---
title: "Against Aristocrates · Κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους"
author: "Demosthenes"
translator: "James Herbert Vince"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 1 of 5
url: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/1/
cite: "Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince, Against Aristocrates · Κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/1/"
---

# Against Aristocrates · Κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους

*Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince*

Against a decree making the mercenary captain Charidemus untouchable, with a survey of the Athenian homicide courts.

> Greek: ed. Samuel Henry Butcher, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0014.tlg023, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: James Herbert Vince, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0014.tlg023.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. Sections 1–50

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/1/#p-N

[¶0] 1. Men of Athens, I beg that none of you will imagine that I have come here to arraign the defendant Aristocrates from any motive of private malice, or that I am thrusting myself so eagerly into a quarrel because I have detected some small and trivial blunder, but if my judgement and my views are at all right, the purpose of all my exertions in this case is that you may hold the Chersonese securely, and may not for the second time be cheated out of the possession of that country.

> Greek: 1. μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίσῃ μήτʼ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἐμὲ μηδεμιᾶς ἕνεχʼ ἥκειν Ἀριστοκράτους κατηγορήσοντα τουτουί, μήτε μικρὸν ὁρῶντά τι καὶ φαῦλον ἁμάρτημʼ ἑτοίμως οὕτως ἐπὶ τούτῳ προάγειν ἐμαυτὸν εἰς ἀπέχθειαν, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ ἄρʼ ὀρθῶς ἐγὼ λογίζομαι καὶ σκοπῶ, ὑπὲρ τοῦ Χερρόνησον ἔχειν ὑμᾶς ἀσφαλῶς καὶ μὴ παρακρουσθέντας ἀποστερηθῆναι πάλιν αὐτῆς, περὶ τούτου μοί ἐστιν ἅπασʼ ἡ σπουδή.

[¶1] 2. If, then, it is your desire to learn the truth about this business, and to give a righteous and legitimate verdict on the indictment, you must not confine your attention to the mere phrasing of the decree, but also take into consideration its probable consequences. Had it been possible for you, at a first hearing, to discover the trick that had been played, you would not, perhaps, have been deceived at the outset;

> Greek: 2. δεῖ δὴ πάντας ὑμᾶς, εἰ βούλεσθʼ ὀρθῶς περὶ τούτων μαθεῖν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δικαίως κρῖναι τὴν γραφήν, μὴ μόνον τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι ῥήμασιν προσέχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ συμβησόμενʼ ἐξ αὐτῶν σκοπεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀκούσασιν εὐθὺς εἰδέναι τὰ κεκακουργημένα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴσως ἂν οὐκ ἐξηπάτησθε·

[¶2] 3. but, inasmuch as one of our grievances is that certain persons make speeches and move resolutions designed to avert your suspicions and put you off your guard, you must not be greatly astonished if we convince you that this decree also is so worded that, while apparently offering some personal protection to Charidemus, it really robs our city of an honest and effective safeguard for the Chersonese.

> Greek: 3. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦθʼ ἕν ἐστι τῶν ἀδικημάτων, τὸ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν ἐνίους ὃν ἂν ἥκισθʼ ὑμεῖς ὑπίδοισθέ τι καὶ φυλάξαισθε, προσήκει μὴ πάνυ θαυμάζειν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμʼ ἡμεῖς οὕτω γεγραμμένον ἐπιδείξομεν ὥστε δοκεῖν μὲν Χαριδήμῳ φυλακήν τινα τοῦ σώματος διδόναι, τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς δὲ δικαίαν καὶ βέβαιον [φυλακὴν Χερρονήσου] τῆς πόλεως ἀποστερεῖν.

[¶3] 4. You will be well advised, men of Athens, to grant me your attention, and give a favorable hearing to what I have to say. I am not one of the orators who worry you; I am not one of the politicians who enjoy your confidence; yet I undertake to convince you of the importance of this transaction; and therefore, if you will cooperate with me to the best of your power and listen to me with goodwill, you will avert this peril, and at the same time you will overcome the reluctance of any of us plain citizens who may believe himself able to do the State a good turn. And he will so believe, if only he is satisfied that it is not difficult to get a hearing in this court;

> Greek: 4. εἰκότως δʼ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ προσέχοιτέ μοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ μετʼ εὐνοίας ἀκούσαιθʼ ἃ λέγω. ἐπειδὴ γάρ, οὐχὶ τῶν ἐνοχλούντων ὑμᾶς οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτευομένων καὶ πιστευομένων παρʼ ὑμῖν ὤν, πρᾶγμα τηλικοῦτόν φημι δείξειν πεπραγμένον, ἐάν, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν, συναγωνίσησθέ μοι καὶ προθύμως ἀκούσητε, τοῦτό τε σώσετε καὶ ποιήσετε μὴ κατοκνεῖν, ἐάν τίς τι καὶ ἡμῶν οἴηται δύνασθαι ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθόν. οἰήσεται δέ, ἂν μὴ χαλεπὸν εἶναι νομίζῃ τὸ παρʼ ὑμῖν λόγου τυχεῖν.

[¶4] 5. though at present many of us,—inexpert speakers, perhaps, and yet better men than the experts—so dread this ordeal that they never think even of examining any public question. You may be sure that I for one, as Heaven is my witness, would never have dared to lay this indictment, if I had not thought it entirely dishonorable that at this time, when I see people engaged in a project to the disadvantage of our commonwealth, I should hold my peace, and close my lips,—I who, on a former occasion, when I sailed for the Hellespont in command of a war-galley, spoke out and denounced certain men who, in my judgement, were doing you wrong.

> Greek: 5. νῦν δὲ πολλοῖς τοῦτο φοβουμένοις, λέγειν μὲν ἴσως οὐ δεινοῖς, βελτίοσι δʼ ἀνθρώποις τῶν δεινῶν, οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἐπέρχεται τῶν κοινῶν οὐδέν. ἐγὼ γοῦν (ὀμνύω τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας) ἀπώκνησʼ ἄν, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἀπενεγκεῖν, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἐνόμιζον εἶναι νῦν μὲν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ σιωπῆσαι, πρᾶγμʼ ἀλυσιτελὲς τῇ πόλει κατασκευάζοντας ὁρῶν τινας ἀνθρώπους, πρότερον δέ, ὅτʼ ἔπλευσα τριηραρχῶν εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον, εἰπεῖν καὶ κατηγορῆσαί τινων, οὓς ἀδικεῖν ὑμᾶς ἡγούμην.

[¶5] 6. I am not ignorant that Charidemus is regarded by some as a benefactor of Athens. But if I can find ability to tell you what I mean, and what I know him to have done, I hope to prove that, so far from being our benefactor, he is particularly ill-disposed to us, and that exactly the wrong conception has been formed of his character.

> Greek: 6. οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν οὖν ὅτι τὸν Χαρίδημον εὐεργέτην εἶναί τινες τῆς πόλεως οἴονται· ἐγὼ δέ, ἄν περ ἃ βούλομαί τε καὶ οἶδα πεπραγμένʼ ἐκείνῳ δυνηθῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δείξειν οὐ μόνον οὐκ εὐεργέτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακονούστατον ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων καὶ πολὺ τἀναντίʼ ἢ προσῆκεν ὑπειλημμένον.

[¶6] 7. If, men of Athens, the most serious offence committed by Aristocrates had been that in his decree he was so solicitous for the safety of such a man as I undertake to prove Charidemus to be that he provided a special and illegal penalty, in case anything happened to him, I should have tried to deal with that point at once, for the purpose of proving that the man is very far from deserving the favour of this decree. There is, however, a much graver iniquity involved in the decree, of which you must first be informed, and against which you must take precaution.

> Greek: 7. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μέγιστον Ἀριστοκράτης ἠδίκει, τὸ τοιούτου, οἷον ἐγώ φημι δείξειν τὸν Χαρίδημον ὄντα, τοσαύτην πεποιῆσθαι πρόνοιαν ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι ὥστʼ ἰδίαν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἄν τι πάθῃ, τιμωρίαν αὐτῷ δεδωκέναι, ταῦτʼ ἂν ἤδη λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπεχείρουν, ἵνʼ εἰδῆτε πολλοῦ δεῖν ἄξιον ὄντα τυχεῖν τοῦ ψηφίσματος αὐτὸν τουτουί. νυνὶ δʼ ἕτερον τούτου μεῖζον διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἔστʼ ἀδίκημα, ὃ δεῖ πρότερον καὶ μαθεῖν ὑμᾶς καὶ φυλάξασθαι.

[¶7] 8. It is essential that at the outset I should explain to you the circumstances to which you owe the secure possession of the Chersonese, for in the light of that knowledge you will get a clear perception of the wrong that has been committed. The circumstances, men of Athens, are these. On the demise of Cotys three persons instead of one became kings of Thrace—Berisades, Amadocus, and Cersobleptes; and the natural result was that they competed with one another and that they all flattered you and courted your favour.

> Greek: 8. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἐστὶ πρῶτον ἁπάντων εἰπεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ Χερρόνησον ὑμᾶς ἀσφαλῶς ἔχειν πεποιηκός· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ μαθεῖν τοῦτο καὶ τἀδίκημα σαφῶς ὄψεσθε. ἔστι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο, τὸ τελευτήσαντος Κότυος Βηρισάδην καὶ Ἀμάδοκον καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην τρεῖς ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς γενέσθαι Θρᾴκης βασιλέας· συμβέβηκε γὰρ ἐκ τούτου αὑτοῖς μὲν ἀντιπάλους εἶναι τούτους, ὑμᾶς δʼ ὑπέρχεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν.

[¶8] 9. Well, men of Athens, certain persons who wanted to put a stop to that state of affairs, to get rid of the other kings, and to put Cersobleptes in possession of an undivided monarchy, contrived to equip themselves with this provisional resolution. If one listened only to the wording, they were far from appearing to pursue any such purpose; and yet such was in fact their main object, as I will proceed to explain.

> Greek: 9. τοῦτο τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλόμενοί τινες παῦσαι, καὶ καταλῦσαι μὲν τοὺς ἑτέρους βασιλέας, παραδοῦναι δʼ ἑνὶ τῷ Κερσοβλέπτῃ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἅπασαν, διαπράττονταί σφισι τοῦτο γενέσθαι τὸ προβούλευμα, τῷ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι κεχωρισμένον τοῦ τι τοιοῦτον δοκεῖν διαπράξασθαι, τῷ δʼ ἔργῳ πάντων μάλιστα τοῦτο περαίνοντες, ὡς ἐγὼ διδάξω.

[¶9] 10. On the death of Berisades, one of the three kings, Cersobleptes, in violation of a sworn treaty concluded with you, began to levy war upon the sons of Berisades and upon Amadocus; and it was at once foreseen that Athenodorus would come to the aid of the sons of Berisades, and Simon and Bianor to that of Amadocus, the former being related by marriage to Berisades and the two latter to Amadocus.

> Greek: 10. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἑνὸς τελευτήσαντος τῶν βασιλέων Βηρισάδου, παραβὰς τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἃς μεθʼ ὑμῶν ἐποιήσατο, Κερσοβλέπτης ἐξέφερεν πόλεμον πρός τε τοὺς Βηρισάδου παῖδας καὶ πρὸς Ἀμάδοκον, εὔδηλον ἦν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν Βηρισάδου παισὶν Ἀθηνόδωρος βοηθήσοι, τῷ δʼ Ἀμαδόκῳ Σίμων καὶ Βιάνωρ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βηρισάδου κηδεστής, οἱ δʼ Ἀμαδόκου γεγόνασιν.

[¶10] 11. Accordingly the persons I have mentioned began to consider by what means those commanders might be compelled to remain inactive, so that, the rival princes being friendless, Charidemus, who was striving to win the monarchy for Cersobleptes, might make himself master of the situation. The first plan was to get a decree enacted by you, making any man who should kill Charidemus liable to arrest; and the second was that Charidemus should receive from you a general’s commission.

> Greek: 11. ἐσκόπουν οὖν τίνʼ ἂν τρόπον ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἔχειν ἀναγκασθεῖεν οὗτοι, ἐρήμων δʼ ὄντων ἐκείνων ὁ Κερσοβλέπτῃ πράττων τὴν ἀρχὴν Χαρίδημος ἀσφαλῶς πάντα καταστρέψαιτο. εἰ πρῶτον μέν, ἄν τις αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνῃ, ψήφισμʼ ὑμέτερον γένοιτο, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι· δεύτερον δέ, εἰ χειροτονηθείη στρατηγὸς ὑφʼ ὑμῶν Χαρίδημος.

[¶11] 12. For neither Simon nor Bianor, both of whom had been admitted to your citizenship, and who were, apart from that, thoroughly well affected towards you, was likely to take the field against a general of yours while Athenodorus, an Athenian citizen by birthright, would never dream of doing so, nor would he incur the criminal charge set up by the decree, which would certainly be brought against those commanders, if anything happened to Charidemus. By these means, the kings being denuded of allies, and impunity provide for themselves, they hoped easily to drive them out and seize the monarchy.

> Greek: 12. οὔτε γὰρ ὑμετέρῳ στρατηγῷ προχείρως ἐναντία θήσεσθαι τὰ ὅπλʼ ἔμελλʼ ὁ Σίμων οὐδʼ ὁ Βιάνωρ, πολῖται γεγενημένοι καὶ ἄλλως ἐσπουδακότες πρὸς ὑμᾶς· ὁ δὲ δὴ γένει πολίτης Ἀθηνόδωρος οὐδὲ βουλεύσεσθαι· οὔτε τὴν διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος αἰτίαν ὑποδύσεσθαι, ἣ πρόδηλος ἦν ἐπʼ ἐκείνους ἥξουσα, εἴ τι πάθοι Χαρίδημος. ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου τῶν μὲν ἐρήμων ὄντων βοηθῶν, αὑτοῖς δʼ ἀδείας δοθείσης, ῥᾳδίως ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκείνους καὶ κατασχήσειν τὴν ἀρχήν.

[¶12] 13. Of such intentions and of such artifices they are accused by the evidence of facts; for, at the moment when they began hostilities, Aristomachus of Alopece visited you as their ambassador, and in his oration before the assembly, not content with commending Cersobleptes and Charidemus and enlarging on their generous sentiments towards you, he declared that Charidemus was the only man in the world who could recover Amphipolis for Athens, and advised you to appoint him as general.

> Greek: 13. καὶ ὅτι ταῦθʼ οὕτως ᾤοντο καὶ τοῦτʼ ἦν τὸ κατασκεύασμʼ αὐτοῖς, τὰ πραχθέντʼ αὐτὰ κατηγορεῖ. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ πολέμῳ τʼ ἐνεχείρουν αὐτοὶ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἧκεν Ἀριστόμαχος πρεσβευτὴς παρʼ αὐτῶν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὑτοσί, ὃς ἄλλα τʼ ἐδημηγόρει παρʼ ὑμῖν ἐπαινῶν καὶ διεξιὼν τὸν Κερσοβλέπτην καὶ τὸν Χαρίδημον, ὡς φιλανθρώπως ἔχουσι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἂν ἔφη Χαρίδημον Ἀμφίπολιν κομίσασθαι τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι, καὶ παρῄνει στρατηγὸν χειροτονῆσαι.

[¶13] 14. But this preliminary resolution had already been drafted and preconcerted by them, in order that, if you should be captivated by the promises and expectations which Aristomachus held out to you, it might be ratified there and then by the Assembly, and no impediment might remain.

> Greek: 14. ἡτοίμαστο δʼ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ προβούλευμα καὶ προδιῴκητο, ἵνʼ εἰ πεισθείητʼ ἐκ τῶν ὑποσχέσεων καὶ τῶν ἐλπίδων ἃς ὑπέτεινʼ ὁ Ἀριστόμαχος, εὐθὺς ἐπικυρώσειεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ μηδὲν ἐμποδὼν εἴη.

[¶14] 15. Yet what more ingenious and cunning device could these men have concocted to obtain the expulsion of the other kings, and the subjection of the whole realm to the monarch whom they preferred, than when they intimidated the commanders who would otherwise have supported the two rivals, and put them on their guard against that spiteful accusation which they might reasonably expect to encounter by the operation of this decree; and when on the other hand they conferred upon the man who was scheming to get the monarchy for one king, and was laying plans entirely opposed to your interests, such ample licence to proceed without fear?

> Greek: 15. καίτοι πῶς ἂν τεχνικώτερον ἢ κακουργότερον συμπαρεσκεύασαν ἄνθρωποι, ὅπως οἱ μὲν ἐκπεσοῦνται τῶν βασιλέων, εἷς δʼ ὃν αὐτοὶ βούλονται πᾶσαν ὑφʼ αὑτῷ ποιήσεται τὴν ἀρχήν, ἢ τοὺς μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν βοηθήσαντας ἂν εἰς φόβον καὶ συκοφαντίας εὐλάβειαν καθιστάντες, [ἣν εἰκὸς προσδοκᾶν ἐκείνους ἐφʼ ἑαυτοὺς ἐλθεῖν ἂν διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος τουτουί,] τῷ δʼ ἑνὶ πράττοντι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πάντα τἀναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέρουσι κατασκευάζοντι τοσαύτην ἐξουσίαν διδόντες τοῦ ταῦτʼ ἀδεῶς πράττειν;

[¶15] 16. Nor is it only these considerations that prove that such was the purpose for which the resolution was moved: the decree itself supplies evidence of great weight. After drafting the words “if any person put Charidemus to death,” and omitting any proviso of what Charidemus might be doing, whether for or against your advantage, the mover forthwith added, “he shall be liable to seizure and removal from the territory of our allies.”

> Greek: 16. οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἐκ τούτων δῆλόν ἐσθʼ ὅτι τούτων ἕνεκʼ ἐρρήθη τὸ προβούλευμʼ ὧν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσματος αὐτοῦ μαρτυρία τίς ἐστʼ εὐμεγέθης. ἂν γὰρ ἀποκτείνῃ τις Χαρίδημον γράψας καὶ παραβὰς τὸ τί πράττοντʼ εἰπεῖν, πότερʼ ἡμῖν συμφέροντʼ ἢ οὔ, γέγραφʼ εὐθὺς ἀγώγιμον ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων εἶναι.

[¶16] 17. Now no man who is an enemy of ours as well as of Charidemus will ever enter allied territory, whether he has put him to death or not, and therefore it is not against such men that this retribution has been directed. The man who will be alarmed by this decree, and will be on his guard against be coming our certain enemy, is one who is a friend of ours, and also an enemy of his, if he should attempt anything inimical to us. And that man is Athenodorus, or Simon, or Bianor, kings of Thrace, or any other man who may wish to lay you under obligation by restraining Charidemus when he is trying to act in opposition to you.

> Greek: 17. οὐκοῦν τῶν μὲν ἐχθρῶν ὁμοίως ἡμῖν τε κἀκείνῳ οὐδέποτʼ εἰς τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἥξει συμμάχους οὐδείς, οὔτʼ ἀποκτείνας ἐκεῖνον οὔτε μή, ὥστʼ οὐ κατὰ τούτων γέγραφεν ταύτην τὴν τιμωρίαν. τῶν δʼ ἡμετέρων μὲν φίλων, ἐκείνου δέ, ὅταν ἐγχειρῇ τι πράττειν ἐναντίον ὑμῖν, ἐχθρῶν, τούτων δή τίς ἐστιν ὁ τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα φοβηθεὶς ἂν καὶ φυλαξάμενος μὴ διʼ ἀνάγκην ἡμῖν εἰς ἔχθραν ἐλθεῖν. ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος Ἀθηνόδωρος, Σίμων, Βιάνωρ, οἱ Θρᾴκης βασιλεῖς, ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν εἰς εὐεργεσίας μέρος καταθέσθαι βούλοιτο τὸ πράττειν ὑπεναντίʼ ἐκεῖνον ἐγχειροῦνθʼ ὑμῖν ἐπισχεῖν.

[¶17] 18. Such, men of Athens, are the purposes for which the provisional resolution was moved, in the hope that it would be ratified by a deluded Assembly; and such the reasons why we, desiring to frustrate its ratification, have brought this present indictment. As I have undertaken to prove three propositions,—first that the decree is unconstitutional, secondly that it is injurious to the common weal, and thirdly that the person in whose favour it has been moved is unworthy of such privilege,—it is, perhaps, fair that I should allow you, who are to hear me, to choose what you wish to hear first, and second, and last.

> Greek: 18. ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἕνεκʼ ἐρρήθη τὸ προβούλευμα, ἵνα κυρώσειεν ὁ δῆμος ἐξαπατηθείς, καὶ διʼ ἃ τὴν γραφὴν ἐποιησάμεθʼ ἡμεῖς ταυτηνί, βουλόμενοι κωλῦσαι, ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. δίκαιον δʼ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἔμʼ ὑπεσχημένον τρίʼ ἐπιδείξειν, ἓν μὲν ὡς παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τὸ ψήφισμʼ εἴρηται, δεύτερον δʼ ὡς ἀσύμφορόν ἐστι τῇ πόλει, τρίτον δʼ ὡς ἀνάξιος τυχεῖν [τούτων] ᾧ γέγραπται, πάντων αἵρεσιν ὑμῖν δοῦναι τοῖς ἀκουσομένοις, τί πρῶτον ἢ τί δεύτερον ἢ τί τελευταῖον βουλομένοις ἀκούειν ὑμῖν ἐστιν.

[¶18] 19. Consider what you prefer, that I may begin with that.—You wish me to deal first with the illegality? Very well; I will do so. There is a favour which I not only ask but claim from you all,—with justice, as I am inclined to think. I beg that none of you, men of Athens, taking a partisan view, because you have been deceived in Charidemus and look on him as a benefactor, will give an unfriendly hearing to my remarks on the point of law. Do not, for that reason, rob yourselves of the power to cast an honest vote, and me of the right to present my whole case as I think fit. You must listen to me in the manner following,—and observe how fairly I will put it.

> Greek: 19. ὅ τι δὴ βούλεσθε, ὁρᾶτε, ἵνα τοῦτο λέγω πρῶτον ὑμῖν. περὶ τοῦ παρανόμου βούλεσθε πρῶτον; τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐροῦμεν. ἃ δὴ δέομαι καὶ ἀξιῶ παρὰ πάντων ὑμῶν τυχεῖν, δίκαια, ὥς γʼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω· μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ διεψεῦσθαι τοῦ Χαριδήμου καὶ νομίζειν εὐεργέτην εἶναι φιλονικῶν δυσχερέστερον τοὺς περὶ τῶν νόμων λόγους ἀκούσῃ μου, μηδʼ ἀποστερήσῃ διὰ τοῦτο μήθʼ ἑαυτὸν τοῦ θέσθαι τὴν ψῆφον εὔορκον μήτʼ ἐμὲ τοῦ διδάξαι περὶ πάντων ὑμᾶς ὡς βούλομαι. ἀλλὰ ποιησάσθω τὴν ἀκρόασιν ὡδί· καὶ σκοπεῖσθʼ ὡς δίκαιʼ ἐρῶ·

[¶19] 20. When I am discussing the point of law, you must disregard the person, and the character of the person, in whose favour the decree has been proposed, and attend to the question whether it is legal or illegal,—that and that alone. When I am bringing the man’s deeds home to him, and relating in what fashion you have been overreached by him, you must look only at the transactions,—do I relate them accurately or untruly?

> Greek: 20. ὅταν μὲν λέγω περὶ τῶν νόμων, ἀφελὼν ὅτῳ τὸ ψήφισμʼ εἴρηται καὶ ποίῳ τινί, σκοπείσθω πότερον παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἢ κατʼ αὐτοὺς εἴρηται, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο· ὅταν δʼ ἐλέγχω τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ διεξίω τὸν τρόπον ὃν πεφενάκισθʼ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, τὰς πράξεις σκοπείσθω, πότερον γεγονυίας ἢ ψευδεῖς ἐρῶ·

[¶20] 21. And when I inquire whether or not the enactment of this decree is conducive to the public good, dismiss everything else and watch my reasoning on that point,—is it sound or unsound? Listen to me in that manner, and you will get a better understanding of what you ought to know, by looking at one question at a time, instead of inquiring into all the issues at once, while I shall have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. On every topic my remarks shall be brief.

> Greek: 21. ὅταν δʼ ἐξετάζω περὶ τοῦ συμφέρειν ἢ μὴ τῇ πόλει ταῦτα ψηφίσασθαι, πάντα τἄλλʼ ἀφεὶς τοὺς λογισμοὺς ὁράτω τοὺς περὶ τούτων, πότερʼ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντας ποιοῦμαι ἢ οὔ. ἐὰν γὰρ τοῦτον ἔχοντες τὸν τρόπον ἀκροάσησθέ μου, αὐτοί τʼ ἄρισθʼ ἃ προσήκει συνήσετε, χωρὶς ἕκαστα σκοποῦντες καὶ οὐχ ἅμα πάνθʼ ἁθρόʼ ἐξετάζοντες, κἀγὼ ῥᾷσθʼ ἃ βούλομαι δυνήσομαι διδάξαι. ἔσονται δὲ βραχεῖς περὶ πάντων οἱ λόγοι·

[¶21] 22. Now take and read the actual statutes, that I may prove thereby the illegality of their proposal. One of the Statutes of the Areopagus Concerning Homicide “[The Council of the Areopagus shall take cognizance in cases of homicide, of intentional wounding, of arson, and of poisoning, if a man kill another by giving poison.]”

> Greek: 22. λαβὲ δὴ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς καὶ λέγε, ἵνʼ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπιδεικνύω τούτων τὸ παράνομον. ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΦΟΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΞ ΑΡΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΓΟΥ. δικάζειν δὲ τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ φόνου καὶ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας καὶ πυρκαϊᾶς καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς.

[¶22] 23. Stop there. You have heard the statute, men of Athens, and you have also heard the decree. Let me tell you how you will more readily grasp the arguments on the question of illegality. Consider the status of the person in whose favour the decree has been proposed: is he an alien, a resident alien, or a citizen? If we call him a resident alien, we shall not be telling the truth; and if we call him an alien, we shall be doing him wrong, for it is only fair to him to admit the validity of that grace of the people by which he was made a citizen. It seems, then, that we must treat him as a citizen in our arguments.

> Greek: 23. ἐπίσχες. ἠκούσατε μὲν τοῦ τε νόμου καὶ τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· ὡς δʼ ἄν μοι δοκεῖτε τοὺς περὶ τοῦ παρανόμου λόγους αὐτοὺς ῥᾷστα μαθεῖν, τοῦθʼ ὑμῖν φράσω· εἰ σκέψαισθʼ ἐν τίνι τάξει ποτʼ ἔσθʼ ὑπὲρ οὗ τὸ ψήφισμʼ εἴρηται, πότερα ξένος ἢ μέτοικος ἢ πολίτης ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν δὴ μέτοικον φήσομεν, οὐκ ἐροῦμεν ἀληθῆ, εἰ δʼ αὖ ξένον, οὐχὶ δίκαια ποιήσομεν· τὴν γὰρ τοῦ δήμου δωρειάν, ἐν ᾗ πολίτης γέγονεν, κυρίαν αὐτῷ δίκαιόν ἐστιν εἶναι. ὡς ὑπὲρ πολίτου τοίνυν, ὡς ἔοικε, ποιητέον τοὺς λόγους.

[¶23] 24. Now I beg you to observe how candidly and honestly I am going to treat the question; for I assign him to that class which entitles him to the greatest respect, though I do deny his right to acquire illegally privileges not enjoyed by us who are citizens by birthright,—the privileges, I mean, which the defendant has specified in this decree. In the statute it is provided that the Council shall take cognizance of homicide, intentional wounding, arson, and poisoning, if a man kills another by giving him poison.

> Greek: 24. θεάσασθε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς ὡς ἁπλῶς καὶ δικαίως χρήσομαι τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς εἰς μὲν ταύτην τίθεμαι τὴν τάξιν αὐτὸν ἐν ᾗ πλείστης ἂν τυγχάνοι τιμῆς, ἃ δʼ οὐδʼ ἡμῖν τοῖς γένει πολίταις ἐστίν, οὐδʼ ἐκείνῳ δεῖν οἶμαι γενέσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους. τίνʼ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα; ἃ νυνὶ γέγραφʼ οὑτοσί. γέγραπται γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ νόμῳ τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν φόνου καὶ τραύματος ἐν προνοίας καὶ πυρκαϊᾶς καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς.

[¶24] 25. The legislator, while he presumes the killing, has nevertheless directed a judicial inquiry before specifying what is to be done to the culprit, and thereby has shown a just respect, men of Athens, for the religious feeling of the whole city. I say of the whole city, because it is impossible that all of you should know who the manslayer is. He thought it scandalous to give credit to such accusations, when made, without a trial; and he conceived that, inasmuch as the avenging of the sufferer is in our hands, we ought to be informed and satisfied by argument that the accused is guilty, for then conscience permits us to inflict punishment according to knowledge, but not before.

> Greek: 25. καὶ προσειπὼν ὁ θεὶς τὸν νόμον ἐὰν ἀποκτείνῃ, κρίσιν πεποίηκεν ὅμως, οὐ πρότερον τί χρὴ πάσχειν τὸν δεδρακότʼ εἴρηκεν, καλῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθʼ ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ὅλης τῆς πόλεως προϊδών. πῶς; οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἅπαντας ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι τίς ποτʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνδροφόνος. τὸ μὲν δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτʼ ἄνευ κρίσεως πιστεύειν, ἄν τις ἐπαιτιάσηται, δεινὸν ἡγεῖτο, δεῖν δʼ ὑπελάμβανεν, ἐπειδήπερ ἡμεῖς τιμωρήσομεν τῷ πεπονθότι, πεισθῆναι καὶ μαθεῖν ἡμᾶς διδασκομένους ὡς δέδρακεν· τηνικαῦτα γὰρ εὐσεβὲς ἤδη κολάζειν εἰδόσιν εἶναι, πρότερον δʼ οὔ.

[¶25] 26. Moreover he argued that before the trial is held such expressions as “if a man kill,” “if a man rob a temple,” “if a man commit treason,” and the like, are merely phrases of accusation: they become definitions of crime only after trial and conviction. To a formula of accusation he thought it proper to attach not punishment, but only trial; and therefore, when enacting that, if one man killed another, the Council should take cognizance, he did not lay down what should be done to the culprit if found guilty.

> Greek: 26. καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ διελογίζετο, ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτʼ ὀνόματα, οἷον ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, ἐάν τις ἱεροσυλήσῃ, ἐάν τις προδῷ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα πρὸ μὲν τοῦ κρίσιν γενέσθαι αἰτιῶν ὀνόματʼ ἐστίν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ κριθείς τις ἐξελεγχθῇ, τηνικαῦτʼ ἀδικήματα γίγνεται. οὐ δὴ δεῖν ᾤετο τῷ τῆς αἰτίας ὀνόματι τιμωρίαν προσγράφειν, ἀλλὰ κρίσιν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ τινά, τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν ἔγραψεν, καὶ οὐχ ἅπερ, ἂν ἁλῷ, παθεῖν εἶπεν.

[¶26] 27. So much for the legislator; but what of the author of the decree? “If any man kill Charidemus,” he says. So he defines the injury in the same phrase, “if any man kill,” as the legislator; but the sequel is not the same. He struck out submission to trial, and made the culprit liable to immediate seizure; he passed by the tribunal appointed by law, and handed over to the accusers, to be dealt with as they chose, a man untried, a man whose guilt is not yet proven.

> Greek: 27. ὁ μὲν δὴ τὸν νόμον τιθεὶς οὕτως, ὁ δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα γράφων πῶς; ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ φησὶν Χαρίδημον. τὴν μὲν δὴ προσηγορίαν τοῦ πάθους τὴν αὐτὴν ἐποιήσατο, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ γράψας, ἥνπερ ὁ τὸν νόμον τιθείς· μετὰ ταῦτα δʼ οὐκέτι ταὐτά, ἀλλʼ ἀνελὼν τὸ δίκην ὑπέχειν ἀγώγιμον εὐθὺς ἐποίησεν, καὶ παραβὰς τὸ διωρισμένον ἐκ τοῦ νόμου δικαστήριον, ἄκριτον τοῖς ἐπαιτιασαμένοις παρέδωκεν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται χρῆσθαι τὸν οὐδʼ εἰ πεποίηκέ πω φανερόν.

[¶27] 28. When they have got him, they are to be allowed to torture him, or maltreat him, or extort money from him. Yet the next ensuing statute directly and distinctly forbids such treatment even of men convicted and proved to be murderers. Read to the jury the statute that follows. Statute. “It shall be lawful to kill murderers in our own territory, or to arrest them as directed on the first turning-table, but not to maltreat or amerce them, on penalty of a payment of twice the damage inflicted. The Archons, according to their several jurisdictions, shall bring cases into court; for any man who so desires and the court of Heliaea shall adjudicate.”

> Greek: 28. καὶ λαβοῦσιν ἐκείνοις ἐξέσται στρεβλοῦν, αἰκίσασθαι, χρήματα πράξασθαι. καίτοι πάντα ταῦτʼ ἀπείρηκεν ἄντικρυς καὶ σαφῶς ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος μηδὲ τοὺς ἑαλωκότας καὶ δεδογμένους ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν. λέγε δʼ αὐτοῖς αὐτὸν τὸν νόμον τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα. ΝΟΜΟΣ. τοὺς δʼ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ ἀπάγειν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ⟨α⟩ ἄξονι ἀγορεύει, λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν, ἢ διπλοῦν ὀφείλειν ὅσον ἂν καταβλάψῃ. εἰσφέρειν δʼ ἐ⟨ς⟩ τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧν ἕκαστοι δικασταί εἰσι, τῷ βουλομένῳ. τὴν δʼ ἡλιαίαν διαγιγνώσκειν.

[¶28] 29. You have heard the law, men of Athens; and I beg you to examine it and observe how admirably and most righteously it is framed by the legislator. He uses the term “murderers”; but in the first place you see that by murderer he means a man found guilty by verdict; for no man comes under that designation until he has been convicted and found guilty.

> Greek: 29. ἠκούσατε μὲν τοῦ νόμου, σκέψασθε δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρήσατε ὡς καλῶς καὶ σφόδρʼ εὐσεβῶς ἔθηκε ὁ τιθεὶς τὸν νόμον. τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους φησίν. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἀνδροφόνον λέγει, τὸν ἑαλωκότʼ ἤδη τῇ ψήφῳ. οὐ γάρ ἐστʼ οὐδεὶς ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τῇ προσηγορίᾳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐξελεγχθεὶς ἁλῷ.

[¶29] 30. That is made clear both in the earlier statute and in this one; for in the former, after the words “if any man kill,” the legislator directs the Council to take cognizance, and here, after designating the man as “the murderer,” he has directed what is to be done to him. That is to say, when it is a question of accusation, he has ordered a trial, but when the culprit, being found guilty, is liable to this designation, he has specified the penalty. Therefore he should be speaking only of persons found guilty. Well, what does he direct? That it shall be lawful to kill them and to put them under arrest.

> Greek: 30. ποῦ τοῦτο δηλοῖ; ἔν τε τῷ προτέρῳ νόμῳ καὶ τούτῳ. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ γράψας ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν εἶπεν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὸν ἀνδροφόνον προσειπών, ἃ χρὴ πάσχειν εἴρηκεν· οὗ μὲν γὰρ ἦν αἰτία τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὴν κρίσιν εἴρηκεν, οὗ δʼ ὁ ἁλοὺς ἔνοχος τῷ προσρήματι τούτῳ καθέστηκεν, τὴν τιμωρίαν ἔγραψεν. περὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἑαλωκότων ἂν λέγοι. λέγει δὲ τί;

[¶30] 31. Does he say that they are to be taken to the house of the prosecutor, or as he pleases? No, indeed. How are they to be arrested? “As directed on the first turning-table,” is the phrase; and you all know what that means. The judicial archons are there authorized to punish with death persons who have gone into exile on a charge of murder. Only last year you all saw the culprit who was arrested by them in the Assembly.

> Greek: 31. ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν. ἆρʼ ὡς αὑτόν; ἢ ὡς ἂν βούληταί τις; πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ. ἀλλὰ πῶς; ὡς ἐν τῷ ⟨α⟩ ἄξονι εἴρηται φησίν. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν τί; ὃ πάντες ἐπίστασθʼ ὑμεῖς. οἱ θεσμοθέται τοὺς ἐπὶ φόνῳ φεύγοντας κύριοι θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαί [εἰσι], καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας πέρυσιν πάντες ἑωρᾶθʼ ὑπʼ ἐκείνων ἀπαχθέντα.

[¶31] 32. It is to the archons, then, that the murderer is to be taken on arrest; and that differs from being taken to the house of the prosecutor in this respect, men of Athens,—that the captor who carries a man to the judges gives control of the malefactor to the laws, while the captor who takes him home gives such control to himself. In the former case punishment is suffered as the law enjoins; in the latter, as the captor pleases; and of course it makes a vast difference whether the retribution is controlled by the law or by a private enemy.

> Greek: 32. ὡς τούτους οὖν ἀπάγειν λέγει. διαφέρει δὲ τί τοῦτο τοῦ ὡς αὑτὸν ἄγειν; ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀπάγων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας, τοὺς νόμους κυρίους ποιεῖ τοῦ δεδρακότος, ὁ δʼ ὡς αὑτὸν ἄγων ἑαυτόν. ἔστι δʼ ἐκείνως μέν, ὡς ὁ νόμος τάττει, δοῦναι δίκην, οὕτω δέ, ὡς ὁ λαβὼν βούλεται. πλεῖστον δὲ δήπου διαφέρει τὸν νόμον κύριον τῆς τιμωρίας ἢ τὸν ἐχθρὸν γίγνεσθαι.

[¶32] 33. “Not to maltreat or amerce,” says the statute. What does that mean? Every one, I am sure, understands that not to maltreat means that there is to be no scourging, no binding nor anything like that, and that not to amerce means not to extort blood-money, for the ancients called fining amercement.

> Greek: 33. λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ φησὶ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν. ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν τί; τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι γνώριμον οἶδʼ ὅτι πᾶσιν μὴ μαστιγοῦν, μὴ δεῖν, μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν λέγει, τὸ δὲ μηδʼ ἀποινᾶν μὴ χρήματα πράττεσθαι· τὰ γὰρ χρήματʼ ἄποινʼ ὠνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί.

[¶33] 34. Note that in this manner the law lays down not only how the murderer or convict is to be punished, but also where, for it specifies the country of the person injured, and it directly prescribes that the penalty is to be inflicted in that way and in no other, in that place and in no other. Yet the author of the decree is far indeed from making this distinction,—his proposals are exactly contrary. After the words, “if anyone shall kill Charidemus,” he adds, “he shall be liable to seizure everywhere.”— What do you mean, sir?

> Greek: 34. ὁ μὲν δὴ νόμος οὕτως τὸν ἀνδροφόνον καὶ τὸν ἑαλωκότʼ ἤδη διώρισεν ὡς κολαστέον καὶ οὗ, τὴν τοῦ πεπονθότος εἰπὼν πατρίδα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ μηδένʼ ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ τοῦτον μηδʼ ἄλλοθι πλὴν ἐνταῦθʼ ἄντικρυς εἴρηκεν. ὁ δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα γράφων, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, διώρισεν, ὅς γε πάντα τούτοις τἀναντίʼ εἴρηκεν· γράψας γὰρ ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον, ἀγώγιμος ἔστω φησὶν πανταχόθεν.

[¶34] 35. The laws do not allow even convicted criminals to be arrested elsewhere than in our own country, and do you propose that a man shall be liable to seizure without trial in any allied territory? And when the laws forbid seizure even in our own territory, do you permit seizure? Indeed, in making a man liable to seizure you have permitted everything that the law has forbidden,—extortion of blood-money, maltreatment and misusage of a living man, private custody and private execution.

> Greek: 35. τί λέγεις; τῶν νόμων οὐδὲ τοὺς ἑαλωκότας διδόντων ἀπάγειν πλὴν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ, σὺ γράφεις ἄνευ κρίσεώς τινʼ ἀγώγιμον ἐκ τῆς συμμαχίδος πάσης; καὶ οὐδʼ ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ ἄγειν κελευόντων τῶν νόμων, σὺ δίδως ἄγειν πανταχόθεν; καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τῷ ποιεῖν ἀγώγιμον πάνθʼ ὅσʼ ἀπείρηκεν ὁ νόμος δέδωκας, χρήματα πράξασθαι, ζῶντα λυμαίνεσθαι, κακοῦν ἔχοντα, αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι.

[¶35] 36. How could a man be convicted of a more clearly unconstitutional proposal, or of drafting a resolution more outrageously than in this fashion? You had two phrases at your disposal: “if any man kill,” directed against a person under accusation, and “if any man be a murderer,” directed against a culprit found guilty; yet in your description you adopted the expression that applies to a man accused, while you propose for untried culprits a penalty which the law does not permit even after conviction. You have eliminated the intermediate process, for between accusation and conviction comes a trial.—There is not a word about trial in the decree proposed by the defendant.

> Greek: 36. πῶς οὖν ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἐλεγχθείη παράνομʼ εἰρηκὼς ἢ πῶς δεινότερʼ ἂν γράφων ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ὃς δυοῖν ὑποκειμένων ὀνομάτων, κατὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν αἰτίᾳ, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, κατὰ δὲ τῶν ἑαλωκότων, ἐάν τις ἀνδροφόνος ᾖ, ἐν μὲν τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τὸ τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχοντος ἔλαβες ὄνομα, τὴν δὲ τιμωρίαν, ἣν οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν ἐξεληλεγμένων διδόασιν οἱ νόμοι, ταύτην κατὰ τῶν ἀκρίτων ἔγραψας, καὶ τὸ μέσον τούτων ἐξεῖλες. μέσον γάρ ἐστιν αἰτίας καὶ ἐλέγχου κρίσις, ἣν οὐδαμοῦ γέγραφʼ οὗτος ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι.

[¶36] 37. Read the statutes that come next in order. Statute “If any man shall kill a murderer, or shall cause him to be killed, so long as the murderer absents himself from the frontier-market, the games, and the Amphictyonic sacrifices, he shall be liable to the same penalty as if he killed an Athenian citizen; and the Criminal Court shall adjudicate.” You must be informed, men of Athens, of the intention with which the legislator enacted this statute. You will find that all his provisions were cautious and agreeable to the spirit of the law.

> Greek: 37. λέγε τοὺς ἐφεξῆς νόμους. ΝΟΜΟΣ. ἐὰν δέ τις τὸν ἀνδροφόνον κτείνῃ ἢ αἴτιος ᾖ φόνου, ἀπεχόμενον ἀγορᾶς ἐφορίας καὶ ἄθλων καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείναντα, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι, διαγιγνώσκειν δὲ τοὺς ἐφέτας. τουτονὶ δεῖ μαθεῖν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν νόμον τί ποτʼ ἐβούλεθʼ ὁ θείς· ὄψεσθε γὰρ ὡς ἅπαντʼ εὐλαβῶς διώρισε καὶ νομίμως.

[¶37] 38. “If any man,” he says, “shall kill a murderer, or shall cause him to be killed, so long as he absents himself from the frontier-market, the games, and the Amphictyonic sacrifices, he shall be liable to the same penalty as if he killed an Athenian citizen; and the Criminal Court shall adjudicate.” What does this mean? In his opinion it was just that, if a man who had gone into exile, when convicted on a charge of murder, should make good his flight and escape, he should be excluded from the country of the murdered man; but that it was not righteous to put him to death anywhere and everywhere. His view was that, if we put to death people who have gone into exile elsewhere, others will put to death people who have come into exile here;

> Greek: 38. ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ τὸν ἀνδροφόνον φησὶν ἢ αἴτιος ᾖ φόνου, ἀπεχόμενον ἀγορᾶς ἐφορίας καὶ ἄθλων καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείναντα, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι, διαγιγνώσκειν δὲ τοὺς ἐφέτας. τί δὴ ταῦτʼ ἐστίν; ἐκεῖνος ᾤετο τὸν πεφευγότʼ ἐπʼ αἰτίᾳ φόνου καὶ ἑαλωκότα, ἐάνπερ ἅπαξ ἐκφύγῃ καὶ σωθῇ, εἴργειν μὲν τῆς τοῦ παθόντος πατρίδος δίκαιον εἶναι, κτείνειν δʼ οὐχ ὅσιον πανταχοῦ. τί σκοπῶν; ὅτι καὶ τοὺς δεῦρο πεφευγότας, ἂν ἡμεῖς τοὺς ἑτέρωσʼ ἀποκτιννύωμεν, ἀποκτενοῦσʼ ἕτεροι.

[¶38] 39. and that, in that event, the only chance of salvation left for all those who are unfortunate will be destroyed, that is to say, the power of migrating from the country of those whom they have injured to a country where no one has been wronged by them, and there dwelling in security. To avert that misfortune, and to prevent an endless succession of retributions, he wrote: “if any man kill a murderer, so long as he absents himself from the frontier-market,”—meaning thereby the confines of the man’s own country. It was there, I suppose, that in old times borderers of our own and neighboring countries used to forgather; and so he speaks of a “frontier-market.”

> Greek: 39. εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔσται, ἡ μόνη λοιπὴ τοῖς ἀτυχοῦσιν ἅπασι σωτηρία διαφθαρήσεται. ἔστι δʼ αὕτη τίς; ἐκ τῆς τῶν πεπονθότων μεταστάντα εἰς τὴν τῶν μηδὲν ἠδικημένων ἀδεῶς μετοικεῖν. ἵνα δὴ μὴ τοῦτʼ ᾖ μηδʼ ἀπέραντοι τῶν ἀτυχημάτων αἱ τιμωρίαι γίγνωνται, ἔγραψεν ἐάν τις τὸν ἀνδροφόνον κτείνῃ ἀπεχόμενον φησὶν ἀγορᾶς ἐφορίας. τί τοῦτο λέγων; τῶν ὁρίων τῆς χώρας· ἐνταῦθα γάρ, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τἀρχαῖα συνῇσαν οἱ πρόσχωροι παρά θʼ ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν ἀστυγειτόνων, ὅθεν ὠνόμακεν ἀγορὰν ἐφορίαν.

[¶39] 40. Or take the words, “from Amphictyonic sacrifices.” Why did he also exclude the murderer from them? He debars the offender from everything in which the deceased used to participate in his lifetime; first from his own country and from all things therein, whether permitted or sacred, assigning the frontier-market as the boundary from which he declares him excluded; and secondly from the observances at Amphictyonic assemblies, because the deceased, if a Hellene, also took part therein. “And from the games,”—why from the games? Because the athletic contests of Hellas are open to all men,—the sufferer was concerned in them because everybody was concerned in them; therefore the murderer must absent himself.

> Greek: 40. καὶ πάλιν ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν. τί δήποτε καὶ τούτων ἀπέκλεισε τὸν ἀνδροφόνον; ὅσων τῷ παθόντι ζῶντι μετῆν, τούτων εἴργει τὸν δεδρακότα, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ πάντων καὶ ὁσίων καὶ ἱερῶν, τὴν ἐφορίαν ἀγορὰν ὅρον προσγράψας ἧς εἴργεσθαί φησιν, εἶτα τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν ἐν Ἀμφικτύοσιν· καὶ γὰρ τούτων, εἴπερ ἦν Ἕλλην ὁ παθών, μετῆν αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄθλων. διὰ τί; ὅτι κοινοὶ πᾶσίν εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδʼ ἀγῶνες, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πάντων μετουσίαν μετῆν καὶ τούτων τῷ πεπονθότι· καὶ τούτων οὖν ἀπεχέσθω.

[¶40] 41. Accordingly the law excludes the murderer from all these places; but if anyone puts him to death elsewhere, outside the places specified, the same retribution is provided as when an Athenian is slain. He did not describe the fugitive by the name of the city, for in that name he has no part, but by that of the act for which he is chargeable. Accordingly he says: “if any man kill the murderer;” and afterwards, when he prescribed the places from which the man is debarred, he introduces the name of the City for the lawful assignment of punishment: “he shall be liable to the same penalty as if he killed an Athenian.” Gentlemen, that phrase is very different from the wording of the decree before us.

> Greek: 41. τούτων μὲν δὴ τὸν εἰργασμένον εἴργει. ἂν δʼ ἔξω τούτων κτείνῃ τις αὐτὸν ἄλλοθι, τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δίκην δέδωκεν ἥνπερ ἂν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείνῃ. τὸν γὰρ φυγάδα τὸ τῆς πόλεως οὐ προσεῖπʼ ὄνομα, ἧς οὐκ ἔστι ματουσία αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος, ᾧ κατέστησεν αὑτὸν ἐκεῖνος ἔνοχον· καὶ διὰ ταῦτʼ ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ φησὶ τὸν ἀνδροφόνον. εἶτʼ εἰπὼν ὧν εἰργόμενον, ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν τιμωρίαν νομίμως ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὄνομʼ ὠνόμασεν, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνεχέσθω καθάπερ ἂν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἀποκτείνῃ γράψας, ἀνομοίως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ τουτὶ τὸ ψήφισμʼ εἰρηκότι.

[¶41] 42. Yet is it not scandalous to propose the surrender of men whom the law has permitted to go into exile and to live in security, provided they absent themselves from the places I have mentioned, and to rob them of that benefit of mercy which the unfortunate may justly claim from those who are unconcerned in their crimes, although, in our ignorance of the future destiny of every man, it is uncertain for which of us that benefit is in store? In this case, if the man who slays Charidemus (supposing the thing really to happen) is slain in his turn by men who capture him as an outcast, after he has gone into exile, and while he absents himself from the places specified in the law, they will be liable to a charge of bloodguiltiness,—and so will you, sir.

> Greek: 42. καίτοι πῶς οὐχὶ δεινὸν εἰ, οἷς ὁ νόμος δέδωκεν, ἐὰν ὧν εἶπον εἴργωνται, μετʼ ἀσφαλείας ζῆν φεύγουσιν, τούτους ἐκδότους τις εἶναι γράφει, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖται τὸ τῆς συγγνώμης ὠφέλιμον, ὃ τοῖς ἀτυχοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν εἰκὸς παρὰ τῶν ἔξω τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ὄντων, ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν πάντων ἀπόκειται ἄδηλον ὄν, μὴ προδήλου τῆς ἐπιούσης τύχης οὔσης ἑκάστῳ; καὶ νυνὶ τὸν ἀποκτείναντα Χαρίδημον, ὄντως ἂν ἄρα τοῦτο γένηται, ἂν ἀνταποκτείνωσί τινες λαβόντες ἔκδοτον, πεφευγότα καὶ τῶν νομίμων εἰργόμενον, ἔνοχοι μὲν αὐτοὶ ταῖς φονικαῖς δίκαις ἔσονται, ἔνοχος δὲ σύ·

[¶42] 43. For it is written: “if any man shall cause to be killed,” and you will have caused, because it is you who have granted the licence implied in your decree. Therefore if, when the event has happened, we let you and your friends go free, we shall be living in the society of the unholy, and on the other hand, if we prosecute, we shall be constrained to act in opposition to our own resolution.—Gentlemen, is it a trifling or a casual reason that you have for annulling this decree?

> Greek: 43. καὶ γὰρ ἄν τις αἴτιος ᾖ γέγραπται, ἔσει δʼ αἴτιος τὴν διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐξουσίαν δεδωκώς. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἐάσομεν ὑμᾶς τούτων συμβάντων, οὐ καθαροῖς οὖσιν ὁμοῦ διατρίψομεν· εἰ δʼ ἐπέξιμεν, οἷς ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτοὶ τἀναντία πράττειν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα. ἆρά γε μικρὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν ἐστιν ὑπὲρ οὗ δεῖ λῦσαι τὸ ψήφισμʼ ὑμᾶς;

[¶43] 44. Read the next statute. Statute “If any man outside the frontier pursue or violently seize the person of any homicide who has quitted the country, and whose goods are not confiscate, he shall incur the same penalty as if he so acted within our own territory.” Here is another law, men of Athens, humanely and excellently enacted; and this law the defendant shall in like manner be proved to have transgressed.

> Greek: 44. λέγε δὴ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον. ΝΟΜΟΣ. ἐάν τίς τινα τῶν ἀνδροφόνων τῶν ἐξεληλυθότων, ὧν τὰ χρήματα ἐπίτιμα, πέρα ὅρου ἐλαύνῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ ἄγῃ, τὰ ἴσα ὀφείλειν ὅσα περ ἂν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ δράσῃ. ἄλλος οὗτος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νόμος ἀνθρωπίνως καὶ καλῶς κείμενος, ὃν παραβὰς οὗτος ὁμοίως φανήσεται.

[¶44] 45. “If any man,” it begins, and then, “any homicide who has quitted the country and whose goods are not confiscate,” meaning any man who has migrated by reason of involuntary manslaughter. That is quite clear, because it speaks of those who have “quitted the country,” not of those who have gone into exile, and because it specifies persons “whose goods are not confiscate,” for the property of willful murderers is forfeited to the State. The legislator, I say, is speaking of involuntary offenders. To what purport?

> Greek: 45. ἐάν τίς τινα τῶν ἀνδροφόνων φησὶ τῶν ἐξεληλυθότων, ὧν τὰ χρήματα ἐπίτιμα. τῶν ἐπʼ ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ λέγει μεθεστηκότων. τῷ τοῦτο δῆλον; τῷ τʼ ἐξεληλυθότων εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φευγόντων, καὶ τῷ διορίζειν ὧν τὰ χρήματα ἐπίτιμα· τῶν γὰρ ἐκ προνοίας δεδήμευται τὰ ὄντα.

[¶45] 46. If they are pursued or violently seized, he says, “outside the frontier.” What is the significance of “outside the frontier”? For all homicides alike the “frontier” implies exclusion from the country of the person slain. From that country he permits them to be pursued and seized; but outside of it he permits neither seizure nor pursuit. For anyone who contravenes this rule he orders the same punishment as if he had done the man wrong at home, in the words, “shall incur the same penalty as if he had so acted at home.”

> Greek: 46. περὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἂν λέγοι. λέγει δὲ τί; ἐὰν πέρα ὅρου φησὶν ἐλαύνῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ ἄγῃ. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν τί, τὸ πέρα ὅρου; ἔστι πᾶσιν ὅρος τοῖς ἀνδροφόνοις τῆς τοῦ παθόντος εἴργεσθαι πατρίδος. ἐκ μὲν δὴ ταύτης δίδωσιν ἐλαύνειν καὶ ἄγειν, πέρα δʼ οὐκ ἐᾷ τούτων οὐδέτερον ποιεῖν. ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα ποιῇ, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δίκην ἥνπερ ἂν εἰ μένοντʼ ἠδίκει [οἴκοι], γράψας ταὔτʼ ὀφείλειν ἅπερ ἂν οἴκοι δράσῃ.

[¶46] 47. Now suppose the defendant Aristocrates were asked,—you must not think it a silly question—first if he knows whether Charidemus will be killed by someone, or will die in some other way. He would reply, I take it, that he does not know. However, we will presume that somebody will kill him. Next question: will the man who is to do it be a voluntary or an involuntary agent, an alien or a citizen,—do you know, Aristocrates? You cannot say that you do know.

> Greek: 47. εἰ δή τις ἔροιτʼ Ἀριστοκράτην τουτονί (καὶ μὴ νομίσητʼ εὔηθες τὸ ἐρώτημα) πρῶτον μὲν εἰ οἶδεν εἴ τις ἀποκτενεῖ Χαρίδημον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως τελευτήσει, οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, φαίη. θήσομεν τοίνυν ἀποκτενεῖν. πάλιν οἶσθα, ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων, καὶ ξένος ἢ πολίτης ὁ τοῦτο ποιήσων ἔσται;

[¶47] 48. Then of course you ought to have supplied these particulars, and written, “if any man, whether alien or citizen, shall kill, with or without intention, rightfully or wrongfully,” in order that any man soever, by whom the deed should have been done, might have received his deserts according to law; but assuredly, after merely naming an accusation, you ought not to have added, “he shall be liable to seizure.” What boundary have you left in this clause?

> Greek: 48. οὐκ ἔνεστʼ εἰπεῖν ὡς οἶσθα. οὐκοῦν ταῦτά γε δήπου προσῆκε γράψαι ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ γράφοντα, ἄκων ἢ ἑκών, ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως, ξένος ἢ πολίτης, ἵνʼ ὅτῳ ποτὲ τοὔργον ἐπράχθη, τούτῳ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ὑπῆρχε δίκαια, μὴ μὰ Δίʼ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας ὄνομʼ εἰπόντα ἀγώγιμος ἔστω προσγράψαι. τίνα γὰρ σὺ λέλοιπας ὅρον τῷ γράμματι τούτῳ, τοῦ νόμου σαφῶς οὑτωσὶ λέγοντος μὴ πέρα ὅρων ἐλαύνειν, ὃς πανταχόθεν δίδως ἄγειν;

[¶48] 49. Yet the law distinctly provides that beyond the frontier a man shall not be pursued, whereas you permit him to be seized anywhere. Beyond the frontier the law forbids not only pursuit but also seizure; and yet according to your decree anyone who chooses will take as an outcast and forcibly seize a man who has slain without intention, and carry him by violence into the country of the slain man. Are you not treating human conduct indiscriminately, and ignoring the motives according to which a given act is either virtuous or immoral?— Observe, gentlemen, that this is a universal distinction: it does not apply only to questions of homicide.

> Greek: 49. ὁ νόμος δʼ οὐκ ἐλαύνειν τῶν ὅρων πέρα, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἄγειν ἐᾷ. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ σοῦ ψηφίσματος ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει τὸν ἄκοντʼ ἀπεκτονότα, ἔκδοτον λαβών, εἰς τὴν τοῦ παθόντος βίᾳ πατρίδα. ἆρʼ οὐ πάντα συγχεῖς τἀνθρώπινα, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖ τὴν πρόφασιν μεθʼ ἧς ἢ καλόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων ἢ αἰσχρόν;

[¶49] 50. “If a man strike another, giving the first blow,” says the law. The implication is that he is not guilty, if the blow was defensive. “If a man revile another,”—“with false hoods,” the law adds, implying that, if he speaks the truth, he is justified. “If a man slay another with malice aforethought,”—indicating that it is not the same thing if he does it unintentionally. “If a man injures another with intention, wrongfully.” Everywhere we shall find that it is the motive that fixes the character of the act. But not with you: you say, without qualification, “if any man slay Charidemus, he shall be seized,” though he do it unwittingly, or righteously, or in self-defence, or for a purpose permitted by law, or in any way whatsoever.

> Greek: 50. ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ πάντων, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν φονικῶν μόνον, οὕτω τοῦτʼ ἔχει. ἄν τις τύπτῃ τινά φησὶν ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ὡς, εἴ γʼ ἠμύνατο, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ. ἄν τις κακῶς ἀγορεύῃ, τὰ ψευδῆ προσέθηκεν, ὡς, εἴ γε τἀληθῆ, προσῆκον. ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, ἐκ προνοίας, ὡς, εἴ γʼ ἄκων, οὐ ταὐτόν. ἄν τις καταβλάψῃ τινά, ἑκὼν ἀδίκως. πανταχοῦ τὴν πρόφασιν βεβαιοῦσαν τὸ πρᾶγμʼ εὑρήσομεν. ἀλλʼ οὐ σοί, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον, ἀγέσθω, κἂν ἄκων, κἂν δικαίως, κἂν ἀμυνόμενος, κἂν ἐφʼ οἷς διδόασιν οἱ νόμοι, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν.