “etiam obesse filio debet.” O vocem duram atque indignam tua probitate, Laterensis! ut in iudicio capitis, pater ut in dimicatione fortunarum, pater ut apud talis viros obesse filio debeat? qui si esset turpissimus, si sordidissimus, tamen ipso nomine patrio valeret apud clementis iudices et misericordis; valeret, inquam, communi sensu omnium et dulcissima commendatione naturae.
32. But as that Cnaeus Plancius is a Roman knight, whose rank as such is of that antiquity that his father, his grandfather, and all his ancestors were Roman knights before him, and in a most flourishing prefecture occupied the highest position both for rank and influence; secondly, as he himself while serving in the legions under Publius Crassus as general, enjoyed a character of the highest respectability among a number of most accomplished men, Roman knights; as he was after that the chief man among his fellow-citizens, a most incorruptible and upright judge in many causes, a promoter of many companies, and president of some;—if not only no fault has ever been found with him, but if the whole of his conduct has been universally praised; shall we still be told that such a father shall be an objection to a most honourable son, when he would be able by his authority, or, if not, by his interest, to protect a less honourable man, or one entirely unconnected with him?
32. cum sit Cn. Plancius is eques Romanus, ea primum vetustate equestris nominis ut pater, ut avus, ut maiores eius omnes equites Romani fuerint, summum in praefectura florentissima gradum tenuerint et dignitatis et gratiae, deinde ut ipse in legionibus P. Crassi imperatoris inter ornatissimos homines, equites Romanos, summo splendore fuerit, ut postea princeps inter suos plurimarum rerum sanctissimus et iustissimus iudex, maximarum societatum auctor, plurimarum magister: si non modo in eo nihil umquam reprehensum sed laudata sunt omnia, tamen is oberit honestissimo filio pater qui vel minus honestum et alienum tueri vel auctoritate sua vel gratia possit?
33. “He has at times,” says he, “said some very harsh things.” Perhaps he may have spoken rather freely. “But that speaking freely, as you term it,” says he, “is not to be borne.” Are then those men to be borne who complain that they cannot bear the freedom of a Roman knight? Where are our old customs? Where is our equality of privileges? Where is that ancient liberty, which, having been overwhelmed by civil disasters, ought by this time to be raising its head and to be at last recovered and assuming a more erect attitude again? Need I recount the abuse directed by the Roman knights against even the noblest men, or that of the harsh, ferocious, unbridled expressions of the farmers against Quintus Scaevola, a man superior to all others in genius, justice, and integrity? Granius, the crier, replied to the consul Publius Nasica in the middle of the forum, when he, after a suspension of all judicial proceedings had been proclaimed, as he was returning home, had asked Granius “why he was sad; was it because all the auctions were postponed?” “Rather,” said he, “because they have sent back the ambassadors.” The same man made this answer to a tribune of the people, Marcus Drusus, a most influential man, but one who was causing great disturbances in the republic. When Drusus had saluted him, as is the fashion, and had said, “How do you do, O Granius?” he replied, “I should rather ask, O Drusus, what are you doing?” And he often reproved with impunity the designs of Lucius Crassus and Marcus Antonius, with still harsher witticisms. At present the state is to such a degree oppressed by your arrogance, that the freedom of laughing in which a crier used to be indulged, is more than is now allowed to a Roman knight in making lamentations.
33. “,” inquit, “locutus est aliquid aliquando.” fortasse liberius. “id ipsum,” inquit, “non est ferendum.” ei ferendi sunt qui hoc queruntur, libertatem equitis Romani se ferre non posse? Vbinam ille mos, ubi illa aequitas iuris, ubi illa antiqua libertas quae malis oppressa civilibus extollere iam caput et aliquando recreata se erigere debebat? ego Romanorum in homines nobilissimos maledicta, publicanorum in Q. Scaevolam, virum omnibus ingenio, iustitia, integritate praestantem, aspere et ferociter et libere dicta commemorem? P. Nasicae praeco Granius medio in foro, cum ille edicto iustitio domum decedens rogasset Granium quid tristis esset; an quod reiectae auctiones essent: “immo vero,” inquit, “quod legationes.” tribuno pl. potentissimo homini, M. Druso, et multa in re publica molienti, cum ille eum salutasset ⟨et⟩, ut fit, dixisset: “quid agis, Grani?” respondit: “immo vero tu, Druse, quid agis?” L. Crassi, ille M. Antoni voluntatem asperioribus facetiis saepe perstrinxit impune: nunc usque eo est oppressa nostra adrogantia civitas ut, quae fuit olim praeconi in ridendo, nunc equiti Romano in plorando non sit concessa libertas.
34. For what expression was ever used by Plancius which was not dictated by grief rather than by insult? And what did he ever complain of, except at times when he was protecting his companions or himself from injury? When the senate was hindered from making a reply to a representation of the Roman knights,—a thing which was invariably given even to enemies,—that injury was a great grief to all the farmers of the revenue and that indignation this man did not care to conceal. Their common feelings may perhaps have been disguised by others, but the sentiments which my client shared with the rest he revealed more plainly than the rest both by his countenance and by his language.
34. enim umquam Plancio vox fuit contumeliae potius quam doloris? quid est autem umquam questus nisi cum a sociis et a se iniuriam propulsaret? senatus impediretur quo minus, id quod hostibus semper erat tributum, responsum equitibus Romanis redderetur, omnibus illa iniuria dolori fuit publicanis, sed eum ipsum dolorem hic tulit paulo apertius. ille sensus in aliis fortasse latuit; hic, quod cum ceteris animo sentiebat, id magis quam ceteri et voltu promptum habuit et lingua.
35. Although, O judges, (for thus much I know of my own knowledge,) many things are attributed to Plancius which were never said by him. In my own case, because I sometimes say something, not from any deliberate intention, but either in the heat of speaking, or because I have been provoked; and because as is natural, among the many things which I say in this manner something comes out at times if not excessively witty, still perhaps not altogether stupid, the consequence is that, whatever anyone else says people say that I have said. But I, if it is anything clever and worthy of a well-educated and learned man have no great objection but I am very angry when the sayings of other men are attributed to me, which are utterly unworthy of me. For, because he was the first person to give his vote for the law concerning the farmers, at the time when that most illustrious man the consul gave that privilege to that order of men by a vote of the people, which if he had have done it, he would have given them by a vote of the senate, if it be a crime in him to have given his vote for it, I ask what farmer was there who did not vote for it? If the charge be that he was the first to vote, is that the fault of chance, or of the man who proposed the law? If it was the effect of chance, then there can be no crime in what happened by chance. If it was by the choice of the consul, then it adds to the renown of Plancius that he was considered the chief man of his order by so illustrious a man.
35. , iudices,—agnosco enim ex me—permulta in Plancium quae ab eo numquam dicta sunt conferuntur. quia dico aliquid aliquando non studio adductus, sed aut contentione dicendi aut lacessitus, et quia, ut fit in multis, exit aliquando aliquid si non perfacetum, at tamen fortasse non rusticum, quod quisque dixit, me id dixisse dicunt. autem, si quid est quod mihi scitum esse videatur et homine ingenuo dignum atque docto, non aspernor, stomachor cum aliorum non me digna in me conferuntur. quod primus scivit legem de publicanis tum cum vir amplissimus consul id illi ordini per populum dedit quod per senatum, si licuisset, dedisset, si in eo crimen est quia suffragium tulit, quis non tulit publicanus? si quia primus scivit, utrum id sortis esse vis, an eius qui illam legem ferebat? sortis, nullum crimen est in casu; si consulis, ⟨statuis⟩ etiam hunc a summo viro principem esse ordinis iudicatum.
36. But let us at last come to the merits of the case; in which, under cover of the Licinian law, which relates to treating, you have embraced all the laws relating to bribery. Nor have you had any other object in view in dwelling on this law, except the power which it gave you of selecting your judges. And if this sort of tribunal is an equitable one in any other case except that of bribing the tribes, I do not understand why, in this one description of prosecution alone, the senate has allowed the tribes from which the judges are taken to be selected by the prosecutor, and has not given the same power of selection in other cases also. In actual prosecutions for bribery, it has directed the tribunal to be formed by each party striking off judges alternately; and though it omitted no other species of severity to the defendant, still it thought it ought to omit this.
36. aliquando veniamus ad causam. qua tu nomine legis Liciniae, quae est de sodaliciis, omnis ambitus leges complexus es; neque enim quicquam aliud in hac lege nisi editicios iudices es secutus. genus iudicum si est aequum ulla in re nisi in hac tribuaria, non intellego quam ob rem senatus hoc uno in genere tribus edi voluerit ab accusatore neque eandem editionem transtulerit in ceteras causas, de ipso denique ambitu reiectionem fieri voluerit iudicum alternorum, cumque nullum genus acerbitatis praetermitteret, hoc tamen unum praetereundum putarit.
37. What? Is the reason of this conduct still obscure? was it not mooted when that matter was discussed in the senate, and argued most abundantly by Hortensius yesterday, who carried all the senate with him? This, then, was our opinion, that if he had bribed any tribe by means of this hospitality—which the treating would be called by people more solicitous to give it a respectable name than a true one;—if he had, I say, corrupted any tribe by disgraceful bribery, he must be known to have done so by the men who belonged to that tribe above all others. Accordingly, the senate thought that when those tribes were selected is the judges of the accused person, which he was said to have corrupted by bribery, they would serve both as witnesses of the truth and as judges. It is altogether a very severe sort of tribunal; but still, if either his own tribe, or one with which he was especially connected, was proposed to a man as that which was to judge him, it could hardly be refused.
37. ? huiusce rei tandem obscura causa est, an et agitata tum cum ista in senatu res agebatur, et disputata hesterno die copiosissime a Q. Hortensio, cui tum est senatus adsensus? igitur sensimus: “cuiuscumque tribus largitor esset, et per hanc consensionem quae magis honeste quam vere sodalitas nominaretur quam quisque tribum turpi largitione corrumperet, eum maxime eis hominibus qui eius tribus essent esse notum.” putavit senatus, cum reo tribus ederentur eae quas is largitione devinctas haberet, eosdem fore testis et iudices. omnino genus iudici sed tamen, si vel sua vel ea quae maxime esset cuique coniuncta tribus ederetur, vix recusandum.
38. But in this case, O Laterensis, what tribes did you select? The Terentian tribe, I suppose. That certainly was an equitable proceeding, and certainly one that was expected, and it was quite worthy of your wisdom and firmness. The tribe of which you keep crying out that Plancius had been the seller, and corrupter, and briber; that tribe, especially since it consists, as it does, of most virtuous and highly respectable men, you ought to have chosen. Did you choose the Voltinian tribe? for you have taken it into your head to connect some charge or other with that tribe. Why, then, did you not select that tribe? What had Plancius to do with the Lemonian tribe? What had he to do with the Ufentian? or with the Crustumine? for as for the Maecian tribe, you selected that to be one, not to judge, but to be rejected.
38. autem, Laterensis, quas tribus edidisti? Teretinam, credo. certe id aequum et certe exspectatum est et fuit dignum constantia tua. tu tribus venditorem et corruptorem et sequestrem Plancium fuisse clamitas, eam tribum profecto, severissimorum praesertim hominum et gravissimorum, edere debuisti. Voltiniam; libet enim tibi nescio quid etiam de illa tribu criminari. igitur ipsam cur non edidisti? quid Plancio cum, quid cum Oufentina, quid cum Clustumina? Maeciam, non quae iudicaret, sed quae reiceretur, esse voluisti.
39. Have you any doubt, then, O judges, that Marcus Laterensis selected you on his own judgment having regard not to the spirit of the law, but to some hope which he had himself formed with reference to the state? Have you any doubt that when he avoided selecting those tribes among which Plancius had extensive connections, the reason was that he judged that they had been won over by legitimate attention and kindness, not corrupted by bribery? For what reason can he allege why that power of selection given to the prosecutor is not a measure of great severity towards the defendant, if it is adopted without the consideration which determined us to pass such a law?
39. igitur, iudices, quin vos M. Laterensis suo iudicio non ad sententiam legis, sed ad suam spem aliquam de civitate delegerit? dubitatis quin eas tribus in quibus magnas necessitudines habet Plancius, cum ille non ediderit, iudicarit officiis ab hoc observatas, non largitione corruptas? enim potes dicere cur ista editio non summam habeat acerbitatem, remota ratione illa quam in decernendo secuti sumus?
40. Are you to choose out of all the people either those who are personal friends of your own, or personal enemies to me, or men whom you consider inexorable, inhuman and cruel? Are you, without my knowing, or suspecting, or dreaming of such a step, to choose your own connections and those of your friends, personal enemies to me and to my counsel? And are you to add to them those whom you think by nature harsh and unfriendly to all the world? And are you then to produce them all of a sudden, so that I see the bench of judges who are to try me before I can form the least idea who they are going to be? And are you to compel me to plead my cause, one in which all my fortunes are at stake, before those men, without having the power of rejecting even five, which was a privilege allowed to the last man who was put on his trial by the decision of the judges themselves?
40. deligas ex omni populo aut amicos tuos aut inimicos meos aut denique eos quos inexorabilis, quos inhumanos, quos crudelis existimes; tu me ignaro, nec opinante, inscio convoces et tuos et tuorum amicorum necessarios, iniquos vel meos vel etiam defensorum meorum, eodemque adiungas quos natura putes asperos atque omnibus iniquos; deinde effundas repente ut ante consessum meorum iudicum videam quam potuerim qui essent futuri suspicari, apud eosque me ne quinque quidem reiectis, quod in proximo reo de consili sententia constitutum est, cogas causam de fortunis omnibus dicere?
41. For it does not follow because Plancius has lived in such a manner as never willfully to offend any one, or because you have made such a mistake as unintentionally to select such men that we find we are come before judges, and not before executioners, that on that account that selection, if looked at by itself, is not a severe measure. Was it not lately the case that some most illustrious citizens would not endure the idea of a judge selected by the prosecutor, (when, out of a hundred and twenty-five judges, the chief men of the equestrian order, the defendant rejected seventy-five, and retained fifty,) and preferred throwing the whole business into confusion, to obeying that law and complying with those terms? And shall we put up with judges chosen not out of the select body of judges, but out of the whole people, and not proposed to us with a power of striking off the obnoxious ones, but appointed by the prosecutor in such a way that we have no power to object to a single one?
41. enim, si aut Plancius ita vixit ut offenderet sciens neminem, aut tu ita errasti ut eos ederes imprudens, ut nos invito te tamen ad iudices non ad carnifices veniremus, idcirco ista editio per se non acerba est. vero nuper clarissimi cives nomen editicii iudicis non tulerunt, cum ex cxxv iudicibus principibus equestris ordinis quinque et lxx reus reiceret, l referret, omniaque potius permiscuerunt quam ei legi condicionique parerent; nos neque ex delectis iudicibus sed ex omni populo, neque editos ad reiciendum sed ab accusatore constitutos iudices ita feremus ut neminem reiciamus?
42. I am not now complaining of the injustice of the law, but I am showing that your conduct is at variance with the spirit of the law; and I not only should not complain of the severity of that proceeding, if you had acted as the senate intended and as the people decreed, and had proposed to him as judges his own tribe, and those which he had paid attentions to; but, if you had given him those men as judges who ought also to have served as witnesses, I should think him acquitted at once. And even now my opinion is not very different. For when you proposed these tribes, you showed plainly that you preferred having judges who were unknown rather than such as were known; you evaded the intention of the law; you discarded every principle of justice; you preferred enveloping the case in obscurity to throwing light upon it. “The Voltinian tribe was corrupted by him.” “He had bought the Terentian tribe.”
42. ego nunc legis iniquitatem queror, sed factum tuum a sententia legis doceo discrepare; et illud acerbum iudicium si, quem ad modum senatus censuit populusque iussit, ita fecisses ut huic et suam et ab hoc observatas tribus ederes, non modo non quererer, sed hunc eis iudicibus editis qui idem testes esse possent absolutum putarem, neque nunc multo secus existimo. enim has tribus edidisti, ignotis te iudicibus uti malle quam notis indicavisti; fugisti sententiam legis, aequitatem omnem reiecisti, in tenebris quam in luce causam versari maluisti.
43. What could he say then before men of the Voltinian tribe, or before his own tribesmen, if they were his judges? Yes, what rather could you say yourself? What judge of all the number could you find who might be a silent witness of those matters, or which of them could you summon as such? In truth, if the defendant himself were to propose the tribes which were to furnish his judges, Plancius perhaps would have proposed the Voltinian tribe on account of his neighbourhood to and connection with it; but most unquestionably he would have proposed his own. And if he had had to propose the president of the court whom would he have been more likely to propose than this very Caius Alfius, who is the president to whom he ought to be thoroughly well-known, his own neighbour, a man of his own tribe, a most respectable and upright man? Whose impartiality and desire for the safety of Cnaeus Plancius which, without the least suspicion of being influenced by any covetous motives he makes no concealment of, declares plainly enough that my client had no reason to avoid having men of his own tribe for judges, when you see that a man of his own tribe for president was a most desirable thing for him.
43. “Voltinia tribus ab hoc corrupta, Teretinam habuerat venalem. diceret apud Voltiniensis aut apud tribulis suos iudices?” vero tu quid diceres? quem iudicem ex illis aut tacitum testem haberes aut vero etiam excitares? si reus tribus ederet, Voltiniam fortasse Plancius propter necessitudinem ac vicinitatem, suam vero certe edidisset. si quaesitor huic edendus fuisset, quem tandem potius quam hunc C. Alfium quem habet, cui notissimus esse debet, vicinum, tribulem, gravissimum hominem iustissimumque edidisset? cuius quidem aequitas et ea voluntas erga Cn. Planci salutem quam ille sine ulla cupiditatis suspicione prae se fert facile declarat non fuisse fugiendos tribulis huic iudices cui quaesitorem tribulem exoptandum fuisse videatis.
44. Nor am I now finding fault with your prudence in not giving him those tribes to which he was best known, but I am proving that the intention of the senate was disregarded by you. In truth which of all these men would listen to you? Or what could you say? Could you say that Plancius was guilty of the depository of the money to be used in bribery? Men's ears would reject the assertion. No one would endure it. All would turn away from it. That he was a very acceptable man to the tribes? They would hear that willingly. We ourselves should not be afraid to allow that. For do not think, O Laterensis, that the effect of those laws which the senate has thought fit to establish concerning bribery has been to put an end to the recommendation of candidates to attentions being paid to electors, or to personal influence. There have always been virtuous men who have been anxious to have influence among the men of their own tribe.
44. ego nunc consilium reprehendo tuum quod ⟨non⟩ eas tribus quibus erat hic maxime notus edideris, sed a te doceo consilium non servatum senatus. quis te tum audiret illorum, aut quid diceres? Plancium? aures, nemo agnosceret, repudiarent. gratiosum? libenter audirent, nos non timide confiteremur. enim putare, Laterensis, legibus istis quas senatus de ambitu sanciri voluerit id esse actum ut suffragatio, ut observantia, ut gratia tolleretur. fuerunt viri boni qui apud tribulis suos gratiosi esse vellent;
45. Nor, indeed, has our order ever been so harsh towards the common people, as to be unwilling to have it courted by moderate liberality on our part. Nor are our children to be forbidden to pay attention to the men of their own tribe or to show regard for them or to canvass them on behalf of their friends, or to expect a similar service from them when they are themselves candidates for any office. For all these things are only acts of mutual kindness and politeness, and are sanctioned by ancient customs and precedent. That was on our conduct when the occasions of our ambition required it; and such we have seen to be the course of most illustrious men; and even at the present day we see many men alive to the necessity of keeping up their interests. It was the dividing the men of a tribe into decuries, the classification of the whole people, and the attempt to bind men's votes by bribes, that provoked the severity of the senate, and the energetic indignation of all good men. Allege this, prove this, direct your attention to this point, O Laterensis, that Plancius divided the tribes into decuries, that he classified the people, that he was an agent with whom money was deposited, that he promised money, that he distributed it; and then I shall wonder at your not having chosen to use the weapons which the law has armed you with. For with judges taken from the men of our own tribe, I need not say we could not if those things were true, bear their severity, but we could not even look them in the face.
45. neque vero tam durus in plebem noster ordo fuit ut eam coli nostra modica liberalitate noluerit, neque hoc liberis nostris interdicendum est, ne observent tribulis suos, ne diligant, ne conficere necessariis suis suam tribum possint, ne par ab eis munus in sua petitione respectent. enim plena sunt offici, plena observantiae, plena etiam antiquitatis. in genere et fuimus ipsi, cum ambitionis nostrae tempora postulabant, et clarissimos viros esse vidimus, et hodie esse volumus quam plurimos gratiosos. tribulium, discriptio populi, suffragia largitione devincta severitatem senatus et bonorum omnium vim ac dolorem excitarent. doce, haec profer, huc incumbe, Laterensis, decuriasse Plancium, conscripsisse, sequestrem fuisse, pronuntiasse, divisisse; tum mirabor te eis armis uti quae tibi lex dabat noluisse. enim iudicibus non modo severitatem illorum, si ista vera sunt, sed ne voltus quidem ferre possemus.
46. But, after having avoided this line of conduct, and declined having those men for judges, who, as they must have had the most certain knowledge of such conduct, were bound to feel the greatest indignation at it what will you say before those men who silently ask of you why you have imposed this burden upon them; why you have chosen them above all men; why you prefer having them to proceed by guesswork, rather than those men to decide who had means of knowing the truth? I, O Laterensis, say that Plancius himself is a popular man, and that he had to assist him in his canvass many men eager in his cause, who were also popular men. And if you call them agents to treat people, you are polluting a kind and zealous friendship, by a very insidious name. But if, because they are popular, you think them on that account objects for prosecution, then do not wonder that you yourself, after repudiating the friendship of popular men, failed in attaining what your real worth demanded for you.
46. tu rationem cum fugeris cumque eos iudices habere nolueris quorum in huius delicto cum scientia certissima, tum dolor gravissimus esse debuerit, quid apud hos dices qui abs te taciti requirunt cur sibi hoc oneris imposueris, cur se potissimum delegeris, cur denique se divinare malueris quam eos qui scirent iudicare? Plancium, Laterensis, et ipsum gratiosum esse dico et habuisse in petitione multos cupidos sui gratiosos; quos tu si sodalis vocas, officiosam amicitiam nomine inquinas criminoso; sin, quia gratiosi sint, accusandos putas, noli mirari te id quod tua dignitas postularit repudiandis gratiosorum amicitiis non esse adsecutum.
47. But now, as I prove that Plancius was a popular man in his tribe, because he has been kind to many of them, because he has been security for many of them, because he has procured employment for many of them by means of the authority and interest of his father, and because he has bound the whole prefecture of Atina to himself by all the kindness displayed by himself, by his father, and by his ancestors; I call on you to prove in an equally convincing manner, that he was an agent for receiving money to be spent in bribery; that he was himself a briber; that he classified the people; that he divided the tribes into decuries. And if you cannot, do not deny our order the exercise of a legitimate liberality; do not think that popularity is a crime; do not enact a punishment to be inflicted for courteous attentions. And accordingly, as you were forced to hesitate about this charge of corrupting a tribe by means of treating, you had recourse to a general accusation of bribery. And in examining this, let us, if you please, cease awhile to contend in vulgar and random declamation.
47. ut ego doceo gratiosum esse in sua tribu Plancium, quod multis benigne fecerit, pro multis spoponderit, in operas plurimos patris auctoritate et gratia miserit, quod denique omnibus officiis per se, per patrem, per maiores suos totam Atinatem praefecturam comprehenderit, sic tu doce sequestrem fuisse, largitum esse, conscripsisse, tribulis decuriavisse. si non potes, noli tollere ex ordine nostro liberalitatem, noli maleficium putare esse gratiam, noli observantiam sancire poena. haesitantem te in hoc sodaliciorum tribuario crimine ad communem ambitus causam contulisti, in qua desinamus aliquando, si videtur, volgari et pervagata declamatione contendere.
48. For I will argue with you in this way. Do you choose any one tribe you please, and prove, as you are bound to do, what agent received the money for corrupting it, and who distributed the money among the men of the tribe. And if you cannot do that, which in my opinion you will not even begin to attempt, I will show you the means to which he owes his success. Is not this a fair challenge? Do not you like to proceed in this manner? Can I come to closer quarters, as they say, or can I meet you on a fairer field? Why are you silent? Why do you conceal your intentions? Why do you seek to shirk off? Again and again I press upon you, and keep close to you; I pursue you, I ask for, I even demand some definite accusation. Whatever tribe, I say, you select, whose votes Plancius received, you show, if you can, any flaw in that one instance. I will then show you by what means he really did gain its vote, and the principle shall be exactly the same in his case, and, O Laterensis, in yours. For as you, if I were to ask you, may be able to explain to me through whose influence it was that you gained the affection of these tribes who voted for you, so do I assert that I will explain to you, our adversary, the means by which we gained the vote of any tribe you choose to inquire about.
48. enim tecum ago. tibi commodum est, unam tribum delige; tu doce, id quod debes, per quem sequestrem, quo divisore corrupta sit; ego, si id facere non potueris quod, ut opinio mea fert, ne incipies quidem, per quem tulerit docebo. haec vera contentio? placetne sic agi? num possum magis pedem conferre, ut aiunt, aut propius accedere? taces, quid dissimulas, quid tergiversaris? atque etiam insto atque urgeo, insector, posco atque adeo flagito crimen. tribum, inquam, delegeris quam tulerit Plancius, tu ostendito, si poteris, vitium; ego qua ratione tulerit docebo. erit haec alia ratio Plancio ac tibi, Laterensis. ut quas tribus tu tulisti, si iam ex te requiram, possis quorum studio tuleris explicare, sic ego hoc contendo, me tibi ipsi adversario cuiuscumque tribus rationem poposceris redditurum.
49. But why do I argue in this manner? Just as if Plancius had not already been elected aedile in the former comitia. Which comitia were begun to be held by the consul, a man in every respect of the very highest authority, and the author of those very laws concerning bribery. And besides, he began to hold them very suddenly, contrary to any one's expectation; so that, even if any one had formed the design of committing bribery, he would never have had time to manage it. The tribes were summoned; the votes were given; counted up, declared. Plancius was by far the highest of all on the poll. There neither was nor could there be any suspicion of bribery. Is it not the case that the one prerogative century carries such weight with it that no one has ever gained the vote of that, but what he has been declared consul either at that very comitia, or at all events consul for the year? And yet do you wonder that Plancius was elected aedile when it was not a small portion of the people, but the whole people that had declared their good-will towards him? when it was not a portion of one tribe, but the whole comitia which were prerogative comitia in his behalf?
49. cur sic ago? non comitiis iam superioribus sit Plancius designatus aedilis; quae comitia primum habere coepit consul cum omnibus in rebus summa auctoritate, tum harum ipsarum legum ambitus auctor; deinde habere coepit subito praeter opinionem omnium, ut, ne si cogitasset quidem largiri quispiam, daretur spatium comparandi. tribus, latum suffragium, diribitae ⟨tabellae⟩. plurimum valuit Plancius; nulla largitionis nec fuit nec esse potuit suspicio. ain tandem? una centuria praerogativa tantum habet auctoritatis ut nemo umquam prior eam tulerit quin renuntiatus sit aut eis ipsis comitiis consul aut certe in illum annum; aedilem tu Plancium factum esse miraris, in quo non exigua pars populi, sed universus populus voluntatem suam declararit, cuius in honore non unius tribus pars sed comitia tota comitiis fuerint praerogativa?
50. And at that time if you, O Laterensis, had been inclined, or if you had thought it consistent with your gravity to do what many men of high birth have often done, who, having gained a great many fewer votes than they had expected, afterwards, when the comitia had been adjourned, have prostrated themselves, and, with broken spirits and in a humble tone, had addressed supplications to the Roman people, I do not question but that the whole multitude would have turned towards you. For nobility, especially when upright and innocent has never, when appearing as a suppliant, been rejected by the Roman people. But if your personal dignity and character for magnanimity was, as it ought to have been, of more importance to you than the aedileship, then, since you have that which you preferred, do not regret that which you thought of less consequence. I myself, in truth, have always striven most zealously, in the first place, to be worthy of honour; in the second place, to be considered so. The third consideration with me, though with most men it is the first, has been the honour itself; but that is a thing which ought to be acceptable to those men in whose case the Roman people has conferred it on them as a testimony to their worth, and not as a favour granted to their assiduity in canvassing for it.
50. quidem tempore, Laterensis, si id facere voluisses, aut si gravitatis esse putasses tuae quod multi nobiles saepe fecerunt, ut, cum minus valuissent suffragiis quam putassent, postea prolatis comitiis prosternerent se et populo Romano fracto animo atque humili supplicarent, non dubito quin omnis ad te conversura ⟨se⟩ fuerit multitudo. enim fere nobilitas, integra praesertim atque innocens, a populo Romano supplex repudiata est. si tibi gravitas tua et magnitudo animi pluris fuit, sicuti esse debuit, quam aedilitas, noli, cum habeas id quod malueris, desiderare id quod minoris putaris. primum ut honore dignus essem maxime semper laboravi, secundo ut existimarer; tertium mihi fuit illud quod plerisque primum est, ipse honos, qui eis denique debet esse iucundus quorum dignitati populus Romanus testimonium, non beneficium ambitioni dedit.
51. You ask also, O Laterensis, what answer you can make to the images of your ancestors; how you are to excuse yourself to that most accomplished and excellent man your deceased father? Never think about those things. Take care rather lest that querulousness and excessive grief of yours be reproved by those men of consummate wisdom. For your father saw that Appius Claudius a most noble man, even in the lifetime of his own father a most influential and most illustrious citizen, Caius Claudius, failed in his endeavour to obtain the aedileship, and yet that he was afterwards elected consul without a repulse. He saw that a man most closely connected with himself a most illustrious citizen, Lucius Volcatius, and he saw that Marcus Piso too, having both sustained a slight defeat in the matter of the aedileship, received afterwards the very highest honours from the Roman people. But your grandfather could tell you also of the rejection of Publius Nasica, when he stood for the aedileship, though I am sure that a greater citizen has never existed in this republic, and of Caius Marius too, who was twice rejected when a candidate for the aedileship, and yet was seven times made consul, and of Lucius Caesar and of Cnaeus Octavius and of Marcus Tullius, every one of whom we know were beaten for the aedileship, and were elected consul afterwards.
51. etiam, Laterensis, quid imaginibus tuis, quid ornatissimo atque optimo viro, patri tuo, respondeas mortuo. ista meditari atque illud cave potius ne tua ista querela dolorque nimius ab illis sapientissimis viris reprendatur. enim pater tuus Appium Claudium, nobilissimum hominem, vivo fratre suo, potentissimo et clarissimo civi, C. Claudio, aedilem non esse factum et eundem sine repulsa factum esse consulem; vidit hominem sibi maxime coniunctum, egregium virum, L. Volcatium, vidit M. Pisonem ista in aedilitate offensiuncula accepta summos a populo Romano esse honores adeptos. vero tuus et P. Nasicae tibi aediliciam praedicaret repulsam, quo cive neminem ego statuo in hac re publica fortiorem, et C. Mari, qui duabus aedilitatis acceptis repulsis septiens consul est factus, et L. Caesaris, Cn. Octavi, M. Tulli, quos omnis scimus aedilitate praeteritos consules esse factos.
52. But why am I hunting up instances of men having failed as candidates for the aedileship, when it is an office which has often been discharged in such a way that the people appeared to have been doing a kindness to the men who had been passed over. Lucius Philippus, a man of the highest truth and most distinguished eloquence failed in his election to military tribune. Caius Caelius, a most illustrious and admirable young man, was beaten for the quaestorship. Publius Rutilius Rufus, Caius Fimbria, Caius Cassius, Cnaeus Orestes all stood in vain for the tribuneship of the people. And yet we know that every one of these men were afterwards made consuls. And your father and your ancestors will of their own accord tell you this not with the object of comforting you, nor to excuse you from any fault which you fear that you must seem to have been guilty of, but with a view of encouraging you to persevere in that course which you have followed from your earliest youth. No credit believe me, O Laterensis, has been lost by you. Lost, do I say? I declare solemnly, if you were to come to a right appreciation of what has happened, an especial testimony has been borne to your virtue. For think not that there was not a great impression made by the circumstances of your offering yourself as a candidate for that office from all competition for which you subsequently withdrew, rather than swear to a particular thing. You then, being quite a young man, declared plainly what were your sentiments about public affairs: speaking more boldly, indeed, than some men who had already attained the honours of the state, and more undisguisedly than regard to your ambition, or to your age, required.
52. quid ego aedilicias repulsas conligo? quae saepe eius modi habitae sunt ut eis qui praeteriti essent benigne a populo factum videretur. militum L. Philippus, summa nobilitate et eloquentia, quaestor C. Caelius, clarissimus ac fortissimus adulescens, tribuni pl. P. Rutilius Rufus, C. Fimbria, C. Cassius, Cn. Orestes facti non sunt, quos tamen omnis consules factos scimus esse. tibi ultro pater et maiores tui non consolandi tui gratia dicent, neque vero quo te liberent aliqua culpa, quam tu vereris ne a te suscepta videatur, sed ut te ad istum cursum tenendum quem a prima aetate suscepisti cohortentur. est enim, mihi crede, Laterensis, de te detractum. ⟨⟩ dico; si me hercule vere quod accidit interpretari velis, est aliquid etiam de virtute significatum tua. enim existimare non magnum quendam motum fuisse illius petitionis tuae, de qua ne aliquid iurares destitisti. homo adulescens quid de summa re publica sentires, fortius tu quidem quam non nulli defuncti honoribus, sed apertius quam vel ambitionis vel aetatis tuae ratio postulabat.
53. And, therefore, among the people so disparaged your pretensions, you must not think that there were none who had taken offence at the intrepid spirit which you then displayed; who were able, perhaps, to keep you, incautious as you were, from arriving at that rank, but will never be able to move you when you are on your guard and watchful against them. Have these arguments had any influence with you? “Have you any doubt,” says he, “that a coalition was entered into against me, when you see that Plancius and Plotius gained the votes of the majority of the tribes?” But could they have acted in concert if the tribes did not give their votes in concert? But some of the tribes gave almost the very same number of votes for each of them. Yes, when at the preceding comitia those two had been already almost elected and declared. Although even that fact would not necessarily involve any suspicion of a coalition. For our ancestors would never have established a rule of casting lots for the aedileship, if they had not seen that it was possible that the competitors should have had an equal number of votes.
53. ob rem in dissentiente populo noli putare nullos fuisse quorum animos tuus ille fortis animus offenderet; qui te incautum fortasse nunc tuo loco demovere potuerunt, providentem autem et praecaventem numquam certe movebunt. te illa argumenta duxerunt? “,” inquit, “quin coitio facta sit, cum tribus plerasque cum Plotio tulerit Plancius?” una fieri potuerunt, si una tribus non tulissent? “non nullas punctis paene totidem.”, cum iam facti prope superioribus comitiis declaratique venissent. ne id quidem suspicionem coitionis habuerit. enim umquam maiores nostri sortitionem constituissent aediliciam, nisi viderent accidere posse ut competitores pares suffragiis essent.